Kar-sing-foo.--Christmas in Ti-pingdom.--Works of
Art.--Dangerous Companions.--Narrow Escape.--Retribution.--Adieu
to Ti-pingdom.--Mr. White's Case.--The Neutrality
Ordnance.--Order of July 9th, 1864.--Intended Return to
England.--Particulars of the Siege of Soo-chow.--Strength of the
Garrison.--The Assault Described.--The Nar-wang's
Treachery.--Its Cause.--Major Gordon's Report.--The _Friend of
China_.--Gordon's Report Continued.--Narrative by an
Eye-Witness.--The Soo-chow Tragedy.--Major Gordon.--His
Conduct.--Gordon's Letter to Sir F. Bruce.--Analysis
thereof.--Newspaper Extract.--Gordon's "Reasons"
Refuted.--Analysis Continued.--Gordon's "Personal
Consideration."--His Motives explained.--Newspaper
Extracts.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatch.--Its Analysis.--Falsity of
Gordon's Statements.--How Proved.--Extract from the _Times_.
Upon reaching the city of Kar-sing-foo, I was kindly received by the
governor, Yoong-wang, who gave us all quarters in the Wei-wang's palace.
This latter chief had gallantly assisted in defeating the Anglo-Manchoo
forces on their first attack upon Tait-san; he had been promoted for his
services, and was celebrated as a brave leader; yet, singular to relate,
he had gone over to the enemy with the city (Haining), to which he had
been appointed governor only a few days before my arrival.
Previous to the year 1860, treachery was a thing unknown among the
Ti-pings. The baneful effect of British meddling had not been felt; they
were successful, therefore the mercenary-minded did not find occasion to
desert; neither was the number of chiefs so great as since the successes
of 1860-61, nor the Tien-wang's appointment of them so imprudent.
Latterly, however, the great extent of country and population included
within the limits of Ti-pingdom rendered necessary the employment of a
large number of civil and military officers; unfortunately, the king,
having much secluded himself from the affairs of state to study
religious matters, and being influenced by two or three of his
non-military ministers, did not exercise sufficient care in selecting or
controlling them. Thus, it came to pass that sometimes not only
incompetent, but untrustworthy men were placed in high and important
commands; and many of these new officials were neither animated by the
patriotism, nor inspired with the religious fervour of the older chiefs.
Self-aggrandizement was the motive of such men; and although some of
them were brave soldiers, directly they found British hostility was
making their cause a failing one, they did not scruple to change sides
when they could obtain reward for doing so.
At Kar-sing-foo the Shi-wang left me, after having made arrangements for
my return either to that city or Hoo-chow-foo (where I had left the
engineer and another man from Soo-chow for the purpose of making shell,
casting guns, &c.), and then proceeded on his way to other places, in
order to collect men and money with which to rejoin the Chung-wang at
Chang-chow-foo.
I found the country under the Yoong-wang's administration in a far
better state than the desolate regions through which I had passed on my
journey to his city, because the Imperialists and their allies had not
yet attacked and ravaged the neighbourhood; although, before I started
for Shanghae, they made their appearance.
Christmas Day I spent at Kar-sing-foo. The Ti-pings keep the festival
two days before we do; and, if possible, venerate it still more. I made
the Yoong-wang a present upon the occasion, and passed the day very
happily at his palace, where a grand dinner was given to all the chiefs
in the city, after special services had been held in the Heavenly Hall.
My friend W---- was present with me, and we mutually declared that we
had never enjoyed a better Christmas in our lives. Upon the 25th the
Yoong-wang sent his own cooks, attendants, plate, &c., and spread a
magnificent dinner at my quarters for all the European and Chinese
followers I had in the city.
I found much to admire during my stay with the Yoong-wang. He was one of
the best veteran Ti-ping leaders, and all his officers were stanch,
trustworthy adherents of the cause. Of one Yu, who was a general of
brigade, I became the particular friend, and dined with him nearly every
day. This officer had charge of the artillery, and I gave him all the
instruction I could in casting shell (which he had just commenced to
do), making fusees, and sighting his guns. The organization within the
city was so perfect that everything went like clockwork. Bars and bolts
were not to be found; for thieves, beggars, or robbers were unknown in
Kar-sing-foo. I felt a real happiness in living there, and was quite
sorry when I took my departure. Here I found the most splendid building
I have ever seen in China. It was a new palace, not quite finished, for
the Ting-wang, governor-general of the province; and was a standing
proof of the fact that the Ti-pings (had they been allowed to succeed by
England) would have restored the arts of China, and especially the
public works--all of which have fallen into decay since the era of the
Manchoo. In general outline the palace resembled those I have already
described as existing at Nankin, but every particle was far more
beautiful and costly. Neither in China nor elsewhere have I ever seen
such a magnificent work of complicated stone and wood carving. The
gorgeous gilding and painting was, of course, in Chinese style; and
though very effective and varied, too gaudy for European taste. The
carved work was exquisite; I have stood for hours watching either the
grotesque or the life-like representations. Many hundreds of sculptors,
painters, and artisans were employed, at a very high rate of wages, upon
the building; and I found that some of the former were the most
celebrated professors of the two arts in China, and had been induced to
come to Kar-sing from the most distant parts of the empire. From what I
have seen of China, I do not believe such a building has been commenced
for many hundred years.
At last the Imperialists came to overthrow all Ti-ping improvement, they
having succeeded in capturing Pimbong, the nearest town, with the help
of one Major Baily and a powerful artillery corps, a few days before I
left the city.
Previous to setting out for Shanghae, I gave the rowdies their share of
prize-money; and although I fully expected that they might cut each
other's throats over the coin, I hardly expected the attack they made
upon myself and lieutenant, whereby our lives were placed in danger. It
seemed that they were aware that we were taking funds to use at
Shanghae; and to three of them the temptation to possess themselves of
the same became irresistible. Upon receiving their prize-money,
furnished with passes I obtained for them, they set forth from the city;
but, on reaching the suburbs, the afore-mentioned trio made a halt for
the purpose of planning our murder, and mustering up courage to commit
the deed by indulging in a copious supply of that ardent
spirit--_samshoo_. At length, having cunningly waited until the
Yoong-wang had gone outside the city with nearly all his men, in the
direction of Pimbong, they returned upon their murderous mission.
Fortunately for myself and W----, they went in on the way for another
dose of _samshoo_, which made one of them helplessly intoxicated, but
the other two had become brave enough to proceed on their errand without
him. After obtaining admittance at one of the city gates, they came
straight to the Yoong-wang's palace, where we were engaged with an
interpreter and one of the chief's secretaries making up a communication
I wished to send to the Chung-wang.
A-ling, my own faithful interpreter and companion, was quite
incapacitated by the injury he had received at Wu-see. Although standing
directly between him and the enemy's fire when he was struck, the ball
passed me and inflicted a severe wound on his left shoulder, passing
round the back and lodging on the right shoulder blade. The poor fellow
was carried with me to Kar-sing-foo, and suffered much torture from the
Chinese doctors, who treated him by thrusting long strips of twisted
paper into the wound, and screwing them round until the ball was
reached. At last, however, a better doctor was found in the person of
the Yoong-wang's own medical attendant, who cut down to the ball and
extracted it, much to the patient's relief. A-ling was not sufficiently
recovered to accompany me to Shanghae; he therefore remained at
Kar-sing-foo, and from that day to the present I have never seen him
again, nor probably ever shall, for I believe he was killed when the
city subsequently fell into Imperialist hands.
Directly our friends, the rowdies, came into the ante-room in which we
were seated, they began to insult myself and lieutenant, knowing that
the Yoong-wang was absent and could not arrest them, and that I could
not do so either, as my few men were at the Wei-wang's palace in another
part of the city. As they were no longer under my command, it was
useless ordering them out of the place; I therefore sent an attendant to
request the officer left in charge of the city to send a guard to remove
them.
At this moment the most forward of the two suddenly drew a revolver and
fired it at W----'s head, immediately afterwards turning towards me.
Through the smoke I could not see whether my lieutenant had been killed
or not; but before the scoundrel could shoot me, I had lodged a bullet
in his carcase. Almost at the same instant I heard another shot
fired--as it afterwards proved to be, by W----, and saw that my
assailant was unable to discharge his revolver, though evidently
tugging at the trigger. The other rowdy was now advancing; and as his
companion still endeavoured to fire at me, I was compelled to again use
my own revolver in self-defence. The would-be murderer now fell dead,
while his cowardly friend ran up presenting his pistol by the barrel,
and crying, "Don't shoot, don't shoot!"
I really did feel very much inclined to take vengeance upon the fellow,
and my Cantonese (who now came up) would certainly have put him to
death, had it not been for my lieutenant's request to leave him
unharmed. As it was, the wretch seemed nearly frightened out of life,
and it was singular how such a coward could have mustered up desperation
enough to attempt murder; evidently, he depended upon the determination
of his comrade; for, had he been at all resolute, we would assuredly
have been killed. Upon examining the dead man's revolver, we found that
although the powder had exploded, the bullet had never left the barrel,
but had stuck just between it and the revolving chambers, thereby
disabling the weapon, and probably saving our lives. We accounted for
this singular circumstance by supposing the pistol must have been loaded
a long time, and that the powder had consequently lost its strength.
Upon the Yoong-wang's return, I fully intended to give up the surviving
ruffian to be dealt with according to the law. Again my brave lieutenant
begged him off, blindly and suicidally, as it afterwards appeared, for
ultimately he lost his own life through the treacherous act of the
wretch he spared. The name of the man who was killed was Hart, an
Englishman; his dastardly companion was an American named William
Thompson.
I would here give a piece of advice to those who may have the misfortune
to fall into the disreputable company of Yankee and cosmopolitan rowdies
abroad. Act with quickness and decision, and you will defeat men who are
mostly cowards at heart; but if you hesitate or endeavour to temporize,
you are a dead man; for these murderous wretches will butcher a
fellow-creature with less compunction than people generally feel at
killing a fly. I have heard that the man Hart had murdered and robbed
several Europeans in the silk districts, and I believe his Yankee
confederate is now serving a long term of imprisonment for highway
robbery. I engaged the five rowdies in the dark, and it has given me a
caution against their _genus_ that will never be forgotten.
The Yoong-wang having supplied me with a boat and guide, accompanied by
W----, I bid adieu to Ti-pingdom and set out for the Imperialist
territory and Shanghae. Between the outposts of the two belligerents I
found a considerable tract of country entirely occupied by large bodies
of banditti, who preyed alike upon Ti-ping or Imperialist. At one place
we had a very narrow escape from falling into their hands, having to run
the gauntlet of a large camp along the two banks of a narrow creek,
which we successfully did amid a storm of bullets, not one, however,
taking effect. These robbers were the wildest and most ferocious looking
men I have ever seen, and it was said that they spared neither man,
woman, nor child. Since my departure from China this sort of brigandage
has become frequent in the country wrested from the Ti-pings.
At last we reached Shanghae, after running past all the Imperialist
stations at night, when our small canoe-like boat was not easily
discerned. We at once placed ourselves under medical attendance, and for
a few days remained perfectly quiet. Within a week, however, I was
grieved to hear that my lieutenant had been seized and thrown into
prison _by the British Consul_ for being in the service of the Ti-pings
and having captured a Manchoo vessel, the ungrateful blackguard,
Thompson, having given the information which led to his arrest.
Englishmen should be aware of the gross injustice exercised by their
authorities in all affairs connected with the Ti-pings, and no more
striking example is to be found than in the case of Mr. White, who was
sentenced to three years' imprisonment by the Consular Court for doing
upon the side of the Ti-pings exactly what Admiral Hope, Generals
Staveley, Michael, and Brown, and Major Gordon, Captain Stack, Dr.
