_On outside wrapper (a handkerchief):_
No secrets as far as I am concerned.
C. G. GORDON.
LT.-COLONEL STEWART, C.M.G., Chief of the Staff, or LORD WOLSELEY,
G.C.B. Soudan Expeditionary Force.
* * * * *
JOURNAL OF EVENTS—KARTOUM, VOL. III. From 1st Oct. to 12th Oct., 1884.
* * * * *
_On cover at back_:
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL
From 1st Oct. to 12th Oct., 1884.
EVENTS IN KARTOUM.
It will require pruning down if published.
C. G. GORDON.
1/10/84.
_On inside sheet_:
EVENTS AT KARTOUM.
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL, VOL. III.
From Oct. 1st to 1884.
If published, must be pruned down.
C. G. GORDON.
[Illustration: GOUVERNORAT GENERAL DU SOUDAN]
JOURNAL.
_October 1._—Steamers left yesterday at 3 P.M. for (Berber, _D.V.,
viâ_) Shendy. Yesterday the steamer _Towfikia_ attacked the Arabs on
the White Nile, and killed a horse and three men. Steamer _Bordeen_
drove back the horsemen on the Blue Nile. The Arabs attacked a village
lower down the White Nile than Halfeyeh, and were driven back by the
villagers with loss: you may believe as much as you like of this, _but
our vessels went out_, that is the main thing.
The more I think of appointing Abdel Kader[94] Pasha in my place, the
more strongly does the idea recommend itself, for it does away with
all difficulties, and leaves Her Majesty’s Government perfectly free
to abandon or not as it thinks fit. Abdel Kader Pasha would be under
no such obligations as I am to the soldiers, &c., of these beleaguered
places, and Her Majesty’s Government could put it all on him if
anything was said. To me it has the selfish advantage of being free at
once of a very disagreeable and troublesome position, both personally
and publicly.
As for feeling at all vexed at this arrangement, viz. my being put
out, I should not, for the only thing which actuates me is this: _I
think it mean to leave the garrisons_; but if my superiors decide to do
so, and will take the responsibility, then what am I? to dispute their
decision, the more especially as I cannot do so without funds, which I
have not. I do not dispute but that the withdrawal of the garrisons is
not a difficult task, but not impossible; and if not impossible, our
honour binds us to fulfil it, and to my mind it is shabby not to do
it: but Governments do shabby things, _vide_ the Boer business, and if
they are going to do it here, the way I have pointed out is the best.
There is not the least reason for me to participate in its execution,
it would not be fair to try and force me, and another thing is that I
would _not_ be forced. I believe Her Majesty’s Government will adopt
this idea, and if they do, I see a vista of an escape with honour and
without _fracas_ (which is very pleasing), from a position which is
not likely to be a feather-bed, and which might require me to go on
struggling for over a year, not only against the Arabs, but against the
antipathies and ill-disguised hostility of Her Majesty’s Government,
for certainly they would not be over friendly if forced into a line of
action their soul abhors.
_I think_ we are bound to extricate the garrisons whatever it costs;
_they do not_; there is no reason for any difference of opinion which
cannot exist between a Government and an individual, they simply place
an individual who thinks with them, and the matter is done, and this
individual is Abdel Kader Pasha. I see no reason to try and force me to
do what I do not think right, and which I can consequently do only in a
half-hearted manner if I even undertook it, _which I will not_.
As for the effect of my replacement by Abdel Kader Pasha: 1st, it
would produce no surprise, for it is well known I and Towfik are not at
all friends. 2nd, it is also known that Her Majesty’s Government wish
to be rid of all responsibility of the Soudan, _in re_ the garrisons;
therefore the removal of me would be merely the carrying out of this
policy. 3rd, Abdel Kader Pasha is the best man they have had up here,
and so, till the matter was broken to them, he would be well received.
It is not vaunting myself when I say that the general opinion here is
this, that Her Majesty’s Government would never have sent an expedition
up here had it not had me and Stewart here, _sent up by them!_[95] I
think they fully realise, that as far as the garrisons, &c., &c., were
concerned, were it not for us they might perish as quickly as they
liked; they also realise that, unless for the action of Her Majesty’s
Government at Cairo, assistance would have been sent long ago from
Cairo, so it must not be expected of the people to be very grateful.
They are glad to get out of their mess, but consider they are only
extricated under compulsion of circumstances, and not _con amore_.
If time presses, then telegraph Towfik to make the Mudir of Dongola
_Governor-General_ (it does not signify who is your dummy, only perhaps
he may not be so ductile as Abdel Kader) in my place, and your work is
easy, such work as it is.
_Personally_, I can assure you, I shall be only too delighted, for I
could be in Brussels in December, and free, honourably, of the whole
affair; you could not possibly expect me to stay after being replaced.
_Mark my words, if you have made up your mind, this is the best
solution_ and avoids all scandal.
Abdel Kader will make out that the Mahdi’s government is not really
so bad: that it is impossible, &c., &c., to be wandering all over
Africa, and his paper on the state of affairs will go down splendidly
with the public, and there will be honours all round, and mutual
congratulations. The British public accepted, without hesitation, the
trial of Arabi Pasha, by Ismail Pasha Ayoub, and Réouf Pasha, _as being
a just one_! Why, had they tried an angel, and Towfik had wished the
angel _guilty—guilty that angel would have been_, even if Michael or
Gabriel. Now I have told you how to whitewash I will end this tirade.
I will only remark that Her Majesty’s Government must not say _I was
replaced, because I wished to keep the Soudan_, FOR I DO NOT SAY SO, it
is an useless country; what I say is, that it is shabby _to abandon the
garrisons_, &c., &c.
I own the proposition I make is in some degree a trap, for I feel
confident that there will be no end of trouble, even in placing Abdel
Kader Pasha in my place and trying to evacuate; but if you accept it
you will do so (after this warning) with your eyes open.
Two women slaves came in from the Sheikh el Obeyed; no news, except
that the Arabs with this chief, are very badly off for water.
The following is what I would do, if in supreme command, military and
political. Divide the forces into three sections; one, A, to stay at
Dongola, half force, and look after communications from Wady Halfa to
Berber by river, in those _étapes_ or stages already alluded to.
Another, B, to occupy Berber, quarter force.
Another, C, to be a fighting force (quarter force) without artillery,
for we have guns up here. With C I would come to Kartoum, coax Arabs
down to Giraffe, destroy them, then coax Arabs to El foun and destroy
them; then push up to Wad el Medinet and destroy Arabs there, thus
opening the road to Sennaar and allowing grain to come down.
[Illustration]
By which time you would see your way as to the future. I would restore
the telegraph as I went along.
The result of these operations would be the retreat of the Mahdi’s
Arabs to Kordofan, and the surrender of those in and about Kassala.
Humanly speaking, there will be probably _three_ fights, costing each
fight, _eight_ killed and _fifteen_ wounded, as far as experience goes;
not more, and very likely, if the first fight is a good one (and we
have a _good_ pursuit), there will be no more after it; all the rest
will be child’s play.[96]
Arabs must have one good defeat, to wipe out Hicks’ disasters, and _my
defeats_. Berber will be evacuated.
[Illustration]
The troops at fight No. 1 _Giraffe_ will go up in the castellated
barges (which are real fortresses), and be covered by five steamers,
each with two guns, and two barges with a Krupp gun in each
(16-pounders), so there would be no risk; none of the Arabs’ forts are
closed at gorge.
Force need not be more than 1000 strong, _for we could send_ 3000 for
the flanks; but, as it would fight on river banks, there would be no
fear for flank attack. All could be done in thirty days as far as
fighting is concerned. This of course leaves the question of Kordofan
unsettled. The Mahdi might come to terms, and abandon his spiritual
power, but I doubt it.
[Illustration]
The fighting force C probably will be under Buller. _Earle_ at
_Berber_; _Dormer_ at _Abou Hamed_; and _Fremantle_ at _Dongola_; the
Sirdar at _Wady Halfa_; Lord Wolseley PARTOUT! Goodenough in command of
Royal Artillery; Harrison (in recollection of China) commanding Royal
Engineers. I hope Goodenough will not be too proud to use our guns, he
will be horrified at the vents, which are from continuous firing; we do
not rebouch up here, not having bouches.
