Renewed Attempt.--Its Success.--Narrow Escape.--British
Interference.--How explained.--Its Failure.--The _Coup de Main_
succeeds.--Groundless Alarm.--Route to Soo-chow.--Its
Difficulties.--Generous Conduct.--Arrival at
Wu-see.--Prize-Money.--Treachery.--Preparations for an
Attack.--Manoeuvering.--The Attack.--Warm Reception.--The Enemy
repulsed.--The Result.--Wu-see evacuated.--Return to
Shanghae.--Last Interview with the Chung-wang.--Manchoo
Cruelty.--Result of British Interference.--Evidence
thereof.--Newspaper Extracts.--Further Extracts.--England's
Policy.--Its Consequences.--Its Inconsistency.--Her Policy in
Japan.--Religious Character of the Ti-pings.--Their
Christianity.
As the steamer was expected to get under weigh about 1 a.m., I started
with my men a little before midnight. Upon this occasion the very
elements seemed to favour our design. The tide ran slack; the moon,
after shrouding herself within a bank of silvery-edged clouds, retired
below the horizon to rest; while even the never-setting stars were
partially hidden by the volume of damp, misty vapour hanging over the
surface of the river, and almost concealing our two small boats.
In little more than half an hour from the time we left the shore, we
were right alongside our destined prize. With the exception of a sentry
at each gangway, everything on board seemed silent and unprepared for an
attack, although by the symptoms from the funnel and steam-pipe it was
evident that the engines were in readiness. I decided to attempt cutting
the vessel out immediately, as it seemed to me that her crew were
probably turned in, and if so, not a moment should be lost in taking
advantage of the opportunity, or they might be roused out to get under
weigh, in which case we would hardly be able to effect the capture
without loss of life.
Dividing my followers equally between the two boats, one being under my
lieutenant's charge, and assigning to each man his duty in the attack, I
gave the word to pull alongside, my own party to board on the starboard
bow, the others on the port.
Another second and we were grappling at the sides of the steamer, and
scrambling over her bulwarks, sword or pistol in hand. The Chinese
sentinels on guard, and a Manilla-man who appeared on deck, were secured
without either resistance or alarming those below. In fact, the
Chinamen, directly they perceived the danger, seemed suddenly inspired
with a strong determination to take no notice, but to be very diligent
in marching up and down, and carefully employing themselves by intently
gazing somewhere else. The calmness and attentive inattention with which
they acted throughout the capture were really charming to behold. They
betrayed neither surprise, fear, sympathy, _esprit de corps_, nor any
other feeling. I then placed a guard over the hatches, set a party to
slip the cable, and sent A-ling into the engine-room to get steam up;
while, with four Europeans, I proceeded into the cabin and secured the
officers. These comprised the intended captain, the mate, and the
gunner, the others being still on shore. They submitted very quietly,
gave up their arms, and were altogether too much confounded to attempt
any resistance. Just as the vessel was entirely in our possession and I
had given the order to go ahead full speed (the cable being slipped),
the engineer came alongside in a _san-pan_, only to find himself a
prisoner when he got on board. Directly the capture was accomplished, I
produced the commission the Chung-wang had given for the purpose, and
showed it to the senior officer of the steamer, informing him that we
were Ti-ping partisans, and that we would endeavour to pass himself and
brother captives from Soo-chow into Gordon's lines as prisoners of war.
Meanwhile, steam had been got up by A-ling, and we were carried along in
the direction of the Ti-ping territory as fast as possible. During the
capture, one of the Manilla quartermasters had jumped overboard and swam
towards the shore. Fearing that this man would raise the alarm and bring
a swarm of Impish Manchoos down upon us, I was compelled to lose no time
in making good our escape, otherwise I might have managed to capture
something more than the one steamer. A few days afterwards I was much
vexed by ascertaining that I might have taken Macartney prisoner, and
with him a large sum of sycee destined to pay Gordon's mercenaries. It
appeared, from the information given by the former officers of the
steamer, when too late to take advantage of it, that the redoubtable
_General_ was to come off in a boat with the dollars and be picked up
abreast of the Fu-tai's camp. If I had known this on the same night, I
could easily have taken measures to effect his capture. Aggravated by
the infamous manner in which Macartney carried on hostilities against my
friends, I would most assuredly have given him up to the Ti-pings, and
he would have been justly punished for his cruelty to his unfortunate
prisoners, if they had treated him by the strictest law of retaliation;
but of this he would have been in little danger, the mad forbearance of
the Ti-pings causing them to suicidally avoid the only means by which
they might have saved themselves from slaughter by British means, viz.,
by proclaiming, and by _executing_ the promise, that if any British help
were given the Manchoo, either directly or indirectly, they would
retaliate by destroying the silk and tea trade (totally in their power),
and by generally making war upon British interests. As for the soundness
of such policy upon the part of the revolutionists, it could not
possibly have done them any injury, and it offered the only chance of
arresting foreign hostility.
Some hours after the capture of the steamer, the Manilla-man, as I
expected at the time, made his way to the Fu-tai's camp and reported
the circumstance. The Manchoo official had no sooner received the
information than he sent off couriers to his very good servants and
allies, the British authorities. Those devoted personages immediately
made ready one of their national gunboats, and, placing a number of
English soldiers on board, despatched her to overhaul and bring back the
missing vessel to Shanghae.
Naturally enough my readers may be inclined to wonder what business the
British officials had to interfere with the capture of an Imperialist
craft by the Ti-pings, they must therefore have an explanation.
All the English admirals, generals, consuls, and others, who were
fighting upon the side of the Manchoo, chose, with an amazing amount of
injustice and arrogance, to assume that they and their disreputable
allies were alone entitled to belligerent rights and privileges. Every
act of their enemy was very indignantly branded as either atrociously
piratical or a form of bloodthirsty brigandage. They alone were
virtuous; they alone had any right to kill, burn, and otherwise destroy!
In consequence of this very comfortable state of self-conceit, and in
order to succour the dearly beloved Manchoo, some experimental warrior
or statesman among the British officials, according to their enlightened
_ex parte_ diplomacy, did me the honour to designate my humble exploit a
piratical outrage. This of course justified their praiseworthy efforts
to capture the scoundrel who dared to differ from their immaculate
selves, by presuming to prefer and assist the rebels instead of the
Imperialists. Besides, is not the vile pirate an enemy of all mankind?
And who would be so oblivious of merit as not to do them reverence when
they caught him? Unfortunately for their visionary laurels, though
fortunately for the pirate, they did not succeed in catching him.
Now, as even at the period referred to, the Ti-ping revolution included
a population and a territory, the former at least equal in number, and
the latter in extent, to the people and soil of England; and as they
were not only recognised as a belligerent power, but as constituting the
Government _de facto_ throughout the large tract of country under their
control, I cannot understand how the military service of such a Power,
with an army of several hundred thousand men in the field, and an
organized administration ruling their possessions, was termed piracy and
brigandage.
I was not only duly commissioned by the Chung-wang, the proper Ti-ping
authority, but also acted upon a special commission issued against the
vessels of the enemy. If, therefore, the capture of the steamer could be
termed an act of piracy, what should be the language used to express the
raids and seizure of Ti-ping craft by Admiral Hope, Generals Staveley,
Brown, Michel, &c.? when it is remembered that they performed such acts
entirely without authority from their own Government or any one else.
Some pirates might feel flattered by finding themselves in the same boat
with such worthy people; but the author of this work begs most
respectfully to decline the doubtful honour. There is another point
connected with this employment of defamatory epithets. If I, holding
authority direct from the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief (whose acts were
authorized by his king), were a pirate, then what can have been the
_status_ of Major Gordon, R.E., the commander of the Anglo-Manchoo
contingent, who held no commission whatever from Imperial authority, but
was simply employed by a _local_ Chinese mandarin?
