CHAPTER 13. THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH.

Monday, October 30th, 1899, is not a date which can be looked back to

with satisfaction by any Briton. In a scrambling and ill-managed action

we had lost our detached left wing almost to a man, while our right had

been hustled with no great loss but with some ignominy into Ladysmith.

Our guns had been outshot, our infantry checked, and our cavalry

paralysed. Eight hundred prisoners may seem no great loss when compared

with a Sedan, or even with an Ulm; but such matters are comparative,

and the force which laid down its arms at Nicholson's Nek is the

largest British force which has surrendered since the days of our great

grandfathers, when the egregious Duke of York commanded in Flanders.

Sir George White was now confronted with the certainty of an investment,

an event for which apparently no preparation had been made, since with

an open railway behind him so many useless mouths had been permitted

to remain in the town. Ladysmith lies in a hollow and is dominated by

a ring of hills, some near and some distant. The near ones were in our

hands, but no attempt had been made in the early days of the war to

fortify and hold Bulwana, Lombard's Kop, and the other positions from

which the town might be shelled. Whether these might or might not have

been successfully held has been much disputed by military men,

the balance of opinion being that Bulwana, at least, which has a

water-supply of its own, might have been retained. This question,

however, was already academic, as the outer hills were in the hands

of the enemy. As it was, the inner line--Caesar's Camp, Wagon Hill,

Rifleman's Post, and round to Helpmakaar Hill--made a perimeter of

fourteen miles, and the difficulty of retaining so extensive a line goes

far to exonerate General White, not only for abandoning the outer hills,

but also for retaining his cavalry in the town.

After the battle of Ladysmith and the retreat of the British, the Boers

in their deliberate but effective fashion set about the investment of

the town, while the British commander accepted the same as inevitable,

content if he could stem and hold back from the colony the threatened

flood of invasion. On Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday the

commandoes gradually closed in upon the south and east, harassed by

some cavalry operations and reconnaissances upon our part, the effect of

which was much exaggerated by the press. On Thursday, November 2nd, the

last train escaped under a brisk fire, the passengers upon the wrong

side of the seats. At 2 P.M. on the same day the telegraph line was cut,

and the lonely town settled herself somberly down to the task of holding

off the exultant Boers until the day--supposed to be imminent--when the

relieving army should appear from among the labyrinth of mountains which

lay to the south of them. Some there were who, knowing both the enemy

and the mountains, felt a cold chill within their hearts as they asked

themselves how an army was to come through, but the greater number, from

General to private, trusted implicitly in the valour of their comrades

and in the luck of the British Army.

One example of that historical luck was ever before their eyes in the

shape of those invaluable naval guns which had arrived so dramatically

at the very crisis of the fight, in time to check the monster on

Pepworth Hill and to cover the retreat of the army. But for them the

besieged must have lain impotent under the muzzles of the huge Creusots.

But in spite of the naive claims put forward by the Boers to some

special Providence--a process which a friendly German critic described

as 'commandeering the Almighty'--it is certain that in a very peculiar

degree, in the early months of this war there came again and again a

happy chance, or a merciful interposition, which saved the British from

disaster. Now in this first week of November, when every hill, north

and south and east and west, flashed and smoked, and the great 96-pound

shells groaned and screamed over the town, it was to the long thin

4.7's and to the hearty bearded men who worked them, that soldiers and

townsfolk looked for help. These guns of Lambton's, supplemented by two

old-fashioned 6.3 howitzers manned by survivors from No. 10 Mountain

Battery, did all that was possible to keep down the fire of the heavy

Boer guns. If they could not save, they could at least hit back,

and punishment is not so bad to bear when one is giving as well as

receiving.

By the end of the first week of November the Boers had established their

circle of fire. On the east of the town, broken by the loops of the Klip

River, is a broad green plain, some miles in extent, which furnished

grazing ground for the horses and cattle of the besieged. Beyond it

rises into a long flat-topped hill the famous Bulwana, upon which lay

one great Creusot and several smaller guns. To the north, on Pepworth

Hill, was another Creusot, and between the two were the Boer batteries

upon Lombard's Kop. The British naval guns were placed upon this side,

for, as the open loop formed by the river lies at this end, it is the

part of the defences which is most liable to assault. From thence all

round the west down to Besters in the south was a continuous series of

hills, each crowned with Boer guns, which, if they could not harm the

distant town, were at least effective in holding the garrison to its

lines. So formidable were these positions that, amid much outspoken

criticism, it has never been suggested that White would have been

justified with a limited garrison in incurring the heavy loss of life

which must have followed an attempt to force them.

