EVENTS AT KARTOUM.
FROM 5 NOVEMBER TO 14 DECEMBER, 1884.
* * * * *
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL.
_Vol. VI._
To be pruned down if published.
C. G. GORDON.
* * * * *
_Copy of letter that accompanied this diary._
KARTOUM, _10 Nov., 1884_.
SIR,
Since departure, 10 Sept., of Lt.-Colonel Stewart,
C.M.G., I have kept a daily journal of all events at
Kartoum, which contains also my _private_ opinions upon
certain facts, which perhaps it is just as well you should
know confidentially. You can of course make extracts
of all official matter, and will naturally leave my private
opinions out in the case of publication. I have already
sent five portions of this journal, and now send the sixth
portion.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
C. G. GORDON.
The Chief of the Staff,
Soudan Expeditionary Force.
JOURNAL.
EVENTS AT KARTOUM.
_November 5._—Steamer _Bordeen_ left this evening for Metemma.
According to all accounts the presence of the steamers at Shendy and
Metemma cause the Arabs great annoyance, for the Arab chief of Berber
keeps calling for them to come down and help him; while they say, “If
we do, then the steamers will pillage our houses.” I cannot get out of
my head the _Abbas_ catastrophe; that the _Abbas_ (with her 970 bullet
marks on her, her gun, and her parapets, which were bullet-proof),
could be captured by force, seems impossible; that she ran upon a rock
seems unlikely, for she had her sides defended by buffers, sunk one
foot in water. I also had warned them against ever anchoring by the
bank, also to take wood from isolated spots; in fact, as far as human
foresight goes, I did all my possible. Why did you let them go? The
matter was thus. I determined to send the _Abbas_ down with an Arab
captain. Herbin asked to be allowed to go. I jumped at his offer. Then
Stewart said he would go, if I would exonerate him from deserting me.
I said you do not desert me. _I_: I cannot go; but if you go, you do
great service. I then wrote him an official; he wanted me to write him
an order. I said “No, for though I fear not responsibility, I will not
put you in any danger in which I am not myself.” I wrote them a letter,
couched thus: “_Abbas_ is going down; you say you are willing to go in
her, if I think you can do so in honour—you can go in honour, for you
can do nothing here, and if you go you do me service in telegraphing
my views.” You will notice the number of Greeks. They were a bodyguard
I ordered and paid highly, to prevent any treachery on the part of the
crew. Thus the question of treachery was duly weighed by me and guarded
against, as far as I could—both on the part of the crew and on the
part of the inhabitants—and I told them to anchor mid stream, and not
to take wood except in isolated spots.[188]
I escorted them by two steamers past every place where danger could
be apprehended, viz., Berber and Shendy. They appear to have been
captured in a comparatively thinly populated place, below Abou Hamed.
I feel somehow convinced they were captured by treachery—the Arabs
pretending to be friendly—and surprising them at night. I will own
that, without reason (apparently, for the chorus was, that the _trip
was safe_) I have never been comfortable since they left. Stewart
was a man who did not chew the cud, he never thought of danger in
prospective; he was not a bit suspicious (while I am made up of it). I
can see in imagination the whole scene,[189] the sheikh inviting them
to land, saying, “Thank God the Mahdi is a liar”—bringing in wood—men
going on shore and dispersed. The _Abbas_ with her steam down, then
a rush of wild Arabs, and all is over! A spy said something of a
chief having pretended to be friendly, and when the _Abbas_ was near,
rushing on her, but then he said the _Abbas_ turned on them, and killed
seventy-two or seventy-three (see back page of this Journal).[190] It
is very sad, but being ordained, we must not murmur. I look on it as
being a Nemesis on the death of the two Pashas.
I do sincerely hope you will have a strict examination into the
question of Stewart, Power, and Herbin going down. What makes me
think so much of the capture being by treachery is, that the two
sailing-boats which went with the _Abbas_ have not arrived at Debbeh,
for if the _Abbas_ struck on a rock, why could not the boats come on?
I expect they were all caught at one _coup_. 11 P.M. last night Arabs
fired twelve shells into the town from their Krupps on the South Front,
they did not frighten us and did no harm. At midnight they fired two or
three volleys of musketry with no effect. Four soldiers came in from
the Arabs at Omdurman. They state the Mahdi sent a party of Arabs to
Sennaar, the garrison sallied out and killed nearly all of them. Also
that the Baggara Arabs, under pretence of getting better pasturage
for their cattle, asked the Mahdi to let them go from his camp some
distance, he agreed, and they the people no longer regard the Mahdi as
before. Hussein Pasha Khalifa is good friends with the Mahdi. The Arabs
came near Bourré and fired a few shots, and then went back. I expect
that the Arabs sent the regulars out, and go through this as a mere
form, one of these men[191] was with Slatin Bey when he surrendered,
and says he did so when he had plenty of food and ammunition, and that
he (Slatin) is on the best terms with the Mahdi. We shall not know the
truth until the other Europeans get out of the Mahdi’s clutches.
Stewart had about £60 in gold with him, and _every paper_ connected
with our mission. I purposely kept none here, for one did not know what
one day would bring forth; when he left on the 10th of September we had
lost over 800 men killed, and 978 Remingtons, with a lot of ammunition
on 4th of September, only six days before he left. Baker tells me news,
he says Clifford Lloyd has left on account of row with Nubar, and that
China and France have come to terms.
One shell from the Arabs went over the town and fell in the river.
I have mentioned that Stewart’s journal contained all events from 1st
March, 1884, to 10th September, and if lost there is only the journal
of the Doctor, which begins 7th March, 1884.
I wish the correspondent of the _Times_ to know this, and to be told
that the Doctor has promised me that the _Times_ shall have the first
offer of that journal. Stewart was wounded near the Palace, at 6 A.M.
on Sunday, 25th May, in the arm (flesh wound). If Sennaar has beaten
back the Arabs a second time I cannot see how it is possible to abandon
the garrison, and if they are to be relieved, I see at least a delay
of four months; all this could be avoided by handing the Soudan over
to the Sultan with a subsidy. When Stewart left we were at the lowest
ebb, the Arabs from Kordofan had arrived with their guns, and our three
steamers were just in from Sennaar, with seven shot holes in them.
Hansall, the Austrian Consul, has a daily journal; Power and Herbin had
one also.
I have captured[192] all the European telegrams which we sent and
which we received. I shall hand them over to you, as they are in
cipher, and as you may have the F. O. cipher books, you can peruse
them. Stewart (as I have said) carried off the cipher books with
him; he had two copies of the journal, but I did not like to ask
him to leave one here, as I said, have bolted—they are his best
horsemen—also that “you can send one home, while you keep the copy to
refer to.”
I send with this the Firman of Towfik and the letters[193] respecting
the troops withdrawing, which I received at Cairo on the 23rd January,
1884, and which have not been promulgated.
If Stewart, Power, and Herbin died because they would not change their
religion, they are as much martyrs as Peter or Paul.
A black boy of ten years was caught by the Arabs outside of the Lines
this morning, collecting grass, and he escaped from them this evening
and came back to the town; he is a smart boy.
If the _Abbas_ is taken, the Mahdi has the small seal I used in my
former time, and he captured at fall of Berber my large seal, so he
has both. If it is true, the _Abbas_ must have been captured between
Abou Hamed and Merowé, on or about the 18th September. Now, on the 18th
September the Arabs must have known of Kitchener being at Debbeh, since
he wrote to me from that place on 31st August. Probably Stewart was
lulled into security in feeling himself so near Merowé, and on account
of the news the Sheikh gave him of the advance of the expedition.
Abou Hamed is one hundred miles from Merowé, which, with the
current, the _Abbas_ could do in twelve hours, and there is only
one small cataract to pass, which is, by all accounts, an easy one.
Stewart had a supreme contempt for the Soudanese people, and for their
courage, which I do not share. That our men are not heroes, I agree,
but we had against us the feeling that the Arabs were ten times our
numbers, while we had received no reinforcements whatever.[194] If he
(Stewart) has fallen, it is because he was carried away by the idea the
Arabs would not dare to do anything. Power had the same defect, viz.,
over-rashness in not considering the material they had to support them.
You may be very strong yourself, but your strength is of no avail if
you are supported by weaker vessels. The rate of progress of a fleet
is decided by the speed of the slowest vessel, so up here one ought
to work as if the whole mass was as cowardly as the greatest coward
in the force. If the _Abbas_ went on a rock she had two boats (which
I expressly mentioned to Stewart were to be taken in case of such an
accident), and they could have got into them, and, with the current,
got down easily. I sent, in 1878, a boat with a large tank, in which
were four hippopotami (infants); it got down to _Cairo_ in fifty days
from _here_, and Stewart had the Reis, or pilot of that boat, in the
_Abbas_. Humanly speaking, when Stewart left here the condition of
Kartoum was desperate; while, on the other hand, when once the _Abbas_
passed Berber, which we escorted her past, the certainty was she would
reach Dongola, and even we discussed whether Dongola might not have
fallen, and agreed that the _Abbas_ even in that case could have got
down to Wadi Halfa, in which case I told Stewart to go on with her to
Cairo. Men may not remember the case of Captain ..., who took a middy
up against Taepings with him, which middy was killed. Middy’s father
... made a great row about this. Why did ... take the middy up, &c.
I say, in defence of my letting Stewart go, that both he, Power, and
Herbin felt our situation here was desperate after the defeat at El
foun—that I had, over and over again, said it was impossible for me to
go, physically impossible, because even my servants would have betrayed
me (even if I had felt inclined to leave), and I would die here (even
going so far as to have two mines brought to the palace with which to
blow it up if the place fell). These three men’s ideas were that it was
shabby to leave me, but when I showed them they could do no possible
good by being prisoners, and when I said I shall send the _Abbas_ with
the journal, then, first, Herbin, then Stewart, and then Power, said
they would go in her. A long conversation took place between me and
Stewart, he wishing me to _order_, I declining to do so, on account of
eventualities which might arise: it ended in my writing the letter I
alluded to in former pages of the journal. I avow I was glad they went,
1. because I thought it was quite safe; 2. because I knew if Europe
knew of the state of affairs the Government would be shamed into action.
Remember that this was when the last telegram[195] from Egerton was to
the effect that “Her Majesty’s Government would pay _on delivery_ for
all who came down, if I contracted with Arabs.” Stewart’s idea was that
every order of Her Majesty’s Government, or wish that they expressed,
was indisputable. We often discussed the nuisance we must have been to
Her Majesty’s Government in being sent up here, and I think he was, to
some degree, actuated by a desire to aid Her Majesty’s Government when
he went down, for then it only left one nuisance (myself), and I had
so completely exonerated Her Majesty’s Government by my letters, and
the notes in his journal, that they might, as far as I was concerned,
have let the garrison fall. On my part, I do not think I could have
done Her Majesty’s Government a better service than to have, at any
rate, tried to send Stewart down with Power and Herbin, for certainly
it only left a small remnant here of Europeans (_one of whom is mad_),
and the French government could no longer say a word. Next, Stewart
knew everything, and could tell Her Majesty’s Government the pros and
cons, from their point of view, and with feelings akin to theirs, which
they would accept from Stewart, and never without suspicion from me (in
which they are justified, for I do not look on things from their point
of view). I told Stewart also, “I know you will act conscientiously
and honourably; but I know your opinions, and, therefore, as you
have all my views on the Soudan in your journal, I beg you will, in
answering queries of Her Majesty’s Government, make extracts from the
journal, and state ‘General G. says this, or that,’ while you are
at full liberty to give your opinion, even if it differs from mine,
but let Her Majesty’s Government know _when I answer_ and _when you
answer_.” Stewart, the night he left, wrote at my dictation a series
of questions, which I answered on half-margin of the same paper, and
in which I said, “If Her Majesty’s Government have not acted up to
time when you get down, then it is too late, and it is no use doing
anything.”
A curious thing has happened; my friend Kitchener sent up the post;
he wrapped the letters in some old newspapers (he gave me no news in
his letter), the old newspapers were thrown out in the garden: there a
clerk who knew some English found them blowing about, and gave them to
the apothecary of the hospital, who knows English. The doctor found him
reading them, saw date _15th September_, and secured them for me; they
are like gold, as you may imagine, since we have had no news since 24th
February, 1884!
These papers gave us far more information than any of your letters.
Did K. send them by accident or on purpose? Abyssinian ambassadors
in London, Walmer Castle, &c.; my black troops beating back Ras
Aloula at Keren, not recognizing the Hewitt Treaty, and killing 194
of the Abyssinians, at Keren, _vide Standard_, 1 and 15 September.
Lord Wolseley seen off at Victoria Station, for the _Gordon relief
expedition!! NO! for the relief of Soudan garrisons_. Khedive
expressing delight at seeing Lord N., while during the audience the
Khedive displayed great cordiality towards Lord N. Abdel Kader saying
you would have four hard fights. I do not believe it.[196]
It appears that these newspapers were chucked out of the Palace; but
that a man saw the papers were thrown out, and said to the cavass,
“Give me those papers to wrap up tobacco.” The cavass gave them, and
the doctor’s assistant going to the shop saw them, and seeing the date,
took them, and then the doctor got them.
I think that the defeat of Ras Aloula, at Keren, if true, is splendid;
when the Abyssinian Ambassadors were being entertained at Walmer
Castle. The Hewitt Treaty, instead of aiding us, appears only to have
added to our enemies.
It does seem wonderful if Her Majesty’s Government have made a treaty
with King John to give over Bogos, _i.e._ Keren, _i.e._ Senheit, to
him (with other places), that orders were not sent to the fortress
to evacuate; but if the papers we secured are true, that Ras Aloula
was beaten back, it is evident no such orders were given. What an
extraordinary state of affairs! Mitzakis, in his letter to Greek Consul
here of date 25th of August, says, _that possession will be taken of
Keren_ (_i.e._ Senheit, _i.e._ Bogos) _at once_, and then we have the
telegram from Massowa that Ras Aloula has _attacked_ Keren, and lost
heavily (_vide_ the _Standard_ of 1st September). By these papers,
miraculously secured, I see we have made Minister of Interior Abdel
Kader Pasha; according to all accounts up here, he is “Abdel Kader and
the Forty Thieves _in one_.”[197]
* * * * *
_November 6._—Three horsemen and four footmen (Arabs) came opposite
Bourré to-day on right bank of the Nile, and fired a few shots, and
went off on our firing two shots from Krupp. Also, the Arabs came
down with their guns to the White Nile end of Lines, and fired on the
Santals. A soldier of ours came in from Sheikh el Obeyed with his
wife and child; he says _Sheikh el Obeyed died_ four days ago (to the
great relief of Sanderson), now we have only the _city_ to deal with.
Two more soldiers came in from Arabs at Omdurman. The Arabs fired
seven rounds from their guns on the Lines near the White Nile. A post
was captured by Sheikh el Obeyed (with European letters, coming from
Kassala) just before his death; the porter of these letters was killed.
I expect that the naming of the expedition the Gordon Relief Expedition
is because the fiction “_that Her Majesty s Government has no
responsibility towards the Soudan and its garrisons_” is going to be
held to, and that the object of the expedition _thus named_, will be
considered as accomplished, if Kartoum is reached; but in that case,
how can the sending up Stewart and me be explained? It was certainly
because our Government thought they were responsible that we were sent;
also if Her Majesty’s Government has no responsibility, why did the
troops attack Osman Digma, and relieve Tokar?[198]
The Sheikh el Obeyed’s death will be a heavy blow to the Arabs, for his
following will no longer hold together.
Another soldier, with his wife, has come in at Omdurman.
These men report Sheikh el Obeyed dead, and that he is succeeded by
his son Achmet, and that not more than 1000 or 1500 are with him; the
Mahdi and the Arabs are against any attack on the Kartoum Lines. A good
many Baggara are still with Mahdi, who is daily losing followers.
A soldier was severely wounded this morning at Bourré.
They say Sheikh el Obeyed died of chagrin. He would not go and see the
Mahdi, who sent him word to give up all his property.
What a fury King John will be in, if it is true Keren has fired on and
killed his men; he will swear it is Towfik’s treachery. I wonder who
are the Treaty Powers—Towfik and King John, or our Government and King
John? Keren is only three days from Massowah, and it is not likely
they would invent this telegram. It makes one laugh, to think of this
addition to our enemies kindly given us.
The soldier (who came in with his wife and two children) says that
Sheikh el Obeyed captured a post with the Arab and European letters;
that he sat for some time in a comatose state, and then died; that
his people are all dispersing. This is a great comfort, for we will
have (D.V.) no fighting there. A soldier and his mother have come in.
They say the Mahdi moved his camp to-day four hours further off. This
evening the Arabs fired six times, with their guns, on the Lines near
the White Nile.
I knew Harrison[199] would come. Extract A[200] on the other side
shows you, A, if you cannot protect dhows _now_, how will you do so if
all the Soudan falls into hands of the Mahdi? Also extract B respecting
rebellion in Hedjaz, will show all their lands are in a fermenting
state, and will be well worked up by the Mahdi if he ever gets to
Kartoum. Another man who came in says the Mahdi has drawn closer to
Omdurman, and has _not gone further off_. I have an idea the Arabs will
make a try to take the place. A soldier was wounded on the Lines near
the White Nile this evening; he was fishing, and got hit. It certainly
does seem most miraculous that Suakin should be besieged[201] and dhows
captured close to it; no lesson has yet been taught these Arabs.
