Operations Resumed.--Attack on Kin-tang.--The Battle of the
Brickbats.--Ti-ping Success.--Active
Operations.--Manoeuvring.--Hang-chow Invested.--Fall of
Kar-sing-foo.--Gordon's Proceedings.--Chang-chow-foo.--Narrative
of the Siege.--Fall of Chang-chow.--The Foo-wang.--Manchoo
Cruelty.--Debate on the Chinese War.--Lord Palmerston's
Policy.--Its Errors.--Mr. Cobden's Policy.--Mr. Layard.--His
Inaccuracy.--Extracts from the Debate.--Result of Lord
Palmerston's Policy.--Fall of Nankin.--"Imperialist"
Account.--The Chung-wang's Capture.--Other Reports.--Digest of
Events.--The Chung-wang.--His Position in Nankin.--Events in the
City.--Newspaper Reports.--Doubts as to the Chung-wang's
Fate.--The Retreat from Nankin.--Newspaper Extracts.--The
Shi-wang's Proclamations.--Lee Shai-Yin's Address.
Late in the month of February, 1864, the Futai's _General_, Gordon,
resumed operations against the Ti-pings. Upon this occasion it appears
that he acted entirely on his own responsibility, neither under the
orders of his hitherto controller, General Brown (commanding H.B.
Majesty's forces at Shanghae), nor the Futai. Consequently, the campaign
to be noticed partook more strongly of filibustering than any of the
preceding raids already described.
The first movement the Anglo-Manchoo force made was directed against the
walled city of Yih-sing, on the western shore of the Ta-hoo Lake, and
about forty miles south-west of Wu-see. After a short engagement, the
usual result of such operations occurred. The garrison, unable to resist
the overwhelming artillery employed by Gordon, an arm newly replenished
from the British arsenal at Shanghae before taking the field, was
driven from the city with much loss; those who managed to escape
retreating to Li-yang, the nearest walled town. Soon, however, they were
followed up to this place, but the commandant having received orders to
retire to another city, it was evacuated upon the appearance of the
disciplined troops and their irresistible guns.
The appearance of the country lately wrested from the Ti-pings is given
as follows by one of Gordon's own officers (who was present during all
operations) in his notes, "How the Taepings were driven out of the
provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang." Describing the march to Yih-sing,
he states:--
"Some commissariat boats also went astray, causing the infantry
a few days' hunger, as scarcely any food could be obtained, the
country being all deserted and devastated. Seemingly it had not
been cultivated easily _after the Taepings lost possession_.
Hundreds of dead bodies were strewn along the roads, people who
died from starvation; and even the few who were yet alive,
watched one of their comrades dying, so as to obtain some food
off his dead body."[75]
Sleep calmly and sweetly, ye China-rebel-subduing English politicians,
and speak authoritatively as to the benefit of your intervention in the
Chinese civil war, after reading this testimony from the hand of one of
your mercenary tools! Is there a man so ill-"liberal" as to consider
Lord Palmerston and colleagues are responsible for the results of their
policy of interference towards the outlandish Chinamen? What do the
starving Chinamen above mentioned say?
Their easy successes seem to have made the victorious enemy too
confident in their own prowess, and less cautious than heretofore.
Leaving a garrison at Li-yang, and also a considerable portion of his
artillery, Gordon next advanced upon Kin-tang, a small city to the
north-west. Elated by his former triumphs, and believing that his
appearance alone would cause the submission of all Ti-ping cities in the
district, and place their long-haired people under the barber's razor,
Gordon expected no resistance at Kin-tang, and was induced to think that
the place would open its gates to receive him as a sort of "conquering
hero" whenever he might choose to enter. It will be seen that he became
the victim of misplaced confidence.
Although, since my departure from China, and since the Ti-pings have
been driven far inland, all information has been received from Chinese
sources--false, exaggerated, and figurative--it seems pretty certain
that the Chung-wang, after parting with me at Wu-see, placed the Shi and
Foo Wangs in charge of the military position, while he proceeded to
Nankin in order to confer with his king, the Tien-wang. Chang-chow-foo
became the head-quarters of the Foo-wang, and it so happened that
Kin-tang was similarly occupied by the Shi-wang (a general second only
to the Commander-in-Chief in talent and capability), when Gordon arrived
before its walls. Both cities were situated on the southern road from
Nankin, and their retention was absolutely necessary to maintain either
the communications of the capital, or insure the retreat of the
garrison, should they be obliged to abandon their charge. In consequence
of this the Chung-wang divided about 10,000 of the best Ti-ping troops
between his two lieutenants for the express purpose of holding Kin-tang
and Chang-chow, while another force was organized to co-operate in the
field.
The two Wangs had concentrated all their strength at Chang-chow when
intelligence of Gordon's advance upon Kin-tang reached them. The
Shi-wang, with a division of several thousand men, by forced marches,
managed to throw himself into the city just before the enemy appeared.
When the Anglo-Manchoo contingent arrived under the walls on the 20th of
March, they summoned the place to surrender, but no reply was made, for
the battlements were silent and deserted, neither soldier nor spear,
nor sign of living occupation being visible. The gates were all fast
closed, and although Gordon had been looking forward to enter peaceably,
and when he had arrived could see neither trace of man nor prospect of
opposition, something there must have been ominous and suspicious in the
stillness reigning over the city, for he preferred battering the walls
down to knocking at the gates and demanding admission. The heavy guns
were moved up to within a few hundred yards; the boats, containing
supplies, followed them by the creeks; and batteries were soon thrown
up, still amidst the same profound and mysterious silence upon the part
of the garrison. During the bombardment all the noise was on one side;
nor flag, nor face, nor living thing could be observed about the
encompassed battlements. After several hours' constant firing, a large
and practicable breach was effected, and the 1st regiment of
Anglo-Chinese ordered to storm the silent ramparts. The enemy came
forward with a loud cheer, bearing with them bamboo bridges to throw
across the moat, while the stormers were closely supported by portions
of the 2nd and 5th regiments, who were allowed to enter the city ditch
in their boats and cross unopposed. The short space between the moat and
the foot of the breach was soon passed, and the storming column began to
ascend. At this moment the hitherto invisible garrison appeared and
broke their previous silence in a manner fatal to the assailants.
Manning every available position, they threw such incessant showers of
brickbats that the Imperialists, despite the gallant behaviour of their
foreign officers, were unable to advance. The Ti-pings then rushed into
the breach, and charging with their spears, drove them back in
confusion. Three times the enemy turned to renew the struggle, but on
each occasion were hurled back with loss, being quite unable to cope
with the Ti-ping soldiers in a hand-to-hand combat. The breach was now
played upon by the artillery, and the defenders driven back with great
loss of life from the canister, grape, and shell. Gordon then ordered
his Adjutant-General, Kirkham, to bring up fresh companies of the 2nd
and 5th regiments, and himself to lead them forward to a second assault.
Scarcely, however, had he given the order, when a jingall ball reached
him at his almost secure distance and wounded him in the leg. _Colonel_
Kirkham, with great bravery, led his men into the deadly breach, but
when half-way up, fell severely wounded. Still, with courage worthy of a
better cause, his men followed their officers only to be again charged
by the valiant garrison and completely routed after a desperate conflict
at close quarters. Again the murderous artillery swept away the
defenders of the breach, and _Major_ Brown, Gordon's _aide-de-camp_,
leading forward fresh columns, made a last desperate attempt to storm
the yawning chasm. Again the disciplined Chinese and their foreign
officers rushed upon the blood-stained ruins; but with dauntless and
undiminished courage the Ti-pings again met them--spear to bayonet and
firelock, and man to man. After a terrible struggle the assailants were
finally driven off, and retreated upon Li-yang, with _Major_ Brown and
all their commanding officers _hors-de-combat_. This action has been
called "the Battle of the Brickbats," such missiles being the principal
means of defence used by the garrison.
The attack upon Kin-tang was the most severely contested action that the
Anglo-Manchoo troops had ever fought. Their defeat is to be attributed
to the fact that they were not assisted by an overwhelming park of
artillery, which usually did all the fighting. If the Imperialists had
not been supplied with British guns, men, and munitions of war, _ad
libitum_, the Ti-pings would have been quite able to manage the
disciplined legions. Gordon, in this assault, lost fourteen European
officers and nearly one-seventh of the men engaged. The destruction
amongst the defenders of Kin-tang must have been equally severe, not
less than 600 having fallen.
At this period the Ti-pings seem to have made a desperate effort to
defeat the overwhelming numbers of the enemy encircling them on every
quarter. At Nankin, Chang-chow-foo, and Kin-tang they managed to defeat
the Imperialist forces almost on the same day at each place. The
garrison of the capital having sallied forth in strength, defeated a
portion of the great beleaguering army under Tseng-kwo-fan (Imperialist
Commissioner and Governor-General of the two Kiang provinces) with much
slaughter. Upon reaching Li-yang, after narrowly escaping being
surrounded by the troops pursuing from Kin-tang, Gordon received
intelligence the same evening that the garrison of Chang-chow had
sallied out, completely routing the large investing force commanded by
the Futai's brother, and following up the success by moving between
Soo-chow and Shanghae, thereby threatening not only to recapture all the
country lately wrested from Ti-ping rule, but isolate his division and
more than counteract its operations by a powerful diversion upon
Shanghae or Soo-chow.
Leaving a strong detachment to garrison Li-yang, Gordon at once
proceeded with the remainder of his force, and all the artillery, to
operate against the Ti-pings from Chang-chow. On the 29th of March he
came upon them at Hwa-soo, in the neighbourhood of the city of Chang-zu,
about 35 miles north-east of Soo-chow. On the morning of the 30th,
finding that the Ti-pings did not number more than 3,000, he ordered
about 1,500 infantry to attack them, while he followed in the boats with
the artillery, to give assistance if required. Again, as at Kin-tang,
the Royal Engineer was completely out-generalled. The Foo and Shi Wangs
were both consummate strategists, and at irregular warfare, when
artillery was not employed against them, would easily have foiled Major
Gordon.
