_On outside wrapper (handkerchief)_:
EVENTS AT KARTOUM.
20th Oct. to 5th Nov., 1884.
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL, VOL. V.
The Chief of the Staff of Expeditionary Force for the
Relief of the Garrisons.
No secrets as far as I am concerned.
C. G. GORDON.
* * * * *
_On cover_:
EVENTS AT KARTOUM.
20th Oct. to 5th Nov., 1884.
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL, VOL. V.
To be pruned down if published.
C. G. GORDON.
* * * * *
_On inside_:
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL,
From 20th October to 5th November, 1884.
EVENTS IN KARTOUM.
The Chief of Staff of Expeditionary Force for Relief of
Garrison.
VOL. V.
To be pruned down if published.
C. G. GORDON.
JOURNAL.
_October 21._—Steamers left this morning for Shendy. To-day is New
Year’s Day of the Arabs, 1302. I think the Mahdi speculated on a
rising in the town, but that the arrests[137] have put him out in his
calculations.
New Year’s gift this morning, in arrival of Mahdi at Omdurman. Not much
display. It is reported that he will occupy Kerowé and Halfeyeh at
once; so it is as well I got the steamers off before he got his guns
down to river bank. They will be safe with you,[138] and very useful.
Two men came in from Saleh Bey of Galabat with the post. They were
thirty-two days _en route._ They brought a letter from Mitzakis, the
Greek Consul, from _Adowa_, dated 17th August (which told me as much,
or more, than Kitchener’s letter of 31st August!).[139] Saleh Bey is
all right; he has been attacked. Spies say the small steamer _Mahomet
Ali_, captured by the Arabs, is now on the Blue Nile, at Abou Haraz.
Sennaar is all right.
Mitzakis writes to the Greek Consul here to say that a treaty has been
made between Her Majesty’s Government and Abyssinia, to give Abyssinia
Kassala, Galabat, Katarif, and Bogos! and that the King is preparing
an army to go and take possession.[140] What an action. These lands
(except Bogos) are entirely Mussulman, have held their own, and are
in no way threatened, and WE go and send a wild _so-called_ Christian
people (who have nothing to do with the quarrel) against these peoples,
who have held their own against the Mahdi.
* * * * *
_October 22._—I wonder what Saleh Bey of Galabat will say to this
cession, after he has been fighting for me. Also what Seyd Mahomet
Osman will say after all his trouble.
I can now see why I was kept in the dark.
In one of Saleh Bey’s letters he says he sends me a letter from King
John. This I have not got; it apparently was not sent.
A man came in with letter from Slatin, in which he says the _Abbas_ was
captured near Dar Djumna. Stewart killed, with nine men, and all the
papers captured.[141]
Three soldiers escaped yesterday from the Arabs. Seven more came
in to-day; they had no news. Mahdi and all Europeans are four hours
distant. Mahdi has put Saleh Pasha (of Shaggyeh) in chains.
Twenty-six goats came kindly into lines to-day.
I am very anxious about the _Abbas_; it would be terrible, if it is
true, that she is captured.
The cut out pages are, or rather were, a tirade against the cession of
Kassala,[142] &c., &c., but as they would be no use now I have cut them
out.
I believe Government can, now-a-days, get men to do anything by means
of money and honours (_not honour_), and I have a shrewd idea of how
this affair will end up here. However, it is not my affair, and I have
taken my decision.
Kitchener to Chermside. “He is furious about that admirable treaty
of Hewitt’s. Fortunate I did not tell him about it. He has the Mahdi
alongside now, and can vent his spleen on him. We have got his steamers
all but two, and need not care.”[143]
Admirable treaty, let us think—yes, spread of Christianity, regular
missionary movement, ancient Christian Church and people...! get me up
a _précis_ of this history of Abyssinia, but not that part of Bruce
which speaks of ravages committed by the Abyssinian army on the march.
Hewitt, charmed with His Majesty, calls the Queen his mother, &c.
Now, if we can _only get_ that Mahdi to make a treaty we are safe for
six months. Enough for the day is its evil. I declare I am becoming a
missionary myself with my quotations and acts.
Graham would be angry if I criticised his despatch, which Slatin sent
me. The _Raumer_[144] seems an excellent weapon.
* * * * *
_October 22._—It is suspected that the two men who came with letters
from Saleh Bey of Galabat are spies of the Mahdi, into whose hands
has fallen the letter King John wrote to me; these men came in a very
circuitous way from the direction of the Mahdi’s camp.
Another soldier and a slave came in from the Arabs just now.
King John and the Mahdi both force men to change their religion; both
cut off lips of smokers and noses of _snuffers_; both are fanatics and
robbers.[145]
If the Mahdi has got King John’s letter to me, he knows all about the
famous, or rather infamous, Hewitt Treaty, which is a trouble. Slatin’s
letter mentions the ‘Rapport Militaire’; it seems odd he should have
known it was on board, unless the _Abbas_ was captured; yet we have
two men who declare she passed down. Perhaps the captured Greeks knew
of the existence of this famous journal, and told the Arabs of it, or
Awaan may have written it; it is odd he (Slatin) says nothing of Power
and Herbin.
House of Lords ... in answer to questions put by the ... of ...
replied that the noble marquis seemed to take a special delight in
asking questions which he knew he ( ... ) could not answer. He could
say he had given a deal of time and attention to the affairs of the
Soudan, but he frankly acknowledged that the names of places and people
were so mixed up, that it was impossible to get a true view of the case
(a laugh). The noble marquis asked what the policy of Her Majesty’s
Government was? It was as if he asked the policy of a log floating down
stream; it was going to the sea, as any one who had an ounce of brains
could see. Well, that was the policy of it, only it was a decided
policy, and a straightforward one to drift along and take advantage of
every circumstance. His lordship deprecated the frequent questioning on
subjects which, as his lordship had said, he knew nothing about, and
further did not care to know anything about.
... to ... Why, I did my best to keep the Hewitt Treaty secret from
him. It is no use blaming me. I knew from his telegram he would make a
noise about it, and I told Kitchener not to say a word about it. It is
that brute Mitzakis who let the cat out of the bag.
A man came in from the Mahdi’s camp, who left this fourteen days ago
with my permission to go to the Arabs. He now comes back to see his
family in Kartoum. I have told him,—_once out, there is no return!_ He
is a cool fellow.
The Major wounded at Bourré the other day is dead.
The two men who brought letters from Saleh Bey of Galabat do not like
going out on the North Front side; they want to go out by the West
side, _i.e._ where the Mahdi’s camp is.
I believe that the Hewitt Treaty will be a complete dead letter, for
the Greek Consul says the Admiral gave him (King John) no money, so
what was the use of the treaty. I expect King John wrote to me to ask
me to give him the taxes of the country ceded, quoting the treaty of
Hewitt. As for the King or his men ever leaving their hills, it is out
of the question. He might have made a move had he been given £100,000,
but no chance of his doing so when he has nothing but this paper
treaty. The only place the King could possibly occupy is Senheit, and I
doubt his doing that permanently. He will drive out the Roman Catholic
Mission at once[146] (part of his missionary movement); the occupation
of Senheit just cuts off the safe road from Massowah to Kassala. I
declare it is amusing to see what shifts Her Majesty’s Government have
been put to get out of their mess.
A slave has come in to Omdurman with another letter from the Arabs. I
shall stop this fun for the future.
I feel sure King John gave Admiral Hewitt a spear and shield and
the Order of Solomon—vanity of vanities—for the treaty, and I feel
also sure we shall see no Abyssinian army in the Soudan. The King
will write, or has written, a haughty letter, saying that his mother,
the Queen, has given him, &c., &c., and he requests I will send in
the taxes _at once_, otherwise he will advance. All T.,[147] and we
shall hear no more of His Majesty except groans at my perfidy in not
sending the taxes. He is a hopeless sort of man, and never is worth
considering.[148] Her Majesty’s Government will say: “We made the
treaty; it is not our fault His Majesty did not carry it out, on
paper; Kassala and all the other places are now under King John, and
consequently quite safe.” The treaty is worth as much as any treaty
made now giving Kordofan to any one![149]
We need now only a treaty with the Mahdi about the garrisons, and then
Her Majesty’s Government will sleep in peace: _their work is done_. I
only say I will have no confidence in any such treaty, and shall take
my precautions accordingly.[150]
Letters have come in: one says Lupton Bey has surrendered (Appendix U,
_a_, _b_, _c_, _d_), and has been appointed Governor of Bahr Gazelle
with an adherent of the Mahdi. Another says that he has brought
slaves to the Mahdi, and hopes to buy horses with the products of
their sale.[151] The Mahdi’s letter is to relate how he captured the
post,[152] &c., _Abbas_, &c. My answer[153] was, that I did not care
who had surrendered and who had been captured. As for these letters,
I cannot make head nor tail of them, so I leave them to the Arabic
scholars of the Universities.