Macartney, &c., had done, and were doing, on the side of the Manchoo! He
was actually condemned upon the ordinance of _neutrality_ of Sir John
Bowring, the said ordinance being instituted in 1855, at Hong-kong, to
compel British subjects to observe neutrality towards _both_ parties to
the Chinese internecine war. This neutrality regulation had long been
annulled by the acts of the above-mentioned gallant officers on behalf
of the Manchoo, yet the Englishman who assisted the Ti-pings, and who
was no more guilty of breaking the law than they were, was condemned by
this broken and obsolete ordinance, and died (or rather, shall we say,
was murdered; for confining a man dangerously ill in such a loathsome
den was nothing else) a few days afterwards in his damp and comfortless
dungeon! Is this British justice? How long have Englishmen understood
"neutrality" to mean all help and military assistance to one
belligerent, but open hostilities towards the other, and punishment of
its allies? Had England remained neutral, or had she regularly declared
war against the Ti-pings, there might be some grounds for prosecuting
those who have assisted the latter; but as neither the one policy nor
the other has been followed, it is no more right and just to punish
those who have assisted the Ti-pings, than those who have assisted the
Manchoo. The whole course of the hostilities against the Ti-pings was
irregular and illegal, and certainly no one can deny that the British
officers already referred to have committed a breach of neutrality quite
as much as Mr. White did, even taking Sir John Bowring's ordinance as
being in full force. The proof that this argument is correct may be
gathered from the fact that when Colonel Sykes, M.P., and the Hon. Mr.
Liddel, M.P., brought forward Mr. White's case in the House of Commons,
the Government, in order to protect its agents from prosecution, _then_
passed an Order in Council[60] _condoning the offences_ against
neutrality of all those who had assisted the Imperialists, but not
extending the same favour to those who had assisted the Ti-pings. A
piece of more iniquitous and unfair legislature, or more opposed to
English feeling, it would be impossible to find. Incredible as it may
seem, the present state of the law by which British subjects are
governed in China, viz., Sir John Bowring's ordinance of neutrality, is
re-established, but _one half is declared null and void_, while the
other is made executive by the Order in Council above mentioned, which
acts both retrospectively and anticipatory! So that a law which can only
exist, or be created, for application towards two belligerents, is here
made _ex parte_, and exactly the reverse of what its denomination
implies. The wording of this fraudulent document runs thus:--
"1. Nothing in the said ordinance, made and passed on the 17th
day January, 1855, shall extend or apply, or be deemed to have
extended or to have been applicable, to any British subject,
who, _at any time heretofore_, may have assisted, _or may
hereafter assist_, the Government of the Emperor of China....
"2. If any subject of Her Majesty ... shall ... levy war, or
take part in any operations of war against the Emperor of China
... such person shall be liable to the several penalties
mentioned in the said ordinance of the 17th day of January,
1855."
It is thus perfectly evident that the ostensible neutrality ordinance is
literally an alliance with one of the two belligerents. The style and
title are maintained to satisfy and hoodwink the House of Commons, to
deceive them into believing that the Government is pursuing a neutral
policy in China, while the clauses tacked to the old ordinance entirely
change its every intention, and exclude the least particle of neutrality
from its meaning.
If Lords Palmerston and Russell are so destitute of allies in Europe
that they cannot restrain themselves from rushing into alliance with the
Manchoo Emperor of China (who certainly does not reciprocate their
extraordinary ebullition of feeling, and who would take infinite delight
in making mincemeat of his officious friends and all their countrymen),
why do they not proclaim the stupendous and ever-memorable fact openly?
Why do they seek the most opposite and roundabout way of effecting their
object by employing chicanery and double dealing to convert an ordinance
of neutrality into an importunate treaty of alliance; instead of raising
themselves from their slough of shuffling and fraudulent means, by
repudiating the false ordinance and duly announcing the barbarous
Manchoo despot as their very good ally? Surely the noble lords have not
been deterred from giving to the world their wonderful act of
statesmanship, by doubting that the contented British public would
accept the affair as an agreeable compensation for their questionable
European policy? Perhaps, however, it is as well that they have
preserved a discreet reticence, because the Emperor of China is no party
to the alliance they have thrust upon him, and is particularly liable to
issue an edict for the extermination of all foreign devils, the noble
lords included, at any moment that may appear auspicious.
The shameful Order in Council of July 9, 1864, is quite sufficient proof
that the trial and condemnation of my unfortunate lieutenant was
illegal; every British officer who committed a breach of neutrality by
assisting the Imperialists was equally liable to prosecution. If the
Cabinet Council had not, with oily complacency, justified the acts of
their military subordinates in China _after_ they were committed to the
policy (in fact, when the operations resulting from their illegal
intervention had terminated), and _after_ Mr. White's death, the
friends of the latter would undoubtedly have obtained heavy
compensation.
Besides the fact that my medical adviser ordered a change of climate,
directly I became aware of my lieutenant's fate I determined to take a
trip to England.
Major Gordon, R.E., had retired with his whole force from active
co-operation with the Imperialists since the Soo-chow treachery and
massacre for which he was responsible. I therefore naturally concluded
that he would not resume the position of tool to the sanguinary,
faithless Mandarins, who had so completely dishonoured him. As a
Christian, an Englishman, and a British officer, I did not think it
possible he could himself wish to continue a participator in deeds of
revolting barbarity, and I concluded that his Government would
immediately recall him, and cease all active support of the bloodthirsty
Manchoo. Although my latter supposition proved correct, the former was
quite mistaken, as I found after my return to England. In consequence of
these circumstances, and the fact that at Shanghae I was altogether
unable to execute any of my projects for the service of the Ti-pings, I
decided to abandon the sword for the pen, and to fulfil my instructions
from the Ti-ping authorities by writing the present work, trusting that
I should serve their cause by appealing to the sympathies of the British
people, and hoping that foreign hostility would cease, in which case
their ultimate success would be a certainty.
The emissaries of the Manchoo, and the hirelings of the slaves of the
Manchoo, were not either intelligent or energetic enough to effect the
capture of their humble servant, although they amused themselves by
attempting to do so not only before but after his departure from China,
by one of the overland mail steamers.
Having brought the history of the Ti-ping revolution and my own
adventures down to this period, all that now remains to be noticed are
the events which have transpired since I sailed away from the Chinese
land. Before, however, proceeding with them, it will be necessary to
return to the fall of Soo-chow, and resume our chronicle from the
occurrence of that tragedy.
There is but little doubt that the Ti-pings would have been able to hold
their own against the enemy, even taking into consideration all the
foreign support the latter received, had the betrayal of Soo-chow never
taken place. Although Nankin, as the capital and seat of the Tien-wang's
Government, occupied the first political place, Soo-chow, in consequence
of the extraordinary measures taken to strengthen it, and its central
situation in the Ti-ping dominions, became the principal military
position. The capital, though surrounded by the highest and most massive
walls in China, and defended by some commanding fortifications, was
situated on the extreme verge of the Ti-ping territory, and was the most
assailable point, while its resources were far inferior to those of
Soo-chow. Moreover, directly the latter city became invested by the
Anglo-Manchoo forces, a powerful army was moved within its spacious
walls, while the Chung-wang, with his own division, co-operated from the
outside. These troops constituted the only Ti-ping army in the field at
that time, all the remainder of the forces being employed, according to
a mistaken defensive policy, in garrisoning the numerous walled cities
throughout their kingdom--tactics ordered by the Tien-wang in opposition
to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, and which ultimately led to the
destruction of the greater number of the garrisons in detail, and the
loss not only of Nankin, but all the former possessions of
Ti-ping-tien-kwo.
The siege of Soo-chow was prosecuted by an Imperialist army of from
50,000 to 70,000 men, including _General_ Gordon's and other foreign
contingents, altogether about 6,000 strong. At least 12,000 of the
Imperial troops, under General Ching, were well armed with foreign
muskets and rifles; they were partly disciplined, and constituted a very
effective force, far superior to the usual class of Chinese soldiers.
Attached both to the Anglo-Manchoo legions and ordinary troops, were
many British officers, and, what was still more useful, a very large
supply of every description of artillery. Three or four heavily armed
and shallow steamers, together with a great fleet of Mandarin gunboats,
were possessed by the besiegers. Besides all this array of strength in a
bad cause, several detachments of _British troops_ were moved up from
Shanghae, for the ostensible purpose of giving 'moral support' to the
murderous intentions of the Manchoo, but, in reality, to afford succour
in case the Ti-pings might defeat their assailants--a contingency far
from improbable. The troops so fraudulently prostituted (fraudulent,
because they were solely organized for the interests of the British
taxpayer and not the Manchoo; prostituted, because yellow gold and
mercenary motives caused their disgraceful employment) consisted of some
companies of the Beloochee Regiment, sent to garrison Quin-san (about 14
miles from Soo-chow), and a force of H. M. 67th Regiment, Royal
Artillery, and 22nd B. N. I., commanded by Captain Murray, R.A. Not only
were these troops sent to participate in Manchoo atrocities, but the
British General (Brown) in command actually took upon himself _to lend_
the Imperialists every available piece of artillery on the station, as
though the same were his private property and did not belong to the
British nation, whose trust he was abusing.
To defend Soo-chow, the Ti-pings had a force of about 40,000 fighting
men, including some 8,000 attached to the Chung-wang outside the city.
About one third of these troops were the _elite_ of the service, while
all the others were brave and veteran soldiers. Besides Mo-wang, who was
commandant of the city, four or five other Wangs were present; the
principal among them was the Nar-wang, who commanded more than half the
troops in garrison, his military power being greater than that of the
commandant, although he was placed under the orders of the latter.
The Mo and Nar Wangs were the Commander-in-Chief's two principal and
favourite generals. The former was a Kwang-si man, and had been the
Chung-wang's companion in arms from the commencement of the revolution;
the latter chief was a native of Hu-peh, and had joined the Ti-ping
cause in the year 1854, since which he had been trained to military
tactics by the Chung-wang. Both leaders were associated together in
equal rank and command for nearly ten years, and it was always
understood among the Ti-pings that they were not only bound together by
the strongest ties of adopted brotherhood and friendship, but that they
were equally attached to their renowned superior. Yet it will be seen
that, in spite of the good influences and kindly associations by which
the three were supposed to be governed, the Nar-wang was a man of evil
nature, and small, treacherous mind.
After very severe fighting, _General_ Gordon managed to effect the
capture of all the stockades outside the walls of Soo-chow. This,
however, was only accomplished after many a disastrous repulse, and a
great loss of men and officers.
The following account of the last assaults upon the fortifications
outside the East Gate, which were defended by a few pieces of artillery,
is copied from "How the Taepings were driven out of the Provinces of
Kiang-nan and Che-kiang," and will be found to illustrate the bravery
with which the garrison of Soo-chow struggled against irresistible
odds:--
"On 27th November, after Major Gordon had all infantry (except
1st Regiment) and artillery assembled at Waiquedong, an order
was issued that a night attack should be made on the Low-mun
stockade, which formed the key to all other stockades on the
east side of Soo-chow.
