XII. PROFIT-SHARING AND CO-OPERATION.

Among the reforms suggested for remedying some of the evils incident

to the modern wage system those of profit-sharing and co-operation

occupy a prominent place. The separation of the community into

capitalists and laborers, classes different in conditions and ideals,

constitutes a menace to the peace and progress of industrial society.

The wage system moreover is thought by many to have broken down the

former intimate relation of employer and worker, and some scheme is

needed to correlate their interests again and to bind them together.

To secure this result profit-sharing is advocated. As defined by the

International Co-operative Congress in 1897 this is “the agreement,

freely entered into, by which the employe receives a share, fixed in

advance, of the profits.” It is not a change from the present wage

system, but simply a modification of that system according to which

the laborer receives a share in the profits in addition to his wages.

The purpose is to identify the interests of the employes with those of

their employer and thus to give him some of the same motives for

energy, care, and thrift in the conduct of the business. Three

principal methods of profit-sharing may be mentioned, though the

variations are manifold. The favorite method in England and the United

States is the payment of a cash bonus at the end of a fixed period, 111

as a year. A second plan, which is the rule in France, is a deferred

participation by means of a savings bank deposit, provident fund, or

annuity, for the purpose of providing for old age and disability. The

third plan, which has recently grown in favor in this country, is the

payment in shares of stock of the company.

The economic theory of profit-sharing is that by inducing greater care

and diligence on the part of the employe he will himself create the

fund from which he is paid. It is claimed by its advocates that it

increases both the quantity and the quality of the product and that it

promotes greater care of implements and materials, thus reducing the

cost at the same time that it increases the output. The classic

example of this is the case of the original profit-sharing scheme, the

Maison Leclaire, in Paris; the result of the first six years’

experiment was a dividend on wages of $3,753 a year, derived entirely

from the increased economy and care of the workers. In some cases,

however, the object of the employers is to secure immunity from

strikes and other labor disturbances and a greater permanence of the

labor force; and participation in profits is conditioned on the men

abstaining from joining a trade union, or on uninterrupted service. In

these cases the deferred participation plan is used. The advantages

claimed for the system are not merely the increase in product already

spoken of and the greatest efficiency of the worker, but also the

improvement in his material and moral standards, and the promotion of

industrial peace by lessening discontent and friction. The main basis

for the system, since it is economic and not philanthropic in its

nature, must of course be the increase in production brought about by

its adoption.

More weighty, however, appear the objections against profit-sharing,

which seem to have had sufficient force to cause the failure of a

number of ventures in this direction. In the first place, the 112

relation between the increased effort of a single workman and the

success of a general business is so remote, especially in our

complicated modern industry, that it is unlikely to act as a very

powerful stimulus. But even if it should, the savings thus effected

might be swept away by the poor business management of the employer.

“It is quite possible that the workman who, in the hope of earning

‘bonus to labor,’ has done work 10 per cent in excess of the normal

standard, may, even under a liberal scheme, find that, instead of

receiving an addition to his normal wages of, say, 7 per cent, the bad

management of his employer has reduced his bonus to so low a level

that he has to be content with a supplement equivalent to only 2 per

cent on his wages, or that, as has been the case in a large proportion

of the schemes … no bonus whatever is forthcoming.”[34] It is

undesirable to make the earnings of the laborer dependent in any way

upon the fluctuations of business or the ability of the employer. The

ordinary wage system has at least the merit that the reward of the

laborer is made dependent only on his own efforts. The lot of the

modern worker is too unstable and employment too unsteady to add a new

element of uncertainty in wages. If the laborer has really earned the

premium, say labor leaders, why not add it to his wages instead of

adopting this roundabout method. The sliding scale, or a system of

premiums or bonus payments for increased output, would be better than

profit-sharing, and is rapidly spreading.

This leads to the second objection, which is that profit-sharing

paralyzes the efforts of the laborers to better their own conditions

through trade unions, strikes or other methods. The trade union

attitude was vigorously stated by President Gompers of the American

Federation of Labor in his testimony before the Industrial

Commission[35]:

“There have been few, if any, of these concerns which have been even 113

comparatively fair to their employes…. They made the work harder,

longer hours, and when the employes of other concerns in the same line

of trade were enjoying increased wages, shorter hours of labor, and

other improvements, tending to the material progress of the worker,

the employes of the concern where so-called profit-sharing was the

system at the end of the year found themselves receiving lower wages

for harder work than were those who were not under that beneficent

system.” As long as the system is viewed with suspicion by the laborer

or used as a weapon in industrial bargaining by employers, the plan is

foredoomed to failure. But even were it managed in the proper spirit,

it is after all applicable to only a comparatively few industries,

those, namely, in which labor makes up the largest part of the cost of

production. In most modern industries capital plays such an important

role as compared with labor that the field for this plan is

comparatively limited.

