_Upon outside wrapper_:
COLONEL STEWART, C.M.G.,
OR
CHIEF OF THE STAFF, SOUDAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
JOURNAL EVENTS, KHARTOUM, 23 TO 30 SEPT., 1884.
Contains no secrets as far as I am concerned. Official
parts those not scratched through. Contains map of
Berber; large scale.
CHIEF OF THE STAFF, SOUDAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
For LT.-COL. STEWART, C.M.G. If not with the army,
for _General Lord Wolseley_, G.C.B.
_On Book itself_:
II.
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL.
FROM 23 SEPTEMBER TILL 30 SEPTEMBER.
C. G. GORDON.
N.B.—Will require pruning down if published.
C. G. GORDON.
23/9/84.
_Upon inside_:
II.
GENERAL GORDON’S JOURNAL.
FROM 23 SEPTEMBER TILL , 1884.
N.B.—Will require pruning down if published.
C. G. GORDON.
23/9/84.
JOURNAL.
_September 24._—My view is this, as to the operations of British
forces. I will put three steamers, each with two guns on them, and an
armed force of infantry at disposal of any British authority, will
send these steamers to either Metemma, opposite Shendy, or to the
cataract below Berber, to there meet any British Force which may come
across country to the Nile. These steamers, with this force coming
across country, will (_D.V._) capture Berber and then communicate with
Kartoum. The steamers will have a month’s provisions. I would not
attempt to pass the _bulk_ of British Force across country, only the
fighting column, to co-operate with the three steamers. No artillery is
wanted with either force; it is not needed in any way in this country.
When Berber is taken I should keep the bulk of the forces there, and
send up the fighting column to Kartoum, after having arranged for its
provisions, for I cannot feed them; then, in combination with us,
clear out rebels from A to B,—an affair of a week; then decide on
your future policy. It is absolutely necessary to understand that we
cannot hurry over this affair.[75] If we do we will incur disaster.
I have spoken of the division of British forces into two lots, one a
small fighting column co-operating across country with the steamers
which will meet them, where you like, on the left bank of the White
Nile; the other, composed of bulk, _without artillery_, coming up right
bank of the Nile. Now if I were doing this, I should, by the _Abbas_
steamer, work up by Merowé,[76] Abou Hamed, to Berber, by a _series
of small stations_ with small garrisons. I should at once get on each
step of the Nile ladder steam launches from Cairo, &c., and put them in
the open strips as previously explained in page 49 of my journal, Vol.
No. I.[77] I then have my route open to Dongola where the bulk of the
forces remain.
[Illustration: MAP OF FORCES MOVEMENTS]
Saying the chain of posts is established, that, in the interim, the
Arab forces at A and B are dispersed, then you say _evacuate_. Well,
without moving the bulk, and, with the aid of the fighting column, you
can get down the Sennaar lot, while steamers can bring down the Equator
and Bahr Gazelle garrisons. Now this will take at least six months from
the _present date_ (for you will _not_ come for _a month_). You then
begin your downward march, and are harassed all the way,[78] and the
Mahdi will say he kicked you out. You see you are in for six months,
and if you evacuate all your prestige vanishes. It is therefore, I
say, either, when once you have got up to Kartoum, give the country to
the Turks, or else establish Zubair, and (instead of expending time in
going up to Sennaar and the Equator) combinating with us, commence an
attack upon Kordofan. You must be here six months. How will you spend
the time? Will you at the end of six months allow it to be said you are
kicked out, or will you not establish some government and retire with
dignity. The _cost_ is the same in both cases in money; but in honour
one costs a great deal more. If Zubair falls, after some time, what
is it to you? You did your best and save your honour, and you save a
mint of difficulties and troubles, which these expeditions to Sennaar
and Equator involve. You will not be obliged to go fifty miles beyond
Kartoum.[79] As for the Equator, give it to me, and I will (_D.V._)
keep it from Zubair. It is a thousand pities to give up Kartoum to the
Mahdi when there is a chance of keeping it under Zubair.
[Illustration: BULK OF FORCES]
The fighting force can take the guns of the steamers, if they need
artillery; they are very good guns and have field carriages with
limbers. I shall not send down the castellated barges or the Krupp
guns. Should you cross the desert _en masse_, the way to guard your
communications is to occupy, with a company, all the wells in a
good large radius, for the Arabs cannot come down on your line of
communication, not being able to get water. This is the only way to
deal with the Bedouins, or slave hunters.
The elephants came up by the wells of Gabra,[80] direct from Debbeh to
Kartoum. Care should be taken on approaching Omdurman, for there are
rather a timid lot there (fellaheen).
You must consider whether you will not send down those dreadful Bashi
Bazouks, the scum of Alexandria, and the fellaheen soldiers, on
arrival, for they are of little use, and eat us up.
For my part, I should not hesitate to ride down with three hundred men
(having taken precaution to have made arrangements with the Kababish
tribe) from Kartoum to Debbeh.