No one could be astonished at my reluctance to make a bolt of it
without the garrisons, for it virtually makes out all our toils, for
the last seven months, as utterly useless; we had, to all intents and
purposes, better have surrendered months ago. One feels such a mean
brute to go egging on men to fight, and then to let it end with a
skedaddle.
* * * * *
_October 2nd._—A sergeant-major, with a soldier, escaped last night;
he reports that the Mahdi came from Obeyed to Schatt, with two ortas
of black captured troops, two Krupp guns, and seven mountain guns;
but then the Arab tribes in his rear rose, and that he went back,
taking the guns with him, sending one of his Ameers, Abdullah Waled
Jubira, to Kalakla with 100 black troops. The sergeant-major reports
the Arabs have 140 Krupp shells and 200 boxes of Remington ammunition;
that the Arabs did not suffer when they fired on the steamers coming
from Sennaar; that, with the Mahdi, are all the Roman Catholic Mission
party, _who have not changed their religion_: one nun is exposed to
the sun to force her to do so. The man says the other guns are all
broken in their carriages, in the Mahdi’s fights with the Arabs. The
Mahdi takes Slatin and all the Europeans with him when he moves; he
reports Waled a Goun has sent the black troops he had with him to the
rear, because so many escaped; the Arabs fired a salute of four guns on
arrival of the Ameer Abdullah Waled Jubira.
A slave coming in from the left bank reports Faki Mustapha with few
troops; says the rumour of the advance expeditionary force is rife;
says the Arab ferry is at Kalakla; they pass only at night. The
sergeant-major says that he is sure the tribes (on the Mahdi’s going
to Schatt) all rose and pillaged on the road: hence the Mahdi’s return
towards Obeyed.
The man the doctor operated upon for the large stone is dead.
From what the sergeant-major says, it appears I am not more liked by
the Mahdi than I am _elsewhere_—a nuisance! and a bore!
The _Towfikia_ steamer went up the _White_ Nile, and fired upon the
Arabs! The _Bordeen_ steamer went up the _Blue_ Nile, and fired upon
the Arabs! The Halfeyeh people went out and captured a camel! All these
things are _hostilities_ not countenanced by Her Majesty’s Government.
This afflicts me, that joker Egerton!
I have sent off another spy to Debbeh, saying that three steamers wait
their orders at Metemma, _one hundred and fifty_ miles from Debbeh!
The Shaggyeh tribes are giving me bother again with their horrid
families down river. They are most exasperating.
A horse escaped from the Arabs, formerly belonging to Government. It
gave _no_ information; but from its action, may be supposed _not to
believe in the Mahdi_.
Simmons[97] and I agree on one subject—that Egypt is useless to us,
unless we have command of the seas; and if we have command of seas,
Egypt is ours; therefore it is not worth bothering about. We will never
be liked by its peoples; we do not go the right way to be liked. To
my mind, if we looked after the Cape and Mauritius, &c., it would be
far more beneficial, and less expensive, than wasting our money on
Egypt and the Soudan; but because Egypt _used to_ be important, we
think it is always so. Whereas, the introduction of steam has quite
altered its importance, while the creation of other Naval Powers in the
Mediterranean renders that sea no longer a question of supremacy of
France or England.
I have mentioned reports of troops moving on Kassala, yet not one word
is said, either one way or another, by Kitchener. Surely he must know
that if this is the case, I ought to be told; or if no movement is
being made in that direction, I ought to be informed.
Arabi’s clerk, Ahmet-Eff-Awaan[98] (Stewart knows him well) was, on
Stewart’s departure, represented to me as in utter misery, so I gave
him back £10 a month. _To-night_ I heard my friend had been positively
preaching for the Mahdi! so I have shut him up. An attempt was made
the day before yesterday morning to set fire to one of the houses near
the magazine at the Roman Catholic Mission. It was discovered; it was
evidently the work of an incendiary. I have ordered all houses to be
pulled down in the neighbourhood. This is not comfortable, for it shows
we have some evil-disposed people here.[99]
_October 3._—Small church parade to-day on South Front. Some
twenty-five horsemen came near the lines, and four shots were fired at
them.
An inquiry is going on about the fire near the magazine. Some little
suspicion that Awaan is mixed up with it, for his house was near;
indeed, it adjoins the place where the fire was. It burned four tents.
It will go hard with him if he is found guilty: certainly his preaching
in favour of the Mahdi is against him.
I visited the place of the fire, and also Awaan’s house. My impression
is against Awaan’s being the culprit; but I have no doubt the Court
of Inquiry will find him guilty. Wilfred Blunt will be crying out
about this ill-used martyr, so will Arabi the blest. I am paying for
the houses pulled down. There is no doubt the fire was the work of an
incendiary. To-day ends the Bairam.
Stewart will not believe it of Awaan; but it appears that in disputing
about the Mahdi, Awaan took off his slipper[100] and struck his
opponent—he was so strong in his opinion. A more fawning, wretched
fellow one never saw. I should send him to the Mahdi, but that he knows
English, and is a born intriguer.
I reason thus, respecting the slackness of the Intelligence Department
not sending in spies. As noted in the Journal, on an average four or
five men come in daily from the Arabs, therefore they do not keep so
very strict a look-out; also now there are vast gaps in their lines
around the place, and one may say from here to Shendy is open. It is
more difficult to go out than to come in, for in going out one may
stumble on some new emplacement of the Arabs, while in coming in a man
can ascertain such emplacements beforehand; it is evident also, that
as all the information we have had has come from my _return spies_,
that no effort has been made by the Intelligence Department. Had that
Department initiated any such step, in any energy, it is unlikely that
all _their_ men would have been stopped—my spies get caught, though,
_so frequently_ passing the lines of Arabs.
The more one thinks of it, the more impossible does it seem for Her
Majesty’s Government to get out of this country without extricating the
garrisons and establishing some Government at Kartoum; once having, as
they have, come up to Dongola, they cannot well go back from Dongola,
they must come to Berber, and when once at Berber, as there is the
river, they must come up here; once here, they must go to Sennaar or
arrange to open this route. It is of all things the most perplexing,
and one does not see the end of it, unless we give the country to
the Turks. With the best will and with all favourable circumstances,
_i.e._, that it is found possible to abandon, it will take six to eight
months, and with a terrible outlay, and one cannot think that even then
it is a satisfactory termination if, after extricating the garrisons
and contenting ourselves with that, we let the Mahdi come down and
boast of driving us out.
If we proclaim the abolition of slave-holding we must proclaim it in
Egypt as well, and then the revenue falls. The Turks really seem the
only way out of it, in a speedy way. It would be cheaper to give them
a million pounds than to keep our people up here, and there is no
discredit to our arms if we take Berber and open the route to Sennaar,
and then leave the country to the Turks, letting them deal with the
Mahdi as they like. I think even the gift of two millions to the Turks
would be a cheap solution of it, and is also a quick and an honourable
one.
As for Her Majesty’s Government keeping the Soudan itself, it is out
of the question, for you could not get men to serve here except under
great salaries and supported with large forces; and as for giving
it back to Egypt, in a couple of years we would have another Mahdi;
therefore, our choice lies between Zubair and the Turks. Now, the time
has gone by when Zubair, almost alone, would suffice; he would now
need aid in men, while the Turks would need no aid from us in men.
Therefore, give the country to the Turks, when once you have come to
Kartoum, with one or two millions sterling (which YOU will spend in
three months’ occupation up here if you delay), make arrangements at
once with the Porte for its Soudan cession, let 6,000 Turks land at
Suakin and march up to Berber, thence to Kartoum; you can then retire
at once before the hot weather comes on.[101] Let 3000 Turks land at
Massowah and go to Kassala; that saves you that journey. You would
be even saved waiting till the troops came from the Equator and Bahr
Gazelle.
* * * * *
_28th October._—Berber occupied.
* * * * *
_5th November._—1000 Troops at Kartoum. 6000 Turks land at Suakin and
march to Berber. 4000 Turks land at Massowah and march to Kassala.
* * * * *
_8th November._—Defeat of Arabs on south lines—unless they have
bolted.
* * * * *
_12th November._—Defeat Arabs near El foun, unless they have
submitted.
* * * * *
_15th November._—Despatch of force to Sennaar to clear country round
Medinet.