The British gunboat did not overtake my party, though, if she had been
handled a little smarter, it would have been an easy matter, for we lost
our way several times among the labyrinth of creeks in the interior. If
it had not been prevented by the delay from taking wrong courses
(thereby affording time for the seizure of the vessel to be made known
to the enemy before Soo-chow), and from the fact that only one of the
men I had engaged at Shanghae could be depended upon, I should have
proceeded straight through the Imperialist lines and made an attempt to
seize one of their two other steamers. However, I was obliged to be
contented with my single prize. She mounted a capital pivot 32-pounder
in the bow, a good 12-pounder howitzer in the stern, was well provided
with the best description of ammunition, and she would probably prove
very serviceable in the defence of Soo-chow.
In consequence of the impossibility of forcing a passage through the
enemy's lines, it became necessary to follow some such route as that by
which I had last reached Soo-chow, however difficult it might be to find
a channel large enough to carry the steamer so great a distance.
After losing our course for the last time, and very nearly steaming into
Gordon's head-quarters at Quin-san, we managed to reach the first
Ti-ping position at San-le-jow. Directly we appeared, or rather,
directly the funnel became visible above the dense growth of rush and
bamboo lining the banks of the creek, the garrison of the fort rushed to
arms and made ready to defend themselves against the supposed and
dreaded enemy. The terror inspired by the appearance of the small
steam-vessels acting with the Imperialist mercenaries was at all times
excessive. From a distance the helpless Ti-pings were generally mowed
down with perfect impunity, and heavy artillery carried destruction
throughout their ranks, while the ships, white painted and low in the
water, were almost invisible, and were able to maintain their advantage
by retreating or advancing whenever it was desirable, at the same time
retaining a position from which shrapnel, Moorsom, and other infernally
destructive, though ingeniously contrived shell, could be thrown with
deadly accuracy.
It was no wonder that as we suddenly hove in sight, with a volume of
thick smoke puffing up from our high-pressure engines, the soldiers and
civilians about San-le-jow were dreadfully alarmed. They were well
aware that small mercy was ever shown by the "foreign brethren" in
charge of the irresistible "hoo-lung paou-chwan," for, fighting or
harmless, they were shot down whenever a gun could be brought to bear,
and so long as the missiles could be made to reach them. The rowdy
bravoes of the Imperialist flotilla being unacquainted with the
principles of military honour, seemed to believe that their sole mission
was to kill, burn, and destroy; as for extending mercy to those who were
unable to resist their appliances of modern warfare, or treating the
vanquished with magnanimity, they never entertained such ideas.
Fortunately for the people we came upon so suddenly, the steamer was
under Ti-ping colours; therefore, their alarm presented only the most
ludicrous character, unaccompanied by the tragic and heretofore
inseparable consequences of such an event. From their isolated cottages
the poor villagers rushed forth, carrying the most valued of their
homely effects; men, women, and children ran frantically in the
direction of the fort; some were laden with agricultural implements (for
even these were often destroyed by the victorious Imperialists); others
with household goods; while here and there a few noble labourers were
observed trudging along with their aged fathers or mothers on their
backs. Whenever the edge of a canal was reached, without a moment's
hesitation, the fugitives would plunge right into the water, and give
cause for merriment by the wild efforts they made to regain dry land,
often rolling back, and floundering helplessly through the soft mud.
When I perceived the alarm our appearance had created, and that the
soldiers were making ready to fire upon us with a few heavy gingalls
mounted on their fort, I stopped our vessel's way and brought up
alongside the bank, and then going ashore with A-ling, proceeded to the
fort to satisfy the commandant as to our friendly character. When it was
made known that we were in the Ti-ping service, the soldiers and people
loudly professed their gratification. The chief was a bronzed and hardy
veteran; and although his garrison did not muster nearly 100 men, he was
quite determined to defend his post to the last, had we proved to be
enemies. The answer he made when I asked him whether he would not have
acted with discretion by retreating from the steamer if she had been
still in Manchoo interest, closely resembled that given by a brave
Ti-ping officer (who had charge of a most dangerous and exposed position
near Ningpo) to a friend of mine, when the latter inquired why he did
not abandon so precarious an outpost, which was nearly surrounded by the
enemy; he replied, "Puh pa! laou Tien-ping tung shao" (No fear! an old
Ti-ping soldier knows how to die).
Passing through San-le-jow, we soon reached the small town of Pimbong,
barely twenty-five miles distant from Soo-chow, and also situated on the
Grand Canal. At this place we were very kindly received by the chief,
who, after seeing my commission, supplied me with provisions, coals,
firewood, and other necessaries. Pimbong was almost the last Ti-ping
position in the neighbourhood, as immediately beyond came the lines of
the enemy besieging Soo-chow. Here our pilots ceased to be of service,
and the chief sent on board a man well acquainted with the country, to
guide us through the largest creeks. After trying every channel
branching off from the Grand Canal, and finding them all too small for
the passage of the steamer, we were compelled to proceed on to
Kar-sing-foo, a city nearly twenty miles from Pimbong. Had the creeks we
explored been available, we could have reached Soo-chow by a _detour_ of
not more than forty miles, but by going to Kar-sing the distance would
be doubled at least.
After a short run down the splendid Grand Canal, we came to off the
city, and sent messengers to apprise the governor of our arrival. In a
little while that functionary, who proved to be the Yoong-wang, visited
the steamer in great state; he met me with much friendliness, and
declared himself delighted with the acquisition of the vessel so well
known and dreaded. Two Europeans were with the chief; they had formerly
belonged to the Franco-Manchoo contingent; and as my lieutenant had
known them to be of good character--one had been a captain in the
force--I expressed my wish that they should join me, and the Yoong-wang
very kindly consented.
As time was precious for the success of my plans, we only remained a few
hours at Kar-sing-foo, and then started away with a new pilot on board,
who was instructed to take us to the largest creeks leading to the
Ta-hoo Lake, which it would be necessary to cross in order to reach
Soo-chow.
From Pimbong everywhere we traversed a most beautiful country; and
although, from the rumours of approaching war, the influx of fugitives,
and the scarcity of provisions, no little distress was prevalent, the
people were far more happy, prosperous, and improved than Imperialists
ever have been, or seem likely to be.
Directly we steamed away from Kar-sing our troubles began. Every creek
we attempted to navigate proved either too small, or the bridges were
too narrow and low for the steamer to pass them. After getting, perhaps,
fifteen miles up a creek, and destroying several bridges by the way, the
water would suddenly shallow to less than our draught, or the channel
would narrow to less than our beam; of course, in such cases our only
plan was to get back stern foremost and try some other canal.
Fortunately the vessel was built of iron, so that her progress
overland--for often we were obliged to pass a place not more than four
feet deep, while the steamer drew five--did no further injury than
bending or indenting her pliant sides.
At last, after spending a week exploring the principal water
communication of what seemed in every respect a free and Christian
country, we approached the sea, and it was only when within fourteen
miles of Hang-chow that we managed to find an available creek. Even to
take advantage of it we were compelled to destroy many bridges; and,
upon several occasions, clear the bottom of the channel, while the work
of removing stakes and barriers was incessant. Had it not been for the
willing assistance we received from the Ti-pings, we should never have
been able to get through.
Eventually, after a passage no one would ever have believed the steamer
could have effected against so many obstacles, we arrived at the great
city of Hoo-chow-foo, situated just at the southern end of the Ta-hoo.