"White turbans were served out to all soldiers, so as to be able
to distinguish them from the rebels, in case it should come to
a hand-to-hand fight. About one o'clock Major Gordon himself,
accompanied by Majors Howard and Williams, started with about
two companies of men towards the stockade, leaving the remainder
of the force behind already fallen in, so as to advance at a
given signal. Everything seemed quiet, and in fact all thought
the plan would succeed. After Gordon and his followers had been
advancing close to the stockade, they found everything quiet,
and no signs of the guards being aware of an attack. The
remainder of the force, therefore, received orders to advance,
while the advance guard had succeeded in climbing inside the
breast-work. Scarcely were all troops up to the front and a
portion of them crossing to reinforce Major Gordon, when the
rebels began to direct a fire of grape, canister, and musketry
on the force, which made every one shiver. The Quin-san
artillery responded vigorously, and it was a fine spectacle to
see fiery rockets and red-hot mortar shells going into the rebel
works. But the rebels stood it gallantly, and did not retreat an
inch. The whole line of stockade which the rebels held seemed
one line of fire, and here Major Gordon perceived that Chinese
are not fit to fight at night time, for all the begging and
encouraging of the European officers could not make the troops
try another attack; they seemed afraid of their own shadows. The
only chance left therefore was to try and shell the rebels out
of their position, and this was done till dawn of day, when
Major Gordon, seeing the rebels still resisting desperately, and
receiving thousands of reinforcements from the city, made good
his retreat, leaving numbers of killed and wounded on the field.
This was one of the most bloody fights the force encountered;
and, judging by what the Quin-san force lost this night, the
rebels must have lost tremendously. Still, the gallant fellows,
encouraged by their brave chiefs, held their position manfully
against a fire of about 20 guns, flying on them for about three
hours. The loss of the Quin-san force was as follows:--Captains
Wylie, 2nd Regt.; Christie, 4th Regt.; and Maule, 2nd Regt.;
Lieut. King, 2nd Regt., killed. Major Kirkham severely wounded
on the head; Lieut. Miok, 4th Regt., wounded in the shoulder;
Major Tapp, wounded in the leg; and several more slightly, with
about two hundred men killed and wounded. Major Gordon seeing
this night attack frustrated, determined to pay the rebels off
for it; and shortly after, on the 28th November, at night, all
guns, about 46 in number, were brought in position within about
700 yards of this formidable stockade, and the infantry was to
fall in near the guns at daylight on 29th of November, to make
another attack. The rebels were quite prepared for it, for no
sooner did they perceive all the artillery and infantry so near
their works, than they hoisted their red flag as a sign that
they meant to fight, and not give up this position so easy.
Precisely at eight o'clock the signal rocket went up, and at
once all guns sent forth their different missiles, some
directing their fire on the Low-mun stockade, others directing
their fire on the stockades lying to the right and left.
"The rebels seemed to preserve their ammunition, for but very
little fire was encountered at first. The 8-inch mortars were
playing havoc in the stockades, for every now and then houses,
boats, etc., would be blown up in the air, under the cheers of
the Imperialist soldiers, of whom thousands, under command of
General Ching, were present, to support Gordon's force. Le Futai
himself had taken up a place in rear, in one of the Imperial
stockades, so as to witness the spectacle. About eleven o'clock
the fire from both sides was furious, even the siege artillery
had advanced within about one hundred yards of the rebel works,
pouring forth grape at the rebels, who, however, inspirited by
their noble leader, the Mo-wang, in person, stood it like
European soldiers. The 5th Regiment, under Major Brennon, was
now ordered up, to storm the stockade on the extreme right, near
the Soo-chow creek, the most favourable point to cross the
ditch; but although this brave regiment advanced with cheers,
and some of the officers succeeded in crossing and trying to
climb up the breast-works, the rebels defended this point
desperately, and poured volley after volley of musketry into the
ranks, so that after about ten minutes' struggle the 5th
Regiment was obliged to retire, having lost several officers and
men. This attack having failed, the bombardment was renewed with
vigour, and orders given to the 3rd Regiment, under Major
Morton, to go to the extreme left, to make feint of attack, so
as to draw the attention of the rebels on that side. Gordon here
succeeded beautifully, for scarcely had Morton and his regiment
begun to engage the rebels on the left, when the Mo-wang, of
course anticipating a real attack on that place, ordered his
best men to defend it. Scarcely, however, had the Mo-wang's men
moved on, than Major Williams, of the 2nd Regiment, made a dash
at the place where Brennon had met with defeat, and not waiting
for bridges, but swimming the moat, followed by several officers
and men, succeeded in getting inside the breast-work, which no
sooner had the rebels perceived than the whole fled in confusion
into the Low-mun evacuating all the stockades along the east
side of the city, and leaving a good number killed and wounded
on the field. The stockades were soon occupied by Imperial
troops, and thus Gordon's force was within one hundred yards of
the city wall. The Quin-san force, however, paid dearly for this
victory, their loss being Lieutenant Jones (Artillery),
Lieutenant Williams, 5th Regiment; Captain Acgar, 4th Regiment,
killed. Captain Shaml'sffel lost both eyes; and several more
officers slightly wounded, with about 100 or 150 soldiers killed
and wounded. The ground around the stockades was as if it had
been ploughed by the shell, and no doubt the rebels deserve
credit for having defended the place so long against such
enormous artillery."
Previous to the capture of the last outwork (the Low-mun stockade), and
the day after the Anglo-Manchoos had experienced the severe defeat, in
attempting to surprise the position at night, the Nar-wang secretly
sent messengers into the besiegers' camp, and declared his wish to
betray the city into their hands, requesting their co-operation to
dispose of the Mo-wang, whose loyalty would be likely to defeat the
proposed treachery.
The motive for this defection at a time when the Imperialist successes
had come to a stand-still, and when Gordon himself doubted his ability
to capture Soo-chow, seems to have been caused by jealousy the Nar-wang
entertained against his old friend and companion, the commandant of the
city. Besides this, it is probable that the previous treachery of the
Americo-Ti-ping, or Burgevine, force had affected the leading traitor
and his evilly disposed associates, by giving them the idea that they
might arrange terms with the enemy, by which they would not only be able
to obtain security for their lives and property (and retire from the now
ceaseless hostilities, if not desperate straits, to which the Ti-ping
cause was driven), but also receive substantial rewards from the
Manchoo.
The Nar-wang's jealousy probably arose from the fact that the Mo-wang
was placed over him, as governor of Soo-chow and its dependencies. That
he entertained the most bitter animosity against his former friend and
comrade is quite certain, for, in order to succeed with his treachery,
he went to the dastardly extreme of assassinating him.
We have now to notice the death of the gallant and noble Mo-wang, the
fall of Soo-chow into Manchoo hands, and the various events connected
therewith. These cannot be more effectually described than in the words
of Major Gordon, R. E., and in a review of his report by the _Friend of
China_,--about the oldest and most independent paper in the foreign
settlements in that country.
"MEMO. (BY MAJOR GORDON, R.E.) ON THE EVENTS OCCURRING BETWEEN
THE 29TH NOVEMBER AND 7TH DECEMBER, 1863." PUBLISHED IN THE
"FRIEND OF CHINA," SATURDAY, 12TH DECEMBER, 1863.
"The morning after the failure of the attack by night on the
Low-mun stockades, General Ching came to me, and informed me
that Nar-wang, Ling-wang, Kong-wang, and Pe-wang, with
thirty-five Tien-chwangs[61] and their followers, had opened
negotiations with him for the coming over of their troops; that
these men composed their quarter of the garrison, and had
possession of four out of the six gates of Soo-chow, viz.,
She-mun, Tcha-mun, Tche-mun, and Low-mun; and that he had
entertained their views, and had already seen Kong-wang. He said
that they would have difficulty in disposing of Mo-wang, who was
averse to a surrender; but that, if we resumed our attack on the
Low-mun stockades, they would endeavour to shut him out of the
city. _I consented to the defection with a good deed of
pleasure_,[62] as I considered that, if the rebels fought, we
should lose heavily.
"On the night of the 28th November, Chung-wang arrived in the
city from Wusieh, and was present at the combat of the 29th. His
arrival made a change in the state of affairs, and the
disaffected were unable to carry out their intention of closing
the gates on Mo-wang. They, however, sent over three
Tien-chwangs on the night of the 30th November, and proposed to
remain neutral if we attacked the city, and would trust us not
to touch their men or horses; their men to be distinguished by
white turbans. These Tien-chwangs told us that Chung-wang, on
his return to the city after his defeat, had proposed to vacate
Nankin and Soo-chow, and for the whole Taeping force to go down
to Kwang-si; and, in fact, give up the cause.[63] The Mo-wang
was averse to this, and proposed to remain and fight it out. I
have since learned that he was most anxious to see me, and I
think to see what could be done. This I learnt from two
Frenchmen who came out after his death, of whom more hereafter.
The other Wangs did not meet the Chung-wang's views, as they
intended coming over. Chung-wang then left the city, and
proceeded to Wusieh. General Ching came to me on the 1st
December, and asked me if I would like to see Nar-wang. I said
no, unless it was necessary, and told Ching at the same time
that, if the Futai did not grant the Wangs sufficiently good
terms as to induce them to come over, _I thought our attack on
the city might be foiled_,[64] as we had lost heavily in
officers and men on the attack of 27th and 29th November; and a
little hitch with the bridge, which had to be seventy yards
long, might cause a repulse. I told Ching on the same day that I
could not see the necessity of my seeing Nar-wang. He, however,
pressed it, and I consented to meet him at the north gate that
evening. I accordingly went, and met Nar-wang in General Ching's
boat. His first words were 'that he wanted to obtain help from
me.' I answered that I was most happy to help him, and then I
told him that this proposal to remain neutral would be of no
avail, and that I could not accept it, as I should be only
deceiving him and his chief if I did so, inasmuch as, if the
city fell by assault, I could not, with an undisciplined force
such as the one I command, restrain them from looting every one;
and that, therefore, unless they could give a gate, it would be
better for them to fight, or else vacate the city. I then told
the Nar-wang what I thought of the Taeping prospects, and the
little chance of success. I said that I wanted to make the
Imperialists and rebels good friends (?); that, since the rise of
the rebellion, the Imperialists had much changed; and did not
dare, from fear of foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties
as heretofore (?). He said he would see with General Ching what
he could do about the city, and that he had no fear of Mo-wang
knowing of his having seen me, or of Chung-wang either; that he
had enough troops to keep both in check. I then left, and
General Ching told me the next day that Nar-wang had decided to
see the other Wangs, and to consult on the course of proceeding.
The next day, the 3rd December, General Ching told me that
Mo-wang had some idea of Nar-wang's negotiations, and wanted to
decapitate him, but that Nar-wang was prepared. Nar-wang also
sent out to tell General Ching that the other Wangs agreed to
come over, that he personally wanted no command, but merely
permission to retire to his home with his property; but that
some of the other Wangs wanted to get commands of different
sorts. He told me further that Nar-wang had some difficulty in
seizing Mo-wang. On the morning of the 4th December, General
Ching came to me, and told me that Nar-wang had determined and
agreed with him to get Mo-wang on the wall of the city, and to
throw him down and hand him over to us as a prisoner. I went to
General Ching, and told him I must have Mo-wang given over to
me; to which he acceded willingly, and in fact joyfully, as he
had known him in former days. I then went to the Futai, who was
out, but I saw a very high Civil Mandarin named Pow, who
undertook to tell the Futai that Mo-wang must be my prisoner. I
told him to tell the Futai that I would secure his not giving
any more trouble to China. I had not come back five minutes
before General Ching sent me over two Frenchmen, who had just
come into the lines. They told me that that afternoon, at 2
p.m., all the chiefs had been assembled in Mo-wang's palace, and
after a dinner, they had offered up prayers and adjourned to the
great court, and having put on their robes, crowns, &c., Mo-wang
mounted his throne and began an address, in which he stated
their difficulties, and expatiated on the fidelity of the
Kwang-si and Canton men. The other Wangs answered him; the
discussion got higher and higher, till Kong-wang got up and took
off his robe. Mo-wang asked him what he was doing, when
Kong-wang drew a dagger and stabbed Mo-wang in the neck.[65] The
Mo-wang fell over the table in front of the throne, and the
other Wangs seized him, and decapitated him in the entrance.