The Ti-pings continually gave way as the disciplined troops advanced;
but they were manoeuvred so as to draw their pursuers into a position
from which for a time they were themselves invisible, while a masked
breast-work, ingeniously stretched across the end of the slight hollow,
helped to conceal them. Barely had the retreating forces disappeared
behind their slight intrenchment and the inequalities of the ground,
when they were doubled back upon each flank so as to almost completely
envelop the enemy. The Ti-pings were allowed to execute their manoeuvre
thus easily through the incautious advance of their antagonists, for the
latter halted in the very hollow to which they had been enticed,
directly they lost sight of those whom they were pursuing. When next the
Imperialists saw their opponents, it was in the form of a serried line,
surrounding them upon every side except a small space in their rear, and
charging them on front and both flanks. After a feeble resistance,
during which they lost seven English officers and more than 200 men, the
ranks of Gordon's force were broken, and the whole mercenary contingent
fled from the field with precipitation.
According to the published accounts of this engagement, the Ti-pings
were commanded by the Foo-wang, "numbered about 3,000," and were "badly
armed." It will thus be seen that, without artillery being brought to
bear against them, they were quite able to cope hand to hand with the
disciplined troops, officered by foreigners and well armed with musket
and bayonet as the latter were, although poorly equipped with a small
supply of jingalls, a few bad European firearms, and a majority of
bamboo spears.
During the spring of the year 1864, the Ti-pings struggled with
desperate bravery against the odds opposed to them; and for some time it
seemed very doubtful whether they would succeed or not. While Gordon and
the Imperialist troops were being defeated in the northern districts of
the Ti-ping territory, the Franco-Manchoo contingent and co-operating
forces were meeting a similar fate in the south. Late in February the
Imperialists besieging Hang-chow, the provincial capital of Che-kiang,
were totally defeated by a sortie of the whole garrison. About the same
time another large army was routed by a Ti-ping force in the
neighbourhood of Fo-yang, a city not far from Hang-chow. Having
recovered from their former repulse and obtained fresh supplies of
British mercenaries and munitions of war, the Mandarins again proceeded
to invest the provincial capital. On the 2nd of March the
Franco-Chinese, commanded by _Generals_ D'Aiguebelle and Schodelana,
attacked the above city, and after several hours' hard fighting,
succeeded in capturing three forts on the south side; only, however, to
be driven out by a desperate charge the Ti-pings made during the
afternoon, with a loss of fourteen Europeans and more than a hundred
men. On the 29th of the same month, the besiegers recommenced active
operations. Supported by a strong body of Imperialists, the
Franco-Chinese attacked and carried the outworks of the city a second
time, the garrisons retiring within the walls after some hard fighting.
The next day fire was opened upon the city from numerous siege
artillery, and a practicable breach was soon effected. Again the
Franco-Chinese, or more correctly speaking, Manchoos, led the assault,
but met with such gallant resistance that they were driven back to their
supports in confusion. Twice they bravely rallied, and twice they
endeavoured to storm the breach, rendered impregnable by the brave
hearts and ready hands defending it, and each time they were repulsed
with great slaughter. At the close of the day the assault was given up,
after a heavy loss of life, and a vast expenditure of British shot and
shell without other result.
Although Hang-chow could not be wrested from the Ti-pings by force of
arms, a few days later it fell from external influences, having been
rendered untenable through the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the enemy,
whereby its supplies and lines of communication were cut off.
About the same time that Gordon commenced his raid upon Yih-sing,
Li-yang, and Kin-tang, Manchoo General Ching proceeded with a large army
and an auxiliary force composed of detachments from the English
contingent, to beleaguer the city of Kar-sing-foo, situated about midway
between Soo-chow and Hang-chow, on the Grand Canal. Ching was the
bravest native general engaged against the Ti-pings; he was a renegade
from their cause, and we all know that such people make the most bitter
enemies. He had already been defeated before the city, shortly after I
had left it on my last return to Shanghae. Gordon's subordinate,
_Colonel_ Bailey, had charge of the large siege train accompanying the
army, and in a few hours after establishing his batteries, managed to
effectively breach the walls of the doomed city. On rushed Ching's men
and their allies, but their efforts were useless, for every assault
failed; and Ching himself received a wound which, more than a month
later, proved mortal. Some few days subsequent to this repulse, large
reinforcements were received by the enemy, fresh breaches were made, and
the small but devoted garrison was compelled to evacuate the place at
night, having lost their gallant commander, Yoong-wang, and nearly
two-thirds of their number. When the Imperialists at last entered, they
put to the sword all the unfortunate non-combatants who had not fled the
city,[76] sparing neither man, woman, nor child, during their cruel
butchery of the unoffending inhabitants. Does Colonel Gordon, R.E., call
this "observing the rules of warfare as practised among foreign
nations," according to the proviso of Sir F. Bruce? Does Sir F. Bruce,
after the massacres at Wu-see, Kar-sing, &c., still term Gordon's
conduct "a service in favour of humanity"?
After the loss of Kar-sing, Hang-chow was also evacuated, and the two
garrisons retreated to the large city of Hoo-chow-foo. The fortune of
war now set strongly against the Christian patriots. With a few
memorable exceptions, they were everywhere defeated, through the British
influence so cruelly brought to bear against them, for which they were
always unprepared, and equally unable to resist.
Having retired to Quin-san (the head-quarters of the Anglo-Manchoo
contingent), after his defeat at Hwa-soo, Gordon was shortly joined by
an Imperialist army of 15,000 men. A body of troops, commanded by
officers of H.B. Majesty's 67th regiment, was also moved from Shanghae
to support them. The Imperialists and the whole disciplined force,
together with the latter's large park of artillery, now took the field
again and moved upon the Foo-wang's position. The Ti-pings were still
lightly intrenched at the village of Hwa-soo; they had been strongly
reinforced by the Shi-wang, but were considerably hampered by a large
number of country people who had fled from the enemy.
On the 11th of April the Imperialists commenced their attack, but,
warned by former defeats, they entirely depended upon their artillery,
to which the Ti-pings had not a single gun to reply with. The
over-matched defenders were at last shelled out of their open
breast-works with great slaughter, and being outflanked by the
disciplined and undisciplined enemy, were much cut up during their
retreat, while a great number were made prisoners and savagely put to
death, as described in Chapter XXIII. by the letter of an officer
present, under the eyes of _General_ Gordon. The loss of the Ti-pings on
this occasion was very heavy. Although the Shi and Foo Wangs succeeded
in cutting their way through the enemy with their best troops, at least
8,000 unfortunates, principally country people, were killed.
Following up his success, Gordon pursued the retreating force to
Chang-chow-foo. Meanwhile troops were being concentrated upon the same
point from every quarter, so that within a few days the city was
surrounded by an immense Imperialist army, which was estimated to exceed
100,000 men. The Shi-wang having proceeded to Kin-tang, the garrison
commanded by the Foo-wang cannot have consisted of more than 7,000 to
8,000 effective soldiers, but at least 10,000 civilians, including all
persons of any standing in the Chang-chow district, and who were Ti-ping
subjects, or held civil office under the Tien-wang's Government, had
sought refuge within the city walls, carrying with them their movable
property and their families, whereby the number of non-combatants was
more than doubled.
Three times already had the Imperialists been completely routed before
the city, and the siege raised by the gallant resistance of the
garrison, although on two occasions the enemy were assisted by
detachments of foreign artillery and disciplined troops. After much hard
fighting the defenders were driven from all their outworks and strictly
confined to the city walls, when the besiegers at once proceeded to
effect several breaches. The following account of the subsequent efforts
of Gordon and the Futai to storm the place is partly transcribed from
the narrative of an officer engaged, and which was published in the
_Shanghae Recorder_ of May 2, 1864.
The Ti-pings having been driven from all their stockades and
intrenchments to the west of the city, and these being occupied by a
strong force of Imperial troops, Gordon moved round opposite the
south-east angle, and commenced forming his siege batteries, while the
Imperialists placed their guns on his left, facing the south of the
city. A combined attack was arranged for the 27th of April, but as the
Imperialist batteries were ready on the 24th, and the troops who had so
often been defeated were eager to storm, and averse to relinquish their
hope of taking the city, the Futai gave orders to open fire, and by
three o'clock in the afternoon a capital breach was effected. The
advance was sounded and the stormers pushed on steadily to the city
ditch, but were there thrown into confusion by some defect in the
bridges. At last, however, they scrambled across, and advancing through
the stakes got to the foot of the breach, where they maintained
themselves for a considerable time; but the defenders, notwithstanding a
most destructive covering fire from the Imperialist guns and from a
battery of Gordon's enfilading the _terre plein_, manned the breach and
wall with great courage, regardless of life, and compelled the
assailants to fall back with heavy loss. This ended the first day's
assault.
Gordon's guns having been put in position during the night, and a
pontoon bridge laid down over the city ditch (the garrison was too weak
to prevent the same by a sortie, and had not a single cannon to oppose
its construction), at daybreak he opened fire, while the Imperialists'
batteries did the same to knock away the barricades thrown up in their
breach. Bang, bang, went the heavy guns, as quickly followed by the boom
of bursting shell tearing up ponderous masses of the wall, and burying
beneath them many of the defenders, while the smaller guns laid along
the parapet right and left operated with deadly effect wherever the
garrison appeared, or opened fire with their jingalls or musketry. By
half-past twelve o'clock the new breach was rendered practicable, and
the signal was given to the Imperialists to storm at the old one. On
rushed the 4th Regiment of Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries, bravely led by
_Colonel_ Howard, and forward came the Ti-pings to the breach,
determined and daring, to be mowed down in heaps by the terrible
covering fire of the artillery; but no sooner down than their place was
filled by their followers rushing with unabated courage to the defence.