At this place the commandant, Tow-wang, and the Luk-wang--whose nephew,
the Mo-wang, was commandant of Soo-chow--came out and received us in
state. Upon leaving them, after having dined with the chiefs in the
city, I managed to reach the Ta-hoo after knocking down an obstructive
bridge with a few Moorsom shells. Before proceeding to cross the lake, I
obtained a dozen good men from the chiefs, and put the paddle-wheels
(which had become much dilapidated during the passage of the creeks) in
good repair; for I knew that if _General_ Gordon, of the Manchoo
mercenary service, had sufficient sense, he could easily intercept me
with two, or even three, of the steamers attached to his force. However,
fortunately for me, Gordon did not send his ships until too late; for
had they overhauled their former consort, she would have fallen an easy
prize, as I had not more than two or three Europeans and half a dozen
Chinese on whom I could depend.
As I understood there were only two channels by which Soo-chow could be
reached from the lake by a vessel drawing so much water as the steamer,
and as one of these--_via_ the Tung-shan hills and city of Wo-kong--was
already in Impish hands, I adopted the only remaining course--a creek
leading from the northern end of the Ta-hoo to the city of Wu-see; from
whence, to Soo-chow, the Grand Canal afforded an easy passage.
While stopping at a small Ti-ping position on the west side of the lake,
I was much pleased by witnessing the kind behaviour of the soldiers to a
number of destitute country people, who had fled from the advance of the
Imperialists down the Yang-tze-kiang towards Nankin. There were not more
than 150 soldiers at the station, and from their _own rations_, which
consisted solely of rice and dried fish, they charitably relieved more
than 500 starving people. This is no idle assertion, for the whole of my
confederates were present, and saw the distribution of rice. I went over
the five gunboats belonging to the troops, and found that their stores
of food were nearly exhausted. The chief told me that, when all was
used, he would be obliged to abandon the place, and leave the
unfortunate people to starve. I supplied him with a couple of bags of
rice, and then bade him farewell; although I have never seen him since,
I have not forgotten his praiseworthy conduct. Who has ever seen an
Imperialist official do the like?
At length we found the creek leading to Wu-see, and on the same
afternoon arrived at the city, greatly to the delight of the garrison,
who were much harassed by a formidable flotilla operating against their
lines of communication. Soon after our arrival, the commandant,
Saou-wang, returned to the city with his army, having beaten the enemy
after a sharp fight in the morning. The troops had marched upwards of
forty miles to and from the battle-field, and directly they came to the
creek encircling Wu-see, they threw down their arms on the bank, and
plunged into the cooling water in dense masses, clothes and all; so that
in a few minutes the surface was literally covered with them.
The Saou-wang having informed me that the Commander-in-Chief was
encamped at a place named Ma-tang-chiao--on the shore of the Ta-hoo,
and a place of strategic importance--equidistant from Wu-see and
Soo-chow, I at once requested him to despatch messengers to inform his
superior of my arrival. While awaiting their return, the commandant set
a number of men to work pulling down a very heavy stone bridge, which it
was necessary to remove before the steamer could be taken into the Grand
Canal. At this city I saw upwards of 6,000 poor people, who were
supported by the garrison. They had been driven from their homes by the
progress of the Anglo-Manchoos in the neighbourhood, and were perfectly
destitute. Every day one of the principal officers of the city came to
superintend the distribution of rice, and the ravenous manner in which
the people struggled for their food was something fearful to
contemplate, especially when it was considered that such great misery
was caused entirely by the unjustifiable intervention of my countrymen.
Upon this occasion I had not much time to notice the distress caused by
the approach of the allied English and Manchoo devastators, messengers
from the Chung-wang on the following morning bringing orders for me to
proceed back into the Ta-hoo Lake, and take the steamer to
Ma-tang-chiao. When I reached this place, the Chung-wang, attended by
the Sz, Le, and several other Wangs, came on board, and appeared to be
overjoyed with my successful enterprise and the appearance of the
steamer. A-ling, the two Ti-ping officers, and the two Cantonese were
instantly promoted; and the chiefs took off their own pearl ornaments to
decorate them. The Chung-wang then took me ashore with him, and, upon
reaching his head-quarters, confirmed my lieutenant's appointment, and
declared that he would give 20,000 dollars prize-money for the capture
of the steamer. This I considered amply sufficient for so small a
service, and I determined to divide it equally among all who had
assisted at the seizure--including the five rowdies who only came for
money--besides giving a portion to some of the former crew, who had
kept to their work and assisted me since the capture.
The encampment was formed around a large straggling village; and the
people, like those of the neighbouring hamlets, appeared more happy,
better fed, and less depressed than those of more distant parts of
Ti-pingdom. This was always the result of the Chung-wang's presence in
any locality, for he was not only the most able general, but also the
most talented organizer and pacificator among the chiefs.
At Ma-tang-chiao the Chung-wang was concentrating an army of relief for
Soo-chow; and, with the object of enabling the steamer to participate in
the same movement, men were employed to remove several bridges and other
obstructions on a creek by which she could reach the Grand Canal. This
work was hardly commenced, when two or three fugitives, shortly followed
by many others, from the suburbs of Soo-chow, arrived with the
disastrous intelligence that the city was in the hands of the enemy. How
it had fallen they could not say, further than by stating that it had
not been captured by fighting, but by some treachery. The Chung-wang
seemed much affected by the report, for Soo-chow was not only the most
important and best fortified city, the most abundantly supplied and
strongest garrisoned, but the commandant, Mo-wang, was his oldest and
bravest brother in arms.
Orders were at once given to break camp and march upon Wu-see; and while
the troops were so engaged, I returned with the steamer to the same
city. On the following day the bad news became confirmed by the arrival
of some hundreds of the garrison of Soo-chow. These men stated that the
second in command, Nar-wang, with several other principal chiefs, had
assassinated the commandant and then surrendered the city to the enemy.
A great number of the Mo-wang's men were massacred by the followers of
the other leaders, who commanded about 20,000 troops, while the
Cantonese portion of the garrison --some 5,000 strong, and unconnected
with the treachery--were compelled to fight their way out of the city.
These latter, having placed their wives and children in the centre,
proceeded to force the west gate. Unable, however, to effect the narrow
passage with their helpless families against the incessant attack by
overwhelming numbers of Imperialist and renegade soldiery, they were
driven to the horrible extreme of killing their own women and children
to save them from the worse fate of degradation and torture, if captured
by the enemy. Scarcely a third of the men succeeded in cutting their way
through, and of these many were wounded, many were covered with the
blood of their wives and little ones, while others had become raving
maniacs.
The Chinese nature, although apparently so apathetic, is yet capable of
the wildest frenzy of passion; in fact, no people have a more
paradoxical and anomalous character. It is a well-known fact that
Chinese non-combatants will commit wholesale suicide upon the approach
of enemies; but few Europeans would credit the fearful acts which the
Soo-chow fugitives were driven in desperation to commit, or the frantic
excitement leading to such deeds, and to the insanity of many of the
perpetrators. I shall never forget the terrible appearance of the madmen
stained with the blood of their own dearest relatives, whom they had
themselves killed. They rushed into Wu-see at an immense speed, passed
the city, and came to the encampment outside, and then, yelling,
shouting, and crying, threw themselves, in paroxysms of grief and
frenzy, on the ground before the Chung-wang. Several attempted to drown
themselves in a neighbouring creek; and one, a young chief, stabbed
himself to death before he could be prevented. The unfortunate men were
at last secured and taken into the city.