* * * * *
_October 23._—(What a fearful scrawl!) Ten soldiers, with six women
came in this morning to Omdurman. I have sifted out the Mahdi’s
letter[154] respecting the capture of the _Abbas_, and do not believe
it; the papers he sent me as being captured in the _Abbas_ were never
in the _Abbas_, they were taken from a spy I sent out from here, the
same man who brought me the news from Dongola of the British advance.
He had a bad eye (ophthalmia), and was caught at Metemma and killed,
having, when drunk, let out that he had come from me.
The nuns had to walk all the way from Kordofan. The Mahdi has 15,000
head of cattle with him. The Arabs are dying in great numbers from
dysentery. The village of Hogali opposite the palace is levelled. It
may not be generally known, but by the Firman which named Towfik,
there is an express injunction that no part of the Egyptian territory
is to be ceded, except by permission of the Porte. Also by the Treaty
of Paris, and also by that of Berlin, the integrity of the Ottoman
Dominion is guaranteed by the Powers. What a farce it is to say Egypt
ceded Kassala!
The escaped party, I mentioned as having come in, have arrived at the
Palace, nine soldiers, eight women, and two slaves, all old friends,
also a _baby_! They say the Mahdi started with 40,000 Arabs and 1500
Regulars from Kordofan, that he has not now more than 5000 or 6000
Arabs, and 1000 soldiers (500 ran away), that they have no Dhoora, only
35 boxes (35,000 rds.) Remington cartridges, and 50 shells; they say
the other soldiers want to come in, either to-day or to-morrow. The
Mahdi says he will go against the English and will not stop at Kartoum.
The whole gang were shown themselves in the mirrors. Such a display of
ivories was never seen. The baby danced with delight, at seeing itself,
_for the first time_, it was like a black slug. The _mother_ was, of
course, delighted.
The Arab horsemen cut the telegraph which goes out of the lines at
Bourré to the North Fort. I declined to allow its repair since I had
lost a major and had six men wounded when last we went out of the
lines, and besides which I had another cable to the north side. No
sentries at the North Fort or Bourré, or on the Mudirat; these people
are enough to break any one’s heart. Fortunately, from the roof of the
Palace one watches all these things, and can bully them into obeying
orders, but it is (as Hansall says[155]) a _vie abrutissante_, to be
always snarling and growling. The _Ismailia_ and _Husseinyeh_ went
down the river, and saw no Arabs on either bank. If these Arabs (one’s
servants) are not _eating_, they are _saying_ their _prayers_; if
not _saying their prayers_, they are _sleeping_; if not _sleeping_,
they are _sick_. One snatches at them at intervals. Now figure to
yourself the position; you cannot do anything with them while in these
fortresses _eating_, _saying prayers_, _sleeping_, or _sick_, and they
know it. You would be a brute if you did (which I fear I often am).
You want to send an immediate order, and there is your servant bobbing
up and down, and you cannot disturb him. It is a beautiful country for
trying experiments with your patience.
It is very curious, but if I am in a bad temper, which I fear is
often the case, my servants will be always at their prayers, and thus
religious practices follow the scale of my temper; they are pagans if
all goes well.
[Illustration]
I must say I hate our diplomatists. I think with few exceptions they
are arrant humbugs, and I expect they know it. I include the Colvin
class. The Rothschilds are, I feel assured, giving Her Majesty’s
Government a lot of bother about the Finance Question. If you had asked
... at Balaklava the price of a cheese, he would have said £5 5_s._ If
you asked him now you would offend him.
* * * * *
_October 24._—Arab church parade. Mahomet Achmet and Faki Mustapha,
few in number, at Waled a Goun, the Arabs have divided their camp,
putting the regulars near the river, in camp apart from theirs, to act
as buffers if any attack is made on them.
The Arabs have got a nuggar at Giraffe. A man of Zubair’s old force has
come in from the Arabs. To-morrow expires the six months for which the
notes were issued. We have been boxed up 226 days (seven and a half
months); siege of Troy.
The man who came in (Zubair’s old soldier) was one of Lupton’s men
from the Bahr Gazelle; he left five months ago (Bahr Gazelle). He says
Lupton is at Shaka, and is Sheikh Abdullah, so he has changed his
religion.[156] I wonder what has become of the garrison of the Equator.
Another man has come in.
All that bloodshed in fighting the slave dealers in the Bahr Gazelle
has gone, apparently, for nothing![157] There are great doubts if the
Mahdi is really near, no one appears to have seen him.
Since the escape of the lot yesterday, the Arabs have taken the rifles
of the regulars from them: at the Mahdi’s camp, the Arabs have a ferry
under our nose, across the White Nile; but I do not like to send up the
steamers, for the captains are so heedless.
I calculated that the advance force of troops arrived at Wady Halfa on
22nd September,[158] that they took twenty days from there to Debbeh,
so that on 12th October they were at Debbeh (Stewart (_D.V._) arrived
at Debbeh on 28th September), and I calculate they could not be at
Metemma—Shendy—before 10th November, which will give them twenty-nine
days for 150 miles, thence it is five days here for a steamer, so that
15th November ought to see them or their advance guard.
Extracts from Appendix R.
_La Route de Souakim à Berber._
Avant que la bataille de Tamai eut été livrée et gagnée, le Général
Herbert Stewart, sinon les généraux Graham et Buller, avaient étudié
avec soin la question de savoir si les troupes, ou une partie
des troupes, pouvaient marcher jusqu’à Berber _pour aider Gordon
à réprimer les partisans du Mahdi dans la région du Nil_. Cette
proposition semblait alors si convenable que l’état des troupes
les mieux adaptées à une semblable expédition, les dispositions
pour les approvisionnements, l’équipement, les chevaux disponibles,
etc., avaient été l’objet de l’étude journalière des officiers. On
se souviendra qu’après Tamai, la cavalerie se transporta aux puits
d’Handouk, à huit milles de Souakim. On croyait généralement, alors,
que cette marche en avant n’était que la première étape d’un mouvement
sur Berber d’une force montée. Pour empêcher toute souffrance
provenant d’une disette d’eau, l’effectif ne devait pas être de plus
de 500 hommes de cavalerie; aucune infanterie ne devait faire partie
de l’expédition. Il était en outre entendu, qu’en cas de nécessité, un
semblable effectif pourrait suivre un jour ou deux après et trouverait
également, dans les puits, de l’eau en abondance. Le fait est que
les généraux Graham, Buller, Stewart, les colonels Clery, Taylor,
et d’autres, semblaient ne pas mettre en doute, si l’ordre en était
donné, qu’une succession de détachements, forts chacun de 500 hommes,
pourrait être rapidement poussée sur Berber. Le bruit de ce qui se
passait parvint rapidement aux oreilles de nos hommes qui étaient à
la Zariba d’Handouk, et la plupart des troupiers manifestèrent un
désir intense de prendre part à l’expédition. On savait que le Général
Stewart avait soumis ses plans pour la marche en avant au Général
Graham, et que ce dernier, ainsi que l’Amiral Hewett, les avait
recommandés au gouvernement. _Les jours se succédèrent, mais l’ordre
du départ n’arrivait pas: quelque empressés de partir que fussent
beaucoup d’hommes, si nous avions connu alors la position exacte
de Gordon, on eût manifesté beaucoup plus d’anxiété pour l’ordre
du départ._ Lorsque cette question était discutée, question qui au
moment occupait pleinement nos pensées, entre officiers supérieurs,
ils exprimaient l’étonnement que l’ordre fut tant retardé, et que
le Gouvernement hésitât davantage. _On n’arrivait qu’à une seule
conclusion, c’était que la position du Général Gordon était telle
qu’il n’avait pas besoin d’aide de troupes britanniques venant de
Souakim._ Quoi qu’en ait pu penser, après réflexion, le Général
Graham, de la possibilité d’envoyer une troupe de cavalerie forte de
500 hommes, en mars dernier, de Souakim à Berber, je suis certain
que lui et la plupart des officiers sous ses ordres croyaient alors
que c’était une chose sage et guerrière à entreprendre. Nous nous
apercevons tous trop tard, que cette simple expédition eût sauvé
Berber, Khartoum et Gordon au vrai cœur.