* * * * *
_November 7._—We captured two cows to-day at Bourré. Mahdi’s camp is
now alongside of Faki Mustapha’s, which is one hour and a half from the
Fort Omdurman.
A large body of Arabs left, with caravan, the Dem of Faki Mustafa,
in a north-west direction, towards the Gabra Wells, the Kababish
headquarters. The Dem of the Mahdi is not far from the river, by which
I conjecture he has his Krupps in position near there. Church parade
going on, average size. I am anxious for the flank of the lines ending
on the White Nile,[202] and have sent up a steamer to stay there. Four
soldiers, one slave and two women came from the Arabs to Omdurman.
The Mahdi means to attack Omdurman; he has received 120 camels of
ammunition; Slatin is in chains. These men say the Mahdi and the Arabs
have not the least intention of risking their skins against the fort,
but will shove on the Black Regulars they have captured. It is like
fighting one’s own flesh and blood; it is not fair warfare.[203]
If I am inclined to be vicious I have some little excuse, with women
yelling for dhoora, under the Palace windows! Church parade to-day, and
the approach nearer to us of the Mahdi’s camp, and his sending for and
getting 120 camel loads of ammunition, does not show he is wanting in
confidence, for if he did fear, he would never have sent for 500,000
rounds of ammunition; or if he had sent for it, he would have stopped
its coming, had he feared the advance. The fact is that the Tokar
affair, with the non-following up of the victory,[204] has given him
great confidence, which is strengthened by his Arabs capturing dhows
and firing on the lines of Suakin with impunity. Perhaps the non-firing
on Suakin for three days (August 30) means that the Hadendowa Arabs
have gone to assist Berber! I wonder whether it has not been observed,
that Suakin is perfectly useless if the Soudan is in the hands of the
Mahdi. I declare I think he (the Mahdi) has a fair chance of getting to
Mecca, if the rebellion in the Hedjaz goes on, and he gets Kartoum.
The Mahdi may, and I daresay has good information from Cairo, as
to the intention of the expedition, or he may reason, “They will
relieve Kartoum, leave me alone in my camp, and go back.” If the
Government instructions are definite, and going to be carried out at
any cost, and if they are to the effect that a _Rapid Retreat_ is to
take place, then nothing more is to be said. All I ask for then, is
to be put out of my place here,[205] to go on my way, and be no more
employed. That is not an unreasonable demand, for my mission here
was a special one, and not obligatory, like a military duty, and in
my position of Governor-General I am quite justified in having said
and done everything for the people over whom I was placed by Towfik
(following the “_fiction_” that he was independent) that I thought
would secure them safety. _If it is determined to abandon_ Sennaar and
Kassala (following the _fiction_ that the King of Abyssinia will look
after them), also the Equator, _to their fate_, after their gallant
defence, there is nothing more to be said, and the sooner this action
is performed the better, if it is to be performed at all. To execute
the operation, if it is confined to the evacuation of Kartoum, I can be
of no possible use, and I do not care to wait and see the Mahdi walk
in on your heels into Kartoum, which we have held against him for so
many months; neither do I wish to see Her Majesty’s forces dogged by
these Arabs all the way to Wady Halfa, or to receive the remonstrances
of those who have stuck to me. I am sure I have now written so fully
on all these subjects that there can be little room for further
discussion: you have to make up your mind and act. I have fully
expressed my views and desires, and shall _take, or try to take_, very
philosophically your decision; though I do most emphatically protest
against this abandonment, which will lead to greater disasters, and is
unworthy of our country.
The men who came in to-day say the Mahdi will attack Omdurman
to-morrow. The following decisions have to be taken if the rapid
retreat is carried out:—
1. Are the Government stores to be destroyed?
2. Are you prepared to supply transport for all who wish to go down?
3. Will you disarm the Shaggyeh ere you leave?
4. What will you do with the steamers?
I declare I should tremble to give these orders. As Governor-General _I
never would do it_.
5. Will you write to Sennaar and Kassala, and inform them of what you
mean to do, and exonerate me?
(A slave came in from the Arabs. He says the Arabs will not attack the
lines; that the regulars are all over with the Mahdi on the left bank.)
6. Will you negotiate with the Mahdi (no use, I expect) _in re_ the
deliverance of the prisoners (European) he has with him?
7. Would you object to aiding the black troops to go to Sennaar and to
fight out the question, with the view of saving Sennaar and Kassala
garrisons?
Two soldiers and one slave came in from Arabs at Omdurman; they say
the Mahdi will not attack directly, that Slatin is in chains for
writing to Kartoum; also Saleh Pasha. The Arabs fired two rounds from
their guns towards the lines near the White Nile this evening. They
fell short.
Supposing Kartoum evacuated, then Sennaar and Kassala fall. The Arabs
now fire on the lines at Suakin, and capture dhows in the Red Sea,
and there is a revolt in the Hedjaz. What is to prevent the Mahdi’s
adherents gaining Mecca, where there are not 2,000 men. Once at Mecca,
we may look out for squalls in Turkey, &c.
If decision is taken on the Rapid Retreat proceeding, the consuls
should be warned on your arrival.
If the British Government had only given us Zubair Pasha in March,
when I asked for him, we would not have lost Berber, and would never
have wanted an expedition. We would have beaten the Mahdi without any
exterior help; it is sad, when the Mahdi is moribund that we should by
evacuation of Kartoum, raise him again. The defect I laboured under has
been that I presented no rallying point to the people, not being of
their nation or creed.[206]
The Arabs began musketry fire on Bourré at 1 P.M., and before this
morning. It was quite like old times, when it used to go on for months.
I never got accustomed to it, for I knew what troops we had, and it
always murdered sleep.
* * * * *
_November 8._—It must be obvious that if Zubair was with you, and
installed as Governor-General, with a semi-independent position and
a subsidy, in the present decaying position of the Mahdi, and your
temporary presence, he would rally around him a huge following, who are
now disgusted with the Mahdi and his dervishes, but who will be obliged
to hold to him, because you evacuate; even those people with us, we per
force oblige to join the Mahdi. Zubair’s installation would save you
all the bother of the Sennaar evacuation. You would have only to stay
up here a couple of months, and perhaps have to keep a detachment at
Berber and Dongola (in order that Zubair might get up more munitions)
for a time. You have now boats fitted for the communication by the
Nile, via Abou Hamed, and Zubair could soon put them along the Nile in
a chain. As for the slave trade,[207] the Mahdi will be ten times worse
than Zubair, and you could make the payment of the subsidy (to Zubair)
contingent on his not doing it on any vast scale. The Zubair solution
is the sort of half-way house between rapid retreat and continued
occupation, either by Turks or yourself.
The Mahdi could never get the people to rise against Zubair; it will
be only because they are presented with no rallying point, and per
force they will join him if you leave. They never would have joined the
Mahdi if Zubair had come up. It is only because Zubair was not here
that Berber fell.
6.30 A.M.—Arabs streaming across from the White Nile to Bourré. Some
Arabs on the right bank of the Blue Nile look as if they are coming
down that bank to the North Fort. I have ordered up the steamers
_Ismailia_ and _Husseinyeh_. The Arabs have found our weak point,
_i.e._ prolongation of our lines at Bourré, but the steamers will drive
them out.
[Illustration]
7.30 A.M.—Fight still going on, steamer coming up the river. 8.30
A.M.—Steamers went up and drove the Arabs off the right bank of the
Blue Nile, who were enfilading our lines. The firing, which has been
continuous for four hours, has pretty well ceased. Up to this we have
had no killed or wounded, I am glad to say. During the night the Arabs
on the left bank of the White Nile (Mahdi’s camp) fired three shells
against the lines ending on right bank of the White Nile. A soldier
_fellaheen_ is thought to have deserted to the Arabs last night. 9
A.M.—The Arabs have collected in the vicinity of Omdurman Fort a
heap of cows, who seem drawing down towards the fort. I have ordered
_Ismailia_ to go down. I expect they will drive the cows on to the
fort, and try and explode the mines. The Arabs on the White Nile are
firing on the lines with their Krupp. 10 A.M.—Arabs are leaving the
vicinity of Bourré, and going back to their Dem near the White Nile.
The Arabs near Omdurman village are firing across the river towards
Mogrim.
The Austrian Consul when taking his morning ride was surprised at
seeing two balls strike the water near, and so he returned. 10.45
A.M.—The _battles_ are over, and all is quiet. What a worry all this
is! The rockets from Omdurman drove back the advance of the cows; it
was an ingenious attempt, if meant.[208]
I expect the Arabs fired away 30,000 rounds to-day. We had _one man
killed_ in small steamer, and _one wounded_; in the fort we had _two
wounded_, and _one man_ was wounded by bursting of rocket tube at
Omdurman. I hate these rockets with sticks. Hale’s are the only decent
ones; not that the sticks have anything to do with their bursting. The
composition in these climates shrinks away from the case, and the fire
flares up the whole of the _exterior_ and _interior_ of the rocket. I
expect we are going to have a series of these festivities, which are
so wearisome. In the _Abbas_ there was a heap of money orders, &c.,
connected with the merchants here, so sure did they think she would get
down. Six soldiers came in from the Arabs, also four slaves, who report
the Arabs are thinking of putting a post at Halfeyeh. (I hope they will
not.) The Mahdi has about 8,000 men of sorts with him. Slatin is in
chains, also Saleh Pasha. Hussein Pasha Khalifa is great friends with
the Mahdi. Omdurman captured sixteen cows when they came near the fort,
also one slave. They killed one Arab. The men who came in say the Arabs
mean to continue this day’s festivities every day. They do not seem
to care much about the advance of the expedition, or are uncommonly
confident or ignorant. I do not at all enjoy the thought of these
_daily festivities_, they are “abrutissant,” as the Austrian Consul
says.
It is very curious what a very little effect all our immense
preparations at Dongola, &c., has had on the course of events; one
may say they have not had up to the present the least, while I have
weakened myself by sending down my steamers[209] and four hundred
men (not, however, of the best quality). I expect we will have the
_festivity_ to-morrow on the White Nile end of the Lines, which is our
weakest part. I must not be blamed at looking forward to a repetition
of the past miseries; we truly have had a wearisome time for 241 days!
Another soldier has come in; he says the Mahdi thought Kartoum could
be bombarded from his new camp, but finds it cannot be done. If Lord
Wolseley did say he hoped to relieve Kartoum before “_many months_,”
he must have a wonderful confidence in our powers of endurance,
considering that _when_ he is said to have made this utterance, we had
been blockaded six-and-a-half months, and are now in our ninth month.
I am quite sure of one thing, that the policy followed up till lately
(and the policy which may be carried out, of abandoning Sennaar, etc.)
is one which will act detrimentally on our army; for what officer, if
he was in a fortress, could have any confidence that it might not be
thought advisable to abandon him. Her Majesty’s Government told me, or
rather my friend Baring told me[210] I was not to leave Kartoum for
the Equator until I had permission. I have his telegram (so that if it
was possible, or if I could do it) if I did leave Kartoum, I should be
acting against orders. This Soudan business will cost me £3000[211]
beyond my pay, at least, which I will not ask them or allow them to
pay. I shall get it from others, and I shall get another £1000 to buy
Stewart’s journal, if he has been killed or captured.
Another soldier is in from the Arabs at Omdurman which fort has
captured four more cows, that is twenty to-day (a cow is worth £20
in town!) £400! There is one thing which is quite incomprehensible.
If it is right to send up an expedition now, why was it not right to
send it up before? It is all very well to say one ought to consider
the difficulties of the Government, but it is not easy to get over
a feeling, that “a hope existed of no expedition being necessary,
owing to our having fallen.” As for myself, personally, I feel no
particular rancour on the subject, but I own I do not care to show I
like men, whoever they may be, who act in such a calculating way, and
I do not think one is bound to act the hypocrite’s part, and pretend
to be friendly towards them. If a boy at Eton or Harrow acted towards
his fellow in a similar way, I _think_ he would be kicked, and _I
am sure_ he would deserve it. I know of no sort of parallel to all
this in history, except it be David with Uriah the Hittite, and then
there was an Eve in the case, who, I am not aware of, exists in this
case. Remember, also, that I do not judge the question of abandoning
the garrisons or not: what I judge is the indecision of Government.
They did not dare say “abandon the garrison,” so they prevented me
leaving for the Equator, with the determination not to relieve me,
and the _hope_ (well! I will not say what their hope was) (“March,
April ... August, why! he ought to have surrendered, he said, six
_months_”)—there is my point of complaint. The second is the FICTION
that it is the Egyptian Government which governs Egypt; it is a _silly_
story, for every one sees through it. Can one imagine a greater farce,
than Lord Northbrook asking Towfik for the “assistance of Egyptian
Government to carry out this, or that.” I expect the two roared with
laughter over it (sorry I cannot manage a sketch of the scene). (Baring
would _never_ laugh, _it is too serious_, like jesting in church). The
third grievance is that Treaty with Abyssinia, under the screen of the
“FICTION,” (if it is _true_ it has been made); _however it is a dead
letter_, I am glad to say.
* * * * *
_November 9th._—Four soldiers, five slaves, of whom two are women,
came in, from the Arabs to-day. Desultory firing _on_ and _from_ the
Arabs at Omdurman, and the White Nile Lines.
Of the men who came in, one is a slave of Slatin Bey. The Mahdi does
not mean to fight _direct_; the Khalifas[212] and the Arabs want
to fight direct. Omdurman killed some of their men; the Arabs have
munitions; Slatin is in chains. These men brought in their rifles. The
Arabs lost at Bourré heavily, some bodies came floating down the river
to-day. A soldier came in from the Arabs. A few Arabs came and fired on
the fort at Omdurman, and wounded a slave in it.
The people up here would reason thus, if I attempted to leave: “You
came up here, and had you not come, we should have some of us got
away to Cairo, but we trusted in you to extricate us; we suffered and
are suffering great privations, in order to hold the town. Had you
not come we should have given in at once and obtained pardon; now we
can, after our obstinate defence, expect no mercy from the Mahdi, who
will avenge on us all the blood which has been spilt around Kartoum.
You have taken our money and promised to repay us; all this goes for
nought if you quit us; it is your bounden duty to stay by us, and to
share our fate; if the British Government deserts us that is no reason
for you to do so, after our having stood by you.”[213] I declare
_positively_, and _once for all, that I will not leave the Soudan
until every one who wants to go down is given the chance to do so,
unless_ a government is established, which relieves me of the charge;
therefore if any emissary or letter comes up here ordering me to come
down, I WILL NOT OBEY IT, BUT WILL STAY HERE, AND FALL WITH THE TOWN,
AND RUN ALL RISKS. These remarks are produced by the extraordinary
confidence of the Arabs, combined with the Abyssinian Treaty and other
significant remarks in the newspaper Kitchener sent me—Gordon Relief
Expedition—who, I expect knows _more_ than I do, and that “THAT MORE
_is that the Expedition has come up for me personally_.” I hope, if
things do come to the worst, and that the Expedition goes back, my
steamers (_after abstraction_ of the _Fellaheen troops_) will be sent
back to this place, with £150,000 which Baring promised me! (or as
much as I wanted), and as much provisions as can be possibly spared;
also a gun to replace the one lost (or said to be lost) in the _Abbas_
trying to _communicate with Europe_ and _Cairo_. Unless Zubair is
absolutely required at Cairo, I would also like him to come up, or (_to
save appearances_) allowed to escape. I hope that Stewart’s supposed
death, if _by treachery_, will be avenged in a signal way, on the way
down.[214]
A boy was captured, during the cow business at Omdurman, but he said
his father was with the Arabs, so I let him go back.
I have now got all the “telegrams,” European, “_sent from_” and
“_received in Soudan_” for “1883-84,”—splendid collection, full of
interest. What would the _Standard_ give for them? However, I think I
can afford to be generous, and so I shall send them down with this Vol.
VI.[215]
The fort at Omdurman captured twenty-one cows this evening; this is
splendid—forty-one cows in two days.
The only original document I kept here, and which I was as near as
possible giving to Stewart, is the Firman I have already mentioned,
which I send with this,[216] proclaiming the abandonment of the Soudan
by Towfik.[217] If the Mahdi had got this he would have crowed, though
he may know of it, for I showed it, not knowing well its contents, to
Hussein Pasha Khalifa (_vide_ Stewart’s Journal, which went down, and
in which I criticise my having done so). I felt inclined to give it to
Stewart, who, I felt confident, would get down, because I thought if
found with me the Mahdi might say, “Why, you had the order to give up
the country from Towfik, and you did not”; but, then, I thought as I
shall be killed ere he takes the town it does not make much difference
if here or with Stewart, so I kept it. I call attention to the fact
that _every document_ (except above-mentioned telegrams, of which
Stewart had taken copies) went down with him (Stewart), and that will
show how sure I felt that he and Power would get down, for otherwise,
if I had doubted, I would never have let my original instructions
go; now I have not a _single paper_. I cannot quote textually: all
went with Stewart; but I have my memory, and I even give you the
_Telegrams_. I have not written any dispatch concerning Stewart or
Power. I dare not, with my views, say their death is an evil;[218] if
true. I am sorry for their friends and relations. Stewart was a brave,
just, upright gentleman. Can one say more? Power was a chivalrous,
brave, honest gentleman. Can one say more? Herbin, I liked very much;
he was a most agreeable and gentlemanly Frenchman, and very sharp.
