THE JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY
A work on Japan which did not include some reference to the Army and
Navy would manifestly be incomplete. It is hardly any exaggeration to
assert that nothing in regard to the metamorphosis of Japan has so
impressed the Western mind as the extraordinary progress of its naval
and military forces. Both in this country and on the Continent it was,
of course, known that Japan had been for years evolving both an Army
and Navy, but I imagine most persons thought that this action on her
part was merely a piece of childish extravagance, and that her land
and sea forces would, if they were ever pitted against Europeans,
prove as impotent as Orientals nearly always have proved. I am quite
aware that naval and military experts of various nationalities who had
studied matters on the spot were of a different opinion. They
witnessed the high state of efficiency of both the Japanese Army and
Navy, the patriotic spirit of the officers and men, their enthusiasm
for their work, and that universal feeling of bravery, if it be
bravery, which consists in an absolute contempt of life. Still I
think, even to the experts, the splendid organisation and overwhelming
superiority of Japan in her encounter with China came as somewhat of
a surprise. The complete victory of the Island Nation in that struggle
was, I know, to a certain extent discounted in some quarters by the
stories that were published as to the wretched condition of both the
Chinese Army and Navy, their utter unfitness and unpreparedness for
war, the incompetence and corruption of the officers, and so on. There
were many otherwise well informed persons who felt confident that
though Japan had experienced little or no difficulty in mastering
China, the case would be different when, if ever, she was involved in
war with a European power. I do not think these doubts were prevalent
or indeed present at all, in the minds of the naval and military
authorities. No responsible statesman or official in Japan desired
war. The Japanese are not in any sense a bellicose people. Still, the
statesmen of the country were fully alive to the fact that it might be
necessary to fight for the national existence. They had had experience
in the past of the ambition of Russia to aggrandise herself at the
expense of Japan. They saw, or thought they saw, that Russia had
designs on Korea, and they were determined to frustrate those designs,
and so perhaps obviate in the best manner possible future attempts on
the independence of Japan itself. And hence it came about that serious
efforts were directed to create an Army and Navy strong and efficient.
The creation, or perhaps it would be more correct to say the
reorganisation, of the Army was entrusted, soon after the Revolution
of 1868, to a few European officers, and it has proceeded throughout
on European lines. The task was not so difficult as might have been
expected. In old Japan the terms "soldier" and "Samurai" were
synonymous, and the security of the territory of each of the great
feudal princes depended on the strength of his army. The Continental
system of conscription was adopted and still obtains. All Japanese
males between the ages of 17 and 40 are liable to military service.
The Service is divided into Active, Landwehr, Depot, and Landsturn
services. The Active service is divided into service with the colours
and service with the first reserve. The former is obligatory for all
who have reached the full age of 20 years, and such service is for a
period of three years. Service in the first reserve is compulsory for
all who have finished service with the colours, and lasts for a period
of four years and four months. The Landwehr reserve is comprised of
those who have finished the first reserve term, and it continues for a
period of five years. The Depot service is divided into two sections.
The first, which lasts seven years and four months, is made up of
those who have not been enlisted for Active service, while the second,
extending over one year and four months, consists of those who have
not been enlisted for first Depot service. The Landsturn is in two
divisions--one for those who have completed the term of Landwehr
service and the first Depot service, and the second for all who are
not on the other services. This system of conscription, of course,
lends itself to criticism, and it has been criticised by the military
experts of great military nations, but on the whole it has been proved
by the experience of the two wars in which Japan has been involved
during the last twelve years to have worked well, and it probably
answers as well as any system that could be devised, the needs of the
country, and the characteristics of the people thereof. The Japanese
are, as these recent wars amply demonstrated, patriotic to a degree.
