The manner in which Flacius distinguished between material and formal
substance appears from the tract on original sin (_De Peccati Originalis
aut Veteris Adami Appellationibus et Essentia_), which he appended to
his _Clavis Scripturae_ of 1567. There we read: "In this disputation
concerning the corruption of man I do not deny that this meaner matter
(_illam viliorem materiam_) or mass of man created in the beginning has
indeed remained until now, although it is exceedingly vitiated, as when
in wine or aromas the spirituous (_airy_) or fiery substance escapes,
and nothing remains but the earthy and watery substance; but I hold that
the substantial form or the formal substance (_formam substantialem aut
substantiam formalem_) has been lost, yea, changed into its opposite.
But I do not speak of that external and coarse form (although it too, is
corrupted and weakened very much) which a girl admires in a youth, or
philosophy also in the entire man, according to which he consists of
body and soul, has an erect stature two feet, hands, eyes, ears, and the
like, is an animal laughing, counting, reasoning, etc.; but I speak of
that most noble substantial form (_nobilissima substantialis forma_)
according to which especially the heart itself or rather the rational
soul, was formed in such a manner that his very essence might be the
image of God and represent Him, and that his substantial powers,
intellect and will, and his affections might be conformed to the
properties of God, represent, truly acknowledge, and most willingly
embrace Him." (Preger 2, 314; Gieseler 3, 2, 254.)
Again: "In this manner, therefore, I believe and assert that original
sin is a substance, because the rational soul (as united with God) and
especially its noblest substantial powers, namely, the intellect and
will which before had been formed so gloriously that they were the true
image of God and the fountain of all justice, uprightness, and piety,
and altogether essentially like unto gold and gems, are now, by deceit
of Satan, so utterly perverted that they are the true and living image
of Satan, and, as it were, filthy or rather consisting of an infernal
flame, not otherwise than when the sweetest and purest mass, infected
with the most venomous ferment, is altogether and substantially changed
and transformed into a lump of the same ferment." (Gieseler 3, 2, 254.)
Original sin "is not a mere accident in man, but his inverted and
transformed essence or new form itself, just as when a most wholesome
medicine is changed into the most baneful poison." "The matter remains,
but it receives a new form, namely, the image of Satan." "Man, who in
his essential form was the image of God, has in his essential form
become the image of Satan." "This change may be compared to the change
which the golden image of a beautiful man undergoes when it is
transformed into the image of a dragon, the matter at the same time
being corrupted." (Preger 2, 214. 217. 325.)
Dilating on the substantiality of original sin, Flacius furthermore
declared: "Original malice in man is not something different from the
evil mind or stony heart itself, not something that destroys him
spiritually as a disease consumes him bodily, but it is ruined and
destroyed nature itself (_sed est tantum ipsa perditissima et iam
destructissima natura_). Original malice was not, as many now think
infused from without into Adam in such a way as when poison or some
other bad substance is thrown or poured into good liquor, so that by
reason of the added bad substance also the rest becomes noxious, but in
such a way as when good liquor or bread itself is perverted so that now
it is bad as such and poisonous or rather poison (_ut illud per se iam
malum ac venenatum aut potius venenum sit_)." (Preger 2, 313.)
Also concerning the body and soul of fallen man Flacius does not
hesitate to affirm that, since they are permeated and corrupted by
original sin, "these parts themselves are sin, _eas ipsas [partes,
corpus et animam] esse illud nativum malum, quod cum Deo pugnat._" "Some
object," says Flacius, "that the creature of God must be distinguished
from sin, which is not of God. I answer: now do separate, if you can,
the devil from his inherent wickedness!... How can the same thing be
separated from itself! We therefore can not distinguish them in any
other way than by stating that with respect to his first creation and
also his present preservation man, even as the devil himself, is of God,
but that with respect to this horrible transformation (_ratione istius
horrendae metamorphoseos_) he is of the devil, who, by the force of the
efficacious sentence and punishment of angry God: 'Thou shalt die,' not
only captured us to be his vilest slaves, but also recast, rebaked, and
changed, or, so to speak, metamorphosed us into another man, as the
Scripture says, even as he [the devil] himself is inverted." All parts,
talents, and abilities of man, Flacius contends, are "evil and mere
sins," because they all oppose God. "What else are they than armed
unrighteousness!" he exclaims. Even the natural knowledge of God "is
nothing but the abominable source of idolatry and of all superstitions."