There is no difficulty in making flying bridges across the Nile with
the country boats, however wide, using telegraph wire twisted in six or
eight strands.
Seyd Mahomet Osman’s little boy, aged nine years, was caught by Arabs,
and behaved like a hero: “He was not going to be a Dervish. He was
as much the Mahdi as Mahomet Achmet; and they might kill him if they
liked, &c. He was going to stay with the Government and Gordon Pasha.”
They left him alone.
The Sandjak described the scene as splendid: the little fellow with
flaming eyes, gesticulating and stamping with fury.
“U. S. C.,[81] 6.30 P.M.—Did you ever hear of such a thing?
—--[82] is appointed —-- to —--. A more barefaced job never _was_
perpetrated. Why, the man has done nothing, _absolutely_ nothing.
Atrocious! But _what_ can you expect? The whole lot of them are off
again, a regular autumn flight! What! eh! _you will see them all at
Christmas_” (waxing more wrath). “I declare I have half a mind to
go to the Mahdi,” &c. Page interrupts: “Lady —-- is waiting in the
brougham.” Collapse and exit.
I cannot too much impress on you that this expedition will not
encounter any enemy worth the name in an European sense of the word;
the struggle is with the climate and destitution of the country. It
is one of time and patience, and of small parties of determined men,
backed by native allies, which are got by policy and money. A heavy
lumbering column, however strong, is nowhere in this land. Parties of
forty or sixty men, swiftly moving about, will do more than any column.
If you lose two or three, what of it—it is the chance of war. Native
allies above all things, at whatever cost. It is the country of the
irregular, not of the regular. If you move in mass you will find no end
of difficulties; whereas, if you let detached parties dash out here and
there, you will spread dismay in the Arab ranks. The time to attack
is the dawn, or rather before it (this is stale news), but sixty men
would put these Arabs to flight just before dawn, which one thousand
would not accomplish in daylight. This was always Zubair’s tactics. The
reason is that the strength of the Arabs is their horsemen, who do not
dare to act in the dark. I do hope you will not drag on that artillery:
it can only produce delay and do little good. I can say I owe the
defeats in this country to having artillery with me, which delayed me
much, and it was the artillery with Hicks which, in my opinion, did for
him.[83]
Ten thousand times better for us to perish than for you to run the
risk; and besides that, I have a confident belief we will not (_D.V._)
perish. The usual hammer and tongs fusillade will go on, but they will
not attack the place, and we will not go out against them; while you
will creep on quietly and safely, and send out your feelers, making
raids upon these Arabs. I would let Buller have full swing for all
these little biting expeditions. I believe he is well off (and I
think not married, which is an enormous advantage); and he and his
subordinates will learn scouting, &c., in a good school. It is this
very same warfare we will have to exercise if ever we would oppose
Russia in her advance on Afghanistan—_i.e._, of going up and landing
in the Persian Gulf, and cutting in on their flank. So it will be a
good school for him and his.
The wretched peasant, with that filthy cloth, which you see, is a
determined warrior, who can undergo thirst and privation, who no more
cares for pain or death than if he were of stone. The young fellows
even have a game by which they test who will bear the lash of the
hippopotamus’ whip best. They are in their own land; the pains of
war are their ordinary life; and they are supported by religion of
a fanatical kind, influenced by the memory of years of suffering at
the hands of an effete set of Bashi Bazouks. No; if our Kentish or
Yorkshire boys are to come up to help me, it is not with my wish,
unless with the greatest precaution. Thank God we have few Europeans
here, and those I can (_D.V._) care for, and you need not fear for our
retreat; and if we die, why, when we entered the army we sold our lives
at so much a day. I verily believe no merchant would give me £200,
which, to me, is the current value of _the man_ in this world.
It is the most extraordinary thing, quite incomprehensible, that with
only one exception, that of Zubair’s man who came from Cairo (with
Egerton’s famous despatch about contracts), not one single messenger
has entered this place on the proper initiative of outsiders. It has
been invariably _my_ messengers, who were sent out by me, from Kartoum,
who did bring me any news. It would seem as if those outside seemed
to think it was my duty to send out and bring in news for myself, and
that they had nothing to do with it. Either these officers outside do
not care to spend a sou in spies to give me information, or else they
think it is a matter of supreme indifference, whether I know what is
going on or not; and I must say when my messengers do come back, they
bring me scarcely any information of import. There is a lot of “I hope
you are well,” &c.; men like Kitchener and Chermside might be expected
to have more brains than that.[84] If I had not exerted myself in the
spy business, we never would have had a word, I verily believe. I never
saw such a poor lot as these outsiders. Even if they had had to pay
£20 out of their own pockets, one might have expected them to do it,
considering the circumstances. They might have been paid back. But
neither Her Majesty’s Ministers in Cairo, nor these men have seemed to
care a jot to inform us. Silly foolish questions are all we ever have
got from them, and it is not to be wondered at, that I am indignant
with such unpatriotic conduct, and not inclined to be over civil beyond
my duty. I never saw such a feeble lot in my life! One has only to
compare the telegrams, &c., we sent down, with the _rubbish_ sent in by
_our own messengers I_ paid for.