With the remnant of the Soo-chow garrison came seven Europeans. These
men had been sent from the city to join my legion, by order of the
Chung-wang, and having proceeded to Ma-tang-chiao, when they changed
their route for Wu-see, they were overtaken by the fugitives, and came
on with them. These seven men were not a portion of those whom I had
sent from Shanghae; all the latter (with the exception of the brave
Labourais, who was killed during a night attack on some stockades by the
enemy only a few days previously) being within Soo-chow when that city
was betrayed, and many of them there perishing. Three of the Europeans
had straggled, and did not arrive for some days. Among the four who
joined me were _Captain_ Smith, and an engineer (for the steamer) who
had hitherto been employed casting shell, guns, and executing other
important work at Soo-chow.
As it was absolutely necessary for the increase and establishment of my
legion that I should return to Shanghae, I wished to leave as soon as
the Chung-wang reached Wu-see, particularly as both I and my lieutenant
were in a very bad state of health, and urgently required medical
assistance; but the Chung-wang having requested that I would join him in
an attack upon the Imperialist force threatening Wu-see and
Chang-chow-foo, I was obliged to defer leaving until after the battle.
The enemy were intrenched in great strength within fifteen miles of
Wu-see, and were assisted by a powerful flotilla of gunboats, which gave
them entire command of the water communications of the city. It was to
drive away or destroy this fleet that an attack was decided upon.
At last all obstructions in the way of enabling the steamer--now named
the _Ti-ping_, and flying the Chung-wang's standard--to participate in
the engagement were removed; and I joined the Commander-in-Chief's
consultation held before commencing operations on the following morning.
One thousand men, composing the _elite_ of the Chung-wang's guards, and
the first division of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, were
placed under my orders, together with fifteen gunboats, which were to
co-operate with the steamer. With this force I was ordered to attack
the hostile flotilla, the Chung-wang himself disposing of his troops so
as to prevent a junction between the enemy and their vessels. About
midnight the army marched to take up its position, and at daylight I
advanced with the steamer and gunboats, the men of my legion
accompanying me in two divisions, one on each bank of the canal.
The morning was thick and foggy, so that we were enabled to take up a
position within cannon-range of the enemy without either attracting
their attention or discerning them ourselves. The place I chose for a
halt until the fog cleared away was at a large stone bridge, parallel to
the Grand Canal, up which we were proceeding, and over a creek leading
direct into a small lake, about a mile and a half distant, on which the
enemy's flotilla was stationed.
My plan of action was soon formed. I sent the gunboats in advance beyond
the bridge, with orders to attack the enemy at the entrance of the lake,
and then to retreat in confusion. By this manoeuvre I hoped to draw the
hostile gunboats into the creek, when I should be able to attack them
with the steamer to an advantage. On the creek not more than a dozen
boats could form abreast and work their guns, but on the lake the whole
number, estimated at 60 to 70, would be able to open a concentrated fire
on our advance; and one well-aimed shot could sink the lightly-built
_Ti-ping_, or pierce her boilers.
Taking on board fifty picked men from the Cantonese musketeers of my
legion, and making everything ready for action, I had the steamer moved
close to the side of the bridge, where she lay perfectly concealed.
Towards noon the weather began to clear, and our small squadron
immediately pulled forward and opened fire on their opponents. The
Imperialists, encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, soon
advanced into the creek and gave chase as our gunboats retreated. By
the time that they had reached half-way to the bridge, however, the day
became quite clear, and observing our troops spread out in line of
battle, they gave up any further pursuit.
This was the moment for which I had been waiting. Sending forward my men
on the shore at a run, I moved the steamer from her hidden position,
passed under the bridge, and advanced upon the enemy at full speed,
firing upon them with our 32-pounder, and warmly answered by their stern
guns as they turned and pulled back to reach the lake, which they
managed to do before we could close with them. As we approached the
termination of the creek, we were saluted with a tremendous cannonade.
The gunboats had formed in three divisions, one directly fronting the
mouth of the creek, the others upon either flank, so that they were
enabled to maintain a most powerful cross fire. I counted twenty-two
vessels in the centre squadron, and twenty in each of the others. They
were all fully manned with about 30 men in every boat, and each carried
a bow-gun, from 6 to 18-pounder; a large swivel on either side, and a
stern gun, a little smaller than that in the fore-part.
Of course, my land force could be of no assistance on the lake, all
their use being to accompany the steamer on either side of a creek, and
prevent the enemy's troops closing upon her in such an indefensible
position. Our fifteen gunboats were armed with such inferior artillery
that they were altogether unable to cope with the hostile vessels, every
one of which carried good English guns supplied by the British at
Shanghae. I therefore ordered them to remain in the creek, but to
advance and take charge of any boats we might capture.
Directly we emerged from the creek, the enemy gallantly pulled towards
us, decorated with innumerable flags, maintaining a very heavy fire,
yelling terrifically, and deafening us with a tremendous beating of
gongs and blowing of war-horns. Seeing that their only way of retreat
was by a creek in the rear of their starboard squadron, I immediately
attacked the centre, because, if successful, we should not only succeed
in capturing two-thirds of the flotilla, but would render them unable to
fire upon the steamer through danger of injuring themselves. While
steaming up to obtain this position--necessarily at slow speed, because
the lake was very shallow--showers of grape, roundshot, and every
species of Chinese rocket and missile, came rushing all around and about
our heads. Fortunately the _mitraille_ was fired too loosely, and the
solid shot too badly aimed, to cause us much damage, while every
discharge from our heavy gun, worked by _Captain_ Smith, proved very
effective among the mass of boats, men, and flags. In a short time the
central squadron gave way, and the crews, pulling close to the shore,
began to desert their vessels. The port squadron, in danger of being cut
off, took to flight and became mingled with the centre. Meanwhile, the
starboard division pulled up the creek in its rear, and took up a
position, from which it maintained a sharp fire over the low land,
nearly every shot passing close to the steamer or striking her. Several
times I turned away from the discomfited vessels to follow their
consorts up the creek, but on each occasion, with obstinate courage, the
enemy rallied, remanned their guns, and stuck to them until our return
to the attack drove them ashore again.
[Illustration:
DAY & SON, (LIMITED) LITH.
NAVAL ENGAGEMENT AND CAPTURE OF IMPERIALIST GUNBOATS AT WU-SEE.]
Thrice did the crews of the gunboats resume the conflict. On their last
attempt to turn the fortune of the day, they actually advanced upon us,
loading and firing as fast as they could, keeping up a fearful yelling
and beating of gongs, and evincing every determination to board. Had
they only possessed sufficient confidence to persist in this attempt,
they might easily have succeeded in overpowering us by numbers and
capturing the steamer. Fortunately, however, directly the heavy
discharges from our pivot gun--double-shotted with grape and
canister--and the incessant musketry fire from the small-arm men
stationed on our upper deck began to take effect upon them, they gave
way and retreated to the shore. After the last repulse, my squadron of
gunboats having arrived on the scene of conflict, their crews took
charge of the deserted vessels of the enemy and began to tow them away.
From their position on the creek, the starboard division of the
Imperialist flotilla still maintained the action; so, abandoning the two
others to our allies, we steamed after the still defiant squadron. In a
few minutes a well-aimed shot from our 32-pounder sunk two of the
gunboats, and eight others were captured. The remaining ten, after a
short chase, were abandoned by their men, who escaped ashore, carrying
with them, however, their small arms. At this moment I perceived that
the creek was lined on either side by a cunningly-contrived breast-work,
from behind which the gunboat _braves_ began to fire heavily upon us. At
the same time large columns of Imperialist troops became visible, as, by
sheer force of numbers, they pressed back the Chung-wang's divisions,
and threatened to occupy the bank of the creek by which I had advanced
the steamer, and which formed the only line of retreat to Wu-see.