The first few days of the siege were clouded by the death of Lieutenant

Egerton of the 'Powerful,' one of the most promising officers in the

Navy. One leg and the other foot were carried off, as he lay upon the

sandbag parapet watching the effect of our fire. 'There's an end of my

cricket,' said the gallant sportsman, and he was carried to the rear

with a cigar between his clenched teeth.

On November 3rd a strong cavalry reconnaissance was pushed down

the Colenso road to ascertain the force which the enemy had in that

direction. Colonel Brocklehurst took with him the 18th and 19th Hussars,

the 5th Lancers and the 5th Dragoon Guards, with the Light Horse and the

Natal Volunteers. Some desultory fighting ensued which achieved no end,

and was chiefly remarkable for the excellent behaviour of the Colonials,

who showed that they were the equals of the Regulars in gallantry and

their superiors in the tactics which such a country requires. The death

of Major Taunton, Captain Knapp, and young Brabant, the son of the

General who did such good service at a later stage of the war, was a

heavy price to pay for the knowledge that the Boers were in considerable

strength to the south.

By the end of this week the town had already settled down to the routine

of the siege. General Joubert, with the chivalry which had always

distinguished him, had permitted the garrison to send out the

non-combatants to a place called Intombi Camp (promptly named

Funkersdorp by the facetious) where they were safe from the shells,

though the burden of their support still fell of course upon the

much-tried commissariat. The hale and male of the townsfolk refused for

the most part to avoid the common danger, and clung tenaciously to their

shot-torn village. Fortunately the river has worn down its banks until

it runs through a deep channel, in the sides of which it was found to be

possible to hollow out caves which were practically bomb-proof. Here

for some months the townsfolk led a troglodytic existence, returning

to their homes upon that much appreciated seventh day of rest which was

granted to them by their Sabbatarian besiegers.

The perimeter of the defence had been divided off so that each

corps might be responsible for its own section. To the south was

the Manchester Regiment upon the hill called Caesar's Camp. Between

Lombard's Kop and the town, on the north-east, were the Devons. To the

north, at what seemed the vulnerable point, were the Rifle Brigade, the

Rifles, and the remains of the 18th Hussars. To the west were the 5th

Lancers, 19th Hussars, and 5th Dragoon Guards. The rest of the force was

encamped round the outskirts of the town.

There appears to have been some idea in the Boer mind that the mere fact

that they held a dominant position over the town would soon necessitate

the surrender of the army. At the end of a week they had realised,

however, just as the British had, that a siege lay before both. Their

fire upon the town was heavy but not deadly, though it became more

effective as the weeks went on. Their practice at a range of five miles

was exceedingly accurate. At the same time their riflemen became more

venturesome, and on Tuesday, November 7th, they made a half-hearted

attack upon the Manchesters' position on the south, which was driven

back without difficulty. On the 9th, however, their attempt was of a

more serious and sustained character. It began with a heavy shell-fire

and with a demonstration of rifle-fire from every side, which had

for its object the prevention of reinforcements for the true point of

danger, which again was Caesar's Camp at the south. It is evident that

the Boers had from the beginning made up their minds that here lay the

key of the position, as the two serious attacks--that of November 9th

and that of January 6th--were directed upon this point.

The Manchesters at Caesar's Camp had been reinforced by the 1st

battalion 60th Rifles, who held the prolongation of the same ridge,

which is called Waggon Hill. With the dawn it was found that the Boer

riflemen were within eight hundred yards, and from then till evening a

constant fire was maintained upon the hill. The Boer, however, save when

the odds are all in his favour, is not, in spite of his considerable

personal bravery, at his best in attack. His racial traditions,

depending upon the necessity for economy of human life, are all opposed

to it. As a consequence two regiments well posted were able to hold them

off all day with a loss which did not exceed thirty killed and wounded,

while the enemy, exposed to the shrapnel of the 42nd battery, as well

as the rifle-fire of the infantry, must have suffered very much more

severely. The result of the action was a well-grounded belief that in

daylight there was very little chance of the Boers being able to carry

the lines. As the date was that of the Prince of Wales's birthday, a

salute of twenty-one shotted naval guns wound up a successful day.