Two children and three escaped soldiers came in to-day from the Arabs,
but had no news.
Read “Floyer’s” telegram, with Kitchener’s note to Stewart on same
paper—it perfectly exasperates one. Kitchener asks Stewart “what he
can do for him”—nothing of what has gone on with respect to the Soudan
since Graham’s expedition. Of course men are not _obliged_ to write at
all.
I altogether _decline_ the imputation that the projected expedition
has come to _relieve me_. It has _come to SAVE OUR NATIONAL HONOUR in
extricating the garrisons, &c., from a position our action in Egypt
has placed these garrisons_. _I was relief expedition No 1._ They are
_relief expedition No 2._ As for myself I could make good my retreat at
any moment if I wished. Now realise what would happen if this _first
relief expedition_ was to bolt and the steamers fell into the hands of
the Mahdi: _this second relief expedition_ (for the honour of England
engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat hampered. We the
_first_ and _second_ expeditions are equally engaged for the honour of
England. This is fair logic. _I came up to extricate the garrisons and
failed. Earle comes up to extricate garrisons and (I hope) succeeds.
Earle does not come to extricate me._[85] The extrication of the
garrisons was supposed to affect our “national honour.” If Earle
succeeds the “national honour” thanks him and I hope rewards him, but
it is altogether independent of me, who for failing incurs its blame. I
am not the _rescued lamb_, and I will not be.
Had Gessi dared to have communicated with me like these men have, he
would have heard of it; but he never did.
The _Towfikia_ steamer went up and saw no Arabs at Giraffe to-day.
Look at this: I send down a spy, A. Kitchener and Co. send him back
with answer. If Kitchener and Co. thought, they would know that A.,
being seen passing to and fro, must incur suspicion; however, A.
happily gets through _with risk_ (not having, by the way, had one penny
from K. and Co.); then all communication stops till I send down B. What
is K. doing at Debbeh? that he could not write a better letter than to
tell me the names of the generals and regiments—a matter of the most
supreme indifference to Kartoum.
* * * * *
_September 25._—Arabs came down to the Blue Nile in some force, but
the _Mansowrah_ going up, and our men pushing along the bank, they all
fled. I am going to Halfeyeh to see the Shaggyeh, who are the worry
of my heart. Having gone down, I found a very fair market, and the
Shaggyehs less irritating than I expected to find them.
_Question._ What was the policy of her Majesty’s Government in sending
up General Gordon?
_Answer._ To endeavour to retire the garrisons _by quiet means_.
_Question._ What is the object of General Earle’s expedition?
_Answer._ The same. General Gordon having failed.
_Question._ If General Earle’s expedition is for the retreat of General
Gordon and ends there, what is the result?
_Answer._ Her Majesty’s Government agree _that they abandon the
garrisons_.
_There is no possible escape from the situation._
According to accounts from Bourré, the Arabs had come down in some
force at night, and had hid in villages near Bourré, meaning to fall
upon our foraging parties; they did not bargain for the _Mansowrah_
coming up with her two guns, and so caught a Tartar when they emerged
to attack our men, and went off in great confusion and some loss.
An escaped soldier came in from the Arabs—no news. He was so
dreadfully itchy, I could not keep my patience, or keep him in my room.
He saw himself in the mirror, and asked who it was; said he did not
know! and really he did not seem to know. It stands to reason that in
countries where there are no mirrors, every one must be a complete
stranger to himself, and would need an introduction.
I wrote to Waled a Goun, Arab commander-in-chief, as follows:—“I
went to Halfeyeh to see Shaggyeh, found five men there; they wanted
me to kill them, for being of your family, who had gone back to you
after pretending to join me. I questioned these five men; they said
they could not bear the smell of you, and that the Shaggyehs had wanted
their things, and so had invented the accusation. I have no scales to
weigh the truth—perhaps Mahomet Achmet Mahdi has—so, as you have sent
me many soldiers of late, I send you these men. I have taken the body
of your Peacock” (alluding to the man who came in with the wonderful
Dervish dress), “but I send you the plumage of your bird on another
body.” I have put the dress on one of the men I sent out.
“Why did you run away so swiftly to-day? was Abou Gugliz there? It
could not be you, for you said so much about your desire to die at the
fortifications.”
“As for knowing the truth in the Soudan it is impossible, for the
devils of lying and robbery are riding all over the country.”
I gave them a dollar each; they leave to-morrow. I have also given them
a captured Arab flag and a captured Dervish cap each, so they will go
out a grand procession, and as it is their Sunday (Friday), they will
arrive at church parade.
Thousands of cranes, with their curious cry, are passing over every day
(“The cranes of Ibycus.” Few ever read Schiller’s poems. I only know
Bulwer’s translation, but they have grand things in them. “The Veiled
Image of Truth at Sais,” “The Ring of Polycrates,” for who can bear
_plain truth_? Who can bear _success_?)