They not only have great powers of perseverance, but great capacities
for assimilation and adaptation, and are considered by many military
authorities probably the very best raw material in the world out of
which to make soldiers. Conscription may not be an ideal system for
any country. It is, of course, better from one point of view that the
armed forces of a nation should voluntarily enlist rather than be
pressed men. But conscription in Japan has never been, and is not
likely to be, such a burden as is the case among some European
nations. The Japanese idea of patriotism is something totally
different to that which obtains in the West. The late war afforded
ample evidence of that, were any needed.
The war with Russia has been so recently concluded that it is not
necessary to enter at any length into a consideration of the Japanese
Army. The history of that war gave ocular demonstration to the
European nations, however incredulous they may previously have been on
the subject, that Japan was in fact a great military Power. In the
course of that war she put in the field somewhere about 700,000 men,
conveyed them across the sea to a foreign country, and showed
throughout the struggle a capacity for the most wonderful military
organisation. The smallest details were most carefully attended to;
there was an entire absence of that muddle so much in evidence when
European nations are engaged in hostilities. Respecting the fighting
qualities of the Japanese soldier it is hardly necessary to say
anything. On the field of battle or during the long, arduous and
monotonous work of a siege he has shown himself alike a model soldier.
Perhaps he has shone most in the hour of victory by his moderation.
Every foreign officer who saw the work done by the Japanese Army
throughout the various incidents of the Russian War was lost in
admiration. To me the most pleasing feature of that war was the ease
with which the soldier, on coming back to Japan, returned to the
peaceful pursuits of civil life. The bumptious braggadocio that
European military nations have developed has no counterpart in Japan.
The war was, in the estimation of the people, a sacred duty. The
burdens which it entailed were cheerfully borne. The Japanese soldier
bore his hardships or gave up his life equally cheerfully. At the same
time the conclusion of the war came as a relief, and the mass of the
soldiery gladly went through the Japanese equivalent of turning their
swords into ploughshares. Japan has demonstrated that she is a great
military nation, and the organisation of her Army is one that might
well be studied by the military authorities of other countries.
The weak point of the Japanese Army is its cavalry. Whether cavalry in
the warfare of the future will play the important part that it has
played in that of the past is a matter upon which I do not care to
dogmatically pronounce, especially as military authorities are by no
means in agreement in regard thereto, or indeed as to the precise
functions of cavalry in military warfare. The difficulties of Japan in
regard to organising an efficient cavalry have been largely, if not
altogether, owing to the lack of good horses in the country. The
Japanese horses have not been conspicuous for quality, while the
number available has not been anything like sufficient to enable the
cavalry to be brought up to a proper condition of strength and
efficiency. The Japanese military authorities have long been sensible
of this fact, and the late war amply demonstrated it. With its usual
thoroughness, the Government has, as soon as possible after the close
of the war, taken steps to remedy this weak point in its military
system, and quite recently two delegates of the Ministry of
Agriculture have been despatched to Europe on a horse-purchase
mission. Ten million yen have, I understand, been apportioned for the
purpose of improving the national breed of horses, and the delegates
have been instructed to purchase suitable animals for breeding. The
Japanese Government has almost invariably been successful in anything
it has undertaken, and I venture to predict--it is scarcely a
hazardous prophesy--that the horse supply of the country will ere long
be put on a satisfactory footing and the cavalry be rendered as
efficient as every other branch of the Japanese Army.
There is no fear of a military autocracy in Japan. The recent war
proved not only the bravery of the rank and file of the Army, but the
high military talent of the officers. The art of war had evidently
been studied from every point of view, and was diligently applied. The
Japanese talent, in my opinion, consists not in a mere mechanical
copying, but in a practical adaptation of all that is best in Western
civilisation. The tactics and strategy displayed during the war with
Russia showed originality in conception, brilliancy and daring. If
that war did not discover a Napoleon among the Japanese generals, it
can at least be said that Japan has no need of a Napoleon. As I have
said, there is no fear of the development of a military autocracy in
that country or the uprising of a general with Napoleonic ideas and
ambition. The generals who justly earned distinction during the recent
war are singularly modest men, with no capacity for self-advertising
and no desire whatever for self-aggrandisement. They are not only
content but anxious, now that the war is over, to sink into obscurity.
