Although at the opening of the disputation the debaters had agreed to
decide all questions by clear Scripture-passages alone, Strigel's
guiding principle was in reality not the Bible but philosophy and
reason. His real concern was not, What does Scripture teach concerning
the causes of conversion? but, How may we harmonize the universal grace
of God with the fact that only some are converted and saved?
Self-evidently Strigel, too, quoted Bible-passages. Among others, he
appealed to such texts as John 6, 29; Rom. 1, 16; 10, 17; Luke 8, 18;
Heb. 4, 2; Rev. 3, 20; Luke 11, 13; Mark 9, 24; 1 Thess. 2, 13; Jas. 1,
18. But as we shall show later, his deductions were philosophical and
sophistical rather than exegetical and Scriptural. Preger remarks: In
his disputation Strigel was not able to advance a single decisive
passage of Scripture for the presence and cooperation of a good will at
the moment when it is approached and influenced (_ergriffen_) by grace.
(2, 211.) And the clear, irrefutable Bible-texts on which Flacius
founded his doctrine of the inability of natural will to cooperate in
conversion, Strigel endeavored to invalidate by philosophical reasoning,
indirect arguing, and alleged necessary logical consequences.
At Weimar and in his _Confession_ of December 5 1560, delivered to the
Duke soon after the disputation, Strigel argued: Whoever denies that
man, in a way and measure, is able to cooperate in his own conversion
is logically compelled also to deny that the rejection of grace may be
imputed to man, compelled to make God responsible for man's damnation;
to surrender the universality of God's grace and call; to admit
contradictory wills in God, and to take recourse to an absolute decree
of election and reprobation in order to account for the fact that some
reject the grace of God and are lost while others are converted and
saved. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not say that the will is able
to assent to the Word without the Holy Spirit, but that, being moved and
assisted by the Spirit, it assents with trepidation. If we were unable
to do this, we would not be responsible for not having received the
Word. _Si hoc [utcumque assentiri inter trepidationes] non possemus, non
essemus rei propter Verbum non receptum._" Again, also at Weimar: "If
the will is not able to assent in some way, even when assisted, then we
cannot be responsible for rejecting the Word, but the blame must be
transferred to another, and others may judge how religious that is. _Si
voluntas ne quidem adiuta potest aliquo modo annuere, non possumus esse
rei propter Verbum reiectum, sed culpa est in alium transferenda quod
quam sit religio sum, alii iudicent._" (Planck 4, 689. 719; Luthardt,
_Lehre vom freien Willen,_ 222.)
Over against this rationalistic method of Strigel and the Synergists
generally, the Lutherans adhered to the principle that nothing but a
clear passage of the Bible can decide a theological question. They
rejected as false philosophy and rationalism every argument directed
against the clear sense of a clear Word of God. They emphatically
objected to the employment of reason for establishing a Christian
doctrine or subverting a statement of the Bible. At Weimar, Flacius
protested again and again that human reason is not an authority in
theological matters. "Let us hear the Scriptures! _Audiamus
Scripturam!_" "Let the woman be silent in the Church! _Mulier taceat in
ecclesia!_" With such slogans he brushed aside the alleged necessary
logical inferences and deductions of Strigel. "You take your arguments
from philosophy," he said in the second session, "which ought not to be
given a place in matters of religion. _Disputas ex philosophia, cui
locus in rebus religionis esse non debet._" Again, at Weimar: "It is
against the nature of inquiring truth to insist on arguing from blind
philosophy. What else corrupted such ancient theologians as Clement,
Origen, Chrysostom, and afterwards also the Sophists [scholastic
theologians] but that they endeavored to decide spiritual things by
philosophy, which does not understand the secret and hidden mysteries of
God. _Est contra naturam inquirendae veritatis, si velimus ex caeca
philosophia loqui. Quid aliud corrupit theologos veteres, ut Clementem,
Originem, Chrysosthomum et postea etiam Sophistas, nisi quod de rebus
divinis ex philosophia voluerunt statuere, quae non intelligit
abstrusissima et occultissima mysteria Dei._" "May we therefore observe
the rule of Luther: Let the woman be silent in the Church! For what a
miserable thing would it be if we had to judge ecclesiastical matters
from logic! _Itaque observemus legem Lutheri: Taceat mulier in ecclesia!
Quae enim miseria, si ex dialectica diiudicandae nobis essent res
ecclesiae!_" (Planck 4, 709.)
In an antisynergistic confession published by Schluesselburg, we read:
"This doctrine [of conversion by God's grace alone] is simple, clear,
certain, and irrefutable if one looks to God's Word alone and derives
the _Nosce teipsum,_ Know thyself, from the wisdom of God. But since
poor men are blind, they love their darkness more than the light, as
Christ says John 3, and insist on criticizing and falsifying God's
truth by means of blind philosophy, which, forsooth, is a shame and a
palpable sin, if we but had eyes to see and know.... Whatsoever blind
reason produces in such articles of faith against the Word of God is
false and wrong. For it is said: _Mulier in ecclesia taceat!_ Let
philosophy and human wisdom be silent in the Church." (_Catalogus_ 5,
665f.) Here, too, the sophistical objections of the Synergists are
disposed of with such remarks as: "In the first place, this is but spun
from reason, which thus acts wise in these matters. _Denn fuers erste
ist solches nur aus der Vernunft gesponnen, die weiss also hierin zu
kluegeln._" (668.) "This is all spun from reason; but God's Word teaches
us better. _Dies ist alles aus der Vernunft spintisiert; Gottes Wort
aber lehrt es besser._" (670.)
Evidently Strigel's rationalistic method was identical with that
employed by Melanchthon in his _Loci,_ by Pfeffinger, and the Synergists
generally. Accordingly, his synergism also could not differ essentially
from Melanchthon's. Planck pertinently remarks: "It is apparent from
this [argument of Strigel that natural man must have power to cooperate
in his conversion because otherwise God would be responsible for his
resistance and damnation] that his synergism was none other than that of
the Wittenberg school; for was not this the identical foundation upon
which Melanchthon had reared his [synergism]?" (4, 690.) Like methods
lead to the same results, and _vice versa._ Besides, Strigel had always
appealed to the Wittenbergers; and in his _Opinion on the Weimar
Confutation_ 1559, Melanchthon, in turn, identified himself with
Strigel's arguments. (_C. R._ 9, 766.) The "Confession and Opinion of
the Wittenbergers Concerning Free Will--_Confessio et Sententia
Wittebergensium de Libero Arbitrio_" of 1561 also maintained the same
attitude.