already comparatively easy to forecast their eventual form without much
danger of being proved a false prophet later on. We may safely say
that they will become capable of much higher speeds than at present;
also (which is perhaps more important) _slower_ speeds; and that all
existing troubles with stability will eventually be overcome. But
experiments made with birds indicate that the run which an aeroplane
has to take before it can rise occurs in much the same proportion with
birds; and so there are few, if any, practical men who now expect to
see future aeroplanes capable of rising vertically from the ground, or
hovering in the air except under such conditions as any bird can hover
without inconvenience.
The possibilities of the dirigible, on the other hand, no man can
foresee. The gasbag that can be brought to the ground by a single
bullet hole in it, is a very different thing from the possibility of
airships of the future, which may be a mile or two long, divided into
innumerable compartments, filled with non-explosive gas such as is sure
to be discovered sooner or later. Two miles seems an extraordinary
length to-day, but a ship ten miles long would only be something like
the ratio of the early dirigible to the future ones compared to the
ratio Dreadnoughts bear to the first ships built by men.
On the water, bulk is limited by the depth and size of harbours, but
in the vast regions of the air there are practically no limitations
whatever, and there is virtually nothing to limit size, save the
building of land docks on open plains into which airships could descend
for purposes of repair and so forth. Consequently those who hastily
assume from a few accidents that the “lighter than air” craft has no
future are probably making a mistake; at any rate, so far as naval work
is concerned. Certain definite uses are apparent even now to those who
think and ignore commercial rivalries.
It has been wisely laid down that aeroplanes for naval purposes must
be capable of rising from and descending on the water. The Curtiss
was the first successful hydro-aeroplane, but since then floats have
been fitted to various other types with equal success. It is doubtful
whether naval aeroplanes will ever be carried on shipboard like boats,
although this is by no means impossible. It will, however, be more
convenient for a variety of reasons to use them like submarines with
their own special depot ships.
The main naval use of aeroplanes at the outbreak of war was for
scouting purposes. How near they would be able to approach a hostile
fleet was a question not likely to be solved until the day of battle.
The question of their being hit is secondary to the question of their
being upset, owing to tremendous concussions of heavy gun fire. The
idea of aeroplanes dropping bombs down the funnels of warships can be
dismissed as the entirely fanciful dreams of people who know nothing
whatever about aeroplanes or the mathematical problems involved.
Judging by recent events, dropping bombs anywhere upon a moving ship is
nearly or entirely impossible, except at ranges where the aviator would
at once be brought down by rifle fire.
A far more likely and useful service would be the destruction of enemy
aeroplanes. For this purpose a special gun, firing a species of chain
shot, has already been suggested, and the naval aeroplane of the future
was always certain to carry a gun of some kind. The off-chance of doing
a certain amount of damage to a hostile ship by dropping a bomb upon
it, is nothing compared to the importance of destroying the enemy’s
aeroplanes. This last seems likely to be all-important as time goes on.
The duties of naval airships will be of a different nature. Already a
point kept in view in their design is ability to “keep the air” for a
considerable period, and with what are in these days “large airships”
of the Zeppelin type (to which the ill-fated Naval Airship No. 1
_Mayfly_ belonged) there seems no reason why an airship should not be
kept in the air for three or four days already.
The fuel problem is not very difficult, because a great deal can
already be done without the use of the engines, or with only partial
use of them. It is also more than probable that with a view to
further economy some kind of sails, combined with sea-anchors, will
be evolved, whereby the ship might become able to sail in the air
nearly as well as the old three-deckers, or, at any rate, as well as
the masted ironclads, sailed in the water. The difficulty of “keeping
the air” is the inevitable leakage of gas, but as leakage nowadays is
infinitesimally less than it once was, the assumption is that as the
years go on it will eventually be reduced to almost a minus quantity.
Gales will be met by “bulk” and efficient anchors, on the principle
that the gale which swamps a fishing-boat or blows over a haystack has
no effect on a Dreadnought or a cathedral.