Before we could secure the last abandoned gunboats, a large number of
musket-armed skirmishers were thrown into the intrenchments in our
immediate vicinity. So heavy and effective became their volleys--every
bullet striking some part of the steamer, riddling her light upper works
through and through, and wounding many men, while we could neither reply
with our heavy guns nor bring a rifle to bear upon the hidden foe--that
we were compelled to save ourselves by precipitate flight, leaving the
last captured vessels behind, and hurrying to the other creek at full
speed, in order to avoid being intercepted by the advancing troops.
Owing to the gallantry with which my land division held the enemy in
check, we were able to effect our retreat, carrying off fifty-one
gunboats as the substantial trophy of our victory, and capturing more
than fifty of the Sung-wang's[54] flags.
Upon reaching the bridge we were warmly congratulated by the Chung-wang,
who at once declared he would give 200 dols. prize-money for each
gunboat, which promise he scrupulously fulfilled. As the enemy continued
to advance in line of battle, orders were given for a general attack,
and I was despatched with the steamer to the city of Chang-chow-foo, to
join in the co-operating movements being executed therefrom. We were too
late to participate in them, for, upon reaching some outworks, about
twelve miles from the city, our orders were countermanded, the
Imperialists being defeated at every point, and the stockades from which
they had menaced the two cities being in the hands of the Ti-pings.
Our escape from the ambush into which we had fallen while pursuing the
remnant of the Imperialist flotilla was something miraculous, for,
although our casualties were only two Chinese killed, three Europeans
slightly, my interpreter A-ling dangerously, and a dozen Chinese
wounded, the steamer was pierced about her upper-works with countless
bullets; so much so, indeed, that it was difficult to understand how
every person on board had not been killed.
Some days after our victory, a large Imperial force advanced from
Soo-chow and proceeded to invest Wu-see. Upon one occasion they advanced
close up to the walls, but were driven back by the shell we threw among
them from the steamer. As the city was rendered untenable by the loss of
Soo-chow and other places, the Chung-wang decided to evacuate it and
retire upon Chang-chow-foo. Before executing this arrangement the
Commander-in-Chief, in his capacity of Vicegerent to the Ti-ping king,
TIEN-WANG, commissioned me to promulgate among foreigners the objects of
the revolution; the wishes and opinions of its leaders; the treatment
they had received from England; and all subjects relative thereto upon
which I might be able to write. This event has been the sole origin,
besides my own feelings in the cause, of the present work--"Tai Ping
Tien Kwoh."
My arrangements to return to Shanghae were soon made. _Captain_ Smith,
together with the Ke-wang (one of the Commander-in Chief's high
officers), I left in command of my legion so far as it was organized,
including the steamer and captured gunboats. My lieutenant, who was too
ill to remain on duty, the five rowdies, A-ling and his two Cantonese
friends, were to accompany me. Those who remained were given their
prize-money, but I refused to receive the share for the others until we
should reach the city of Kar-sing-foo, because this place was on the
limit of the Ti-ping territory in the direction of Shanghae, and I felt
confident that, if they had time, the rowdies would quarrel over their
money, and, probably, injure one another. It will be seen that my
anticipations were not groundless.
Thinking that the horrible Soo-chow treachery and massacre (the chiefs
and their men who surrendered upon _General_ Gordon's _guarantee of
conditions_ were put to death by the Manchoo colleague of the British
officer) would surely occasion the British Government to withdraw its
help from those whose sanguinary atrocities were not only dishonouring
them by their participation as allies, but actually making them morally,
if not materially, responsible; I set out for Shanghae under the
impression that the Anglo-Manchoo alliance would cease, and the time
prove favourable for advocating the Ti-ping cause and its claims upon
all foreign, but especially British, sympathy.
Having taken leave of the noble Chung-wang and his son Maou-lin, I left
Wu-see with an escort of fifteen gunboats; at the same time the city was
evacuated, and the Commander-in-Chief started with his troops for
Chang-chow-foo, carrying with him the four Europeans captured on board
the steamer, whom he promised to retain as prisoners of mine until the
return of myself or my lieutenant. It has since been reported that the
bodies of these four men were found some time afterwards near Wu-see,
and Major Gordon of the R. E., in his notorious capacity of
uncommissioned general to Manchoo Governor Le, took upon himself to
report that the Chung-wang had roasted them to death, his only authority
being the testimony of a demented "old woman," who declared that
"Cantonese rebels" had killed them! If the Ti-pings did kill the four
prisoners, the act was not only the first instance in which they have
retaliated upon foreigners,[55] but was also the result of Major
Gordon's treacherous capture of Soo-chow, for I should have sent the men
over to his lines as exchanged prisoners of war if I had reached that
city. It is, however, believed by all in China who are acquainted with
the facts of the case, that the men fell into the hands of the
Imperialists, and were put to death by them; and this seems to me a very
likely affair (if they have been killed, for it is by no means certain),
because the rear of the forces that retreated from Wu-see were closely
pursued by the troops of Le, Futai. But my strongest reason for
believing that the Ti-pings had no hand in killing them, if murdered
they were, is the fact that the Chung-wang was personally pledged (to
me) to keep them unharmed and properly cared for; and even Major Gordon
cannot state that this celebrated chief ever broke his word, _or
sanctioned a violation of his guarantees by associates_. Moreover, I
particularly gave the Chung-wang to understand that my future services
would depend very much upon finding my prisoners safe and sound at my
return; besides, he could not possibly have had any motive to injure
them, and thereby lose what he expected might prove valuable aid; and
certainly, to judge by the kind treatment they received within Wu-see,
he had no intention of doing so.
At my last interview with the Chung-wang I shall never forget the
speaking expression of his fine eyes, as I shook his hand for the last
time and stepped back to take my final departure. His look seemed to
express friendship and gratitude for what I had already done, doubt for
the future, and a mutely pathetic request, imploring that I, too, would
not desert him in his hour of need. This well-remembered glance created
another bond between us which only death can obliterate, and which would
alone have bound me to help the Chung-wang to the utmost of my ability.
No wonder he seemed doubtful as to my future course, for the Ti-pings
had never trusted a foreigner without being deceived, and they never
experienced anything but insult or unprovoked injury from European
officials!
From Wu-see to Kar-sing-foo, _via_ the Ta-hoo Lake and Hoo-chow-foo, I
was accompanied by the Shi-wang, a cousin of the Chung-wang, who had
received instructions to facilitate my movements and make arrangements
for my return, besides being commissioned to divert to the city of
Hoo-chow the reinforcements on their way to Ma-tang-chiao. A few days
after commencing our journey we fell in with a body of troops belonging
to the Ting-wang's command at the provincial capital Hang-chow, who were
proceeding to the appointed rendezvous; but the Shi-wang ordered them to
Hoo-chow, where they afterwards proved very useful in maintaining
communications with Nankin along the west shore of the Ta-hoo, _via_
Chang-chow, Kin-tang, Li-yang, &c.