In the actual practice of profit-sharing there have been many

interesting experiments, and not a few failures. It may be said to

date from 1842, when M. Leclaire, a Parisian painter and house

decorator, introduced it into his business, and has since spread over

France and England; it has met with little success in the rest of

Europe. In the United States the movement has also been more recent

and of smaller proportions. The reason for this is suggested by

President Hadley as follows[36]: “Where the laborers under the old

wage system are not working up to a high standard of efficiency, there

is more chance for the success of profit-sharing. This seems to be the

reason why it works better on the Continent than in England, and

better in England than in America.” It was estimated in 1900 that

there had been in the entire world some 500 experiments in

profit-sharing, of which about 400 were still in existence: a more 114

conservative estimate would place the latter number at about 300.

More radical than profit-sharing, which involves only a change in the

method of payment of wages, is co-operation, which involves a change

of management as well. Its final goal, in the minds of its advocates,

is the radical modification if not ultimate abolition of the present

wage system. While profit-sharing is paternalistic and is directed to

an increase of production, co-operation may be said to be democratic,

and to aim at a more equitable distribution. Under this plan the

laborers hope to divert to themselves the large amount of profits

which they now see going into the possession of their employers. By

eliminating the manager or enterpriser they hope to save his profits

for themselves. Two different kinds of co-operation are usually

distinguished--distributive or consumers’ co-operation, and producers’

co-operation--which we may profitably take up in turn.

Successful consumers’ co-operation may be said to have originated in

Great Britain when twenty-eight Rochdale workingmen founded their

famous society of Equitable Pioneers. The success and growth of this

remarkable experiment, starting with a capital of £28, to a great

system of 8,000 members with a capital of £200,000 in 1874, is a most

romantic story. It was largely imitated and retail co-operative stores

sprang up all over England. In 1864 the English Co-operative Wholesale

Society was started, for the purpose of the joint purchase of supplies

for the retail co-operative stores on better terms than these could

secure singly from ordinary wholesalers. It effected large economies

and was successful from the beginning; by 1901 it had a capital of

£2,500,000 and acted as purchaser for over 1,000 retail societies.

From buying, the society soon passed to making its own goods and now

manufactures directly a long list of commodities. In 1868 the Scottish

Wholesale Society was inaugurated upon practically the same plan. 115

Consumers’ co-operation has met with considerable success in Europe

also. In the United States, however, experiments of this kind have in

general had only a brief existence. It is impossible to say how many

such societies exist today as no adequate statistics on the subject

exist. Trade union stores in New England, the grange stores of the

Patrons of Husbandry and later similar ones of the Sovereigns of

Industry, and a few sporadic movements since in different parts of the

country, show what has been attempted. The reasons for the lack of

success in this country are not hard to find. Co-operation requires a

willingness to take considerable trouble for small economies, which

American workingmen, with their generally high wages, have not yet

been willing to take. It also requires a considerable degree of

homogeneity in thought and interests on the part of a people, which is

naturally less present in the United States with its large admixture

of foreign population than in England or the countries of Europe.

The methods of the Rochdale Society will serve as an illustration of

the way in which the savings effected by co-operation are distributed

among the members. Any one might become a member upon payment of one

shilling and was then entitled to trade at the store. The prices

charged were those current in the town, but purity of goods was

assured; cash payments were an essential feature. At the end of the

year the profits were divided among the members in proportion to the

amount of their purchases. On the other hand, it may be noted that no

attempt was made to, introduce profit-sharing with the employes, who

are paid ordinary but good wages only. Other forms of consumers’

co-operation are those which undertake to supply insurance, or credit,

like the co-operative insurance companies, banks, and building and

loan associations. The latter especially have had considerable success

in the United States and have helped many a laborer or man of small 116

means to the ownership of a home.