In the words of the officer whose narrative we are making contribute to
this history:--The edge of the city ditch was gained, and over went the
4th Regiment's colours, accompanied by Colonel Howard, Captain Cane
(R.A.), and Lieutenant Stackpole, and up the breach through a shower of
missiles and fire-balls. Then came that deadly pause, the colours waving
on the breach, defended by a few brave men. The defenders and assailants
hesitated. They stood at bay for a moment. The "celestial" nature shrank
from the dread conflict hand to hand. The officers attempted to break
the spell: they pushed their men, they pulled them, they beat them with
their swords, but in vain. The Ti-pings, fighting for life, sooner
recovered their presence of mind, and every man discharged his missile
on the heads of the assailants. The colours and their defenders were
pushed off the wall down the breach, and had to retire over the bridge
on their column. A murderous fire was poured from every loop-hole, men
were falling fast, yet the attacking force stood its ground, but
hesitated to advance to where it would have been comparatively safe,
being too low for the aim of the besieged. The retire was now sounded,
and the stormers fell back to cover.
The Ti-pings suffered terribly from the superior arms of their
assailants, and now that they had succeeded in repulsing them a second
time, they were swept from the shattered walls by the artillery, which
still continued to fire on them. At half-past two o'clock in the
afternoon the enemy were ready at both points of attack for a
simultaneous movement. Up went their signal rockets, a yell burst from
the ranks of Gordon's force, which was taken up and carried along the
Imperialist lines, and on came both storming parties at a rapid pace.
The 3rd Regiment of the English contingent now made the assault, and
their colours were borne up the breach by Captain Winstanley (H.M.'s
67th Regiment), and other officers rallying around them and fighting
hand to hand with the defenders. The Imperialists crossed their bridges,
crowded at the foot of the other breach, and waved their flags about,
but hesitated to mount it. With their bamboo spears, and undiminished
courage, the brave garrison rushed to meet their well-armed enemy,
while all who possessed firearms plied them diligently from the walls,
and others kept up an incessant volley of brickbats from the heaps piled
ready for use around the rampart, and which formed a principal means of
defence. Still Gordon's troops maintained their position on the walls,
and, if possible, began to increase the extent of their lodgment, whilst
the Ti-pings were falling fast from the musketry of the enemy, which
they had but small means to answer. At this critical moment the Foo-wang
headed a last desperate charge in person. Leading forward all his
unwounded men, this gallant chief inspired them with fresh ardour, while
the efforts of the assailants began to flag. As one present stated: The
contest every moment became more close, and was prolonged for at least
twenty minutes. At length the stormers were driven from the ground they
had gained, and hurled to the bottom of the breach. Several times they
struggled to mount again, but every attempt was futile. The rear ranks
of the enemy being under the fire from the wall, lost heavily in killed
and wounded, while the front ranks, so desperately opposed, could not
advance. The order to retire was now given, and the assaulting forces
were withdrawn to cover, while their artillery again swept the breach
with canister, shell, and grape, inflicting fearful havoc among the
dauntless garrison of Chang-chow. During all this time the Imperialists
had hurried on column after column to assault by their own breach, but
none were able to effect a lodgment within the well-defended walls of
the city. Every attack was repulsed with great slaughter upon both
sides, and at last the bravest of the late General Ching's--he had died
from the effects of a wound in the head received at Kar-sing--Mandarins
advanced with his men, but though he passed the sticking point and got
his colours partly into the breach, yet he too was brought to a stand
and obliged to retire. The assault was now abandoned, and the besiegers
carried off their killed and wounded, including 27 European officers,
400 of the English contingent, and about 1,500 Imperialists.
Although the Ti-pings were victorious, and had succeeded in defeating
every attack upon the city, their triumph was only purchased by an awful
sacrifice of life. When the stormers mounted the wall a fearful sight
was before them. "Far as the eye could see, heaps upon heaps lay dead
and mangled." During the different assaults at least one half the
garrison were placed _hors-de-combat_, principally by the murderous fire
of the enemy's artillery, which they were totally unable to countervail,
having none to reply with. Chang-chow being completely surrounded by the
vast Imperialist army, its fall, either by famine or the sword, was
certain.
Having established fresh batteries at a different part of the city, on
the 11th of May the enemy succeeded in capturing it. Upon this occasion
two immense breaches were made, while the incessant artillery fire, and
the overwhelming rush of the enormously superior assailing force over
the wide-spread ruins of the wall, quickly overpowered the last gallant
resistance offered by the remnant of the garrison. A comparison of the
casualties of the English contingent at each attack affords the best
proof that the terrible results of the first had almost exterminated the
defenders. At the first attack the contingent lost 27 officers and 400
men; at the second, only 2 killed and 5 wounded! When the Imperialists
poured through the two fresh breaches, the best and bravest of the
remaining Ti-ping soldiers sacrificed themselves in the futile effort to
repulse them, while their comrades, although fighting desperately to the
last, were driven from the walls, and then through the streets of the
city, still disputing the ground step by step. At last the few survivors
were brought to bay in the commandant's palace. Throughout all the
fighting the brave Foo-wang had been foremost in leading and encouraging
his troops, and now, still unwounded, with several officers and a score
or two of men, he made a last desperate stand in his own house. One by
one his few followers--unable to conquer, but determined to die with
their faces to the foe and their hands raised to the last in defence of
their noble cause--fell around him, and then for a moment he fought
alone against a host of assailants. Still he was not killed, for a price
was fixed upon his capture alive. At length this dauntless chief, whose
acquaintance I have valued, and whose elegist I am proud though grieved
to have become, was overpowered by numbers and beaten to the ground,
though not until many an enemy had fallen under his heavy sword. Even
when disarmed and helpless in the grasp of the foe, he still struggled
against a fate that would never have befallen him but for the
unexpected, irresistible, and unrighteous military interference of
England. One report of the capture of Chang-chow (_China Mail_, May 30)
states:--"The chief (Foo-wang) of those who were in command of the city,
fought in his palace to the last, and required ten men to bind his hands
and secure him; and, when brought into the presence of the Futai,
refused submission or to pay any respect to him, saying, 'Ah! were it
not for the aid of the disciplined troops (under Gordon) he defied all
the Futai's hosts to take the city from him.'" If the British army,
arsenals, and navy had been thrown open to supply the young and vigorous
revolution, instead of _wasting_ their help upon the corrupt and
hopeless Manchoo, how great would the success and future results have
been! With all the British assistance the Imperialists have barely been
able to drive the Ti-pings from their cities and possessions in the
provinces of Che-kiang and Kiang-nan, much less to suppress the great
Christian and patriotic movement, or insure its final extinguishment.
The Foo-wang was cruelly put to death by his merciless captors. "The two
breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was given _to only a few
hundred men_;" so says the report above quoted from. How many days the
triumphant Mandarins were engaged butchering the unfortunate inhabitants
does not transpire; but, with the exception of the small number
mentioned, the whole 12,000, besides the garrison, with their families,
were massacred. Two years' provisions were found in the city, and this
being stored in the Ti-ping granaries, was the entire produce of the
district, and was the sole means destined to support the people during
the ensuing season. The whole supply was seized by the Imperialists; and
though previous to their success much misery had been caused by the
general effect of the war, after their capture of the departmental city
the entire department was starved; such being the usual result of
Manchoo re-establishment in any locality, and particularly so at
Chang-chow-foo, as proved by the letter of the first English-contingent
officer in Chapter XXIII.
We have now noticed four authenticated instances (the captures of
Wu-see, Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, and Chang-chow-foo), subsequent to
Gordon's return to service, when the conditions upon which Sir F. Bruce
gave his approval to that officer's action were violated by the
wholesale massacre of the vanquished and prisoners. We may, therefore,
while expressing boundless disgust at Colonel Gordon's persistent
continuance in the Futai's service after each and every one of these
atrocities, fairly presume that the astounding assertion as to his
influence in favour of humanity--in spite of the eulogy by Mr.
Montgomery Martin at a late "China dinner" in London, wherein he stated
that the officer in question had done more _for_ the "civil cause" in
China than all the bishops, merchants, and military put together--is not
only negatived, but quite reversed.
Soon after the capture of Chang-chow-foo, Colonel Gordon was compelled
to withdraw from active military operations by the Order in Council,
prohibiting further aid to the Manchoo. He managed, however, to continue
acting contrary to the ordinance, by organizing camps of instruction
and proceeding to Nankin in person, there to advise the besieging forces
commanded by Tseng-kwo-fan.
About the time the events noticed in this chapter were taking place in
China, in England the energetic opposition of such men as Lord Naas,
Colonel Sykes, Hon. Mr. Liddell, Mr. White, Messrs. Bright, Cobden, &c.,
from their places in the House of Commons, drew attention to the
subject, and will ever stand as a memorable protest against the criminal
policy of the Government.
During the second debate of the session on "British relations with
China" (May 20, 1864), Mr. Baxter, M.P., very happily termed the policy
of the Government "not a comedy of errors, but a tragedy of errors."
Lord Palmerston, in this case, defended his policy by a very
extraordinary argument, which it is singular that his opponents did not
use to his confusion. Coming out as the advocate of intervention in
foreign affairs, he stated, as a justification of his war against the
Ti-pings:--
"We have interfered in other countries, and with great benefit
to those countries.... We interfered in the case of Greece, and
established the independence of the Greek state. We interfered
in the affairs of Belgium, and established it as an independent
state. We interfered in the case of Portugal, and enabled the
people of that country to obtain a free and parliamentary
constitution. (Hear, hear.) We interfered in the affairs of
Spain with equal success, and a similar result.... We interfered
in a great measure in those events which led to the Crimean
war.... We interfered in the affairs of China; and why? Because
our treaty rights _were_ endangered, and our national interests
_were_ at stake."
Now, the noble Premier here cites a number of precedent cases;
unfortunately, however, for his argument and acumen, on each occasion
referred to, England, as worthily became her, interfered in the cause of
an oppressed people; whereas, in the present case, he had been the
active originator of an intervention diametrically the very opposite--a
military interference _against_ the oppressed natives of China, who were
striving to liberate _and Christianize_ their unfortunate country. If
Lord Palmerston had interfered in the spirit of the cases which came so
glibly to his voluble tongue, he would have interfered to support the
Ti-pings--not to slaughter them.