If they do not come before 30th November the game is up, and Rule
Britannia. In this calculation I have given every latitude for
difficulties of transport, making forts, &c., and on the 15th November
I ought to see Her Majesty’s uniform. I suppose a part of the force
will go to attack Berber on the 10th November (when I calculate they
will be at Metemma—Shendy), and that a small party will come on here;
so we have now 7 days in October and 15 days in November to wait = 22
days—three weeks to add to the 226 days we have already passed, owing
to Baring (who I shall remember) and his peace manœuvres. One of the
papers Slatin sent to me, says that Graham was willing to send men to
Berber, and could have done it; but Evelyn would not give the order. I
asked only for 200 men to be sent there (vide my telegram in Stewart’s
Journal). I take Slatin’s paper out of Appendix R, and put it on the
other side.[159] I do not know the date, but I declare that, if my
telegrams to Baring are made known, it will be proved Baring knew up to
the 12th March the exact position of affairs up here; and therefore,
if there was an impression abroad that I did not say, “Send troops
(200) to Berber,[160] or you will lose it,” he must have suppressed my
telegrams.
I dwell on the joy of never seeing Great Britain again, with its
horrid, wearisome _dinner_ parties and miseries. How we can put up with
those things passes my imagination! It is a perfect bondage. At those
dinner parties we are all in masks, saying what we do not believe,
eating and drinking things we do not want, and then abusing one
another. I would sooner live like a Dervish with the Mahdi, than go out
to dinner every night in London. I hope, if any English general comes
to Kartoum, he will not ask me to dinner. Why men cannot be friends
without bringing the wretched stomachs in, is astounding.
_October 25._—Three men came in from Waled a Goun; one I sent out
again, as I think he is a spy, the other reports that the small
captured steamer _Mahomet Ali_ will be down at Giraffe with twelve boat
loads of grain, either to-day or to-morrow. I do not even attempt to
stop it; for if the expeditionary force arrives, we will capture it; I
cannot risk steamers against land guns.
Two soldiers came in from the Arabs at Omdurman with their rifles.
A lot of people are moving from the right bank of Nile, towards the
Sheikh el Obeyed’s (the _man_ not the _city_). Are they leaving on
account of the advance of the troops? or is it for offensive purposes?
or is it a raid which is returning from pillage? We sent up the
steamers and stopped the Arab ferry near the lines. The Arabs are
retaliating by putting a gun or two in the old place near the large
tree (el Sheddarah). The Arabs fired four shells at the steamers.
Soldiers at Omdurman captured two cows, and killed two others. Another
slave came in at Omdurman. Yesterday some cows were captured near the
South Lines.
[Illustration]
What would be the best plan of attacking the Arabs? The object is to
give them such a crushing defeat as will put an end to the fighting,
and prevent them rallying on Kordofan. The position is thus:—
1. I would attack Waled a Goun at A, and I would cut off his retreat by
the sending up steamers to Duem with a small force; the Mahdi’s force
and Sheikh el Obeyed’s force would look on.
2. At the same time I would attack the post at Giraffe. Both operations
on the same day with the following troops.
_Operations on White Nile._—To proceed up the White Nile by boats,
2000 B. infantry to point X. To proceed along the White Nile, right
bank, the cavalry you may have to point X. To occupy with two guns and
1500 men simultaneously the two villages outside the lines, with the
Soudan troops, the troops not to advance, only to threaten, houses
loop-holed, &c. Three steamers to accompany the force.
_Operations on Blue Nile._—To proceed up the Blue Nile or along the
bank, 1000 B. infantry, accompanied by steamers and boats, with the
Shaggyeh horsemen, some 80, and 1000 men of Soudan troops to Giraffe.
If these operations are successful, then 800 men with four steamers to
pursue up the river to Duem.
_Expedition towards Sennaar._—The Sheikh el Obeyed will probably
surrender at once, then a force of 500 B. I. and 1000 Soudan infantry
should go up river to Wad el Medinet, and open the route to Sennaar
(while men are sent up to buy corn with them). There appear to be no
Arabs in arms between Wad el Medinet and Sennaar, or south of Sennaar.
(The Mahdi will at once retreat to Obeyed, _the city_.) This expedition
will probably be met at Abou Haraz by the surrender of Katarif and all
that district, and thus the route to Katarif and Kassala will be opened.
These operations will entail the very smallest amount of marching on
the troops, and would be completed in three weeks or less.
It must be remembered that in all these engagements in the Soudan
no quarter on either side has been given, so it must not be expected
that the Soudan troops will give it now if you come; also with respect
to the wounded Arabs, if you go and help them, they will (like the
Afghans) try and kill your men who make the effort; they are very
treacherous, and, worked up by religious frenzy, they think—1. That
you only pretend to help them, in order to kill them afterwards; 2.
That, being desperate, they think to enter Paradise if they kill an
infidel. It seems rather cold-blooded to write this, but it is the
character of those whom you are to fight. For my part, I hope they
will all run away, for they are only dupes ninety-nine out of every
hundred; it is the leaders who are the prime movers. I would give the
lives to the leaders if they ask pardon; but I would send them all to
Mecca to study Mahdism under the Orthodox. No information as yet as to
the meaning of the caravan, &c., which left the Nile to go towards the
Sheikh el Obeyed. One of our boats, which was collecting grass down
below Halfeyeh, must needs land its crew and try and take some cattle
of the caravan. The Arabs turned on them, and killed the Reis. Crew
says they killed a lot of Arabs (?). I think these people do really
love fighting, if there is the least chance of plunder.
King John (according to the Greek consul) is to be allowed to import
arms at Massowah. He will never do it, for he has not money to buy them.
If the Mahdi has got the Bahr Gazelle, and we evacuate the Soudan in
his favour, the Anti-Slavery Society may as well close their office as
to the suppression of the slave-trade in these parts, especially if we
leave him the steamers.[161]
Special Commission, House of Lords.... under examination, Q. 2389.
Did your Lordship know, when in Cairo, that the Fellaheen were being
dragged in chains, from their houses, to go and fight the Mahdi, under
Hicks, and what steps did you take to prevent it?[162] Did you inform
Her Majesty’s Government of the facts, and what was their answer?
The Mahdi has moved his ferry higher up river since our steamers went
up this morning.
It is a great question of doubt to me, if Public Officials ought to
so sink their personality, as to allow themselves to overlook facts,
which must strike them, as being not only evil, but also detrimental
to our national interests, merely because such facts are likely to be
disagreeable to our Government in requiring them to decide on difficult
questions. ... did know of this forced conscription, and so did.... Did
they not see that, to allow such conscripts to go up to the Soudan,
was not only cruel, but also politically unwise, for it could not be
expected that they would have any heart in the matter? If they had
stopped it, Hicks would have never left Kartoum, and his army would not
have been annihilated; for it is the defeat of Hicks which gave the
Mahdi his great prestige. He had annihilated detachments _before that:
after that_ he had crushed a huge army. See what it has led to! There
are times when men like ... ought to obey, and there are times when
they ought to disobey or else resign. Now, if ... had only hinted his
resignation, the Governments were so placed as to be obliged to listen
to him. I have a strong suspicion ... did know how to act. It was ...
and a wish to be agreeable to Her Majesty’s Government which prevented
him acting according to his own ideas. Sometimes it is the height of
unkindness to be too kind and amiable, and this is one of those cases.
History may be misty about it (will not know the thimble the pea is
under, for the cards are well shuffled), but there is no doubt that ...
had the destinies of Egypt and of the Soudan in his hands, _far more
than Her Majesty’s Government_, and he did not succeed. His amiability
did for him. It is _not insubordinate_ to resign, if you do not agree
to a policy, or feel you cannot carry it out with a whole heart. In
military affairs it is different; one is ordered to go here and there,
and one obeys (even if one thinks it is unwise, having represented
it), but in Diplomacy there is no such call, and certainly there was
none in the case of ... who is only an amateur in the Foreign Office
Service, an outsider. Had ... when he came to Egypt cut down the rate
of interest by a swoop of his pen to 3½ per cent., who would have
said a word; but now it is the difficulty. There would have been a
fearful howl from the bondholders, but that would have been all. He
dismissed the Control (under the _cover_ of Towfik), and could have
reduced the interest, and he would have gained the sympathy of all the
people. Hicks (who, by the way, never wanted to go to the Soudan) would
have held his own at Kartoum, and have worn out the Mahdi, and we would
have had none of this late work. I am afraid to say what numbers have
been killed through this present policy, certainly some 80,000; and it
is not yet over. For my part, I hope they will all run away. We have in
a most effectual way restored the slave-trade and slave-hunting, for
Her Majesty’s Government cannot keep the Soudan, and never will Egypt
be able to govern it. The only thing to be done, is to give it to the
Sultan. What an end to diplomacy of Her Majesty’s Government: and it
was so easy when I left in January, 1880, to have settled it quietly,
_giving up Kordofan, Darfur_, and _Bahr Gazelle_, and _Equator_, with
decency and quiet.
