Ti-ping Disasters.--The Vampyre Fleet.--Important Letters.--Mr.
Roberts's Case.--Mr. Consul Harvey.--Letters
continued.--Misrepresentations.--Anti-Ti-ping Meeting.--The
Sherrard Osborne Theory.--The Fleet Afloat.--The "Lay" and
"Osborne" Agreement.--The Fleet repudiated.--Pecuniary Loss to
England.--A Resume.--General Burgevine.--Lieutenant Ridge.--Act
of Piracy.--A Tartar caught.--Exit of the Anglo-Chinese
Flotilla.--General Ward's Proceedings.--Progress of the
War.--Death of General Ward.--Captain Dew's Disgrace.--How
caused.--His Mode of Proceeding.--Its Effect upon
Trade.--Operations before Kah-ding.--"Wong-e-poo."--General
Burgevine dismissed from his Command.--Major Gordon takes
Command.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatches.--His Objections to Gordon's
Appointment.--Also to General Brown's Interference.
During the absence of the Chung-wang on his campaign to the north, and
while I was still confined by illness in Nankin, important events
disastrous to the Ti-ping cause were occurring elsewhere. These events,
which must be described before continuing my personal narrative,
consisted of the organization of that extraordinary flotilla known in
England as the _Anglo-Chinese_, but principally as the _Vampyre_ fleet
in China; the resumption of hostilities against the Ti-pings by General
Staveley and his colleagues; and the conversion of Ward's old
mercenaries into a British contingent, besides the formation of several
other similar legions both at Shanghae and Ningpo.
The origin of the _Vampyre_ scheme to regenerate China by exterminating
the Ti-pings, is as yet uncertain, although Mr. Lay (late Inspector
General of Chinese Customs) in his pamphlet intituled "Our Interests in
China," thus describes its first practical adoption:--"Threatened by Sir
F. Bruce, 'that Her Majesty's Government will not go on protecting
Shanghae for ever,' ... [Blue Book, 1863, pp. 13 and 67], and alarmed by
the news of the loss of Ningpo, and of the advance of the Ti-pings upon
Shanghae ... they (the Manchoo Government) saw that they must
comply,[29] or perish.... The Prince Regent (Kung) accordingly declared
himself ready to adopt any measure that Sir F. Bruce might advise. What
was his bidding? 'Get foreign ships and engage foreign officers.'[30]
'Procure us the ships and the officers,' was the rejoinder."
Accordingly some one whom Mr. Lay terms "my _locum tenens_, Mr. Hart,"
received from the Manchoo Government "a certain sum of money for
transmission to England for the purchase of a steam fleet." Meanwhile
arrangements were made between Mr. Lay and Captain Sherrard Osborne,
R.N., by which that officer agreed to receive the _elevation_ to a
Manchoo Admiralship. The British Government suspended the Foreign
Enlistment Act, ignored the pledges of neutrality, and "at the Court at
Windsor, the 30th day of August, 1862," passed an "Order in Council
authorising the enlistment of officers and men, and the equipment and
fitting-out of vessels of war for the service of the Emperor of China."
Although fearing I may tire my readers, I cannot resist quoting from a
small book of official letters under my hand in order to prove by most
conclusive authoritative testimony the _false pretences_ upon which the
raising of the flotilla and the enlistment of British subjects in the
service of the barbarous Manchoo despotism was permitted in England. The
letters have been lent to me by a distinguished Member of Parliament,
and are written by one of the first Shanghae merchants to his brother, a
member of the present Government. These letters have, I am informed,
been submitted to various ministers; therefore, it may be concluded that
in addition to the despatches of Consul Meadows, &c., the Government had
ample means of becoming acquainted with the favourable characteristics
of the unfortunate Ti-pings they have devoted to destruction.
The letter I now propose quoting is written in reference to Earl
Russell's speech in the debate upon China in the House of Lords on the
2nd of July, 1862, and commences by stating "Earl Grey's view is far
sounder than that of the Government." Passing over Earl Russell's
preamble the letter states:--
"II. Earl Russell next propounds two questions:--
"_First._--Will the Ti-pings give us the same advantages which
the Government of China is bound to give us?
"_Second._--Can the Ti-pings form a Government with which
foreign Powers can treat?
"He argues a negative answer to these questions, and I take
issue with him on his argument as follows:--
"_First._--He alludes to the agreement made with the Ti-pings at
Nankin by Admiral Hope, restricting them to a limited distance
of thirty miles from Shanghae. The arrangement was made about
the end of 1860, and was generally understood at the time to be
limited to the space of one year. _The agreement was faithfully
kept for that time._ When Admiral Hope and Mr. Parkes went to
Nankin at the close of 1861,[31] they found the Ti-pings
stubborn, and, I believe, the latter would give no further
pledge, while Shanghae, under our protection, was made the
arsenal, mint, and storehouse of their opponents!... I believe
that the Ti-pings acted in good faith, as far as they knew, and
that _the accusation is fallacious_.
"Earl Russell, on the assumption of their want of faith,
proceeds to say:--'They approached very near to Shanghae. Junks
belonging to British owners were seized, the crews were
imprisoned, _one_ European was murdered, and every determination
was shown to interfere with the British _trade_ at that port.'
"This is a very sweeping sentence, and to a great extent
fallacious.
"'A. The Ti-pings certainly, early _this_ year, came in strong
force close to Shanghae. Their leaders sent in a note
immediately to the British and French authorities.... _All
negotiation was repudiated by our authorities._'
"Seeing that Shanghae was the centre, from which, under cover of
our flags, safe from harm, the Imperialists organized all their
plans, provided all the necessaries of war, and found a ready
treasury in the customs' revenue, it is not to be wondered at
that the Ti-pings were most anxious to get possession of a place
so important to the success of their cause; and it is scarcely
reasonable, in this view, to suppose that they ever intended to
pledge themselves in perpetuity, to allow such a state of
matters to continue.
"'B. Junks belonging to British owners were seized, and their
crews imprisoned.'
"This is so vague, that it is difficult to know what instances
are alluded to. Some boats, British owned, were, during last
season, stopped at the passes from the silk districts, in
possession of the rebels, _from their attempting to run the pass
without paying the usual toll_. I have never heard of any boat
being molested which stopped and paid the moderate duty exacted
by the _de facto_ power....
"'C. _One_ European was murdered.'
"To what case does this allude? Several Europeans have been
murdered. A Frenchman, named Salabelle, having imprudently gone
up the Yang-tze in a China boat with a lot of dollars, was
murdered by pirates in collusion with the boatmen. The Ti-pings
had nothing to do with that.
"Another man, in charge of a silk-boat, was attacked on his way
to Shanghae by a band of robbers. He was killed, but the robbers
turned out to be Imperial soldiers--not Ti-pings. I have not
heard of any European being so murdered by the Ti-pings. On the
contrary, both last year and this season, numbers of Europeans
have been engaged in the silk and green tea districts in
pursuance of their business, and have been perfectly welcome, on
paying the duty on their produce....
"'D. And every determination was shown to interfere with the
British trade at that port.'
"_This, to a person on the spot, is a most extraordinary
statement._ Both last year and this season the Ti-pings have had
possession of the entire silk district, and a great part of the
green tea district. Yet, for the year ending the 30th of June
last, we exported 75,000 bales of silk, and fully 50,000 bales
have come to market already of the new crop. What sterling money
do these 125,000 bales of silk represent? Take them at L80 per
bale, you have L10,000,000 sterling, or one-third of the
L30,000,000, which Earl Russell correctly states as about the
present annual value of the Shanghae trade. The Ti-pings might
have cut off nearly all this, had they been so inclined, but
they have allowed it all to come to market on payment of a
moderate duty. I have not the figures of the green teas by me at
this moment, but a very full supply was exported up to 30th June
last, a great part of which came from districts in possession of
the Ti-pings.