After striving to justify his policy by precedents which should have
entirely reversed it, Lord Palmerston was equally unhappy in his faulty
explanation of the reasons "why" he interfered in China. As the Hon. Mr.
Liddell, M.P., well said in his speech after the Premier, "The noble
Viscount said that the Government interfered because the treaty rights
were in danger. He wanted to know in what single instance had our treaty
rights or our trade been in danger? He had asked that question before,
and he now repeated it. (Hear, hear.) He wished to know any instance in
which either the property or the life of a British subject had been
placed in danger?"
Every member of the British Parliament, who questioned the China policy
of the Government, has asked the same question. It has never been
answered, because there is really not a single fact on which to base an
answer. Colonel Sykes, M.P., has frequently defied and challenged the
Government to cite one act ever committed by the Ti-pings prejudicial to
British interests, and they have been quite unable to do so; for none
are upon record.
Those who have been interested enough to wade through the compiled
portion of this work will, no doubt, at once perceive the truthlessness
of Lord Palmerston's charge against the Ti-pings, viz., that they
endangered the treaty rights and national interests of England. No
particle of truth mingles with the unfounded charge; no tittle of proof
has ever been produced to justify the undeclared hostilities perpetrated
against a friendly people which were consequent on it.
Besides this, the venerable Premier was no less unfortunate with each
proposition he chose to base his arguments upon. To prove the cruelty
of the Ti-pings, he stated:--
"A steamer, called the _Firefly_, was carried off, and four or
five men, who were upon the vessel, were roasted to death.
"Colonel Sykes.--'By whom?'
"Lord Palmerston.--'The Taepings.'
"Colonel Sykes.-'No, no!'"
Now, by the above extract from the _Standard's_ report of the debate, we
find that the Prime Minister's vivid imagination positively roasted the
men whose fate has never yet been ascertained even in China. They are
referred to in Chapter XXIV. of this work, but whether they are living
or dead, and, if dead, how they were killed, are questions which have
never yet been satisfactorily answered; and, from the mystery in which
the fate of the unfortunate men is involved, probably never will be.
Again, in a feeble effort to vaunt the duration and existence of the
Manchoo dynasty, and, consequently, to make it appear that the Ti-pings
were not striving to expel a foreign rule of comparatively modern
establishment (which has never been entirely acknowledged nor submitted
to, which has always been rebelled against, and which is still foreign
to and hated by the Chinese), but, on the contrary, were simply rebels
against an ancient and legitimate throne, Lord Palmerston made another
very singular and important _mistake_. He tried to be satirical in
commenting upon the excellent speech made by Mr. Baxter, M.P., who
brought on the debate, by stating:--
"My hon. friend says he has studied the Blue Books, but I
apprehend that he has not equally studied the history of China.
He talks of the Imperial dynasty as having been recently
established over a conquered country; and, if I am not
misinformed, I think it has existed for nearly 500 years."
Well, the noble Premier was misinformed, and very much so, too. The
Manchoo Tartars invaded China A.D. 1644; they had not established
themselves as its masters before the year 1683. It was, doubtless, very
funny and gratifying to chaff a troublesome member out of countenance,
but still there must be some people who expect the Chief Minister of the
British Government to be pretty accurate in the statements he makes from
his place in the House of Parliament.
We will now notice a few incidents of the next, and last, debate on
China; when the late Mr. Cobden, on the evening of May 31, 1864, rose to
move in the House of Commons:--
"That, in the opinion of this House, the policy of
non-intervention, by force of arms, in the internal political
affairs of foreign countries, which we profess to observe in our
relations with the states of Europe and America, should be
observed in our intercourse with the Empire of China."
Mr. Cobden, after making a truly magnificent and exhaustive speech, was
replied to by Mr. Layard, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. Out of the many distinguished Members who followed, only one,
Mr. Gregson, supported the policy of the Government; and he, by faintest
praise and three minutes' unmeaning talk, proved but a poor champion, if
he did not make a worse case for his superiors.
At the termination of the debate, Mr. Cobden withdrew his motion because
Lord Palmerston distinctly avowed the failure and abandonment of his
policy of intervention in China, and declared his intention to preserve
an entirely neutral, defensive attitude in future.
The faithlessness and falsehood induced by the evil course adopted by
the British Government in persistently endeavouring to carry out Lord
Palmerston's pertinacious, crotchety, unrighteous policy to force
British trade upon China (which involved the necessity of crushing the
Imperial power, and then that of the Ti-ping revolution which would have
succeeded it, so that, in fact, the British Government could dictate its
whims without fear of refusal or opposition) were singularly
exemplified during the debate referred to.
We have seen that in the preceding debate Lord Palmerston plainly and
frankly declared:--
"We interfered in the affairs of China; and why?"
Now, Mr. Layard, when replying to Mr. Cobden's speech, stated:--
"Her Majesty's Government had been accused of supporting the
Chinese" (Manchoo) "government against the Taipings. [Cries of
hear, hear!] _He had pointed out that such was not the
case._"--He then qualified this sentence by saying,--"Beyond our
preventing the Taepings entering the treaty ports FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM, a course which we were compelled to
take."
First, Mr. Layard denies the interference declared by Lord Palmerston,
and then he admits it, attempting to justify the policy by the sweeping
assertion in capitals. Now, if the ministers were "compelled" to prevent
the Ti-pings entering the treaty ports, how is it that they were allowed
to capture and occupy the treaty port of Ningpo? And now, to impugn Mr.
Layard's veracity, if the Ti-pings endeavoured to enter the treaty ports
"FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM," how is it that they held the city
of Ningpo for many months and did not destroy the least particle of
property within its walls?
Mr. Layard's fault is a common one, only in an uncommon position. He
knew that the policy of the Government was wrong, he knew that he was
wrong himself, and besides occupying the pugnacious position of buffer
or breakwater to the Foreign Office, he did not like to admit it. Poor
Mr. Layard's situation must be an unpleasant one sometimes. He has
unpleasant work to do. Undoubtedly he has an irritable temper and a
sharp tongue, but it is rather unfortunate that he has a bad memory.
After stating that her Majesty's Government had not been interfering,
"such was not the case," beyond preventing the destruction of the
treaty ports, and affirming, "the hon. gentleman the member for Montrose
(Mr. Baxter), the other evening, after condemning the policy of the
Government, concluded by expressing a wish, that the Government would
continue to defend the treaty ports and protect British interests in
China. _That was what the Government had been doing all along._" After
thus expressing himself, Mr. Layard declared, "His hon. friend had
really condemned a state of things in China _which no longer existed_."
That is to say, Mr. Layard firstly stated that the hostilities waged
against the Ti-pings were only to protect British interests; in fact,
simply a defensive policy; and, secondly, he stated that such policy "no
longer existed." Therefore, the natural deduction is that the British
Government ceased to protect British interests at the treaty ports;
such, however, was not and is not the case. The change that took place
was the abandonment of the policy "of supporting the Chinese (Manchoo)
Government against the Taepings," and the cessation of further
aggressive military and naval operations against them. This was
satisfactorily proved by the Premier's speech, who sadly contradicted
his subordinate's defensive theory, as the following extracts from it
will show:--
"Now, it is almost unnecessary, I think, for them" (the members
who had spoken against his policy) "to have expressed their
opinion with regard to the expedition of Captain Osborn, and the
employment of Major Gordon and others, because we have stated on
former occasions that those Orders in Council under which those
officers _were employed_" (by the Manchoo Government; how about
Mr. Layard's "such was not the case"?) "have been revoked....
Therefore that policy is at an end." (Now the following is a
plain avowal of what Mr. Cobden brought his motion against.) "I
think that we were perfectly justified in the steps we took,
because it is evident that the more we can contribute to the
_internal classification_ of China, the more the trade, which
everybody agrees is the main and principal object of our going
to China, the more that trade would flourish....
"If, by allowing a British subject _to enter into the service of
the Emperor_ _of China_,[77] we have been the means of
strengthening the hands of the Chinese Government, and enabling
them to put down in any degree or diminish the scope of that
rebellion, I say we should have been rendering not only a
service to China, but promoting those objects to which alone our
intercourse with China ought to be confined.[78] THOSE MEASURES
HAVE FAILED, and I am sorry for it."
After this expression of opinion it is by no means surprising to find
the Premier declaring a little further on, in the same speech: "I say it
is the duty of this country to endeavour by _all the means_ in her power
to extend her commerce." Under _these_ circumstances it is not difficult
to account for the intervention in China, and while Englishmen, who have
any respect for the principles of right and justice, may regret their
late lamented statesman did not say, "by all the" righteous or
legitimate "means in her power," they cannot fail to feel gratified that
"those measures have failed," even though the originator of the
measures, their late popular and jaunty minister, was "sorry for it."
Those measures have failed! it is true. They have failed miserably; they
have failed to work good, but not to do harm. England has derived no
benefit from them, China has received much evil. The schemes to
Anglicise the Chinese army, navy, and civil service have failed; the
efforts to extinguish rebellion against the Manchoo allies of the
British Government (after the last war had rendered them quite powerless
and docile _for the time being_) have likewise signally failed, for
rebellion is more rife than ever: but "those measures" have been
famously successful in causing an enormous sacrifice of life, in
injuring the cause of Christianity and civilization, and obstructing its
progress in China for the present.
The failure of Lord Palmerston's policy came all too late for
rectifying the evil already perpetrated. Within two months of his public
announcement that the measures of his administration had failed, Nankin,
the capital and the political strength of the Ti-pings, fell into the
hands of the Imperialists. Assisted, as we have described, by the
powerful, though underhanded, British alliance, the Manchoo forces were
enabled to capture or isolate every city beyond the capital. When
Chang-chow-foo was taken by the Englishman Gordon, the neighbouring
cities of Tan-yang, Kin-tang, &c., became untenable, and were
consequently evacuated by their garrisons. Under command of
Le-shih-seen, the Shi-wang (the Chung-wang's cousin, sometimes
figuratively referred to as his "brother"), were also the troops from
Hang-chow (capital of Che-kiang), Kar-sing-foo, Yih-shing, Li-yang, and
many smaller places. Between these forces and Nankin the vast army
commanded by the Imperialist Le-Futai now intervened, but their
communication with the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, at the south of the
Ta-hoo lake, and strongly garrisoned by several wangs, was still intact.
