The terms "substance" and "accident" are defined in Melanchthon's
_Erotemata Dialectices_ as follows: "_Substantia est ens, quod revera
proprium esse habet, nec est in alio, ut habens esse a subiecto._
Substance is something which in reality has a being of its own and is
not in another as having its being from the subject." (_C. R._ 13,
528.) "_Accidens est quod non per sese subsistit, nec est pars
substantiae, sed in alio est mutabiliter._ Accident is something which
does not exist as such nor is a part of the substance, but is changeable
in something else." (522.) Melanchthon continues: "Accidentium alia sunt
separabilia ut frigus ab aqua, notitia a mente, laetitia, tristitia a
corde. Alia accidentia sunt inseparabilia, ut quantitas seu magnitudo a
substantia corporea, calor ab igni, humiditas ab aqua, non separantur...
Et quia separabilia accidentia magis conspicua sunt, ideo inde sumpta
est puerilis descriptio: Accidens est, quod adest et abest praeter
subiecti corruptionem. Whatever is present or absent without the
corruption of the subject is an accident." (_C. R._ 13, 523; Preger 2,
396. 407; Seeberg 4, 494.)
Evidently this last definition, which was employed also by Strigel, is
ambiguous, inasmuch as the word "corruption" may signify an
annihilation, or merely a perversion, or a corruption in the ordinary
meaning of the word. In the latter sense the term applied to original
sin would be tantamount to a denial of the Lutheran doctrine of _total_
corruption. When Jacob Andreae, in his disputation with Flacius, 1571,
at Strassburg, declared that accident is something which is present or
absent without _corruption_ of the subject, he employed the term in the
sense of destruction or annihilation. In the same year Hesshusius stated
that by original sin "the whole nature body and soul, substance as well
as accidents, are defiled, corrupted, and dead," of course, spiritually.
And what he understood by substance appears from his assertion: "The
being itself, the substance and nature itself, in as far as it is
nature, is not an evil conflicting with the Law of God.... Not even in
the devil the substance itself, in as far as it is substance, is a bad
thing, _i.e._, a thing conflicting with the Law." (Preger 2, 397.)
The _Formula of Concord_ carefully and correctly defines: "Everything
that is must be either _substantia_, that is, a self-existent essence,
or _accidens_, that is, an accidental matter, which does not exist by
itself essentially but is in another self-existent essence and can be
distinguished from it." "Now, then, since it is the indisputable truth
that everything that is, is either a substance or an _accidens_ that is,
either a self-existing essence or something accidental in it (as has
just been shown and proved by testimonies of the church-teachers, and no
truly intelligent man has ever had any doubts concerning this),
necessity here constrains, and no one can evade it if the question be
asked whether original sin is a substance, that is, such a thing as
exists by itself, and is not in another, or whether it is an _accidens_,
that is, such a thing as does not exist by itself, but is in another,
and cannot exist or be by itself, he must confess straight and pat that
original sin is no substance, but an accident." (877, 54; 57.)
Flacius, however, took the words "substance" and "accident" in a
different sense. He distinguished between the material and formal
substance, and the latter he regarded as man's true original essence.
This essence he explained, consisted in the original righteousness and
holiness of man, in the image of God or the will as truly free and in
proper relation toward God. He said: "Ipsum hominem _essentialiter_ sic
esse formatum, ut recta voluntas esset imago Dei, non tantum eius
accidens." (Seeberg 4, 494.) He drew the conclusion that original sin,
by which the image of God (not the human understanding and will as such)
is lost, cannot be a mere accident, but constitutes the very essence and
substance of fallen man. He argued: The image of God is the formal
essence of man, or the soul itself according to its best part, by
original sin this image is changed into its opposite: hence the change
wrought by original sin is not accidental, but substantial,--just as
substantial and essential as when wine is changed into vinegar or fire
into frost. What man has lost, said Flacius, is not indeed his material
substance (_substantia materialis_), but his true formal substance or
substantial form (_substantia formalis_ or _forma substantialis_). Hence
also original sin, or the corruption resulting from the Fall, in reality
is, and must be designated, the formal substance or substantial form of
natural man. Not all gifts of creation were lost to man by his Fall; the
most essential boon, however, the image of God, was destroyed and
changed into the image of Satan. "In homine," said Flacius, "et mansit
aliquid, et tamen quod optimum in ratione et essentia fuit, nempe imago
Dei, non tantum evanuit, sed etiam in contrarium, nempe in imaginem
diaboli, commutatum est." The devil, Flacius continued, has robbed man
of his original form (_forma_), the image of God, and stamped him with
his own diabolical form and nature. (Luthardt 215; Gieseler 3, 2, 253.)