The diplomatic ... called him _names_ in a telegram; but I found him
fairly just,[219] though naturally with a French bias. For my part I
cannot see what harm the French can do us if they had a voice in Egypt;
and I can see much good arising from it. I declare if they had had a
voice in Egypt the present state of affairs would never have existed.
If you can find _no chivalry_ in your own house, you had better borrow
it from your neighbour. We fired yesterday 41,000 rounds of Remington
ammunition, and we fired _less_ than the Arabs.
* * * * *
_November 10._—This morning forty Arabs came down near Omdurman Fort,
and fired on it—angry about the capture of cows last evening.
One soldier and one slave came in from the Arabs at Omdurman. Seven
Arabs on camels went across from the Blue Nile towards Halfeyeh. I fear
a reconnoitring party, previous to their putting a post there. To day
is the day I expected we should have had some one of the Expedition
here. Hicks’ defeat was known at Cairo on the 21st or 22nd November,
since which reinforcements to extent of nine persons reached this place
(up to date) from Cairo—“for which the Egyptian Government” (according
to the FICTION) “is solely and entirely to blame”!!!!!
The man who was wounded by the mine is dead. If man knew what the
future would bring forth he would be pretty miserable. Look at the
telegram on other side, written in December 1883.[220] I would not
read those telegrams, or Stewart’s Journal, for a good deal, when I
think how we kept feeding on delusions for so many months. A soldier
and slave have come in from the Arabs at Omdurman; five more soldiers
and three slaves came in later on in the day; they say Slatin is
released from his chains; that there is a rumour of the advance of
the Expedition direct on Kartoum from Debbeh; that Luigi and Yusef,
two priests, are still in Obeyed, having refused to become Muslim;
that the Arabs lost heavily at Bourré the day before yesterday. Why
Kitchener[221] did not tell me the route the Expedition would take
is inexplicable, for it could have done no possible harm, seeing the
Mahdi has his spies everywhere, and it was easy to have couched this
information in terms I could have understood, and the Mahdi could not
have understood. The Fellaheen soldier did go to the Mahdi.[222]
* * * * *
_November 11._—This morning, 6 A.M., 200 Arabs came to north of
Omdurman Fort, and fired vollies towards the village of Tuti and the
Fort; the Fort answered, and the footmen of the Arabs retreated; then
the Arab horsemen made the footmen go back again, and so on, four or
five times; at last they retired. We had three soldiers and one woman
wounded; only one wound was at all serious. Arabs must have fired five
thousand rounds; evidently they do not wish much to fight. Nineteen
Arabs came along the right bank of the White Nile from Halfeyeh to
Goba, and captured a donkey, this even the Shaggyeh could not stand,
and so I suppose one hundred sallied out and some fifteen horsemen;
then came a running fight across the plain, but it was evident the
horsemen would not head the Arabs; however, from the roof, it was
evident four or five Arabs were killed, and the pursuit is still going
on. You may imagine the Arabs have a good deal of confidence, for their
nineteen men were distant at least ten miles of desert from their camp
and were at _a_. They were going along _b b_ when they were discovered
with the captured donkey. Five at least of these Arabs got away. The
Arabs are sure to come down to avenge this. Noon.—Arabs coming down
from their camp. _Ismailia_ getting steam up. North Fort reports (?)
“Captures, 3 Remingtons! 3 spears! 3 swords! and the killing of 20? 5
got away?” The Arabs are halted on the sand hills. Five soldiers and
one woman came in from the Arabs at Omdurman, report, “Arab rocket-tube
broken; carriage of gun broken; the Arabs deserting; rumoured advance
of the expedition; quarrels going on; _Slatin in chains_.” The Shaggyeh
say they killed twenty Arabs, but they only say they captured nine
arms, so eleven must have been unarmed!!!
[Illustration]
It appears 93,000 okes + 166,000 okes = 259,000 okes of biscuit have
been stolen in the last year, only found out now; however, we have now
quarter of a million okes, which will see us only for a month or so. It
appears that more than thirty of the principal merchants are engaged
in the above robbery of biscuit. The process is not finished. One of
the greatest problems will be what to do with those Shaggyeh, those
Cairo Bashi Bazouks and fellaheen soldiers, whose courage is about
equal,—perhaps the palm is due to the Shaggyeh. The twenty cows I
mentioned as captured by the men of Omdurman Fort (making up forty-one
captured cows, page 309) _were driven in_ by five soldiers _escaping
from the Arabs_ and _were not captured_. They do not stick at a lie
(and, in this, resemble some people in high places I know). 259,000
okes of biscuit was a good haul, nearly 2½ million pounds: worth
£26,000 now, or £9000 in ordinary times.[223]
* * * * *
_November 12._—Last night three slaves came into Omdurman. At 11 P.M.
they reported Arabs meant to attack to-day at dawn. It was reported
to me, but the telegraph clerk did not choose to tell me till 7 A.M.
to-day. We had been called up at 5.30 A.M. by a violent fusillade at
Omdurman. The Arabs came out in considerable force, and, as I had not
been warned, the steamers had not steam up. From 5.30 A.M. to 8.30
Arabs came on and went back continually. All the cavalry were out; the
expenditure of ammunition was immense. The Arabs had a gun or guns on
the bank. Details further on, as the firing is still going on.
10.20 A.M.—For half-an-hour firing lulled, but then recommenced,
and is still going on. The _Ismailia_ was struck with a shell, but I
hear is not seriously damaged. The _Husseinyeh_ is aground (I feel
much the want of my other steamers at Metemma). 11.15 A.M.—Firing
has lulled; it was very heavy for the last three-quarters of an hour
from _Ismailia_ and Arabs; it is now desultory, and is dying away.
_Husseinyeh_ is still aground. The _Ismailia_ is at anchor. What a
six hours of anxiety for me, when I saw the shells strike the water
near the steamers from the Arabs; imagine my feelings! We have £831 in
specie and £42,800 in paper; and there is £14,600 in _paper_ out in
the town! I call this state of finance not bad, after more than eight
months’ blockade. The troops are owed half a month’s pay, and even that
can be scarcely called owed them, for I have given them stores, and
beyond the regulations. Noon.—The firing has ceased, I am glad to say.
I have lived _years_ in these last _hours_! Had I lost the _Ismailia_,
I should have lost the _Husseinyeh_ (aground), and then Omdurman, and
the North Fort! And then the Town! 1 P.M.—The Arabs are firing on the
steamers with their two guns. The _Husseinyeh, still aground_; that is
the reason of it. Firing, 1.30 P.M., now has ceased. The _Ismailia_,
struck by three shells, had one man killed, fifteen wounded on board
of her; she did really very well. I boxed the telegraph clerk’s ears
for not giving me the telegram last night (after repeated orders that
no consideration was to prevent his coming to me); and then, as my
conscience pricked me, I gave him $5. He said he did not mind if I
killed him—I was his father (a chocolate-coloured youth of twenty).
I know all this is brutal—_abrutissant_, as Hansall calls it—but
what is one to do? If you cut their pay, you hurt their families. I
am an advocate for summary and quick punishment, which hurts only
the defaulter. Had this clerk warned me, of course at daybreak, the
steamers would have had their steam up, and been ready. We have a
Krupp at Mogrim Fort. Ferratch Pasha reports he has dismounted one
of the Arab guns. The Arabs had a show of four hundred horsemen, who
kept far off. Telegraph was, and is, interrupted between this and the
Omdurman Fort (whether by bullet or otherwise is not known as yet).
Considering that the Arab mountain gun can (and has) made holes _two
feet square_ in the steamer, my anxiety is not to be wondered at. (I
feel as if I had walked thirty miles.) We fired eighty-three rounds of
Krupp at the Arabs from Mogrim, forty-three rockets. The Arabs fired
three hundred and seventy rounds from their guns at the steamers. As
for ammunition (Remington), we fired from _our steamers_, forts, &c.,
fifty thousand rounds; and I certainly think the Arabs fired as much,
Omdurman certainly was “OVER-EAGER TO FIRE ON THE ENEMY”[224] in the
early dawn, and consequently wasted ammunition. This ends the greatest
battle (_as yet_) of our second blockade. Spies (of last night) say it
was undertaken against the Mahdi’s wish, by his Khalifa or Vizier, who
persuaded him to allow it. During all through, the Arabs of the South
and East never moved a peg. Like the Chinese, one may calculate, they
will never assist one another.
This is our _first_ encounter with the Mahdi’s personal troops. One
tumbles at 3 A.M. into a troubled sleep; a drum beats—tup! tup!
tup! It comes into a dream, but after a few moments one becomes more
awake, and it is revealed to the brain that _one is in Kartoum_. The
next query is, where is this tup, tupping going on. A hope arises
it will die away. No, it goes on, and increases in intensity. The
thought strikes one, “Have they enough ammunition?” (the excuse of bad
soldiers). One exerts oneself. At last, it is no use, up one must get,
and go on to the roof of the palace; then telegrams, orders, swearing,
and cursing goes on till about 9 A.M. Men may say what they like about
glorious war, but to me it is a horrid nuisance (if it is permitted to
say anything is a nuisance which comes on us). I saw that poor little
beast the _Husseinyeh_ (a Thames launch) fall back, stern foremost,
under a terrific fire of breechloaders. I saw a shell strike the water
at her bows; I saw her stop and puff off steam, and I gave the glass
to my boy, _sickened unto death_, and I will say my thoughts turned
on ... more than on anyone, and they are not beneficent towards him.
My boy (he is thirty) said, “_Husseinyeh is sick_.” I knew it, but
said quietly, “Go down and telegraph to Mogrim,[225] ‘Is _Husseinyeh_
sick?’” Answer, “No.” I asked again; answer, “No.” Then telegraph said,
“She was aground.”
2.45 P.M. The _Ismailia_ tried to take _Husseinyeh_ off, and got
struck twice, in addition to the three times before mentioned, with
shells, so she desisted from the attempt. The Arabs are firing on the
_Husseinyeh_. I have ordered the Krupp of Mogrim to play on the Arab
guns, and shall wait till night to take off the _Husseinyeh_. She is
nearer to the _left_ bank than to the _right_ bank; it is not clear
if she is aground or half sunk (equally a trouble). 3.30 P.M. The
Arabs are bringing their guns nearer to the aground or half-sunken
_Husseinyeh_. The _Ismailia_ reports that the two last shells have done
her no material damage. 4.30 P.M. The Arabs have now three guns bearing
on the _Husseinyeh_. 6 P.M. The firing has ceased. I hope to get the
_Husseinyeh_ off at night. 7 P.M. The Arabs keep up a dropping fire
on the _Husseinyeh_, who, I hear, has two shell holes in her, and has
six men, including the captain, wounded. I must say the Arabs to-day
showed the greatest of pluck; over and over again they returned to the
attack, though overwhelmed with the musketry fire of the castellated
_Ismailia_. I think they must have lost heavily, for at times they were
in dense groups. I believe that by the _Arabs_ we may understand _our
own regulars captured in Kordofan and Darfur, &c._ We are going to get
the _Husseinyeh_ off to-night _if we can_. No Royal Navy vessels would
have behaved better than the _Ismailia_ to-day; she passed and repassed
the Arab guns upwards of twenty times, when any one well-placed shell
would have sunk her. Whether the crew knew it or not does not matter.
_I did, and felt comfortable accordingly._ The Arab guns were not 1,200
yards distant from her, and even less at times. She was struck five
times with shell. Remember that the _Ismailia_, is only a superior
penny boat, and that the Egyptian mountain gun is as superior to our
wretched seven-pounders as a three-pounder is to a twelve-pounder
Howitzer, both for range and for effect. You want a gun to make a hole,
not a gimlet-hole, which these seven-pounders do, and what wearisome
work to carry them!
All this worry is (humanly speaking) due to that chocolate-coloured
clerk of the telegraph not warning me. This evening there was an
ominous sign that the Arabs on the Blue Nile knew of our troubles with
the _Husseinyeh_. They came up against Bourré, but two gunshots drove
them off. At 4 P.M. the Arabs on the right bank of the White Nile fired
twelve shells against the Lines, and opened a fire of musketry for a
short time, but did no harm. I have given half a month’s pay to the
_Ismailia_ and to the _Husseinyeh_ crews, and $2 for the men who have
gone to get the latter off; she is _not half sunk_, but _is aground_.
There is (8 P.M.) a fire on the left bank of the White Nile, opposite
to Halfeyeh. The Arabs got into the ditch of the entrenched camp at
Omdurman, which is theirs. We only occupy the fort X. Hicks’ army were
in this entrenched camp. Arabs came to Y.
8.15 P.M. The Arabs have still their guns on the river bank, and are
firing at the _Husseinyeh_, whom I am trying, by my men, to get off.
Evidently they are not cowed, for generally they take their guns back
at night to their camp. Report from _Husseinyeh_ steamer:—-10.20 P.M.,
Wounded, 6; killed, 3; efforts as yet are ineffectual as to taking off
the steamer _Husseinyeh_.
* * * * *
_November 13._—The _Ismailia_, 2 A.M., got struck by _two shells_
(?)[226] going to take off the _Husseinyeh_, so we took her gun out,
and her crew, and have left her. At 5.30 A.M., the Arabs commenced
firing on the Lines at Bourré, and 7 A.M. I see they are coming across
to Goba, bringing a gun with them. The Arabs at Omdurman are quiet. The
Arabs have fired five times with their gun at the Omdurman Fort. The
Arabs have got their gun at the village outside Sheikh Ali, near the
end of the Lines on the White Nile, and have fired shells at the Lines.
Our telegraph was cut yesterday evening with Omdurman Fort, and cannot
be repaired (8 A.M.), for the Arabs are shelling that fort. The Arabs,
on the North Side, have their gun on the low sandhills some 4,000 yards
off, and are shelling us; musketry firing going on at Bourré. The Arabs
had their guns last night defending the approach to the _Husseinyeh_.
We are repairing the _Ismailia_; the barricade of the steersman of the
_Husseinyeh_ got struck by a shell. We raised a parapet on the river
bank to defend any approach of the Arabs to _Husseinyeh_. Omdurman had
yesterday a quarter of a million cartridges—Remington.
[Illustration]
Omdurman Fort has one and a half month’s supply of food and water;
it was a fault to place it so far from the river;[227] yesterday it
had not its flag up; to-day it has. The Arabs have sent 250 men to
Goba; but the village Hogali, which was the one close to the palace,
having been levelled, they are too far off to do us any harm. There is
a report in town, the Arabs say they will enter it to-morrow, and say
their prayers in the mosque on Friday. The Arabs at Goba are wasting
a lot of ammunition (Remington), their bullets do not reach us.[228]
They will be bothered for water, for we filled up all the wells in
Goba. 9.15 A.M. The Arabs have returned from Goba. 10 A.M. They have
made a long _détour_,[229] and have gone to the prolongation of our
lines at Bourré, on the right bank of the Blue Nile, where they are
firing heavily. I expect we fired 50,000 rounds yesterday, and the
Arabs rather more, while to-day the Arabs have fired a great deal. We
calculate that with Hicks’ army was lost 1,000,000 cartridges, and
now it is a year ago, during which time, with the firing there and
elsewhere during a year, two-thirds of that million must have been
expended, and they have no means to renew the cartridges; they cannot
have much more than 300,000 rounds.
[Illustration]
The Arabs have now gone from opposite Bourré (11 A.M.), having fired
a nice lot of ammunition, and hurt no one in the fort. Omdurman
Fort is still cut off from us; Arabs at A B C. The Arabs certainly
got the best of it yesterday, though I expect they paid for it. It
appears the _Husseinyeh_ got aground through the captain, who was
afterwards wounded, not doing what the Reis told him. Fortunately I
had foreseen the likelihood of the fort at Omdurman being cut off, and
had provisioned it. If the expedition comes at all, it ought to be
here before long. We had fifteen men wounded yesterday, three rather
dangerously, and seven were killed. I never feel anxious about any of
the fights, except when the steamers are engaged, and then I own I am
on tenterhooks as long as they are out. 1 P.M. The Arabs have got four
guns down on the river, and are firing across the river at the Mogrim
Fort, which is answering by Krupp and rockets. We are not fortunate
with the little steamers I had brought out in sections from England; we
have lost, at any rate _temporarily_, one, the _Husseinyeh_; another,
the _Abbas_, where is she? And the Arabs have the third, the _Mahomet
Ali_, on the Blue Nile. The Arabs fired four guns on the lines near the
White Nile this morning (they fired sixty rounds). Musketry (3 P.M.)
going on across river between our men and the Arabs. Certainly we have
been left to almost the very last extremity, and I declare I think the
year will be complete, from the time Cairo heard of Hicks’ defeat, to
the time of the relief expedition arriving here!!! And I am sure, if an
enquiry was made, it would be made out no one was to blame.