Unable to advance against the superior forces of the enemy, much less to
reach Nankin and endeavour to rescue it from the besieging army of
Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan, at least 80,000 to 100,000 strong, the
Shi-wang commenced what seems to have been a preconcerted retreat to the
south. This occurred during the month of June.
Shortly afterwards, on the 19th of July, 1864, Nankin reverted to
Manchoo authority. Thus the city which had been the capital of the great
Ti-ping revolution and the head-quarters of its Government during more
than eleven years, and which throughout that period had defied the
strongest efforts of the rulers of the greatest and most populous empire
in the world, succumbed at last through the unjustifiable hostilities
and crotchety, bullying, meddlesomeness of the British Government or
some of its members.
Again, soon after this overwhelming disaster, the Ti-ping forces at
Hoo-chow-foo, after soundly beating their immediate adversaries,
evacuated that city, and followed in the rear of the Shi-wang's army, if
they did not join it during the nearly simultaneous retrograde movement.
During the months of May, June, July, and August, 1864, the remnants of
Ti-pingdom continued retreating to the southern provinces.
We must now consider for a moment the loss of Nankin. Of the two other
events--the retreat of the Shi-wang's army and the retreat from
Hoo-chow--it is needless to say much, as these fugitives are well known
to be safe, and at present advantageously disputing the enemy in the
south of China.
The only records of the fall of the Ti-ping capital are those of
Imperialist origin, and the lying proclivities of the whole body of
Manchoo officials are too well known to need comment.
The following particulars are condensed from the Mandarin reports; they
cannot be depended upon except to a very limited extent, and are,
therefore, succeeded by a version I have deduced from almost every
source of European information in China, comprising the Shanghae and
Hong-kong press, and intelligence gathered for me by friends on the
spot. Besides this, I have carefully traced the progress of events since
the fall of Nankin till the present moment, and have found my former
experience of much value in disentangling contradictory and confused
statements.
The Imperialist accounts of the capture of Nankin are to the following
effect:--
On the 17th of August news reached the besieging army that the Tien-wang
had committed suicide by swallowing gold-leaf. The Imperialists now
pushed on their works more rapidly than before, and on the 19th of the
same month, having run an enormous mine under the north-east gate, they
fired it, and completely destroyed a portion of the wall, about one
hundred and twenty feet in length. It is also reported that 68,000
pounds of powder were used in the explosion.
The Imperialists stated that they lost 5,000 killed and wounded in the
breach, but, as the _North China Market Report_ observed, "for this
assertion there is not the slightest foundation, as on the day following
the assault there remained no trace of a struggle." In similar style
they declared that their losses while storming the Tien-wang's palace
were immense, but, as the European journals say, "This assertion is in
like manner utterly false. The gate must have been forced with little or
no difficulty, or quietly given up, and the very citadel of Taepingdom
was in the hands of the enemy."
Now, after having poisoned the Ti-ping king with gold-leaf, the enemy
very curiously burned him to death.
Immediately after the capture of Nankin, Mr. Adkins, H.M. Consul at
Chin-kiang, proceeded to the city on board M.M.S. _Slaney_, in order, as
he expresses himself in his despatch to Earl Russell on the subject, "to
congratulate the Chinese (Manchoo) Commander-in-Chief on the auspicious
termination of his two years' siege." Well, the commander, or some of
his followers, told the officious Mr. Adkins that when they made good
their entrance into the city, "they found that the palace of the
Tien-wang _had been burnt to the ground_."
What about the "immense loss" of the other version, in which they do
such heroic deeds to capture the palace?
Mr. Adkins goes on to say "that the impostor (?) and his immediate
attendants lie buried in its ruins."
The victors also reported that they captured the Chung-wang a few days
later, and also the Kan-wang when they entered the city, finding him in
the Tien-wang's palace. Chung-wang, they say, managed to leave the city
with a number of followers, but was captured three days later by a body
of cavalry sent in pursuit: this was the account given to Mr. Adkins.
Another Imperialist version states that the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief
was captured by _some villagers_ a few miles from the city, through
having given up his own white horse (celebrated for great strength and
fleetness) to his young prince, the Tien-wang's son, and having
compelled him to mount it and escape when he saw that at least a portion
of his party must be captured. Certainly this seems very characteristic
of the Chung-wang's brave, loyal, and generous nature, but then it is
the only incident in the whole narrative which bears the appearance of
truth and probability. Besides the above two stories of his capture,
when the enemy obtained possession of Hoo-chow-foo, they reported that
they had caught the Chung-wang _there_, and from that place a head,
stated to be the great rebel general's, was sent over the country as a
warning to the people.
As for the story of the Kan-wang's capture, there are several
contradictory and apparently authentic statements: one by a certain
Patrick Nellis, who personally saw the chief and talked with him at
Hoo-chow (subsequent to the fall of Nankin), where it seems that he
proceeded with an escort to communicate the loss or abandonment of the
capital, and concert measures for the evacuation of Hoo-chow-foo as
well.[79]
Besides the above reports, others were promulgated by the Mandarins, in
which they defeated different Ti-ping armies _en route_ for the south,
killing thousands and tens of thousands of rebels and capturing many
chiefs, among them the Shi-wang, who, singularly enough, still managed
to be in command of the Ti-pings near Amoy, until within the last few
months, when he retired to join other leaders farther inland.
Confessions were produced which professed to be written by the penitent
rebel leaders in their dungeons, while awaiting their turn to be
disembowelled, or "cut into a thousand pieces"--a pleasing prospect, of
course likely to make the destined victims suddenly feel inspired with
love and respect for the benevolent Manchoos, whom they had so
vigorously opposed all their lives! Among these seemingly fabricated
confessions only one is worthy of any attention, and that is a lengthy
composition, entitled, "The autographic deposition of Chung-wang, the
faithful king, at his trial after the capture of Nankin." Were it not
for the known mendacity of the Mandarins, and their particular addiction
to forging documents of this sort in order to lessen the prestige of the
revolution by representing its principal leaders as in their merciless
power, there would be little doubt but that the one in question was
genuine. In 1852, previous to the capture of Nankin by the Ti-pings, the
Imperial authorities concocted an article they named the "Confession of
Tien-teh," pretending that it was the deposition of the leader of the
rebellion, whom they falsely declared was their prisoner. It is quite
probable that the "Chung-wang's deposition" is of similar truthlessness,
and was made up by some prisoner of note (who may have been pardoned in
consequence), and the cunning writers attached to the Governor-General
of the two Kiang, Tseng-kwo-fan. Still it must be admitted that many
portions of the alleged deposition bear not only the impress of truth
(in so far as historical events, data, &c., are concerned), but
expressions closely resembling the well known sentiments of the great
Ti-ping general; so that if, as we trust, he was not the author, some
one pretty intimately acquainted with him must have been. However, some
facts tending to support the theory (for there is no direct proof in any
case except the Shi-wang's movements subsequent to the fall of Nankin)
of the Chung-wang's escape, will be given in the course of our
narrative.
Having noticed the Imperialist reports, it is now necessary to give the
following digest of the events referred to, and which may be depended
upon as the only possible version to be derived from the existing and
attainable sources of information:--
It is known that when the Chung-wang became convinced England was
determined to persist in prosecuting hostilities against his people, and
likewise felt their inability to cope with the foreign power, he at once
decided upon the best military movement under the circumstances--namely,
an entire abandonment of all accessible possessions, and a retreat into
the interior, where British hostility could not reach them, and where no
Manchoo forces could either prevent their operations, restrain their
consequent reinforcement, or impede their future progress.
Before parting with the Chung-wang, I was myself present at several
councils when the above plan was discussed, and unanimously agreed to by
every chief present. But one impediment prevented the Commander-in-Chief
from acting with his usual brilliancy of conception and wonderfully
successful rapidity of execution; it was the Tien-wang, who refused even
to listen to any proposal to abandon his capital.
Different people will view this ruinous obstinacy of the Ti-ping king in
various ways. Some will look upon it as sheer, downright folly; others,
as the useless, fanatical sacrifice of a bigot; while some may consider
that that great, heroic, noble-minded man, having once established the
capital of his dominions and the centre of his religio-political
movement at Nankin, did right and gloriously in meeting death rather
than turning backwards on the grand path. If we ascribe to the Tien-wang
motives partaking equally of the three traits--nobleness, fanaticism,
and rashness--we shall probably be pretty near the truth.
At all events, the Tien-wang passionately refused to entertain the only
plan by which the existence of the Ti-ping power, and the perpetuation
of his dynasty, seemed possible. All the court officers, cabinet
ministers, and other high authorities of Nankin, were blindly
subservient to the will of their king, and equally infatuated with his
religious and temporal command. Besides, many of those about him were of
the Hung family, and, being nearly related to their chief, not only
followed implicitly his wishes, but jealously formed themselves into a
clique about him, to the prejudice and exclusion of other more capable
and independent officers. All the fighting Wangs were outside the
capital, and incessantly engaged with the enemy; few troops were in
garrison, while many thousands of helpless non-combatants daily
diminished the stores of the failing granaries; and if the multitudinous
besieging army, encamped and fortified all round the devoted city, had
been animated with the slightest particle of courage or military spirit,
they might easily have captured it many months before it eventually fell
through starvation, or was evacuated by the troops.
