At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as
one of the causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no
conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in
conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences
conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing
to conversion, and therefore the will "is purely passive in the
reception of grace." (Preger 2, 217.) "We are pressed hard with the
sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge
and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that
good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?"
(216.) "We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of
the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not
whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but
whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing
of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of
willing and thinking of God alone?" (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that God
alone converts man, said Flacius, "does not exclude the presence of the
will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the
natural will in conversion (_non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed
excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in
conversione_)." (Seeberg 4, 492.)
In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared:
"Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of God and of
ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will.
_Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit
velle aut perficere nisi nobis volentibus._" Charging Strigel with
ambiguity, Flacius replied: "You speak of one kind of synergism and we
of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these
questions are unknown to you." Strigel, protesting that he was unable to
see the difference, answered: "For God's sake, have a little forbearance
with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it
be to my discredit.--_Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut
halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's
eine Schand'_." (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that
man, too, has a share in _producing_ the good volition, while Flacius
understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the
latter, _e.g._, writing in _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio:_ "It is
certain that we will when we will; but He who makes us will is He of
whom it is written: It is God who worketh in us to will. _Certum est nos
velle cum volumus; sed ille facit, ut velimus, de quo dictum est: Deus
est, qui operatur in nobis velle._" (Frank 1, 238.)
In his objections to the doctrine that man is purely passive in his
conversion, Strigel protested again and again that man is not like a
block or stone when he is converted. "That is true," said Flacius, "for
a block can neither love nor hate God, while man by nature hates God,
and scoffs at Him. Rom. 8, 1; 1 Cor. 2. Thus God is dealing with one
whose will and heart is altogether against Him. But here [in the denial
that man is purely passive in conversion] is buried a popish _meritum de
congruo_ and a particle of free will." (Preger 2, 191.) Flacius
furthermore explained that in his conversion man is able to cooperate
just as little as a stone can contribute to its transformation into a
statue. Indeed, man's condition is even more miserable than that of a
stone or block (_miserior trunco_), because by his natural powers he
resists, and cannot but resist, the operations of the Spirit. (Planck 4,
696f.)
Strigel reasoned: If man is converted without his consent, and if he
cannot but resist the operations of the Holy Spirit, conversion is an
impossibility, a contradiction. He said: "If the will, even when
assisted by the Holy Spirit, is unable to assent, it must of necessity
resist Him perpetually, drive out, reject, and repudiate the Word and
Holy Spirit; for it is impossible that motions extremely conflicting and
contradictory, the one embracing, the other repudiating and persistently
rejecting, should be in the same will. _Si voluntas etiam adiuta a
Spiritu Sancto non potest assentiri, necesse est, ut perpetuo ei
repugnet, ut excutiat, reiiciat et repudiet Verbum et Spiritum Sanctum.
Nam impossibile est in eadem voluntate esse motus extreme pugnantes et
contradictorios, quorum alter est amplecti, alter repudiare et quidem
perstare in reiectione._" Flacius replied: You need but distinguish
between the sinful natural will inherited from Adam, which always
resists, and the new consenting will implanted by God in conversion.
"Man consents with the faith given by God, but he resists with the
inborn wickedness of his Old Adam." Your error is that you acknowledge
only an inciting grace, which mere incitation presupposes powers of
one's own to do and to perform (_talis incitatio includit proprias vires
ad perficiendum_). "I plead," said Flacius, "that by original sin man is
not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his
faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other
hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (_hominem ...
penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra
insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum_)." "The will is free with respect to
things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In
spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan." Hence, said Flacius, in
order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and
created in, man by the grace of God. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff.,
Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)
Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of
God, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied:
"Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their
actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at
least to observe external decency (_Zucht_), which God earnestly demands
of us, for example, to hear God's Word, to go to church more frequently
than into the tavern." "Furthermore, there are many carnal
transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he
has not done." "God may justly hold us responsible also with respect to
things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured
powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully
lost through his own fault." (Preger 2, 214f.)
Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man
is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of God. But the
latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will
of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (_voluntas
repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter_), but not by coercion or
compulsion. Necessity to resist (_necessitas repugnandi_), Flacius
explained, does not involve coercion to resist (_coactio repugnandi_),
since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (_necessitas
immutabilitatis_), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and
yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise
than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve
coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion,
although they cannot sin or fall any more. It is the highest degree of
freedom and Christian perfection when, in the life to come, our will to
remain in union with God is elevated to immutability of so willing.
Again, though Satan cannot but sin, yet he is not coerced to sin. Thus
too, of his own powers, natural man is able only to resist grace, yet
there is no compulsion involved. The fact, therefore, that natural man
cannot but sin and resist grace does not warrant the inference that he
is compelled to sin; nor does the fact that natural man is not coerced
to resist prove that he is able also to assent to grace. The fact, said
Flacius, that the wicked _willingly_ will, think, and do only what
pleases Satan does not prove an ability to will in the opposite
spiritual direction, but merely reveals the terrible extent of Satan's
tyrannical power over natural man. (Luthardt 224. 231.) According to
Flacius the will always wills willingly when it wills and what it wills.