The Arabs have eighteen boats plying as ferry from one side of the
White Nile to the other. They may try with these boats to get hold of
the _Husseinyeh_, or else to board her; there are only some bags of
biscuits on board; but as the steamer is blinded, if Arabs once get
on board, it would be very difficult to dislodge them, unless we sink
the steamer, for they will find the biscuit and so have plenty to eat.
Fifteen shells fell into the town this morning, but did no harm.
Nearly all the Arab force which came on the north side to-day were
slaves, with them perhaps forty horsemen Arabs. Eventually the Arabs
will find out the inconvenience of these Mamelukes.[230] Four bullets
came from the Arabs to the Palace to-day—2800 yards—and came with a
good force. A native of Kartoum came and complained he had had nothing
to eat for himself and family for four days; they found eight ardebs of
dhoora in his house; in another house forty ardebs were found.
* * * * *
_November 14._—8 A.M. The Arabs on both sides of the Blue Nile began
firing on Bourré at 5.30 A.M., and it is going on now. They kept up for
more than quarter of an hour a continuous roll of fire, and have wasted
a precious lot of ammunition. They brought down one of their guns and
fired a few rounds. Up to this time no one is wounded at Bourré.
Two men crossed from Omdurman, and report Ferratch Ullah as all right,
and as having no men wounded in the fort. The Arabs fired their guns on
the fort this morning.
An Arab tried to swim off to the _Husseinyeh_, whom (_they say?_) our
men shot.
I wonder where King John is, with his 200,000 soldiers?
I argue thus: 1. It would be impossible for the Expeditionary
Force, once having come to Dongola, not to move up to Metemma, or
to the vicinity of Berber. 2. That once at Metemma, or at Berber,
they will find the steamers, and consequently must communicate with
Kartoum. 3. Once they communicate with Kartoum they must assume the
responsibility of the government of that place (of course, when once
that responsibility is assumed, the decision as to what they will do
rests with them).
4. It is impossible for them to loiter long on the road between Dongola
(or Debbeh) and Metemma.
5. It will be impossible for them, _owing to the events of the last few
days_,[231] to avoid collision with the Arabs around Kartoum. A week
ago it might have been possible, but now the Arabs are too close to
the town to avoid it. Omdurman Fort being cut off will oblige action
being taken to re-open communications. The Arabs _may run away_, but,
somehow, since a few days, I doubt it.
A soldier came in from the North Fort from the Arabs this morning.
_Another fib_—they told me that they had got everything out of the
_Husseinyeh_ but the biscuit: it appears that the ammunition is still
in her.
[Illustration]
No church parade on the right bank of Nile (Kalakla), but one is going
on at Giraffe on the Blue Nile. It appears last night that a boat went
off to the _Husseinyeh_, that the men in this boat got frightened at
the challenge of our own men and jumped into the water, and left their
boat. I went down to Mogrim, and found the _Ismailia_ has been struck
by seven shells, and is pockmarked with bullets all over. The Arabs
(some 400 rifles) line a long trench opposite the _Husseinyeh_: we have
erected a parapet on our side opposite her. The Arabs have four guns,
from which they kept up a desultory fire, doing no harm. The Arabs’
rifle-fire is continuous and futile, ours is less heavy, but I expect
equally futile, for the Arabs keep under cover. The Arabs fired regular
volleys, upwards of five, while I was there: they appear to delight in
the noise. The _Husseinyeh_ is about 1,200 yards from the point X, 800
yards from Y, and 1,000 yards to Z, where my trench is.
_Husseinyeh_ lies just off the end of the entrenchment of Omdurman
_entrenched camp_.
She has her stern to the Arabs.
[Illustration]
A soldier came in to the North Fort from the Arabs on the Blue Nile,
and reports that a man with letters came the night before last to the
fort of Omdurman and called out to the sentries, but before they could
let him into the fort the Arabs captured him and the letters. I hope to
be able to-night to communicate by bugle sounds with Omdurman Fort.
Revised list of the robbery; 172,000 okes of biscuit they change every
day. We have to-day in the magazine 240,000 okes of biscuit, 1,326
ardebs of dhoora. Have ordered 1000 okes to be given away, and 4000
okes to be sold.
The Omdurman Fort is ill placed, as it cannot see the ground down to
the river, and is distant 1200 yards from the river. The Arabs on left
bank of the White Nile opposite _Husseinyeh_ number 500 (I expect all
are my soldiers), and they are so far away from any reserve that it
would be easy to crush them before they were aided, _if we dared to
try_, which we do not. I was at Mogrim Fort for half an hour, during
which time the Arabs fired, as I calculated, fifteen shells and 8000
rounds, and no one was touched; indeed, where their bullets went I
could not see nor hear. No stores could stand that, and up to sundown
they were still at it with rifles and guns. Bourré, in spite of all the
heavy firing, has no casualties; 80,000 rounds would scarcely cover our
_united_ expenditure to-day.
Reports from the Arabs at different times said the Mahdi had brought
200 (some say 120) camel loads of ammunition (Remingtons) from
Obeyed—say 200, and say that each camel carried 2 boxes, each box
1000, so that he had, before he began, 800,000 rounds; he must have
expended in the last week 250,000 to 300,000 rounds, and has left
550,000 rounds or 500,000 rounds. I do not expect he has 200,000 rounds
left, which is his weekly expenditure if he goes on at the rate he is
going now. We turn out on an average 40,000 rounds a week, and are
well ahead of our requirements. Looking at the Arab gunners with my
telescope, they never seem to bother themselves about aim, but just to
load and fire. It is, of course, different when the steamers are in
action. The officer in command of Mogrim Fort was wounded in the arm at
sundown. The captain of _Husseinyeh_ died to-day. We suppose that on
board the _Husseinyeh_, are the men I mentioned as having jumped out of
the boat last night on the challenge of the sentry, also a soldier of
Omdurman who swam off to her with letters from Ferratch Bey, commandant
of the fort, so we are sending off a boat to _Husseinyeh_ to take them
off. A workman in the arsenal was wounded to-day by a ball from Bourré,
distant 2300 yards. The Arab fire on Bourré renders the vicinity of the
palace far more dangerous than Bourré, the balls fall so plentifully
around the Mudirat, which is close by, that the Greek consul was
obliged to lay to for some time till the firing ceased: it is at least
2500 to 3000 yards from the palace to the place the Arabs fire from.
We have put the gun of the steamer _Ismailia_ on the bank of the Nile,
to cover the approach to the _Husseinyeh_; the Greek consul says “the
balls fall like water” on the road leading to the palace. I believe
a good deal, if you have the ammunition, in the dropping fire of
rifles, even at three thousand yards; the balls that fell on the palace
are fairly flattened, showing they have plenty of life to kill. The
buglers have communicated with Fort Omdurman, who are all well. 8 P.M.
to-morrow we will have signals with flags. Out of evil comes good—if
_Husseinyeh_ was not aground, the Arabs, instead of concentrating
their force and attention on her, would have devoted it on the fort,
which, cut off, would suffer; as it is now, the fort is unmolested.
Bullets rained on the hospital yesterday and to-day, but did no harm! I
calculate that the _Ismailia_ has two thousand bullet marks on her.
* * * * *
_November 15._—Last night we sent off a boat to the _Husseinyeh_, and
took off the soldier of Ferratch Ullah Bey, who had come from Omdurman,
also the ten men who jumped into the water from their boat the night
before. Ferratch Ullah writes he is all well; he wants ammunition!!! he
had 230,000 rounds three days ago: he says he has now 150,000 rounds,
also he has regulars, 470, each 100 rounds, 47,000; he has irregulars,
170, each 200 rounds, 34,000 altogether; in magazine of fort, 150,000
rounds, and with the men 81,000; total ammunition in fort, 231,000
rounds: yet he calls for ammunition!!! Hicks took 1,000,000. The
buglers communicated well with the fort at Omdurman; buglers then spoke
the soldiers on Mahdi’s side, but they did not answer; we invited them
to come over to us.
The five feluccas, which took the men off the _Husseinyeh_, were not
seen by the Arabs. I sent an engineer to take off the steam-valves of
the _Husseinyeh_; the five feluccas took off, _this time_, everything
from _Husseinyeh_, biscuit, ammunition, &c., &c. It appears that the
Arabs, who were watching the _Husseinyeh_, had gone off to Kerowé,
opposite Halfeyeh; but this is doubtful.
At dawn the Arabs opened a heavy fire with the usual futile efforts on
Bourré, also they fired with gun and musketry on Omdurman Fort.
At Omdurman Fort they have had, in the last few days, four killed and
sixteen wounded.
A shell from the Arabs struck _Husseinyeh_ yesterday, but did no harm,
for she is well aground. No wounded at Bourré to-day by the Arab fire.
The Bimbashi, who was wounded in the arm yesterday evening, was lying
on his angarep[232] when he was wounded: he thought it a secure place;
he died to-day.
The Arabs from Omdurman side of the river have kept up a desultory fire
of guns and musketry all day; but at sundown the fire was much heavier,
and if the Arabs go on like that for many days, they will be out of
ammunition, both gun and rifle.
It has turned out a benefit for us the _Husseinyeh_ going aground, for
the attention of the Arabs is devoted to her, and they fire scarcely at
all on the fort at Omdurman; even if we had her, she could do little
good: the other little steamer will be completed in twelve days.
I think I have been rather unjust towards the fellaheen soldier, for
though he is not brave enough to take the field, he has done good work
on board the steamers, and a good many of their officers and men have
been killed and wounded (thanks to the policy that has been followed
elsewhere) in a quarrel which does not concern them. These remarks are
produced by a visit I made to the hospital to-day, when I saw the mass
of the wounded were fellaheen soldiers, whom I put in the steamers,
because, when in action, they could not run away, while I kept the
blacks for the defence of the Lines. As I was leaving the hospital
to-day, a dead man was carried out by four men in chains (convicts) on
a stretcher, accompanied by two soldiers with fixed bayonets—to be
buried as a dog! This is part of the glory of war! According to the
demands for ammunition, we are firing away 40,000 rounds per diem; the
officers ask for fresh Remingtons, as by the constant firing those
they have are out of order. I feel quite indifferent, for, if not
relieved for a month, our food supply fails, and even at the above rate
of expenditure of ammunition we have fifty days’ cartridges. I like
to go down with our colours flying. The Arabs are quite equalling us
in expenditure, and they have no reserve of ammunition, or means of
repairing their arms. I am going to call the new steamer the _Zubair_,
after Zubair Pasha Rahama;[233] the town wanted it called after me, but
I said, “I have put most of you in prison and otherwise bullied you,
and I have no fear of your forgetting me.”
* * * * *
_November16._—The Arabs quiet, little firing at Mogrim; I expect
the Mahdi has found out that his men have been making away with his
ammunition too fast, even as I have found it out. A small fantasie or
church parade is going on near the Mahdi’s camp this morning.
The Arabs at the Mahdi’s camp have moved the camp further inland;
they did this at sundown yesterday. It is on the _tapis_ that they may
retire altogether; if so it will be glorious. The camp opposite the
Lines on South is much diminished, not more than five or six tents.
The Arabs there have gone to Giraffe and El foun on the Blue Nile.
With the exception of the Arab guns firing on Mogrim, and our guns
answering, everything is quiet to-day. In a couple of hours the Arabs
fired sixteen shells without the least effect. Their gun ammunition
must be nearly expended. A woman was slightly wounded at Bourré this
morning. The Arabs work on a regular principle with the captured black
troops. They know that they will escape to us if they can, in the
first instance, so they keep them on short rations, and promise them
full rations if they fight us. They then force them into contact with
us for (at first) appearance sake and to get the full rations; when
in contact with us we fire on and kill some of them, then their black
blood gets up, and they retaliate _en bonne volonté_, and are egged on
by the Arabs, who say to them, “Now you have fired on the Government
troops you are in for it; the Government will never pardon you,” and so
thus we get no more deserters. It was the same way at Bourré, before we
fired on the Arabs we got plenty of deserters, but when once we gave
them a slating no more came in; they are compromised with the Mahdi’s
cause, and afraid of us if they come in. The Janissaries were the
children of Christian parents captured when young, and they fought with
vigour against the Christians when they grew up. Scarcely ever is the
true Arab in the front, so they say.
We have ninety men in hospital at present, of which fifty-four are
wounded. We had one man killed, and one wounded at Mogrim to-day. A
woman was wounded in the town yesterday. Report in town says seventy
of our captured soldiers have deserted and have entered the fort at
Omdurman.
Having been assured by my officers that it was a most terrible risk
even to go along the bank near the _Husseinyeh_, even by night, owing
to the Arabs’ rifle fire, and being extremely sceptical of the past
(putting down the information given me as an excuse for doing nothing
towards taking off the _Husseinyeh_ the first night she got aground;
and also as an effort to enhance the danger and daring of those men who
did take off the ammunition, &c., the night before last), I went down
to-night at 11.30 and found it was all a myth, and that if I wished I
could take her off without any risk. However, as she is a target and
occupies the attention of the Arabs, who leave the fort at Omdurman
alone in consequence of her, I shall leave her as she is. Of course,
needless to say, I found all the officers in charge absent; _they had
gone home to bed!_ However, I am not put out at it. They are, as a
rule, the _very feeblest of the conies_, and nothing will change their
nature. The _Husseinyeh_ lies close to the junction of the White and
Blue Niles, and one may say is within our lines.
I daresay this is a repetition, but if we do get out of this mess it is
a miracle, for I do not think a slacker lot of officers ever could be
found, but a bad workman always complains of his tools. A good workman
turns out good work however rotten his tools may be.
* * * * *
_November17._—It is really amusing to find (when one can scarcely call
one’s life one’s own) one’s servant, _already_ with one wife (which
most men find is enough), coming and asking for leave for three days,
in order to take another wife. Yet such was the case, a few days ago,
with one of my servants.
The Arabs this morning fired from their guns from Bourré, from the
White Nile, and from Omdurman; they are also keeping up a musketry
fire. At the Mahdi’s camp they had another “church parade” to-day.
I suppose they are working up their fanaticism. The Arabs have a
Nordenfeldt opposite the little steamer _Husseinyeh_. The town
people are pleased at the new steamer being called the _Zubair_; the
Anti-Slave Society will be furious.[234] If Zubair had come up, I
should have had news long before now.[235] It does seem ridiculous
that when our apparent policy is to hand over the Soudan to the Mahdi,
who with his people are far more slave hunters than Zubair ever would
be, we should not have utilized this man in this expedition. There are
about two hundred people on the Isle of Tuti, yet last night an Arab
came over, killed a man and carried off three donkeys; they do not
deserve the name of men. How Zubair would touch up these fellows; he
would go to Tuti and give all the men between eighteen and fifty at
least thirty blows of Kourbatch. I am obliged to content myself with
lamentations.
(“Count the months—March, April, May, June, July, August, September,
October, and half November! Why, I declare, it is a breach of
contract.”[236])
If it be true about the repulse of the Abyssinians at Keren, I expect
there were roars of laughter in Downing Street at the greenness of His
Majesty the Emperor John (as Mitzakis calls him). It is very odd, but
we have had no news of Kassala for months, not since September ... to
.... “You said _it was too dreadful_; what will you say when I tell you
he has made sketches of _you_ and ME? and how, horrible to relate, put
them in his demi-official journal; and we can do _absolutely_ nothing,
for if he is attacked as being a British officer, he says he made the
sketches as Governor-General, and _vice versâ_.”
Independent of my regret for Stewart, the loss of his journal affects
me, for there were lots of things in it of interest. All the powers
(including the Pope, and excluding England and France) were appealed to
in a touching memo., to raise an auxiliary force under Baker, &c., &c.,
and to stop the wave of Dervish fanaticism. I also wrote to the Sultan.
I do not know if these appeals ever got through, but Stewart had them
all copied in his journal. Events and my discourses had almost made
him latterly, as vicious as I am. Baring’s ears ought to have burned,
for the last eight months, he was nicely dissected by us all (Power
aiding). If Herbin, the French Consul, had got down Baring would have
had a time of it, for Herbin says that Barère, the French minister,
went to Baring before Herbin left, and Baring did not tell (Barère) any
thing about the evacuation of the Soudan. Of course Baring will shelter
himself under the “fiction” that he, as British minister, had nothing
to do with it. What a farce, if it did not deal with men’s lives.
When one thinks that Baring works harder than a galley slave for such
wretched results, one ought to pity him.
I have sent 150 of these superior troops (the Shaggyeh), to the Isle
of Tuti, in consequence of the outrage of last night (which I do not
believe in, _for that one man came over and killed another man, and
carried off three donkeys in a small boat_ is absurd). However, the
Shaggyeh are safer in the Isle of Tuti than in the North Fort. At 7
P.M. the Arabs came down and fired on Bourré from the left bank of
the Blue Nile. The officer (a full colonel of _my_ creation), asks
me “Is he to fire back?” I said, “Better _not_ ask me that question,
unless you want to catch it.” 7.15 P.M. Omdurman Fort is firing away.