The failure of the attempt upon Ladysmith seems to have convinced the

enemy that a waiting game, in which hunger, shell-fire, and disease were

their allies, would be surer and less expensive than an open assault.

From their distant hilltops they continued to plague the town, while

garrison and citizens sat grimly patient, and learned to endure if not

to enjoy the crash of the 96-pound shells, and the patter of shrapnel

upon their corrugated-iron roofs. The supplies were adequate, and the

besieged were fortunate in the presence of a first-class organiser,

Colonel Ward of Islington fame, who with the assistance of Colonel

Stoneman systematised the collection and issue of all the food, civil

and military, so as to stretch it to its utmost. With rain overhead and

mud underfoot, chafing at their own idleness and humiliated by their

own position, the soldiers waited through the weary weeks for the relief

which never came. On some days there was more shell-fire, on some less;

on some there was sniping, on some none; on some they sent a little

feeler of cavalry and guns out of the town, on most they lay still--such

were the ups and downs of life in Ladysmith. The inevitable siege

paper, 'The Ladysmith Lyre,' appeared, and did something to relieve the

monotony by the exasperation of its jokes. Night, morning, and noon the

shells rained upon the town until the most timid learned fatalism if not

bravery. The crash of the percussion, and the strange musical tang of

the shrapnel sounded ever in their ears. With their glasses the garrison

could see the gay frocks and parasols of the Boer ladies who had come

down by train to see the torture of the doomed town.

The Boers were sufficiently numerous, aided by their strong positions

and excellent artillery, to mask the Ladysmith force and to sweep on at

once to the conquest of Natal. Had they done so it is hard to see what

could have prevented them from riding their horses down to salt water.

A few odds and ends, half battalions and local volunteers, stood between

them and Durban. But here, as on the Orange River, a singular paralysis

seems to have struck them. When the road lay clear before them the first

transports of the army corps were hardly past St. Vincent, but before

they had made up their mind to take that road the harbour of Durban

was packed with our shipping and ten thousand men had thrown themselves

across their path.

For a moment we may leave the fortunes of Ladysmith to follow this

southerly movement of the Boers. Within two days of the investment of

the town they had swung round their left flank and attacked Colenso,

twelve miles south, shelling the Durban Light Infantry out of their post

with a long-range fire. The British fell back twenty-seven miles

and concentrated at Estcourt, leaving the all-important Colenso

railway-bridge in the hands of the enemy. From this onwards they held

the north of the Tugela, and many a widow wore crepe before we got our

grip upon it once more. Never was there a more critical week in the war,

but having got Colenso the Boers did little more. They formally annexed

the whole of Northern Natal to the Orange Free State--a dangerous

precedent when the tables should be turned. With amazing assurance the

burghers pegged out farms for themselves and sent for their people to

occupy these newly won estates.

On November 5th the Boers had remained so inert that the British

returned in small force to Colenso and removed some stores--which seems

to suggest that the original retirement was premature. Four days passed

in inactivity--four precious days for us--and on the evening of the

fourth, November 9th, the watchers on the signal station at Table

Mountain saw the smoke of a great steamer coming past Robben Island. It

was the 'Roslin Castle' with the first of the reinforcements. Within the

week the 'Moor,' 'Yorkshire,' 'Aurania,' 'Hawarden Castle,' 'Gascon,'

'Armenian,' 'Oriental,' and a fleet of others had passed for Durban with

15,000 men. Once again the command of the sea had saved the Empire.