Ability to keep the air will enable all Fleets to be accompanied by
airships, which would detect mines and perhaps submarines, and with
their ability to adapt their speeds at will, the presumption is that
they would be able to destroy submarines by bombs.
A further and very important duty would be the detection of torpedo
attacks at night. Experiments carried out in Austria some few years
ago with a captive balloon proved conclusively that except in cases
of thick fog any vessels in motion are easily detected at a distance
of ten or twelve miles. It is not merely the tell-tale flames in the
funnels which betray attacking vessels; their wakes are always clearly
visible, and as a general rule the vessels themselves, no matter how
dark the night.
Bomb-dropping from an airship must be a more serious matter than from
aeroplanes, as so much more in the way of explosives could be carried.
The chance of being hit, however, would probably be so much greater
that it was (when war broke out) unlikely that any airships would be
risked for such purposes. Nor is it very probable that naval airships
will for some time to come attack each other, if they can possibly
avoid it, the reason being that for a good many years they will be
comparatively few in number, and the attack would have, in most cases,
to be delivered in the presence of a fleet, which would make the
attack, to say the least of it, very hazardous.
Eventually, of course, aerial Dreadnoughts fighting each other are
probable enough; but “the Trafalgar of the air” is unlikely to be
witnessed within the lifetime of most or any of us now living. Nor is
it likely that aerial Dreadnoughts will replace Dreadnoughts of the
water, although as years go on they may cause profound modifications in
design in order to allow of mounting guns for vertical fire.
We are in the presence of the introduction of a “new arm.” But between
what a “new arm” can actually accomplish, and what enthusiastic
inventors say it will do, there is always an enormous gap. Inventors,
when they come to prophesying, are usually one of two things--asses, or
prodigious asses! France--once the second Naval Power in Europe--became
of little or no account because it took the submarine at the
enthusiastic inventor’s face value, and neglected the present and
immediate future.
The present stage of aerial progress in the British Navy is briefly to
be summarised as follows:--
1. A big Zeppelin type naval airship was built in 1909–1911. It proved
a total failure.
2. In 1911 four naval officers were appointed to learn aeroplane work.
Subsequently a few others were appointed. Others, again, qualified
privately. In 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was established--both naval
and military aviators becoming “wings” of the same body--an excellent
principle, but one necessarily experimental so far as practical work
was concerned.
3. In practice it proved a failure; so the Naval Air Service was formed
into a branch by itself. Four small army airships were handed over
to it--craft too small to be of any value except for instructional
purposes.
At the outbreak of war there were two effective dirigibles--one of
French type of Astra-Torres design, the other a Parseval purchased in
Germany. Neither of these ships is in any way comparable to the German
Zeppelins in dimensions or endurance. A number of other dirigibles
of varying sizes were on order, but it is inadvisable to publish any
particulars on this subject. The designs for these were foreign, but
the construction was British.
In the matter of aeroplanes a number of special naval stations were
established and supplied with seaplanes and landplanes of various
types, while strenuous efforts were made towards the training of a
large number of efficient pilots. The building of an aeroplane is a
matter of only a few weeks, whereas the training of a really efficient
pilot is a matter of a year or thereabouts.
VII
AUXILIARY NAVIES.
No account of the British battle fleet would be complete without
reference to the various auxiliary navies. Though none of them
possesses any very serious fighting value, yet all possess
potentialities for the future which can with difficulty be computed.
The auxiliary navies may be divided into two main sections--(1) those
which are direct branches of the British Navy, and (2) those which
belong to the semi-independent colonies.
Of the former, the principal is the Royal Indian Marine, which
consists of a number of armed troopships. Of these the chief are the
_Northbrook_, launched at Clydebank in 1907, 5,820 tons, 16 knot speed,
and an armament of six 4-inch and six 3-pounders. The _Dufferin_, which
was launched in 1904, is of 7,457 tons, has a speed of 19 knots, and an
armament of eight 4-inch and eight 3-pounders. The _Hardinge_, launched
1900, is of 6,520 tons, 18 knots speed, and carries six 4.7-inch guns
as well as six 3-pounders and 4 Maxims.