The notables were in a regular state about my going to Halfeyeh
to-day. A deputation came to prevent it, but it was of no use. The
Mudir threw himself down and embraced my feet, begging me not to go;
but, as I thought his solicitude was actuated more by the wish to
prevent me going to where he has, I expect, been robbing right and
left, than my security, I did not attend much to him. I should break
the hearts of our F.O., for I say openly, “As your Government is bad,
and will give you nothing when you are decrepit, rob away gaily, but
with wisdom, and do not let me hear of it.”
The Arabs will be in an awful rage to-morrow with the procession of
the five Dervishes with captured flags, &c. You can scarcely imagine
the state (well known to Stewart, Power, and Herbin) one gets in, when
one is constantly hearing explosions; what with the guns, mines, and
musketry, one’s nerves get strained, and nothing can drop without one
thinking it is an explosion. What the Russians underwent at Sevastopol
must have been terrible. As Hansall, the Austrian Consul, says, it is
_abrutissant_. It has slackened off now, but still any loud noise, in
this clear air, makes me jump (_i.e._, be, for a moment, afraid) like
any man who rides knows, when his horse, as it were, sinks completely
beneath him, on a sudden start.
I look forward to the advent of some of the Royal Navy more than
anything. There are such a lot of splendid cutting-outs and surprises
to be made by the steamers, and the steamers are first-rate in every
respect. Each steamer is worth two thousand men, if well handled, and
they have all on board grub and ammunition, and want no commissariat
officers.
If I were Earle, I would leave all the principal medical officers
at Dongola, and only take on the lowest ranks of the Army Medical
Department.
The Principal Medical Officers are bores and croakers, and want all
sorts of attention. A man is a fool or a physician at forty years of
age. All in this country you want is to _keep the communication open_,
and Cockle will do that. As for wounds, there will be none, _for Arabs
give no quarter_; neither will we, I expect, if we go over one hundred
miles of desert.
At Halfeyeh to-day, going round the Fort, a tallow-faced Egyptian
dashed out with the most fearful whine. I tried to calm him, no good,
so Cassim el Mousse, the Shaggyeh Meleh, interfered; no use! the man
(?) threw himself on the ground, and deluged himself and me with dust,
so Cassim gave him a wipe over the head with his Hippo whip, and I
ordered him to be taken out of the ranks and brought to Kartoum;
_en route_ my cavasses came and remonstrated, saying he ought to be
secured, for he was the most notorious thief of Alexandria; so, justly
or not, I have put him in prison.
It would be a great mistake to think the troops are down in the mouth.
We have certainly lost a lot; but the men are as determined as ever,
and only think it their due if they are aided. Stewart talks of their
cowardice, but it is a cowardice of calculation, and it would be a
great mistake if the expeditionary force _for the extrication of the
garrisons_ comes up here, and thinks the men are going to say they are
_in extremis_. (I leave out Cairo troops and the Bashi Bazouks.) The
black soldiers do not think they have been beaten. There are not many
armies which would bear with the equanimity these troops do, the loss
of say one-fifth of their numbers _killed_, which was the case in one
defeat (only twenty days ago) of Mahomet Ali Pasha.
The steamers from Sennaar will I think be in to-morrow.
The question to-day at Halfeyeh was this. Certain heads of families
had gone over to the Arabs with Saleh Pasha (we put a sponge over that
affair), and their adherents, being in Kartoum, had not gone over (not
their fault); those who had gone over with Saleh Pasha, afterwards
came over to me, and asked for their adherents to be given back to
them. To this the chiefs of families, who had been in Kartoum and who
had kept these adherents under them, objected, so it became a question
what to do. I decided to ask each man his desire. “Will you go with A.
or B.?” The men came in at the door, and after having elected, they
went out of the window, for there were not two doors; they elected as
they wished, and went out of the window. Some came in and thought that
all that was required of them was to come in at the door, and go out
of the window as quickly as possible without answering! I do love to
study mankind; he is far better than any landscape. These fellows knew
well enough I was going to put their decision on them, and tried to
avoid giving any, as to with whom they would go. It was somewhat of a
gymnastic process for them to go out of the window, and they made a
good mess of it; but if I had let them go out of the door by which they
had entered, inextricable confusion would have occurred. As it was, we
had resurrections at the door of those who had departed by the window,
which caused some bother. The two rival chiefs were present, and one’s
object was to prevent the elector looking at either while he elected;
sometimes it was necessary to secure that the pug-face was fairly on
the clerk, the electing officer, who asked the question A. or B. I will
back the eye for knowledge more than any other organ. A man who does
not look you in the face in answering is 99 times in 100 a liar.