I declare I do not see how we will get out of it (the Soudan) even
now; allow that you come to Kartoum, that you drive off the Arabs, open
the road to Sennaar. What are you going to do? You will say, “Take out
those who wish to leave.” Well, you begin with Sennaar, and of course
will have to fight all the way down. It will take three months. During
those three months, how are you to feed Kartoum? for the moment you
leave Sennaar you leave your granary. You get to Kartoum, you are face
to face with 30,000 people who will not leave, and who are hedging with
the Mahdi; and with 3000 Shaggyeh, all armed. You fight your way to
Berber; another three months, you have no food at Berber; then it will
need another two months to get to Dongola, which (seeing your policy)
will be hostile. It is indeed a terrible problem, and I wish I could
see my way out of it.
Then you come into the hot months, and low Nile. This time _next year_
will not see you out of the Soudan, with decency. Of course you can
go back now, but what was the use of coming? _I will not allow that
you came for_ ME. _You came for the garrisons of the Soudan._ Now, by
the Turkish arrangement, if you act promptly, you can get away quietly
in January, 1885. It will not cost anything like what it will cost
you to keep your troops here for a year, as I fear you must do if you
persevere in trying a “_rapid retreat_.”
I can have no object in this advice. I want to get out of the affair,
but with decency. I regret the necessity of an expedition, but if
once you come to Berber, and communicate with Kartoum, if you stick
to the “_rapid retreat_.” you will not be able to accomplish it, and
you are in for a year’s stay. While, on the other hand, the giving of
country to Turks enables you to get away with credit. Let Her Majesty’s
Government _find excuses_ for it, it will not be difficult for _them_.
Put yourself in my position if you say “_rapid retreat, and leave
Sennaar to its fate_.” I will say “_No, I would sooner die first_,” and
will resign my commission, for I could not do it. If you say, “_Then
you are no longer_ Governor-General,” then I am all right, and all the
responsibility is on you (for I could not be supposed, if you turn me
out of Governor-General, to be obliged to aid such a movement, which I
think is disgraceful). You will then be face to face with the people. I
do not say but that Abdel Kader might not aid in the “_rapid retreat_”
better than I could, even if I agreed to it (of this you can judge for
yourself, at any rate I shall be out of it, and of my engagement to the
people).
It may be that all this writing is unnecessary, and that you
have other views, but it is as well you know my opinions. _I am
secure against any loss, by the King of the Belgians, if I leave
H.M.S., therefore I am, so to say, free of H.M.S. If you turn me
out of Governor-General I am relieved from all responsibility, as
to your action in Soudan, towards the people._ I do not think I am
insubordinate in this matter, nor unreasonable. I do not say I would
not give _all my services in a subordinate position_ to aid you, but
it would be against my grain and be very distasteful, and must NOT be
in POSITION of GOVERNOR-GENERAL, that must be a _sine quâ non_, and
it must be known that I disapprove of the “_rapid retreat_.”[163] I
would not say this if I was not convinced that the “_rapid retreat_”
is an operation of such difficulty as to make every Englishman akin,
and bound to aid one another. If I was Lord Wolseley _I would make_ Her
Majesty’s Government send the Turks here.
I do not advocate the keeping of the Soudan by us, it is a useless
possession, and we could not govern it, neither can Egypt (after the
late events). I am only discussing how _to get out of it_ in _honour
and in the cheapest way_ (we must remember we caused its troubles),
and that way is, either by some sort of provisional Government under
Zubair, or by giving it to the Turks; it is simply a question of
GETTING OUT OF IT with decency. Zubair would square the Shaggyeh and
townspeople and arrange with the Mahdi, and you could get away. He
might hold his own if you gave the Mahdi a good defeat ere you left;
at any rate it is only by Zubair or the Turks you will get out of the
Soudan before November 1885!!!!!
The Turks are the best solution, though most expensive. _They would
keep the Soudan_: give them £2,000,000. The next best is Zubair with
£500,000, and £100,000 a year for two years; he will keep the Soudan
_for a time_. (In both cases slave trade will flourish), thus you will
be quiet in Egypt, and will be able to _retreat to Egypt in January,
1885. If you do not do this_, then be prepared for a _deal of worry and
danger_, and your campaign will be _entirely unprofitable and devoid
of prestige_,[164] for the day after you leave Kartoum the Mahdi will
walk in and say he drove you out, which is not pleasant in India or
elsewhere.
In discussing this question I have entirely put my own peculiar views
out of the question: to give up countries which are to some degree
civilised, which, if properly governed, are quiet and orderly, to the
Turks or to Zubair, and to allow of the slave trade to flourish again
in tenfold intensity, is not a very high _rôle_, but _quoi faire_? We
have not the men to govern these lands, we cannot afford the money;
consequently, I advise what I have said. When I left the Soudan it
was quiet and covered its expenses, and there was no bother to have
continued to have governed it. Now it is different, and would need an
outlay which our Government will not give. (It is because the cloth is
short I recommend the shape of coat to be such.)
It would be nobler to keep the Soudan, but it is too much to expect our
taxpayers to agree to (and besides which, ‘Plutarch’s Lives’ are no
longer in vogue, and “_you must pay me well ere I go to the Soudan_” is
the idea). The Soudan could (if cut off from excrescences) be made to
pay its expenses, but it would need a _dictator_, and I would not take
the post if offered to me.
* * * * *
_October 26._—Three women came in from Waled a Goun. The idea is
gaining ground that the Mahdi is dead, and that his Vakeel is acting
his part. The Arabs are thinking of placing a station at Kerowé.
Yesterday week was the anniversary of Hicks’s defeat, 1st November,
1883, though I believe it went on for three days, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
November.
The Arabs have brought a gun nearer Bourré to-day, probably emboldened
by absence of the steamers. Two lieutenants, one sergeant-major, two
serjeants, one soldier, and one slave came into Omdurman from the Arab
camp. They say the Mahdi is alive; with him are Saleh Pasha, in chains,
Hussein Pasha Khalifa, Elias Pasha, and all the Europeans. They heard
a report (now some days old) that the Expeditionary Force was two days
distant from Berber. The two lieutenants were with Hicks; they say the
army died of thirst, and scarcely fought at all. With the Mahdi are
5000 men, of which 1000 are black troops, 150 are Egyptian troops.
What little weight do engineers place on the existence of populations
in fortresses, yet this existence is all-important; more so than the
works. Malta and Gibraltar are weak, because of their civil population.
The Arabs have a big tent at Giraffe this evening. The lieutenants who
came in say the Mahdi will try and place a station in the place we
drove them out of—on the North Front—in August last, just before our
defeat at El foun. Goba, with the exception of Mahomed Seyd Osman’s
house and the Mosque, is destroyed. Salaam Pasha’s is nearly so.
8 P.M.—Two slaves have come into Omdurman. They say “_the regulars_
in the camp of Mahomet Achmet, _the Mahdi, went this afternoon_ to the
Dem, or camp of _Faki Mustapha_, and looted it, firing on the soldiers
of Faki Mustapha, who resisted the plundering.” I fear it is all fudge.
* * * * *
_October 27._—One sergeant-major and two slaves came into Omdurman
this morning. Sent out two spies towards Shendy.
One thing which (although spiteful) would cause me intense pleasure if
the “_rapid retreat_” is carried out, is that the English would just
walk into those Shaggyeh and Bashi Bazouks, and bundle them all out,
and thus pay them out for the worry they have given me, and for their
meanness.
If the Turks come here, you would have scarcely anyone to send down,
and you would hand over the Shaggyeh and Bashi Bazouks to the Turks,
and all the Divans, &c. Nothing then could be better for you than to
get the Turks here. You would get off all responsibility of Kassala and
Sennaar, and you would let the Turks and the King of Abyssinia settle
about the _Hewitt Treaty_. You would also get off the bother of the
Equator and Bahr Gazelle, if it has not fallen.
You would know exactly what sum you had to pay, and save no end of
expense and time and vexation with regard to the settlement of claims.
Remember that Baring authorised me to draw more than £100,000; indeed,
he said, “Such sum as you need.” So you are responsible for paper-money
issued.
You would make up with the Sultan, and, as for giving up Suakin and
Massowah to the Turks it is nothing; for those ports are useless,
except as ports of the Soudan, and would be a bother to you to keep,
if the Mahdi has the Soudan. You would be always in strict blockade on
land side.[165]
The more I think of it the more the Turk solution appears Hobson’s
choice. I can see no option, unless, ere you arrived at Kartoum,
Kartoum fell, and then, even, it would not look well to go back from
Berber, while that even would be dangerous to some degree; for the
Dongola people would see you meant to evacuate, and would be hostile.