I certainly lay claim to having commanded, more often than any other
man, cowardly troops, but this experience of 1884 beats all past
experiences; the worst of the matter is, that you cannot believe one
word the officers say. With respect to the major who was absent from
the Fort Mogrim last night, he says he was in the telegraph station,
which is a direct falsehood. However, I did nothing to him, more than
call him a liar, which he probably considers a compliment. A sort of
adjutant-major, whom I had borne with for a long time, told me _two
cold lies_ in _two days_, so I bundled him out. Can it be wondered
at that, after nine months and more of this sort of military worry,
and ditto of civil worry, I am heartily sick of the whole affair, and
provided _I_ am not made a party (and I _will not be_) to a shabby
retreat, I should be glad to be out of this place.
The Arabs fired fifteen shells against the Fort of Omdurman; only one
seemed to strike the keep; one man was wounded at Mogrim with the
splinter of a shell. The Arab gun-carriages must be in bad state of
repair, for our carpenters are continually at work making new ones,
and the Arabs have no means of so doing. The _Husseinyeh_ lies just
off the division of the White and the Blue Niles, and not as I showed
her position, page 327. All the scratched out portion is abuse of
Baring.[237] Some one said, “If you feel angry, then write your angry
letter, and then tear it up.” It certainly does relieve the mind
to write one’s bile, and it is good also to scratch it out, for I
dare say Baring is doing his duty better than I am; he is certainly
more patriotic, if patriotism consists in obedience to the existing
Government of one’s country.[238]
Doctor reports that the shells and bullets of the Arabs fell all
around the hospital this morning, but did no harm, they came from
Bourré.
* * * * *
_November 18._—Everything quiet all round the place; they fired a few
shots with their guns at the lines near the White Nile.
11.30 A.M. The Arabs on the right bank of the Blue Nile have moved
towards the north, and, from the number of porters, I expect they are
going to form a camp to the north.
It may be turned as one likes; three prominent undeniable facts exist.
Her Majesty’s Government refused to help Egypt with respect to the
Soudan, refused to let Egypt help herself, and refused to allow any
other power to help her: this cannot be disputed or explained away.
Lord Dufferin’s despatch was “hands off.”[239] The resignation of
Cherif was the prohibition of allowing Egypt to help herself. This
tardy succour under pressure, and Baring’s despatch, establishes the
unwillingness to help.
The Arabs have settled down in the old Dem they occupied in March
last!! opposite the palace, and which they evacuated in August; their
vicinity will give us more spies, which we have lacked hitherto; this
proceeding does not show as if they were much appalled at the advance
of the expeditionary force. On the 12th March they pitched their tents
on the very spot they are pitching them now—251 days ago—during which
we have night and day been in hostilities with them, and been obliged
to keep on the alert “because of?” “because of?”—“What?” The answer
has been worn threadbare.
The Arab guns on Omdurman side firing 1.30 P.M. on Mogrim. They have
expended a lot of gun ammunition in last few days. 3.30 P.M. They are
still firing; one can distinguish the Nordenfeldt. I remember how,
when Hicks left for the Soudan, papers wrote of the great effect that
the Nordenfeldts were to have upon Arabs, like the French before the
Franco-Prussian war with their mitrailleuses. At 4 P.M. they fired
for a quarter of an hour quickly. This was caused by five cows which
approached the Fort, the men of which killed three (so to-night they
will have meat). The Arabs fired fifteen shells one after the other
against the Fort, for the outrage on their property. I shall have to
move these superior troops (the Shaggyeh) out of the North Fort, for
the approach of the Arabs has filled them with dismay. I have kept
moving them from every place the Arabs came near. It is really absurd
that one should have to pay and keep such troops. I will say Ferratch
Pasha (however irritating he is in some ways) is always the gentleman,
which I am sorry to say _I am not_, with the fury I get in on state
occasions. A woman came in from the south front; she says they were
all my old soldiers who are fighting on the left bank of the Nile,
and that they lost heavily on the day _Husseinyeh_ got aground. I am
moving _these_ Shaggyeh to the lines; it is no use exposing them to be
attacked. The Arabs now on the north front opposite the palace are the
men of the Mahdi, not as before the men of the Sheikh el Obeyed, who do
not seem to have entered cordially into the second blockade of Kartoum.
We had to-night the Arab forces all around us, and are regularly hemmed
in, but the town does not care a bit, and are fighting questions of
pay with me, for I am paying in paper the three months’ backsheesh I
promised them.
The major who was shot when lying on his angarep, and who died of
his wound, was 3,000 yards distant from the Arabs. We do not know yet
the effect of the rifle in a dropping fire. I offered, in paying the
three months’ backsheesh to the troops, to give orders for bulk sums
£120, £130, but they refused to accept them; they want the _regular
paper money_, so I have issued £10,000 more in £50 notes. In this paper
money notes _I am personally responsible_ for the liquidation, and any
one may bring an action against me, _in my individual capacity_, to
recover the money, while in the orders it might be a query whether they
(the authorities of Cairo) might not decline to pay the orders. Paper
money now cannot be bought at a discount. People have tried to buy it
up, but they failed.[240] I consider this is very satisfactory for
one’s credit. Her Majesty’s Government, as well as the Soudan people,
will not need to name a vessel after me in order to remember me, even
if they felt so disposed, which I very much doubt. We shall get lots
of spies in now the Arabs have hemmed us in. In these deserts, if you
leave a space unguarded you see at once any one moving over it; but if
you surround it entirely, there is the usual going to and fro, and thus
a spy slips in. I do not think it is realised what happened in Hicks’
defeat a year ago. 10,000 soldiers, including 2,000 cavalry, 4,000
camp-followers, 7,000 camels, perished in two days from thirst;[241]
1700 rifles, 1,000,000 rounds Remington ammunition, were captured;
7 Krupps, 6 Nordenfeldts, 29 mountain guns, with 500 rounds each,
were captured (perhaps 300 men were spared out of the host). Eight
Englishmen and 8 Germans were killed, and, according to all accounts,
they were so exhausted that they were unable to move. Stewart took
great pains to get all the details, and wrote them in his journal. The
Arabs have made a pyramid of the skulls. The major who was wounded at
Mogrim was sleeping in the telegraph station in the Fort. He found it
hot, and went out and got struck and died. If you went to the Fort at
Mogrim you would (on seeing the position whence the Arabs fire) say you
were as safe there as in Regent Street. This man was a very timorous
man, and had avoided every service of the least danger. It is of no use
fighting against your destiny. The doctor described to me to-night the
state of the town _a year ago_, when they heard of the defeat of Hicks;
and one compares it to our present state, when one may say perfect
confidence exists in the town, and every one has gone comfortably to
bed—it is a lesson to man to never despair.
* * * * *
_November 19._—The Arabs came down, 7 A.M., to Goba, opposite the
Palace, and fired, but did no harm; they are pulling down Seyd Mahomet
Osman’s house, which was spared. Ferratch Ullah did not dare to go
out for the three cows killed last night. The Arabs had a bugler
of ours with them at Goba; he bugled a call “1st Regiment!” and
then was apparently stopped, he then bugled “We are strong! We are
strong!” I have packed up and addressed to the chief of staff, Soudan
Expeditionary Force, “all European telegrams sent _from_ and received
_in_ the Soudan for years 1883-84,” and send the box with this portion
of the Journal.[242] The Arabs have put a gun in the breastwork on
the left bank of the White Nile below Omdurman Fort, so as to bar the
entrance to Kartoum on the north.
We have communicated with Omdurman Fort with flags, it is all right.
The Arabs are not firing to-day (since 8.30 A.M.). Twelve days have
to elapse ere the month’s rations become due; this evening it is
reported to me that those utterly useless troops—some fifty Bashi
Bazouks—began crying that they had nothing to eat, and even went
so far as to throw down their arms; now this is rather too much,
considering that they are receiving the full rations of soldiers, and
also the pay of men who are supposed to find themselves, so that it
is a perfectly gratuitous gift to give them rations at all, or if I
do so, I should cut their pay; the best of it is, that I _have given_
them full rations for the month, which has twelve days yet to run ere
that month is out. I do not know if ever the expeditionary force will
come here, and I do not know the policy which will be pursued; but
there is one thing I think I am justified in demanding, that is the
disbandment of these brutes, to whom only yesterday I gave a gratuity
of fifty dollars to erect their breastwork—a totally unnecessary
proceeding on my part. Of course if I can hand over the government
to the Expeditionary Forces’ Leader I have nothing to say; he can do
as he likes. What irritates me is, that a row like this is aided and
abetted by every officer, inasmuch as it is to me the row is brought,
they daring not to decide; of course, it must be seen, that situated
as we are, if one corps can take rations for a month and eat them in a
fortnight, and then get more, it is virtually giving double rations to
the troops, for if you gave to one part, all the rest would want it.
* * * * *
_November 20._—A caravan of 300 men and twenty camels came up the
left bank of the White Nile, from the direction of Metemma. 7 A.M. A
soldier who came in from the Arabs, says, “The Mahdi sent 2,000 men
down towards Metemma on account of the advance of the Expedition, who
are near Berber.” Also “reports the advance of King Johannes” (which I
doubt). I expect the caravan seen to-day is a caravan with _the money_
from Berber. Report in the town says the Arabs have been repulsed three
times by the Expeditionary Force. The Arabs are very quiet to-day;
their Nordenfeldt kept on grunting at intervals this morning. Four of
those precious troops the Shaggyeh (one a Bashi Bazouk), have deserted
to the Arabs; it was never reported to me. I have a suspicion that more
have gone. We communicated with Omdurman Fort by flag-signals; they are
all right. The Arabs fired from their guns on the White Nile, and from
the Omdurman side, a few rounds this evening.
It is rather astonishing to find that the row about the rations
the night before last, was made by the Cairo Bashi Bazouks, who are
completely at one’s mercy, for the Arabs would never look at them;[243]
they even went so far as to throw down their arms! A volley of lies
was told about this affair, trying to prevent me hearing the truth.
However, I got at the bottom of it, and have noted my friends. A
merchant here had a partner in business, who went to the Arabs eight
months ago with £3,000 belonging to this merchant, who coolly asks me
to pay the £3,000!!!
* * * * *
_November 21._—I do not believe one person has died of hunger
during the 8-11/30 months we have been shut up. Ferratch Ullah Bey,
in Omdurman, signalled, “Yes, I have 230,000 rounds, but I fire a lot
every day.” Now this is a corker, for I do not believe he fires ten
rounds without my personal knowledge, and I estimate his expenditure of
ammunition at under 2,000 rounds per diem. By this I expect he wants me
to open the road to him, and ammunition is only an excuse; but I do not
care to risk a defeat, or a momentary success, attended with a lot of
wounded (we have sixty wounded in hospital now). To-day year came the
news to Kartoum of Hicks’ defeat. He left this on the 3rd September.
The Greek Consul and the Greek doctor describes the arrival of news
thus at Kartoum: At night came in the _Bordeen_ with Coetlogon from
the White Nile. The Greek Consul was in his house. Marquet, the French
Consul, came to his house and said, “Come to my house, by the garden.”
He went to Marquet’s house; he found Hussein Pasha Cheri, Ibrahim
Pasha Haidar, Coetlogon, Power, and Hansall. He was told “_Hicks is
finished_.” The Consul sent a telegram to Towfik, “Hicks finished.”
Then Towfik sent a telegram that he would send up reinforcements that
night. Towfik had a large party at the Abdeen Palace, and reports were
rife that something bad was in the air, but nobody knew anything.
_Since that day no aid has come to Soudan._ I hear that the day before
yesterday two corporals (one who had come in from the Arabs), five
soldiers, and a clerk, all Soudan soldiers, deserted to the Arabs. This
was never reported to me. I expect the officers have robbed them.
Ferratch Ullah Bey, of Omdurman, signals he has only 43,000 rounds
left. This, out of 230,000 rounds, and I feel sure he tells fibs,
and is acting in order to force me to relieve him, which I shall not
attempt. He says he has had twenty-five wounded and eleven killed.
Church parades all round to-day. The Arabs fired at Bourré and at Tuti
this morning.
To-day I discovered a robbery of Ruckdi, my old clerk, about which
there could be no doubt whatever, so I have turned him out, and written
to cancel his being made a Bey. A woman came in from the Arabs. She
says the Expedition left Merowé for Berber, and that Mahomet Achmet
will try, on Monday, the 24th November, to take Omdurman Fort. This
is disagreeable news! However, I have done what I can, and one can do
no more than trust now. What has been the painful position for me is
that there is not one person on whom I can rely; also, there is not one
person who considers that he ought to do anything except his routine
duty. We have now been months blockaded, and things are critical; yet
not one of my subordinates, except the chief clerk and his subordinate,
appears to-day. I had to send for them, and wait till they came,
perhaps an hour. “It is Friday, and it is unreasonable to expect us
at the office,” is what they say. My patience is almost exhausted
with this continuous apparently never-ending trial; there is not one
department which I have not to superintend as closely as if I was its
direct head. The officer who commanded the post from which the men
deserted never told me, but says he told Ferratch Pasha. This Ferratch
Pasha denies, and so it goes on, tissues of lies, and they no more care
about being found out than not. It is indeed hopeless work, and yet,
truly, they have been treated most handsomely in every way. Nearly
every order, except when it is for their interest, has to be repeated
two, and even three, times. I may truly say I am weary of my life; day
and night, night and day, it is one continual worry.[244]
Our breastworks at Tuti are bothering the Arabs near Omdurman. A
soldier came in from the Arabs; he had nothing to say of importance. We
have got a breastwork also towards Goba, on the Isle of Tuti. I have
given those improvident troops 15,000 okes of biscuits. I sincerely
hope I may never be besieged with such a garrison another time. A slave
came in, and reports “that Berber has been taken by the troops from
Kassala, and that the Arab Governor of Berber arrived at the Mahdi’s
two days ago (perhaps the caravan we saw yesterday);” also that “the
four steamers have gone to Berber, _one being disabled, or aground, or
sunk_!” If this is the case, it is that brute Nutzer Bey or Pasha who
(keeping himself well under cover) has disobeyed my repeated orders as
to “not taking the steamers against the guns, but to stay quietly at
Shendy and wait for the Expedition.” The last order that I sent him was
that “I would cancel his appointment as Pasha if he dared to disobey me
again.” But of what avail is that?
* * * * *
_November 22._—Slight firing at Bourré and Goba this morning. A
soldier deserted to the Arabs last night, with his rifle.
A soldier and a slave came in from the Arabs. It appears more Shaggyeh
deserted to the Arabs than the four I mentioned, but it seems perfectly
impossible to find out the truth, or even the number of Shaggyeh there
are.
I am terribly anxious for the fort at Omdurman, and am trying to devise
some means of occupying the Arabs, and diverting their attention
elsewhere. Omdurman Fort signals they are all right; they had another
man wounded. Up to date we have had, passing through the hospital, 242
wounded. We have had some 1800 to 1900 killed (between 17th March and
22nd November).
This is the present state of affairs; the Arab camps are about five
miles from the city.
Camp C is on river.
[Illustration]
A is one mile from river; camp D and E are three to four miles from
the river. Of these numbers perhaps there are 3000 to 4000 fighting
men, and 600 horsemen to 800 horsemen in the _whole lot_. There is
nothing like being precise in these days, and it saves a deal of
talking if one knows a man’s ideas beforehand. If the Expedition
comes here before the place falls (which is doubtful), and _if the
instructions are to evacuate the place at once, and leave Kassala and
Sennaar, &c., I will resign, and have nothing more to do with the
Government of the place, or of the Soudan_; and this I have a perfect
right to do, and no one, not even the Soudan troops or people, could
say one word. It will depend on circumstances how I shall act _in
re_ my commission in Her Majesty’s service (which I do not hold too
fast to, seeing any future employment would not be accepted, even if
in the very improbable case of its being offered); but I consider
that every officer has a right to resign, and if he resigns he is no
longer subject to military orders, and is free to go when and where
he likes. It may be argued I was named Governor-General “in order to
carry out the evacuation of the Soudan, and that I am bound to carry
that out, which is quite correct, but I was named for EVACUATION OF
SOUDAN” (against which I have nothing to say), _not to run away from
Kartoum and leave the garrisons elsewhere to their fate_.[245] If it
is positively determined on _not to look after the garrisons_, and
_not_ to _establish some sort of provisional Government in the Soudan_,
then the course to pursue is _to name a Governor in my place on day of
arrival_, and carry out with that Governor that policy which, I have
already said, is one of very great danger (putting all the _other_
considerations aside). PERSONALLY, looking at the matter from a VERY
SELFISH POINT OF VIEW (and seeing I have done my best to prevent this
policy being followed, and am impatient to oppose it), I should be much
relieved at this _denouement_, for I should be in Brussels on 20th
January.
I have given 6,000 lbs. of biscuit out to the poor (I expect half
will be stolen), and I shall sell to-morrow 90,000 lbs. to the
townspeople. I am determined if the town does fall, the Mahdi shall
find precious little to eat in it. Two soldiers got hold of the head
of a shell-rocket fired by Arabs, and, having nothing better to do,
they set to work to open it. It burst, and has nearly killed one, and
wounded the other—the effects of curiosity!