"Are these facts consistent with Earl Russell's assertions?
"I think they confute them altogether.... You are trying to
patch up a rotten Government, which will only get weaker for all
your efforts to mend it. Finally on this head, the Ti-pings have
all along professed anxiety to keep on friendly terms with us,
till our decided hostility, and harbouring of the Imperialists
at Shanghae, has made their wish impracticable. They are not
inimical to trade, as the facts above prove. They are not the
savages who would murder every European who goes among them on
peaceable pursuits, as many who have been among them could
prove; and I believe that if we could only give up the
unfortunate Imperialism we have espoused, we should find them
quite ready to give every facility of trade we have now, and to
restore this unlucky province to peace.
"_Second._ Earl Russell asks:--
"'Is there any chance, supposing the Ti-pings consented not to
annoy us any longer, and we made peace with them, that they
could form a regular government?--and upon this point we have
most convincing testimony.'
"Convincing testimony, indeed! Mr. Roberts[32] is the first....
Some time back Mr. Roberts went to join his former pupil at
Nankin. Whatever faults the chief might have, he was always most
kind to his former teacher. The reverend gentleman, however, was
alarmed one day, and left the place precipitately, and therefore
wrote a recantation of his former belief in Ti-pingdom. He could
not have been quite in his senses at the time, for the boy whom
he said was murdered before his eyes, was seen alive and well
afterwards....
"His opinion is not worth much.
"The next authority is Mr. Consul HARVEY of Ningpo."
The writer of the letter deprecates the idea of using this gentleman's
testimony in a grave debate, especially because it was permitted to
overrule the opposite evidence adduced by the talented and trustworthy
Mr. Consul Meadows. It is unnecessary to say more upon this subject than
notice the fact that Mr. Meadows is a man of honour, of noble mind, and
possesses a thorough knowledge of Ti-ping and Manchoo; Mr. Harvey
is--Mr. Harvey!
The letter continues:--
"On the strength of these valuable witnesses, Earl Russell
proceeds to say, 'It must therefore be clear to your lordships
that it is quite impossible anything like civil relations can be
established with the Ti-pings, or that they can govern the
Chinese empire, or conduct relations with foreign countries upon
the footing of amity upon which alone peace can be preserved.'
"Well, if their lordships are content to come to this conclusion
on this valuable evidence, they are very likely to find out
their mistake in doing so."
After citing proof of the "very great system in their military
department," the writer of the letter goes on to state with regard to
the Ti-pings:--
"If men can thus conduct the details of a military department,
is it not probable that they have also the power of conducting
the details of a civil department, when the military necessity
is past? At Soo-chow, which the Ti-pings have now had for
eighteen months, the country people round about are now living
quietly enough, and carrying on their usual avocations....
"With regard to the attack at Ningpo, Earl Russell asserts that
the Ti-pings first fired on Captain Dew. The fact was, I
believe, that the pirate, 'Apak,' anchored his boats near the
English ships, so that in firing at 'Apak,' the shot from the
rebel batteries came close to, or over, the foreign ships. An
excuse for attack was wanted, this was enough, and the place was
taken.
"The Earl goes on to say, 'It appeared clear from this that
there was no chance of our being able to maintain any relations
of amity with the Ti-pings; and as they seemed determined to
destroy us, all that we could do was to protect our trade and
the lives of our merchants.'
"It is not to be expected that we can be on terms of amity while
we make Shanghae the arsenal of the Imperialists, and carry out
our intervention on the principle by which it has hitherto been
characterized.
"A most disgraceful affair took place the other day. Nine young
gentlemen, members of the Shanghae Mounted Volunteer Corps, went
out one afternoon with Captain BORLASE, of H.M. ship _Pearl_,
and a party of men, to reconnoitre. They came on a number of
Ti-pings, who on seeing the horses, immediately threw away their
arms, and ran off half naked. Captain Borlase gave the order to
pursue and _to give no quarter_.[33] These young gentlemen
accordingly amused themselves that afternoon in cold-blooded
murder, and their captain distinguished himself, it is said, by
the chivalrous action of killing a man lying badly wounded on
the ground. One of the number, a young friend of mine, I am glad
to say, refused to obey the order he received. I say that if
H.M.'s officers are to be permitted to give such brutal orders,
the sooner we cease to talk of Ti-ping cruelties and the
savageries of General Butler the better.... A cry has been _got
up_ about the cruelties of the Ti-pings, for want of a better
war-cry, and our people are taught to illustrate Christianity by
the perpetration of cruelties, considering our lights,
infinitely more atrocious. The conduct of the Ti-pings,
notwithstanding all the provocation they have received, towards
foreigners who have had to enter their lines on business,
contrasts in their favour with our conduct to them.
"From Captain Osborne's appointment, I infer that my friend Lay
has been entirely Imperialist in the advice he has given the
Government.
"I regret that Osborne should have taken such an appointment,
and that Government should have sanctioned it.
"I regret still more that Palmerston should be making what I
consider such a grave mistake on this question, and that is one
of the main reasons why I write these letters. Another is that I
am convinced our present policy will be detrimental alike to
British interests, and to the interests of the Chinese people."
We have seen that Messrs. Jardine and Matheson pronounced the policy of
their Government "suicidal." We have now noticed the important evidence
of another of the principal merchants, in whose interest it was alleged
to be necessary to slaughter the Ti-pings. The British Parliament was
persuaded by fallacies, and the "Vampyre" fleet was made ready and sent
to China, while the British people were led into the belief that it was
organized merely to act against Chinese pirates, the Government organs
representing the Ti-pings as "attempting to force a way to the sea
coast, where they hope to take to the amphibious life a Chinaman always
loves, and prowl at sea or penetrate the inner waters as necessity or
opportunity may tempt or dictate." This, and innumerable similar
fabrications, are perfectly astounding by the depth of their untruth and
the total absence of any foundation. The above-quoted statement is only
surpassed by another in the same article of the same newspaper:--"It is,
however, _the people of China_ who have broken the force of the
Ti-pings, and it is under the dread of their terrible reprisals that the
Ti-pings are now attempting to force a way to the sea-coast"!!!
This article, so horribly wicked in purpose and so thoroughly false in
substance, was one of those written upon the grand meeting held at the
rooms of the Royal Geological Society upon the subject of the
"Anglo-Chinese flotilla." The leaders of the quasi-regenerating
expedition here held forth to the scientific gentlemen of the Society,
their friends, and sundry members of the Government. The speeches they
made, their arguments, facts, and declared intentions, were equally
reasonable and trustworthy as the statement in the newspaper article
eulogising them, and which, by some most extraordinary perversity of
knowledge, represented the bitter and ruthless warfare prosecuted by
Admirals Hope and Protet, Generals Staveley and Brown, and others,
against the Ti-pings, as "_the people of China_ who have broken the
force of the Ti-pings." Certes, had such been the case, it required an
astonishing quantity of British shot, shell, artillery, and men, to
enable the Manchoo Government to occupy any single village or foot of
land held by the "broken force!" And one can hardly discover the object
of the flotilla if the "people of China" had already done the only thing
for which it was being organized; for which Prince Kung was paying, and
Mr. Lay, Captain Sherrard Osborne, and his men, receiving a goodly share
of that Manchoo mintage. Five months later, this "broken force" was
found to be so well able to convert its opponents into a similarly
unpleasant state, that upon the 9th day of January, 1863, another order
in counsel was passed, making it "lawful for all military officers in
Her Majesty's service to enter into the military service of the Emperor
of China."
To resume the history of the "Vampyre" expedition. At the oratorical
display of the civil leader and the naval chief, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer (with a keen eye to the guarantee the flotilla might afford
for the payment of the indemnities by China) was present to see, to
hear, to judge, and to wind up in most affecting and impressive style by
giving the well-paid, and doubtless well-deserving, adventurers his
blessing.