You have gone so far and spent so much that I cannot see anything for
it but to go on. And the Turks are the only solution which affords the
certainty of being able to stop. I get out of all my troubles if the
Turks come, for I shunt them on the Turks, and so do you. The idea is
that when the English come here the Arabs will bolt.
Stewart’s servant, Macktar, must needs go and marry another wife. How
they can go on like this, marrying and giving in marriage, when one can
never say, that to-morrow is our own, is wonderful. Tangi has taken two
wives up here!
The Government shall not get out of the desertion of Kassala (if they
take cover under the Hewitt Treaty and say, “we arranged with the
King of Abyssinia to look after that country”), if they do desert it,
for the King will never move, and all who have ever known anything of
Abyssinia must know he can never move. There is a report in town that
Slatin has been put in chains. I should not be at all surprised.
The sergeant-major, soldiers, and two men, Shaggyeh, who came in
to-day, say that Slatin is not a prisoner. The sergeant-major states
that one of our soldiers escaped from Omdurman three days ago. On
inquiry, I find that it is true, and the officer in command never
reported it. The sergeant-major says the Arabs meditate an attack on
Omdurman, in consequence of what the deserter told them. This is the
_fourth_ desertion since March that I know of, and it is the _first_
desertion among the soldiers (with saving clause) that I know of. Arabs
fired on the Santels[166] at the end of the lines on the White Nile,
and struck one. The Arabs fired fourteen times with Krupp guns; they
retired when we fired twice on them; they fired from their old battery
near the Tree “el Sheddarah.” Some time ago I gave Ferratch Pasha £100
a month, and I afterwards made him a Ferile, or General of Division,
for political reasons. He had the cheek to ask me to give him £150
a month (the sum I used to give the Seraskier or Commander-in-Chief
in the Soudan in old times, but which was £50 beyond regulation). He
put in an application a few days ago for the £150, and forage for
eight horses! Quite ignoring the state of the Dhoora exchequer, I
said, “Wait.” He was foolish enough to renew the application, which I
tore up. He may go to the Arabs if he likes. The Arabs appear to be
passing the Blue Nile at Giraffe, they may be going to place a post at
Halfeyeh, the Sheikh el Obeyed refusing to send his men there, we shall
see to-morrow. It is not from any feeling of respect to the people up
here that I urge their relief, but it is because they are such a weak
selfish lot, and because their qualities do not affect the question of
our duties to them. The Redemption would never have taken place if it
had depended on our merits.
I must say I rather revel at the thought of the dismay which will
attend the reduction of salaries to quarter their present rate, they
have been so very selfish about these things. I believe if the Mahdi
would only give them half the present rate, they would go to the Mahdi,
but the Mahdi’s service is _gratuitous_, so there is no fear of that.
I go out, a black Bashi Bazouk addresses me on the inadequacy of his
pay and rations. I whisper to him, “_Go to Sheikh el Obeyed_,” he grins
and evaporates. I do not care a bit now. We must either be relieved,
or fall, before the end of November, or at the end of November. I am
meditating the sending down of “_Husseinyeh_” with this post; if the
Arabs come to Halfeyeh I then cut off all hopes of our escape, for the
_Ismailia_ steamer would not be fit to go down to Berber. The financial
affairs up here will be a precious job.
It amuses me to find people here holding on to the delusion that the
old state of affairs is likely to come back as to the Government, and
saying, “You are going to stay with us as Governor-General, and things
are to be as of old.” I answer, “I would not take you again at any
price after your meanness.” They say, “Oh, yes, the people are not well
behaved, &c., &c., but you will stay _for the glory of God_” (_i.e._
our interests). They are an amusing lot: Allah on lips, self interest
at heart, and such self interest, as is _positively naked_, and they
even laugh at it.
A soldier and a slave came in to-night to Omdurman. They say the Mahdi
is undecided what to do. The regulars with the Mahdi have been robbing
the Arabs, so the Mahdi has taken away their arms.
Spy in from Sennaar fifteen days ago with letters,[167] which say
Sennaar is all right. This was in answer to a letter I sent to Sennaar
saying, “Expedition was on its way to relieve the _garrisons, so
Sennaar depends on me to see after it_.”
* * * * *
_October 28._—The man who came from Sennaar says the Mahdi has ordered
all the Arabs to congregate at Kartoum from all parts. Sheikh el Obeyed
has made a station close to Giraffe, on right bank of Blue Nile. They
have two boats plying across the river, taking corn from Sheikh el
Obeyed to Waled a Goun. Arabs had a reconnoitring party in the ruins of
Omdurman village this morning.
One lieutenant, one sergeant-major, four soldiers, and one boatman
came in this morning from the Arabs at Omdurman. Rumour says the
steamers have been looting Shendy (I hope that it will be remembered
none of the Egyptian soldiers, officers, or Pashas are to come up here
again). The boatman left Berber six days ago. He says the Arabs at
Berber have sent the captured money, &c., of Berber into the desert;
that Seyd Mahomet Osman, with a mixed force, were two days’ march
from El Damer; that the five steamers have brought Shendy, &c., into
subjection; that the road from here to Shendy is free of Arabs, who
have gone into the desert; that only in a certain district _near_, but
_higher up_ than Shoboloha, there are marauding Arabs, but no great
number; that the _Abbas_ passed down safely; that the two boats which
had wood in them alone were captured, being abandoned on being emptied;
that at Dar Djumna a sheikh pretended to be friendly, and tried to
capture the steamer, which fired on the Arabs, and killed a lot; that
three spies from Seyd Mahomet Osman were captured trying to communicate
with Dongola, and were executed; that _a man went with a camel from
Berber to Dar Djumna, and came back in one day_; that the expeditionary
force is at Dar Djumna. The officer reports the Mahdi most undecided,
one hour disarming the regulars, and at another hour arming them; the
Arabs deserting, and others joining the Mahdi day after day.
A mine was exploded by a man on the North side, and I hear he is
dangerously wounded, if not dead. On questioning the boatman again he
explained the _Dar Djumna_ is not the cataract, but is a place (near
the cataract, just below Berber) one-and-a-half days from Berber. They,
the expeditionary force, had eight steamers (one, the old screw boat
of Dongola, I had towed up from Wady Halfa in 1878). The man said the
_Abbas_ went on to Dongola (why was it not sent up with the others?). I
have given half month’s pay to all ranks below sergeant-major. I only
owe them now half month’s pay.
If the General of the expeditionary force has sent up a force, _by Nile
to Berber, to take Berber_, and _then_ if he marches across with _bulk
of force_ from Merowé, in my humble opinion he has done the right thing.
[Illustration]
If Berber had not been taken it would have been a picnic. Baring!!
Baring!![168]
The force going up Nile from Merowé to Berber would have pretty
well quieted the banks of the Nile, for the _triangle_ contained by
_Merowé_, _Abou Hamed_, and _Berber_, so that the bulk of the force,
moving from Merowé to the captured Berber, would only be exposed to
attacks from the south flank, where there are few people. My experience
is that whenever you can possibly do so, never expose yourself to be
attacked on all points of the compass; at any rate secure yourself on
_one flank_. The force advancing up the Nile were protected on one
flank, the Nile; that going across from Merowé to Berber, will be
protected on the north flank by the subjugated triangle. Arabs this
evening appear not to intend to come to Halfeyeh. They have a station
at Giraffe, and another at Kokoo, which is nearly opposite Giraffe, on
right bank of Blue Nile. (End of this _blotting paper_!)[169]
Ferratch Pasha tried again in a roundabout way to get the £150 a
month, forage (_i.e._ Dhoora) for four horses, and rations for ten men;
he utterly failed, and had to content himself with £100 a month: they
are a mean lot. (_Do not let any of those Egyptians_ in the steamers
_come back here_ is my earnest prayer.) (Floyer will be furious at
this misuse of telegraph forms.)[170] I am truly delighted that the
_Abbas_ did not leave the Greeks behind, and only abandoned the boats
carrying wood. I hope in fourteen days to have another sister steamer
to _Abbas_ and _Husseinyeh_ completed. I have told them to rivet her
only six inches above water line, and to put holdfast rivets for the
upper portion which is above water, and which does not require to be
watertight.
They say that the _Fascher_[171] steamer had a gun on her; she went
aground near Abou Shourim (the Father of the Truth), and got delayed in
her pursuit of the _Abbas_. The man wounded by the mine is wounded in
the head, chest, and legs; there is not much hope of his recovery.
Awaan (Stewart’s friend, the secretary of Arabi) is behaving very badly
in prison; he was put in chains by mistake and released, but it has
had no effect: he abuses the soldiers. I expect he wrote to the Mahdi
and told him of Stewart’s departure and of the “Journal.” His arrest
is said to have been of great effect in the town; he is said to have
preached for a long time in favour of the Mahdi.