* * * * *
_1st to 10th December._—Arrival of Turks at Berber and Kartoum, and at
Kassala.
* * * * *
_20th December._—Return of Her Majesty’s forces to Wady Halfa, leaving
1000 men at Dongola till Turks could come from Berber.
The frontier to be Wady Halfa. All steamers, &c., to be handed over to
the Turks. The two millions to be paid in four instalments.
Suakin and Massowah to be free ports under the Turks.
Egypt is responsible for the pensions of those who return to Egypt.
Turkey is responsible for the pensions of those who stay in the Soudan.
I see nothing to prevent the whole affair being settled by the end of
January, and the whole expeditionary force from being in Cairo at the
end of February.
As for the slave-trade, one cannot help it.[102]
I cannot see why France could object if we let her have some “say” in
Egypt. She will thwart all we do there unless we do let her have a
“say.”[103]
We make up with Turkey by this action, and she would aid us to prevent
Egypt being annexed by any other Power.
Remember we have no time to lose—that we must make our choice at
once—and that choice must be one of a strong decisive kind, with
no shifting hopes of something turning up. Our expedition is very
ticklish, very expensive, and _utterly unremunerative_.
If once our men get sickly up here, and our programme is a skedaddle,
the consequences might be most disastrous. The skedaddle programme
would cool all the people against us, and strengthen the Mahdi
immensely; and then there is no way to avoid the heats, unless by the
skedaddle programme; but if you agree with the Turks, you avoid the
heats and the skedaddle programme, and have people with you.
I hope I am not going down to History as being the cause of this
expedition, for I decline the imputation. _The expedition comes up to
deliver the garrisons._[104] I think it would read well in history:
“Her Majesty’s Government having accepted duties in Egypt, and
consequently in the Soudan, sent up a force to restore tranquillity,
which, having been done, Her Majesty’s Government handed over that
government of the Soudan to the Sultan.”
Our people may try as they like, they can never govern Egypt and pay
the interest; combine with France, and let down the interest to 3 per
cent., which we cannot do without France agreeing.
As for any of the men in Cairo now pretending to govern, it is
useless; they know nothing of, and have no sympathy with, the
country. What can they know of the country, sitting at Cairo? What
the people want, is half taxes, and Censors going through provinces
remedying evils. Do away with Wood’s army, an useless expense.
Do away with three-fourths of European employés, railway, &c.,
&c.—cormorants!—ditto Gendarmerie.
I shall send out three men in different directions to-morrow to Debbeh,
with further notifications that three steamers, and each with two
field-guns, are at Metemma, Shendy, 150 miles from Ambukol, which is
35 miles higher up river than Debbeh, waiting orders of expeditionary
force, and saying Cuzzi’s baggage is to be searched. I have now done
all I can. In ten days’ time I shall send a steamer to Metemma with
further information. The attempt to fire the magazine has made me
vicious with the people. No one in from Arabs to-day. Query, _ominous_!
* * * * *
_October 4._—The boiler will be put in the new steamer (sister to
_Abbas_) to-day. She will be ready for sea in six days.
Report from Cassim el Mousse late last night. Arabs say Sheikh el
Obeyed meditates an attack on Halfeyeh. The trouble these Shaggyeh have
given us is beyond description.
Ibrahim Bey Ruckdi, loq. Lutraim: “He called for me at (9 P.M.) 3! in
the night; he bullied me to work. Can you imagine such a thing?—it
is preposterous. He flew at me like a tiger, because I showed he was
unreasonable. It is _Bairam_ too: can you imagine such a thing?”
_Awaan_, Arabi’s clerk, has been telling, in the town, that the
letters I got saying, “Her Majesty’s troops are advancing,” were
written by him and sent down, and then returned. There is an evident
wish to take off his head; but I think he is more fool than knave, and
shall try and resist the wish of town.
Saleh Pasha’s son telegraphed to me he wanted to come and see me. I
answered he might come or _go_, as he liked. He said, what did I mean
by “go?” I was much tempted to say, “_Go to your father, who is in
chains with Mahdi_,” but resisted temptation, and said, “_Go out of
telegraph station_.”
I had to send down ten barges for those creatures at 10 P.M. last
night. (See p. 185.)
No spies in this morning; people will begin to believe Awaan’s
statement, that he it was who wrote the letters (I pretended to have
had) from the English.
A woman just in says there is a report with the Arabs that the English
are at Dongola; that a steamer and four nuggars, with English, are at
Berber(?) (I expect she has mixed up Stewart’s steamer and boats with
her story); that the Arab chief of Berber has sent for help, which has
not yet been sent him.
One of those large shells was blown up by a boy treading on it; it does
not appear to have hurt him; it was in the group of date palms opposite
to the Palace.
I confess the shells do not seem so very destructive. Perhaps they are
too deeply buried; however, they have frightened people.
A small boy and five men escaped from the Arabs and came in. The
Mahdi, with Europeans, is at Schatt; he means to come to Omdurman. They
corroborate that some troops went back to Obeyed to put down the rising
of tribes.
The boiler has been successfully put in the small steamer.
It is odd how quick the blacks, by instinct, know how to avoid the
effects of the shells, by throwing themselves on the ground when
they hear the fizz of the quick-match; they all do it, and thus have
escaped. Of course it would not do in an assault. The little black chap
never ran so fast as he did when he got up after the explosion, never
looking behind him. He went to two black sluts, who had been alarmed at
the noise, and explained the opening of the ground, &c., with a good
deal of gesticulation. They had a sort of Medgliss[105] on the subject
whether it was not time to return home, and pick no more grass, after
such dreadful things had happened, and which ended in their doing so,
carefully avoiding the scene of the accident.
I expect these improvident people killed over 1000 sheep and goats at
their Bairam; the report is that it exceeds that number.
There is no doubt there will be a fearful famine in this country next
year, for there are vast districts lying desert which were formerly
cultivated.
The party which went to Jaila, the village north of Halfeyeh which
the Arabs had attacked, have come back with the rescued families, and
twenty-five cows captured from the so-called rebels. (Query, Who are
the rebels, _we or the Arabs_?) (To-day is the 206th day we have been
more or less shut up. Delightful life! I wonder what Azotus [Ashdod]
felt with its twenty-nine years blockade?)
* * * * *
_October 5._—Two men and a boy came in from the Arabs, and report that
the Mahdi has made a small advance towards Omdurman. Little else of
import. They say Hussein Pasha Khalifa, Saleh Pasha, Slatin, and all
the Europeans are with the Mahdi; that Kordofan is in turmoil; that the
Arabs say they will wait till they can collect a lot of men, and then
will attack the lines.
If you do not arrange with the Turks you will not get out of the
country for a year, and it will cost you twelve millions, and probably
then you will have to fall back on the Turks.[106] Whereas if you
arrange with the Turks you can get out in January, and it will cost you
seven millions, including the two millions you give the Turks. Truly
this black sister “Soudan” has avenged her white sister “Egypt.”
A scorpion in bath sponge this morning. It stung me upon the finger. I
murdered it, and so am quits. I wonder whether any analysis has been
made of the scorpion’s and the cobra’s poison. This is the sixth time I
have been stung.
A sheikh of the neighbourhood came in, and says a short time ago a
Frenchman came up with two Arabs from Dongola to the Mahdi. The Mahdi
could not make it out, and asked why he came. The man said he had come
up to salute the Mahdi. The Mahdi being suspicious imprisoned him for
seven days, and then let him out. He was in a Dervish dress. It is said
he spoke to Saleh Pasha and to Slatin in secret, upon which the Mahdi
separated these two, and put them in open arrest (is this Rochefort?)
My informant says he denied to the Mahdi that the English were in
Dongola, but told Slatin and Saleh Pasha that they were there. This man
is with the Mahdi now, and is free. It might be Renan,[107] the author
of the ‘Life of Jesus,’ who in his last publication takes leave of the
world, and is said to have gone into Africa, not to reappear again. He
was a Roman Catholic priest originally, is a great Arabic scholar, and
evidently a very unhappy and restless man.
I met him once in the rooms of the Royal Geographical Society one
afternoon, and I remember the Secretary proposing to him to go up to
the _top_ of that _high house!_ to see the observatory. Renan declined.
