The week which extended from December 10th to December 17th, 1899, was
the blackest one known during our generation, and the most disastrous
for British arms during the century. We had in the short space of seven
days lost, beyond all extenuation or excuse, three separate actions.
No single defeat was of vital importance in itself, but the cumulative
effect, occurring as they did to each of the main British forces in
South Africa, was very great. The total loss amounted to about three
thousand men and twelve guns, while the indirect effects in the way of
loss of prestige to ourselves and increased confidence and more numerous
recruits to our enemy were incalculable.
It is singular to glance at the extracts from the European press at that
time and to observe the delight and foolish exultation with which our
reverses were received. That this should occur in the French journals
is not unnatural, since our history has been largely a contest with that
Power, and we can regard with complacency an enmity which is the tribute
to our success. Russia, too, as the least progressive of European
States, has a natural antagonism of thought, if not of interests, to the
Power which stands most prominently for individual freedom and liberal
institutions. The same poor excuse may be made for the organs of the
Vatican. But what are we to say of the insensate railing of Germany,
a country whose ally we have been for centuries? In the days of
Marlborough, in the darkest hours of Frederick the Great, in the great
world struggle of Napoleon, we have been the brothers-in-arms of these
people. So with the Austrians also. If both these countries were
not finally swept from the map by Napoleon, it is largely to British
subsidies and British tenacity that they owe it. And yet these are the
folk who turned most bitterly against us at the only time in modern
history when we had a chance of distinguishing our friends from our
foes. Never again, I trust, on any pretext will a British guinea be
spent or a British soldier or sailor shed his blood for such allies. The
political lesson of this writer has been that we should make ourselves
strong within the empire, and let all outside it, save only our kinsmen
of America, go their own way and meet their own fate without let or
hindrance from us. It is amazing to find that even the Americans could
understand the stock from which they are themselves sprung so little
that such papers as the 'New York Herald' should imagine that our defeat
at Colenso was a good opportunity for us to terminate the war. The
other leading American journals, however, took a more sane view of the
situation, and realised that ten years of such defeats would not find
the end either of our resolution or of our resources.
In the British Islands and in the empire at large our misfortunes were
met by a sombre but unalterable determination to carry the war to a
successful conclusion and to spare no sacrifices which could lead to
that end. Amid the humiliation of our reverses there was a certain
undercurrent of satisfaction that the deeds of our foemen should at
least have made the contention that the strong was wantonly attacking
the weak an absurd one. Under the stimulus of defeat the opposition to
the war sensibly decreased. It had become too absurd even for the most
unreasonable platform orator to contend that a struggle had been forced
upon the Boers when every fresh detail showed how thoroughly they had
prepared for such a contingency and how much we had to make up. Many
who had opposed the war simply on that sporting instinct which backs
the smaller against the larger began to realise that what with the
geographical position of these people, what with the nature of their
country, and what with the mobility, number, and hardihood of their
forces, we had undertaken a task which would necessitate such a military
effort as we had never before been called upon to make. When Kipling at
the dawn of the war had sung of 'fifty thousand horse and foot going to
Table Bay,' the statement had seemed extreme. Now it was growing upon
the public mind that four times this number would not be an excessive
estimate. But the nation rose grandly to the effort. Their only fear,
often and loudly expressed, was that Parliament would deal too tamely
with the situation and fail to demand sufficient sacrifices. Such was
the wave of feeling over the country that it was impossible to hold
a peace meeting anywhere without a certainty of riot. The only London
daily which had opposed the war, though very ably edited, was overborne
by the general sentiment and compelled to change its line. In the
provinces also opposition was almost silent, and the great colonies were
even more unanimous than the mother country. Misfortune had solidified
us where success might have caused a sentimental opposition.
On the whole, the energetic mood of the nation was reflected by the
decided measures of the Government. Before the deep-sea cables had told
us the lists of our dead, steps had been taken to prove to the world
how great were our latent resources and how determined our spirit. On
December 18th, two days after Colenso, the following provisions were
made for carrying on the campaign.
1. That as General Buller's hands were full in Natal the supervision and
direction of the whole campaign should be placed in the hands of Lord
Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff. Thus the famous old
soldier and the famous young one were called together to the assistance
of the country.
2. That all the remaining army reserves should be called out.
3. That the 7th Division (10,000 men) should be despatched to Africa,
and that an 8th Division should be formed ready for service.
4. That considerable artillery reinforcements, including a howitzer
brigade, should go out.
5. That eleven Militia battalions be sent abroad.
6. That a strong contingent of Volunteers be sent out.
7. That a Yeomanry mounted force be despatched.
8. That mounted corps be raised at the discretion of the
Commander-in-Chief in South Africa.
9. That the patriotic offers of further contingents from the colonies be
gratefully accepted.
By these measures it was calculated that from seventy to a hundred
thousand men would be added to our South African armies, the numbers of
which were already not short of a hundred thousand.