In brief: The categories "coercion" and "compulsion" cannot be applied
to the will. This, however, does not imply that God is not able to
create or restore a good will without coercion or compulsion. There was
no coercion or compulsion involved when God, creating Adam, Eve, and the
angels, endowed them with a good will. Nor is there any such thing as
coercion or compulsion when God, in conversion, bestows faith and a good
will upon man.
In his statements on the freedom of the will, Flacius merely repeated
what Luther had written before him, in _De Servo Arbitrio:_ "For if it
is not we, but God alone, who works salvation in us, then nothing that
we do previous to His work, whether we will or not, is salutary. But
when I say, 'by necessity,' I do not mean by coercion, but, as they say
by the necessity of immutability, not by necessity of coercion, _i.e._,
man, destitute of the Spirit of God, does not sin perforce, as though
seized by the neck [stretched upon the rack] nor unwillingly, as a thief
or robber is led to his punishment but spontaneously and willingly. And
by his own strength he cannot omit, restrain, or change this desire or
willingness to sin, but continues to will it and to find pleasure in it.
For even if he is compelled by force, outwardly to do something else,
within, the will nevertheless remains averse, and rages against him who
compels or resists it. For if it were changed and willingly yielded to
force, it would not be angry. And this we call the necessity of
immutability, _i.e._, the will cannot change itself and turn to
something else, but is rather provoked to will more intensely by being
resisted, as is proved by its indignation. _Si enim non nos, sed solus
Deus operatur salutem in nobis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare,
velimus nolimus. Necessario vero dico, NON COACTE, sed, ut illi dicunt,
necessitate immutabilitatis, NON COACTIONIS; id est homo cum vacat
Spiritu Dei, NON QUIDEM VIOLENTIA, velut raptus obtorto collo, NOLENS
facit peccatum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed
sponte et libenti voluntate facit. Verum hanc libentiam seu voluntatem
faciendi non potest suis viribus omittere, coercere aut mutare, sed
pergit volendo et lubendo; etiamsi ad extra cogatur aliud facere per
vim, tamen voluntas intus manet aversa et indignatur cogenti aut
resistenti. Non enim indignaretur, si mutaretur ac volens vim
sequeretur. Hoc vocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod
voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur
magis ad volendum, dum ei resistitur, quod probat eius indignatio._" (E.
v. a. 7, 155f. 134. 157; St. L. 18 1717. 1692. 1718.)
Flacius was also charged with teaching that "man is converted resisting
(_hominem converti repugnantem_)." In their _Confession and Opinion
Concerning Free Will,_ of 1561, the Wittenberg theologians repeated the
assertion that Flacius taught "_converti hominem ... repugnantem et
hostiliter Deo convertenti adversantem._" (Planck 4, 688.) But Flacius
protested: "I do not simply say that man is converted resisting
(_hominem repugnantem converti_). But I say that he resists with respect
to his natural and carnal free will." "It is not denied that God
converts us as willing and understanding (_quin Deus nos convertat
volentes et intelligentes_), but willing and understanding not from the
Old Adam but from the light given by God and from the good volition
bestowed through the Word and the Holy Spirit." (692.) "Man is converted
or drawn by the Father to the Son not as a thief is cast into prison,
but in such a manner that his evil will is changed into a good will by
the power of the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 218.) It is the very essence
of conversion that by the grace of God unwilling men are made willing.
In support of his error that natural man is able to cooperate in his
conversion Strigel appealed to Rom. 8, 26: "Likewise the Spirit also
helpeth our infirmities," etc.; and appealing to the _Augustana_ for the
correctness of his interpretation, he declared that this passage proves
that one may speak of a languid and weak assent in man even before he is
endowed with faith. Flacius replied that this Bible-passage referred to
such only as are already converted, and that Strigel's interpretation
was found not in the original _Augustana,_ but in the _Variata._--From
the admonition 2 Cor. 5, 20: "Be ye reconciled to God," Strigel inferred
that free will must to a certain extent be capable of accepting the
grace offered by God. Flacius answered that it was a logical fallacy,
conflicting also with the clear Word of God, to conclude that man by his
own powers is able to perform something because God demands it and
admonishes and urges us to do it.--From Acts 5, 32: "...the Holy Ghost,
whom God hath given to them that obey Him," Strigel argued that the will
is able to consent to the Holy Spirit. But Flacius rejoined that this
passage refers to special gifts bestowed upon such as are already
converted.--In support of his synergism, Strigel also appealed to the
Parable of the Prodigal Son, who himself repented and returned to his
father. But Flacius answered: If every detail of this parable taken from
every-day life were to be interpreted in such a manner, Strigel would
have to abandon his own teaching concerning prevenient grace, since
according to the parable the repentance and return of the son precedes
the grace bestowed by the father. (Preger 2, 210f.)