* * * * *
_September 26._—There is one great question, and if you know a
person, say, K. is faithless and is seeking his own, ought one to be
down on him? We have an example in our Lord. He knew Judas was going
to betray Him, yet He did not denounce him; from which I infer, if we
know even that K. is going to rat, or be faithless, unless he, K.,
gives positive proof of such intention, we ought to treat K. as J., of
whom we have no suspicion of treachery. I am inclined (satanically I
own) to distrust every one, _i.e._, I trust every one. I believe that
circumstances may arise when self-interest will almost compel your
nearest relative to betray you to some extent. Man is an essentially
treacherous animal; and although the psalmist said _in his haste_ “all
men are liars,” I think he might have said the same _at his leisure_.
“You may depend upon it, I will do my best for you”—to chief clerk
W.O. “Why, if you give it to _him_ we must give it to more than forty.
It is out of the question.” What is the result? Why the _him_ will
go to his club and say, “Why I was promised it and did not get it.”
Whereas if he had weighed the words, he would have seen he was promised
only “the best he could do.” This is a breach of confidence, but it is
an example. A man long ago dead —-- was asked by a lady to recommend
her son for an appointment —-- (who was most honest), wrote saying
so-and-so wants such and such a thing, but that he did not think the
young man for whom the appointment was solicited was worth much. —--
wrote to the lady to say he had done his best. Unfortunately he placed
the letters into wrong envelopes. The lady never looked on —-- again.
Well, I suppose —-- was treacherous to the lady. He might have refused
to write, but he did more—he did the young man _harm_ by saying _he
was not worth much_.
I like to take things in a light-hearted way. I like the tacit
contract, “that if you are useful to me I will use you”; and “_that_”
(with full belief) “if I cease to be useful to you you will leave me.”
I try and act, “do to others as they wish you to do to them.” I would
never put a man in any position I would not put myself.
Although man is the essence of treachery, I believe every man _wishes
to be honest; his interests prevent him_.
The five men went out to Arab lines with their Arab flags, on which a
church parade, which was going on, dispersed.
It is a curious fact that any effort to relieve the garrisons made
from the outside is contemporaneous with the _expiration_ of the period
stated in March of the time they could hold out, viz., six months.
There are some ugly suspicious circumstances all the way through!
The consequence will be a far greater expense. Had efforts been made
quietly between March and August to span with proper transport between
Wady Halfa and Hannek,[86] much of the present difficulties to an
advance would have been got over, and security would have been felt
everywhere that efforts were really being made. There is a humility in
Baring’s telegram asking my advice as to routes for access to Kartoum.
“Sir E. Baring having gone to London, I am charged by Her Majesty’s
Government to tell you to keep them informed not only as to immediate
but as to any prospective danger at Kartoum, that you should advise
them in order to be prepared for any such danger as to force necessary
to secure your retreat, its amount, character, route for access to
Kartoum, and time for its departure. Her Majesty’s Government does not
entertain your proposal to supply you with Turkish or other forces for
the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond
scope of your commission, and at variance with the policy which was
the purport of your mission to the Soudan. If with this knowledge
you continue at Kartoum, you should state cause and intention with
which you so continue.”[87] If the telegrams I sent down in March to
Baring are referred to, it will be seen I had already[88] informed
him of all he could possibly want to know, and I specially said that
the expedition by the route of Wady Halfa would be (as it was at that
epoch) a mere picnic party.
Man proposes—God disposes. Any one who two-and-a-half years ago had
said that the Gladstone ministry would not only go to Egypt, and, not
content with one expedition to the Soudan (Graham’s), would go in
for _two expeditions_, would have been scouted as a madman; and it
certainly is curious that Mr. Gladstone, in “—-- _Review_”[89] of
1878, combating Mr. Dicey’s ideas for the annexation of Egypt, should
have stated that this _annexation was impossible on account of the
Soudan_!
There is one thing, which, in the opinion of the world, would expunge
all disagreeables from the whole question, _i.e._, if the abolition
of slavery were proclaimed. It would be a difficult job, but would be
possible if we took our time, and at Lord Mayor’s dinners, &c., it
would be a platform no one could come up to.
4 P.M. Steamers from Sennaar in sight. Now we shall be all together
again, thank God!
The Arabs off the south front are all agog at sight of the steamers
coming down. Those on the Blue Nile are firing on the steamers. I sent
up _Mansowrah_ to help them. The Arabs are in the houses. Expenditure
of ammunition is enormous, I should think. The three steamers have
passed the place where the Arabs are. They came down one by one, which
was not wise.
From the top of the Serail one commands view all round for miles.
It will be a satisfaction to Her Majesty’s Navy to know that it is our
navy which has, humanly speaking, saved us. It really is a splendid
fleet and naval arsenal. The steamers have come in; the Arabs were
numerous and had five guns; seven of their shells struck the steamers
(Arabs had also two rocket tubes). The steamers brought down 2000
ardebs, and report Sennaar well off, and no Arabs in arms in all their
district. Seyd Osman Mahomet is said to have occupied Katarif with his
men. A sheikh has promised to capture the steamer _Mahomet Ali_, which
is up the River Dinder, and to hand her over to the Sennaar Governor.
Wad Medinet did not fire on the steamers, but brandished spears, &c.;
our loss in passing the gauntlet was three killed and eight wounded.