Mr. Lay, with a surprising theory for a questionable purpose, told the
meeting that the great cause of the civil war in China was its crowded
population, "which the productive power of the soil was not sufficient
to maintain." Emigration of the Ti-pings (when he caught them) was his
remedy. Now, how that clever, though it is just possible, mistaken
gentleman, expected to forward the change of habitation with the
Armstrong and Whitworth guns, and other deadly weapons of exceedingly
killing power he was carefully providing, is by no means clear, unless,
indeed, the emigration was to be eternal. Neither is it by any means
easy to understand that if the production of the soil was not sufficient
to maintain the natives, the distress could be alleviated by making it
support, in addition, a large number of very expensive foreign officers
and men, besides a costly fleet of steamers.
Captain Sherrard Osborne then succeeded the would-be Dictator General of
China, and with no less extraordinary principles than his civilian
superior, made the astounding declarations:--1. "That his first duty in
China would be to bear in mind that he was a member of the Geographical
Society." 2. "That he was going to China to spread peace, and not to
shed blood" (with his Armstrongs and &c.s). 3. "That his object was to
teach the Chinese rather the duty of sparing than the art of killing"
(singular that such pains were taken to procure the most effective
armament England could furnish). 4. "And that he hoped to report that
Nankin was taken without the loss of one life after the assault was
over."
1. As the _Daily News_ wrote at the time, "Though this may be very
advantageous for Burlington House, it affords an adequate explanation of
the way China is to benefit by his vaunted advent. Perhaps, however, it
may be accepted as a proof of his being a philanthropic adventurer; that
his first care will be to look after, not the interests of the Chinese
Government, which pays him 3,000_l._ a year, but those of a society to
whose funds he is called on to contribute."
4. This naive announcement is a startling one for the "pirate" dodge of
the gallant captain's friends, and proves that the only motive, which,
in fact, is admitted by all save a few bigots, was suppression of the
Ti-ping revolution.
Of Mr. Lay and his fighting-man, the _Daily News_ well said, "As these
gentlemen seem to have the power of carrying on their scheme for the
present, they will doubtless do so, but it is a mistake for them to
depart from the policy of reserve which they have hitherto followed."
In dire alarm and trouble, Prince Kung grasped at the offer of a fleet
to save the Manchoo dynasty, as a drowning man will clutch at a straw.
The British Government, wisely thinking that the fleet would guard the
treaty ports against the Ti-pings, and thereby protect both the payment
of the indemnity and the opium trade at the expense of the Chinese,
quickly seized the opportunity it shadowed forth. The justice of their
conduct is a very different matter, and it would be interesting indeed
to know by what right the capture of Nankin was undertaken,--a city far
in the interior of China, the owners of which only entreated the
friendship of foreigners, while striving to throw off a foreign yoke and
enjoy the blessing of the Christian faith and self-government.
The worst part of the tale has now to be related. Upon the individual
authority of Mr. Lay, the flotilla (consisting principally of British
men-of-war) having struck the English flag, hoisted a green and yellow
rag, and without commission or any authority to constitute them national
ships of war, proceeded to the high seas in true pirate fashion. The
laws of England were unscrupulously violated, her navy indelibly
disgraced, and all who took share in the expedition perfectly fooled, by
the _unofficial_ countenance of a Manchoo Prince, and the indecent haste
of British ministers to comply with his ambiguous request for a fleet,
in order to gratify their own ulterior motives.
Prince Kung simply authorized Mr. Lay to buy a number of vessels, but
those ships were despatched from England fully manned and armed, as
though they had been duly commissioned, which was not, and never became,
the case. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne, between them, prepared an
agreement (that being the authority and regulation upon which the crews
were engaged, and merely a private understanding, strangely resembled
the bond of a piratical organization), which, had it been carried into
execution, would virtually have consigned the destinies and executive of
China into their hands. These were the salient features of the
agreement:--
"4. Osborne undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor
which may be conveyed direct to Lay; and Osborne engages not to
attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel.
"5. Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of
any orders of the reasonableness of which he is not satisfied."
No wonder the Manchoo Government repudiated this pretty arrangement,
fleet and all, when it arrived in China. There is, however,
another reason to account for the ignominious failure of the
"Vampyres,"--ignominious because they had neither right nor
justification to be placed in the position of mercenaries, or to be
subjected to dismissal by a barbarous court. The Imperialists were
willing enough to receive a fleet upon _any_ terms when the success of
the Ti-ping revolution was certain unless foreigners interfered; but
when the "Vampyres" did arrive, the dread of the avenging Ti-ping no
longer existed. By English troops and English officers in command of
Chinese disciplined legions, the revolutionists had been driven back
from Shanghae and Ningpo, and were still retreating before the shock of
foreign arms. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne came too late. They could not
become the slaves of the Manchoo, neither could they constitute
themselves his tyrants, and consequently Prince Kung repudiated all his
obligations with characteristic treachery.
When the flotilla reached China the Imperial Government endeavoured to
place it under the command of the provincial authorities, and by this
determination they effected its dissolution. Captain Osborne refused to
lower himself into the position occupied by British officers in the
neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo--that of filibusters, subordinate
to the _local_ authorities--but the Tartars had the best of the
argument, for the precedent existed in the terms upon which the military
had taken service with them; they were therefore justified in applying
the same reasoning to make the navy of England subservient to their
inferior officials. Prince Kung and his colleagues were decided upon
this point and the repudiation of other guarantees; Captain Osborne
remained equally firm; consequently Mr. Lay lost his lucrative
appointment as Inspector General of Chinese customs, Captain Osborne did
not become a Manchoo Admiral, and the naval force of no nationality was
sold, while the officers and men had to go back to where they came from.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer's magniloquent benediction, in which he
prophesied of "the day when its leaders would come back rich in
professional fame, and bringing also with them fresh glory to their
country," vanished and disappeared in thin air, thanks to the failure of
the attempt to "spread peace" with rifled artillery. Mr. Lay, since his
tardy appreciation of the Manchoo, in "Our Interests in China," thus
describes the state of affairs which led to the failure of his
regenerating scheme:--
"When I left China, the Emperor's Government, under the pressure
of necessity,[34] and with the beneficial terror established by
the allied foray to Pekin in 1860 fresh in their recollection,
was in the best of moods, willing to be guided," &c. "What did I
find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed.
There was the old insolent demeanour, the nonsensical language
of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties, the declared
determination to yield nothing that could be evaded. In short,
all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered
away, and we were thrust back into the position we occupied
before the war--one of helpless remonstrance and impotent
menace."
A pretty state of affairs truly! Re-established, too, by British
politicians, who, by supporting the Manchoos, have perpetuated a system
which the Ti-pings would have altered for ever.
Time has already proved the truth of the above assertion by Mr. Lay;
time will yet prove the bitter hatred the present dynasty of China
entertains towards Great Britain, the nation which has frequently
chastised them, forced them to break their own laws and receive the
obnoxious opium, humbled them before their people and compelled them to
eat the fruit of humility, and worse than all, originated the once
irresistible Ti-ping revolution by the importation of Christianity. They
would not be men did they forget the blows (not always justifiable) they
have received; they would not be Manchoo did they forget to revenge
themselves _when_ able.
Financially considered, this Anglo-Manchoo expedition was rather a
serious matter for the British Government. The only authentic estimate
of the expenditure which is at present available shows that the portion
consequent merely on the return of the flotilla when its services were
rejected, amounted to 213,000 taels, or L71,000, which was advanced in
the first instance from the Manchoo customs and subsequently refunded by
England when receiving the quarterly payment of the Indemnity.
Here is what Captain Osborne says:--
"Dire necessity made Pekin accept our aid in a form likely to be
beneficial to China and England. Reason or argument had nothing
to do with it, so far as the mandarins were concerned. Most
unexpectedly to them, our authorities repulsed the rebellion,
without taking any guarantees from Pekin for future behaviour.