They then mounted their horses and rode off to their troops;
Mo-wang's head being sent to General Ching. Mo-wang's men and
the other troops looted the palace. There was no fighting in the
city till the morning of the 5th, when the Nar-wang's men had
some trouble with the Cantonese, and drove them out of the city,
killing some 50 or 60 of them. General Ching's men advanced, and
with a small body, took charge of the Low-mun, my men being kept
fallen in, as they were under stricter discipline than the
Imperialist soldiers are. On the night of the 4th December the
rebels all shaved their heads. I went to the Futai, and telling
him that it would not do to let my men remain idle, proposed to
him to march on Wusieh, if he would give the men compensation of
two months' pay, as they had received no reward since I had
taken the command. He objected to it, and I told him if he could
only promise, the matter could be settled well. He still
objected, and I then told him I should leave _his service_,[66]
and went myself to the city. The Imperialists had some men
straying about, but not many. I went straight to Nar-wang's
house, and saw him and all the Wangs. I asked him if all was
right. He said that everything was satisfactory, and appeared
quite secure. He had not seen Ching at the time. I went to
Mo-wang's palace, and the body was where it had fallen. I then
went out of the city, and arrived in time to see General Ching,
who came to me on the part of the Futai to arrange matters. It
was now 4 p.m. I told General Ching that I was helpless in the
matter. The colonels of regiments and the officers had little
authority over them unless they used the harshest means, which
they would not do in this question. General Ching offered one
month's pay, and the officers refused it. I told Ching that it
was not my intention to accept anything; but that I felt that
after the length of time the force had been fighting it was only
right the men who wished to leave should have the means of doing
so. Matters began to look bad, and I at last determined to make
the men accept the one month's pay, which I did with difficulty,
the men having made an attempt to march down on the Futai. I
then, at the _Futai's request_,[67] gave orders for the march to
Quin-san. Ching told me at this time that the Futai had written
to Pekin, and said that he had extended mercy to the Wangs and
the rebels. Next morning, after the troops had left, I started
for the city, sending the two steamers to Wu-lung-chiao to meet
me, as I expected to be able to retake the _Fire Fly_ easily
from information I had received from the letters in Mo-wang's
house, and from some Europeans who were with Mo-wang, and who
had escaped. I went to the Low-mun, and there learnt that
Nar-wang and the other Wangs and chiefs were to come out and see
the Futai at 12, noon, and that the city would then be given
over. I thought I had better see Nar-wang before I went out, so
I called at his palace, and took him aside and asked him if
everything was all right, and if he wanted me to do anything. He
said no; that everything was proper. I told him I was going to
the Tai-hu; and he said, 'Why not wait? I am coming to see you.'
I said it was important business, and that unless he
particularly wished it, or thought it necessary, I would not
stay. He said very good, and I left. He passed me on his way to
the Low-mun very soon after on horseback, with all the Wangs,
going, as I supposed, to the Futai. I went then to Mo-wang's
palace, and then to the east, or Low-mun, to while away the
time, till the steamers could get round from Wai-quai-dung to
Wu-lung-chow. From the top of the Low-mun I saw a large crowd of
people near Ching's stockades, and thought it was the ceremony
of submission going on. A few minutes after, perhaps 12.30 p.m.,
a large body of Imperial soldiers came up, and passing the gate,
rushed cheering into the city, as they generally do into vacated
stockades. I thought little of it, more than expressing my
disapprobation to some of them. They, however, went on pouring
in and firing off their muskets in the air and yelling. Ching
then came up, and looked rather pale. I asked him if the
interview was over, and if it had been satisfactory. He said
that Nar-wang had not been to the Futai at all. I said I had
seen him going with the others. He said no; that he could not
say for certain; but that he thought he had run away. I said I
could not make out what for, as I had just seen Nar-wang, and he
said everything was all right. I asked Ching if there was any
trouble. He said that Nar-wang had demanded the command of 2,000
men, and of half the city of Soo-chow, the division to be a
wall, and that the Futai had refused it, and also that he had
let some of Chung-wang's men in. _The latter part I knew to be
false, but, strange to say, I believed the former portion._ I
asked him where Nar-wang could go to. He said that he would not
go back to the rebels, but that he would go to some village and
settle there I thought the thing so strange that I asked Dr.
Macartney, who was by me, to go to Nar-wang's house, and to see
him, and tell him not to fear anything.[68] Ching then told me
that his men alone would be allowed in, and that there would be
no looting; and as I knew before that he had his men in good
discipline, I had no fear, and therefore rode round the wall
with him. He kept on firing vollies in the air, which I
remonstrated at, and could not make out the object. He said it
was merely to prevent Kwang-si men from doing anything to his
men while they were taking possession of the city. I became
uneasy about Nar-wang; and at the south, or Pou-mun, I left
General Ching and rode off to Nar-wang's palace. I got there at
dark, and found it had been gutted. I was then met by Nar-wang's
uncle, who asked me to come to his house. Being only with my
interpreter, I had no one to send for General Ching, or for my
troops; but the entreaties of this Tien-chwang being so great I
agreed to do so, and therefore went with Nar-wang's family to
his house. When I got there his men were all fallen in, and the
streets barricaded. I wanted to send my interpreter for
assistance, but they would not let him go. I therefore remained
till 2 a.m., keeping away the Imperial looting parties. At 2
a.m. I sent my interpreter and an Imperial soldier, who was with
my horse, to get the steamers round to Wai-quai-dung to make the
Futai answerable, and also sent for my body guard. After he had
started, the man who went with him came back and said he had
been beheaded by the Imperialists. I remained till 4 a.m., and
then went out to send orders to the steamers myself. _I was
taken by the Imperialists and detained an hour._ At last I got
to the Low-mun, and sent the body guard to the Nar-wang's house,
but it was too late, the Imperialists had entered and gutted it.
I then went to the Low-mun, and met there General Ching, to whom
I gave my opinion. He was most anxious to excuse himself, but I
did not listen to him. At this time I did not know that the
Wangs had been beheaded. I then went down to Ching's stockades,
and met Major Baily, commanding Ching's artillery there. He said
that General Ching was very much put out; that the Futai had
ordered him to execute the Wangs, and had given orders to the
troops to enter the city, that he had lost face, &c. Baily then
told me that he had Nar-wang's son, and brought him to me. I
refused any communication with General Ching, Nar-wang's son
came to my boat, and, pointing to the other side, said it was
there that the Wangs had been executed. I went over, and
recognised Kong-wang's, Nar-wang's, Sieh-wang's, and Sung-wang's
heads, but the body of Nar-wang was not to be seen, having been
buried. I took, at the son's request, Nar-wang's head. _The
bodies had been cut down the chest, and the wounds on the head
were most horrible, showing the brutality of the executioners._
I then was waiting for the steamers, as I had heard that there
were some high persons still in custody, and I thought that I
could frighten the Futai into giving them up. He, however, heard
of my arrival, and went off to the city. _I left him a note
telling him my opinion, and then moved off with the steamers to
Quin-san._[69] I received, just before leaving, a letter from
Futzu-quai, telling me that a chief had come over with 3,000 men
to my officer in command; and that he, the officer in command,
had received them. I sent orders to him to inform the chief of
the treachery, and to let him go with his men and arms, if he
liked, or else to bring his troops to Quin-san.
"This is a brief summary of the late events, _which will prove
to the Imperial Government a most fatal blow_. I imagine that
the Futai and General Ching arranged this matter, and know that
it is viewed by the mass of Mandarins with disgust.
"Nar-wang's son tells me that Chung-wang was willing to come
over; and that all the people in the silk districts are the
same; but how to come they know not. Is not this a time for
foreign governments to come forward and arrange the terms? The
power is in this force, if the authority from Pekin is given to
it to act under some _honest_ Chinaman. What is now to be feared
is that foreigners will join the rebels, and will thus cause the
war to linger on to the extermination of the unfortunate people
on whom the burden falls, and to the detriment of trade of
every sort. That the rebels really do not possess the qualities
of government cannot be doubted. They merely hold cities, and
let the villages govern themselves. The head chief may know
something of the Christian religion, but I will answer for it
that nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the
subject. It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government will
interfere at this time.[70]
"C. E. GORDON, Major Commanding.
"P.S. Prince F. de Wittgenstein was present at most of the above
occurrences, and can vouch for the correctness of the same."
"'THE FRIEND OF CHINA,' SATURDAY, OCT. 12, 1863.
"We publish to-day a document which we consider one of the most
remarkable that it has been our good or evil fortune to peruse
for many a day. Emanating as it does from a man of Gordon's
ability and position, we have been much more than disappointed.
How we have been so, let our readers judge.
"The exact position of the major is, it would appear, that of
Adjutant of Quin-san, though possessing less power than General
Ching, whose faculty of lying seems to have the wonderful power
(by attraction we suppose) of giving credence; though the major
tells us that he knew the rogue _was_ lying. We give the major's
own words, 'the latter part I _knew_ to be _false_; but, strange
to say, I believed the former portion.'
"This General Ching, this cowardly liar, it was who voted as the
right-hand man on all occasions concerning the conduct of
negotiating with the rebels. The major tells us that the Taeping
Wangs had opened negotiations with Ching for the surrender of at
least four gates of the city. We suppose this was before the
29th of November. On the 4th of December we learn of Ching's
being _joyful_ at the prospect of the Mo-wang falling into the
hands of Major Gordon, and on the same day we hear of his
reception of the unhappy Wang's head.
"Ching next appears as Envoy of the Futai 'to arrange matters,'
we suppose, for the surrender of the city. Here the major slips
out of the 'matter' by declaring himself 'helpless,' and this,
after he had assured the Nar-wang that he wanted to make the
Imperialists and Taepings friends, and only wanted possession of
'a gate' to prevent looting everybody.
"Major Gordon does not tell us _why_, at the 'supreme' moment of
the taking of Soo-chow, he was so anxious to get possession of
the _Fire Fly_. We beg to call our readers' attention to the
following statement:--'I thought I had better see Nar-wang
before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him
aside, and asked him if everything was all right, and if he
wanted me to do anything. He said no; that everything was
proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu; and he said, "_Why
not_ wait? I am coming to see you at the meeting of the Wangs,"
as he _supposed_, at the Futai's.' Why was Major Gordon absent?
Why did he not make it his business to see that the assurances
which he had given to the Nar-wang were carried out?
"The major tells us that he got 'uneasy' when he found that
Nar-wang's palace had been gutted; however, his remaining till 4
o'clock next morning where he was (though why he did not go
himself for his body-guard instead of sending his servant he has
not told us) hardly seems to prove this assertion; but the
affair of his steamers being of so great a consequence, he sends
an assistant 'to send orders to them,' when he is taken and
detained by the Imperialists for an hour. (General Ching was, of
course, busy just at that moment, and Major Gordon's detention
was most opportune.) The screaming farce of General Ching's
losing face, and Major Gordon's refusal to have anything to do
with him, here opportunely follows the tragedy--(one likes to
laugh after the heavy business!). The idea of frightening the
Futai is nicely got over. The latter gentleman----_goes into the
city_, where, of course, he _couldn't_ be frightened! The major
takes a steamer and goes off to Quin-san.
"_Leaving a note_ for the Futai.