The Arabs have no conscience; they make my captured soldiers serve the
guns, and otherwise act against us under pain of death!
I declare my people do, in a feeble way, what is wanted, and do not
deserve the character of cowards; they bear defeat far better than
other peoples, and they are good-tempered over it. _We_ English are the
cream, all acknowledge that, but we will not exist on two dates a day,
as these men do, without a murmur.
The steamer _Bordeen_ was struck by two shots, one near water-line.
The _Ismailia_ steamer received three, the _Talataween_ steamer
received two shots. Happily all got down safe. The Arabs fired from
guns and rifles with fury—we could see that from the roof. All the
steamers have got small-pox from bullet-marks! Our chief of the
arsenal, Hussein Bey, had been sharp enough to have bits of old tents
ready to stop shot-holes. Had we not had these we might have lost the
_Bordeen_ steamer.
The Arabs had three forts (breastworks) along the river-bank, rather
above Giraffe. I mentioned that we lost three killed and eight wounded;
_now mark this_, on their way down the steamers met three escaped
soldiers from the Arabs; they took them on board, and, odd to say, of
those killed and wounded, were these three men, two having been killed,
and the other badly wounded! This is remarkable. If we could believe
it, _we are as safe in the fiercest battle as in a drawing-room in
London_.
* * * * *
_September 27._—I have arranged to send down three steamers to Shendy
to co-operate with Dongola forces, and to raise the Shaggyeh tribes.
I have sent out a man to warn Dongola of this fact. He carries no
letters, only a small slip, stating he is a “true man.”
It is of no use sending up to Sennaar again for dhoora, for we have
no money to pay for it, and it is a risk with these Arab guns. Steamer
_Ismailia_ received three shells; steamer _Bordeen_ two; steamer
_Talataween_ two. Some made tremendous holes, and one in _Bordeen_ was
close to water-line; it is wonderful how they escaped. The poor escaped
soldiers were asleep in the hold, when a shell entered and burst; two
were killed, one was seriously wounded.
Two men came in from the Arabs. One said he was the Mahdi, the other
said a courier had come to the Arabs, saying the English were at
Berber; they knew nothing of yesterday’s fight.
Our steamers are of about the same consistency as the Thames
steamboats, so you may imagine the risk there is of putting them under
artillery fire.
_Towfikia_ steamer went up the White Nile exchanging musketry fire with
the Arabs.
My beautiful steamers, which used to be comparatively sweet, now stink
like badgers. As for the swell _Ismailia_ she is a cess-pit.
Several other shots struck the upper works of the steamers; evidently
they were under a nasty fire, and as for bullet marks they are spotted
all over. Among the three killed (two of them escaped soldiers) one was
a little boy.
Another slave came in at Omdurman, but had no news.
Great female squawking under the window of the Serail, approaching
to yells. On examination I find the noise comes from a black female
fighting the cavass. On enquiry I find my lady had gone down to buy
dhoora with two dollars in her hand, and had been pushed by some
ungallant fellow, and the dollars fell into the river. Though I do not
see that the responsibility was upon me, I gave her the two dollars,
and comforted her black soul. It would be a comfort if all the troubles
of life were got rid of so cheaply.
Having undergone considerable anxiety owing to the Shaggyeh tribe in
our lines during the blockade, we got rid of them to Halfeyeh as soon
as we could.[90] But when they got to Halfeyeh, and met their brethren
who had been with the Arabs, and who had come over to us, the former
were seized with distrust of the latter, and so we are obliged to bring
these latter into Kartoum. I do not think it any risk, for the Shaggyeh
have lied so very much to the Arabs that nothing would ever make peace
between them, so I do not feel any discomfort about them.
It is not comfortable to see your steamers with a hole in them through
which you could push your head and shoulders, and that not a foot above
the water-line. The _Bordeen_ had that, the shell came in on one side
and burst on penetrating the other plate of the other side.
To my mind, these Egyptian mountain guns are far preferable to those
steel guns of ours, with their wretched small calibre, and I would
prefer a smooth bore howitzer to an Armstrong for these wars.
I made Nutzer Bey a Pasha for his Sennaar trip, and send him down with
Cassim el Mousse to Metemma to await advance of Her Majesty’s forces.
Ibraham Tongi and Mousse Beys refused, or rather declined to go unless
also made Pashas, which I did not see, so these worthies stay here.
B. to A.—“Well you know I had to send on the telegram, and I added I
hoped Stewart was well. That fellow G. takes exception to this, and
says _va sans dire_, that I could not have wished that Stewart was ill.
Most unjust. Had I added anything to this telegram, I might have got
into a row, which would never do, but what was the use of pampering to
inordinate curiosity?”
A. to B.—“Well he pitched into me for asking Stewart to tell me if I
could do anything for him (the communications being so easy), and for
telling _him_ the names of the Generals (to my mind a most important
matter, for it would strike terror among the Arabs), _he_ says _he_
does not care who the Generals are (which is sheer heresy and perfectly
sickening). I shall write nothing more to _him_ except the purest
official documents. It is very clear his liver is out of order, to go
and attack officers of his own corps like that. It is atrocious!”