The Chung-wang, after his separation from myself at Wu-see, proceeded
direct to Nankin _via_ Chang-chow-foo. His only object was to save the
king and his own family (living with his aged mother, whom he loved with
excessive filial tenderness), by inducing them to leave the untenable
city. He, alone, proposed the unpalatable manoeuvre to the Tien-wang,
whose severe displeasure he had already incurred, being punished in
various ways--by deprivation of titles, refusal of audience, accusation
of disloyalty, &c. How the time (December, 1863, to 19th July, 1864) was
passed, from the arrival of the Chung-wang to the fall of the capital,
unless the professed "autographic deposition" be true, or the garrison
really abandoned the city and escaped, will probably never be known to
history. Either, as the "deposition" states, the whole city petitioned
against the departure of the renowned commander, or he personally
elected to remain, rather than desert his king in the hour of death and
darkness, even though such calamity might have been avoided but for the
fatal perverseness of the monarch; perhaps both causes operated to
confine him to useless inactivity within the walls of the doomed
city--inevitably doomed, and encircled by the numberless siege works of
the enemy as with a band of impenetrable steel.
How the poor people, fated by the passive stubbornness of their rulers,
must have gathered together round their great warrior, as men will rally
about a tower of strength; how the unnumbered thousands of helpless
non-combatants must have rejoiced at the presence of him whose very name
was an army, a bulwark to his people, and a terror to the enemy; how
bitterly must the brave, energetic soldier have grieved and chafed at
the unnecessarily-incurred annihilation, and growing horrors of the
siege, which should have been avoided; but, alas! how could one great
man, without means, save a people, a sacred cause, and a city invested
by 100,000 savage foemen?
Loyalty and filial duty brought the "faithful prince" to Nankin; the
same motives bound him there to await destruction, when his presence in
the field--at the head of his own army, left under command of his
cousin, the Shi-wang--would have proved invaluable, and would surely
have placed the Ti-pings in a much better position than they occupied at
the close of the year 1865.
Nankin fell at last. All that is _positively_ known by Europeans--apart
from false, garbled, and exaggerated Mandarin sources--may be summed up
in few words:--Frightful privations were endured before the enemy took
possession; and when the city was entered by Mr. Consul Adkins, and
other gentlemen, the streets and houses were literally blocked up with
the bodies of the dead, by far the greater portion having the appearance
of death from starvation; and many being very far advanced in
decomposition, proved that, long before the Imperialists found courage
enough to blow an opening through the undefended walls, the unfortunate
people had succumbed to famine faster than the living could bury the
dead--in fact, it was evident that no such effort could have been
successful from the numbers who had daily perished.
Mr. Adkins, in his despatch to Earl Russell, places the number of people
slaughtered by the Imperialists on their entry at 10,000; but other
visitors state as many as 30,000, which is probably nearer the truth.
It is also certain that many chiefs with their followers left Nankin in
safety. A successor to the Mo-wang, assassinated at Soo-chow, having
afterwards appeared at Hong-kong; the Yu and Hsieh Wangs (the latter
being one of the Tien-wang's brothers, and always attached to the court)
being heard of in Kiang-si at the head of an army; while the following
extract from the narrative of one Patrick Nellis, already referred to,
and which was made on affidavit before the British Consul at Shanghae,
seems to prove that the Ti-ping prime minister escaped from Nankin, and
such being the case, undoubtedly there are strong grounds to believe the
military leaders did likewise. In the evidence sworn to, Nellis, after
describing an engagement with the Imperialists, states:--
"On our return to Hoo-chow-foo, Kang-wang arrived from Nankin
with an escort. Great ceremonies were shown at his reception; he
did not look as if he had suffered any hardship...."
In speaking of the evacuation of the city, Nellis makes the following
statement:--
"Kan-wang spoke to me in English very slowly. He asked me what I
was. I said, 'an Englishman.' He said he had never met a good
foreigner, and asked me if I would go with him to Kiang-si. I
said I should be very glad if Tow-wang (Commandant of Hoo-chow)
would let me."
This conversation took place more than a month after the fall of Nankin,
and a few days before the abandonment of Hoo-chow-foo on the 28th
August, 1864. Upon the strength of such facts the _Friend of China_ has
steadily maintained that Nankin was abandoned by all but the poorest
civilians when the Imperialists made their breach and marched through
without opposition.
Another circumstance damaging to the veracity of the Imperialist
reports, is a statement (contained in one of the Mandarin's inspired
"confessions,") purporting to be that of the Tien-wang's son (the heir
to the throne). The young prince is made to state that his father
"succumbed to sickness on the 24th of May, 1864;" but of this
all-important event the "Chung-wang's deposition" makes no mention. Here
is an inconsistency which at once proves either one or both the
"confessions" false; because, if the Tien-wang had really died, the
Chung-wang would have been at liberty to carry out his own views and
abandon Nankin; whereas his professed "deposition" states that, to the
day the city fell, he was unable to do so in consequence of the
Tien-wang's opposition.
The _Friend of China_ also states that a Mr. Butler, of Shanghae,
actually witnessed the withdrawal of the garrison. Moreover, adding
together the few spared by the enemy, those slain and those destroyed by
famine, we should even then scarcely have the number of destitute
people--labourers, coolies, and friendless non-combatants--who were
relieved by the Chung-wang alone during the early part of the year 1864,
when he kept a list of about 80,000 dependent upon his resources and
charity. In 1863 rations were daily issued to upwards of 400,000 people.
At the period now referred to, when the Chung-wang shut himself up in
the beleaguered city, the population, inclusive, was certainly not less
than a fifth of a million, and, probably, far exceeded that number;
therefore, even supposing that one-half (which is a large estimate)
perished, were slain, or made prisoners, during and at the termination
of the siege, how can we account for the 100,000 remaining, unless we
believe that they had previously managed to effect their retreat from
the city?
In the _Friend of China_, August 16, 1864, appears the following:--
"We are still assured by parties who have means of knowing, that
our first story of the evacuation of Nankin by its soldiery,
before the Imperialists sprung their mine and rushed in, was the
correct story; all those 30,000 massacred individuals told of by
the _Recorder_ (but _not_ mentioned at the Asiatic Society with
the "flushing of a pheasant") being inoffensive men, women, and
children.
"The Chung-wang, it is said, is not dead. He is at Hoo-chow-foo,
while the Tien-wang is still in the body."
The strongest support of the Imperialist statement of the death of the
Tien-wang, and the capture and subsequent execution of the Chung-wang,
is the fact that, since the fall of Nankin, nothing whatever has been
heard of them elsewhere. On the other hand, however, it was supposed
that one or the other was commanding the forces in the interior, acting
in Fu-keen in concert with the Shi-wang when he occupied the city of
Chang-chow, near Amoy, from October, 1864, to May, 1865: and what seems
to lend force to this supposition is that he appeared to be acting under
the orders of some superior farther inland; the only chiefs of higher
rank being the King and his son, the Chung, Kan, I (several years absent
in Sz-chuen), and Si Wangs--the latter being a young man (son of the
original Western King) attached to the court at Nankin, and totally
without authority in military affairs. Upon the whole, it is quite
possible that the Ti-ping King, his son and heir, Prime Minister, and
General-in-Chief, may have met with the fate ascribed to them by the
enemy; still there is no positive proof, and there are good grounds for
supposing that some, if not all, are yet living and directing the
Ti-ping movements.
The siege of Hoo-chow-foo by the Imperialists was merely nominal, for,
up to the abandonment of that city by the Ti-pings, they were never
allowed within range of its walls, and were compelled to act almost
entirely on the defensive, so repeated and vigorous were the attacks by
the garrison and a corps of observation they had encamped outside the
place on a neighbouring range of hills. Only a few days before the
evacuation took place, the garrison succeeded in capturing a number of
Imperialist stockades, several hundred gunboats, and three or four
thousand men, besides inflicting heavy loss in killed and wounded; the
Franco-Manchoo disciplined auxiliaries alone losing 6 officers and 800
men. Very soon after this victory, the evacuation was effected with
consummate skill, the enemy not discovering that the Ti-pings had flown
until the day after. The number of troops forming the garrison and
encampment was very considerable, 50,000 being the lowest estimate;[80]
their line of retreat was either through the province of Fu-keen or
Kiang-si, and their destination is even yet unknown, none of the chiefs
from Hoo-chow having been recognised anywhere since. It is, however,
pretty certain that they acted in concert with the forces led by the
Shi-wang, though keeping an inland position, while the latter advanced
to the sea-board at Amoy.
The _Friend of China_, Sept. 8, 1864, under the heading,--"Another of
the parties despatched by us a short time ago, to learn the real state
of affairs about Hoo-chow-foo, has just returned,"--reports as
follows:--
"The Chung-wang was in command up to the last.... Hoo-chow was
evacuated.... Three days afterwards--we repeat--three days
afterwards, Le Futai gallantly marched into the city with a
thundering noise; and then what did he? The gates were closed,
and then commenced a general sack, and the usual massacre of
innocent individuals.... A laughable story is told of the
_second_ capture of the Chung-wang here, at Hoo-chow; his
head--the veritable caput--with loud clamour of gongs, being
sent round to all the villages, that people might behold the
head of the arch traitor! Our reporter, wicked sceptic! loudly
declares that the head _said to be_ the Chung-wang's, truly sat
on the shoulders, a week ago, of a man whose highest grade in
life was that of a coolie!"
In the month of October, 1864, the residents of Amoy were suddenly
surprised to hear that a body of Ti-pings, about 10,000 strong, had
surprised and captured the city of Chang-chow, barely twenty miles
inland, and situated on a river emptying itself into the sea at the
Treaty Port.
From this reappearance of the Ti-pings close to a Treaty Port, we are
enabled again to obtain some authentic records--many Europeans,
including the British Consul, having visited them at Chang-chow. One
English gentleman wrote the following account (which may be relied on as
authentic) of his experiences to the _Daily Press_, and the same was
reproduced in _The Overland China Trade Report_, 1st January, 1865:--
"A VISIT TO CHANG-CHOW.
"_To the Editor of the 'Daily Press,' Hong-kong._
"Sir,--As you appear desirous to obtain information regarding
the insurgents in this neighbourhood, I take leave to furnish
you with the following result of my personal observations, which
were derived in the course of a visit amongst them.