There are three older troopships, the _Minto_ (1893), the _Elphinstone_
(1887), and the _Dalhousie_ (1886). These are supplemented by ten small
steamers and nine small mining vessels.
The germ of this fleet was created in the early seventies when the
breastwork monitors _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ were sent out for the
defence of Indian harbours. These were small predecessors of the
_Devastation_, very similar to the home coast-defence monitors of the
_Cyclops_ class, and carried four 18-ton muzzle-loading guns.
About the year 1888 some new torpedo boats (Nos. 100–106) were lent for
the Indian Marine service. These, with their names and numbers, were
as follows:--_Baluch_ (100), _Ghurka_ (101), _Kahren_ (102), _Pathan_
(103), _Maharatta_ (104), _Sikh_ (105), and _Rajput_ (106). The two
earliest numbers were built by Thornycroft, and were of 92 tons; the
others were built by White, of Cowes, and were of 95 tons displacement.
In the years 1890–91 two torpedo gunboats, _Plassy_ and _Assaye_, of
the _Sharpshooter_ class, were launched at Elswick for the Indian
Marine, in which they remained until withdrawn in the early years of
the present century.
On a similar footing to the Royal Indian Marine are the flotillas,
mostly consisting of river gunboats, maintained in North and South
Nigeria and in Central Africa, and the gunboats on the Nile under the
Egyptian Government.
The Colonial Navies are on a different standing. First place in their
formation belongs to Australia. The monitor _Cerberus_, practically a
sister of the _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ already mentioned, was launched
at Jarrow in 1868 for Victoria. This vessel (which still exists as a
drill ship) is of 3,480 tons, armed with four 18-ton muzzle-loaders,
and protected with an 8-inch belt.
In 1884 Australia’s local defence was re-inforced with four gunboats as
follows:--The _Protector_, of 920 tons, carrying one 8-inch and five
6-inch guns, for South Australia. She, as well as the others, was built
at Elswick. For Western Australia a similar vessel of 530 tons, named
the _Victoria_, was built, armed with one 18-ton muzzle-loader. The
_Gayundah_ and _Paluma_, also of the same type, carrying one old 8-inch
and one 6-inch, were built for Queensland. Their displacement is 360
tons each.
From that time onward the Australian Navy occasionally sent a few
officers and men for training in the British Navy.
Towards the end of the eighties interest began to be taken in
Australian naval defence, and five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats
were ordered for local Australian service while borne on the Royal
Navy List. Of these vessels the five cruisers were the _Katoomba_ (ex
_Pandora_), _Mildura_ (ex _Pelorus_), _Ringarooma_ (ex _Psyche_),
_Tauranga_ (ex _Phœnix_), and the _Wallaroo_ (ex _Persian_), all 2,575
vessels of the old _Pallas_ class, of which at the time of writing
the _Philomel_ still exists. These ships had a designed speed of 16.5
knots, a protective deck, and an armament of eight 4.7-inch and some
smaller guns.
The torpedo gunboat _Boomerang_ (ex _Whiting_) and _Karrakatta_ (ex
_Wizard_) belonged to the _Sharpshooter_ class, and were lent under the
same conditions as the cruisers.
In the course of time all of them wore out and were eventually recalled.
Coincident with this the Australians commenced to have a revived
interest in Imperial defence, and in the year 1905–6 Australia and New
Zealand contributed £240,000 to Imperial naval defence, and a project
was put forward for the building of eight destroyers and four torpedo
gunboats for Colonial Defence purposes.
