still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster
than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of
them--the Thornycroft type--is the appearance of the Diesel engine for
partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea
did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the
side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow
firm in the _Archer_ and _Attack_, their special destroyers, evolved a
system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase
in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam
and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable
feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage;
but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a
similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction
of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction.
The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers
or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain
practical difficulties which cannot be ignored.
In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later
boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally
a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any
definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer.
Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla
leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo
boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There
is also the still older idea of our original _Swift_.
The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide
the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful
than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce
as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed,
the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that
matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of
the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse.
It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war
the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice.
Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage
is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it
should be an immense asset if properly handled.
_GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA._
The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:--
=======+========+========+==========+=========================
Calibre| Length | Weight |Weight of | Maximum penetration
in. | in | tons. |projectile| A.P. capped against K.C.
| cals. | | lbs. +------------+------------
| | | |at 5000 yds.| 3000 yds.
-------+--------+--------+----------+------------+------------
| | | | in. | in.
13.5 | 45 | 80 | 1250 | 22 | 26
12 | 50 | 58 | 850 | 19 | 24
12 | 45 | 50 | 850 | 17½ | 22
9.2 | 50 | 30 | 380 | 10 | 13
9.2 | 45 | 27 | 380 | 8¾ | 11¼
=======+========+========+==========+============+============
It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original
_Dreadnought_) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence
at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The
main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and
the better capacity of its shell.
Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison
between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts
era.
========+========+========+==========+======================+================
Calibre | Length | Weight |Projectile| Maximum penetration | Corresponding
in. | in | tons. | lbs. | A.P. capped against | value in K.C.
| cals. | | | K.C. at | of belt of ship
| | | +-----------+----------+ carrying
| | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.|
--------+--------+--------+----------+-----------+----------+----------------
13.5 | 30 | 80 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | 9
13.5 | 45 | 67 | 1250 | 22 | 26 | 12
========+========+========+==========+===========+==========+================
From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the
gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the
old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000
yards is now held in the same or even less estimation.
Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the
last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and
increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by
range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some
armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship
is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle
Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,[37]
and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to
judge are extremely careful about prophecying.
Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the
British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch
guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of
delivering heavier and heavier projectiles.
_TORPEDO PROGRESS._
The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily
increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved
engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range.
About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum
speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon
by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type
Hardcastle torpedo--so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander
Hardcastle--is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be
capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots.
As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is
obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single
enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the
other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as
likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of
ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory
that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted
the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one,
despite all the protests against “mastodons.”
With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been
devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the
solid bulkheads of the original _Dreadnought_, was, after a time,
partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form
of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of
internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship
_Henri IV_, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view
to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An
improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in
the Russian _Tsarevitch_ in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed
in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the
specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war
utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by
some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes,
others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is
afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next
naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or
a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position;
but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now
that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to
the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is
going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough
to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo
is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the
torpedo, startling things are toward.[38]
The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in
connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since
nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British,
Russian and Japanese Navies--most other navies making no use of net
defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria
coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy--the British
theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of
net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed
that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed.
_NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA._
==========+============+===========+===============================================
Financial | Amount. | Personnel.| Ships provided.
Year. | | +-----------+-----------------------------------
| | |Battleships|Battle-cruisers|Armoured |Prot.
| | | | |cruisers.|cruisers.
----------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------+---------+---------
1902–03 | 31,003,977 | 122,500 | 2 | | 2 |
1903–04 | 35,709,477 | 127,100 | 3 | | 4 |
1904–05 | 36,859,681 | 131,100 | 2 | | 3 |
1905–06 | 33,389,500 | 129,000 | 1 | 3 | |
1906–07 | 31,472,087 | 129,000 | 3 | | |
1907–08 | 31,419,500 | 128,000 | 3 | | |
1908–09 | 32,319,500 | 128,000 | 1 | 1 | | 5
1909–10 | 35,142,700 | 138,000 | 6 | 2 | | 3
1910–11 | 40,603,700 | 131,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3
1911–12 | 44,392,500 | 134,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3
1912–13 | 44,085,400 | 136,000 | 3 | 1 | |
==========+============+===========+===========+===============+=========+=========
Later in 1912 the sum of £1,000,000 was handed to the Navy out of the
Budget surplus. This sum, the “supplementary estimate,” was allotted in
order to set off a corresponding German increase.