After the evacuation of Wu-see by the Ti-ping troops, the city, of
course, fell into Imperialist hands; when the wretches, in their usual
style, commenced a general massacre of the unfortunate inhabitants, it
being estimated that 6,000, at least, were put to death, their crime
being the fact that they were found in a city which had been held by
rebels! The poor people who had been daily supplied with food from the
Ti-ping granaries were now starved to death, for charity is a virtue
unknown to Manchoo mandarins. I was at Wu-see for several weeks, and
during that period I went over the country for miles in every direction,
finding everywhere the same frightful results of British
intervention--in the devastation of the country by the allies, and the
starvation of the unfortunate Ti-ping country people. During my return
to Shanghae, every place I saw exhibited more or less misery; a painful
contrast to the prosperity universally prevailing only a few months
before, when the power and rule of the Tien-wang was unshaken. Upon
leaving the Ti-ping territory, or rather upon passing the few strong
cities they still occupied in proximity to the frontier, the desolation
of the country was perfectly appalling. Even throughout those portions
of the silk districts still untouched by the enemy, everything was in a
state of turmoil, inactivity, and distress. The mulberry-trees and the
silkworms, which require constant care, were but partially tended; in
many parts they were neglected altogether; so that these facts, coupled
to the wholesale massacre of the people by the Imperialists, fully
account for the great decrease of silk _since_ the Ti-pings have been
driven from the producing districts.
My readers have already been shown the prosperous condition of the
country entirely under Ti-ping control during the years 1860-1-2-3. We
will now notice for the last time the effect of British support of the
barbarous Manchoo.
The change for the worse may be considered to have fairly commenced
directly after the capture of the city of Quin-san by the Anglo-Manchoo
forces. Since that event, entirely caused by British means, death and
destruction have swept throughout the once free, Christian, and smiling
land. I have wandered over mile after mile of the once happy Ti-ping
districts (during the latter part of 1863 and beginning of 1864); I have
passed through twenty and thirty villages in a day, and, horrible to
relate, in almost every room of each house have found the unfortunate
people starved, starving, or barely maintaining the embers of life by a
fearful state of cannibalism, feeding on the dead bodies lying thick
around them! I have seen this sight of unparalleled horror in large
unwalled towns containing many hundred houses, and I frequently found as
many as fifteen to twenty bodies in one dwelling, the great number being
occasioned by refugees from places already occupied or threatened by
Anglo-Imperialists. I have had the fearful consolation of resuscitating
many of the miserable people for a short time by giving them all the
rice I could obtain, though I was convinced it would only give them
strength to undergo the pangs of starvation a second time. Some
insensate patriots may accuse me of un-English feeling for my
expressions against the policy of the _present_ British ministry; but
would not any Englishman feel and write strongly upon witnessing such
scenes as those I am describing, and which have been solely caused by
the wicked use of England's strength? I denounce the policy pursued
against the Ti-pings as being not only egregiously stupid and suicidal
in theory and practice, but absolutely iniquitous in every result.
Nothing could work greater harm on living mankind.
From the few poor wretches I found able to speak, in most cases I
gathered their expression of opinion "that it was through foreign
soldiers coming to fight the Tien-ping (Ti-ping troops) that their
distress had been occasioned." Some said that "they had come from places
taken by the Kwan-ping (Imperialist troops), and reaching where I found
them, could get nothing to eat, were unable to travel farther, and so
had lain them down to die." Whenever I came to villages where the people
were not yet reduced to the last stage of famine, mothers were offering
their daughters to any one who would take them; but even this was
unavailing! Although in other parts of China the young women would have
been taken for evil purposes, in Ti-pingdom the laws strictly prohibited
everything that was condemned as immoral, so they were left to starve if
provisions were not supplied from better motives. These fearful scenes
are so vividly impressed upon my memory that I am sorry I ever had the
misfortune to witness them.
The desolating sword of Asiatic warfare has been ruthlessly carried into
provinces for years in the most flourishing condition under Ti-ping
rule. Hundreds of once happy villages have been obliterated from the
face of the earth they once adorned, while the decaying skeletons of
their industrious and inoffensive people are thickly scattered
throughout the surrounding country, changing into a vast Golgotha and
desert what would otherwise have remained an earthly paradise.
As many people would probably feel inclined to deny that the
Anglo-Manchoo forces created the desolation I have described, because it
has frequently been misrepresented by interested persons that the
Ti-pings were the devastators, I have selected two or three statements
which entirely corroborate my own.
The following narrative was given by a gentleman who has comparatively
lately traversed the silk districts in search of mulberry-trees and
silkworms, in order to estimate the probable extent of the next silk
crop, and the causes of the present great fall-off. It appeared in the
_Friend of China_, Shanghae paper, of January 13, 1865, from which I
quote:--
"When Burgevine went to Nankin, that time the country between it
and Soo-chow was a garden for loveliness. For eighteen _le_
(Chinese miles) along the canal, on either side, the banks were
lined with houses--the inhabitants busy as bees, and as thriving
as they had reason to expect to be. With the reversion of
Soo-chow to the Imperialists, these houses and numerous bridges
disappeared. For the whole eighteen _le_ there is not a
roof--the country around, as far as the eye can reach, is a
desert. The people have fled from the Imperialists as though
they dreaded them like wolves and tigers; nor man, nor woman,
nor child, nor beast of any description to be seen. Fowls,
ducks, pigs, buffaloes--no such thing to be got for love or
money.
"Twenty-seven _le_ from Soo-chow brought me to Soo-za-qua,
formerly a custom-house station, now the abode of part of the
residue of Gordon's force....
"The place is an oasis in the desert. For miles after leaving
it, indeed, all the way thence to Wu-see, the same barren,
weed-overgrown appearance meets the sight. Pheasants,
partridges, and a wild deer now and then, gave me plenty of
amusement for my fowling-piece. But the number of bleached
skeletons, skulls, or partially decayed dead bodies, is awful to
look at--to count them would be impossible--they literally cover
the ground for miles. As for traffic in boats, there was none;
trade is all gone. Wu-see is in ruins. Where they were going I
could not make out, perhaps the boatmen themselves did not know
beyond their next stage, but the number of soldiers passing up
in boats was legion, the contrast between them in their fat,
saucy appearance, and that of the meagre, starved-looking
wretches in the streets, being very striking. Before reaching
Wu-see I passed a camp of from 20,000 to 30,000
soldiers--impudent rascals, shouting after me, 'Yang-qui-tsze,
Yang-qui-tsze' (Foreign devil),[56] till I was tired of hearing
them; beckoning me to come on shore; waving spears and dashing
them out to show what they would do if they could. They have
evidently no love for Westerns, these Imperial Imps....
"On to Chang-chow-foo, for 95 _le_, still the same howling
desert, not a working soul to be seen. The depth and strength of
the weeds now are prodigious. Alack, for my search for
mulberry-trees! I could not see one. All are cut down, and if
wood at all were seen, it was borne by hungry-looking people,
propelled by soldiers who had impressed them into the
wood-cutting line. It was for such a state of things as this,
was it, that Gordon gave his talents? His reward would be a
sorry heart (?), could he only view the misery he has made. They
are perfectly rabid after firewood, these same Mandarin
soldiers, and cut down green wood and everything they meet. I
should say there must be from eight to twelve thousand men at
Tan-yang, which I next got to--Loo-tszeur, a village between
Chang-chow-foo and it, having disappeared to a brick; not a soul
to be seen, though they have established a custom-house station
about five _le_ from it.
"Tan-yang, a small city on the left bank of the canal, is almost
entirely deserted. Soldiers presenting here, as at the other
places, the same fat, saucy appearance I before noticed, some of
them wearing bangles, earrings, and jewels of value, while the
people around are clotheless and miserable, and how the poor
wretches live at all is a mystery. All that I saw them grubbing
at was a species of porridge, consisting of the _husks_ of
paddy, a mess one would not give a horse. Oh, the skulls again!