* * * * *
_October 29._—To-day, year 1301 A.H., is said to be about the date
of Hicks’s disaster; it was on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd November, but with
the Arabs it was the 12th, 13th, 14th Moharrem. The news was known in
Cairo three weeks after the event occurred; _since that date up to this
date_ nine people have come up as reinforcements—myself, Stewart,
Herbin, Hussein, Tongi, Ruckdi, and three servants, and not one penny
of money.[172] Of those who came up, two, Stewart and Herbin, have
gone down: Hussein is dead, so six of the reinforcements alone remain,
while we must have sent down over 1500 and 700 soldiers, total 2200,
including the two Pashas, Ibrahim Hardar, and Hussein Cheri, Coetlogon,
&c. The regulars, who were in arrears of pay for three months when
I came, are now only owed half a month, while the Bashi-Bazouks are
owed only a quarter month, and we have some £500 in the treasury. It
is quite a miracle. We have lost two battles, suffering severe losses
in those actions of men and arms, and may have said to have scrambled
through, for I cannot say we can lay claim to any great success during
the whole time. Things apparently went against us when we thought we
were getting the best of it.
[Illustration]
I believe we have more ammunition, Remington (though we have fired
three million rounds at the Arabs), and more soldiers now, than when
I came up. We have every reason to thank God for His protection. We
had many untoward and unexpected misfortunes; the death of Berzati
Bey[173] at Gitana; the almost unprofitable first trip of steamers to
Sennaar, and their useless delay; our defeat (after El foun victory),
by which we lost the active part of our troops, and our fighting
Pasha, Mahomet Ali; the surrender of Saleh Pasha and 1500 men, with
the capture of the _Mahomet Ali_ steamer; the fall of Berber, with
two steamers lost. It is really very wonderful that, with such few
successes and so many heavy disasters, we should be in the position
we are now. Of the reinforcement, Stewart and Tongi got wounded. We
have lost three steamers, two at Berber and one at the Blue Nile, and
we have built another, the _Husseinyeh_, and hope to have another
finished in a fortnight, which makes our loss only one. The defeat
near El foun brought about the arrival here of the Mahdi, which might
have been very serious, but his arrival has been apparently rendered
innocuous. We have £40,000 in Treasury IN PAPER, and £500. When I came
up, there was £5000 in Treasury. We have £15,000 out in the town in
paper money. When I came, we had two Pashas, _Ibrahim Hardar_, _Hussein
Cheri_; we have now two, _Ferratch_ and _Nutzer Pasha_. Two women,
wives of the men who escaped yesterday (with another very small brown
baby), came into Omdurman to-day. They say the Arabs are very angry
about the desertions; also a boy came in. It would seem, looking over
the past months, that, if taken in detail, events have been very much
against us; while, if taken generally, we have been most successful. I
always had an idea we would not be allowed any success which we could
impute to ourselves; that events would be so ruled that we should just
_scramble_ through and have nothing to boast of. Mahomet Ali Pasha’s
defeat was owing to his and his men and the people of Khartoum’s desire
to _loot_ Sheikh el Obeyed (the _man_, not the city). It was against my
grain, for I wanted to capture Berber, which was the proper military
operation to undertake; it was only because they were so anxious, and
represented the affair as so easy, that I consented to it. Perhaps, if
_we_ had taken Berber, Her Majesty’s Government would have said that
no expedition was necessary for the _relief of the garrisons_; but it
would not have been correct to reason thus, for, though Berber might
have been taken, we could not have garrisoned it; and it would have
been a barren victory, and not have done much towards the solution of
the Soudan problem or withdrawal of the garrisons, while it might, on
the other hand, have stopped the expedition for _their relief_.
It is the Mahdi’s men who have made the station at Kokoo on right bank
of the Blue Nile opposite Giraffe, not the men of Waled a Goun; I
expect it is to overawe the Sheikh el Obeyed.
The Baggaras on the north side captured this morning three of the Arabs
(one is brother of the writer whose things were found on the bank,
and whom we supposed to have been murdered); they were stealing three
horses belonging to Saleh Pasha. A slave came in from the Arabs at
Omdurman; he says the Mahdi says, the Moharrem being a sacred month, he
does not mean to fight; he did not act on that view _in re_ Hicks; but
then Hicks attacked or tried to attack him.
Doubts are thrown on the veracity of that boatman, for he told some few
lies about how he went to Berber in a Government boat, which is not
true. However, his report cheered us for a time. Some one (Talleyrand?)
said, “If a lie got currency for twenty-four hours, it did its work.”
I am still of opinion, however, if the season was not so far advanced,
and the Nile on the fall, that the route by the Nile for a COVERING
force was a correct one, but it ought to have been undertaken in July
with a rising Nile.
[Illustration]
The three men caught to-day say the “_expeditionary force is still
at Debbeh_,” and I expect this is the truth, for the eight steamers
coming up the Nile is scarcely possible now, since the Nile is falling.
The distance direct from Kartoum to Debbeh is nearly 250 miles, and if
the Kababish are friendly, the road is not a bad one; however, I think
_Ambukol to Metemma_ (could the force know I had the five steamers at
Metemma) would be better, for it is only 150 miles, and from Debbeh
to Ambukol there is water transport. The road from Ambukol to Metemma
does not plunge so deeply into desert; indeed, _Merowé to Berber_, 150
miles, with water transport from Debbeh to Merowé, would be best of
all, if the force could cross the Nile at Berber. The only enemy the
force will meet with, on any of the three roads, are camel-men and
horsemen, till it arrives on the banks of the Nile.
* * * * *
_October 30._—This morning the Arabs came to Halfeyeh, capturing some
of our heedless people; whether they will stay there or not I do not
know—rumour says they are on their way to Shoboloha and Shendy to
repel the ravages of steamers.
You have the map made by railway engineers of the route from Ambukol
to Metemma, which must have all information, wells, &c., &c. I should
put five station forts along the line, and when I made my debouch
at Metemma I should split off one detachment to capture Berber, and
another towards Kartoum, taking care of any guns in Shoboloha defile
(during which passage I should march the men, and not leave them in the
steamers or boats). I would make my base at Metemma for all operations
in the Soudan connected with the Nile Valley—the numbers I have put
for the forts along road are probably in excess of what would be
required.
The Arab force which went towards the north (? Shendy) consists of 200
footmen, and 50 horse.
Two men came in from the south front—they say the Sheikh el Obeyed
is with the Mahdi; and Waled a Goun, and Abou Gugliz are at Giraffe.
I expect that the Arabs have captured one of our merchant’s boats at
Halfeyeh.
We have 1300 men in the North Fort, yet 250 Arabs went boldly across
our front to Halfeyeh, and we do not dare to show our noses; this
speaks for our _morale_.
A slave came in at Omdurman; he says the Mahdi says he will not fight
until after Moharrem (to-day is 12th Moharrem).
Arabs fired on the lines from near the White Nile to-day, but did no
harm. Not being able to sleep last night, I was late in getting up,
and consequently every one also slept and no proper look-out was kept
on the Arabs. I should think I had written twenty orders about their
keeping a look-out, but it is of no use. The Arabs have gone back to
Giraffe. I am going to make the officer of North Fort pay compensation
for the men wounded, and to the families of those killed, in this raid.
The map made by the railway engineers (1874-1875) must have every
information as to water supply on Ambukol-Metemma road.
In reality, the relief of the garrisons is only a question of
crossing over a _well-surveyed road_ of _150 miles_, at the end of
which are found _five steamers_ and _nine guns_: of course there is
a great deal of trouble in transport arrangements, but no particular
danger.
[Illustration]
_I believe we_ (_i.e._ those Shaggyeh) lost to-day twenty-three
soldiers taken prisoners, one killed, one wounded; seventeen cows, five
women, eight slaves, three donkeys, seven horses,[174] twenty-four
Remington rifles[175] captured; and this after I had repeatedly warned
them of an impending attack, and specially warned them last night after
the capture of the three spies. They, these Shaggyeh, number 1200;
on the other side, with 30 horses, the Arabs were not 200; they made
no attempt to defend themselves; dreadful lot, how I look forward to
their disbandment! Had I left them at Halfeyeh what a time I should
have had with them. The Arabs have paid us off with interest for our
cavalry raids of a few days ago. If any troops come up, as soon as the
environs are clear around Kartoum, I would recommend their immediate
disbandment. I cannot see any reason why the “_expedition for the
relief of the garrisons_” should not have _captured Berber_, and
_arrived at Kartoum on 10th November_ (Lord Mayor’s Show), which is
giving ample time; saying that troops did advance from Cairo on the
15th August, which I guess (from Kitchener’s laconic dispatch of 31st
August) was the case. That strong rumours could not have been known
at Debbeh (for at least twenty days) that Kartoum steamers were at
Metemma (plundering right and left) is most unlikely, even if my many
spies (sent with notes to this effect) did not get through one of their
number. These rumours should have pointed out that the Ambukol-Metemma
road was THE ROAD to follow[176]—even if not decided on before, which
is most probable.
