Strigel's views concerning the freedom of man's will in spiritual
matters may be summarized as follows: Man, having a will, is a free
agent, hence always able to decide for or against. This ability is the
"mode of action" essential to man as long as he really is a man and in
possession of a will. Even in matters pertaining to grace this freedom
was not entirely lost in the Fall. It was impeded and weakened by
original sin, but not annihilated. To be converted, man therefore
requires that these residual or remaining powers be excited and
strengthened rather than that new spiritual powers be imparted or a new
will be created. Accordingly, persuasion through the Word is the method
of conversion employed by the Holy Spirit. When the will is approached
by the Word, incited and assisted by the Spirit, it is able to admit the
operations of the Spirit and assent to the Word, though but feebly.
Hence, no matter how much of the work of conversion must be ascribed to
the Holy Spirit and the Word the will itself, in the last analysis,
decides for or against grace. Man is, therefore, not purely passive in
his conversion, but cooperates with the Holy Spirit and the Word, not
merely after, but also in his conversion, before he has received the
gift of faith.
"God who, outside of His essence in external actions, is the freest
agent," said Strigel "created two kinds of natures, the one free, the
other acting naturally (_naturaliter agentes_). The free natures are the
angels and men. Those acting naturally embrace all the rest of the
creatures. A natural agent is one that cannot do anything else [than it
does], nor suspend its action _e.g._, fire. Men and angels were created
differently, after the image of God, that they might be free agents.
_Homines et angeli aliter conditi sunt ad imaginem Dei, ut sint liberum
agens._" (Planck 4, 669.) This freedom, which distinguishes man
essentially from all other creatures, according to Strigel, always
implies the power to will or not to will with respect to any object. He
says: The act of willing, be it good or evil, always belongs to the
will, because the will is so created that it can will or not, without
coercion. "_Ipsum velle, seu bonum seu malum, quod ad substantiam
attinet, semper est voluntatis; quia voluntas sic est condita, UT POSSIT
VELLE AUT NON; sed etiam hoc habet voluntas ex opere creationis quod
adhuc reliquum, et non prorsus abolitum et extinctum est, UT POSSIT
VELLE AUT NON SINE COACTIONE_." (674.) According to Strigel, the very
essence of the will consists in being able, in every instance, to decide
in either direction, for or against. Hence the very idea of will
involves also a certain ability to cooperate in conversion. (689.)
This freedom or ability to decide _pro_ or _con,_ says Strigel, is the
mode of action essential to man, his mode of action also in conversion.
And in the controversy on free will he sought to maintain that this
alleged mode of action was a part of the very essence of the human will
and being. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not wish to detract from
the will the mode of action which is different from other natural
actions. _Nolo voluntati detrahi modum agendi, qui est dissimilis aliis
actionibus naturalibus._" (Planck 4, 668.) Again: "The will is not a
natural, but a free agent; hence the will is converted not as a natural
agent, but as a free agent.... In conversion the will acts in its own
mode; it is not a statue or a log in conversion. Hence conversion does
not occur in a purely passive manner. _Voluntas non est agens naturale,
sed liberum; ergo convertitur voluntas non ut naturaliter agens, sed ut
liberum agens.... Et voluntas suo modo agit in conversione, nec est
statua vel truncus in conversione. Et per consequens non fit conversio
pure passive._" (Luthardt, 217. 219. 209.)
What Strigel means is that man, being a free agent, must, also in
conversion, be accorded the ability somehow to decide for grace.
According to the _Formula of Concord_ the words, "man's mode of action,"
signify "a way of working something good and salutary in divine things."
(905, 61.) The connection and the manner in which the phrase was
employed by Strigel admitted of no other interpretation. Strigel added:
This mode of action marks the difference between the will of man and the
will of Satan, for the devil neither endeavors to assent, nor prays to
God for assistance, while man does. (Luthardt, 220.) Natural man is by
Strigel credited with the power of "endeavoring to assent, _conari
assentiri,_" because he is endowed with a will. But shrewd as Strigel
was, it did not occur to him that, logically, his argument compelled him
to ascribe also to the devils everything he claimed for natural man,
since they, too, have a will and are therefore endowed with the same
_modus agendi,_ which, according to Strigel, belongs to the very idea
and essence of will. Yet this palpable truth, which overthrew his entire
theory, failed to open the eyes of Strigel.
If, as Strigel maintained, the human will, by virtue of its nature as a
free agent, is, in a way, _able_ to cooperate in conversion, then the
only question is how to elevate this ability to an actuality, in other
words, how to influence the will and rouse its powers to move in the
right direction. Strigel answered: Since the will cannot be forced,
moral suasion is the true method required to convert a man. "The will,"
says he "cannot be forced, hence it is by persuasion, _i.e._, by
pointing out something good or evil, that the will is moved to obey and
to submit to the Gospel, not coerced, _but somehow willing. Voluntas non
potest cogi, ergo voluntas persuadendo, id est ostensione alicuius boni
vel mali flectitur ad obediendum et obtemperandum evangelio, non coacta,
sed ALIQUO MODO VOLENS._" (Seeberg 4, 491.) Again: "Although God is
efficacious through the Word, drawing and leading us efficaciously, yet
He does not make assenting necessary for such a nature as the will,--a
nature so created that it is able not to assent, if it so wills, and to
expel Him who dwells in us. This assent therefore is the work of God and
the Holy Spirit, but in so far as it is a free assent, not coerced and
pressed out by force, _it is also the work of the will. Etiam si Deus
est efficax per Verbum et efficaciter nos trahit et ducit, tamen non
affert necessitatem assentiendi tali naturae, qualis est voluntas, id
est, quae sic est condita, ut possit non assentiri, si velit, et
excutere sessorem. Est igitur hic assensus opus Dei et Spiritus Sancti,
sed quatenus est liber assensus, non coactus, expressus vi, EST ETIAM
VOLUNTATIS._" (491.) Strigel evidently means: The fact that man is able
not to assent to grace of necessity involves that somehow (_aliquo
modo_) he is able also to assent, according to man's peculiar mode of
action (freedom) he must himself actualize his conversion by previously
(in the logical order) willing it, deciding for it, and assenting to it;
he would be converted by coercion if his assent to grace were an act of
the will engendered and created solely by God, rather than an act
effected and produced by the powers of the will when incited and
assisted by the Spirit. Man is converted by persuasion only, because God
does not create assent and faith in him but merely elicits these acts
from man by liberating and appealing to the powers of his will to effect
and produce them.
In defending this freedom of the will, Strigel appealed also to the
statement of Luther: "The will cannot be coerced;... if the will could
be coerced, it would not be volition, but rather nolition. _Voluntas non
potest cogi;... si posset cogi voluntas, non esset voluntas sed potius
voluntas._" However, what Luther said of the form or nature of the will,
according to which it always really wills what it wills, and is
therefore never coerced, was by Strigel transferred to the spiritual
matters and objects of the will. According to Strigel's theory, says
Seeberg, "the will must be free even in the first moment of conversion,
free not only in the psychological, but also in the moral sense." (4,
492.) Tschackert, quoting Seeberg remarks that Strigel transformed the
natural formal liberty into an ethical material liberty--_"indem die
natuerliche formale Freiheit sich ihm unter der Hand [?] verwandelte in
die ethische materiale Freiheit._" (524.)