"Our readers have the major's letter before them, and they can
judge for themselves whether our analysis be correct or not. Our
own opinion is that the major--owing to his recent losses,
fearing a repulse if the city of Soo-chow had then been
attacked, and finding occasion of taking it himself by
treachery, and yet desiring to shield himself from the infamy of
such a transaction--would have acted precisely as he declares he
_has_ done.
"Though a considerable reader of history, our recollection does
not supply a parallel to the infamous treachery practised upon
the unsuspecting Taeping chiefs. The conduct of Pizarro, in
Peru, was nothing in comparison. One Inca, and a room full of
treasure, is a small affair when compared with the confiding
Princes of Soo-chow. Now, we ask all right-minded men to take
Major Gordon's statement to Nar-wang, which we quote
literally:--'I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and
rebels good friends. That since the rise of the rebellion the
Imperialists had been much changed; and did not dare, from fear
of the foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as
heretofore.' And compare his account of the atrocities committed
upon the Princes of Kong, Nar, Seih, and Sung.
"Our review of these facts is based upon Major Gordon's own
statements; and if he does not find means of extrication, we
have placed him upon a pinnacle of infamy whence he shall not
readily descend. From the moment Major Gordon first became
_particeps_ in the affair of the surrender with General Ching
(the very ideal of a Manchoo liar), he should have stood between
the Manchoo butcher of a Futai and his confiding victims, and,
as a true soldier (the soul of honour), yielding his life rather
than have exposed himself to the execration of all society as a
traitor of the deepest dye.
"Major Gordon will, no doubt, think us severe upon himself; but
we assure him that what we have said is by no means meant as a
personal attack. We are simply commenting upon his own statement
of what has lately occurred at Soo-chow. It may possibly be true
that he has been victimized by the liar, Ching, and the Futai.
We are half inclined to think such to be the case, considering
his simplicity in telling us, on the authority of the Nar-wang's
son, that 'Chung-wang was willing to come over, and that all the
people in the silk districts are the same.' He also tells us
that the 'rebels do not possess the qualities of government.'
That they actually allow 'villages to govern themselves;' and
that while the 'head chief _may_ know _something_ of the
Christian religion, nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas
on the subject.'
"We are rather astonished at Major Gordon's information as to
this point. We have been for many years in China. We have seen
the way in which the cherished temples and idols of the Manchoos
have been treated by the Taepings; and it is rather late in the
day to tell us what rebel 'ideas' are on the subject of the
Christian religion.
"In conclusion, Major Gordon hopes for the interference of the
'Government.' He means, of course, the _English_ Government. If
there were anything wanting to make Major Gordon contemptible in
the eyes of all Europe and America, it was this last phrase.
What! the English Government interfere to prop up the Manchoos
after the statement of what Major Gordon says has occurred at
Soo-chow! Major Gordon! We thought you not only an English
officer in Chinese employ, but we considered you an honourable
subject of our Sovereign, yet it seems you penned this sentence
after the atrocious perfidy of Soo-chow--'It is sincerely to be
hoped that the Government [English] will interfere at this
time.'
"If he had not added this last sentence we could have pardoned
Major Gordon everything. What! the Government of Englishmen to
sustain a Government which, by Major Gordon's own showing, is so
perfidious that we can make no possible comparison! There is no
Englishman in this or any other part of the world who will not
blush for Gordon, or the era in which it was found that an
Englishman advocated assistance for a Government which has
violated every treaty, and even the most sacred obligations
recognised among men.
"As for ourselves, we are not military adventurers, and,
perhaps, cannot understand how _any stratagem_ may be fair 'in
war as in love,' but we do hereby protest against a violation of
a solemn word of honour given. Major Gordon must clear himself,
or he will go down to posterity not only 'unhonoured and
unsung,' but as a wretch who sold blood to General Ching and the
present Futai of Kiang-nan.
"Major Gordon, in telling us that, or, in fact, asking the
question, viz., 'Is this not the time for foreign Governments to
come forward and arrange terms?' looks as though he fancied
foreign Governments _could_ entertain the idea of an honest
Chinaman under authority from Pekin. But in spite of the
testimony of the Prince Wittgenstein, or any other potentate, we
are inclined to believe that unfortunate Taepingdom has little
to learn from Manchoo morality, and still less from mercenary
soldiers, whose honour is bought and sold!"
Some people may consider the article last quoted as too severe upon
Gordon--perhaps they may change their opinion after perusing the
following extracts from a narrative of a journey to Soo-chow, by the
sub-editor of the _Friend of China_, soon after the great treachery. I
prefer giving this authenticated description by an eye-witness, to
narrating the facts myself, because I did not enter Soo-chow after its
betrayal, and cannot, therefore, vouch for the subsequent massacre (and
other disputed points) from my own personal observations, although
otherwise I have the strongest proof that the reported atrocities were
perpetrated:--
"TO SOO-CHOW AND BACK, VIA QUIN-SAN.
"After leaving Shanghae, our route (or creek) lay through a low,
flat country, intersected by canals innumerable in all
directions; the richest land in China, stretching away to the
very horizon, unbroken to view, except by countless graves,
commemorative arches, and heaps of ruins. The weather, though
superb, seemed oppressive, from the utter abandonment of the
country; not a soul was to be seen as far as the eye could
reach, and the endless fields of neglected and fallow ground
(once the garden of China) deepened that air of sadness which
winter always seems to wear in the country. Though ashore the
desolation is complete, not so on the water; Mandarin squeeze
stations have sprung up in all directions.
"At Wong-doo we were actually stopped, and 400 cash demanded
from our Louda. Our indignation getting the better of us, we did
then and there write our protest against thievery upon the
rogue's ribs; and in round, legible characters, too, we did all
we could to teach _this_ Manchoo robber that the higher the
squeeze, the less commerce, and the less commerce will certainly
produce less revenue. When will all Manchoos, Morrill tariff
men, &c., learn this lesson?
"There were, besides, a few wretches fishing by means of
cormorants (so often described that I will say nothing about
it), making up the sum total of population. At last, Quin-san
pagoda became visible; and after a short run over the country
(our boat following), we reached the city.
"Of course, we went to see the 'lion' of the place. He seemed to
be in a consumedly bad humour; but, nevertheless, granted us
passes for Soo-chow. Dropping metaphor, Major Gordon impressed
us as a very young man (say thirty) _without_ an 'old head on
his shoulders.' We suppose coolness is a quality which he
constantly displays on the field; he certainly displayed it in
his own house when we called upon him.
"On the 18th December, after a run of fifteen miles from
Quin-san, we reached the stockades outside the city of Soo-chow.
They had evidently been the scene of a fierce encounter.
Innumerable shot (solid) in their interiors told the tale of
carnage; and numerous unburied corpses were lying about in all
directions, in spite of the number which had been disposed of in
the creeks. As we drank our tea that evening, we studiously
avoided any remark on _this_ subject. Four or five miles more
brought us to the lofty walls of Soo-chow. Inside the gate
(Lo-mun) an immense stone wall and water-gate (as protecting the
outer bastion) will ever stand a monument of Taeping energy. Of
course, our first move was to see the 'lion' of Soo-chow, the
_in_-famous Futai. The palace of this magnate (the former Ya-mun
of the Chung-wang) really 'impressed' us as something worthy of
the 'Mings,' in which style it is erected.
"We have visited hundreds of such structures, but the Soo-chow
pagoda is certainly the finest we have ever seen. In ascending
we counted 220 steps, and judged the height to be from 150 to
170 feet from base to summit. It is nine stories high (as usual,
an odd number); but when we reached the top, the view there
presented well repaid our trouble. The vast city lay at our
feet--the Venice of China--intersected with hundreds of canals,
pagodas, and temples (in the tent-like style of the Chinese),
relieving the otherwise monotonous view of infinite tiled roofs.
"In many places the city was obscured by the burning of houses,
set on fire by the Imperialist soldiers.
"On the 19th December, having sent our cards before us, we
called upon General Ching. While waiting for his appearance, we
had time to examine a magnificent English clock (looted from
Mo-wang's palace), which formed the main ornament of the
'reception-hall.'
"Over the dial was a fountain of water (in glass), and under it
a pastoral scene, with moving figures of impossible shepherds
and shepherdesses, worthy of Arcadia--all moved by the
mechanical contrivances provided in the clock itself. At last
Ching entered, and at first took us for a second edition of
General Brown, for he immediately entered upon a defence of Le
Futai. After telling him who we really were, he suddenly became
so reserved that we beat a polite retreat (for the fate of the
Taeping-wangs had by no means faded from our memory).
"As it was still noon, we determined on a visit to the residence
of Chung-wang's secretary in the neighbourhood.
"On our arrival we found that the house had not only been
looted, but that the valuable furniture it contained had been
literally smashed to atoms by the Imperialist soldiery.
"In the rear we discovered a large hall, over the entrance of
which a rebel tablet still remained--'Teen-foo-dong'--'Hall of
the Heavenly Father.' But what really astonished us was to find
on the walls a complete set of elegant lithograph engravings,
which Roman Catholics are accustomed to call the 'stations,' a
series of pictures representing the sad journey of Jesus from
the house of Pilate to His place of execution.
"One of the pictures we became possessed of, and we shall ever
keep it as the most precious souvenir of our trip to Soo-chow;
for we think that the affecting story of Jesus' passion and
death was _appreciated_ by these _Missionary-forsaken_ patriots.
"It certainly shows that a high Taeping official loved to
contemplate the various scenes of that awful tragedy (for
principle's sake) over which the world, till the end of time,
shall weep the bitter tears of violated right and triumphant
wrong.
"_20th Dec._--The day being fine, we determined to have a look
at the steamers _Feillong_ and _Sycee_. A smart walk to the
Padi-cho gate brought us to the 'fifty-two arched bridge,' where
we saw the heavy artillery just outside.
"We looked with regret upon those splendid 'peace-makers,' that
_they_ should have been _loaned_ to the butcher of
Soo-chow--that _they_ should be the property of the British
Government--were thoughts upon which we need make no comment.
"Captain Baily in charge, and very creditably too! His
hospitality is the last pleasant impression we had of Soo-chow,
if we omit the feeling of relief we experienced when once
outside of its walls on our way to Shanghae.
"_21st Dec._--On learning (to our surprise) that the _locale_ of
the 'execution ground' was neither more nor less than the
court-yard of the '_Shing-s-tah_,' 'twin pagodas,' where the
unhappy rebels had paid with the forfeit of their lives for
trusting in the word of honour of their unprincipled assailants,
we determined on a trip thither. On our arrival, we examined
several most ancient tablets of stone, whence we gathered that
these pagodas were erected long anterior to the Ming dynasty
(_i.e._ reign of Tai Ching, dynasty of Sung); but we will not
detain our readers with antiquarian trifles. On entering the
court-yard (about half an acre) we found the ground _soaked_
with HUMAN BLOOD! the creek forming its drain was still (after
twenty days of slaughter) reddish with blood, as the officers
of Dr. Macartney's force can testify. The ground for three feet
deep stunk with blood (and the best blood of China); though the
weather, except at noonday, did not favour the corruption of
animal particles, Soo-chow being situated in lat. 31 deg. 23' 25"
N., and long. 120 deg. 25' E.; consequently of rather a warm climate
even in winter.
"Our Chinese informants told us that 30,000 rebels had been led
to these shambles, and executed. We had proofs enough to know
that the number was enormous; we have it on authority of an
European _eye-witness_ that this creek was so full of
decapitated rebels that the Mandarins employed boatmen to clean
it, by pushing the bodies with boat-hooks outside of the city
into the principal stream.