History will, however, not permit of that. Their achievements in the
recent campaign will long afford subject-matter for study and the
instruction of the military students of the future. In this book I
have as far as possible avoided mentioning names, otherwise I would
gladly inscribe on its pages the names of those many generals who
earned fame in the Russo-Japanese War. I feel perfectly certain that
every endeavour will be made to maintain the Japanese Army in the high
state of efficiency it has reached. At the same time I would emphasise
the fact that that Army is intended solely for defence. Japan has, in
a word, no military ambitions outside her own territory.
And as of the Army, so of the Navy. Perhaps the prowess of Japan's
Fleet impressed the English people even more than the victories of her
soldiers. Because the Navy, as it is to-day, is largely the outcome of
English training and the application of English ideas. In the first
instance Japan borrowed from the British Government the services of
some of its best naval officers to develop the Japanese Navy. A naval
college was established in the capital, modelled on the English system
of training. A dockyard was also constructed at Yokosko under French
guidance. It is, however, a mistake to suppose that Japan had no Navy
or no ambitions in the direction of creating one prior to English
naval officers being lent to the Japanese Government to assist in the
reorganisation of the Navy. The determination to create a fleet on
European lines was entertained by Japanese statesmen as far back as
the 'fifties, when the European Powers and the United States of
America were bringing pressure to bear on Japan with a view of
obtaining trading facilities and the opening up of the country
generally. The Japanese statesmen of those days were wise enough to
see that unless Japan was to be permanently under the tutelage of the
European Powers, it was necessary for her to construct a fleet and
army on European lines. Soon afterwards a naval school, under Dutch
instructors, was established at Nagasaki, and a certain number of
selected officers and men were sent to Europe to undergo a course of
instruction, and several war-vessels were ordered from Holland. In
1854 a two-masted ship was built in Japan from an English model, and
subsequently two others. During the war between Russia and Great
Britain a Russian sloop was wrecked on the Japanese coast, and
permission was obtained for Japanese workmen to be employed in the
repairs of the vessel, with a view of giving them an opportunity of
gaining some practical knowledge of naval architecture. In 1855 the
King of Holland presented a steam corvette to the Tycoon. In this year
the now familiar Japanese ensign--a red ball on a white ground--was
introduced, and has since remained the national flag.
On the arrival of Lord Elgin in Japan on a mission in 1857 a sailing
vessel at Nagasaki was flying the flag of an Admiral of the Japanese
Navy. In the same year a steam yacht was presented to the Tycoon by
the late Queen Victoria, and was formally handed over to the Japanese
Government by Lord Elgin. His secretary relates that the yacht got
under way, commanded by a Japanese captain and manned by Japanese
sailors, while her machinery was worked by Japanese engineers. The
secretary, in his account of the incident, relates that
"notwithstanding the horizontal cylinders and other latest
improvements with which her engines were fitted, the men had learnt
their lesson well, and were confident in their powers, and the yacht
steamed gallantly through and round the Fleet, returning to her
anchorage without a hitch." This authoritative statement ought to
dispose of the absurd story which has long been a chestnut among the
English community in Japan and the English naval officers on the China
station, that when the old Confederate Ram, the _Stonewall Jackson_,
was purchased in America and brought to Yokohama a somewhat ludicrous
incident occurred. According to the story, which, I may observe, is
one of the _ben trovato_ order, when steam was got up in the vessel
for trial purposes it had to steam round and about Yokohama Harbour,
to the great danger of the foreign warships and merchant steamers
there, until the steam was in due course exhausted and the machinery
automatically stopped through the lack of any motive power to drive
it, as the Japanese engineer in charge did not know how to shut off
steam. The _Stonewall Jackson_, I may observe, did not take part in
the now almost forgotten battle of Hakodate, which took place at the
time of the Revolution, and may be regarded as the expiring effort of
old Japan to stay the march of events in that country. In the battle
of Hakodate the rebel fleet was totally destroyed, and the various
clans in the country who possessed war-vessels of one kind or other
presented them to the central Government. These vessels, it must be
confessed, were not of much, if any, utility in the direction of
forming a Navy, and I am not aware how many of them, or indeed whether
any of them, were utilised for the purpose of inaugurating that Navy
which has now become world-famous.