(Preger 316f.; Gieseler 3, 2, 255.)
That the fundamental view of Flacius, however, was much farther apart
from Manicheism than some of his radical phrases imply, appears from his
"_Gnowthi seauton, De Essentia Originalis Institutiae,_" of 1568. After
admitting that Augustine, Luther, and the _Apology of the Augsburg
Confession_ are correct when they define original sin as an inordinate
disposition, a disorder (_ataxia_), perversion, and confusion of the
parts of man, Flacius proceeds: "The substantial form of a certain thing
for the most part, consists in the right position and disposition of the
parts; as, for example, if a human body were born which had its eyes,
ears, and mouth on the belly or feet, and, _vice versa,_ the toes on the
head, no one would say that it was properly a man, but rather a monster.
... It appears, therefore, that the inordinate disposition of the parts
produces an altogether new body or thing. Thus, forsooth, the horrible
perturbation of the soul has also produced, as it were a new kind of
monster fighting against God." (Preger 2, 409.) Accordingly, it was not
man's body and soul as such, but the alteration of the relation of his
powers toward one another and the consequent corruption of these powers,
that Flacius had in mind when he designated original sin as the new
substantial form, or substance, of sinful man.
Flacius expressly denied that the fall of man or his conversion involved
a physical change. "I do not teach a physical regeneration," he
declared, "nor do I say that two hearts are created, but I say that this
most excellent part of the soul or of man is once more established, or
that the image of God is recast and transformed out of the image of
Satan, even as before the image of God was transformed into the image of
Satan. _Physicam renascentiam non assero nec dico duo corda creari, sed
dico istam praestantissimam animae aut hominis partem denuo condi aut ex
imagine Satanae refundi aut transformari imaginem Dei, sicut antea imago
Dei fuit transformata in imaginem Satanae._" (Seeberg 4, 495.) Gieseler
pertinently remarks: "It is apparent that Flacius did not deviate from
the common concept of original sin, but from the concepts of substance
and accident, but that here, too, he was uncertain, inasmuch as he
employed the terms _substantia, forma substantialis,_ and _substantia
formalis_ promiscuously." (3, 2, 255.)
If not necessarily involved in, it was at least in keeping with his
extreme position and extravagant phraseology concerning original sin
when Flacius, in his _De Primo et Secundo Capite ad Romanos, quatenus
Libero Arbitrio Patrocinari Videntur,_ rejected the doctrine of an
inborn idea of God and of His Law inscribed in the heart of natural
man. On Rom. 1, 19 he comments: It is only from the effects in the world
that man infers the existence of a supreme cause. And with respect to
Rom. 2, 15 he maintains that Paul's statements were to be understood,
not of a law written in the heart of man, but of a knowledge which the
heathen had derived by inference, from experience, or from tradition of
the fathers. On this point Strigel, no doubt was correct when he
objected: If the knowledge of God's existence were really extinguished
from the heart, there could be no discipline among men; and if man had
no inborn knowledge of the Law, then there could be no such thing as
conscience which condemns him when he sins. The fact that man fears
punishments even when there is no government to fear, as was the case
with Alexander when he had murdered Clitus, proves that in the heart
there is a certain knowledge both of God and of His Law. (Preger 2,
213.) However, Flacius did not, as Strigel seems to insinuate, deny that
natural man has an obscure knowledge of God's existence and Law, but
merely maintained that this knowledge was not inborn or inherited, but
acquired from without.