But, now that it was too late, the Boers suddenly took the initiative,

and in dramatic fashion. North of Estcourt, where General Hildyard was

being daily reinforced from the sea, there are two small townlets, or at

least geographical (and railway) points. Frere is about ten miles north

of Estcourt, and Chieveley is five miles north of that and about as

far to the south of Colenso. On November 15th an armoured train was

despatched from Estcourt to see what was going on up the line. Already

one disaster had befallen us in this campaign on account of these clumsy

contrivances, and a heavier one was now to confirm the opinion that,

acting alone, they are totally inadmissible. As a means of carrying

artillery for a force operating upon either flank of them, with an

assured retreat behind, there may be a place for them in modern war, but

as a method of scouting they appear to be the most inefficient and also

the most expensive that has ever been invented. An intelligent horseman

would gather more information, be less visible, and retain some freedom

as to route. After our experience the armoured train may steam out of

military history.

The train contained ninety Dublin Fusiliers, eighty Durban Volunteers,

and ten sailors, with a naval 7-pounder gun. Captain Haldane of the

Gordons, Lieutenant Frankland (Dublin Fusiliers), and Winston Churchill,

the well-known correspondent, accompanied the expedition. What might

have been foreseen occurred. The train steamed into the advancing Boer

army, was fired upon, tried to escape, found the rails blocked behind

it, and upset. Dublins and Durbans were shot helplessly out of their

trucks, under a heavy fire. A railway accident is a nervous thing, and

so is an ambuscade, but the combination of the two must be appalling.

Yet there were brave hearts which rose to the occasion. Haldane and

Frankland rallied the troops, and Churchill the engine-driver. The

engine was disentangled and sent on with its cab full of wounded.

Churchill, who had escaped upon it, came gallantly back to share the

fate of his comrades. The dazed shaken soldiers continued a futile

resistance for some time, but there was neither help nor escape and

nothing for them but surrender. The most Spartan military critic cannot

blame them. A few slipped away besides those who escaped upon the

engine. Our losses were two killed, twenty wounded, and about eighty

taken. It is remarkable that of the three leaders both Haldane and

Churchill succeeded in escaping from Pretoria.

A double tide of armed men was now pouring into Southern Natal. From

below, trainload after trainload of British regulars were coming up to

the danger point, feted and cheered at every station. Lonely farmhouses

near the line hung out their Union Jacks, and the folk on the stoep

heard the roar of the choruses as the great trains swung upon their way.

From above the Boers were flooding down, as Churchill saw them, dour,

resolute, riding silently through the rain, or chanting hymns round

their camp fires--brave honest farmers, but standing unconsciously for

mediaevalism and corruption, even as our rough-tongued Tommies stood for

civilisation, progress, and equal rights for all men.

The invading force, the numbers of which could not have exceeded some

few thousands, formidable only for their mobility, lapped round the more

powerful but less active force at Estcourt, and struck behind it at

its communications. There was for a day or two some discussion as to a

further retreat, but Hildyard, strengthened by the advice and presence

of Colonel Long, determined to hold his ground. On November 21st the

raiding Boers were as far south as Nottingham Road, a point thirty miles

south of Estcourt and only forty miles north of the considerable city of

Pietermaritzburg. The situation was serious. Either the invaders must

be stopped, or the second largest town in the colony would be in

their hands. From all sides came tales of plundered farms and broken

households. Some at least of the raiders behaved with wanton brutality.

Smashed pianos, shattered pictures, slaughtered stock, and vile

inscriptions, all exhibit a predatory and violent side to the

paradoxical Boer character. [Footnote: More than once I have heard the

farmers in the Free State acknowledge that the ruin which had come upon

them was a just retribution for the excesses of Natal.]

The next British post behind Hildyard's at Estcourt was Barton's upon

the Mooi River, thirty miles to the south. Upon this the Boers made a

half-hearted attempt, but Joubert had begun to realise the strength of

the British reinforcements and the impossibility with the numbers at his

disposal of investing a succession of British posts. He ordered Botha to

withdraw from Mooi River and begin his northerly trek.

The turning-point of the Boer invasion of Natal was marked, though we

cannot claim that it was caused, by the action of Willow Grange. This

was fought by Hildyard and Walter Kitchener in command of the Estcourt

garrison, against about 2000 of the invaders under Louis Botha. The

troops engaged were the East and West Surreys (four companies of the

latter), the West Yorkshires, the Durban Light Infantry, No. 7 battery

R.F.A., two naval guns, and some hundreds of Colonial Horse.