"The city and suburbs of Chang-chow are still occupied by the
Taeping insurgents. About three-fifths of the whole city is
burnt, and in the ruins may be seen the dead bodies of the late
inhabitants, uninjured except by fire; not a wound could I see
on any, which plainly shows, and as the rebels themselves
affirm, that the inhabitants set fire to their dwellings
themselves, and perished in them; having previously drugged
themselves with opium rather than fall into the hands of the
insurgents.
"Those portions of the city unburnt are occupied by the rebels,
but there are many streets of Hongs, the doors of which are
sealed up, uninhabited, and apparently full of merchandise. The
rebels appear to be very numerous; I should estimate them at
about 12,000; but they affirm themselves that they number
15,000. There are a great number of boys and youths among them,
but I saw no women. They are much sunburnt, thin, and haggard in
their appearance, and evidently have undergone much hardship
before they took this city. I was told by many of them that they
underwent extreme privations during their retreat from the
north; that food of any kind, at many places, could not be
obtained, on account of the country people being extremely
hostile, and destroying everything as soon as they heard that
the rebels were nearing them. That at several small towns on the
borders of the Provinces of Che-kiang and Fokien human flesh
was used for food; and that a peasant's body was retailed out at
80 cash per catty by the fortunate rebel who had killed him!
"The chief in command at Chan-chow is Tszle-wang,[81] brother to
Chung-wang. He was at Ningpo during its occupation by the
insurgents in 1862, and he commanded in the defence of that city
when he was attacked and driven out by the British naval force,
under Captain Dew. But he says he bears no animosity towards the
British on account of it, as he is aware that Captain Dew was
subsidized by the Chinese Government to retake Ningpo from the
rebels. He professes the profoundest respect for the British
nation for their bravery and power; and what he most ardently
wishes is to be on friendly terms with her; and all that he
requests is for her to act fairly up to her _professed
neutrality_ to both contending parties. He says that, should
they not succeed in conquering the Imperialists, he would be
most happy to see the country under British rule. He promised he
would not venture nearer to Amoy than Chang-chow (which is about
twenty miles distant), provided the Mandarins at Chau-bay, a
town situated on the river, about half way between Amoy and
Chau-chow, did not blockade the river, and cut off all native
trade and communication with them. That, in case they did, he
should be compelled to take Chau-bay. That he should on no
account attack Amoy, as he did not wish to have any rupture with
foreigners. That he was very sorry the trade of Amoy suffered on
account of their occupation of Chau-chow. That he would be only
too happy to open trade reciprocally with foreigners; and that
he would grant them every privilege and protection. That he was
willing to trade with them for any description of European goods
and native produce in return. Opium was not interdicted. He has
made a law to protect all native farmers and tradespeople, and
this has been already felt by the country people who have opened
a day market in one of the main streets of the south suburb;
and, from daylight to dark, until the gates are shut, every
description of native 'Chow-chow' is to be obtained. Tszle-wang
told me that the establishing of this market, though doing a
great deal of good to both parties, had led to many executions
of both rebels and country people--the former on account of
taking goods and not paying for them, and natives found in the
city setting fire to houses and plundering; who, when caught,
are taken before a rebel Mandarin, and, if found guilty,
executed; as no rebel, under penalty of death, can take the life
of any person, except in action. The rebels appear to be well
armed with rifles, revolvers, and muskets. The Imperial soldiers
in this respect are not to be compared to them, as their arms
consist entirely of native matchlocks, gingalls, and spears,
and not one in ten has even a matchlock; and they are a wretched
lot of ragged rabble. On the other side, the rebels are very
neatly dressed, more cleanly, and are drilled after European
tactics. There are some Europeans amongst them, but I had no
communication with them. They have entirely routed the
Imperialists in every engagement they have had with them; and on
the 2nd instant they came down on the Imperial lines 2,500
strong, the Imperial troops numbering 11,000; who have advanced
to within about five miles of the city, to endeavour to protect
the farmers, to gather in the standing crops of rice, which are
in great abundance for many miles around the city, and which the
rebels have gathered in and secured. The Imperials were encamped
on both sides of the Rim, but their greatest force was on the
right bank, behind a rugged hill, the inner extremity of which
was crossed at right angles by a valley, which could have been
easily protected by throwing up a few earthworks and mounting a
few guns in them. Their weak point they could not see; and the
rebels, taking advantage of the hilly ground in the
neighbourhood to advance under cover during daylight, and,
coming down the valley at dark, entered the Imperial camp about
eleven p.m., without any warning being given. The Imperials were
completely panic-struck; and having no retreat but by river,
rushed to their boats in such numbers that many of them were
swamped, and hundreds of soldiers drowned. Many of them ran and
hid themselves wherever they could, and among the latter was the
chief Mandarin in command. They offered little or no resistance;
and the rebels, after killing 1,000 and taking 450 prisoners,
destroying the camp equipage, returned to the city at daylight.
Tszle-wang told me that his plan of campaign would be next to
take the large and populous town of Tong-wah, and from thence
march upon the district city of Chin-chew in the spring. That
the amount of the whole rebel force in the province of Fokien
under his command fell little short of 50,000 men; and hoping to
increase it to 80,000 after the capture of Chin-chew, he should
then endeavour to open communication with the British
authorities, and arrange to take Foo-chow-foo.
"Tszle-wang appears to be a man of considerable calibre. He
appears, for a Chinaman, to be well up in foreign politics, and
conversant on many subjects that you generally find the Chinese
most ignorant on. He is affable and engaging in his manner, and
appears to treat those about him with kindness. He is thirty-one
years of age; short, stout, and well-made; his face is much
sunburnt, and complexion, say dark; any person might think he
was of Malay origin, as he has both the features and colour of a
Malay. That he is some strategist and has considerable military
tact must be acknowledged by the manner he took the city of
Chang-chow, before a rumour was even circulated of the rebels
being anywhere near the place, or intending to capture it; and
from the defeats the Imperial force has sustained in every
engagement they have had with him, although in numerical
strength the Imperial force has always been 3 or 4 to 1. I
should like to pay another visit to the insurgents, but all
foreigners are interdicted from visiting them, both by the
Consuls and Mandarin authorities; in fact, we are now not even
allowed to enter the river, which is only a mile and a half, and
nearly twenty miles from Chang-chow, on the usual shooting
excursions, wild fowl being very plentiful in the river, and
which is our only amusement at this season of the year. The
whole foreign community feel this to be very hard indeed, and
consider it to be very arbitrary on the part of the Consul, as
this place is extremely dull--no amusements whatever, our only
recreation being in a picnic or shooting excursion up the
river--but Mr. Pedder tries to make himself as unpopular as he
possibly can, and he has told the Mandarins that they can arrest
any foreigner they can find on the river under any circumstances
whatever, and the Mandarins have threatened to decapitate any
boatmen who may hire their boats to or take foreigners up the
river. I also hear that the British Consul some few days ago
issued a _warrant_ to search the private dwelling of an English
resident here for arms and munitions of war; and, if any were
found, to bring him prisoner to the Consulate; but, happily, his
suspicions were wrongly placed, as they found nothing of the
kind in the gentleman's house whatever. Has a British Consul
authority to search a gentleman's private dwelling whenever he
may please, and set spies to watch the movements of a person to
please the Chinese Mandarins? Really this is cringing or holding
the candle to the Celestials, and taking away the liberty of the
subject entirely; and if it goes any further, I cannot say how
it may end.
"Your obedient servant,
"VERITAS.
"Amoy, 14th December, 1864."
In a subsequent letter, describing another visit to Chang-chew, the same
writer states:--
"The rebel campaign is about to be carried on with vigour in
this quarter; of the 30,000 men collected in Chang-chow, not
one-fifth are required to garrison the city. I heard from
Tszle-wang myself that he should immediately detach 7,000, under
Tsi-wang, to assist in the capture of Tong-san, and another
force would be despatched simultaneously to attack Tong-wak and
Chin-chew. The rebels (Ti-pings) are in possession of six cities
in this part of the province of Fu-keen, and within a few days'
march. _The rebels told me that Tien-wang's son was at one of
the cities._"
The violation of the Queen's Order in Council (commanding neutrality to
be observed after the Soo-chow massacre) by the British Consuls in
China, is well shown by the previous letter of "Veritas." Besides the
partisan acts therein complained of, six or seven English steamers were
hired to the Mandarins at Shanghae to carry Imperialist troops to Amoy.
They did so, and were well paid for the affair; but is this neutrality?
Moreover, every kind of war material was freely supplied to them, and
British officers were allowed to command some of the Imperialist troops
(_Colonel_ Kirkham, formerly with Gordon, and one _Captain_ Macdonald
being particularly noticed), while all supplies for, or communication
with, the Ti-pings were forbidden and attempted to be cut off; but,
notwithstanding, munitions of war, and some Europeans (including
_Colonel_ Rhode, Gordon's late Adjutant-General, and _Colonel_ Williams,
who had commanded one of the Anglo-Manchoo regiments) managed to reach
the revolutionists.
Shortly after the capture of Chang-chew, the Shi-wang issued the
following proclamations:--
"NOTIFICATION FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG-CHOW.
"Notification from His Royal Highness Lee, Shee-king and
Protector General, ordering the people to submit willingly and
to continue their occupations.
"Whereas agriculture is the chief of the occupations of mankind,
upon which people necessarily subsist, and whereas, since I rule
this city I have always informed the people everywhere that they
may continue their duties and occupations as usual--be it
therefore known that those who submit to this government are
called good people. Strict orders have been given to my officers
and soldiers not to make any disturbance among the inhabitants,
which orders you must have heard.
"But how is it that at present the fields are left uncultivated
and all agricultural business seems to be entirely neglected?
The plantations of sugar-cane are nearly ready for harvest, but
will spoil if not cut, and the grains and paddy are nearly
rotten, the reason of which we cannot comprehend. Probably the
raising of arms is the cause of it, of which the people stand in
awe, consequently they moved to their countries; or is the cause
that at the time of fighting they are afraid that they may be
implicated, that on this account they fled to other places? But
the benevolent and just army will not destroy the good people;
while they exterminate the wicked, they will not punish the
innocent.