"We quitted the 'execution ground' (travellers will know it by
the 'twin towers'), faint at these horrible proofs of _human_
butchery which had met our view, and overcome with emotion. Was
it for _this_ that Englishmen fought? Was it for this that
English guns had been loaned by the representatives of the
British people? Was it for _this_ that the 'first nation of the
world' and the two _Scotchmen_, Gordon and Dr. Macartney, had
fought?
"Let the spirit of Robert Bruce forbid it! Let the noble sons of
Scotia contemn it; and all Christendom, in the name of ...
liberty, protest against the unspeakable perfidy, the horrible
treachery, and brutal butchery of Soo-chow!
"_22nd Dec._--Though the experiences of yesterday made us long
to leave Soo-chow, we determined to visit the ruins of Mo-wang's
palace; though completely burned, it had evidently covered an
immense area of several acres; huge bronzes half melted
obstructed the passage, and only a solitary drum stood sentinel
at the entrance.
"It was with a melancholy satisfaction that we gazed at the
wreck of his palace.
"Among so many traitors (his brother Wangs) he had been _true_
to his flag. He knew what Manchoo honour meant, and his death by
the hands of Taeping traitors is his eulogium. If his spirit
_can_ visit this world of ours, we must rejoice that the
Manchoos have not profited (even in money) by his destruction.
"If the infamous barbarity of the Futai _can_ be excused; if his
atrocious violation of justice and right can be pardoned; if
there is any possible Jesuitical ground of justification for his
immeasurable atrocities, it is this--he betrayed the betrayers
of their own cause: he was a traitor to traitors, and has broken
faith with the recreant Wangs.
"Depressed in spirit, we hurried from the ruins of Mo-wang's
palace to our boat, and instantly gave orders to our crew to get
under weigh for Shanghae.
"Hardly had we quitted the gate, when a letter was placed in our
hands by a trusty agent from Chung-wang, dated Kia-ching-foo;
what were our feelings in perusing it and finding these
words:--'You foreigners are like the Manchoos; you have no
honour! you have deceived us!' We, as a foreigner, felt all the
bitterness herein contained. We, a personal friend of his,
blushed for our nationality in being compared to perfidious
Manchoos!
"We candidly avow it, if we thought that the sword was really
stronger than the pen, we would have girded it on, and be one
more 'witness' to the glorious cause of liberty! We should like
to prove to the Taepings that European nations are not _all_
unprincipled liars, devoid of every virtue recognised by men,
and that sacred volume which teaches a morality of which one
would think they were ignorant. So much for our trip to Soo-choo
and back.
"S. E. F. O. C."
The dreadful Soo-chow tragedy may be considered the terminating point of
that unrighteous period of British policy commencing with the
organization of the Anglo-Manchoo flotilla; the hiring out of Major
Gordon and other officers; and the making of those infamous Orders in
Council authorizing military and naval support of the Manchoo, while it
has since been declared that an ordinance of neutrality was in force all
the time! That the terrible result of their policy would have so far
influenced the supposed Christian and civilized principles of those
members of Lord Palmerston's Government who originated it, as to make
them admit their mistake with worthy humility, and seek to rectify the
wrong already done by an essay towards the much easier path of right, is
very doubtful. However, the spirit of Englishmen could no longer be
restrained, and the Government were driven to rescind their former
Orders in Council (placing the forces of England at the evil disposal of
the Manchoo) by the unanimous voice of the Parliamentary representatives
of the people.
Englishmen may thus flatter themselves that they have repudiated the
atrocities which they had occasioned; but the very fact that their
mistaken policy entirely caused such deplorable results, makes them
morally responsible for the same. Still the national complicity _may_ be
glossed over. The participation of the agents on the spot, and
especially the principal, Gordon, cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be excused.
If Major Gordon had resigned his employment in the service of the local
servant of the Manchoo Government, he might, by thus immediately
forsaking his brother generals when he became involved in their deeds of
blood and treachery, have saved his honour from suspicion and his name
from everlasting infamy. If he had possessed the least particle of
self-respect, humanity, or Christian feeling, he could not possibly have
followed any other course. Incredible as the fact must ever seem to
right-minded Englishmen, Major Gordon, after craftily passing two months
at Quin-san, still in command of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, and still
receiving his pay from his employer, resumed active service with those
sanguinary monsters and consummate betrayers, General Ching and the
Futai Le.
Men judge by actions, but despise words. Gordon has _said_ that his
disgust was something stupendous at the revolting barbarities
perpetrated by his friends; yet the sentiment did not make him refuse
their pay, neither did it prevent his return to participate in fresh
atrocities within two months, nor shock him sufficiently to stay his
early reconciliation with the blood-stained wretches who had smeared him
with the same unfading and polluting mark. Of course, before returning
to active service, the British officer induced his Manchoo master to
indite a cunningly worded Chinese despatch, setting forth that he was
not actually concerned in the massacre of the confiding Soo-chow
victims. Naturally enough, to retain the services of Major Gordon (and
the consequent assistance of the British Government), without which they
would still have been powerless before the Ti-pings, the Manchoos,
through Futai Le, verbosely declared all that was required. Shortly
afterwards, besides resuming his employment, the major responded by
writing an official letter, in which he forgot his former disgust, and
had the singular audacity not only to exonerate the Futai from blame for
his unparalleled atrocities, but to request Sir F. Bruce not to make any
further complaint about the same[71]--events that had seriously stained
the honour of Great Britain, and which only the most prompt and
unqualified repudiation, together with entire cessation of further
countenance and help to the Manchoo, could either erase from her
scutcheon, or clear her policy from the imputation of complicity.
Unfortunately for the reputation of Major Gordon, since his elevation to
the position of General of Futai Le's Anglo mercenaries, he had been too
much accustomed to intrigue and encouragement of treachery to have felt
a proper indignation at the Soo-chow affair; and it is possible he might
have had some knowledge of the planned perfidy before it was put into
execution, and so was not sufficiently horrified to throw up his 1,200
taels (L400) per month. Gordon's behaviour in the treachery of the
Burgevine-Ti-ping legion is one specimen, and a very strong one too, of
the conduct referred to. He induced the Europeans who went over to him
to desert the Ti-ping cause by his promises of office, bribes, and safe
conduct to Shanghae for such as were tired of fighting. Some mistaken
individuals have ascribed this proceeding to the humane disposition of
the man who condoned the ruthless massacre of his paroled prisoners, who
assisted as a principal agent in the vast destruction of life and
desolation of country during the unjustifiable British hostilities
against the Ti-pings, and who never put himself to the trouble of saving
the lives of those he assisted to vanquish. It must be a rather lax code
of military honour which could reflect any _credit_ on Gordon for
rewarding many of the traitors (mostly low American rowdies), by
bestowing upon them various commands in his own force; and he--supposed
to be an English officer and gentleman--with open arms receiving them as
his messmates and brother officers: even less creditable is the fact
that he obtained pecuniary reward for those whom he did not make his
_friends_.
The letter written to Sir F. Bruce by Gordon as a justification for his
fresh alliance with the Futai Le, appears in the Parliamentary Papers,
as noticed by the foot-note on the preceding page. This document is so
important, as showing the character of Gordon's connection with the
Imperialists, that I quote it in full, and then subject it to a close
analysis.
"INCLOSURE 1 in No. 9.
"_Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce._
"Soo-chow, February 6, 1864.
"My dear Sir Frederick Bruce,--
Par. 1.--"_In consequence of the danger which will arise by my
delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of
uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footae_ to issue a
proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any
participation in the late execution of the Wangs, and have
determined to act immediately."
Par. 2.--"The reasons which actuate me are as follows:--_I know
of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels;
that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of
no character; and that the Footae will not accept another
British officer if I leave the service_, and therefore the
Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put
under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at
times we should never feel certain."
Par. 3.--"_I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for
the course I am about to pursue_; but in the absence of advice,
_and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support
the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run
the risk_. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I
have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful. _But the
rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body_, and it
will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as
possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should
serve to benefit the Imperial Government."
Par. 4.--"_I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months
longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave,
and the Government does not support the Imperialists._ I propose
to cut through the heart of the rebellion, and to divide it
into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang."
Par. 5.--"If the course I am about to pursue meets your
approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect
to be well rebuked. However, _I know that I am not actuated by
personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most
conducive to the interests of our Government_.
"The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I
imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself."
Par. 6.--"_The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some
extenuating circumstances in his favour, for his action_; and
although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can
scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an
European governor.
"This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this
matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I
will answer shortly, I am, &c.,
(Signed) "C. G. GORDON."
Par. 7.--"P.S. _If you would let the matter drop_, and make me
responsible for my action in the matter, _I think it would be
more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government
than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae_.
"C. G. G."
NOTE.--The parts of the letter in italics are those subjected to
review.
_Analysis of Major Gordon's Letter._
Par. 1. Now, with regard to this first premise, what right had Major
Gordon to make a prospect of danger to the Imperialists a pretext to
resume _friendship_ and _alliance_ with the faithless and barbarous
wretches who had already implicated him in their revolting atrocities?
Major Gordon's duty as a British officer, specially executing the policy
of his Government, and leaving it responsible for his conduct, was
simple and palpable. To avoid the deathless guilt of participation in
the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, he should have repudiated both.
What course did he pursue? He wrote and talked a great deal about
disgust, indignation, horror, &c., but never took any _action_ to fulfil
his otherwise worthless protestations. By the only part we find he
really performed and did not merely talk, it appears that he actually
had the unparalleled audacity, folly, or knavishness, to _arrange_
terms with the Futai, although any intercourse, arrangement, or
communication whatever, upon a friendly basis constituted a direct
condonation and approval of the atrocities which would have made an
unqualified separation from _all_ interests and future connection
imperative to any man of honour, humanity, or Christian principle.
Par. 2. The assertion that Gordon _knew for a certainty_ that Burgevine
intended to rejoin the Ti-pings, is best controverted by the following
extract from the _Friend of China_, Shanghae newspaper (issue of
September 29, 1864), which, being one of the principal organs among a
population of Europeans and Americans, scarcely numbering 2,000 souls,
may be credited for being well informed upon affairs in their midst;
moreover, the editor was personally acquainted with Burgevine, and was
aware, equally with myself, that he entertained no enthusiasm for the
Ti-ping cause.
The article referred to states:--
"As for Gordon's assertion to Sir F. Bruce that he knew for a
certainty Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels, and that
upwards of 300 Europeans--[This estimate is supremely absurd.
During the whole time Burgevine was with the Ti-pings, and when
everything seemed to favour his enterprise, he could never
obtain more than one-third of 300 Europeans]--of no character,
intended to join him. This being written in February last, we
know for a greater certainty that, at that time, neither did
Burgevine meditate anything of the kind, nor were there
thirty--the tenth of 300--Europeans in this quarter available
for any such game. And though Gordon may have been under an
impression that he was writing truth when he made this
assertion, his common sense might have told him the thing was as
improbable as it has eventually proved incorrect. We say he
_may_ have been under an impression that he was writing truth.
We may not refrain, however, from saying we doubt it. Why,
Gordon knew as well as we did that the rebels never sought the
assistance of foreigners, did not care to see them in their
ranks, and were always jealous of them. Gordon knew right well,
moreover, that when Burgevine left Soo-chow he left the rebel
service for ever; that he was sick and disgusted with it; and if
ever he meditated anything afterwards, it was operation rather
as an independent buccaneer than as a Ti-ping general. The
assertion--yarn, wilful lie, or whatever it shall be called--did
very well, however, in the place it was intended for, viz.
Pekin, a place so far away from the scene of action, that there
was no possibility of contravening it at the time."