The enemy being observed to have a gun upon a hill within striking

distance of Estcourt, this force set out on November 22nd to make a

night attack and to endeavour to capture it. The hill was taken without

difficulty, but it was found that the gun had been removed. A severe

counter-attack was made at daylight by the Boers, and the troops were

compelled with no great loss and less glory to return to the town.

The Surreys and the Yorkshires behaved very well, but were placed in a

difficult position and were badly supported by the artillery. Martyn's

Mounted Infantry covered the retirement with great gallantry, but the

skirmish ended in a British loss of fourteen killed and fifty wounded

or missing, which was certainly more than that of the Boers. From this

indecisive action of Willow Grange the Boer invasion receded until

General Buller, coming to the front on November 27th, found that the

enemy was once more occupying the line of the Tugela. He himself moved

up to Frere, where he devoted his time and energies to the collection of

that force with which he was destined, after three failures, to make his

way into Ladysmith.

One unexpected and little known result of the Boer expedition into

Southern Natal was that their leader, the chivalrous Joubert, injured

himself through his horse stumbling, and was physically incapacitated

for the remainder of the campaign. He returned almost immediately to

Pretoria, leaving the command of the Tugela in the hands of Louis Botha.

Leaving Buller to organise his army at Frere, and the Boer commanders

to draw their screen of formidable defences along the Tugela, we will

return once more to the fortunes of the unhappy town round which the

interest of the world, and possibly the destiny of the Empire, were

centering. It is very certain that had Ladysmith fallen, and twelve

thousand British soldiers with a million pounds' worth of stores fallen

into the hands of the invaders, we should have been faced with the

alternative of abandoning the struggle, or of reconquering South Africa

from Cape Town northwards. South Africa is the keystone of the Empire,

and for the instant Ladysmith was the keystone of South Africa. But

the courage of the troops who held the shell-torn townlet, and the

confidence of the public who watched them, never faltered for an

instant.

December 8th was marked by a gallant exploit on the part of the

beleaguered garrison. Not a whisper had transpired of the coming sortie,

and a quarter of an hour before the start officers engaged had no idea

of it. O si sic omnia! At ten o'clock a band of men slipped out of the

town. There were six hundred of them, all irregulars, drawn from the

Imperial Light Horse, the Natal Carabineers, and the Border Mounted

Rifles, under the command of Hunter, youngest and most dashing of

British Generals. Edwardes and Boyston were the subcommanders. The men

had no knowledge of where they were going or what they had to do, but

they crept silently along under a drifting sky, with peeps of a quarter

moon, over a mimosa-shadowed plain. At last in front of them there

loomed a dark mass--it was Gun Hill, from which one of the great

Creusots had plagued them. A strong support (four hundred men) was left

at the base of the hill, and the others, one hundred Imperials, one

hundred Borders and Carabineers, ten Sappers, crept upwards with Major

Henderson as guide. A Dutch outpost challenged, but was satisfied by a

Dutch-speaking Carabineer. Higher and higher the men crept, the silence

broken only by the occasional slip of a stone or the rustle of their own

breathing. Most of them had left their boots below. Even in the darkness

they kept some formation, and the right wing curved forward to outflank

the defence. Suddenly a Mauser crack and a spurt of flame--then another

and another! 'Come on, boys! Fix bayonets!' yelled Karri Davies. There

were no bayonets, but that was a detail. At the word the gunners were

off, and there in the darkness in front of the storming party loomed

the enormous gun, gigantic in that uncertain light. Out with the

huge breech-block! Wrap the long lean muzzle round with a collar of

gun-cotton! Keep the guard upon the run until the work is done!