ROUTE AMBUKOL TO METEMMA.—ITINERARY OF ARABS.
Ambukol to Nesgee 24 hours.
Nesgee to Om Halfa 12 ”
Om Halfa to Gakdal 12 ”
Gakdal to Klela Abou 18 ”
Abou Klela to Metemma 12 ”
—
Caravan 78 ”
Wells plentifully supplied.
_No wells of import on flanks._
I expect water can be found along Wadi Abou Gir, as water is found at
Kambok, which is on a higher level. I shall anticipate no danger for a
force of 200 men as far as Gebil Gelif well—that takes 60 miles off
this march of 150 and leaves 90 miles.
In the centre you have the wells Abou Halfa and Gakdul, 12 miles
apart. This central portion is distant Ambukol 80 miles, Metemma 65
miles. There appear no wells on flanks where Arabs can assemble in any
numbers.
_October 31._—Three men, soldiers, came in from the Arabs on the White
Nile last night. To-day it is 7-23/30 months, or 233 days, since the
Arabs appeared in our immediate neighbourhood, since which date we have
had no peace.
It will be bitter cold in the desert, and I think, of all the deserts,
that of Dongola is the coldest. I do not think I should send Nutzi
Pasha and the Egyptians you take out of the steamers down further than
Dongola, for the moment, for if you do you will put Dongola on the
_qui vive_ as to the evacuation. Certainly, for those who are for a
rapid retreat, having a _tête du pont_ (so to say) at Metemma, much
facilitates the movement; for the garrisons and the people of Kartoum
and Sennaar. Shendy-Metemma is evidently the chief strategical point
of the Soudan; for from it you reach Kartoum, Sennaar, and Berber by
water, and Kassala by the Atbara valley; but, short of making Fowler’s
railway to Shendy, I should prefer the making of stations along the
Nile, for a peace route and for small forces, as by the Nile you get
free of camel transport, which depends on the temper of the Arab
tribes; besides, the Nile route is cheaper, and could be put into
execution with one high Nile.
The three soldiers who came in last night have one sergeant-major
among them. He says Mahmound Khalifa wrote to his father, who is
with Mahomet Achmet, in which he says that the English General wants
him to get camels in great haste; that he is delaying as much as
possible; that the English General wants to go in one body; that he is
trying to get him to go in four bodies; _that Mahmound Khalifa_ is a
traitor, like all his family; and he should catch it, for I expect this
information is correct. The sergeant-major says that Mahmound Khalifa
is at Dongola or Debbeh. The Mahdi is going into a cave for this month
and next; he is now in his cave. All the Europeans are with the Mahdi
(not in the cave). Slatin is very good friends with the Mahdi, and
_sees him_ every day (?). (This is rather against the cave report.)
The mysterious Frenchman is not with the Mahdi, but in Kordofan. The
letter which I spoke of as coming from Mahmound Khalifa arrived at the
Mahdi’s camp fifteen days ago, so left Dongola about twenty-two days
ago (9th October). Can it be remembered whether at that time, viz. 9th
October, any altercation took place on subject of march?[177] In the
letter is a remark, that the English General said he wished “all to
go together, for he would not leave a sick man behind.” The man says,
Mahmound Khalifa wrote another letter to his father, stating the start
from Dongola towards Berber. I can produce the sergeant-major who gave
this information.
Church parade much as usual. I expect they exhibited the captives of
yesterday. It is extraordinary if we are employing Mahmound Khalifa,
when his father, Hussein Pasha Khalifa, is a _so-called_ prisoner of
the Mahdi. Stewart knows, I think, that the father gave up Berber by
more or less treachery.
I hope the Mudir of Dongola will look after this man. The
sergeant-major says “that the Mahdi declares” he will execute the
Sheikh el Islam (whom I put in prison) for preventing our surrendering,
by which bit of news _I read_ that an adherent of the Sheikh el Islam
got some friends of his to bribe the sergeant-major _to say this_ while
on his way to the Palace.
Three men more have come in—one sergeant, one corporal, and a
slave—from the Arabs at Omdurman. They say many Arabs leave daily for
Kordofan; the Mahdi has sent three companies of regulars to bring back
deserters; the Mahdi has been taking women from others, which makes the
Arabs doubt his holiness; he has only forty rounds for each Krupp gun,
of which he has two. The slave was a great fat bull-faced fellow. He
was honest, for when I asked him why he came here, he said, “because he
got so little to eat with the Arabs.” His appearance belied his words.
These men said nothing of the cave business. The living skeleton in
hospital (Stewart knows him) departed this life yesterday—I will not
say, deeply regretted, except by _me in a small way_, for I knew him so
long. It turns out that the Shaggyeh chief who commanded in the North
Fort slept in town the day before yesterday night, and so was absent at
yesterday morning’s catastrophe; also the officer Osman Bey, who went
down to Berber with steamers to escort the _Abbas_ past Berber, and who
let the _Fascher_ pursue the _Abbas_ never reported this man’s absence;
I have turned them out, and cut them each a month’s pay. (No sentry
as usual, on North Fort. They are incorrigible. 2 P.M. Though their
men have gone to look for missing rifles, I ordered them thirty blows:
_i.e._ the sentries.)
Two cows have kindly walked into Omdurman Fort. The Arabs fired a few
shots on the lines near the White Nile, which did not reach them; I
expect the Arab chiefs send out the regulars and tell them to fire on
the lines, and the regulars obey orders much as my orders are obeyed
here. The North Fort hate my telescope; day and night I work them. It
is one of Chevalier’s, of Paris, which I picked up here and gave £5
for, it is by far the best glass I ever saw. Commander J. Baker, R.N.,
has the _best_ opera-glasses; he got them from me at Berberah in 1878,
in exchange; they belonged to the Egyptian Government. It was the
father of Hussein Pasha Khalifa who led the Egyptians into the Soudan
in 1823. The family comes from Assouan, for this, the grant of monopoly
of commerce through Korosko desert was given to the family. It was
taken away from them in Ismail Pasha Ayoub’s time, about 1872, and I
restored it to them. I heard the Mahdi gave them this monopoly after
the fall of Berber, or rather agreed to their retaining it. I think
the only good one of the family was Sheikh Hamid, who died this year.
I sent the horsemen of these Shaggyeh out to the scene of yesterday’s
disaster; they recovered a horse! two donkeys! and three Remingtons!
and found the body of one of their slaves. I am going to make them pay
for the lost Remingtons, nineteen in number now. I cannot afford to
have Remingtons thrown away like that. This recalls to my mind how,
when I had 700 men in the North Fort, which consisted of two houses
distant sixty yards apart, the great Melon, who was in the house where
the telegraph office is, declined to open the door of his house and
sent a message to the other house, for fear of the Arabs, who were
camped three miles distant. It was like this:
I have ever felt the greatest insecurity respecting the lines, for I
believe one hundred determined men would carry them with ease, if they
made their attack on the Shaggyeh or Bashi Bazouk part. These creatures
used to shut themselves into the houses at about 7 P.M., and never go
out till it was broad daylight; they were not eighty yards from the
river. The Cairo Turkish Bashi Bazouks, the Shaggyeh, and the Fellaheen
soldiers, I will back against any troops in the world for _cowardice_!
I expect the reason why the Arabs did not take the three recaptured
horses was because they were as frightened nearly as our men (_vide_
p. 259); the worst of it is, that it is taken generally as a thing of
“_matter of course_” by the Kartoum people, and, one may say, officers;
no one is a bit put out or ashamed; it teaches no experience. _Vide_
the absence of sentries on the fort to-day, who, I expect, cannot sit
down over-comfortably to-night after their thirty blows.
[Illustration]
One cannot help feeling amused at these Shaggyehs, for they are the
most arrant braggadocios, as are the Cairo Turkish Bashi Bazouks, and
when you come up, if you do, you will see how they will exhibit. They
have little kettledrums about a span in diameter; whenever I hear them
I feel viciously inclined. This dates back many years. The Shaggyeh are
very quiet to-day; they are all boxed up in the houses; very few have
ventured out more than 2000 yards. The report is that they are ashamed,
which, if words could make them so, they ought to be; but I doubt it.