Besides the facts--incontrovertible to those acquainted with the
case--in the above refutation of Gordon's "reasons" for his fresh
blood-alliance with that cold-blooded murderer, the Futai, another
strong argument may be proved against his veracity:--
1. We may be quite sure that the Ti-pings would never have accepted a
second time the services of the man who had once betrayed them. From my
own knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Chung-wang, I am quite
assured on this point. 2. Then with respect to the probable action of
Burgevine himself. Having deserted the Ti-ping cause before Soo-chow had
fallen, and while its prospects were in vastly more favourable condition
than at the period of Gordon's statement, he would, consequently, never
be disposed to join when its circumstances had become desperate. 3. As
for the "300 of no character," mercenaries would certainly not espouse a
failing movement, which, in fact, had become still more "unprofitable"
than when the Burgevine-Ti-ping legionaries ran away because, even at
that time, they found no sufficient inducement to remain. These
propositions cannot fail to damage the "reasons" given by Gordon,
because they show that all common sense and reason points to an exactly
opposite conclusion. Thus we find that logic reverses Gordon's
"reasons," while facts entirely prove the falseness of his statements.
The principal argument is the fact that Burgevine _did not_ join the
Ti-ping, and the mythical "300" were never more heard about.
Par. 3. This paragraph of Gordon's letter seems to contain about the
most severe condemnation of his "reasons" that it would be possible to
imagine. He states that "he is open to very grave censure for the
course he was about to pursue," and that, "knowing the Pekin authorities
will support the Futai in what he has done," he had made up his mind to
"run the risk;" that is to say, he knew that the Manchoo Government
would approve the treachery and massacre in which the Futai had involved
him; yet such was his obliquity of principle that he actually used as a
reason to resume the sanguinary alliance the very fact which should have
made his separation from the Manchoo still more imperative.
With regard to the ungenerous, if not treacherous, manner in which
Gordon, behind their backs, termed his comrades "the rabble," it is well
noticed in the quotation from the _Hong-Kong Daily Press_, at the end of
this analysis.
Par. 4. This section of the letter exhibits a very pretty ebullition of
overweening self-conceit. If the writer takes the field again, the
rebellion cannot last "six months;" without that mighty warrior's
hostility, it would last "six years." Well, Bombastes did take the
field, but the "rebellion" still flourishes. It will be seen that the
blower of his own trumpet modestly puffs his value at only twelve times
that of any other officer who might conduct the operations against the
Ti-ping.
Par. 5. Concerning this protestation of disinterested motives--"I know
that I am not actuated by personal considerations"--I beg to refer my
readers to the concluding paragraph of the analysis, when they will find
that this statement is no less questionable than others by the same
author. With regard to Gordon's excessive care of the "interests of our
Government," and his declaration (in paragraph 2 of the letter), "that
the Futai will not accept another British officer if I leave the
service," the article in the _Friend of China_, already quoted,
continues from where we left off:--"And just as likely to be true was
the statement that the Futai would not accept another _British_ officer
if he, Gordon, left the Chinese service. How did Gordon learn that fact,
or that story? What can there be in _British_ officers that they should
be so repugnant to the Deputy Viceroy? What Gordon really meant was:--If
I leave, 'the Government' will not find such a faithful tool in any one
else as they have found in me."
Par. 6. In this part of the precious letter it is shamelessly declared
that "the Futai has extenuating circumstances in his favour" for
breaking faith and cruelly butchering the defenceless prisoners at
Soo-chow, who solely surrendered upon the terms guaranteed by Gordon
himself.
Par. 7. This postscript makes a fitting conclusion to the bad principle
and illogical reasoning of the letter we have reviewed. Gordon has the
audacity to request that the "matter"--affecting not only his own
character, for that is immaterial, but the honour of the British army
and the fair fame of England herself--may be "let drop," and to opine
that "good relations" should be maintained with the Pekin Government, by
no longer expressing any indignation at the immeasurable disgrace
reflected upon England by the revolting barbarities perpetrated by her
very good Manchoo allies, through the aid, and in the actual presence,
of British officers.
Before concluding the analysis of Gordon's apology for resuming active
operations with the Futai, it is necessary to make a few further
observations. In the first place, it is quite impossible to deduce a
sufficient cause from the three "reasons" by which he declares himself
to have been actuated (paragraph No. 2). Even suppose we admit the
allegations that Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels; that 300
Europeans were ready to join him; and that the Futai would not have
accepted another _British_ officer, to what conclusion do they lead us?
Simply, that _if_ these suppositions became realized, the event might
prove disastrous to the Manchoo. Now, as Gordon chose to make this his
excuse for comfortably passing over the Soo-chow affair, and resuming
active service, it is perfectly clear that (whether he intends to convey
this meaning or not) he pursued such conduct in the interest of his
Imperialist friends; and this reduces the three "reasons" into a plea of
duty to the Manchoo. Moreover, from the independent action claimed
throughout the letter, the writer does not attempt to justify himself by
any pretence of duty to his own Government. British officers, and,
indeed, all their countrymen, may well feel astonished and disgusted at
the extraordinary reasoning of Gordon, who, though merely the hired
mercenary of a _local_ Mandarin (Le Futai), and being totally without
_status_ in the Imperialist service,[72] made his duty to the Manchoo,
forsooth, a reason for condoning the atrocities in which they had
already involved him, and justifying his future participation in deeds
equally abhorrent to every civilized and Christian sentiment.
We now come to the question as to the worth of this plea of duty. Either
Gordon was the servant of the Manchoo Government or the British
Government. When the English Commons compelled ministers to revoke the
Order in Council authorizing the employment of British officers by the
Manchoo, and to recall all so employed, _in consequence of the Soo-chow
massacre_, Gordon, eventually, was withdrawn from service with the
Futai. Now this proves that he was _bona fide_ the servant of the
British Government, and not only destroys his implied plea of duty to
the Government of China, but virtually disclaims any countenance or
indorsement of his act in joining the Futai and resuming active
operations subsequent to the Soo-chow tragedy. Thus it is palpable
beyond any manner of doubt that the course Gordon pursued was _entirely_
according to "personal considerations;" was at his own responsibility;
and was neither in consonance with duty to his own Government nor that
of the Manchoo.
There are but three other motives which might be held to account for
Gordon's conduct. The first would be, duty to his God--but this never
has been attributed to him, and it would be gross blasphemy to do so;
the second, philanthropy, has been professed both by himself and
friends; the third, which is pecuniary, has been more frequently
ascribed to him. The philanthropical motive will be controverted shortly
when we come to a case in which it is attributed to him. With one
exception (the _China Mail_), the whole European press of China lamented
Gordon's connection with the Futai at Soo-chow; still more indignant
were the channels of public opinion when they found that he quietly
ignored the treacherous massacre by remaining at his post; and then
rumours were not wanting with regard to the mercenary motives believed
by many people to be the real cause of his return to active service.
Major Gordon has not only brought himself into evil repute, but also the
service of which he is so questionable a specimen. Take, for instance,
the following extract from the _Friend of China_ (issue February 20,
1864):--"If it be true that Major Gordon has again coalesced with Le
Futai, he must not blame us if we judge of his motives according to the
old maxim, 'actions speak louder than words.' It would seem that his
late rejection of rewards from the hand of Kung was simply because of
its having been too little for his acceptance, not too vile. His
retirement to Quin-san was a safe dodge to quiet public opinion in
regard to the Soo-chow massacre.... We hope that he has stipulated for
tens of lacs of rupees. Why should a soldier of fortune not make a
fortune? When the major returns to Scotland, will any of his 'canny'
countrymen ask impertinent questions as to the source of the 'siller'?
To be sure, military men who wear Queen Victoria's uniform may hem and
haw, cough and look doubtful; but we assure the major that if one
British officer can sell his sword, the others have no right to complain
about the price.... Dollars cover every defect, and a wealthy soldier
can afford to buy the respect which he cannot exact. Let the trade of
murder flourish, as it always has done, and may Major Gordon fully enjoy
all the wealth that the Manchoos can give, and that mental satisfaction
which faithful servitude never fails to bring to those of integrity! Is
not faithfulness bought and sold in 'Vanity Fair,' and should that not
be looked for in the conduct of a--British soldier?"
If this article were to be literally intended, it would probably
indicate the principles of Gordon. It appears very unfair to judge him
by the code of honour, civilized morality, and Christian doctrine, when
he does not seem either to appreciate such restraints or conform to
them; therefore it is possible that the press has been too severe when
condemning acts that, in this case, may, perhaps, be rather virtuous
than otherwise.
We now bring the analysis of Gordon's "reasons" to a close by the
following extract from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_ (October, 1864),
which refers to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the letter, and finishes by
making a direct accusation of mercenary motives for his coalescence with
the Futai:--
"We believe it is well known that had Gordon left, Macartney
would have succeeded. Certain it is that Macartney was an
applicant for the post when Gordon was nominated, and as he had
subsequently completely won the Futai's confidence, there can be
little doubt about the matter.
"It will be seen, therefore, that Gordon's pretexts are shallow
subterfuges, which will not stand the test of truth for one
moment. He admits he is open to grave censure, but he says,
'knowing as I do that the Pekin authorities will support the
Futai in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the
risk.' That is a nice process of reasoning, certainly!
"He then turns round on his comrades--calls them a dangerous
rabble, 'which he will make it his duty to see dissolved as
quietly as possible, and that while in course of dissolution it
should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.'
"Apart from Gordon's unprincipled conduct with respect to the
perfidy of the Futai, and to the murder of the Wangs--conduct
which must heap disgrace on his name, and for ever prevent him
from looking an honest man in the face again--we doubt whether,
in the whole page of history, a parallel is to be found of a
victorious fortunate commander turning on his comrades in the
disgraceful, and we will add treacherous, manner in which Gordon
turns on the Quin-san force in the letter before us. Let the
reader remember the number of times Gordon had led the Quin-san
force to victory--how splendidly they behaved in the campaign
which Gordon was about to lead them through when he thus
treacherously denounced them! Whatever they were, they had made
him what he was; and bad as they might have been, we doubt
whether any one of them ever departed more directly from the
code of honour laid down by himself than Gordon did in rejoining
the Futai, or even whether any one of them so far betrayed his
comrades as Gordon does in the letter before us.
"A letter from Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell, dated Pekin, 21st
March, encloses a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector of
Customs, to Sir Frederic, communicating the important fact that,
at the interview which Colonel Gordon had had with the Futai at
Soo-chow, about the beginning of February, he, Mr. Hart, acted
as interpreter between the two. The ostensible reason for Mr.
Hart thus acting was to enable the Futai to exculpate himself,
which, according to Mr. Hart, he most completely did. Why did
not Gordon mention this important circumstance in his letter to
Sir Frederic advising His Excellency that he had again taken the
field?[73] How came it that Mr. Acting-Consul Markham in his
letter to Sir Frederic announcing the reconciliation, was silent
on the point? How came it that General Brown was either ignorant
of, or suppressed the fact? How did the fact come to be kept so
secret from the public? Not a whisper nor a hint of Mr. Hart's
presence is to be detected in the despatches of these officers,
let alone the complete vindication of the Futai which that
gentleman avers was effected at the interview?
"The answer is plain. Mr. Hart is a man of good repute, of high
standing, and is a true and faithful servant. The Mandarins have
great faith in him, and his word goes a long way. If they sent
him to Gordon with an offer of 50,000 _taels_, the colonel might
be assured not only that the money would be placed to his credit
in any bank in London he might name, but that the transaction
would be kept an inviolable secret.