He looked bored and weary in being made a hero of, and when Sir R.
Alcock introduced me to him, I suppose he saw my look of commiseration
for his trials, and was civil to me. I have often thought we might meet
again. What a fearful infliction hero-worship is to its victim. I think
it a great impertinence to praise a man to his face. It implies you
are his superior, for the greater praises the smaller; and though that
may be the case, it is not necessary to announce it to the smaller.
Supposing one is wrinkled and grey-haired, it is satire to say you are
smooth-skinned, &c., &c., and beautiful, and so it must be with every
man who knows himself and who is praised—endurance, self-denial, and
twaddle—one would have bolted like a lamplighter if one could, and one
could have stood the after criticism.
... on going to the trenches before Sevastopol fell out, and said he
would not go down. The colonel put him under arrest. He was in a way
more plucky to do this than to go to the trenches. Self-sacrifice is
that of a nurse—ignored (and “paid,” of course, what can she want
more!). No one goes into ecstasies over her self-denial.
If it is Renan he will not approve of the pepper system. The man says
the Mahdi was perfectly astounded at this Frenchman’s appearance, and
did nothing but question him. “Why do you come here?” &c., &c. If he
comes to the lines, and it is Renan, I shall go and see him, for,
whatever one may think of his unbelief in our Lord, he certainly dared
to say what he thought, and he has not changed his creed to save his
life.
A black mother and her two sons have come in, and say the Mahdi is at
Jura Hadra, twenty-five miles south of Duem. The woman was delighted to
see herself in the mirrors, and grinned and smirked at her reflections.
Spies say Nuehr Bey Angara has been sent back by the Mahdi to Obeyed,
to put down the rising of the tribes; if he would only _rise_ himself,
for he is an old friend of mine, the Mahdi would be cut off from Obeyed
and be in a bad way.
The steamer _Bordeen_ is back from Halfeyeh.
We chose to regard Greece, Spain, Turkey, Mexico, and other lands,
as debtors and bankrupts. We did not attempt to saddle the rulers,
personally, with the debts of these countries—excepting in the case
of Egypt and Ismail Pasha (_i.e._, we did not turn out the rulers of
those states, while we did turn out Ismail), of course it is easy to
put it down to his ill-faith. I expect the rulers of those other states
were guilty of far worse faith. It is the custom to _say_ we acted in
the interests of the oppressed fellaheen, but what have the fellaheen
gained up to the present time? Where are those millions to come from I
have talked of?
Let us consider dispassionately the state of affairs. Does Her
Majesty’s Government consider they are responsible for the extrication
of the Soudan garrisons and Cairo inhabitants? We can only judge that
Her Majesty’s Government does recognise this responsibility, for
otherwise why did they send me up, and why did they relieve Tokar?
Once this responsibility is assumed, I see no outlet for it but to
relieve the garrisons, _coûte que coûte_. It may be said that the
object of the present expedition is for _my_ relief _personally_. But
how is it possible for me to go away and leave men whom I have egged on
to fight for the last six months? How could I leave after encouraging
Sennaar to hold out? No one could possibly wish me to do so. No
Government could take the responsibility of so ordering me. There is
this difficulty: perhaps it would be patriotic to bolt; but _even if_
I could get _my mind_ to do it, I doubt if it is possible to get _my
body_ out of this place. Had Baring said in March, “Shift for yourself
as best you can,” which he could have done, the affair could have been
arranged, and we could have bolted to the Equator; but, if you look
over my telegrams,[108] you will see I ask him what he will do, and he
never answered.[109] The people had not then endured any privation, and
I was, as it were, not much engaged to them; but now it is different,
especially as we have communicated with Sennaar.
No one can judge the waste of money and expense of life in the
present expedition—it is an utter waste of both—but it is simply due
to the indecisions of our Government. Had they said from the first,
“We do not care—we will do nothing for the garrisons of the Soudan,
they may perish; had they not relieved Tokar; had they not telegraphed
to me as to the force to relieve me (_vide_ telegrams, 5th May,
from Suakin; 29th April, from Massowah). Had they telegraphed (when
Baring telegraphed to Cuzzi 29th March, which arrived here saying,
‘No British troops are coming to Berber, negotiations going on about
opening road—Graham was about to attack Osman Digna’”), “_SHIFT FOR
YOURSELF_”, why, nothing could have been said; but Her Majesty’s
Government would not say they were going to abandon the garrisons, and
therefore “_shift for yourself_”. It is that which has hampered us
so much. On the one hand, if I bolted I deserted them (Her Majesty’s
Government); on the other hand, by staying I have brought about this
expedition. Baring gave me distinct orders not to go to the Equator
without the permission of Her Majesty’s Government (_vide_ telegrams
with Stewart’s journal).[110] I do not question the policy of Her
Majesty’s Government in not keeping the Soudan. It is a wretched
country, and not worth keeping. I do not pretend even to judge the
policy of letting the garrisons, &c., &c., perish; but I do say, I
think that Her Majesty’s Government ought to have taken the bold step
of speaking out and saying, _“SHIFT FOR YOURSELF” in March_, when I
could have done so, and not now, when I am in honour bound to the
people after six months’ bothering warfare. Not only did Baring not
say, “_Shift for yourself_,” but he put a veto upon my going to the
Equator—_vide_ his telegrams in Stewart’s Journal. I say this because
no one deplores more the waste of money and life in this expedition,
and no one can realise its difficulties better than myself, but,
owing to what has past, owing to indecision, we are in for it, and
the only thing now to do is to see how to get out of it, with honour
and the least expense possible—and I see no other way than by giving
the country to the Turks. I am not raising difficulties, or being
cantankerous; I wish most sincerely I was out of the place, where from
February I have had no peace. The question is how to do so. I may be
wrong, but I have a strong suspicion that much rejoicing (_rejoicing_
perhaps a _little_ for my personal, but a good deal for my official
safety) would have taken place in official circles had I appeared in
the _Abbas_ with Stewart; but it was not even physically possible, and
I should have been a disgraced man for ever had I been able to do so
and had done it. Besides which, we were entirely in doubt as to the
intentions of Her Majesty’s Government as to letting the garrisons
slide or not. I might have been tried for deserting my post, and for
letting the steamers and stores fall into the hands of the Mahdi, for
that was certain within five days of my quitting the place. What I
suspect or do not suspect, would not justify me in my action, and,
as it turns out, my suspicions were wrong, for after Stewart left, I
hear a British force is coming up—of course it is a query what is
it coming up for? If _for the garrisons_, then I have done what the
Government wants, for I have kept the city; if _for me_, then I have
done wrong, for I should have come down at all costs; but in one case
great inconvenience would have been given; while in the other it is
only my life—and if it is _for me_ the expedition comes, it would be
better to tell me, “Shift for yourself; we do not mean to extricate the
garrisons”—in which case perhaps we may find an issue—at any rate the
people will know exactly the state of affairs, and our Government will
not be exposed to an unnecessary expense and danger in sending troops
up here for _ME_. I should consider Her Majesty’s Government were
completely exonerated from all responsibility with respect to myself
if they sent me that order, “_Shift for yourself_; we _do not mean to
extricate the garrisons_,” I should make my arrangements, and (telling
the people how I am situated, with no hope of relief for them), should
make a bolt to the Equator in six weeks’ time. There would be no
dishonour in that, for, as I had no relief coming, the only sequel of
my staying with them would be to be a prisoner with them, and in fact
my presence would only exasperate the Arabs instead of being of any
good.
It may be argued, Why not retreat on Berber? I would rather not do
that, for I would wish to show in a positive way that I had no part or
lot in the abandoning of the garrisons, &c., &c., and, at any rate, I
should save the garrisons of the Equator and of the Bahr Gazelle if I
succeeded in getting away to them.
* * * * *
_October 6._—The steamer _Bordeen_ up the _Blue_ Nile wasting a lot
of ammunition on the Arab foraging parties. No arsenals could stand
this drain on their resources. I expect that the _Bordeen_ fired fifty
rounds to-day.
Three escaped soldiers came in from the Arabs; they say that the Arabs
have sent a Krupp and a mountain gun to Giraffe; so that may account
for the heavy firing above mentioned. One of the men says the Arabs
placed two boats in a position close to the two guns they had brought,
in order to entice the steamer to go and take them, thus hoping to
sink her. However, I am glad to say the steamer is on her way back.