The decrease of 1905–1908 is probably directly responsible for the
increase 1910–1912; owing to the fact that the British decrease was
met by a corresponding rise in German expenditure. It was the fashion
before the war to deplore the sums spent on naval armaments, while
little or nothing was said about the military estimates.
For 1912–13 the Naval Estimates were £45,075,400.
For 1912–14 they increased to £48,809,300, and for 1914–15 they stood
at £51,550,000.
On the face of things, this ever-increasing naval outlay looked likely
to lead to ultimate financial ruin. This, however, is really a somewhat
superficial view, and mostly nothing but a modern equivalent to that
“Insular Spirit” which has been referred to in previous pages.
Compared to the national interests at stake, the increase regarded as
an insurance is more apparent than real. It is, if anything, a smaller
percentage on national existence; also over a period of a hundred years
it is far less than the corresponding increase in the Civil Service
Vote, which lacks any claims to be considered an “insurance.” The
entire amount spent in shipbuilding is expended in the country, and
about 70 per cent. of it goes in direct payment to “Labour”: which is
probably a larger percentage than would be achieved were the same sum
spent in any other way whatever.
The “ruinous competition in naval armaments” so prated on by certain
publicists was really little better than an idle phrase so far as the
British nation is concerned; and there was never any real reason to
regard future increases with apprehension.
Now that the nation is at war this fact is being recognised. We must
continue to recognise it. In trenches over the water we may attack. But
on the British Navy depends our defence of home interests.
V.
SUBMARINES.
The submarine as anything of the nature of a practical arm made its
first appearance as a “submarine torpedo boat,” useful merely for
harbour defence. As such it was eagerly embraced by the French Navy,
and had a considerable vogue therein, besides being a commonplace in
the United States long before the British Admiralty accepted it as
serious in a way.
As a matter of fact, till the invention of the periscope enabled it
to see where it was going when submerged, the submarine was little if
anything but a paper menace. The periscope altered all this.
The first submarines for the British Navy figured in the 1901–2
Estimates. Five copies of the American _Holland_ were laid down at
Barrow, the first being launched in October, 1901. These boats were of
120 tons submerged displacement, and used merely as instructional or
experimental craft almost as soon as completed.
[Illustration: SUBMARINES LEAVING PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR.]
They were followed immediately by the “A” class, totalling thirteen
boats in all. Displacement submerged, 207 tons. Those numbered from
five to thirteen were given sixteen cylinder surface motors of 550
horse-power in place of the 450 horse-power twelve cylinder ones of
the earlier boats. In 1904 A1 was lost with all hands under tragic
circumstances off Spithead, being run down by a merchant steamer. This
disaster led to the installation of double periscopes in later types.
A3 was lost off Spithead in 1912, being run down by the _Hazard_, very
near where A1 was lost.
The B class which followed numbered eleven boats, of which B1 was
originally known as A14. The remaining B class belong to the 1904–05
Estimates. The submerged displacement in these rises to 313 tons, and
the surface speed to thirteen knots, instead of eleven and a half,
though, owing to improved lines, the horse-power was little increased.
New boats, completed in 1906 and later, though generally identical
with the B class, were known as the C class, and totalled thirty-eight
altogether. One, C11, was lost at sea from a collision.
In 1907 the earliest boat of a new type (D Class) was put in
hand. Displacing 600 tons submerged, she practically doubled her
predecessors. Her surface speed rose to sixteen knots with 1,200
horse-power. Three instead of two torpedo tubes were fitted, also
wireless telegraphy was experimentally adopted in her. She herself
was never any great success, but the rest of the type were far more
successful.