It is one thing, however, to draw up paper reinforcements, and it is
another, in a free country where no compulsion would be tolerated, to
turn these plans into actual regiments and squadrons. But if there were
any who doubted that this ancient nation still glowed with the spirit
of its youth his fears must soon have passed away. For this far-distant
war, a war of the unseen foe and of the murderous ambuscade, there
were so many volunteers that the authorities were embarrassed by their
numbers and their pertinacity. It was a stimulating sight to see those
long queues of top-hatted, frock-coated young men who waited their turn
for the orderly room with as much desperate anxiety as if hard fare,
a veld bed, and Boer bullets were all that life had that was worth the
holding. Especially the Imperial Yeomanry, a corps of riders and shots,
appealed to the sporting instincts of our race. Many could ride and not
shoot, many could shoot and not ride, more candidates were rejected
than were accepted, and yet in a very short time eight thousand men from
every class were wearing the grey coats and bandoliers. This singular
and formidable force was drawn from every part of England and Scotland,
with a contingent of hard-riding Irish fox-hunters. Noblemen and
grooms rode knee to knee in the ranks, and the officers included many
well-known country gentlemen and masters of hounds. Well horsed and well
armed, a better force for the work in hand could not be imagined. So
high did the patriotism run that corps were formed in which the men
not only found their own equipment but contributed their pay to the war
fund. Many young men about town justified their existence for the first
time. In a single club, which is peculiarly consecrated to the jeunesse
doree, three hundred members rode to the wars.
Without waiting for these distant but necessary reinforcements, the
Generals in Africa had two divisions to look to, one of which was
actually arriving while the other was on the sea. These formed the 5th
Division under Sir Charles Warren, and the 6th Division under General
Kelly-Kenny. Until these forces should arrive it was obviously best that
the three armies should wait, for, unless there should be pressing need
of help on the part of the besieged garrisons or imminent prospects of
European complications, every week which passed was in our favour. There
was therefore a long lull in the war, during which Methuen strengthened
his position at Modder River, Gatacre held his own at Sterkstroom,
and Buller built up his strength for another attempt at the relief of
Ladysmith. The only connected series of operations during that time were
those of General French in the neighbourhood of Colesberg, an account of
which will be found in their entirety elsewhere. A short narrative may
be given here of the doings of each of these forces until the period of
inaction came to an end.
Methuen after the repulse at Magersfontein had fallen back upon the
lines of Modder River, and had fortified them in such a way that he felt
himself secure against assault. Cronje, on the other hand, had extended
his position both to the right and to the left, and had strengthened the
works which we had already found so formidable. In this way a condition
of inaction was established which was really very much to our advantage,
since Methuen retained his communications by rail, while all supplies
to Cronje had to come a hundred miles by road. The British troops, and
especially the Highland Brigade, were badly in need of a rest after the
very severe ordeal which they had undergone. General Hector Macdonald,
whose military record had earned the soldierly name of 'Fighting Mac,'
was sent for from India to take the place of the ill-fated Wauchope.
Pending his arrival and that of reinforcements, Methuen remained quiet,
and the Boers fortunately followed his example. From over the northern
horizon those silver flashes of light told that Kimberley was dauntless
in the present and hopeful of the future. On January 1st the British
post of Kuruman fell, by which twelve officers and 120 police were
captured. The town was isolated, and its capture could have no effect
upon the general operations, but it is remarkable as the only capture of
a fortified post up to this point made by the Boers.
The monotony of the long wait was broken by one dashing raid carried
out by a detachment from Methuen's line of communications. This force
consisted of 200 Queenslanders, 100 Canadians (Toronto Company), 40
mounted Munster Fusiliers, a New South Wales Ambulance, and 200 of the
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry with one horse battery. This singular
force, so small in numbers and yet raked from the ends of the earth, was
under the command of Colonel Pilcher. Moving out suddenly and rapidly
from Belmont, it struck at the extreme right of the Boer line, which
consisted of a laager occupied by the colonial rebels of that part of
the country. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the colonists at
the prospect of action. 'At last!' was the cry which went up from the
Canadians when they were ordered to advance. The result was an absolute
success. The rebels broke and fled, their camp was taken, and forty of
them fell into our hands. Our own loss was slight, three killed and a
few wounded. The flying column occupied the town of Douglas and hoisted
the British flag there; but it was decided that the time had not yet
come when it could be held, and the force fell back upon Belmont. The
rebel prisoners were sent down to Cape Town for trial. The movement was
covered by the advance of a force under Babington from Methuen's force.
This detachment, consisting of the 9th and 12th Lancers, with some
mounted infantry and G troop of Horse Artillery, prevented any
interference with Pilcher's force from the north. It is worthy of record
that though the two bodies of troops were operating at a distance of
thirty miles, they succeeded in preserving a telephonic connection,
seventeen minutes being the average time taken over question and reply.