A few years later this project took a more definite shape, and
about the year 1910 the battle-cruiser _Australia_, a sister of the
_Indefatigable_, was ordered. As part of the same programme, three
protected cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ type, the _Melbourne_, _Sydney_,
and _Brisbane_, were also ordered. Previously to this, three destroyers
of the _Paramatta_ type had been commenced, and in 1911 three more were
ordered, thus forming a nucleus of a serious Australian Navy.[40]
New Zealand’s interest in the Imperial Navy may be said to have
commenced about the year 1900. It eventuated in paying for the
battleship _New Zealand_[41] of the _King Edward_ class, which was
laid down in September, 1903. An old gunboat of the _Magpie_ class
was purchased, re-christened the _Amokoura_, and used for training
purposes, while to replace some old torpedo boats, which had been sent
to New Zealand about the same time as similar boats went to Australia,
three destroyers of the _Paramatta_ type were ordered. Finally, an
offer from the New Zealand Premier to supplement the Dreadnought
efficiency of the British Navy culminated in the battle-cruiser _New
Zealand_, which was offered to be provided about the same time or a
little before Australia offered a similar vessel.[42]
[Illustration: BATTLE CRUISER “NEW ZEALAND” ON THE STOCKS--1912.]
The Dominion of Canada has always maintained a certain number of
small vessels for Customs duties or fishery protection, also for
service on the Great Lakes. In 1909 the question of a Canadian Navy
became insistent, and two old British cruisers--the _Niobe_ of the
_Diadem_ class and the _Rainbow_ of the _Apollo_ class--were purchased
as training ships for the Canadian Navy. A project was also brought
forward for the creation of Canadian dockyards and building therein
four second-class cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ class and six destroyers,
though up to the time of writing none of these ships have materialised,
and the Canadian Navy is still very much a project in the air.
Newfoundland has a naval reserve, trained over many years in the
drill-ship, which is ex H.M.S. _Calypso_.
The whole subject of Colonial Navies is somewhat involved, owing to
the question as to how far they should be under the orders of and part
of the British Navy, liable to be used when and where required for
Imperial needs, and how far they should be regarded as merely for local
defence. It has been argued from one point of view that Colonial Navies
acting on their own responsibility might create undesirable Imperial
complications--as for instance, Australia with Japan, or Canada with
the United States. On the other hand it is argued that it would not
be possible to arouse Colonial enthusiasm for a Colonial fleet which
was not always on the spot, despite any strategical grounds that might
exist for its being elsewhere. New Zealand, in May, 1912, negatived
this by presenting her battle-cruiser to the Imperial Navy for use
where most needed, but generally speaking Colonials think first of
local defence.
These two divergent points of view, which are certainly extremely
delicate, may be said to be still _subjudice_, but in the year 1911
the following agreement, which is of the nature of a very judicious
compromise, was drawn up:--
1. The naval services and forces of the Dominions of Canada and
Australia will be exclusively under the control of their respective
Governments.
2. The training and discipline of the naval forces of the Dominions
will be generally uniform with the training and discipline of the fleet
of the United Kingdom, and by arrangement, officers and men of the said
forces will be interchangeable with those under the control of the
British Admiralty.
3. The ships of each Dominion naval force will hoist at the stern the
white ensign as the symbol of the authority of the Crown, and at the
jack-staff the distinctive flag of the Dominion.
4. The Canadian and Australian Governments will have their own
naval stations as agreed upon and from time to time. The limits of
the stations are described in Schedule A (Canada) and Schedule B
(Australia).
5. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring
to send ships to a part of the British Empire outside of their own
respective stations, they will notify the British Admiralty.
6. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to
send ships to a foreign port, they will obtain the concurrence of
the Imperial Government, in order that the necessary arrangements
with the Foreign Office may be made, as in the case of ships of the
British Fleet, in such time and manner as is usual between the British
Admiralty and the Foreign Office.
7. While ships of the Dominions are at a foreign port a report of
their proceedings will be forwarded by the officer in command to
the Commander-in-Chief on the station or to the British Admiralty.
The officer in command of a Dominion ship so long as he remains in
the foreign port will obey any instructions he may receive from the
Government of the United Kingdom as to the conduct of any international
matters that may arise, the Dominion Government being informed.