By the end of 1911 eight boats of the D class had been launched. It was
originally intended to build a total of nineteen of this class, but
meanwhile an improved boat of the E type was evolved. The E class are
177ft. long, with a submerged displacement of 800 tons or thereabouts,
and four 21-inch tubes. They are fitted with wireless. Their special
feature, however, is the fitting of guns, as a regular and integral
part of the design.
The first submarine to mount a gun was D4, in which a special
12-pounder was experimentally mounted, so that it could be housed when
the boat was submerged; for later boats two guns were decided on.
The E class were followed by an F class--and a variety of other boats,
most of which have been completed since the war began and concerning
which it is obviously undesirable to say anything whatever.
Guns for submarines were expected to appear sooner than they actually
did. At an early stage it was foreseen that, once radii developed,
submarines were likely enough to find themselves in contact with
hostile submarines and to need something to attack them with. The
original idea of the submarine as “the weapon of the weaker Power” soon
went the same way as did a similar idea about torpedo boats at their
first inception.
In torpedo-boats it was at once self-evident that, whatever the value
of the torpedo boat, the stronger Power was able to build far more than
the weaker, and to annihilate accordingly.
For a time the submarine seemed to defy this law. It was fatuously
hoped that “submarines cannot injure hostile submarines”; and that the
“torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat” would not have as
sequel “the submarine is the answer to the submarine.”
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Stephen Crabb. Southsea._
SUBMARINE E 2.]
It may well be in the womb of the future that submarines to-morrow,
or perhaps to-day, may be what the ironclad was yesterday or the day
before. The submarine battleship may appear and render obsolete the
“Dreadnought” of to-day! But nothing can alter the cardinal fact that,
given equal efficiency, the Power with most such craft must win,
and that, given an inferior efficiency, defeat may be looked for as
the natural corollary on lines entirely unconnected with whether
the “capital ship” is of a type that floats only or one that can be
submerged at will.
Tactics may alter, the means may alter, and the most obvious
instruments of naval strategy may do the same. But nothing whatever
can affect the bedrock truth that, given equal efficiency, “numbers
only can annihilate.” Given the “equal efficiency” nothing else really
matters!
If the creators of weapons keep themselves to date, if those who supply
them see to it that the supply is sufficient, if those who work the
weapons are efficient, the part of those in chief control resolves
itself into little save achieving victory with the minimum of loss. The
day may yet arrive when someone discovers that a good deal of what has
been written about the genius of various famous admirals of the past is
verbiage rather than fact, that they were a part of one great whole,
rather than the sole controlling organisation--at any rate, once battle
was engaged.
In the future, if the submarine “Dreadnought” becomes an actuality,
this is probably likely to be so to a greater extent than anything
which obtained in the past. So far as we can to-day conceive of such
future fights, much of the battle, at any rate, will entail more or
less blind work under the surface, individual enemies engaging one
another, the leader compelled to rely more and more upon the efficiency
of his individual units and less and less upon his own tactical
combinations.
Of course things may turn out otherwise. Inventions yet undreamed of
may come to the fore, and the nether waters present no greater obstacle
to regular operations than the surface does to-day. Plunging may offer
no salvation to a beaten enemy. We can only make idle speculations now.
Yet, however things may shape, success or failure, victory or defeat
must assuredly depend in a great measure on the makers of the
weapons and the efficiency of those who work them--the tools, on the
reliability of which every admiral must trust for victory.
When this war started there were roughly thirty German submarines to
something like seventy British. At the moment of writing (June, 1915)
at least twenty of those German submarines have gone below. How and why
cannot be published: but they have gone under in one way or another.
Means of defeating submarines are being developed.
Where big ships are concerned the principle means in use are high speed
and a zig-zag course, the combination making it difficult for the
relatively slow submarine to arrive at the correct striking point.
In this connection it has to be remembered that the vision of a
submarine is limited; and so that though the range of modern torpedoes
is something like five miles, the actual effective range of a
submarine’s torpedoes is nearer a mile or less.