Encouraged by this small success, Methuen's cavalry on January 9th made
another raid over the Free State border, which is remarkable for the
fact that, save in the case of Colonel Plumer's Rhodesian Force, it
was the first time that the enemy's frontier had been violated. The
expedition under Babington consisted of the same regiments and the
same battery which had covered Pilcher's advance. The line taken was a
south-easterly one, so as to get far round the left flank of the Boer
position. With the aid of a party of the Victorian Mounted Rifles
a considerable tract of country was overrun, and some farmhouses
destroyed. The latter extreme measure may have been taken as a warning
to the Boers that such depredations as they had carried out in parts of
Natal could not pass with impunity, but both the policy and the humanity
of such a course appear to be open to question, and there was some cause
for the remonstrance which President Kruger shortly after addressed to
us upon the subject. The expedition returned to Modder Camp at the end
of two days without having seen the enemy. Save for one or two similar
cavalry reconnaissances, an occasional interchange of long-range shells,
a little sniping, and one or two false alarms at night, which broke the
whole front of Magersfontein into yellow lines of angry light, nothing
happened to Methuen's force which is worthy of record up to the time of
that movement of General Hector Macdonald to Koodoosberg which may be
considered in connection with Lord Roberts's decisive operations, of
which it was really a part.
The doings of General Gatacre's force during the long interval which
passed between his disaster at Stormberg and the final general advance
may be rapidly chronicled. Although nominally in command of a division,
Gatacre's troops were continually drafted off to east and to west, so
that it was seldom that he had more than a brigade under his orders.
During the weeks of waiting, his force consisted of three field
batteries, the 74th, 77th, and 79th, some mounted police and irregular
horse, the remains of the Royal Irish Rifles and the 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers, the 1st Royal Scots, the Derbyshire regiment, and the
Berkshires, the whole amounting to about 5500 men, who had to hold the
whole district from Sterkstroom to East London on the coast, with a
victorious enemy in front and a disaffected population around. Under
these circumstances he could not attempt to do more than to hold his
ground at Sterkstroom, and this he did unflinchingly until the line of
the Boer defence broke down. Scouting and raiding expeditions, chiefly
organised by Captain De Montmorency--whose early death cut short the
career of one who possessed every quality of a partisan leader--broke
the monotony of inaction. During the week which ended the year a
succession of small skirmishes, of which the town of Dordrecht was the
centre, exercised the troops in irregular warfare.
On January 3rd the Boer forces advanced and attacked the camp of the
Cape Mounted Police, which was some eight miles in advance of Gatacre's
main position. The movement, however, was a half-hearted one, and was
beaten off with small loss upon their part and less upon ours. From then
onwards no movement of importance took place in Gatacre's column until
the general advance along the whole line had cleared his difficulties
from in front of him.
In the meantime General Buller had also been playing a waiting game,
and, secure in the knowledge that Ladysmith could still hold out, he
had been building up his strength for a second attempt to relieve the
hard-pressed and much-enduring garrison. After the repulse at Colenso,
Hildyard's and Barton's brigades had remained at Chieveley with the
mounted infantry, the naval guns, and two field batteries. The rest of
the force retired to Frere, some miles in the rear. Emboldened by their
success, the Boers sent raiding parties over the Tugela on either flank,
which were only checked by our patrols being extended from Springfield
on the west to Weenen on the east. A few plundered farmhouses and a
small list of killed and wounded horsemen on either side were the sole
result of these spasmodic and half-hearted operations.
Time here as elsewhere was working for the British, for reinforcements
were steadily coming to Buller's army. By the new year Sir Charles
Warren's division (the 5th) was nearly complete at Estcourt, whence it
could reach the front at any moment. This division included the 10th
brigade, consisting of the Imperial Light Infantry, 2nd Somersets, the
2nd Dorsets, and the 2nd Middlesex; also the 11th, called the Lancashire
Brigade, formed by the 2nd Royal Lancaster, the 2nd Lancashire
Fusiliers, the 1st South Lancashire, and the York and Lancaster. The
division also included the 14th Hussars and the 19th, 20th, and 28th
batteries of Field Artillery. Other batteries of artillery, including
one howitzer battery, came to strengthen Buller's force, which amounted
now to more than 30,000 men. Immense transport preparations had to be
made, however, before the force could have the mobility necessary for a
flank march, and it was not until January 11th that General Buller's new
plans for advance could be set into action. Before describing what these
plans were and the disappointing fate which awaited them, we will
return to the story of the siege of Ladysmith, and show how narrowly the
relieving force escaped the humiliation--some would say the disgrace--of
seeing the town which looked to them for help fall beneath their very
eyes. That this did not occur is entirely due to the fierce tenacity and
savage endurance of the disease-ridden and half-starved men who held on
to the frail lines which covered it.