* * * * *
_November 23._—A soldier came in at the North Fort from the Arabs; he
says the Expedition has captured Berber, and are advancing on this, and
the Arabs want to attack Tuti Isle.
The Arabs, this morning, fired from Goba on breastwork of Tuti. The
soldier says my noble friend, Nutzer Pasha, kept safely all the
steamers at Shendy, and never aided in any way at Berber. The Arabs
are (so says this soldier) collecting at Halfeyeh to receive the
expedition, but I do not think it.
Three women came in last night from the Arabs to North Fort; they had
been captured during the raid the Arabs made on the Shaggyeh some days
ago.
The soldier who came in brought two rifles and two belts of ammunition.
Ferratch Ullah Bey, of Omdurman Fort, reports “he is all right,” by
signal.
A report has come in that the Expedition had arrived at Metemma,
and had encountered the Arabs twice; that a steamer had been sent up
to inform me, but the Arab guns had forced her to return; they say
that this report has come into the town by men who have friends in
the Mahdi’s camp, and who had seen some of the Arabs wounded. This
news is five days old. Very few Arabs in the camp on the North of the
Palace. The Shaggyeh came and asked me to let them go up and pillage
the Arab camp as there were so few in it; they knew well that I knew
if I did give them leave they would not go, so it was a safe volunteer
on their part. A caravan of Arabs came from the North to the Arab camp
this morning. The Arabs have only one gun on the Omdurman side now; I
expect the rest are taken down against the Expedition. We have only 541
rounds of Krupp ammunition left for our two Krupps. I went to Mogrim,
and practised on the Arab House where their gun is, 1600 yards range;
we put three shells into it, upon which the Arabs left. I am still
apprehensive of an attack on Omdurman Fort, and have the _Ismailia_
steamer ready. I have sent down thirty rockets (sky) to Mogrim to be
fired off; this will bother the Arabs, who will not know what to make
of it, and will think we have got some very important _news_. I know
if this happened when _I_ was meditating an assault, I should hesitate
before I made that assault after the fireworks.
* * * * *
_November 24_, 6 A.M.—Arabs came down and fired on the Isle of Tuti
from Goba. Ferratch Ullah Bey of Omdurman reports all well; another man
had been wounded, and one had died. A slave came in from the Arabs on
the south front, who says there is no news of the Expedition in Walad a
Goun’s camp. 12.15 P.M. The Arabs near Omdurman Fort are retiring from
their position near the small steamer, and are burning the straw huts;
our men are firing on them, and they do not reply, the _Husseinyeh_
steamer has slipped down towards deeper water, of herself. I am sending
down the _Ismailia_ to reconnoitre. The Arabs have not fired from their
gun at Omdurman to-day. It appears the _Husseinyeh_ has sunk, so that
may be the reason of the Arabs retiring. I expect the Mahdi wanted his
troops, who were guarding the steamer _Husseinyeh_, and so he sent off
men last night to sink her, and that is the history of the retreat. It
is somewhat of a relief to me, for I expect it shows the Arabs will
not make an assault on Omdurman Fort. Perhaps our fireworks last night
all along the lines made the Mahdi think I had some great news, which
he did not know of; we fired from five places fifteen sky-rockets at
one concerted moment. They report from Mogrim that the Arabs retreated
_before Husseinyeh_ sank, but I expect that is a fib, and that they
did not leave till she sank; it is against all reason with a falling
river, and, fixed on a level as she was, she sank untouched. The fact
is, I expect, that the man put to watch her was asleep, and the Arabs,
trying to capture her, drew her into deep water, when the water got
into her shot-hole. 1.30 P.M. The _Ismailia_ went down to the junction
of the Blue and White Niles, and the Arab guns opened on her, so she
has come back. I have sent down to make inquiries on the quiet, whether
the Arabs returned BEFORE or AFTER the sinking of _Husseinyeh_. The
Arabs fired five rounds at the _Ismailia_. The Arabs came back to their
breastwork when the _Ismailia_ appeared, but on her return they also
went back. If _Husseinyeh_ had not had a shot-hole in her, the Arabs
would have captured her; but, as I had taken her steam-cocks off, they
could not use her. We may be able to raise her if she has sunk evenly.
The steamer has sunk evenly, for her funnel is above water.
I expect the Arabs put a slave-boy to turn the handle of the
Nordenfeldt, for it keeps on grunting all day at intervals of half
seconds, but does no harm.
* * * * *
_November 25._—Arabs came to Goba this morning and fired on the Isle
of Tuti for half an hour. It is quite true the _Arabs did work at the
Husseinyeh and caused her to sink, and on her sinking they retired_;
the sentries in our lines being all asleep, as I had supposed. Ferratch
Ullah Bey of Omdurman Fort reports all well; he has another death among
his wounded. I have promised him three days’ pay for every day he and
his men are shut up. 1.15 P.M. Steamers in sight; the doctor saw them
first. The steamers are firing; only one steamer in sight.
The Arabs had three guns at Halfeyeh against the coming-in steamer.
2.30 P.M. I have sent down the _Ismailia_ to cover the incoming
steamer. The Arabs are grunting with their Nordenfeldt, and firing from
their gun. Mogrim is playing on them with the Krupp, and Tuti with
their mountain gun. 2.45 P.M. For the last half-hour the firing on the
part of Arabs on the advancing steamer has been most furious with guns
and musketry; we replying. I am grateful to say that, after this hot
reception, she has got in safe to Mogrim.
If any officer of the Expedition is on board, he will know what it
is to be in a penny boat! under cannon fire. The _Bordeen_ has come
in; she has seven wounded. There are _no Arabs_ at Shoboloha, or
(consequently) _guns_; the wounded were from two shells fired by the
Arabs from Halfeyeh. The expeditionary force is at Ambukol (which is
LIVELY!);[246] the Arabs had four guns at Halfeyeh; one woman was
killed in the _Bordeen_: the letters received by _Bordeen_ are of no
great import, for they do not tell me the route the expedition will
take, and I have received a later post—that of 14th October.
Two men were wounded at Mogrim to-day. According to the report of the
two men who came from Dongola, it is not _certain_ that the _Abbas_ is
captured.
I enclose a telegram,[247] which we cannot decipher. I imagine Colonel
Stewart has the key, it being probably Foreign Office cipher.
Towfik, by a telegram, cancels his Firman, which gives up the
Soudan,[248] which I have _torn up_, but enclose; (this telegram[249] I
received to-day).
A telegram to the Ulemas from Towfik says: _“Baring” is coming up with
Lord Wolseley_.
* * * * *
_November 26._—One man came to Goba and fired two shots and retired.
The Arabs fired three rounds at Fort Omdurman. The Fort reports all
right. Nutzi Pasha reports that the money at Berber has been taken
up to the Mahdi. He sends up four wounded. He says the Expedition
is advancing in three parties—one to Berber from Ambukol, one from
Ambukol to Metemma, and one from Ambukol to Shoboloha. This letter
was written six days ago. A caravan came across from the north to the
Mahdi’s camp to-day. The Arabs at Metemma have crossed to Shendy and
gone into the interior. Four fellaheen soldiers deserted from Nutzi
Pasha and went to the Arabs—I expect through his ill-treatment of them.
There are three long telegrams in cipher, which I cannot make out,
pasted on the other side.[250]
I had a letter saying Government had given Kitchener _carte blanche_ to
pay the Mahdi up to £20,000 for me; but adds the “writer does not think
I would accept such a proposition”; in which he is quite right; neither
would the Mahdi.
I like Baker’s description of Kitchener.
“The man whom I have always placed my hopes upon, Major Kitchener,
R.E., who is one of the few _very superior_ British officers, with a
cool and good head and a hard constitution, combined with untiring
energy, has now pushed up to Dongola and has proved that the Mudir is
dependable. The latter has given him a letter received from you asking
about reinforcements, and stating that you have 8000 troops at Kartoum,
and that Sennaar is still occupied by the Government forces.”[251]
There was a slight laugh when Kartoum heard Baring was bumping[252] his
way up here, for so we read Towfik’s telegram—a regular Nemesis.
I am sure we are deprived of a treat in not being able to decipher
the long telegrams on the preceding page. It also is delicious to find
not one civil word from any official personage except Kitchener; it
relieves me immensely (also I must except Towfik, who in his dispatch
was civil and polite). Evidently I am in disgrace! How fearful!
According to the man who came yesterday the _Abbas_ struck a rock,
and the two boats surrendered to the Arabs. I have no doubt but that
the Arabs have captured the steamer _Abbas_, for the Arab chief of
Berber sent to Cassim el Mousse an impression of the seal I used when
I was up here before, and which I sent down by Stewart. Now, it is
impossible he could have known this unless he had possession of the
seal, for I do not think Stewart knew it. The Arabs at Omdurman have
the slave boy grinding away at their Nordenfeldt. I have sent one of
our French mitrailleuses down to grind on them. If Baring does bump his
way up here as British Commissioner, I shall consider he has expiated
his faults and shall forgive him. We seldom realise our position. In
ten or twelve years’ time Baring, Lord Wolseley, myself, Evelyn Wood,
&c., will have no teeth, and will be deaf; some of us will be quite
_passé_; no one will come and court us; new Barings, new Lord Wolseleys
will have arisen, who will call us “bloaks” and “twaddlers.” “Oh! for
goodness’ sake come away, then! Is that dreadful bore coming? If once
he gets alongside you, you are in for half an hour,” will be the remark
of some young captain of the present time on seeing you enter the Club.
This is very humiliating, for we, each one, think we are immortal. That
poor old General ... who for years vegetated at the end of —-- street
close to Clubs! who ever visited him? Better a ball in the brain than
to flicker out unheeded, like he did.
* * * * *
_November 26._—The ex-Khedive will chuckle over Baring’s ride to the
Soudan. I can fancy him twinkling his little eyes over it. He came up
in his youth to Dongola with his uncle Ismail Pasha, a slim youth;
Halim (the rightful heir to the Khediviat after Ismail) also was here
as Governor-General for three weeks, but he bolted back, without leave,
from Said Pasha, who was then Viceroy. If Ismail, ex-Khedive, could
only get Malet, Vivian, and Colvin to go this ride, I think he would
forgive his deposition. I have published the telegram of Towfik to me,
and to the Notables (note that in this telegram, Towfik—a year late,
it is true—says he is sorry for Hicks’s army destruction!), saying he
will retain the Soudan. Whoever comes up here had better appoint Major
Kitchener Governor-General, for it is certain, after what has passed,
_I am impossible_. (What a comfort!)
* * * * *
_November 27._—The Arabs fired with artillery and musketry on Bourré
for about an hour this morning. They fired three shells, at Omdurman
Fort, who signals it is all right.
Two slaves came in to-day; they say the Arabs are wanting in
ammunition. I do not wonder at it, at the way they fire it away; they
say the Mahdi has had a revelation that the Turks will keep the country
for eight years, that he is to go back and come again at the end of the
eight years.[253] The little captured steamer _Mahomet Ali_ came down
near Giraffe last night, and then went back.
If Kitchener would take the place, he would be the best man to put in
as Governor-General, but I must confess I think, _with our Government
constituted as it is_, that for Her Majesty’s Government to take the
charge of these countries would be a very serious burden, and that the
only solution would be the Sultan taking them over, with a subsidy and
the ports of Suakin and Massowah. Judging from Towfik’s telegram to me,
it would seem that the Hewitt Treaty has fallen through, for he speaks
of the retention of Kassala.
Our Government has two courses to pursue, _one_ to appoint Kitchener
or some other Governor-General, and to be prepared to give him £500,000
a year for two years, for he will never get any taxes worth speaking
of; for two years, also, our Government must be prepared to renew the
stores, war material, &c., and give 6000 extra soldiers to the Soudan.
Second, to give the country over to the Sultan with two millions and
the ports.
To me the last is the best and speediest course to pursue; it rids
Her Majesty’s Government for ever of any responsibility. If the first
course was taken, to my mind, a _sine quâ non_ for its success would
be, _to make up with France in re Egypt_.
There is one other course, an intermediate one, viz., Zubair, with
£100,000 a year, and replenished magazines.
About forty females congregated under my window, yelling for food. It
delights me to think of the treat Baring will have when he gets here
(if ever he does). I do not think there are 500 Arabs in the camp on
north side, and no horsemen, though their straw huts extend further
than they did in the first blockade. The _Zubair_ steamer was launched
to-day. With respect to the force of Arabs on north side it may be
said, “if so few, why not attack them;” but supposing I was wrong, and
they were more than I think, a defeat would cause the fall of the town,
therefore I will not risk it.
The Ulemas and Notables got a telegram from Towfik excusing himself
for his indolence. They came to-day and wished to send an answer, which
I agreed to. They did this of their free will, and NOT PROMPTED MUCH BY
ME. It will make Towfik hop. Of the Ulemas who came, _two_ (the Sheikh
el Islam and the Cadi) had been imprisoned by me.[254]
* * * * *
_November 28._—Fort Omdurman all right. Another of the wounded has
died. Two soldiers came in from the Arabs. Small church parades, that
on the Blue Nile rather larger than usual. We have to-day in store
174,400 okes of biscuit and 1165 ardebs of dhoora, which is not bad
after 261 days’ blockade. A slave has come in at the North Fort, and
says the Arabs are expecting four steamers to come up. I hope that the
officer in command will clear Halfeyeh before he pushes on to this,
for he may get a shell from the Arabs at Omdurman into one of his
steamers. I do not like to risk the _Bordeen_ down by herself to give
this warning. If the steamers do come up, and have not the sense to
stop at Halfeyeh, I shall endeavour to warn them by a tremendous fire
on the Arabs at Omdurman. The danger is at the Ras, or nose (X), on
the junction of the rivers. We are protecting the _Bordeen_ by casing
her steam-chest with wood. The proper thing to do would be to clear
the Halfeyeh camp of the Arabs before coming on here. You could then
communicate with Kartoum by land, and avoid having to run in penny
steamboats the gauntlet of Arab guns.
[Illustration]
A woman came in from the Arabs. She says yesterday morning a man came
to the Arab camp on the north side who said that the Expedition had
captured Berber, and that four steamers were on their way here; that
the Arabs sent out men to see if this was true, and that it is my own
soldiers who are now fighting against us.
If the news that Berber is captured is true, the steamers will be
towing up boats (fifty of which are at Berber) and will not be here for
some days. 2 P.M. I think the Arabs are making an embrasure at Goba,
with the view of bombarding the Palace. I can see this with my glass.
If they do this, it will not hurt us, and it will take their men and
guns from off the river, where their gun-fire is alone dangerous to the
steamers. It is rather amusing to see the _personality_[255] of this
Arab battery. The range is 2,200 yards from here, but as _we_ never
hit anything we fire at, at that distance, I think I shall be safe in
the Palace from the Arab fire. The mountain shell will not penetrate
the walls at that distance, as we know from a shell which struck the
North Fort some time ago. I expect they will begin to-morrow morning
at daybreak. I have fired eight or ten rounds at them; which brought
them out to look, but it is quite a chance if the Remington reaches
them at that range. There was a time when one would have been anxious
for the Palace, but that has gone by. It will not be the first time I
have been fired on by my own soldiers, for in China two men of the 31st
Regiment were on the breach of Taitsan and one was killed. The other
with a shell splinter, was taken prisoner. “Mr. Gordon! Mr. Gordon,
you will not let me be killed.” “Take him down to the river and shoot
him;” and _aside_, “put him in my boat: let the doctor attend him, and
send him to Shanghai.” He was sent down to Shanghai, and got three or
six months’ imprisonment by court-martial for deserting, and I daresay
he exists at present. His name was Hargreaves. I do not know his
regimental number.
[Illustration]
Baring to Egerton—“Metemma! at last, after the most fearful
sufferings, every bone in my body dislocated with those beastly camels.
Found here his journal, from which it appears that that duffer, the
Mahdi, has at last roused himself, but I fear it is too late. As to the
tone of the journal, it is _simply deplorable_, and (do not mention it,
please) he has actually made a sketch (brace yourself up to bear it) of
our high priest. Excuse more, for what with the bumping of the camel
and the depravity shown by this scoffer, I am more dead than alive.” A
Bashi Bazouk (no loss), a bugler, and two musicians (of our terrible
band) deserted to Arabs yesterday, as ... says it is “incorrigible.”
This is owing to the robbery of the rations by the officers.
* * * * *
_November 29._—Omdurman Fort all right, but three men deserted to the
Arabs. Truly this life is almost insupportable: the officers have been
robbing the men of their rations, and the storekeeper has been giving
them short weight. One feels utterly powerless to contend with these
affairs, and unless the Expedition comes soon the place will fall from
the venality of these people.[256] They know I cannot possibly find
out their misdeeds, and chuckle over it. The Arabs are working away at
their battery at Goba.
It is odd that among the despised Egyptian fellaheen soldiers this
robbery of rations does not take place. It is only among the officers,
&c., of the black troops. 1 P.M. I hear that the soldiers waylay the
women, to whom I have given biscuit, and rob them!