Hunter stood by with a night light in his hand until the charge was in

position, and then, with a crash which brought both armies from their

tents, the huge tube reared up on its mountings and toppled backwards

into the pit. A howitzer lurked beside it, and this also was blown into

ruin. The attendant Maxim was dragged back by the exultant captors, who

reached the town amid shoutings and laughter with the first break of

day. One man wounded, the gallant Henderson, is the cheap price for the

best-planned and most dashing exploit of the war. Secrecy in conception,

vigour in execution--they are the root ideas of the soldier's craft. So

easily was the enterprise carried out, and so defective the Boer

watch, that it is probable that if all the guns had been simultaneously

attacked the Boers might have found themselves without a single piece of

ordnance in the morning. [Footnote: The destruction of the Creusot was

not as complete as was hoped. It was taken back to Pretoria, three feet

were sawn off the muzzle, and a new breech-block provided. The gun was

then sent to Kimberley, and it was the heavy cannon which arrived late

in the history of that siege and caused considerable consternation among

the inhabitants.]

On the same morning (December 9th) a cavalry reconnaissance was pushed

in the direction of Pepworth Hill. The object no doubt was to ascertain

whether the enemy were still present in force, and the terrific roll

of the Mausers answered it in the affirmative. Two killed and twenty

wounded was the price which we paid for the information. There had been

three such reconnaissances in the five weeks of the siege, and it

is difficult to see what advantage they gave or how they are to be

justified. Far be it for the civilian to dogmatise upon such matters,

but one can repeat, and to the best of one's judgment endorse, the

opinion of the vast majority of officers.

There were heart burnings among the Regulars that the colonial troops

should have gone in front of them, so their martial jealousy was allayed

three nights later by the same task being given to them. Four companies

of the 2nd Rifle Brigade were the troops chosen, with a few sappers and

gunners, the whole under the command of Colonel Metcalfe of the same

battalion. A single gun, the 4.7 howitzer upon Surprise Hill, was the

objective. Again there was the stealthy advance through the darkness,

again the support was left at the bottom of the hill, again the two

companies carefully ascended, again there was the challenge, the rush,

the flight, and the gun was in the hands of the stormers.

Here and only here the story varies. For some reason the fuse used

for the guncotton was defective, and half an hour elapsed before the

explosion destroyed the howitzer. When it came it came very thoroughly,

but it was a weary time in coming. Then our men descended the hill,

but the Boers were already crowding in upon them from either side. The

English cries of the soldiers were answered in English by the Boers, and

slouch hat or helmet dimly seen in the mirk was the only badge of friend

or foe. A singular letter is extant from young Reitz (the son of the

Transvaal secretary), who was present. According to his account there

were but eight Boers present, but assertion or contradiction equally

valueless in the darkness of such a night, and there are some obvious

discrepancies in his statement. 'We fired among them,' says Reitz.

'They stopped and all cried out “Rifle Brigade.” Then one of them said

“Charge!” One officer, Captain Paley, advanced, though he had two bullet

wounds already. Joubert gave him another shot and he fell on the top of

us. Four Englishmen got hold of Jan Luttig and struck him on the head

with their rifles and stabbed him in the stomach with a bayonet. He

seized two of them by the throat and shouted “Help, boys!” His two

nearest comrades shot two of them, and the other two bolted. Then the

English came up in numbers, about eight hundred, along the footpath'

(there were two hundred on the hill, but the exaggeration is pardonable

in the darkness), 'and we lay as quiet as mice along the bank. Farther

on the English killed three of our men with bayonets and wounded two.

In the morning we found Captain Paley and twenty-two of them killed and

wounded.' It seems evident that Reitz means that his own little

party were eight men, and not that that represented the force which

intercepted the retiring riflemen. Within his own knowledge five of his

countrymen were killed in the scuffle, so the total loss was probably

considerable. Our own casualties were eleven dead, forty-three wounded,

and six prisoners, but the price was not excessive for the howitzer and

for the morale which arises from such exploits. Had it not been for that

unfortunate fuse, the second success might have been as bloodless as the

first. 'I am sorry,' said a sympathetic correspondent to the stricken

Paley. 'But we got the gun,' Paley whispered, and he spoke for the

Brigade.

Amid the shell-fire, the scanty rations, the enteric and the dysentery,

one ray of comfort had always brightened the garrison. Buller was only

twelve miles away--they could hear his guns--and when his advance came

in earnest their sufferings would be at an end. But now in an instant

this single light was shut off and the true nature of their situation

was revealed to them. Buller had indeed moved...but backwards. He had

been defeated at Colenso, and the siege was not ending but beginning.