From Chang-chow-foo to Tan-yang the ground is literally white,
like snow, with skulls and bones. The massacre of the
unfortunate Taipings (inoffensive villagers, most likely) must
have been awful! Between Chang-chow-foo and Wu-see stands a
dilapidated pagoda, said to be 4,000 years old, and I went to
look at it. What was my surprise to find it crammed with dead
bodies, from which slices had been cut to eat as food!... I went
on for 45 _li_ beyond Tan-yang; the farther I went, the country
getting worse and worse, if it were possible for there to be a
difference when one description of 'bad' does for all, and I
began to think that my search for a mulberry-tree, _in what,
under the Taipings, was a splendid silk-producing country_, was
useless, and I had better turn back."
Here we have the testimony of an impartial mercantile gentleman. Comment
is needless. We will now turn to the evidence given by two of Gordon's
own officers, men who were present during the operations against the
Ti-pings, but who were ultimately honest enough to admit the truth. The
following extracts are from a letter which appeared in the _Friend of
China_, April 28, 1864:--
"TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'FRIEND OF CHINA.'
"SIR,--I read in the _North China Herald_ a letter from Gordon's
head-quarters, in which the writer says that the slaughter among
the rebels, after the capture of Hwa-soo, was terrible. Upwards
of 9,000 were taken prisoners, and of these it was estimated
6,000 were killed or drowned, principally by the Imperialists.
Further, that there is no doubt they would have killed ten times
that number if they had the chance to do so. Now, Sir, I do hope
there will be a stop put to such massacres, though I can but
believe that the writer of that article must be, what they call
in Australia, a _new chum_, for he cannot know much about the
treachery of the Imps, or he would not dwell so much on it. Why,
did not the Imperialists take rice, beans, wheat, and all other
kinds of grain out of Wu-see, even while those around were
starving; and as the old people came up to the gate to go
outside the city with their few catties of rice, were they not
stopped and their food taken from them, while, if they spoke
against it, they were bambooed? There was rice sufficient in
Soo-chow and Wu-see to keep the poor in the districts around for
many months; why, then, could not the Futai and other Mandarins
be made to relieve the poor in the surrounding country?
"At Chang-chow, again, in place of bambooing the poor when
begging for a few grains of that which was taken from them, why
were they left to die outside by starvation? I saw this, for I
was one of the officers engaged in the capture of Wu-see, and
other cities. From Wu-see we advanced towards Chang-chow, where,
at first, there were but few poor to be seen. After we had been
there a short time, however, there was a great number of them.
Why?--_Because the Imperialists had gained so much of the
country, and the poor had been robbed by them._ As for the
much-lauded Gordon's troops, do they not rob the country people
on the march? And if the disciplined troops do this with
impunity, what can you think if the non-disciplined do it? I
have seen beggars beheaded by these wretches in sheer
wantonness.
"The _Herald's_ correspondent writes within sight of the walls
of Chang-chow, and says, the starvation and cannibalism which
prevail are unrelieved by the fiends who have been the cause of
so much misery! The writer of that article little thinks the
Imperialists are the fiends, or he would not have written so. On
the other hand, parties who have travelled in the rebel
districts have seen the Taepings relieve their poor."
Besides the above letter, the following appears in the issue of the same
paper on the 31st of January, 1865:--
"TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'FRIEND OF CHINA.'
"Shanghae, 26th January, 1865.
"SIR,--I see you say in your 'apology' for rebels that the
destruction of the city of Quin-san was caused by the Taepings
on their evacuation of it. Such was not the case. The idol
temples and official quarters were destroyed or ransacked by
them; but the destruction of the dwelling-houses of the
inhabitants was the work of the Imperialists. I was one of the
first in the city after its evacuation by the Taepings, and what
I now state I saw with my own eyes. Indeed, it was, as you have
stated repeatedly, a practice with the Imperialists to burn all
which the Taepings left. Why they did so I can hardly tell,
further than that the men were encouraged to do it by their
native officers.
"I am, dear Sir, yours truly,
"LATE OF GORDON'S FORCE.
"P.S.--Ching and Le[57] were the grand devastators, and have to
be thanked for the bulk of the misery now so rampant all over
the country."
As the Liberal Government has such a _penchant_ for interfering in the
internal affairs of other nations, why has it not devoted its meddlesome
talents to killing some one either in Denmark, America, Italy, Poland,
or Mexico? Cynical people may well say that the Premier and his
colleagues dared not more than bluster in these cases; that in the
centre of China, in Japan, Ashantee, New Zealand, &c., they became very
brave and officious because they could be so with impunity, and that
such disgraceful, unprofitable, and inconsistent, if not imbecile
policy, is either the expiring flashes of their administration or the
greatness of England.
Although it may be perfectly true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer
and his _confreres_ in office have saved the opium trade and the China
indemnity (probably also their places in office, by covering the
expenses of the last China war, which would otherwise have made a
serious cause of opposition), at the immaterial responsibility of the
destruction of a few millions of Chinese and the devastation of some
districts of China three or four times the size of England, of what
benefit has the meddling policy proved to general commercial or
mercenary interests? The silk trade, the most valuable with China, has
fallen off exactly one half at the present date,[58] since the due
effect of driving the Ti-pings from their dominions has transpired. The
interior, free and open under the revolutionists, who earnestly desired
the friendship of Europeans, has now been closed to freedom of trade or
travel by the very Mandarins who have been reinstated to tyrannize over
regions their oppression had otherwise lost to them for ever; while the
old hatred of foreigners, persistent determination to evade treaty
obligations, and the haughty, exclusive policy of the Manchoo has been
resumed, since the hypocritical pretence of adopting a more friendly
line of conduct, in order to obtain foreign assistance, has become no
longer necessary, by the recoil of the Ti-ping revolt before British
arms. Besides this, having broken the political power of the only
movement in China which afforded a prospect of improving, pacifying, or
Christianizing that vast empire, England has been the means of creating
a general state of anarchy. The Ti-pings have simply retreated to the
interior and the sea-coast province of Fu-keen, while in every other
part of the empire the people, no longer able to look upon the great
revolution as likely to overthrow the Manchoo, and being more than ever
oppressed by their foreign rulers, are not only driven to discontent but
open rebellion. Besides the Ti-ping revolution, there are at the present
time three or four powerfully organized rebellions. The "Nien-fei," in
the north; the "Honan Filchers," towards the west; and the so-called
"Mohammedan rebels," in the central provinces. Elsewhere, the
innumerable local insurrections have settled into a regular system of
brigandism, because the discontented have no longer the opportunity or
confidence to join the diminished forces of Ti-pingdom. These
circumstances, added to the fact that the Imperialist Mandarins are now
systematically enforcing at least five times the treaty-legalized
transit duties upon merchandise, are not only greatly enhancing the
price of foreign goods to the natives, but, of course, considerably
limiting their consumption. The only staple article of trade which has
not at present decreased in quantity is tea. Still the price has become
higher in China, and the non-diminution of export is due to the fact
that the Ti-pings evacuated their former tea districts and captured the
famous Vu-e, or Bohea districts, which they held for some time, without
much fighting. It would be impossible to say that, since the result of
British hostilities against the revolutionists has transpired, our
commerce with China was ever in a more stagnant, unprofitable, and
generally unsatisfactory condition. So much for the mercenary interests,
to aid which England has been unscrupulously dragged into a clandestine
and grossly criminal war!