In 1858 the naval school, which, as I have already stated, had been
established at Nagasaki, was transferred to Yeddo, and a few years
later the Japanese Government determined to obtain the assistance of
some English naval officers with a view of giving instruction in the
school. Application was accordingly made to the British Government
through the Minister in Yeddo, and the sanction of the Admiralty
having been obtained, a number of English naval officers were
selected, and despatched to Japan as instructors in the Yeddo Naval
College. Amongst these officers, it may be interesting to state, was
Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, V.C., G.C.B., the late Commander-in-Chief of
the Channel Fleet. In the year 1873 a number of other naval officers
were sent out from England, the previous staff having been withdrawn
on the outbreak of the Civil War. This staff was in charge of Admiral
Sir A. L. Douglas, till recently Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, and
for some years subsequently an English naval officer was at the head
of the instructing staff of the college. Japan was fortunate in one
respect--in the Englishmen she entrusted with the evolution of her
Navy. She was fortunate in attracting the men best fitted for the
work, and also in inspiring them with a high conception of their task.
Some Englishmen are of opinion that Japan has somewhat forgotten her
obligations in this matter. Young Japan, they suggest, desires to
forget the influences to which the country mainly owes its present
magnificent fleet. That fleet is undoubtedly, for the most part, the
outcome of English conceptions and English training. There is one man
whose name, I think, deserves to be recorded in connection therewith.
I refer to the late Lieutenant A. G. S. Hawes, of the Royal Marine
Light Infantry, who left the English Service and worked strenuously,
enthusiastically, and earnestly to build up the _personnel_ of the
Japanese Navy in the early 'seventies. There were others whose efforts
in the same direction assisted in that consummation, but Hawes's
services were unique and splendid. He believed in Japan, and he threw
himself into his work with a zeal and ardour which were beyond praise.
His services were dispensed with, as were those of the other English
officers and men, when it was felt that Japan had learnt sufficient to
work out her own destiny as a naval Power. The labours of these men
may not have been adequately recognised at the time, but their work
remains, and is in evidence to-day. Hawes received a decoration from
the Mikado, and the British Government gave him a consular appointment
in some obscure quarter of the globe, where he died a disappointed
man, fully sensible of the value of the work he had performed and
inspired, a firm believer in the future of Japan as a great naval
Power, but disgusted with the non-recognition of his labours.
The Navy of Japan as it is to-day is a triumph of organisation.
Discussing a short time ago the question with an ex-officer of the
Mercantile Marine who had, by a curious chance, served as a Naval
Reserve officer in both the English and Japanese Navies, he explained
to me the wonderful progress of the latter by pointing out that it had
been, as it were, called instantaneously into existence. The Japanese
Navy, he observed, had no past and no traditions to hamper its
development; its officers and administrators had only one desire--to
get the best of everything in modern naval science from anywhere.
There was no cult of seamanship, no dead wall of prejudice to trammel
modern naval developments. There was no prejudice at the Japanese
Admiralty against anything--save stagnation. Progress was the keynote
and watchword of the Japanese Navy. My friend assured me that it was,
as regards equipment, organisation, and general efficiency, the finest
fighting force the world has ever seen. So far as my own knowledge of
the matter goes, and so far as I am competent to express an opinion
on the subject, I fully endorse these observations. A visit to a
Japanese vessel-of-war, however perfunctory the knowledge of the
visitor may be on matters naval, very soon convinces him of the fact
that the Japanese naval officers and men are filled not only with
ardour but enthusiasm for their profession, that efficiency and
proficiency are the watchwords, and that the desire of every one
connected with the Navy, from the Admiral downwards, is to maintain
the _personnel_ and _materiel_ of the Fleet in the highest possible
condition of efficiency.