_September 28._—Two women and a man came in to-day; they say the
Mahdi is not at Schatt, but at Rahad. Hussan Effendi and another
directed the guns against the steamers. The women say the Arabs had
three guns, not five. The Arabs did not lose many from their people’s
accounts. Among the three guns there was a Krupp, they say.
Say for a moment that the object of Her Majesty’s Government is simply
to enable me to retreat, and is irrespective of the retreat of the
garrisons—then all the loss of life in this neighbourhood on both
sides was thrown away, inasmuch as if I had not come there would have
been a speedier collapse, without the loss of life (at least such is
probable). The Government may say that they had reasonable hopes that I
would succeed; I will neither say I gave them such assurance or that I
did not give it. I think I was neutral in giving or in not giving such
assurance.
When the steamers get to Shendy, they will be only 150 miles from
Ambukol, which is a little higher up the Nile than Debbeh (35 miles).
Three more slaves came in from the north; they had run away from their
master, and will enter the army. I expect we shall have lots of this
sort of thing.
Arabs show no disposition to close our road to Shendy as yet, and I
believe the country up to that place is with _Kartoum_ (I cannot say
_the Government_, for I do not know what the Government is).
One of the greatest sinners in the way of getting Egypt into financial
difficulties (whence all this trouble) is ... who in the Crimea used to
sell cheeses and other things at exorbitant prices.
Sir Samuel Baker will be disgusted to know that the crack vessel he
got from Samuda, the _Ismailia_, the biggest of his lot, is the worst
of the larger _fighting_ steamers. She is a good yacht, but nothing
more. All these steamers we owe to Sir Samuel Baker.
A Frenchman, Monsieur de Bizemont, brought up the steamers from
Cairo, through all the cataracts. Monsieur le Blanc was with him. Mr.
Higginbotham, C.E., took the steamers in sections across the Korosko
desert.
* * * * *
_September 29._—To-morrow is Bairam. I have made Ferratch Pasha take
over the festivities. The _Talataween_, _Mansowrah_, and _Saphia_,
(_D.V._) leave for Shendy to-morrow night with 100 men on board of
each. Cassim el Mousse goes with them. I send a slip to Lord Wolseley,
to be forwarded with a spy. The two journals of events from 10th to
30th September, and map of Berber, will go with steamers, in hopes of
their being able to find a more secure road of sending them to Debbeh
or elsewhere.
I found we had 700 bags of Indian rice in store. I have issued it on
account of pay to the troops, at two okes[91] per dollar. They will
sell it at three okes per dollar. It wipes off my debt to them, and
they will gain.
An escaped soldier came in, and says Mahdi has had three messengers
from Metemma, saying British troops were coming up in shoals, and so he
had a dream, in which he was ordered back to Kordofan.
I hope the officers and men of Her Majesty’s forces will be considerate
to the Egyptian soldiers and sailors; _they do not understand English_,
but as they have done some good service, I hope they will be kindly
treated. They are a trying lot, as I well know, but if it were not for
them, our soldiers would have to tramp many a weary sandy mile. It is
one of my joys that I never have to see Great Britain again. I hope to
get out of this affair, and either go to the Congo, _viâ_ Equatorial
Province, or by Brussels. At any rate I shall never have to undergo
the worries I underwent during the week I was in England this year. I
say this in order that those who may have to do with me may know how
very determined a man’s will must be who does not wish (and indeed
_will not ever_) go back to England again, and to whom continuance in
Her Majesty’s Service, except for the honour of it, is a matter of
indifference.
I am now going to be egotistic, but it will save a mint of trouble, and
I may be pardoned, considering the circumstances. By being so I may
save myself what I should much regret, a quarrel.
My idea is to induce Her Majesty’s Government to undertake the
extrication of all people or garrisons, now hemmed in or captive, and
that if this is not their programme, then to resign my commission and
do what I can to attain it (the object). As long as a man remains in
Her Majesty’s Service he is bound to obey the orders of his superiors,
but if he resigns he cannot be held as insubordinate if he disobeys. Of
course it may turn on the question of whether once having entered the
service of Her Majesty’s Army, one is free to leave it at one’s will.
But we officers are not like the private soldiers engaged for a term
of years, and perhaps one may risk dismissal if the cause is worthy of
it—which, I think, the question of abandoning the garrisons is.
I say this, because I should be sorry for Lord Wolseley to advance from
Dongola without fully knowing my views. If Her Majesty’s Government are
going to abandon the garrisons, then do not advance. I say nothing of
evacuating the country, I merely maintain that if we do so, every one
in the Soudan, captive or hemmed in, ought to have the option and power
of retreat. Having given them that option and power, I have nothing
more to say, and I would not care whether the country is evacuated or
not.
It is a miserable country, but it is joined to Egypt, and to my idea it
would be difficult to divorce the two.