"There, reader, you have the clue to Gordon's sacrifice of
principle, and Mr. Hart's visit to Soo-chow."
Before narrating the events subsequent to Gordon's return to active
operations, and bringing the history of the Ti-ping revolution down to a
close, it is necessary to review a despatch written by Sir F. Bruce, the
British Minister in China. The document constitutes the only authority,
or rather the only official approval, Gordon ever received for rejoining
the Futai. It is necessary to notice the same, because, as it was an
entirely conditional approval, and the conditions were _never_ observed,
it naturally became null and void. It is, therefore, our duty to prove
these facts, and thereby elucidate what might otherwise be held to
remove the responsibility from Gordon, and, in fact, justify his
conduct. The following despatch is the one in question, and it will be
seen that it is the reply to Gordon's letter:--
"Pekin, March 12, 1864.
"Sir,--I have received your letter of the 6th of February,
stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations
in concert with the Governor of Kiang-soo. I informed the
Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere
with the course you have taken, _but that my acquiescence was
founded on the passage in their despatch to me, which states_,
that in any future operations in which a foreign officer is
concerned the rules of warfare as practised among foreign
nations are to be observed, and that I should enclose you the
extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing
the arrangements agreed upon for the future. [1.]
"I have received the strongest assurance that it will be
strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Le is to be
instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how
essential it is that there should be no repetition of the
occurrence at Soo-chow.
"I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the
correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at
once, and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You
might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which
rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the
onus of decision before committing yourself to any action.
"But you appear to have felt, as commander of a Chinese force,
and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its
composition and with the dangers to which this force, if
indiscreetly handled, might give rise that the decision must be
based on your representations, and you therefore assumed its
responsibility.
"This honourable and manly conduct on your part entitles you to
a frank expression of my opinion on the subject.
"I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step
you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of
the high motives that have guided you while in command of the
Chinese force, _of the disinterested conduct you have observed
in pecuniary questions_, and of _the influence in favour of
humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided
associates from Soo-chow_. [2.]
"I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of
serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily
pursued the _pacification of the province of Kiang-soo_. _In
relieving it_ from being the battle-field of the insurrection,
and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of
their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry,
you may console yourself with the assurance that you are
rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great
material interest. [3.]
"It would be a serious calamity and addition to our
embarrassments in China were you compelled to leave your work
incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution or dispersion of the
Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger
and anxiety from which, during the last two years, Shanghae has
suffered.
"Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to garrison
Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on
until a civil administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits
is firmly established in the province, and until the disorderly
and brigand elements which form the force of the Taeping
insurrection are either put down or so thoroughly repelled from
its frontiers as to leave that unfortunate province in peace.
"To the force under your command we must look for that result,
and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is
indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inactivity is
full of danger, and I approve your not awaiting the result of
the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow, _provided
you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in
future defeated by the Chinese authorities_.[74] [4.]
"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
"FREDERIC W. A. BRUCE.
"Major Gordon, R.E., &c."
[1.] Now, here we have the _condition_ upon which Sir F. Bruce agreed to
Gordon's action. Let us see how the condition has been observed. If my
readers will take the trouble to turn back to the preceding chapter,
they will find that the capture of Hwa-soo and Wu-see (as corroborated
by the letter dated "April 28, 1864," from one of Gordon's own officers)
was followed with a complete violation of Sir F. Bruce's conditional
"acquiescence" by the wholesale massacre of the unfortunate Ti-pings.
Furthermore, the following chapter will prove that at every city
captured by Gordon and the Imperialists "the rules of warfare as
practised among foreign nations" were _not_ observed, nor even pretended
to be fulfilled according to the terms of the condition upon which
Gordon's action was approved: the principal cases referred to will be
found to be the capture of Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, Chang-chow-foo, and
Nankin.
[2.] The preceding quotation from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_, and the
description of Burgevine's hegira in Chapter XXII., sadly differ from
Sir F. Bruce's "pecuniary" and "influence in favour of humanity"
theories formed at Pekin upon evidence supplied by Gordon himself.
Burgevine had actually _left_ Soo-chow before Gordon interfered.
[3.] Readers of this history will at once perceive the falseness of
these statements, Major Gordon having, in fact, not only _prevented_ the
"pacification of the province of Kiang-soo" by the Ti-pings, but _made_
it "the battle-field of insurrection" by his "steadily pursued"
_invasions_ of the otherwise peaceful and settled Ti-ping territories.
As for the hypocritical cant about "a service to true humanity," &c., I
need only refer to the narrative of the journey to Soo-chow by the
sub-editor of the _Friend of China_; the travels of the silk-merchant
through the _pacified_ country; the letters from two of Gordon's own
officers, &c.
[4 and 1.] Combining the first and last paragraphs selected from the
precious letter for review, we will briefly notice the facts proving in
what manner Gordon fulfilled the proviso of Sir F. Bruce--"I approve
your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai's
proceedings at Soo-chow, PROVIDED you take care that _your efforts in
favour of humanity_ are not in future defeated by the Chinese
authorities." In Chapter XXIII., the letter from one of Gordon's
officers contains the following statement relative to the capture of the
village of Hwa-soo, subsequent to the reconciliation between the
official Manchoo murderer and the British bravo, and also subsequent to
the establishment of the conditions by Sir F. Bruce's despatch:--"The
slaughter among the rebels _after_ the capture of Hwa-soo was terrible.
Upwards of 9,000 were _taken prisoners_, and of _these_ it was estimated
6,000 were killed or drowned, principally by the Imperialists." Now,
Gordon himself commanded on this occasion, but he did not "take care"
that "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations should be
observed." This distinct violation of the British Minister's conditional
sanction is alone sufficient to illustrate the fact that his _protege's_
conduct was contrary to his wish or intention, and, also, to withdraw
his stipulated justification. Moreover, we shall find that, at every
succeeding capture of a Ti-ping city the same barbarities were
perpetrated, and the same indifference to his superior's instructions
exhibited by Gordon, who stuck to his dear Imperialist friends with
extraordinary devotion and tenacity, considering their sanguinary deeds
and treacherous nature.
The _Shanghae Recorder_ (a paper supporting the policy of the British
Government in China, and their very good Manchoo allies), in its issue
of March 31, 1864, thus narrates the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the
Imperialist General Ching and Major Baily, one of Gordon's
subordinates:--"As we expected, the usual horrible and revolting cruelty
was exercised, after the _surrender_ of Kar-sing-foo, by Ching's troops.
On entering the city they encountered no resistance, when the
unfortunates (_all non-combatants_) found remaining were laden with
loot, obliged to carry it out to the Imperial lines, and forthwith
beheaded, as payment in full! Truly it is the cold-blooded butcheries
which disgrace the Imperialist cause, and deaden every feeling except
unmitigated disgust at their mode of warfare." The city had been
evacuated by the troops.
The _China Mail_ (describing the capture of the city of Chang-chow-foo)
by Gordon's Anglo-Manchoo force and an army of his Imperial friends, in
its issue of May 30, 1864, states:--"The two breaches were carried in a
rush, and quarter was given _to only a few hundred men_ who had offered
to surrender some weeks before." The families of the garrison and the
other inhabitants of this large city numbered many thousand; but all,
excepting the "few hundred men," were cruelly butchered in cold blood
during several days.
The _Times_, in its issue of September 28, 1864, in a leading article
upon the fall of Nankin, states:--"What the cost of human life has been
on this occasion we cannot yet calculate. It is plain that no mercy was
extended, and although the treacherous deeds at Soo-chow must have acted
as a warning to the European officers, the account of the European
eye-witnesses makes it evident that the carnage was very great."
According to my own private advices, the _Friend of China_ and other
journals, the Ti-ping capital was evacuated; therefore, the unfortunates
butchered by the Imperialists were, probably, the sick, wounded, and
poor inhabitants who were unable to fly, or had not sufficient
inducement to do so.
With regard to Gordon's "influence in favour of humanity," can any man
of ordinary mind understand these results as philanthropical: viz., the
slaughter of thousands in the field; the cold-blooded massacre of
thousands of helpless prisoners; and the death of even hundreds of
thousands by starvation; the destruction of Christianity and free
circulation of the Bible, as practised among the Ti-pings; and the
re-establishment of Buddhism? Those who ascribe philanthropical motives
to Gordon must entertain curious ideas as to the love of mankind, when
they illustrate it by ravaging Ti-pingdom with fire and sword!
Having now terminated the narrative of Gordon's reconciliation with the
Futai, the next chapter will describe the subsequent events.
FOOTNOTES:
[60] This Order in Council was passed on the 9th July, 1864. See "Copy
of all Ordinances relating to Neutrality in China," issued in return to
an address of the House of Commons, dated May 30, 1864. (Colonel Sykes'
motion.)
[61] Tien-chwangs, colonels of regiments.
[62] Italics are by the Author.
[63] This the Chung-wang proposed, if the Tien-wang would authorise such
policy. As for his having even thought of "giving up the cause," the
assertion is equally false and absurd, which subsequent events have
proved.
[64] Here we have Gordon's reasons for approving the treachery.
[65] It was a follower of the Nar-wang who first attacked the Mo-wang.
[66] It will be seen that Gordon here admits he was not an Imperialist
officer, but a _local_ Mandarin's.
[67] This sinister statement, when combined with the fact that Gordon
soon afterwards returned to companionship and active co-operation with
General Ching and the Futai, regardless of his responsibility for the
Soo-chow treachery and massacre, certainly affords some ground for the
belief that the whole tragedy was previously arranged; that Gordon
retired only while compelled to do so by the unanimous expression of
indignation among all Europeans (General Brown and other authorities
included); and that his future course he originally intended to follow
whenever the universal excitement became somewhat abated, and public
attention less directed towards himself. Whether this conclusion be
correct or otherwise, Major Gordon and his Manchoo friends alone can
say; but in either case the Englishman fully deserves the imputation.
His first conduct occasioned and made him _particeps_ in the treachery;
his last act condoned the atrocities at which he had pretended to be
disgusted.
[68] This statement is quite sufficient to make Gordon entirely
responsible for every circumstance connected with the surrender of
Soo-chow. He made all the assurances and guarantees, it appears, but
never troubled himself to insure their observance, although he had
complete power to do so.
[69] Here is another extraordinary admission; for, though Gordon's
honour was pledged to preserve the lives and property of the deceived
traitors, he very coolly took himself off to Quin-san, without making
the slightest exertion to save the unfortunate people who had trusted to
his word as a British officer. Subsequent to this event hundreds and
thousands of the betrayed garrison were cruelly put to death. Who is
responsible for the massacre--the Manchoos, who followed their natural
instincts and barbarous laws, or the British officer, who obtained the
surrender, guaranteed the terms, and then quietly permitted the
violation of his pledges?
[70] This concluding paragraph is simply a tissue of mendacity and
absurdity. Does the dishonoured officer intend to qualify the
treacherous destruction of _his_ prisoners, by introducing the totally
irrelevant opinion that they have no Government, or "real ideas" of
Christianity?
[71] See Inclosure 1 in No. 9, "Return to an Address of the Honourable
House of Commons," dated July 1, 1864:--for "Copies of Communications
which have passed between Sir F. Bruce and Colonel Gordon."
[72] See "Our Interests in China," by H. Lay, C.B., late
Inspector-General of Chinese Customs, pp. 37-41. This _expose_ of
British policy in China fully proves, together with Blue Book
information, that Gordon never held any commission from the Emperor of
China; that neither did he hold any commission from the local
authorities, but, by serving without, was in reality a "filibuster."
[73] It will be seen that Gordon's letter is dated from Soo-chow.
[74] Italics by the Author.