8. The commanding officer of a Dominion ship having to put into a
foreign port without previous arrangement on account of stress of
weather, damage, or any unforeseen emergency, will report his arrival
and reason for calling to the Commander-in-Chief of the station or to
the Admiralty, and will obey, so long as he remains in the foreign
port, any instructions he may receive from the Government of the
United Kingdom as to his relations with the authorities, the Dominion
Government being informed.
9. When a ship of the British Admiralty meets a ship of the Dominions,
the senior officer will have the right to command in matters of
ceremony or international intercourse, or where united action is agreed
upon, but will have no power to direct the movements of ships of the
other service unless the ships are ordered to co-operate by mutual
arrangement.
10. In foreign ports the senior officer will take command, but not so
as to interfere with the orders that the junior may have received from
his Government.
11. When a court-martial has to be ordered by a Dominion and a
sufficient number of officers are not available in the Dominion
service at the time, the British Admiralty, if requested, will make
the necessary arrangements to enable a court to be formed. Provision
will be made by order of his Majesty in Council and by the Dominion
Governments respectively to define the conditions under which officers
of the different services are to sit on joint courts-martial.
12. The British Admiralty undertakes to lend to the Dominions during
the period of development of their services, under conditions to be
agreed upon, such flag officers and other officers and men as may be
needed. In their selection preference will be given to officers and
men coming from, or connected with, the Dominions, but they should all
be volunteers for the service.
13. The service of officers of the British Fleet in the Dominion naval
forces or of officers of those forces in the British Fleet will count
in all respects for promotion, pay, retirement, etc., as service in
their respective forces.
14. In order to determine all questions of seniority that may arise,
the names of all officers will be shown in the Navy List, and their
seniority determined by the date of their commissions, whichever is the
earlier, in the British, Canadian, or Australian services.
15. It is desirable in the interests of efficiency and co-operation
that arrangements should be made from time to time between the British
Admiralty and the Dominion for the ships of the Dominions to take part
in fleet exercises or for any other joint training considered necessary
under the Senior Naval Officer. While so employed the ships will be
under the command of that officer, who would not, however, interfere
in the internal economy of ships of another service further than is
absolutely necessary.
16. In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion or any part
thereof has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by
the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of
the British Fleet, and will remain under the control of the British
Admiralty during the continuance of the war.
17. The Dominions having applied to their naval forces the King’s
Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and the Naval Discipline Act,
the British Admiralty and Dominion Governments will communicate to each
other any changes which they propose to make in these Regulations or
that Act.
The Schedules A and B defined the stations of Canadian and Australian
ships respectively. These stations cover the territorial and contiguous
waters in each case. The agreement generally seems framed in an
exceedingly able and statesmanlike spirit, designed so far as may be
to avoid any possible friction or misunderstanding in the future, and
in preparation for the day when the Imperial British Fleet shall be
something very much more than a dream or just a fancy.
This chapter merely records the birth of something the end of which
none can foretell. It may be the first hint of a great world-wide
English-speaking confederation: it may be the swan song of the British
Empire. But it is probably one or the other in full measure.
VIII.
GENERAL MATTERS IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS.
Since the Great French Wars the British Navy has altered out of all
recognition in its _materiel_; but changes in the _personnel_ are often
considerably less than appears on the surface.
To take matters in the same order as they are taken in Chapter VIII,
Vol. I., uniform has, of course, long established itself. It has done
so with a formality which, in the view of many, has “established the
régime of the tailor rather than the sailor.” Within the last few years
a slight change for the better has occurred; but of the greater part
of the period so far as concerns purposes for which uniform was first
introduced--the sailor and tailor exchanged places. Much has been
written about admirals and captains whose ideas of naval efficiency
were limited by “spit and polish,”[43] but “spit and polish” at its
worst was never so bad as that tailoring idea which was the ultimate
result of George II admiring the costume of the Duchess of Bedford.[44]
[Illustration:
_Photo_] [_Stuart, Southampton._
ADMIRAL FISHER.]