The mandarins were at once rampant; they are not such fools as
to spend their revenue in maintaining order, if we Englishmen
will do it for nothing. The fear of rebellion is past. Lay, I,
and the force may return to England."
With regard to the failure of the Osborne, Lay, and Gladstone theory, we
can only say that it was deserved. Mr. Lay was dismissed from the
service of the Manchoo, through the "Vampyre" embroglio. The many years
that he had faithfully and energetically served them were lost sight of
in the squabble arising from this unparalleled affair. He most likely
was sincere in his efforts to regenerate Tartars; he has certainly been
badly treated by them. Lay's motive in undertaking the notorious
flotilla scheme seems to have been his philanthropical idea (brightened
by the receipt of L5,000 a year), of regenerating China. Some people say
he was a puppet in the hands of "taller men" behind, who worked the
wires. Osborne's acceptance of the command without a commission may be
ascribed to the erratic notions of that gallant officer, and _his_
natural philanthropy.
The arrival of the "Vampyre" fleet was hailed with general
disapprobation upon the part of the foreign community at Shanghae; its
flight, without spreading peace, with no less satisfaction. During the
short time the would-be mercenaries--the cream of the British navy, as
they were loudly proclaimed to be, by ultra-philo-Imperialist papers and
people--remained at that port, they managed to create no little ill
feeling against themselves. Although they possessed neither warrant nor
Imperial authority for their position and action, they nevertheless had
the audacity to constitute themselves into a sort of police by _land_
and water. No business could be transacted on shore, no vessel move upon
the waters of the harbour, or work its cargo, unmolested by their
inquisition. Vessels were seized, and their crews imprisoned in irons,
upon the merest suspicion that they might be destined to assist the
Ti-pings; houses were broken into and searched throughout the British
and American settlements for supposed Ti-ping refugees, by parties armed
to the teeth. They took, however, particular care not to venture upon
the French settlement, as the Gallic authorities had given their own
police orders to arrest them if they went there; and, if they resisted,
to shoot them. The whole place was thrown into a regular ferment and
uproar by their proceedings.
Just previous to the ignominious flight of the "cream of the British
navy,"--which, by the way, possessed an extraordinary sympathy for
another sort of cream peculiar to the Shanghae rum mills,--I happened to
become personally acquainted with some of their piratical outrages,
while visiting Shanghae for medical advice, and other reasons which will
transpire by-and-by.
General Burgevine, successor to Ward in command of the disciplined
Chinese contingent, having been badly treated and cashiered by his
Manchoo masters, had joined the Ti-pings at Soo-chow. At the time of my
visit to Shanghae, Burgevine was supposed to be there also; and, using
this as their pretext, the "Vampyres" made a descent upon the house of
my friend, Mr. Tarrantt (Editor of the _Friend of China_), where we were
passing the evening with a social party. The dwelling was situated in a
compound, also containing the house of the American Marshal; and, while
walking round the grounds with my friend and another gentleman, we were
suddenly pounced upon in the dark by a party of "the cream of the
British navy," hitherto concealed in the shrubbery. At the same moment
other detachments rushed into the adjoining houses with a zeal and
alacrity tending to prove what capital burglars they were becoming, and,
making prisoners of all the men they could find, marched them up to the
position we had already been conducted to, in the broad colonnade
extending along the front of the American Marshal's house. It was very
fortunate neither myself nor any of our company were armed, otherwise,
from the suspicious and sudden circumstances under which they had made
their appearance, we might very naturally have mistaken the men who
sprang upon us for the assassins, or robbers, whom they so strongly
resembled. The "Vampyres" were commanded by a Lieutenant Ridge, the most
ungentlemanly and discourteous British officer it has ever fallen to my
lot to meet.
When our friends were all assembled under the guns of his men, he turned
to the latter and distinctly gave them this order, at least in
substance: "Now then, men, allow none of these gentlemen to leave this
place; _if they attempt to do so, shoot them down_!" This spirited
British officer then led off a party bristling with rifle, bayonet,
cutlass, and revolver, himself with sword in hand and a huge "Deane and
Adams" slung round his neck, and proceeded to tear up the flooring of
Mr. Tarrantt's printing-office, in order to search for arms destined for
the dreaded Ti-ping! Of course none were found. The man and his men then
proceeded to the sanctum of the editor, and ransacked this and the
adjoining rooms, emptying and breaking open boxes of letters, papers,
and other editorial correspondence, leaving the whole scattered about
the floor in a state of inextricable confusion, after their fruitless
search for some trace of Burgevine or his doings.
When this gallant exploit had been brought to a termination by the fact
that no private place under lock and key remained to be broken into, the
leader of the outrage turned his attention to the neighbouring mansion.
Having rummaged every nook and corner from top to bottom with a
fruitless result, excepting indeed a spoil of two old muskets, a
fowling-piece in good order, and another without any barrels, which they
carried off in triumph, the "Vampyres" released us from the
unpleasantness of their presence and took themselves off, visibly
disappointed at their want of success.
Mrs. Pindar, the wife of the American Marshal, told us that Lieutenant
Ridge had even penetrated into her bed-room and ransacked the drawers of
her toilet table, &c. That Yankee lady accompanied him during his
impertinent and unwarrantable intrusion, and assisted him by suggesting
that he had better explore the chimney pots, have the carpets lifted to
see whether Burgevine was hidden there, or perhaps he would like to
search her pockets, &c. The "Vampyre" officer wore a uniform of unknown
nationality, consisting of simple anchor buttons and a British naval
badge with the crown cut off! When asked by Mr. Tarrantt for his
authority, he produced an informal warrant from the British consul,
which could only have been legally used by a consular constable. When
this was explained to him, he agreed to the justice of the fact and
pleaded orders from his commanding officer. He was thereupon asked for
his commission, and he naively admitted he had none. He was next asked
upon what authority his commanding officer was acting, and his reply
was, upon Captain Sherrard Osborne's commission from the Emperor of
China (this in ludicrously pompous language and manner). He was then
asked whether he was aware that Captain Osborne did _not_ possess any
such commission, and confessed that, although he believed the reverse,
he thought the Commander-in-chief might have gone to Pekin to obtain it!
The judicial proceedings that would have been instituted against the
"Vampyres" but for their fortunate retreat from China, would almost
certainly have found them guilty of unqualified piracy, not only in the
case I have just described, but in several others equally outrageous.
About this time, and while it was fully expected that the flotilla would
shortly proceed to attack Nankin, the following squib appeared as an
advertisement in the _Friend of China_:--
"WANTED:
"Several first-class ships, to convey several thousand rebels
from Nankin to Labuan.
"Apply to
"LAE, HORSEBORN, & CO."
Many foreign merchant vessels were in the habit of flying long pennants
from the main truck, a practice indulged in by some of the shipping at
Shanghae. This proved offensive to the "Vampyre" officers, who chose to
consider that it was an infringement of their _quasi_ right to the
man-of-war emblem. They consequently amused themselves by boarding
sundry easy-going Dutchmen, who, alarmed by their brass-bound appearance
and peremptory orders to strike the obnoxious pennant, generally
complied very quietly. Upon one occasion, however, while I was at
Shanghae, the would-be Tartar martinets caught a Tartar of the implied
characteristics, if not literal nationality.
An American vessel with a particularly extensive pennant, which it was
afterwards rumoured had been rigged up on purpose, happened to attract
the "fe fi fo fum" sense of a "Vampyre" commander. Instantly a cutter
was despatched with a lieutenant to humble the offending parties. The
officer proceeded on board and ordered the chief mate to haul down the
pennant. Mr. Mate immediately sang out, "Cook, bring a bucket of hot
water aft," but before this could be brought, the "Vampyre" was over the
gangway "like a streak of greased lightning," as the Yankee mate
afterwards related to an admiring audience on shore, and shouting with
might and main to his boat's crew: "Give way, men!" in order to escape
the warm reception preparing for him.