"Now two villages on the south and north have already submitted,
they are settled as usual. You people should be diligent at all
times in trade and agriculture.
"Further, in the four villages of that place, the sugar-canes
may be converted into sugar and the grains be collected: if you
do not immediately return and resume your occupations, then how
will the people get their subsistence? Furthermore, the people
who fled away have not paid their taxes due, being thus ignorant
of the plan of seeking peace.
"I treat others with great liberality, and therefore again and
again issue these notifications, intimating to you that all
those who have fled away may quietly return to cut the
sugar-canes and collect the grains, and those who have not paid
their taxes must, with submissive mind, come and pay their
taxes. You must not cherish any doubt or hesitation, nor have a
different heart, otherwise you will too late repent what you
have done. I protect the people as children, and look upon them
as wounded; therefore, for more than a month since I have taken
possession of the place, I have never allowed a single soldier
or officer to go to any village to give trouble. Now all the
regulations have been arranged and the laws rectified, and
strict orders have also repeatedly been given to the army thus
treating you people bountifully and kindly. When the superior is
so affectionate, you inferiors should readily come and pay
tributes.
"After this notification has been issued, if those who have not
paid their taxes and still insist on their obstinacy by
disregarding it, troops will be raised to punish them in order
to warn those who are perverse and stubborn, without lenity.
Every one of you must obey this command and not disappoint me of
my affection to you.
"LEE-SHAI-YIN,
Shee-king, and Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty.
"Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 19th moon, 30th day."
--_Daily Press._
"ADDRESS FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG-CHOW TO THE TREATY
POWERS.
"His Royal Highness Lee-Shai-yin, Shee-king and Imperial
Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty, to their
Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, United
States, and the people of their respective countries.
"Since creation our Chinese Empire was first governed by
Shinnung, then by the Emperors Yaw and Shun, who afterwards
resigned their throne. Again the Emperors Tang and Mo attained to
their throne by force of arms; then Dynasties Chun, Han, Ngai,
and Tsiun transmitted their thrones to their respective
posterity, and were succeeded by the Dynasties Tang, Sung, Yune,
and Ming. It would be a matter of considerable difficulty, when
referring to the distant generations, to repeat them all, but as
a nation it had hitherto been in amity with all your various
nations, no distinct border having been marked out. I was born
late, and have not had the fortune to view these good prospects,
and to enjoy the administration of the benevolent Government, but
I have examined maps of the world, and studied the histories, and
I am happy to possess a thorough knowledge of them, and the
contents of which are as before me. For a man to guard a place,
the watchword is to remember the fact that when the lips are cut
off, the teeth will be endangered. To be in amity with adjacent
countries, and for one to keep intercourse with neighbouring
countries, it is essential not to forget the maxim of one large
nation serving another small one. Of the history of China in
counting back from the Dynasties of Ming and Yune, there have
been innumerable successive revolutions of kingdoms who
invariably paid tributes and presented precious stones to each
other when due, and who never encroached upon other's territory.
But the Tartars were of a different species, remarkable for their
ravenous disposition, and for this reason, the central kingdom
with the eastern provinces, in order to prevent their invasion,
built the great wall. Unfortunately, during the latter part of
the Ming Dynasty they were allowed to invade the interior, we
became their victim, and have since been disgraced by them for
these two centuries or more. Who then with common sense and
natural patriotism would not strike his breast and weep? Even
your various nations, in a practical point of view, are countries
and in relation as lip to teeth, would not fail, I think, to hate
them.
"Long had it been designed to raise the just standard, but in
consequence of their being few in China who would support the
movement, the design had for a time to be abandoned. Happily our
Heavenly Father the Almighty God did not desert the descendants
of Han (China), and hated the Tartars, and sent down my Lord who
settled at Kinling[82] as a basis of operations for more than ten
years, and during that period exterminated thousands and ten
thousands of Tartars. My Lord had always been in friendship with
the heroes and enterprising men of your various nations who
carried on their respective trades as usual. Further, the
provinces of Kwang, Cheh, Yu, and others have been opened, and
the ministers and people of various nations have travelled and
rambled, and trade has been carried on uninterruptedly as usual.
Is this not excellent? In obedience to my Lord's command I have
been ordered to extirpate and root out the Tartars. Recently I
attacked and took Chang-chow, where I encamped my soldiers.
Whilst there I was glad to hear that you were close by, and I
would ere this have sent a despatch to you, but various
difficulties were thrown in the way. I now write this and tell
the people of Tai-po-tsz of Cha-chow to present it for your
perusal, earnestly hoping that after reading, you will consider
the importance of lip-lost-and-teeth-endangered phrase, and
perceive the advantage of a large nation serving a small one;
that you will support our just movement by combining together to
put an end to the Tsing Dynasty, in order that the people may
live in happiness, and your various natives enjoy peace. The
doctrine of our Heavenly Father, the Almighty God, and of Jesus
Christ, teaches us that He is merciful, saving us, answering to
prayers and unselfish--all mankind should look to future and
believe in Christianity.
"Therefore, more than ten years before my Lord's accession to
the throne, he believed in Christianity, as his conduct would
show.
"He also received the Rev. Mr. Roberts, who preached the Gospel
to the Chinese who believed and praised with him to God. We have
welcomed your doctors, who cured many Chinese, and healed their
diseases. We all feel grateful for their merciful kindness, and
are under obligation for their favours. From this you will see
that your nations and our Chinese in a universal point of view
are as one. But the Tartars believe in Buddism, despise
Christianity, and turn a dead ear to its doctrine. It may be
argued that belief or disbelief rests with them, and they will
afterwards reap the fruit of their conduct. Well, why then do
they persecute Christian converts so that their lives are in
jeopardy? Therefore my Lord reluctantly took up arms, raised an
army, and coped with them. This has been going on for these more
than ten years, and through the mercy of our Heavenly Father,
the Almighty God, and Jesus Christ, and through the assistance
of your various nations, my Lord has taken many cities and
provinces, and killed many Tsing devils. Still to conquer and
subdue an empire of eighteen provinces, combined with a strong
army of Mongols and Chinese, who have ample munitions of war and
provisions, must be extremely difficult.
"Let us learn from the ancients as well as the moderns that to
lead an army to battle it is indispensable to have
reinforcements; and to establish a kingdom it is essential to
get assistance from the neighbouring countries. Your various
nations and China are at present like lip to teeth, and similar
to a large country serving a small one. Let me ask you that
before my Lord settled at Kiang-nan, could you get admittance
into the interior? Now you can ride from east to west and from
north to south, and the provinces of Hupeh and Ngan-hoin have
been opened to trade. If your various nations do not ally with
me to exterminate the Tsing Dynasty, and in case our force being
unable to cope with the Tartars, as we are deficient in naval
power, we shall be conquered, then the result of lip-lost and
teeth-endangered will soon follow. Therefore it is desirable
that your various nations should embrace this opportunity as
presented.
"If, on the other hand, your various nations, relying on the
omnipotence of our Heavenly Father and Jesus Christ, and acting
upon the doctrine of Christianity, will come to terms with us
for destroying the Tsing Dynasty, if you command your naval
armies and attack those places near the water, and whatever
cities, districts, ports, and passes you will have taken and
conquered by your force, you will be at liberty without the
least hinderance on my part to keep them, and whatever treasures
and food found therein, you will be at liberty to appropriate
them. And so I will attack on land, and whatever cities,
districts, and passes I conquer, and whatever treasures and food
I find, I will divide, giving one half to you, and all the
distant cities, ports, and marts will be surrendered to you.
"Thus having your naval armies, we can cross the ocean and
bestride the rivers without obstacle or hinderance. Our army, I
must confess, in its beginning is weak, and food is not
plentiful; and unless your various nations lend a hand to assist
me, the Tartars will be more ravenous and their ferociousness
will be greater, _and if once our army is subdued, they will as
a matter of course come upon your various nations_, when, it is
clear, you will be precluded from trading and travelling in the
provinces of Kiang, Kwang, Cheh, and Yu. I earnestly pray that
you will despatch your soldiers and co-operate with me to
exterminate the evil posterities, and that we all may obtain
advantages. Hoping you will comply with my views is my earnest
prayer.
"The statements I have made, though they are vulgar, I undertake
to swear before heaven that I will keep them. Let us write in
benevolence to accomplish our undertakings, then we shall make
peace with each other, trade with each other from generation to
generation, and enjoy together universal peace. Is this not the
best plan? The city of Chang has been and is a rich place, at
present both the soldiers and inhabitants are happy, trade is
flourishing, and treasures are plentiful. I also earnestly
request that you will convey merchandise and vessels containing
all kinds of foreign cargo, and the caps, powder, &c., which
will be sold immediately here. You have no occasion to fear that
some of my men will take them without paying for them. I will
make up the damages should they do so, and surely I will not
break my promise!
"On the day of this epistle reaching you, you will favour me
with a reply.
"With my best compliments to your gentlemen of your various
nations,
"I am your obedient servant,
LEE-SHAI-YIN,
"Shee-king, and Imperial Protector General of the Celestial
Dynasty
"Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 10th moon, 1st day."
--_Daily Press._
FOOTNOTES:
[75] See _Friend of China_, July 11, 1865.
[76] See the account from _Shanghae Recorder_, at the end of the
preceding chapter.
[77] Referring to Colonel Gordon, Captain Osborn, R.N., and their
subordinates.
[78] Meaning the noble occupation of buying and selling; and that, too,
at the point of the bayonet.
[79] _Times_, January 12, 1865. _China Overland Trade Report_, 30th
November, 1864.
[80] The _Times_, October 26, 1864, in its China intelligence (under
date, "Shanghae, September 4"), describing the evacuation of Hoo-chow,
makes the following statement, which is a further proof of the total or
partial escape of the Nankin garrison:--"The rebel force had been so
greatly swollen by fugitives _from Nankin_ and other places, that it
constituted quite a formidable army."
[81] The writer of the letter has evidently made a confusion of the
name, Le, and title, Shi, of the chief, for the following proclamations
prove him to be the Shi or Shee Wang.
[82] This must mean Nankin.