I have a strong conviction that neither Baring or Lord W. have taken
the precaution of bringing a firman from Towfik Pasha, giving them a
legal status superior to mine in the Soudan. If this conviction is the
case (and the fiction of Towfik being supreme ruler is kept up), then
it is for me to name the Governor-General, and I feel strongly disposed
to print off proclamations to be issued on arrival of Expedition (if
ever it does arrive), by which I relinquish the government in favour
of the officer commanding the Expedition. Of course, if a firman is
brought, then the situation is different; but _if not brought_, and the
_fiction is going to be kept up_, I have a perfect right to vacate the
government, and to appoint whomsoever I like, subject to the ultimate
approval of Towfik Pasha. It may be that the officer commanding the
Expedition may demur to his appointment, but his doing so will not
absolve him of the responsibility thus officially placed on him if the
town falls.
The great question, “Is any officer, civil or military, of the
Expedition possessed of a firman of Towfik?” If not, there is not the
least doubt that the _de jure_ power is with me to name whom I like
(except in the case of a civil or military officer announcing to the
people that the British Government has annexed Egypt). There can be no
question of military discipline in this, for what has a foreign Power
to do with the civil functionaries of Towfik, unless they usurp his
(Towfik’s) functions?
Two more soldiers deserted to-day. 8 P.M. The Arabs came down to
the ruins of village opposite, and fired on the Palace. I sent the
buglers up to the roof of the Palace, who by their own accounts killed
thousands, and the Arabs retired. I have got so accustomed to the sound
of the firing, that I can tell when the report of firing is _from Arabs
on Tuti or Palace_, or our men _from Tuti_ or _North Fort_. Also if it
is the Arabs firing on Mogrim or Bourré, or our men firing on them,
from these places. According to the directions of the muzzles of the
rifles, so are the sounds. I think I would like to be in a real siege,
with no civil population or robbers of officers to bully me. To-night
a sortie with fifty men would give the Arabs a dose which they would
not forget; but it is no use, we are not up to it. The buglers say they
killed thirty (!!!) between them.
* * * * *
_November 30._—Fort Omdurman all right. A slave came from the Arabs
to it last night. Arabs (10.30 A.M.) have fired two rounds from their
(“personality”)[257] battery at Goba, but the projectiles did not reach
the Palace.
I hear that one of the shells fired by Arabs did reach the town, and
fell behind the Palace. They have fired three rounds more, and then
the house in which they had their gun fell down. They are now digging
away to get out the gun. I expect the gun-carriage requires repair, for
the house was a good height. 11.15 A.M. Arabs either had another gun
besides that in the house which fell down, or that gun was not damaged
in the fall of house, for they have just fired another round at the
North Fort. Noon. The Arabs fired three more rounds at the North Fort.
The shells burst in the air, and the Arabs have now gone to dinner.
Another man deserted to the Arabs; he had previously deserted from the
Arabs to us. Two of the band reported to have deserted to the Arabs
have been found in the town. The Arabs at Goba (whom I do not think
number more than 40!!!) fired three more rounds from their gun this
evening. I feel strongly disposed to go over _myself_ with 100 men
(_against_ 40!) and attack them to-morrow. It is simply ridiculous the
apathy that is shown. These forty men, which is the outside of their
number, are at least four miles from any assistance. The place is so
flat and bare that this is a certainty.
* * * * *
_December 1._—During the night the Arabs fired on town with their
guns. At daybreak they fired from their guns on the Palace and the
North Fort, and on Mogrim and Bourré. A caravan of seventeen camels
came to the Mahdi from Dongola to-day. The “Nordenfeldt” (Omdurman) has
been silent for last three days. Omdurman Fort all right. 10.40 A.M.
Arabs just fired one shot, which struck water in front of the Palace;
they fired another which burst in the air.
11 A.M. I have sent down the _Bordeen_ to entice the Arabs to waste
their ammunition, which they are doing.
Towfik’s telegram to me, was to-day more fully explained, and I
gather that he says Lord Wolseley and Sir E. Baring are coming up,
and that they will settle the question of the Soudan. I have replied,
that it may be convenient for him (Towfik), but it does not meet the
case, unless these two officials have a firman from him, giving them
authority. Now this the two officials will never have, for it virtually
would make them _Towfik’s subordinates_. It is implied in the telegram,
that I am to arrange with these two officials, as to the Soudan. A
delightful arrangement for Towfik, but not one so delightful for me; so
I have answered him, _it is for him_ (Towfik) _to arrange with these
two officials, and to send his arrangements in the form of a firman
here_. It is certain that no legal authority exists in the Soudan,
except it is held from Towfik, and unless these two officials have
authority from Towfik, they have no authority in the Soudan; now if
they hold authority from Towfik, they are under Towfik’s orders.
The “fiction” will not hold good in the Soudan. Though I am pretty
well dispirited for the last few days, I cannot help laughing at the
fearful mess we are in. Towfik is as sharp as his father, and wants
to quietly saddle me with the controversy, reserving to himself the
right of criticism, but I do not feel inclined to be thus saddled,
and I shall perhaps appoint Baring Governor-General, subject to the
approval of Towfik, and shall bolt. B. may say he will not take it,
but he will have no choice, for, if he does not, he throws away any
legal status he possesses. He, on his part, may name some one else, but
that will be his look out. My object, of course, is to make tracks,
if I can do so (without hurting our country, or being the cause of
danger in the smallest degree to our troops), and to leave the onus on
Baring and the Ministry. I do not feel so kindly to Towfik as to fight
his battles up here, which is what he evidently aims at, neither do I
feel inclined to compromise myself by aiding Baring.[258] I have said
the only possible solution is the Sultan, let the subsidy be what it
may. The fact is that the expeditionary force comes up here as allies
of Towfik (unless its Government says it comes up as independent),
and as allies of Towfik, it is in all reason subject, as far as civil
affairs are concerned, to Towfik; its officers can issue no decrees,
except _in his name_, save those which concern military operations. A
nice accommodating Governor-General would work this affair, without
friction. _I will not_, for I am too deeply involved with the people;
but I want (like a rat) to leave the house before it falls, so the best
thing is to hint to me, “make Kitchener Governor-General,” “_subject
to the approval of Towfik_!” Then K. would do all you want, and in a
legal way, and you would be happy. Unless you have a superior firman to
mine, you cannot make K. Governor-General (even if you had ten million
troops), unless you declare yourself the rulers of the land, which
you will not do, because of the ninety millions sterling of debt on
Egypt. 5 P.M. Arabs fired two more shells at the Palace, so I put the
three buglers on the roof to practice at them. _They say_ they killed
fifteen. I would much like to know contents of Lord W.’s telegram to
me, also the telegrams in cipher from Nubar and Baring; but I never
shall have that pleasure, for I do not expect either this journal
will ever be given back, or if it is, that I shall be lent the cipher
books to decipher them. The Arabs fired two rounds at the Palace this
evening, one fell in the water in front of the Palace, and one fell
in the garden. Two shells fired by the Arabs from Bourré to-day, fell
close to the hospital.
To my mind, this is the idea of H.M. Government:—_Expedition comes
up to look after British subjects nominally_, but, _in reality, to
settle future government of Soudan, under the pretence that Towfik
governs_. Towfik telegraphs to me, “that the British officials will
settle future status of the Soudan with me _sub rosa_”!! now, of
course, I may be wrong, but my idea is that the British officials will
propose _the keeping of Sennaar, Kartoum, Berber, and Dongola_, the
_non-interference with the Mahdi, cession of Kassala to King John, the
leaving to their fate the Equator Provinces, &c._ And what the British
officials propose Towfik will agree to; but then comes the question, as
_I_ consider _the proposal is unacceptable_ (inasmuch as long as the
Mahdi is alongside, no peace is possible), I will not accept it, and
will leave A. or B. as my, and Towfik’s representative, to carry the
proposition out. (“_Après moi, le déluge._”) No one can blame me for
this, for I should be a scoundrel if I accepted any proposition which
would eventually give trouble to our country.
* * * * *
_December 2._—The Arabs fired four shells at the Palace at daybreak
with no effect. 9 A.M. They have fired four more; one burst close to
my room—a little high. I have put two guns near the Palace to reply
to them. Report in town says Waled a Goun’s men are passing over from
the right bank of the White Nile to the Mahdi’s camp on the left bank.
Omdurman Fort reports all right. 11 A.M. The Arabs opened fire again
on the Palace; we are answering. The Arabs have now two guns firing on
us. There is a report that the Arabs of the Mahdi are going north (on
the left bank of the White Nile). Noon.—We have silenced our friends
opposite, having concentrated a heavy fire on them. I nearly lost my
eyes this morning, firing on Arabs, the base of the brass cartridge
blew out, and sent the fire into my face; this is a fault of the
Remington; the metal case of this cartridge must not be used too often.
[Illustration]
Some people ought to have their heads cut off, if there is to be any
quiet in the Soudan; I wonder how our Government will be able to allow
this to be done under their nose, for however necessary to cut their
heads off, looking to future peace of the Soudan, they can scarcely be
called rebels, for they may say they were forced into rebellion by the
inability of the Government aiding them, and also that they had heard
that the Soudan was abandoned. 3 P.M. _Another battle!_ with Arabs at
Goba, who, however, have no guns—firing terrific. 3.15 P.M. Battle is
over, and we have won. Arabs silent. 3.30 P.M. Arabs began it again, by
firing their gun. 3.38 P.M. Battle over, an Arab (or most likely one
of my men) is standing up, throwing dust in the air (like as Shimei
dusting David—“Thou bloody man.” 2 Samuel xvi. 8). The Arabs must have
used up a lot of ammunition, for they kept up a good fire, though where
their bullets went no one could see; the Palace and the North Fort and
Muduriat being high, our bullets reach them, but theirs do not appear
to reach the river. They have a regular casemate for the two guns, one
directed on the Palace and one on the North Fort. They took two days to
make it, quite a creditable piece of work, with a screen wall in front.
In the Crimea it was supposed and considered mean to bob, and one used
to try and avoid it.... used to say, “It is all well enough for you,
but I am a family man,” and he used to bob at every report. For my
part, I think judicious bobbing is not a fault, for I remember seeing
on two occasions shells like this “●” before my eyes, which certainly,
had I not bobbed, would have taken off my head (“_And a good riddance
too!_” F. O. would say). I make these remarks with reference to the
Arab rifle fire; you can see them with the telescope aim directly at
this wing of the Palace and fire, and then one hears a thud in the
water; I have got quite accustomed to them now. The mitrailleuse (a
Gatling) moved them out of their cover this evening; we have it on the
Muduriat. The Palace roof is thus—
[Illustration]
a shell striking _x_ would bring down the roof, so when the Arabs fire,
one does not feel comfortable as one hears the shell sighing through
the air, till one hears it fall; it is at least 40 feet in height, but
with only two storeys. The pasha who built it (Momtoz Pasha) built it
without leave from the old Khedive, taking funds which he had no right
to; the old Khedive did not see it, and Ismail Pasha Ayoub, who was
a prisoner here, split on him; he was tried here, and they say was
poisoned, Ismail Ayoub getting his place. Ismail Ayoub was sent up
because he did not treat one of the cast-off wives of the old Khedive
(whom he was forced to marry) with proper respect; so this wife got up
a harem intrigue, and he was exiled.
He (Ismail Ayoub) was a great scamp, whatever was the cause of his
exile. He belonged to Kurdistan, and was originally a bugler in Said
Pasha’s band; and I used to tell him, he was as much a foreigner in
this land as I was. He was a good musician, and had learnt French
and German. He is now dead. Whilst I was here, I think he was the
best administrator the Soudan ever had. He was the Minister of the
Interior during Lord Dufferin’s time, and wrote the famous despatch
about the inutility of using the kourbatch. _He!_ who was famous for
its use up here, and who, with Cherif and Towfik, roared with laughter
over the affair, for Lord Dufferin in the gravest way reported it to
Lord Granville, who, I dare say, laughed as heartily over it with Mr.
Sanderson. Poor Ismail Ayoub! he was a most agreeable scoundrel; but
he came to grief at Cairo in 1883 as Minister of Finance. The bugler
“_Almas_” (_i.e._ the _diamond_) telegraphed his _confrères_ that he
had killed twenty Arabs to-day!!
* * * * *
_December 3._—This morning Arabs fired eight rounds at us, and we
replied; one of our shells struck their casemate. Numbers of Arabs
left Mahdi’s camp for the north. Arabs fired nine rounds into the town
at night from the south lines. One shell fell into the garden of the
Palace; this from the south lines. A shell from Arabs at Goba fell in
the garden, so it will be seen the attention which is being paid to the
Palace.
Twenty shells fell in town yesterday, but none did any harm.
I think this is the programme, and though it is of doubtful morality,
perhaps it is the shortest route out of a mess. “British Expedition
comes up to relieve British subjects in distress, _nothing else_; it
finds one of its subjects acting as ruler; it takes him away, and
he, on going away, appoints Zubair ruler, subject to approval of
Towfik, Zubair having been allowed to come up to Kartoum, as a private
individual, to look after his family.”
Now who can say anything to the British Government? It has had nothing
to do with the appointment of Zubair, or with the Government of Towfik;
it came up to relieve its subjects, and “Gordon is entirely responsible
for the appointment of Zubair;” “even Towfik is not responsible, for
Gordon did it on his own responsibility.” This will be a splendid
dodge; it first clears Her Majesty’s Government of any blame, it puts
the blame on me, and in the storm that is caused, I shall have been so
effectually blackened that every one will forget the—well! we will not
say it in direct words (count the months), we will call the DELAY; in
fact, I expect the public will rather blame the Government for having
sent any Expedition at all for such a style of British subject; the
Government will chuckle over it all, and will preserve the _fiction_
that they have nought to do with the Soudan or Egypt.
The Opposition will be perfectly wild at seeing the Ministry get
out of the mess, with what one may call really credit, while the
Anti-Slavery Society and Europe at large will empty their vials of
wrath on me. Towfik and his pashas will wring their hands _openly_ over
such an act ... will get such kudos! For my part I shall get out of
any of those wretched honours, for the Ministry will be only too glad
to say, “We could not, you know, confer any honours on him after such
very disreputable conduct,” knowing well enough I would not take them
if offered; and as I am not going to England again, and shall not see
the papers, I shall not much mind the abuse. I think it is a splendid
programme. Zubair must be given either £200,000 or £300,000 a year for
two years, replenished magazines, and stores of all sorts, all the
Expedition’s boats and steamers, &c., &c., and must be aided for two
months in small expeditions; besides the £200,000 or £300,000 for two
years, he must have down on the nail £150,000 to £200,000.
I must clear, in disgrace, out of the country, to prevent any
appearance of any connivance on the part of ... in this arrangement,
which he will or ought officially to deplore. I do not think Zubair
will care for the Equator Province; he will agree to give that up; he
will agree to uphold the Treaty of 1877 Slave Convention, and laugh
as he does so. As for the Bahr Gazelle, I expect the Mahdi has it,
and if so, his people will move up there, when Zubair by his politics
recaptures Obeyed.
What a fearful row there will be. I know one man who will write:
“Better, my dear Gordon, FAR better! to have died, than have so very
far departed from the right path; nothing, no nothing can explain it
away. A happy Christmas to you.” ... “This news from the Soudan is very
satisfactory; I call it a great triumph, for it not only delivers us
out of a dilemma, but it effectually settles our friends, and vitiates
anything he[259] may say as to the Delay.” Any military operations
undertaken after the proclamation of Zubair will be put down “as
measures necessary to be undertaken to secure the return, unmolested,
of the expeditionary force.” 5 P.M. Artillery duel going on between our
two guns and the Arab gun; our practice is very bad. The shells the
Arabs fire from their Krupp gun reach the Palace Garden, but the report
of their gun is not to be heard. The Arab shells from Goba fall just
about 200 yards short of the Palace; but in its line there is just the
second of suspense (after seeing them fire), while one hears the soft
sighing of their shells coming nearer and nearer, till they strike. 7
P.M. _Another battle!_ (the third to-day). The Arabs came down to the
river and fired on the Palace; we could not stand _that_. 7.10 P.M.
Battle over; we are as we were, minus some cartridges. 7.20 P.M. Battle
begun again, because the buglers played “Salaam Effendina,” the Arabs
wasting ammunition. 8 P.M. The Arabs are firing from the south at the
Krupps on the Palace; they (_i.e._ the Arabs) are at least 4000 yards
distant; one hears the shells burst, but not the report of their gun;
they reached the river close to the Palace.
* * * * *
_December 4._—Omdurman Fort all right. They had a man wounded
yesterday. There was a small battle at Bourré this morning. The Arabs
at Goba are quiet after the exertions of yesterday. Firing was heard
(on north) towards Shoboloha last night. Report in town says the
steamers are near there.