By such acts the "cream of the British navy" made few friends and many
enemies, and the lament of few indeed accompanied their ignominious
departure. During their stay some of the gallant tars deserted and went
over to the enemy, and I cannot forget a very characteristic fact
related by a friend of mine who was present. While passing a certain rum
shop in the "model settlement" of Shanghae, my friend, with several
companions, became mixed with a crowd of the tars, who were on leave,
and had just issued from the shop. Willing to see a little of the sort
of men represented as the _elite_ of the finest navy in the world, my
friend got into conversation with a warrant officer, although the man
and his companions had evidently been indulging their creamy
propensities. The result was that when questioned as to their feelings
for the service they had engaged in, the leader of the party made this
exposition of principle: "D'ye see, my hearty, so long as we gets the
dollars and can make a haul, d---- my toplights if we cares who we
fights for, the himperor of Chiny or his hinemies the t'other longshore
Chinymen."
Organized upon principles of wrong and injustice, the Anglo-Chinese
flotilla came to an unregretted, disreputable, and premature end. In the
words of the same friend who communicated the above incident we will
dismiss the subject: "Captain Sherrard Osborne, like Caesar, may exclaim,
'I came, I saw;' unlike Caesar, 'I did _not_ conquer.' The fleet was
equipped, set sail, arrived, and--was not wanted."
We must now turn to survey events far more disastrous to the Ti-ping
cause than the advent of the foreign vessels of war we have just
finished with, although the fact of their arrival, connected with what
we are about to notice, helped to produce the misfortunes.
Soon after the Chung-wang had recaptured all the places formerly taken
by the allies, and had returned to Nankin with the greater proportion of
his troops, General Staveley, having received the desirable
reinforcements of British troops from Tien-tsin and Hong-kong, resumed
hostilities.
Although Admiral Hope had respect enough for the usages of civilized
nations to invent a _casus belli_ for the raids he first initiated,
General Staveley proved himself to be above such petty considerations
when they could be ignored with impunity, and therefore, upon
commencing a fresh war against the Ti-pings, did not trouble himself to
pretend that they might, could, would, or should do anything inimical to
British interests. However much scrupulous people may think that an
English general should have paid _some_ regard to the rules of civilized
warfare, the gallant officer in question cannot at all events be charged
with hypocrisy.
During the month of August, 1862, the filibuster, General Ward, assisted
by detachments of British and French troops, succeeded in taking several
fortified villages from the Ti-pings and recapturing the city of
Tsing-poo; the success of the operations being attributable to the large
park of artillery always employed. After the fall of Tsing-poo, Ward
moved off with the principal portion of his force into the Ningpo
district, and joined a column already operating there. Since the
atrocious expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo by Captain R. Dew, R.N.,
and his pirate ally, Apak, the advance of filibustering and piracy had
made wonderful progress. Several contingents of disciplined Chinese were
raised, the most important being an officially-authorized British legion
and a similar French one, both entirely officered by foreigners,
including English, American, French, and representatives of other
nations. At first, these organizations consisted of about 1,500 men
each, besides artillery-men to work the numerous heavy guns they were
supplied with. In addition to these, and other bodies of foreign
disciplined and officered mercenaries, Captain Dew devoted the entire
service of the squadron under his command to their assistance and
support, perfectly oblivious of the fact that he was a British officer,
and that the ships prostituted by him to an infamous alliance with
pirates and freebooters were the property of British tax-payers, who
maintained them solely for the protection of their own interests.
The British men-of-war, the Manchoo gunboats, the French vessels, the
American, English, and French drilled filibusters, the Cantonese
pirates, and Imperialist troops, all leagued themselves together in the
war to exterminate the unfortunate Ti-pings, and _loot_ their cities. In
spite of their numbers, their boundless supplies of every munition of
war, their irresistible shell and artillery, and the co-operation of the
friendly legions swarming from the grand depot, Shanghae, these
heterogeneous marauders found the "broken force" able to give them many
hard knocks and many a severe repulse, although the _Times_ happened to
think that "the people of China" had somehow converted the Ti-ping
revolution into a crowd of fugitives running away from their mythical
"terrible reprisals." This statement might do very well to excite the
horror of pious people in England ready to believe anything dreadful;
but the mercenaries banded together against the would-be freemen and
Christians found that to break the force of the latter many a deadly
encounter, and many a cunningly contrived Moorsom or shrapnel shell, was
required. During a period of nearly twelve months, extending from
August, 1862, to the middle of the summer, 1863, the horrors of Chinese
warfare fluctuated backwards and forwards over what would otherwise have
been one of the fairest parts of God's earth. The Ningpo and
neighbouring districts possess a beauty and variety of scenery, added to
a surpassing richness of production (tea, silk, cotton, &c.), second to
none in the world. Yet a few experimental warriors and politicians have
been permitted to create misery and ruin throughout this smiling land,
and strew its plains with mouldering skeletons.
The war conducted by Captain Dew and his colleagues raged furiously for
many months. The cities of Tse-kie, Yu-yaou, Fung-wha, Shou-shing, &c.,
were each taken, retaken, lost, and won, several times over, by the
Allies and by their Ti-ping enemies, and were at last finally held by
the former.
To give any detailed account of the numerous actions fought within the
Ningpo province would be impossible. With one exception they resembled
those in the first campaign of Admiral Hope and General Staveley. The
same great slaughter of the Ti-pings with the deadly artillery, to which
they could make no reply; the same gallant efforts to repel the
stormers, who rushed forward after the defenders had been thoroughly
shelled for many hours; the exception being that few of the cities were
carried by assault. It is, I believe, due to the fact that a great
proportion of the Ti-ping soldiery about the Ningpo districts were
Cantonese, or Kwang-si men, that nearly every attempt to storm the
cities they held was repulsed. They were ultimately driven out of the
province, and the cities were, almost without exception, evacuated,
although the besiegers had been severely repulsed, being rendered
untenable by the severance of their lines of supply and communication.
There are two important episodes of Captain Dew's war which, from their
influence upon future events, it is necessary to notice. The first is
the death of General Ward; the second, the attack upon Shou-shing, in
consequence of which Captain Dew was reprimanded by his superior officer
and the British Government, and was thereby compelled to desist from
actually participating in the further hostilities.
General Ward, whatever his failings might have been, was a brave and
determined man. He served his Manchoo employers only too well, and at
the last, by closing a career of peril and fidelity with the sacrifice
of his life, he sealed all faults with his death, and left those who
cherished his memory to regret that he had not fallen in a worthier
cause. While directing the second attack upon the small town of Tse-kie,
some ten miles inland from Ningpo, on the 21st of September, 1862, Ward,
the American filibuster, and the first foreigner to take military
service under the Manchoo, was mortally wounded by a Ti-ping musket
ball. This adventurer originated the force that finally was the
principal instrument in driving the Ti-pings from the dominions they had
established as "Ti-ping tien kwoh." By such apparently insignificant
means does the Great Ruler of the Universe overthrow the efforts and
establish the destinies of man! The death of Ward placed _Colonel_
Burgevine, his immediate subordinate, in command of the force. Burgevine
could not agree with the mandarins, was badly treated by them, resented
their treatment, was dismissed from the command, and the old Ward force
became transformed from a rowdy, filibustering, hired legion, into a
regular contingent of British mercenaries.
The disgrace of Dew, the Ti-ping slayer, came about in this wise:--The
city of Shou-shing, distant more than _one hundred miles_ from Ningpo,
was attacked by an Imperialist army, to which the Anglo-Chinese and
Franco-Chinese contingents were attached. These forces were defeated
with severe loss, including their French general, Le Brethon, who was
killed before the city. A French captain of artillery, by name Tardife,
succeeded to the command; Captain Dew joined forces with him, and
together they proceeded to besiege the place, and to avenge the disgrace
of their former defeat.