The continual anxiety one is in about these little things is very
wearing. One never knows if, through some rash act, I may not lose a
steamer, or men may not be cut off. One has no man like Gessi[111] who
one can trust for these little expeditions. Steamer _Towfikia_ went up
the White Nile and fired upon the Arabs. It is just as I thought: the
_Bordeen_ steamer has come back, having been struck by a shell about a
foot above the water-line, close to the cutwater; no one was hurt. All
the Arabs are going from the White Nile towards Giraffe. I expect we
shall have the old game at Bourré again. In these circumstances you can
imagine how very vicious one feels towards Her Majesty’s Intelligence
Department for not giving us any news. It is not so much for myself as
it is for the townspeople.[112]
The steamer reports that the Arabs had five guns. It is evident the
Arabs mean to hold the Blue Nile by their force at Giraffe, and I dare
not try to dislodge them; they will then communicate with the Sheikh el
Obeyed’s force, and eventually come down upon Shoboloha or thereabouts;
while the Mahdi, coming to Omdurman, will circle us in, a second time.
Owing to a discovered intrigue and the risk of having too much power
in the hands of one man, I have sent Ibrahim Ruckdi to Malia as chief
clerk, and Gugliz Bey of Malia is made my chief clerk. Nothing like
change of air for these fellows.
As interesting to Stewart, I will mention the intrigue. He knows of
the letters which came, accusing Ibrahim Ruckdi of venality. Well, a
Medgliss was held, and Mahomet Bey Agad was found guilty of sending the
letters. I did not care to push the matter, for, in my belief, Agad was
right in his accusation, although he had no right to write anonymously.
_Of course_ the Medgliss found him guilty, as every Egyptian Medgliss
does every one sent before it; so I temporised and hinted to a third
person that it would be well if Ibrahim asked pardon of Agad; this
hint, being of course a sort of order, he took; but I noticed he was
working against Agad; and yesterday he came with a paper against Hassan
Agad the Sandjak, putting it forward as Ferratch Pasha’s idea to turn
Hassan Agad out. I thought over it, and it worried me, the viciousness
of the man; but I took no action. However, to-day, as I told him to
write another order about the troops saluting me by stopping in the
road and saying he was responsible for it, he said, as he turned away,
in an impertinent manner, “Am I Commandant of troops?” He was brought
back, and, nose to grindstone, was sent to Malia, and Gugliz Bey was
brought up to chief clerkship.
I own I am suspicious, _i.e._, I judge by the eye, by little signs,
&c., for I do not know the language; but I cannot help thinking I
am more often right than wrong with my suspicions. One comes on a
group of clerks, heads all together, in the chief clerk’s room; one
sees disturbed countenances at once. I cannot help thinking “You are
concocting devilry!” and I look out for some “_tricks_.”
Another soldier escaped here from the Arabs, and says the Mahdi is
at Jura Hadra, and intends coming to Omdurman. He does not appear to
think the Arabs care for the English advance, though they know they
are at Dongola, “a far cry,” they say, to Kartoum. They consider
Hicks’s defeat was one over the English troops. One thing is good,
viz., that the Arabs came down to Giraffe, for if they stay there,
when the British do come they will fall easy victims without any long
march inland. It certainly does seem astounding that the Arabs seem
so confident when a British force is only 150 miles from them, which
is the case, for that distance of 150 miles alone separates the three
steamers from Debbeh, which has a water-way to Dongola, and the place
the three steamers are at, has a water-way to Kartoum. In reality, with
a well-equipped force, Debbeh is not more than eight days’ from Kartoum
at the outside, saying that the 150 miles were made in six and a-half
days, which for camels is twenty-five miles a day, very easy marching;
while, from Metemma to this is 100 miles—a day and a half for steamers
(when I say Debbeh, I mean Ambukol, to which place from Debbeh you have
the open river). The appearance of one British soldier or officer here
settles the question of relief _vis-à-vis_ the townspeople, for then
they know that I have not told them lies.
The Arabs fired fourteen rounds at the _Bordeen_. The shell which
entered her was a Krupp; the hole is now repaired.
It was an unfortunate remark of Ibrahim Ruckdi, “Am I Commandant
of soldiers?” I had dismissed the thought of changing him, having
comforted myself that, one way or another, my tenure of office could
not be long up here, when he said that; it was like a match in powder;
he was brought back, and made then and there to sign his dismissal. I
do not think he realised it, even after he had written it. Even to me
it was a surprise, for I really had given up all idea of sending him
off.
The sister steamer to the _Abbas_ will be finished, I hope, in four
days. She will be called the _Hussein_, after the head of the dockyard.
The other one, also a sister steamer, will be, I hope, finished in six
weeks, if we exist that time. Of the two steamers at Berber with Arabs,
the _Fascher_ and the _Monsuhania_—the latter is reported disabled.
I have ordered _Bordeen_ to go on the White Nile on patrol from Kalakli
to Shoboloha; the _Ismailia_ is at Halfeyeh, _Towfikia_ at Omdurman.
The Arabs, who went in numbers to Giraffe to-day went back to their Dem
at sunset.
We have another large steamer, the _Chabeen_, up in our _dry-dock_,
which I hope will be soon ready for action.
A man came in from the Arabs; he says Seyd Mahomet Osman has sent 300
camels to bring his family from Shendy to Kassala (this is a bad sign);
he says the English have advanced towards Berber.
* * * * *
_October 7._—Ibrahim Ruckdi has fallen from £60 per month to £30.
Sixteen soldiers with their arms came in to-day from the Arabs, also
one slave; they had not much to say. Arabs had three guns against the
steamer yesterday; they kept one gun at Giraffe, where they keep small
detachments all night. The Arabs pursued the men escaping, and fired
a few rounds, but did no harm; with these men came in four women of
theirs, quite a flock.
I really think the Arabs on the south side keep such a way off because
they are afraid of the captured soldiers deserting. The sixteen men who
came in were splendid fellows, all nearly six feet; they say a body of
forty others have made up their minds to come in a mass either to-day
or to-morrow.
An Arab of Kartoum came in from Omdurman; says grass huts are being
made for the Mahdi’s arrival there; man says the Arabs report “English
and Turkish troops at Debbeh.” _Towfikia_ went up the White Nile; saw a
few Arabs, who fired on her.
Another soldier has come in—the Arabs will be furious; he says nine
others have made up a party to leave the Arab camp. The Arabs spread
reports that I kill all who come in; but the whole of the soldiers of
the Soudan know me of old, and so the reports are not believed. This
soldier was at Berberah when last I saw him. I had moved all the black
soldiers from there to Senheit, as the climate did not suit them. It is
odd that Berberah, Zeila, and Harrar suits the Egyptian and chocolate
faces; not the blacks, who suffer from pulmonary complaints in those
parts.
The sputtering of musketry on the lines this morning quite reminded me
of old times. The Arabs fired a good deal at the runaways.
[Illustration:
Berber
Arabs
Metemma
Shendy
_Three Steamers_
Shoboloha
_Three Steamers_
Arabs
KARTOUM
Kalakla
El foun
Giraffe]
Some of the officers are very anxious to go out against the Arabs, but
I do not see it. We are not safe off the river banks, and there is no
good risking matters; besides which, we can never, with our force, give
them a crushing defeat, which will alone settle the question; and we
might, by a small defeat, drive them into the desert, where one could
not reach them if other troops come up. We are now thus placed (see
Map), and in four days I shall have four steamers between Shoboloha
and Kalakla. In a month I hope two more steamers will be ready: total,
_nine_. Arabs have _two_ at Berber, _one_ at Wad el Medinet; of those
at Berber only one is fit for work, the _Fascher_.
I will mention a secret in all Egyptian administrations, _i.e._, if
you give an order, it is totally inefficient in three days’ time if
not repeated again and again at intervals; it seems as if its essence
evaporated in the heat of these countries. The officers would laugh
you to scorn if you said, “Why, I gave a _standing order_ respecting
this or that.” It would be to them perfectly ridiculous and absurd to
expect a “standing order” to be obeyed, unless _repeated_ at intervals.