If, as some Englishmen imagine is the case, there is a tendency on the
part of young Japan to be oblivious of the fact that the Navy of the
country is greatly indebted for its present state of efficiency to the
zeal and efforts of English naval officers in its early days, there is
no question that the feeling of the officers and men of the Japanese
Navy to their English comrades is of a very hearty nature. The formal
alliance with Great Britain was highly popular in the Japanese Fleet,
and I have never heard any officer connected therewith speak in any
but the highest and most cordial terms of their English _confreres_.
It is not, I think, necessary for me to refer to the deeds of and the
work done by the Japanese Navy in the course of the war with Russia;
very much the same remarks that I have made in regard to the Army
apply here. Nothing was lost sight of or omitted that could in the
slightest degree tend to ensure or secure success. Everything seems to
have been foreseen. Nothing was left to chance. The results were
precisely what might have been expected, and what indeed were
expected, by those who had an intimate knowledge of the manner in
which the Japanese Navy was organised for war. I regard it especially
in alliance with the English Fleet, as one of the greatest safeguards
for the peace of the world. I trust the alliance between this country
and Japan may be of a permanent nature. I may remark in respect of the
Fleet, as I have of the Army, that Japan has no unworthy ambitions.
Her desire is to conserve what she possesses and to render her Island
Empire secure from invasion or molestation.
Closely connected with the development of Japan's Navy is that of her
Mercantile Marine. A few words in regard to it may therefore not be
out of place here. The insular position and the mountainous condition
of the country, as well as its extent of seaboard, early impressed on
the makers of new Japan the necessity for creating not only a great
mercantile fleet but also for developing the shipbuilding industry.
Both these ambitions have been largely realised. At first their
consummation was attended with many difficulties. The Japanese, as I
have already remarked in this book, were many centuries ago
enterprising sailors, but when the country was closed voyages of
discovery or trade automatically came to an end. With the awakening of
Japan a change immediately took place, and steps were taken to create
and develop the Mercantile Marine. A Japanese gentleman, Mr. Iwasaki,
in 1872 started a line of steamers, subsidised by the Government, the
well-known Mitsu Bishi Company. Shortly afterwards another company was
formed to compete against it. This line was also subsidised by the
Government, but as the rivalry did not prove profitable to either the
two lines were amalgamated in 1885 under the title of Nippon Yusen
Kaisha. Since then a number of other shipping companies have been
formed in Japan, and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha has largely extended its
operations, opening up communication with Bombay, England, and the
Continent, Melbourne, &c. In fact, the Japanese flag is now seen in
many parts of the world, while the Japanese Mercantile Marine has
advanced by leaps and bounds, and is still annually increasing. At the
end of 1904 there were about 240 steamers flying the Japanese flag,
with a gross tonnage of over 790,000. Japan now ranks high among the
maritime nations of the world, and her position therein, unless I am
very much mistaken, will still further advance in the years to come.
There are, I know, a great number of worthy people, both in this
country and Japan, who regard the expenditure on an Army and Navy as
entirely unproductive, and look forward to the halcyon days when all
such expenditure shall cease and the taxation now devoted to these
purposes shall be diverted to more worthy objects. I am afraid, as the
world is at present constituted, there is no prospect of such a, in
some respects, desirable consummation being effected. Nowadays the
most effective means a nation can possess in the direction of the
maintenance and enjoyment of peace is to be well prepared for war.
That is a fact of which I am sure the men responsible for the
government of Japan are firmly convinced; and I believe they are
right. I am certain, as I have said before, that the world has nothing
to fear from the armed strength of Japan by land or sea.