I will end these egotistical remarks by saying that no persuasion
will induce me to change my views; and that as to force, it is out of
the question, for I have the people with me—at any rate of the towns
which hold out. Therefore, if Her Majesty’s forces are not prepared
to relieve the whole of the garrisons, the General should consider
whether it is worth coming up—in his place, _if not so prepared_,[92]
I would not do so. I do not dictate, but I say what every gentleman[93]
in Her Majesty’s Army would agree to—that it would be _mean (coûte
que coûte)_ to leave men who (though they may not come up to our ideas
as heroes) have stuck to me, though a _Christian dog in their eyes_,
through great difficulties, and thus force them to surrender to those
who have not conquered them, and to do that at the bidding of a foreign
Power, to save one’s own skin. Why the black sluts would stone me if
they thought I meditated such action. Stewart knows all this and used
to groan over perversity.
* * * * *
_September 30._ The Arabs fired seven shells last night at 9 P.M. which
fell inside the lines, but did no harm. To-day being Bairam, they fired
four rounds in their camp—a salute I suppose.
The spy who came in yesterday, says the report is rife that Seyd
Mahomet Osman’s men have entered Katarif.
The three steamers will leave here to-day for Shendy at 4 P.M.
I shoved off the Bairam reception upon Ferratch Pasha, who held it upon
the lines. I am not up to these affairs, and I think he likes them.
As soon as ever I hear of the arrival of troops at Berber, down will
go the Greeks, Bashi Bazouks, and Fellaheen soldiers with a month’s
provisions. The people of Berber then can send them on, as best they
can—they will be off my hands. I have everything ready to send them.
We have no telegraph wire left up here to repair the lines, so Floyer
had better see to it; all ours has been used in the wire entanglements.
The troops on board the steamers are Fellaheen soldiers. If Berber is
captured, better take them out and keep them (they are part of their
way to their homes), and replace them with such black troops as may
be released at Berber; but see after these white soldiers’ pay, and
rations, and do not neglect them.
We do not want to be told the steamers are dirty, for we know it.
If coming up, see beforehand that Arabs have not a gun or guns at the
Shoboloha Pass, and if wood has to be looted, loot those people on the
left bank of the Nile, _not_ those on the right.
I do not care much to have Wood’s men here; there will be sure to be
rows between them and our blacks, and they are not favourites in the
Soudan. Still less do I want to see Bashi Bazouks, or tribes who have
been taken into our pay, for they will rob right and left.
I have prepared the beads, copper rods, uniforms, &c., to send up to
the Equator as soon as it is possible. Report says the garrison of the
Equator is at Fashoda.
The sister steamer to _Abbas_ will be finished in twelve days. We made,
or rather Hassan Bey made, a first-rate crank.
Remember, we have very few dollars here, and gold is depreciated in
value. We have only £1,000 in the treasury.
It would be as well to tell the Greek creditors, who may be coming up,
that there is not the least probability that the Government, whatever
it may be, will look at any of their claims until at least a year has
expired.
We have painted the steamers up; they are whited sepulchres.
I hope Ibrahim Tongi and Moussa Beys, who will come down with the
first lot, who leave this (after the hoped-for capture of Berber),
will be sent on to Cairo at once, and not given appointments, on any
consideration, at Berber or elsewhere.
I like trying to find solutions for this Soudan problem. This is the
last. Let Towfik Pasha send up Abdel Kader Pasha, as Governor-General,
to replace me at once. As soon as the Firman comes, I am out of
calculation, and Her Majesty’s Government can do what they like, for
Abdel Kader will follow their dictum. Such an act would not in the
least vex me. Lord Wolseley can then do what he thinks fit with respect
to the Soudan, the abandonment, and all the etceteras, and I am free of
all responsibility to the people and to the troops, or with respect to
the money affairs, dhoora, &c., &c. But in this case, it must be borne
in mind, I am not the “rescued lamb,” simply having been sent up to
perform a certain mission, _i.e._, extrication of garrisons. I failed,
and was replaced by Abdel Kader and a British Force. It is for them to
explain any change in their programme.
The same remarks, appended to the end of Volume I, are added to this
_in re_ Mr. Power and Foreign Office, &c.
C. G. GORDON.
30th September, 2 P.M., Kartoum.
I really think that as Her Majesty’s Government and I are in such
opposite camps (at least I think so)—_in re_ the _extrication of the
garrisons_—it would save a mint of trouble if Towfik Pasha were to
replace me by Abdel Kader Pasha, with whom Her Majesty’s Government
could do as they liked. At any rate, a scandal would be avoided;
and I think Abdel Kader would be well received by all. Of course I
should have the privilege of laughing in my sleeve if, after all,
Her Majesty’s Government found they could not get out without the
establishment of _Turks_ or _Zubair_, or the _retention of the Soudan_
under Egypt. I, therefore, as an adieu, recommend this course, for
it opens a speedy exit for me without rows, and clears me of all
responsibility whatever.
C. G. GORDON.