In most services, standing orders are regarded, but certainly not in
Egypt; this is the reason why all those beautiful proclamations and
laws issued by the control and their successors, are _dead letters_
after ten days; they are constructed for the European Press. What is
needed, is continual hammering at seeing your orders obeyed. Saleh
Pasha sent a man in with a message to me: “Mahdi is coming with 40,000
men, etc., etc., etc.” This is all rubbish. All Kordofan could not
produce this number; and if it could, the country could not support
them in food for five days.
Fearful row to-night because, after one-and-a-half days’ warning, the
_Bordeen_ was going to start for Halfeyeh, no soldiers were found on
board, and this after repeated orders to Ferratch Pasha. Men may say
what they like, but one is bound to lose one’s temper in such cases.
This is the story Saleh Pasha’s man tells: “Mahdi with 40,000 men is
coming to Omdurman, and will take it; he will then plunge into the
river and take Kartoum before the English come.” I reply that “the
Mahdi is not a fool to think that by plunging into the river he will
take Kartoum, neither can he have 40,000 men with him. _Put Saleh
Pasha’s messenger into chains as a spy of the enemy._” We have spies
direct from the Mahdi’s camp, who say “he has not 3000 with him.”
This business was going at the same time as my row with Ferratch
Pasha—certainly one is not on a bed of roses in this place.
* * * * *
_October 8th._—One soldier who escaped this morning, reports that
the Arabs are furious at the desertions of yesterday. Saleh Pasha’s
messenger (spoken of yesterday), on being put in chains, acknowledges
his statement is all fudge about Mahdi’s 40,000 men, &c., &c.
A sergeant escaped from the Arabs; he says the Arabs sent up about 200
black soldiers to Mesalamieh to get grain, and they escaped to Sennaar;
that Waled a Goun meditates coming over, with two guns, to the old Dem,
which was previously occupied by the son of Sheikh el Obeyed, on the
north side, near Halfeyeh, which, if he does, will be a great bore for
us. The Mahdi is at Jura Hadra; that a man had come from near Berber to
say the expedition was advancing towards that place. One has heard so
much of this sort of report that taken with the report of Waled a Goun
coming to Halfeyeh, one is inclined to doubt it, for he would not be
likely to do that if it was true about the expedition at Berber.
Sent out spy from Halfeyeh towards Shendy.
Whatever may happen, I hope it will be put to our credit that we gave
you the _Abbas_ steamer, and placed three steamers at your disposal
at Metemma,—when, if we had them we might have cut the route between
Jura on left bank of the Nile, and Fakir Ibraham on the right bank of
the Nile,—besides using up 350 soldiers of our meagre garrison in the
equipages of those steamers! Truly the indecision of our Government
has been, from a military point of view, a very great bore, for we
never could act as if independent; there was always the chance of their
taking action, which hampered us.
Take the Tokar business: had Baker been supported by, say, 500 men,
he would not have been defeated; yet, after he was defeated, you go and
send a force to relieve the town. Had Baker been supported by these 500
men, he would, in all probability, have been victorious, and would have
pushed on to Berber, and, once there, Berber would not have fallen.
What was right to do in _March_, was right to do in _February_. We sent
an expedition in March, so we ought to have sent it in February; and
then, the worst of it was, that Baker, having been defeated, _when you
did send your expedition to Tokar_, Baker’s force no longer existed,
and his guns resist me at Berber. It is truly deplorable, the waste
of men and money, on account of our indecision. Baker’s expedition
ought never to have been pushed forward, unless by small stages,
supported by forts. It had not more than fifteen or twenty miles to go,
and that distance ought to be, so to say, sapped. Take your present
expedition, I do not know (_thanks to that Intelligence Department!_)
the details, but it seems to me that till 20th August, or thereabouts,
we were supposed to be quietly disposed of, but about that date our
resurrection occurred, and then, “Let us have an expedition at once,
and send for Wolseley.” Had the men at Wady Halfa (Duncan) been told
in March (when he came up to Assouan) to make _étapes_ up to Dongola,
they would have been all ready for the expedition now. Personally, I
do not care, but I think what a perfect mess we would be in, in an
European war. I am convinced Wood, the Sirdar, and many others, foresaw
what was likely to happen, but they did not consider they were called
upon to make a row about it. (Plutarch’s Lives are out of print in our
generation; we do not like to be what club men call insubordinate,
though, of all insubordinates, the club men are the worst.) What is the
consequence? Why, an infinite expense and great difficulty. Mark the
way the Mahdi treated Cuzzi: is it likely he did it for the love of
Cuzzi? was it not because Cuzzi told him of Baring’s telegram, “that no
troops will be sent to Berber”? Remember, though I put these queries,
it is not I who put them: it is _history_. Why did Baker go to Suakin,
and Wood, the Sirdar, stay at Cairo? One was chief of gendarmerie; the
other was commander-in-chief. It was not a question of police, but of
war. If it was right to let Sinkat perish, it was right to let Tokar;
if it was right to relieve Tokar, it was right to see after Berber,
and thence on to Kartoum, Sennaar, Kassala, Bahr Gazelle, and the
Equator. At any rate, _be consistent_. No one can question the right of
the Government to decide; but when they decide, let it be a decision.
“WE WILL ABANDON ALTOGETHER, _and not care what happens_.” That is a
decision one can understand, whether one approves or not. We are not
the judges; but what we have done is such, that I declare I very much
doubt what is really going to be the policy of our Government, even now
that the expedition is at Dongola.
What were my ideas in coming out? They were these: _agreed abandonment
of Soudan, but extricate the garrisons_, and these were the
instructions of the Government; and I only wish that the public would
look over Baring’s and my telegrams exchanged from 28th February to
16th March, and see how he answered me:[113] it was as if I was amusing
myself up here. And then that light-hearted fellow Egerton ... adds
to it (“that I am in Capua”), “What are your intentions in staying at
Kartoum?”[114] I should like to see some explanation why no efforts
were made for the _relief_ of the _garrisons_ before August (_not_ MY
_relief_). Berber was known to have fallen in March; it may be said
the season was not good, then why in June does Egerton tell me to make
_contracts_? I hope Stewart will _cut out all this biliousness_.
9 P.M. _Telegraph cut with Halfeyeh._ This corroborates rather what
this man who came in to-day said, _i.e._ that the Arabs meditate coming
again to the Dem, north of this town, which will be a trouble—it will
be the beginning of a second blockade, and I hope the _last_, for I
declare I do not think I could go through a third _blockade_—siege is
too great a word for it.
* * * * *
_October 9._—Telegraph repaired with Halfeyeh. The Arabs came down on
the lines with two guns and exchanged some shots with our people. Only
waste of ammunition.
One soldier escaped from the Arabs to-day. He came from Sheikh el
Obeyed. He says they have got the gun which was captured at Katarif.
The Arabs fired seventeen shells this morning, but did no harm.
_Those Shaggyeh!_ I will back them to try a man’s patience more sorely
than any other people in the whole world, yea, and in the Universe. It
is no use detailing their efforts. I have now sent Moussa Bey down to
Halfeyeh. I really believe that they did try the patience of the Arabs,
from all I hear; for the Arabs frequently thought of putting them to
the sword, and I can quite imagine Arabs having this thought, from the
wear and tear they have given me.
Of course, the officer on the lines reports masses of Arabs killed
to-day.
Sheikh el Obeyed killed all the prisoners he took (who were
inhabitants of Kartoum) in Mahomet Ali’s defeat, near El foun. I have
ordered the sale of 200 ardebs of grain, no one to buy more than
¼ ardeb.
Stewart will be annoyed at hearing “Ibrahim Ruckdi is _very ill!!!!_”
Illness dates from hour of being turned out of head clerk’s place; he
has not sent for the doctor.