Producers’ co-operation differs from that just described in that it is

a union on the part of laborers to do away with the employer and to

secure for themselves the profits. The object of the first is to lower

prices for the co-operators as consumers; the object of the second is

rather to secure higher prices for themselves as producers by

eliminating the profits of the industrial manager. They hope to

perform his function by their collective effort, and to manage as well

as labor; indeed, by diminishing friction and strikes they even hope

to increase the profits. Examples of successful co-operation of this

sort are not numerous, as it has great difficulties to contend with.

Most of the experiments have failed, though recently it would seem

that the movement is making substantial though slow progress,

especially in France and England. Most of those in the latter country,

however, seem to be of simple industries, as agriculture and

dairy-farming. The most notable example of successful productive

co-operation in the United States has been furnished by the coopers of

Minneapolis, who organized a shop of their own in 1868 and have

steadily increased their business since that time. Other instances

often cited are the wood-workers in St. Louis and boot and shoe

companies in Massachusetts. More recently there has been a

considerable extension of co-operative creameries, cheese factories

and similar businesses of a simple kind.

The advantages of co-operation are summed up as follows by President

Walker.[37] From the laborer’s point of view: “First, to secure for

the laboring class that large amount of wealth, which … goes

annually in profits to the employer. Second, to secure for the laborer

the opportunity to produce independently of the will of an

employer…. In addition to these, the political economist beholds in

cooperation three sources of advantage. First, co-operation would, 117

by the very terms of the case, do away with strikes…. Second, the

workman would be incited to greater industry and to greater

carefulness in dealing with materials and with machinery. Third, in no

small degree frugality would be encouraged.” To these may be added

other advantages, mostly realizable, however, in consumers’

co-operation. Saving in store-room, clerk hire, advertising,

book-keeping, etc., is effected, while above all, the practice of cash

payments saves all loss from bad debts. The initial success of the

Rochdale pioneers was in large part due to the economy in this line,

as a system of long credits burdened the retail trade of England at

the time they began. In this country the large department stores have

introduced this system and have thus been able to give their customers

lower prices, and by so much have lessened the motive for consumers’

co-operation. The educative effects of successful co-operation upon

the participators in developing habits of thrift, careful management

and a knowledge of business principles, is one of the chief advantages

of the system. The ultimate ideal of enthusiastic co-operators does

not, however, stop short of a mere saving in price. The goal is stated

as follows by the Right Relationship League of America, which has

several co-operative stores in the Northwest: Consumers’ co-operation

is merely the first step which “will lead next to co-operative

production, next to public ownership of natural resources and finally

to complete industrial and economic equality, social and political

right relationship--the Kingdom of God on Earth.”

The defects of co-operation have already been suggested in the account

of their failure. In the first place, the importance and need of

intelligent and efficient management are usually underrated by

workingmen. They are unwilling to pay high salaries and as a

consequence lose the best men and secure inefficient service.

Co-operation has therefore succeeded best in retail trade where the

processes are comparatively simple, or in those branches of production 118

where industry counts for most and management for least. But even if

it were possible to secure an efficient and progressive manager for a

co-operative shop, it is found very difficult for a man chosen by the

workmen to enforce discipline among them. A second disadvantage is the

difficulty of securing capital. Where, as in many branches of

large-scale manufacturing today, the average investment of capital

amounts to more than $1,000 per employe, the impossibility of

obtaining this by the contributions of the workers is obvious. Nor are

capitalists usually willing to lend to such organizations, as the

risks are too great. To meet this difficulty Ferdinand Lassalle, a

German socialist, proposed that the state should advance the necessary

capital to associations of workmen. But the experience so far with

productive co-operation would seem to suggest that the social benefits

would not equal the waste of public capital. There is danger also that

if successful the co-operative associations would tend to become

monopolies; they are profit-seeking societies and would probably not

differ materially in their methods from ordinary joint stock

enterprises.

It seems impossible, therefore, to expect from co-operation a final

solution of the labor problem, such as John Stuart Mill, for instance,

hoped for. Where successful, it has succeeded in distributing profits

among a larger number of persons than would otherwise have received

them. Its educative and moral effects, moreover, in the appeals which

it makes to higher motives and to character, are of the highest value.

But as an industrial system of enterprise it cannot supplant the

present system as long as the manager of industry is needed. Today he

performs a useful social service and profits are his pay therefor. If

he is to be eliminated, society must first be raised to a higher plane

of efficiency, intelligence, and morality. But just because it makes

these high demands upon the members of the laboring class, attempts 119

at co-operation should receive all reasonable encouragement.

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