Should the Zubair arrangement be accepted, then comes the question
of the military action during two months, at end of which time the
expeditionary force should be wending its way back. The driving away
of the Arabs from the Dem at the north of the Palace will be immediate
on the arrival of the troops; the Arabs will then hold on to El foun
and to Giraffe. They will vacate the vicinity of Omdurman Fort; 1000
men will deal with El foun and Giraffe, supported by our tag-rag. First
Giraffe, then El foun; but at the same time as this takes place, the
retreat of Arabs ought to be cut off at Gitana from Kordofan by the
steamers and another 1000 men; the Mahdi will return to Schatt, and
the town will be free, and all the troops defending the lines will be
available. Then comes the question of going inland and attacking the
family of the Sheikh el Obeyed’s son, two and a half hours inland, or
else going on and attacking Mesalamieh. I think Sheikh el Obeyed’s
family will give in as soon as the Arabs are driven from El foun (an
affair of an hour, _D. V._). I tried to entice the Arabs at Goba into
a fight this evening, but they would not be drawn, and only replied
by two shells, which fell in the river. We played on them with the
mitrailleuse, and made them move their gun, and then they fired two
more shells, one which fell near the Palace in the river. With a good
mitrailleuse, and a sharp operator, _with telescope sight_, no gun
could be served with impunity at 2000 yards range, though it could be
served _against artillery fire_, for at that range there is plenty of
time to dodge under cover after seeing the flash ere the shell arrives.
The band, principally of small boys, the men being on the lines, went
on to the roof of the Palace to play (they always come on the eve of
their Sabbath, the Friday). The Arabs heard them, and fired a volley at
them; they, furious, threw down their instruments, and flew to arms,
and a regular fusillade went on for some moments, the other places
supporting the fire. The buglers are bugling now “Come to us, come to
us,” to the Arabs. (The Egyptian Government have the French calls, and
can converse by bugle; I do not think we have.) Last night a _renegade_
Dervish bugler in the Arab ranks replied, “Come to us, come to us.”
* * * * *
_December 5._—Small church parades. Three caravans of some size came
in from the north to Mahomet Achmet’s camp this morning. Two deserters
came in from the Arabs. Fort at Omdurman all right. In store 737 ardebs
of dhoora, 121,300 okes of biscuit.
We are going to make an attempt to relieve Omdurman Fort (really
things are looking very black). The men who came in say the Mahdi is
short of ammunition. The Arabs fired three shells at the palace this
afternoon, which fell in the river. A soldier deserted to-day to the
Arabs. 5 P.M. The Arabs fired two shells at the palace, which fell into
the water (if _they only_ knew! that if they sank the trail they would
touch us up! their line is quite correct). 6.30 P.M. Since 3 P.M. we
have been firing on them, and they on us, only wasting ammunition, for
though our bullets reach them, few of theirs reach us. According to the
men who came in from the Arabs, it is the pet detachment of the Mahdi
who are opposite the Palace; they do not number more than one hundred,
and are principally our Soudan soldiers. I have almost given up all
idea of saving the town; it is a last resource, this attempt we make to
open the route to the Omdurman Fort.
* * * * *
_December 6._—(Certainly every fortified place ought to be provided
with a hundred good telescopes.) The steamers went down and fired
on the Arabs at Omdurman. We have £150 in cash in the treasury. In
the affair to-day we had three killed and thirty-six wounded in the
steamers, and Ferratch Ullah Bey reports he had five wounded at
Omdurman Fort. The Arabs came down in good force, and must have lost.
I have given up all idea of landing at Omdurman; we have not the
force to do it. The Arabs fired forty-five rounds from their guns at
Mogrim and the steamers. We had two men wounded at Mogrim, and one
killed. This is most distressing to have these poor fellows wounded and
killed. To-morrow it will be 270 days 9 months that we have endured one
continuous misery and anxiety. The Greeks who were at Mogrim say at
least 300 or 400 Arabs were killed and wounded in to-day’s engagement.
The _Ismailia_ was struck by four, and the _Bordeen_ by two shells, but
not in vital parts. I visited the steamers, and had weariness of heart
at hearing the complaint of the men as to the robbery of their rations
by the officers.
* * * * *
_December 7._—The 270th day of our imprisonment. The Arabs fired
from their guns at Goba 8 shells, one of which fell in the town near
Palace, but did no harm. Omdurman reports the fort all right, one
more man wounded there. A great force of Arabs strayed down near
Omdurman last night, and left at dawn. The cock turkey has killed one
of his companions, reason not known. (Supposed to be correspondence
with Mahdi, or some harem infidelity.) Report in town that Berber
surrendered, “_sans coup férir_.” I hope so. We are going to send the
steamers down again to attack the Arabs at Omdurman at noon to-morrow.
The Arabs fired nine shells at Bourré, and begun again their practice
on the Palace, firing five shells, one of which came close to the roof
of Palace.
A soldier escaped from the Arabs and came in; he says the
Expeditionary Force has captured Berber. Two soldiers deserted to the
Arabs to-day! The Arabs at Goba fired three shells this evening at the
Palace; two fell close to it, one fell in the water. One shell from the
Arabs at Bourré fell in the hospital. One of the shells of the Arabs
this evening struck the building next the Palace, and stuck in the
wall, about 9 feet from the ground. A man came in from the Arabs, who
says the Expeditionary Force is approaching. I saw a body of horsemen
going north to-day, very fast, from El foun. In the _Ismailia_ were
eighty bullet holes on the water line of her hull; in the _Bordeen_
there were seventy-five bullet holes, ditto _in the last engagement_!!!
These holes were stopped by screws made for the purpose. As for the
bullet marks elsewhere they are not to be counted.
My belief is that the Mahdi business will be the end of slavery in
the Soudan. The Arabs have invariably put their slaves in the front
and armed them; and the slaves have seen that they were plucky, while
their masters shirked: is it likely that those slaves will ever yield
obedience to those masters as heretofore?
* * * * *
_December 8._—The Arabs this morning fired twelve rounds from guns
at Bourré, and five rounds at the North Fort and Palace. Two men came
in from the Arabs; they say no Arabs have gone down towards Berber;
that the report in the Arab camp was that Berber was captured; this
report was four days old. 10 A.M. The steamers are going down to
attack. Omdurman Fort reports “_All right_” 10.30 A.M. The steamers
are engaged; the Arabs have two nasty wasp batteries with regular
embrasures, quite _à l’Europe_. (Query Slatin Bey’s design.) Though we
have protected the steam-chests of the steamers, one cannot help being
very anxious. The Arabs at Goba are _silent_. Another soldier from the
Arabs came in and states report of advance of the Expeditionary Force,
who are coming by land. Every time I hear the guns fire I have a twitch
of the heart of gnawing anxiety for my penny steamers. 11.30 A.M. The
battle is over, and my penny boats are safe, thank God! (not in words
only, but from my heart). We had two wounded on board the _Bordeen_,
none on board the _Ismailia_. We are meditating an attack with 500
men on the 50 Arabs, who with their gun, are at Goba. The _Bordeen_
was struck by four shells, the _Ismailia_ by two shells, one of which
destroyed a cabin: they had not much musketry fire, but the Arabs fired
a great number of rounds; they had six guns playing on the steamers.
At noon Arabs fired five shells at Bourré. In the evening they fired
three shells against the Palace from Goba which fell in the town. Had
we not cased the steam-chest of the _Ismailia_ with wood she would have
had her boiler blown up by one of the shells. The Arab rifle force of
Goba is completely innocuous; we do not even hear their bullets, yet
our bullets reach them, for they cannot stay in the open, and we can
see the dust the bullets throw up that we fire. Wadji Barra, an Ameer
of the Mahdi, on the north side, sent me a letter (in Appendix AB)
asking me to surrender, and saying it is all lies about the Expedition,
the Mahdi is evidently (like H.M.G.) offended with my curt answer to
his last, and so his holiness will not write direct. Whenever we have
what we call a victory we fire some fireworks at the main posts of our
lines, which infuriates the Arabs, and puzzle them as to the reason.
They were very angry to-night, and came down in a good number, and
fired on the Palace several volleys. I ordered up the three buglers,
who put them to flight. The letter Wadji Barra sent me was sent by
a woman who came to the North Fort. I telegraphed the officer “Open
the letter and tell me contents.” He did so, and I answered, “Send
the woman back to the Ameer and tell him to go, &c.” I expect this
irritated the Ameer, who ordered the advance of his men, and consequent
expenditure of his ammunition.
* * * * *
_December 9._—A party of sixty men, with ammunition, camels, and
some horsemen, left the Dem of the Mahdi, and went north this morning.
The Arabs on the right bank of the White Nile came over to the left
bank of the Blue Nile, and went through some antics, so we suppose
something is up. A man was wounded yesterday at Omdurman, which fort
reports all right. Letter sent by Wadji Barra in Appendix AB. The
Arabs fired yesterday not rifled shell, but round shell, which they
must have got at Obeyed, which shows they are out of ammunition of
the regulation sort. What called forth the letter from Wadji Barra
(Appendix AB) was a paper I issued (Appendix CD) to the town, when I
received Towfik’s telegram saying he would hold the Soudan, and which
I gave to a man to send to the Arabs. If Lord Palmerston was alive
(or Forster was Premier) he would never leave the Soudan, without
proclaiming the emancipation of the slaves. On 18th December, 1862,
Lincoln proclaimed abolition of slavery in the United States; this
would be a good day to issue such a proclamation in the Soudan. Wadji
Barra’s letter calls me Pasha of Kartoum, and says I have been deaf
to all their entreaties. Stewart left this place _three months ago!_
to-day. A man was wounded by the Arab fire at Bourré: they fired twelve
rounds from these guns at the fort. I feel sure that the cause of the
Mahdi’s coming here is, that he got hold of Herbin’s ‘French Consul’s’
journal, written in a hostile critical spirit, and thinking it true,
he advanced from Schatt. I expect Hansall, the Austrian Consul, also
wrote in the style of Lamentations, for he also sent down a journal
by the _Abbas_. It is remarkable that the very effort which I made to
obtain the ear of Europe should have thus recoiled on us. I have for
the present abandoned the attack on the Arabs at Goba, as Omdurman is
more important, and as I expect the Arabs there have taken away their
gun; it has not (up to 2 P.M.) fired to-day. I would like to ask the
Mahdi—allowing _pro formâ_ that he is the Mahdi—what will be his
ultimate work? Certainly his present work is not exhilarating, firing
on his fellow-creatures night and day. The siege of Sevastopol lasted
326 days. We are at our 271st day. In their case they had always their
communication open, and they dealt with an enemy who would recognise
the rights of war; whereas we are not so placed. They, the Russians,
were united, and had no civil population to deal with; yet I cannot say
I think we are over great heroes (the fact is, that, if one analyses
human glory, it is composed of nine-tenths twaddle, perhaps ninety-nine
hundredths twaddle). We are only short of the duration of siege of
Sevastopol 57 days, and we have had _no respite_, like the Russians
had, during the winter of 1854-55; and neither Nicholas nor Alexander
speculated on (well, we will not say what, but we will put it)
“counting the months.” Of course it will be looked on as very absurd
to compare the two blockades, that of Sevastopol and Kartoum; but if
properly weighed, one was just as good as the other. The Russians had
money, we had none; they had skilled officers, we had none; they had no
civil population, we had forty thousand; they had their route open and
had news, we had neither.
* * * * *
_December 10._—A slave came in to-day, he had been with Slatin. He
says Slatin is still in chains, that there are two insurrections in
Kordofan, and rumour is rife that the Expeditionary Force is near.
Fort Omdurman is all right. The slave says the Arabs have not much
ammunition. The Arabs fired thirty-one rounds at Bourré to-day, and
wounded four men (one an officer, a Major Souleiman Effi, fatally).
The Arabs have been firing stones to-day. Goba is quiet, they did not
fire their gun to-day, or yesterday. I expect it has gone down to the
river-bank. The slave who came in says the Mahdi’s return to Kordofan
is cut off by the insurrection in his rear; so we and he are like two
rats in a box. (I wish _he_ was _out_ of the _box!_) I have ordered the
two steamers to stay up at Bourré, towards which place the Arabs seem
to be directing an unpleasant degree of attention. (Truly I am worn
to a shadow with the food question; it is one continual demand.) Five
men deserted to-day. The Arabs shape the stones they fire, like to the
shells of their guns; they will soon spoil the rifling of their guns if
they continue this.
* * * * *
_December 11._—The Arabs fired their gun from Goba three times;
one shell fell into the water before the Palace—two passed over it.
I put down more mines at Bourré. I have given the whole garrison an
extra month’s pay in addition to the three months’ they had before
received—I will not (_D. V._) hesitate to give them £100,000, if I
think it will keep the town.
Three soldiers came in from the Arabs who report advance of the
Expedition towards Berber. The Arabs fired fourteen rounds from their
guns at Bourré. The officers say that there is a European directing
the Arab guns there. (I wonder if it is that Frenchman who came from
Dongola, and who, I thought, might have been Renan.) Sennaar is holding
out and in great force (so say the three soldiers), so is Kassala. The
Dem of the Mahdi is altered in appearance. They say he has sent off the
families of his adherents into the interior.
3.30 P.M.—The Arabs fired three shells at the Palace from Goba; two
went into the water, one passed over the Palace. This always irritates
me, for it is so personal, and from one’s own soldiers too! It is not
very pleasant also to feel at any moment you may have a shell in your
room, for the creatures fire at all hours. The steamers fired on the
Arabs at Bourré this morning, and one of the Arab shells struck one
steamer, and another struck a santal which we have there to defend the
flank; but neither did any harm. Two soldiers deserted to the Arabs
to-day—these men are generally those who have before been with the
Arabs, and had deserted to us. The Arabs fired another shell at the
Palace this evening, which burst in the air.
* * * * *
_December 12._—Small Church Parade. I sincerely hope this will be
the last we shall have to witness. We have in hand 1,796,000 rounds
Remingtons ammunition; 540 rounds Krupp; 6000 rounds mountain gun
ammunition; £140 in specie; £18,000 in paper in treasury!! £60,000 in
town in paper. 110,000 okes of biscuits; 700 ardebs of dhoora. This
morning I was told a long story of report concerning the expeditionary
force being at El Damer, near the Atbara river; of how Berber had
surrendered, &c. On tracing it, I found it was a fib put in circulation
by one of the chief Ulemas, to encourage the people.
3.30 P.M. The Arabs fired two shells at the Palace; one burst in the
air, the other fell in the water in a direct line with the window I was
sitting at, distant about a hundred yards.
3.40 P.M. They fired another shell, which fell only fifty yards short
of the Palace; another burst in the air. I have sent the buglers up
to stop this target practice. All these shells are in good line for
the west wing, in which the Arabs know I stop. They fired seven shells
in all in this affair; though the Arabs have fired over two thousand
shells at us, I do not think we have lost by artillery fire more than
three men.
* * * * *
_December 13._—The steamers went up and attacked the Arabs at Bourré
(certainly this day-after-day delay has a most disheartening effect on
every one. To-day is the 276th day of our anxiety). The Arabs appear,
by all accounts, to have suffered to-day heavily at Bourré. We had none
wounded by the Arabs; but one man, by the discharge of a bad cartridge,
got a cut in neck: this was owing to the same cause as nearly blew out
my eyes the other day. We are going to send down the _Bordeen_ the
day after to-morrow, and with her I shall send this journal. _If some
effort is not made before ten days’ time the town will fall._ It is
inexplicable, this delay. If the Expeditionary Forces have reached the
river and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we require,
just to show themselves.
I send this journal, for I have little hopes of saving it if the town
falls. I put in (Appendix EF), the sort of arrangement I would make
with Zubair Pasha for the future government of the Soudan. Ferratch
Pasha is really showing an amount of vigour I did not give him credit
for. Even if the town falls under the nose of the Expeditionary Force,
it will not, in my opinion, justify the abandonment of Senaar and
Kassala, or of the Equatorial Province, by Her Majesty’s Government.
All that is absolutely necessary is, for fifty of the Expeditionary
Force to get on board a steamer and come up to Halfeyeh, and thus let
their presence be felt; this is not asking much, but it must happen _at
once_; or it will (as usual) be too late. A soldier deserted to the
Arabs to-day from the North Fort. The buglers on the roof, being short
of stature, are put on boxes to enable them to fire over the parapet;
one with the recoil of rifle was knocked right over, and caused
considerable excitement. We thought he was killed, by the noise he made
in his fall. The Arabs fired their Krupps continually into town from
the south front, but no one takes any notice of it. The Arabs at Goba
only fired one shell at the Palace to-day, which burst in the air.
* * * * *
_December 14th._—Arabs fired two shells at the Palace this morning;
546 ardebs dhoora! in store; also 83,525 okes of biscuit! 10.30 A.M.
The steamers are down at Omdurman, engaging the Arabs, consequently I
am on _tenterhooks!_ 11.30 A.M. Steamers returned; the _Bordeen_ was
struck by a shell in her battery; we had only one man wounded. We are
going to send down the _Bordeen_ to-morrow with this journal. If I was
in command of the two hundred men of the Expeditionary Force, which
are all that are necessary for the movement, I should stop just below
Halfeyeh, and attack the Arabs at that place before I came on here
to Kartoum. I should then communicate with the North Fort, and act
according to circumstances. Now MARK THIS, if the Expeditionary Force,
and I ask for no more than two hundred men, does not come in ten days,
_the town may fall_; and I have done my best for the honour of our
country. Good bye.
C. G. GORDON.
You send me no information, ‘though you have lots of money.
C. G. G.
APPENDICES REFERRED TO IN THE JOURNALS.
APPENDICES TO BOOK I.