Besides several field-pieces landed from the British men-of-war at
Ningpo and a large park of howitzers and mortars belonging to the
disciplined forces, Captain Dew provided them with a large 68-pounder
lent to him for the occasion by General Staveley. Lieutenant Tinling, of
the _Encounter_, with a party of seamen, had charge of this gun. On
their march, the allies entered a large town, which the men thoroughly
pillaged during two days; the consequence being, as it is written by one
who was present, "that it was only after much trouble they could be got
to move forward against Shou-shing. When they did so, at least 500 boats
followed, each soldier having his own private _san-pan_, containing, and
ready for more, _loot_. Many of the officers were almost as bad as the
men, drinking and smoking, and taking hardly any care to maintain
discipline." Here is a pretty description of the doings of those who
were supposed to be protecting the country people from the "ruthless
marauders!" The town referred to was not in Ti-ping possession, and all
the looting was from the unfortunate inhabitants. Facts, that can be
multiplied _ad infinitum_, exist to prove that the foreign intervention,
and the manner and details thereof, seriously increased the anarchy,
desolation, and loss of life, caused by the civil war previous to that
event. The unavoidable devastations had passed away, peace had become
established by the supremacy of the Ti-ping, when, alas!
mercenary-minded Europeans wickedly deluged the peaceful districts with
the blood of fresh victims, and causelessly maintained and prolonged the
unmitigated ravages of war.
Upon reaching the devoted city of Shou-shing,--which, in expectation,
General Tardife had promised his freebooter following the pleasure of
"forty-eight hours" to loot,--Captain Dew placed his big gun in
position, and proceeded to make a hole in the wall, by which the
respectable allies might get at the prizes within. Now it so happened
that the Ti-pings were determined neither to part with their city, nor
their private valuables. A great breach was made, a battalion of
European ruffians, and the nondescript disciplined and Imperialist
troops, rushed forward to take possession; but the defenders--who, to
use the language of an eye-witness, "fought with admirable pluck in the
breach, and exposed themselves freely"--drove them back with a loss of
half the European brigade of Shanghae _rowdies_, half the officers of
the disciplined contingents, and many men _hors de combat_. Almost at
the same moment General Tardife was killed, and Lieutenant Tinling
mortally wounded.
The death of the last-mentioned gallant young officer, by drawing the
attention of Admiral Kuper (on the station), and that of Parliament at
home, to the subject, led to the disapproval of Captain Dew's
disgraceful proceedings, and his removal from a part of China that he
had contaminated by his presence. When brought to task for his
participation in hostilities more than 100 miles from a treaty port, his
shuffling excuse was "that I had gone to watch the proceedings, and
prevent, if possible, any false step being taken by the Chinese
disciplined force, which would at once have imperilled Ningpo." Well, it
is an old saying that, if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the
ditch; and this was undoubtedly realized by Captain Dew. The untrue
statement about "any false step" being certain to imperil Ningpo,
distant 100 miles, and protected by several strong cities directly on
the way, is perfectly absurd; the crafty device was to avoid the censure
he dreaded and deserved by frightening his superiors about the safety of
Ningpo, which he pretended rested upon his exploits at Shou-shing.
Admiral Kuper, however, states in a despatch to the Admiralty, "I have
informed Captain Dew that ... I consider he exceeded his instructions,"
and the Admiralty declares "that my Lords have desired the Rear-Admiral
to inform Captain Dew that he exceeded his instructions." No wonder that
the Chinese papers stated:--
"How Captain Dew, and all his crew, are allowed to do just what
they have a mind to, is more than we can tell. Clearly all the
people he slays he murders. He is violating every law, human and
divine, to an extent which cannot be overlooked."[35]
It is a well-known fact that vast quantities of _loot_, and a money
bonus from the Imperial authorities, almost invariably attended the
capture of every Ti-ping city; and I have under my hand many apparently
authentic statements in the press, accusing Captain Dew particularly,
and others generally, of having been induced to carry on hostilities
against the Ti-pings for "private aggrandisement," and from "far less
disinterested motives than 'the love of glory.'" As for the effect the
Dew war had upon trade, the following extract from a communication dated
"Ningpo, March 28, 1863," and forwarded to H.B.M. Consul by a number of
influential firms, will show:--"So great a panic exists among the
natives on account of the lawless proceedings, that our trade is in a
worse condition than when the rebels were in the neighbourhood!"
Captain Dew attempted to shirk the responsibility of Lieutenant
Tinling's death at a place where duty did not call him, although his
commanding officer's orders did, by declaring that he (the Captain) was
there as an "amateur!" Killing one's fellow man, even when
conscience-bound by the plea of duty, is bad enough; but roving about,
seeking whom to destroy, and slaughtering innocent men for pleasure, is
somewhat different. We have seen that even the Government, which has
approved every other proceeding, completely repudiated the unpardonable
conduct of Captain Dew; we therefore say adieu to that officer, trusting
there are few like him in the British service.
It is now necessary to notice the last of the events referred to at the
beginning of this chapter. Since the death of the lamented filibuster,
various members of General Staveley's staff and command had been in a
perfect state of ferment, intriguing for the command of the Ward force,
which it was determined should be converted into a British contingent. A
battalion of Chinese, wearing shoulder-straps with the badge "67,"
drilled and officered by members of the British regiment of that number,
and popularly known as Captain "Kingsley's force," was organized and
raised to a strength of 1,000 men. Other corps, and some of Chinese
artillery, were formed, while British officers were induced to accept
various commands pertaining to the Ward force and its head quarters at
the city of Soong-kong.
After a series of preliminary operations, General Staveley effected the
recapture of Kah-ding on the 24th of October, 1862. After a desperate
defence, the Ti-pings were driven from the city with heavy loss.
According to the safe _modus operandi_ acquired by experience, General
Staveley shelled the defenders for some hours from 40 pieces of heavy
artillery and mortars. The besieging army consisted of 5,500 disciplined
troops, including about 3,000 British and French, and a large
co-operating force of Imperialist _braves_ and soldiers. The Ti-pings,
out of a garrison less than 5,000 strong, lost upwards of 1,500 men;
while the allied loss amounted to 4 killed and 20 wounded. Soon after
the capture of this city, the Ting-wang from Hang-chow, the Mo-wang from
Soo-chow, and the Tow-wang from Hoo-chow, each commanding about 5,000
men, were ordered by the Shi-wang (chief in authority over their
districts) to attempt its recovery, and also that of Tsing-poo. This
army was attacked by _General_ Burgevine's force, a column of 500
British troops, some 10,000 Imperialists, and an artillery detachment
with 20 guns. The Ti-pings had just intrenched themselves by the light
field works usual among the Chinese, when they were engaged by the
enemy. Unable to reply to the murderous artillery of the British and
disciplined troops, they still held the position, although the shot and
shell committed fearful havoc in their close ranks. At last, when the
enemy had become tired of their shell practice, and imagined the
Ti-pings were sufficiently decimated, a general assault was given. An
episode in this transaction is worthy of notice.
A division of the attacking army was led by one "Wong-e-poo," a young
Chinese officer who had been promoted to a captaincy at the request of
Admiral Hope, who had also presented him with a sword for conspicuous
bravery during the raids he had lately conducted against the Ti-pings,
and in which the officer had served as a sergeant of Ward's force. This
gallant young Chinaman was the first to cross the line of
intrenchments, and almost instantly fell mortally wounded; he then gave
the sword to General Burgevine, whom he begged to keep it, and to give
his young wife a few dollars to keep her from want--this was his last
request. The Ti-pings, when driven from their slight defences, made a
stand at a village just in the rear, and were three times brought back
to the charge by a fine-spirited young chief, who was the Mo-wang's
brother, and whose gallant bearing and handsome trappings attracted
universal attention. At the last charge, Vincente, the late _General_
Ward's _aide-de-camp_, spurred his horse into the Ti-ping ranks. Misled
by the fact that he had separated himself from the enemy, and believing
he came over as a friend, the chief unsuspiciously advanced towards him
and held out his hand; the Manilla-man replied to his friendly gesture
by shooting him dead, and then, singular to relate, managed to gallop
back to the enemy in safety.