They have not beaten their kettledrums to-night; yes, they have begun
to beat them now. On one occasion, when I had two guns in their fort,
I had a truly miserable night; for a cow would have taken the fort,
though there were 1200 men in it. It was more for the guns than for
them that I was anxious. The horse, which was recovered to-day, was
saddled and _was_ bridled, but, like a wise brute, as he could not eat
with the bit in his mouth, he put his foot on the bridle and broke it
off. I telegraphed to the rider “that I felt sure he could not look him
in the face after leaving him out all night for nothing with the saddle
on.”[178]
* * * * *
_November 1._—The Arabs came up to their old fort in front of Bourré
this morning and fired a few shots; they did not stay five minutes
there. A Boulak Basha, his son, and two slaves came in to Omdurman
and report the Mahdi is in the cave; that Slatin has retained all his
property; that the Arabs continue to desert the Mahdi, who sends the
regulars after them; that the deserting Arabs fight the soldiers, and
have killed many of them; that the Arabs generally doubt the mission
of the Mahdi, and wish for the return of the Government. The Mahdi
is not going to fight during Moharrem and Saphia months. Two hundred
and fifty Arabs deserted yesterday. The Mahdi sent the regulars after
them, and four regulars were killed, and the deserters got away. Fifty
to one hundred per diem run away. These people are a fine lot. The
merchants of the market have been refusing to give more than three
and a-half reals for a sovereign, five to six reals being the proper
rate; so I captured nine of the chief of them, and have sent them to
the lines with a pretended order to send them out to Waled a Goun, but
with orders to keep them on the lines. I hope this will cure them. I
shall let them in again when they sign a paper agreeing to my terms.
Of course it is tyranny, but there is no other course to be pursued.
The nine culprits, three soldiers with fixed bayonets before, three
soldiers with ditto behind, and a mounted cavass on each flank, are
wending their way to the lines through the market. Quite a procession!
My servants are my staff. I never hear these sort of things from the
officials, who are bribed, I expect, to keep silence.
7 P.M. A small bright fire in direction of and below Halfeyeh, lasting
scarcely a minute. I flatter myself I keep a good look out.[179]
Two soldiers came to Omdurman, escaping from the Arabs this evening.
Nothing new.
One of the trying things of this existence is the way that one is
waylaid as one goes out with petitions for dhoora, and howled at. These
are the times when one feels _amiably_ disposed towards the gentlemen
who have ruled in Cairo for the last seven years.
* * * * *
_November 2._—Those men I sent out ostensibly to the Arabs have given
in, and I have let them back into town. I hate these coercive measures.
But what is to be done? This frightening them is better than putting
them in prison, or chaining them. No words are of any avail, or orders.
Two dervishes with their weapons presented themselves before lines this
morning, saying they had a letter from the Mahdi for me (at Mesalamieh
Gate). I said, “Leave the letter and go back; I will not let you in. It
is no use any more writing.”
The Arabs fired on the lines near the White Nile. We answered, and
committed some damage, from all appearance; for the whole Dem turned
out. I have forbidden all firing on the Arabs, unless they come so
near as to injure our people; for I expect this vague firing is only
performed by the captured soldiers to conform, in appearance, to the
orders of the Arab chiefs.
Letter has come in;[180] it is an address to the whole town; it has no
seal, the usual rubbish about the Mahdi being Mahdi, &c. A soldier came
in from the Arabs at Omdurman; he says the Mahdi is not in the cave,
but in a tent (very stupid man!) Some one has stolen 93,000 okes of
biscuit; this robbery took place nearly a year ago, and was only found
out two days ago. The people of the town wonder at one’s getting no
information; the last I had was from Kitchener, dated 31st August, and
received 17th September, now forty-six days ago. Had our people sent to
Kassala _viâ_ Massowah,[181] there is no doubt information could have
got through, but it is no use saying any more on the subject. I suppose
you acted according to “your conscience, best of your ability, and
custom of war in like cases.”
3.30 P.M. Sentries off the roof of the North Fort again; sent over to
have them flogged!
Rectified list of biscuit is 266,430 okes.
Dhoora is 2110 ardebs in magazine to-day—six weeks’ consumption!! and
then the sponge must be thrown up.
I could write volumes of pent-up wrath on this subject if I did not
believe things are ordained and all work for the best. I am not at all
inclined to order half rations with a view to any prolongation of our
blockade; if I did so, it would probably end in a catastrophe[182]
before the time, in which, if full rations are given, we should have
exhausted our supplies. I should be an angel (which I am not, needless
to say) if I was not rabid with Her Majesty’s Government; but I hope I
may be quiet on the subject of this Soudan and Cairo business, with its
indecision; but to lose all my beautiful black soldiers is enough to
make one angry with those who have the direction of our future.[183]
Arabs fired four rounds this evening towards the lines near White Nile,
but did no harm (one shell fell in the town) with their Krupp.
* * * * *
_November 3._—Two women and one boy came in to Omdurman from the
Arabs; also seven cows walked into the same place. To-day is _our_
anniversary of Hicks’s defeat. I have let out several of the men whom I
had arrested as adherents of the Mahdi; they have had a good warning.
4 P.M. _Bordeen_ in sight: I have let out the Sheikh el Islam, Cadi,
and the old Mudir. A soldier came from the Arabs to Omdurman; he says
Slatin is a prisoner for the last three days. With this man came in a
spy from the Mahdi, whom I put in prison. The Mahdi has sent regulars
to the rear. I shall send down the _Bordeen_ the day after to-morrow
to Metemma, and shall send the _débris_, Tongi & Co. down with the
steamer, and you can send them on to Cairo. I think this is noble on
my part, for you get their boats and they use your camels. The post
has come in from _Bordeen_. Kitchener’s letter, saying “_Abbas_ was
captured” was a terrible blow (I send back the letters sent to Stewart
in envelope).[184] Kitchener asks who were on board: Stewart, Power,
and Herbin, the French Consul, and the Greeks named in the margin on
the other side.[185] I cannot understand it, for the general opinion
was that the route was quite safe for the _Abbas_, which had a mountain
gun and some fifty soldiers in her. I can only put it down to some
treachery on the part of the Arabs pretending to be friends.
I cannot decipher Lord Wolseley’s telegram,[186] for Stewart took
the cipher-books. (Please inform Foreign Office of _this_, for if he
[Stewart] is killed, and _Abbas_ captured, they, the cipher-books,
are in the hands of the Mahdi.) I think cipher-messages are in some
countries, like this, a mistake.
The Shendy steamers sent back ten wounded from Shendy, one seriously;
and I hear they had five killed. For goodness’ sake do not send back
any Egyptians, _now_ in steamers, to Kartoum; I include Pashas,
officers, men, and exclude the sailors, engineers, and captains of
steamers.
If _Abbas_ is lost, I hope a Court of Inquiry will be held on the
departure of Col. Stewart and Messrs. Power and Herbin; for when they
left we had no news of an Expedition of Relief—_vide_ my journal; also
it was generally believed that the passage of the _Abbas_ down was an
absolute certainty without danger. I also add that Stewart, Herbin,
and Power left of their own free will, and without any order from me,
as the papers captured would show, if ever available. I refused to
_order_, but I said, “If you like to go, I will assist you to go. It is
at your own risk. The service you will perform is great, and you can do
no good here.” _I wrote this to Col. Stewart_, in an official letter.
* * * * *
_November 4._—I received private letters from Stanley, dated Congo,
5th May, and from Sir S. Baker, 1st June. I like the official
note written on the envelope of Sir Samuel Baker’s letter to
me—“Communications avec la Soudan interrompées.” I should think the
communications were interrompées!!!
The Arabs have one gun at Shendy and one gun at Metemma; they struck
_Mansowrah_ four times.
I looked upon the descent of the _Abbas_ as a certainty. I looked
upon the relief of Kartoum as most uncertain; hence I sent down the
cipher-books of the Foreign Office. Perhaps the _Abbas_ got wrecked
on the cataract. It is very sad. There is a report that the Sheikh el
Obeyed is dead; if true, it will simplify that vexed question with
Foreign Office of the _man_ and the _city_. Arabs fired five shells
at the Lines to-day; we answered with two, and they retired. If the
capture of steamer is corroborated, tell French Consul-General that the
Mahdi has his cipher, which was with Herbin. _If Abbas was captured
by treachery, then I am not to blame; neither am I to blame if she
struck a rock_, for she drew under two feet of water; and fifty boats
(sailing) used to go down yearly to Cairo, with high Nile; _if they
were attacked and overpowered, then I am to blame_, for I ought to have
foreseen the chance, and prevented their going. But when they left we
knew nothing of the Expedition, and I passed them under escort through
Berber, which was the apparent only danger they had to meet. The Mahdi,
if it is true that he has captured the _Abbas_, found two of his own
seals,[187] which we had forged but did not use, also all his letters
to me, and the journal was in most careful detail, hour by hour, so to
say. Steamer leaves at daybreak, 5th November, 1884.
C. G. GORDON.