It will be a satisfaction for some to know that, owing to their not
sending me any news, I am exposed to hearing all sorts of disquieting
rumours from the town, which, though I do not mind them, are not
destined to make one’s life lighter. The Ulemas have been coming here
for two days to see me; they have been bothering for more grain, and
so I put off seeing them, but I gave them one ardeb a piece. To-day,
however, they pushed an interview, but I still held out, and said they
_must_ tell my Vakeel what they had to say. After a deal of palaver
my Vakeel came in to say, “_that the whole of the town requested I
would take back Ibrahim Ruckdi_.” What an idea! I said “The town had
better mind their own business, and leave me to mind mine.” I think it
is lovely! and how Ruckdi must have worked at it during his _severe
illness_. Ruckdi had got at my servants. Edrees, the butler, told me,
with a look of deepest commiseration, how ill Ruckdi was, on which I
laughed. I guessed he was on the sick list, and had asked. “Yes” (with
a deep sigh), “_Ruckdi was very ill_.” “Illness commenced when?” I
asked. “Oh, a long time back, but duty and fidelity to _me_ had enabled
him to crawl through his work,” at which I laughed again. Then came
the Ulemas, with the town petition. I can quite imagine when men have
bribed the chief clerk A. to be favourable, that it is a bother to have
to go through the same process with chief clerk B. on A.’s being turned
out; it upsets all calculations. Ruckdi will return to Cairo with Tongi.
“See-saw,[115] see-saw, why it is enough to kill a fellow. I can’t
keep my eyes open. I would give a shilling to have an hour’s sleep!
_Yes_, of course, _you_ say it is close at hand, _you black devil_!”
“I know your _Kareb_ means at least three hours more.” “Give you
the water-bottle? I can’t. I don’t dare to touch the rope of this
long-necked brute. Hullo: there is some one come a cropper. Rifle,
‘broken,’ of course, it is, you cannot fall from a precipice without
its being broken.” “Hi! stop! Catch hold of the brute; the machufat,
as you call it, is slipping round. Can’t you stop the brute (noise of
a body falling); well, there is an end of it. I will walk _now_ sooner
than embark again on the ship of the desert. Am I hurt? Oh, no, of
course not; rather enjoyed sensation. Walks half a mile, boots full of
sand, and tries it again.”—Scene in Desert: Explorations in Central
Africa, by Her Majesty’s Army.
The machufats[116] _will_ slip forward, and camels _will_ object to
people riding _on_ their long necks; they _will_ drop vesuvians on
camels, who will not like it; they _will_ get galled, and have not
glycerine; they will drop their pipes, and not dare to descend for
them; they _will_ pass baggage-camel with sharp edged boxes, which will
rasp their legs; as they mount they will go over the other side and
swear—oh how they will swear! all their Topies will be crushed—aches
and pains in every part of the body (I should be inclined to put them
on ambulance saddles, one on each side: awkward if they meet a baggage
caravan). “Tired and ill! of course I am tired and ill after bowing
and swaying my body to and fro all night, with my eyes pricking like
as from so many needles, from desire to sleep; and you may say what
you like, I swear I saw more than one of those skeleton camels get up,
and I saw houses as plain as I see you.[117] I was between Scylla and
Charybdis. I wanted to sleep, and I was afraid of falling off—shall
never forget it.”
“Chermside to Kitchener: Any news of _him_?”
“Kitchener to Chermside: Nothing particular; two or three more men
down. Steamers at Metemma. Abuse as usual of Intelligence Department.
Mahdi doing much better: _he_ finds it more difficult to get his
letters through, and will have time to get over _his_ liver complaint
and injustices. Stewart says it was a perfect pandemonium to be boxed
up with him when in his tantrums. _I hope you are well. Let me know if
I can do anything for you._”
I think, in the interests of the Telegraph Department, Floyer ought to
make officers pay for telegrams like this intercepted one.
A man came in from the Arabs on the South Front. He says the Arabs have
imprisoned the regular troops with them; that the regulars want to make
a rush for our lines and to escape to us.
A boy came in four days absent from the Mahdi’s camp, which is at a
place opposite Gitana. He says the Mahdi is moving along the left bank
towards Omdurman, and that he has with him all the Europeans, Elias
Pasha, and Slatin; that he will try and take the place before the
advance of the English, who are said to be near Berber. Kordofan is
quiet. The Mahdi has about three to four thousand with him. The Mahdi
says he will cross the river dry-foot—by a miracle.
Sent for the _Ismailia_ from Halfeyeh, replacing her by the
_Towfikia_. The _Bordeen_, down the river, will go to the same place on
her return. Somehow this advance of the Mahdi has raised my spirits;
nothing is more dead-like to be shut up as we have been; now, at any
rate, a month will see him victorious or defeated, as God may will
it. I think he will try and negotiate, for, of course, Hussein Pasha
Khalifa has told him I had a Firman enabling me to give up the country
if I found some one to take it.
“Kitchener to Chermside.—Hurrah! Capital news! The Mahdi has _him_ on
the hip! he has gone to Omdurman. Bottled _him_ up now! We will have no
more impertinent remarks about the Intelligence Departments. Dongola
illuminated! Regular feast of lanterns! Wish you were here, old fellow;
hope you are well! Can I, &c., &c.”
I declare Floyer ought to make them pay for these
telegrams—intercepted and brought here.
... “Well after a long night comes the dawn, this is somewhat
better news. I confess I was never much taken up with Livingstone’s
explorations, and I never would have believed any one, if he had told
me I should be carrying out these explorations with a British army. One
must not be ungrateful, but one may be permitted the remark why that
Mahdi did not move before he has quite spoilt my holiday; why, dear
me, in three months I shall be back in that bear-baiting garden again,
being asked questions. What a life! What do you say? I am sacrificing
myself for my country. Well, you are right there, I am a martyr, if
ever there was one.”
The mass of people who have come in from the Arabs, have spread far and
wide,—what is to be expected from the Mahdi and his Government—so I
have no fear for the town, which I suppose has 40,000 inhabitants in it.
The Arabs prevent all coming to me—I prevent none going to them—and
I even give them written permissions to go; so I gauge the fidelity of
the people.
Small steamer got her steam up to-day, and I hope will be finished in
three days, armed and in action.
I feel sure that the Mahdi comes with the idea of negotiating; if so,
and one can have reasonable hope of success as to the extrication
of the garrisons, I shall negotiate—for up to the present time, my
original instructions are not abrogated, and I feel sure Her Majesty’s
Government will not wish any longer campaign, than is necessary, in
these parts, for their honour, but it must be remembered _if_, by
negotiating, I get out the garrisons at the cost of the steamers, &c.,
&c., I must not be blamed if in the future, by the cession of the
steamers and warlike material, Egypt suffers. Her Majesty’s Government
gave me clear orders, _i.e._, “get out garrisons and evacuate”—these
orders have not been cancelled and are in force. No official notice is
given me of an advance of troops or of a change of policy; therefore I
am justified in acting on my original instructions. Kitchener’s note
is not sufficient to justify me in disobeying my regular instructions.
Egerton’s telegram was not decipherable.
* * * * *
_October 10._—The beginning of the year 1302 of the Arabs is on the
21st October. On the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd October were Hicks’s defeats.
The Mahdi, bringing all the Europeans with him, makes his move look as
if he were confident of his success ultimately. All information tends
to show that his object is to starve us out. If the man would only drop
his prophet’s functions, we might come to terms; but he will never do
that, I fear. There is one good thing in the Mahdi’s coming here—he
will be easy of access, if our Government wishes to communicate with
him; and also if he is defeated there is an end of him, without going
to Kordofan. I suppose our people at Debbeh must be aware of the
whereabouts of the Mahdi at any rate.
It is an odd coincidence the advance of the Mahdi and of the
expeditionary force at the same time, and to the same place
(Armageddon).
I have 240 men at Omdurman, and it is pretty strong. It is not likely
to be attacked; for if the Mahdi won it, he would not have gained
Kartoum, though it would be a trouble, as it would discourage the
people.
There is one bother, in any negotiations (which, however, I do not
think possible), viz. how far one ought to go in _re_ the steamers, and
warlike store. If I had Zubair here it might be settled, but now the
expedition is at Dongola it is a query what ought to be done.
I have lost seven guns, two on board each steamer, at Metemma, and one
on board the _Abbas_.
This morning the Arabs fired six Krupp shells into the lines, which did
not burst.
Not a large church parade either at Kalakla, South Front, or at Faki
Mustapha, near Omdurman. Two men came in, one from south front with
rifle, and one from Omdurman; the latter says the Mahdi will come to
Omdurman either to-day or to-morrow, and will content himself with the
investment of the place. He has with him all the Europeans, nuns and
all. The Arabs meditate coming over to the old Dem, near Halfeyeh, but
they say it will be the _Arabs of Waled a Goun_ who will come, _not_
those of the Sheikh el Obeyed; this is odd, and it would seem as if
these two parties had fallen out. We know Sheikh el Obeyed did not
agree with Abou Gugliz.