After two hours' fighting, during which the artillery mowed them down by
hundreds, the Ti-pings were driven out of the village, and, being then
hemmed in against a wide creek, which they had only one small pontoon
bridge to cross by, suffered terribly from the deadly fire of grape and
canister shot during their retreat. Their loss in this disastrous action
was 2,300 killed (600 bodies were counted in one portion of the
intrenchments) and 700 prisoners, the latter being barbarously put to
death by their captors.
The frightful atrocities perpetrated upon the unfortunate Ti-pings by
those into whose power they had fallen, even excelled the cruelties of
the cruel Chinese and still more cruel Tartars. "How the Ti-pings were
driven out of the Provinces of Kiangnan and Chekiang," from notes kept
by an officer under Ward, Burgevine, Holland, and Gordon, is a lengthy
narrative published in the _Friend of China_. The portion contained in
the columns of that journal of April 25, 1865, describing the engagement
just noticed, states:--"General Burgevine darkened the victory with a
foul deed. The poor rebels who had been captured _were cruelly blown
away from the guns_, to the delight of a few we will not mention, but to
the disgust of the greater part of the officers." Who, after this, shall
talk of _Ti-ping_ cruelties? The revolutionists had neither made war
upon, injured, nor even insulted foreigners; yet the foreign officers,
supported by the help of British troops, actually massacred their
unoffending and helpless prisoners of war in cold blood! Perhaps
_General_ Burgevine thought he was paying a graceful compliment to his
British allies by imitating their deeds in India. No doubt some
war-Christians think these latter proceedings exceedingly worthy and
proper; however, the Ti-pings have never yet reached such a state of
Christian civilization as to copy them.
The allied loss was 5 killed and 15 wounded, including three Europeans!
And this may be taken as a fair sample of all the succeeding battles
with the British, French, and other disciplined and artillery-supplied
forces. The Ti-pings have always done all that men of flesh and blood
were capable of doing, but, without artillery to resist or reply to that
overwhelming arm of the enemy (supplied freely from the British
arsenals), their bravest and best fell to the iron storm, and the rest
fled before it.
Very shortly after the above action, _General_ Burgevine became the
victim of the scheming carried on between the mandarins and those
British officials who desired to establish the Ward force as an English
contingent. Having taken a large amount of specie from the house of
Ta-kee (the banker to the force, and in the service of the Imperial
Government), which he had been compelled to seize, _nolens volens_, in
order to satisfy his men, who were in an open state of mutiny for their
arrears of pay--pay, too, that seems to have been purposely kept lying
idle at Ta-kee's house, probably with the cunning idea it would act (as
in reality it did) upon the force, and produce some outbreak that could
be taken advantage of to disgrace Burgevine and replace him by a
British officer--he was dismissed from his command and a reward offered
for his head by the Manchoo governor, or Fu-tai, of the province. The
excuse given by the Mandarins for this transaction was that Burgevine
had disobeyed orders, resisted lawful authority, and seized the money.
Some measure of this is very probably true; but whatever offence had
been committed by him, the mandarins had themselves been the cause of it
by their peculation, withholding the wages of the troops, and underhand
intriguing. Probably the fact that Captain Holland, R.M., was installed
as Burgevine's successor, may account for the events leading to the
latter's dismissal.
The Imperialist Mandarins were only too eager to fall into the views of
those who assisted them; the command of the once despised filibustiers'
force by Englishmen meant taking all the danger and responsibility of
repelling the Ti-pings out of their own hands; consequently, availing
themselves of the subserviency of British officers and authorities, they
accepted Captain Holland as the commander of their disciplined troops,
and the services of any others who were willing, and did not feel
dishonoured by hiring themselves out to support such a cruel and corrupt
cause. From this moment the active operations by British troops ceased,
but Ward's old legion became a British contingent, and has continued one
ever since. Backed up in all their operations against the Ti-pings by
the presence of British troops to support them in case of reverse, and
supplied with every munition of war, artillery, ships, &c. they
required, the various mercenary legions infesting the neighbourhood of
Shanghae and Ningpo have managed (with the assistance of the ordinary
Chinese and Manchoo soldiers, who alone outnumbered those of Ti-ping
tien kwoh) to terminate the allied operations by driving the
revolutionists from their once happy territory.
Soon after the command of the force had been assumed by Captain
Holland, it met with the most severe defeat the Ti-pings have ever given
it, and he resigned the appointment in disgust. The Order in Council
permitting British officers to take military service with the Emperor of
China having just reached Shanghae, Major Gordon, R.E., took command of
the disciplined Chinese, and many other officers joined in the
questionable service. From this time forth the British Government became
committed to the success and responsibilities of the force; and for
every atrocity perpetrated by the Imperialists, and for every life
destroyed, are equally as much accountable as they were for the previous
conduct of their own troops. Under such auspices, and with boundless
supplies of all the material of war, similar necessaries being
successfully prevented from reaching their antagonists, it is easy to
appreciate the consequent course of events--continued triumph of the
Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries, and repeated defeat of the Ti-pings,
already much weakened by the loss of many of their best troops, and
diminished in their prestige from the result of the raids headed by
Admiral Hope and General Staveley.
The worst feature attending the conversion of the mercenary legions into
British auxiliaries, is the fact that Sir F. Bruce, the English Minister
at Pekin, distinctly repudiated any such action; and yet his Government
saw fit to sanction the arrangement when it was reported to them by
Generals Staveley and Brown, who seem to have been foremost among the
Shanghae local advocates of the system. _General_ Burgevine having
proceeded to the Manchoo court at Pekin, stated his case, and was by
them reinstated in his former command; receiving, also, the full
approval of Sir F. Bruce. Upon his return to Shanghae, with an Imperial
Commissioner to place him in position, the British generals and their
colleagues in collusion with the Imperial authorities, disregarding the
direct instructions of Sir F. Bruce, successfully opposed his
reappointment, and managed to retain Major Gordon in command; by what
means being best known to themselves.
We will conclude our notice of the establishment of the Anglo-Manchoo
contingent with a few facts proving the singular, if not sinister,
circumstance, that Sir F. Bruce, although a virulent enemy of the
Ti-pings, has always carefully avoided authorizing the employment of
British officers against the insurgents; and, in fact, has invariably
disapproved such measures, as well as the movement of British troops to
support and succour the contingents when in difficulty.
In a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin, March 12, 1863,"[36]
Sir F. Bruce, referring to the liberty granted to officers to enter the
Chinese Imperial service, states:--"I should prefer that the military
men employed by the Chinese Government should _not_ belong to the great
treaty Powers;" and, with regard to British officers choosing to enter
what the Press in China has termed "the disgusting service," he
expresses the opinion that "they will then bear a Chinese, and not a
British character." How _literally_ this belief has been fulfilled, the
torture of Ti-ping prisoners captured by the Imperialists, the
treacherous massacre of the prisoners at Soo-chow, and the great loss of
life which occurred, after cities were captured, sufficiently prove.
In a despatch dated "April 10,"[37] Sir F. Bruce expresses his wish to
the same officer that Burgevine should be reinstated to the command of
the Ward force, and, speaking "of the charges brought against him,"
states: "I took occasion to examine them at length, and I am perfectly
satisfied that General Burgevine acted from a regard to the interests
confided to him, that he was sacrificed to an intrigue of some Chinese
subordinate officers, and to the jealousy entertained by the Governor
towards the Chinese drilled force." If the Minister had added the names
of a few foreigners as being privy to the "intrigue," he would have hit
upon the whole truth. The Governor was jealous of the force as a Chinese
one managed by foreigners, and successfully plotted, with no little
ingenuity and shrewdness, to make it a foreign force officered by
Englishmen, and countenanced by British authorities, who accepted all
the responsibility entailed.