Bad as the preceding effects of the foreign policy of the Palmerston
Government undoubtedly are, there is yet another and a far worse
consequence to be noticed. Before adverting to the most serious fact it
is as well to epitomize the political action which has created it. It
has been fondly imagined and fatally supposed by the Liberal ministers
themselves, that they, _par excellence_, are the enlightened men of
England, the only framers of philanthropical and progressive measures;
and, in fact, that their glorious and never-to-be-forgotten
place-holding is a Government of "peace, retrenchment, and reform." The
doctrine of non-intervention having even been especially professed, and
having been carried so far as to make a certain noble lord sacrifice his
publicly and officially declared determination that "Denmark should not
stand alone" in the event of certain contingencies, by leaving her to
stand alone when those contingencies did come to pass, and then framing
another set of probabilities, about the chivalrous deeds he would
initiate if the King of Denmark were to be made a prisoner. Doubtless
the admirers of that noble lord--who once made the astounding and
statesmanlike discovery that "all children are born innocent,"
especially those of his constituents, whose chubby "olive branches" were
also discovered to be the best and most beautiful in England--considered
their representative a marvellously proper man, and his bragging to
fight and then retracting a very creditable proceeding, quite in
accordance with the useful policy of non-intervention: yet, on the other
hand, there are people who have the obstinacy to review this and similar
affairs, and deduct therefrom, and observe the fact that in other parts
of the world a very different policy has been enacted where it could be
done with impunity, all of which affords sufficient evidence that the
pretended adoption of a non-interfering policy is neither more nor less
than an unprincipled truckling to strong powers, and an aggressive
bullying of the weak.
It is quite certain that, whether the rulers of China be Manchoo or
Ti-ping, the vast industrial population would still produce tea, silk,
and other commodities. Now, the professed motive for British intercourse
with China is commercial--that is to say, to buy the above-mentioned
articles, and sell the manufactures of the English markets--but not
political; for meddlesome interference with the internal affairs of
China would prove disadvantageous to both nations, and would certainly
be well calculated to bring the Imperial authority into contempt, injure
the Chinese organizations in an abortive attempt to substitute those for
which they are not yet qualified, and simply foment the troubles already
existing, by the natural consequences of injudicious and unnecessary
meddling.
But the British ministers, who would justify their broken pledges in
Europe by an appeal to the doctrine of non-intervention, act upon a very
different system towards China and Japan. They seem to make it their
business, not only to advance trade in the Celestial Empire, but to
concern themselves with its private and political disturbances, to judge
between the Ti-ping and Manchoo, and then to settle the affair by
destroying the one and bullying the other.
In Japan they have attacked feudal chieftains as though no central
Government existed in that country; and then, after degrading the
Imperial authority in the eyes of the people, force has been used to
compel the opening of ports to trade. Thus have British statesmen
pursued the best course to increase the animosities already existing, to
produce general anarchy, and to establish the violation of all
principles of international law, which they are _compelled_ to observe
in Europe. The most convincing fact with regard to the folly of
interfering in China, is, that _until_ such idiotic, or rather wicked
policy was commenced, the exports were largely on the increase, having
risen from L9,014,310 in 1859, to L14,186,310 in 1863; while the
consumption of British imports has decreased up to the same
period--about which time the operations against the Ti-pings were
exercising due effect--by more than half a million--L567,646. In 1863,
the total value of British exports to China was L3,889,927--a sum less
than the value of the exports to Brazil; yet for this comparatively
paltry amount an enormous military expenditure has been maintained,
whilst it is palpable, by the falling off of trade, that the policy has
signally failed, and the number of persons who have perished through the
mistake would make at least one life destroyed for every pound sterling.
We now come to the most serious point with regard to the war against the
Ti-pings. It is well known, and has never been denied, that throughout
the country, under their control, the Bible was circulated not only with
freedom, but gratuitously, by the Government established at Nankin.
Besides this _unparalleled_ practice, the fact that they accepted the
Word of God in its full integrity is also incontrovertible; and He has
declared, "My Word shall not return unto me void." Furthermore, it is
well known by all who have visited the Ti-pings in their cities and
camps, that (so strict an interpretation have they placed upon the
Commandments, &c.) they effectually prohibit not only the inveterate
vices of the Chinese, and their heathen practices, but the evil
indulgences which find full sway even in the most moral State of Europe.
Their abolition of opium smoking; prostitution; the hitherto universal
Chinese slave trade; the degraded Asiatic status of the women; the use
of torture and bribery in courts of justice; the deformed small feet;
the tail-wearing slave-badge of the men--these, and other facts proving
their complete superiority to the hopelessly corrupt state of public and
private life under the foreign rule of the Manchoo dynasty, we have
already noticed. Let us ask, whence these great and glorious changes?
Are they, as Lords Palmerston and Russell, and their correspondents upon
anti-Ti-ping Chinese affairs, have repeatedly declared (when obliged to
defend their un-English policy) the conduct of the Ti-pings to be, the
natural acts of "bloodthirsty marauders," "locusts," "merciless
brigands," "revolting impostors," "ferocious hordes of banditti," &c.?
Or are they not rather the blessings bestowed by God upon people who, to
the utmost of their power, and the sacrifice of their lives, have
striven to follow His Word and Law? Man may change the public and
outward forms of existence necessary for the body, but only God can
alter the private and moral character necessary for the soul. There is a
doctrine of original and natural sin; therefore it does appear
presumptuous, if not profane, when people combine together against any
vast movement in which the hand of God is visible--either in the
supernatural or the presence of the Bible; especially as they believe
that Divine interposition is necessary to convert and save the souls of
all men, and as they have neither political nor national interest in the
movement to even justify the worldly motives of their interference.
Present ministers[59] and their followers may possibly ridicule the
idea, in order to justify their policy towards China, that whatever the
Ti-pings might or might not have been--even setting apart the fact of
their Christianity--if they have been killed for the sake of British
commerce (especially the vile opium trade, which they prohibited), every
bale of silk and chest of tea brought into this land bears with it an
endless curse; and that these, together with every article of British
manufacture forced upon China, are defiled with the blood of the victims
who have been slaughtered to prosper, forsooth! "our commercial
institutions!" Man cannot serve both God and Mammon. The efforts of the
British Government to worship the latter have failed most signally; but
even had they succeeded in creating the most stupendous trade the world
ever contained, do they believe that a righteous and eternal God has not
witnessed the _means_, and that He who notes the fall of a small sparrow
hath not recorded the murder of every human being, during their unholy
crusade against the unfortunate Ti-pings?
Throughout a vast extent of China the Bible became established; but now,
through the assistance given by the British Government to the Manchoo,
the people--even including the little lisping children--have been
slaughtered, while the idols of Budha are re-erected, dominating for a
season over the desecrated ashes of _our_ Bible.
Nankin, the Ti-ping capital, has fallen, through British intervention,
since my arrival in this country; the printing and circulation of the
Holy Scriptures have therefore ceased, and the Ti-pings have become
wanderers over the face of the earth they would otherwise have adorned.
It is idle and unworthy to cavil at this dogma or that article of the
Ti-ping creed: the revolutionists did their utmost to enter into the
pale and brotherhood of Christendom. Truly and candidly speaking, the
nation solely responsible for preventing so glorious a consummation,
is--England.
FOOTNOTES:
[54] The late famous San-ko-lin-sin.
[55] Some people have thought that the four men were executed as a
retaliation for the murder of the Wangs at Soo-chow, because, naturally
enough, the Ti-pings considered the Europeans present were responsible
for the atrocities. The four prisoners were members of Gordon's force,
and it is just possible that they may have been put to death by some of
the Soo-chow refugees.
[56] My reader will contrast this with the treatment Europeans received
when these districts were in Ti-ping possession.
[57] Ching and Le were the principal Imperialist generals; they were
acting in co-operation with Gordon.
[58] June 1865. See Appendix B.
[59] Palmerston's Government.