So much is this the case that German submarines are fitted with a
torpedo which has a range of only a thousand yards or thereabouts, the
reduced range being compensated for by a greatly increased charge. This
charge, 420 lbs. of very high explosive instead of the usual charge
of 300 lbs. or less, accounts for the devastating effects of German
torpedoes fired from submarines.
It is merely a phase in submarine warfare. At present a submarine
dare not fire too near its victim lest it be involved in the common
destruction. That, however, is likely enough to be guarded against
in future construction, and the prospects of the early future is
one of more importance for submarines rather than less. They are
bound to become larger and larger, their radius increasing with the
size. Coincidently with this we may expect to see the birth of small
submarines designed to attack big ones: some new variant of the
swordfish and the whale.
VI.
NAVAL AVIATION.
The aeroplane idea is so old that we find it in Greek mythology, and it
is consequently of unknown antiquity. Hundreds of years before Christ
there were hoary old legends of Dædalus and Icarus, who made wings for
themselves and flew. Icarus flew too high, the sun melted his wings,
with the result that there happened to him what happens about once a
week to aviators to-day, he fell and died. Contemporary with these
legends, are legends of floating rocks which spurted out fire--stories
which sounded inestimably silly till steamships came along. We may
imagine prophets able to look ahead[39] and to invest their day with
visions of the future. Equally we can discard prophets and imagine a
civilisation long since dead which knew all about flying and steamers,
and survives in legends only.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [“_Topical._”
BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE.]
The latter alternative is really the more reasonable of the two. While
imagination can do a very great deal and exaggerate to any extent,
it must have a base to work on. It is easier to believe in some long
gone and extinct civilisation which destroyed itself in the air, than
to believe that pure imagination accounts for the flying stories
of long ago. Africa is full of traces of vast cities older than any
history, telling of past civilisations of which nothing is or ever will
be known. Also there is practically no known age in which anything but
the motive power stood between aeroplane theories and their realisation.
In support of the theory that men flew before to-day there is the
following:--Somewhere about the year 1100, that is to say, back in the
reign of King Stephen, a French historian relates the appearance of “as
it were, a ship, in the air over London.” It anchored, and the citizens
of London got hold of the anchor. The airship sent a man down to free
it, and the citizens of London caught him and drowned him in the river.
The rest of the aviators then cut the rope and sailed away.
This incident is mentioned so baldly and casually and so much mixed up
with ordinary petty chat of the era (chat which proves to have been
quite true), that it takes far more faith to accept it as “pure lies”
than to accept it as fact more or less.
These legends cannot be disregarded lightly. They one and all give
priority to the aeroplane--the “heavier than air” vehicle. Once in a
way the “lighter than air” idea got a casual look in; but it was not
till the end of the eighteenth century that it got into the regions of
practical politics with the French Montgolfiers. But there were people
who invented elementary aeroplanes long before Montgolfier.
From the end of the eighteenth century until to-day the Montgolfier
idea of “lighter than air” has got little further. The shape has
altered; instead of hot air, hydrogen gas is now employed; and by
means of motors the balloon no longer drifts before the wind. But
progress is terribly slow. That it is so, is a very important thing to
recognise, as slow development is by no means a reason for ignoring an
invention. Sometimes it is quite the opposite.
It will probably be a good many years before it is definitely settled
whether the “heavier than air” or “lighter than air” principle is the
better for Naval purposes, though there are not wanting enthusiasts who
decry the “lighter than air” machines altogether.
This is probably a grave mistake, brought about by the fact that
practical balloons existed long before practical aeroplanes, and
dirigibles made flights before ever aeroplanes rose off the earth. Yet
the dirigible is in a far more elementary stage than the aeroplane
is. Not only is the aeroplane a much older idea in the theoretical
direction, but, being very much smaller, it on that account has very
possibly developed more quickly.
The world has been building ships for thousands of years, yet it has
only recently developed _Tigers_ and _Olympics_, and both are still
developing and likely to do so for some time to come. Row-boats,
however, arrived at perfection a good thousand years ago. That is
to say, there has been no alteration or improvement in them at all
commensurate with the alterations that have taken place in big ships
during the same period.
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Sport & General._
HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE _HIBERNIA_.]