People do not appear a bit put out at the approach of the Mahdi; in
fact they look on it as a good thing, for they say the affair will be
ended here, and there will be no necessity to go to Kordofan.
A very little Arab boy, with large, black, limpid eyes, came in from
the Arabs. He had been captured some months ago.
The steamer _Bordeen_ is still down the river, robbing, I expect, right
and left.
A Sandjak of Shaggyeh, who was for months a prisoner with Sheikh
Ibrahim (son of Sheikh el Obeyed), told me how this latter used to
quarrel with Abou Gugliz, how the latter had taken the gun they had
captured from us; and how glad Sheikh Ibrahim was when we beat Abou
Gugliz at Giraffe. On one occasion Abou Gugliz put Sheikh Ibrahim in
chains.
Four of the Arab Krupp shells fell in the centre of the town—did no
harm—(regular bombardment of Paris), moral effect, _nil_.
Little steamer _Husseinyeh_ trial trip to-morrow. The Arabs will think
one of the large steamers has been brought to bed.
One cannot help being amused at the Mahdi’s carrying all the Europeans
about with him—nuns, priests, Greeks, Austrian officers—what a
medley, a regular Etât major. It will be a great crow for Lord Wolseley
if he manages to put an extinguisher on the Mahdi.
Cambyses, son of Cyrus of Isaiah, lost his army B.C. 525, in these
deserts, 2409 years ago.
The Mussulman year 1302 begins on the anniversary of Trafalgar.
“England _expects_” (does not say even “thank you”) “you will do your
duty.”
Those who were ever quartered at Gibraltar will remember two
despatches over the mantelpiece, Collingwood’s on Trafalgar; Wellington
on Waterloo. What a different tone in them. I cannot help thinking the
navy is more chivalrous than the army in all nations; they are more
seriously minded, having gone through greater vicissitudes of danger.
I noticed flags around Faki Mustapha’s tent, and three women came in
this evening from Waled a Goun’s camp, and reports that the Mahdi came
to Omdurman to-day; but a soldier who escaped with his rifle came in
afterwards and said the Mahdi had not yet come to Omdurman, but was
expected to-morrow.
In five days’ time I shall send down the _Towfikia_ steamer to Metemma,
and order the _Talataween_ back. With the _Towfikia_ I shall send this
journal up to date. The _Towfikia_ will stay at Metemma.
I have placed two of the castled santels at the end of the lines on
the White Nile, the other two are at Bourré. The _Bordeen_ steamer is
back from Shoboloha; she captured fifteen cows and four slaves. She was
fired on from the left bank of the Nile.
Armed the men of the band and made them body guard of Ferratch Pasha.
In future, for the defence of Kartoum, strong forts ought to be built
at Shoboloha, on both sides of the defile.
The _Bordeen_ telegraphed from Halfeyeh “important spy captured.” I
answered, “what did important spy say?” I was answered, “Important
spy said that the English had sent out three men to see about
roads to Kartoum.” This was two and a half hours’ work to get this
information. It is enough to drive one wild (a very small _mouse_
for such a _mountain_). Couriers were sent on horses to and fro for
this information. I am going to sit on the captain of the _Bordeen_
to-morrow. These people, if they have a grain of information which they
(not I) think important, make a perfect Mont Blanc of it, so as to get
promotion. What on earth of importance is it to us whether the British
general has sent 150 spies to look after roads.
The captain of the _Bordeen_ gave the names of the spies sent out by
the British general obtained from this “important spy,” thinking,
of course, I should be delighted. These things render one perfectly
furious, for, at least, twenty people were kept at work for absolutely
nothing; and like a born idiot, there was I, on tiptoe of excitement,
waiting information of the “important spy,” to end with the news
that “three men had been sent out by the British general.” Had “this
important spy” said the British general had started, it would have
been another thing, but that is in the future, and I do not blame the
British general for not rushing headlong into these deserts.
* * * * *
_October 11._—A sergeant-major came in at Omdurman to-day, he left
the Mahdi three days ago. The Mahdi was then one day’s march from
Omdurman, at the place Stewart met the chiefs when he went up the Nile
in March. The Mahdi will be at the camp Faki Mustapha to-night or
to-morrow. He has from 2000 to 3000 regulars with him, whom he captured
here and there. Three Krupp guns and four mountain guns, but has a lot
more mountain guns en route from Kordofan. With the Mahdi are Hussein
Pasha Khalifa, Saleh Pasha, Slatin, and all the Greeks, priests, and
nuns, who have become Muslim. A priest and a nun who refused to become
Muslim, he left in Obeyed. Nuchranza is with him. He has a mixed
multitude with him, who are not over zealous, for he has discontented
the people by his exactions. They have plenty of meat, but not much
grain. The Frenchman spoken of (and supposed to be Renan by me) has
gone away from the Mahdi. Fighting is going on in Kordofan in the Gebel
Nubar. Report is rife of the English being at Debbeh. The Mahdi intends
bombarding Kartoum from the other side, and trying to demolish the Fort
Omdurman. The money captured at Berber has not yet left Berber.
Another soldier came in from Waled a Goun’s camp; he says the regulars
are all in chains.
The Arabs are making a fort 2000 yards off the south front. They fired
eight rounds from a Krupp, which entered the town but did no harm.
Four shells entered the town yesterday—one slightly wounded five black
sluts, one struck a house belonging to the family of the Mahdi.
Small steamer’s trial trip took place to-day—a great success; she
snorts terribly.
Two more soldiers came in this morning from the Sheikh el Obeyed. They
say he intends coming to the old Dem off the north front, where they
were before. They say he is not on the best of terms with Waled a Goun.
I hope sincerely he will not come opposite to us.
Sent out two men separately to Debbeh, with notification of the
arrival of his holiness the Mahdi at Omdurman.
Connected the Fort of Halfeyeh by telegraph to river bank, 1500 yards.
Moussa Bey put in charge of the _Bordeen_ and _Ismailia_, and Omdurman
and Mogrim.
Ferratch Pasha is made a Ferile (General of Division). I am more
generous than Her Majesty’s Government (when a colonel, I used to make
Generals of Division. The Khedive used to tear his hair over it). It
may be that Ferratch Pasha may be sold for 2¼$ in a fortnight, if
the town is taken, and be carrying water for one of the Mahdi’s Ameers.
I must say I am against doctors. If a man is suffering intense pain,
and is in a more or less desperate condition, I would give as much
morphine as would still that pain. It was the custom of the ancients
to give to those who were to be crucified a numbing potion, which is
that mentioned in Matt. xxvii. 34, Mark xv. 23. Our Lord would not
abate, by mortal means, the slightest pang of His passion, and He would
not taste it. But in our Lord’s case He knew the object of giving Him
this potion, whereas a patient need not know it. Our doctors give a
composing draught to produce sleep, and I cannot see why they stop at
that and do not give a draught to produce insensibility to pain—but
I suppose they have rules we know not of. Napoleon at Jaffa asked the
principal medical officer a question—whether, with respect to the
plague patients (whom he could not take with him in his retreat to
Egypt, and they would have had their throats cut had they stayed) it
would not be justifiable to give them composing draughts. The principal
medical officer answered, “his business was to cure, not to kill.”
Now Napoleon did not say “do so,” but he merely asked the question,
inasmuch as it was certain that the throats of those patients would be
cut by the Turks if they were left behind. History disputes whether
Napoleon did not get another doctor to give the composing draughts,
but it is certain that the plague-stricken patients were killed by the
Turks (whether under the influence of composing draughts or not it
does not much signify). To my mind the principal medical officer was a
snob, and took advantage of Napoleon’s question to make himself a hero.
Napoleon alluded to it afterwards at St. Helena, and I am inclined to
believe his version, viz. that he only put the alternative question
to the principal medical officer, and did not order the giving of the
composing draught. I shall now conclude this Volume III. I have sent
200 men to Omdurman, and am prepared to evacuate Halfeyeh and place its
garrison at Goba, if the Sheikh el Obeyed moves to the north of this
place.
C. G. GORDON.
12/10/84.