Upon the subject of Major Gordon's appointment to the coveted
generalship of mercenaries, Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch to General
Brown, dated "June 11," states:[38] "It is not expedient that British
officers should command Chinese troops in the field against the
insurgents, beyond the limits of the radius deemed necessary for the
security of the ports where they are stationed.... I am further of
opinion that, unless the force be properly constituted, and relieved
from the necessity of obeying the orders of the local Government, it
will do no real and permanent good; and that the officer who commands it
will speedily find himself in a position which is neither compatible
with his professional reputation, nor what is due to the character of a
British officer. Under these circumstances, I must _decline_ accepting
the responsibility of authorizing the employment of British officers
beyond Shanghae.... I have informed the Chinese Government of my
objections to the employment of British officers in the field."
Singularly enough, every word prophesied by Sir F. Bruce came to pass;
the force became an instrument of evil in the hands of local Mandarins,
to be used for their individual purposes, and then got rid of; the
officers found their honour tarnished by complicity in deeds of blood
and treachery; some were disgusted, but the Commander retained his
position until he was _compelled_ to break up the force by orders from
his Government. In a despatch to Earl Russell, dated "October 13," Sir
F. Bruce declares:[39] "It was reluctantly, and in deference to the
naval and military authorities, that I consented to our assuming the
responsibility of defending the thirty-mile radius round Shanghae, and I
spared no effort to bring about an arrangement of Burgevine's dispute,
so as to avoid the necessity of having to place an English officer at
the head of the force destined to operate beyond the radius." Yet
members of Lord Palmerston's Government have had the hardihood to
declare that the operations against the Ti-pings _were approved_ by Sir
F. Bruce.
When Major Gordon's force was in danger, General Brown moved
detachments of British troops to support him, and to garrison the
captured towns and hold them against the Ti-pings. Sir F. Bruce, in a
despatch upon the subject, dated "October 6,"[40] clearly condemns his
conduct in these words:--"If officers go into the Chinese service, we
are not entitled to facilitate their operations by moving men, or
placing garrisons in towns beyond the radius for their support, further
than we should be if the corps assisted were commanded by a Chinese
general. We are _not_ entitled to lend them artillery, or men to work
their guns _on any pretext_!" In the very teeth of these distinct
instructions, General Brown persisted in every measure they condemn. It
was the favourite _modus operandi_ over again--the military or naval
authorities acting in direct violation of orders, the disobedience being
ultimately endorsed by the Government, and the apparently disobedient
receiving praise and C.B.'s by way of punishment.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] With the schemes of the Bruce, Wade, Lay, &c., politicians.
[30] This is a startling contrast to what Mr. Bruce declared would be
the "worst" course to pursue.
[31] To completely prove the error of Lord Russell's assumption, and the
slightness of its foundation, we will read the following extract from "A
Memorandum, dated October 15, 1862, addressed to Rear-Admiral Kuper, by
Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, on resigning the Command of the Station."
[Blue Book, June, 1862, to February, 1863, p. 111.]
"_The only question of real importance on which we are at variance with
the rebels_, arose from their desire to possess themselves of Shanghae,
and their capture of Ningpo, since retaken.
"On my first visit to Nanking, ... I effected an agreement with them,
_but limited to the year_, that they should not approach it within 100
_li_ (thirty miles), _on the whole tolerably_ WELL KEPT _during that
time_, but which they refused to renew on the occasion of my last
visit."
[32] Mr. Roberts, an American Baptist missionary already referred to in
this work, joined the Ti-pings at Nankin about the end of October, 1860.
Of all missionaries in China he was the least qualified for such a
position. Intolerant and bigoted to the Baptist dogmas, irritable,
peevish, inconsistent, and vacillating--a man singularly illiterate,
without stability of character or pleasantness of manner--his presence
at Nankin did far more harm than good. His objections to every other
Church, and to every other denomination of dissent except his own, went
far to give the Ti-pings a dread of that diversity of doctrine among the
British and Americans which they had always looked upon with surprise,
thinking, as they did, that God could not be well served by those who
were always quarrelling about it. The circumstances attending the advent
and career of Mr. Roberts among the Ti-pings I have avoided as a
worthless episode, but, as the facts of his indecorous flight from
Nankin have been misrepresented, I think it necessary to notice the
subject. Mr. Roberts accepted temporal rank under the Ti-pings, and by
his unwise dogmatical obstinacy frequently provoked unpleasant
discussion. During a dispute with the Kan-wang, who had entertained him
since his arrival, that chief had particular occasion to chastise a boy
of the household. Mr. Roberts was so blinded by passion, the idea that
Europeans would never know the reverse of his statement, or some other
reason, that, in a paroxysm of rage, he fled from the city, and sought
refuge on board H.M. gunboat _Renard_, which happened to be lying in the
port. By some obliquity of vision best known to himself, Mr. Roberts
mistook the stick used by the Kan-wang for a sword, and declared that
his boy _had been_ brutally murdered. Not satisfied with this, although
on the previous night he had retired to rest fully believing the
surrounding people saints, the very next day, after his quarrel with the
Kan-wang, he awoke to find them howling sinners. The many years that he
had praised the Ti-pings as holy men were, by a moment of passion,
forgotten, and within one day Mr. Roberts not only declared himself to
have been deceived so long, but, for the act of one man, gave up the
hundreds of thousands in the Ti-ping cause to fire and sword. We will
just contrast the different statements of Mr. Roberts, one with the
other, and then dismiss the subject.
This is an extract from the first, made on board the _Renard_:--
"Kan-wang, moved by his coolie elder brother--literally a coolie at
Hong-kong--and the devil, without fear of God before his eyes, did on
Monday, the 13th instant (January, 1862), come into the house in which I
was living, _and with malice aforethought murder one of my servants with
a large sword in his own hand, in my presence_, without a moment's
warning or any just cause. _And after having slain my poor, harmless,
helpless boy, he jumped on his head most fiend-like, and stamped it with
his foot._"
Now, at Canton, on the 3rd of April, 1862, when it was generally known
that the above charge of murder was incorrect, Mr. Roberts retracted
these words [Blue Book, 1862, p. 5], having reference to the Kan-wang's
form of baptism:--
"A miserable apostate, (?) polygamist, _and murderer, too_, to wish to
administer an ordinance held sacred by those who practise it. What a
sacrilege! But as to that boy, _I have since been told that he evinced
indications of life after he was dragged out_, by one who saw him. But I
think it would have been less cruel in Kan-wang to have smoothly cut off
his head than to send him out even half killed, destitute, and naked, to
freeze and starve to death. _Whether the boy was killed directly or not,
I cannot esteem Kan-wang, and his elder brother, who prompted him to the
wicked deed, less than murderers; and hence, in my judgment, they ought
both to be treated as such._"
In the pamphlet, "A Letter to the Bishop of Victoria, regarding the
Religion of the Ti-ping Rebels," the author states, "Of course you now
know that the story of that person's boy being murdered by the Kan-wang
is a fabrication. 'The Kan-wang called on me,' said Mr. Roberts, when I
asked him about the matter, 'and desired me to punish the boy. I told
him I would first remonstrate with him; and then he, the Kan-wang's
brother, dissatisfied with my answer, beat him, _as I thought_, to
death.'"
[33] This affair happened on the 25th of August, was reported to the
Shanghae _Daily Shipping and Commercial News_ of the next day, and was
widely known in China. A certain Mr. CHALONER ALABASTER, of the British
consular service, is mentioned in connection with it.
[34] From the success of the Ti-pings.
[35] _China Overland Trade Report_, February 20, 1863.
[36] Blue Book, China, No. 3, 1864, p. 68.
[37] _Id._, p. 80.
[38] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 96.
[39] _Id._, p. 162.
[40] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 163.