With heavier hearts but undiminished resolution the army and the

townsfolk settled down to the long, dour struggle. The exultant enemy

replaced their shattered guns and drew their lines closer still round

the stricken town.

A record of the siege onwards until the break of the New Year centres

upon the sordid details of the sick returns and of the price of food.

Fifty on one day, seventy on the next, passed under the hands of the

overworked and devoted doctors. Fifteen hundred, and later two thousand,

of the garrison were down. The air was poisoned by foul sewage and dark

with obscene flies. They speckled the scanty food. Eggs were already a

shilling each, cigarettes sixpence, whisky five pounds a bottle: a city

more free from gluttony and drunkenness has never been seen.

Shell-fire has shown itself in this war to be an excellent ordeal for

those who desire martial excitement with a minimum of danger. But

now and again some black chance guides a bomb--one in five thousand

perhaps--to a most tragic issue. Such a deadly missile falling among

Boers near Kimberley is said to have slain nine and wounded seventeen.

In Ladysmith too there are days to be marked in red when the gunner shot

better than he knew. One shell on December 17th killed six men (Natal

Carabineers), wounded three, and destroyed fourteen horses. The grisly

fact has been recorded that five separate human legs lay upon the

ground. On December 22nd another tragic shot killed five and wounded

twelve of the Devons. On the same day four officers of the 5th Lancers

(including the Colonel) and one sergeant were wounded--a most disastrous

day. A little later it was again the turn of the Devons, who lost one

officer killed and ten wounded. Christmas set in amid misery, hunger,

and disease, the more piteous for the grim attempts to amuse the

children and live up to the joyous season, when the present of Santa

Claus was too often a 96-pound shell. On the top of all other troubles

it was now known that the heavy ammunition was running short and must

be husbanded for emergencies. There was no surcease, however, in the

constant hail which fell upon the town. Two or three hundred shells were

a not unusual daily allowance. The monotonous bombardment with which

the New Year had commenced was soon to be varied by a most gallant and

spirit-stirring clash of arms. On January 6th the Boers delivered their

great assault upon Ladysmith--an onfall so gallantly made and gallantly

met that it deserves to rank among the classic fights of British

military history. It is a tale which neither side need be ashamed to

tell. Honour to the sturdy infantry who held their grip so long,

and honour also to the rough men of the veld, who, led by untrained

civilians, stretched us to the utmost capacity of our endurance.

It may be that the Boers wished once for all to have done at all costs

with the constant menace to their rear, or it may be that the deliberate

preparations of Buller for his second advance had alarmed them, and that

they realised that they must act quickly if they were to act at all.

At any rate, early in the New Year a most determined attack was decided

upon. The storming party consisted of some hundreds of picked volunteers

from the Heidelberg (Transvaal) and Harrismith (Free State) contingents,

led by de Villiers. They were supported by several thousand riflemen,

who might secure their success or cover their retreat. Eighteen heavy

guns had been trained upon the long ridge, one end of which has been

called Caesar's Camp and the other Waggon Hill. This hill, three miles

long, lay to the south of the town, and the Boers had early recognised

it as being the most vulnerable point, for it was against it that their

attack of November 9th had been directed. Now, after two months, they

were about to renew the attempt with greater resolution against less

robust opponents. At twelve o'clock our scouts heard the sounds of the

chanting of hymns in the Boer camps. At two in the morning crowds

of barefooted men were clustering round the base of the ridge, and

threading their way, rifle in hand, among the mimosa-bushes and

scattered boulders which cover the slope of the hill. Some working

parties were moving guns into position, and the noise of their labour

helped to drown the sound of the Boer advance. Both at Caesar's Camp,

the east end of the ridge, and at Waggon Hill, the west end (the points

being, I repeat, three miles apart), the attack came as a complete

surprise. The outposts were shot or driven in, and the stormers were

on the ridge almost as soon as their presence was detected. The line of

rocks blazed with the flash of their guns.

Caesar's Camp was garrisoned by one sturdy regiment, the Manchesters,

aided by a Colt automatic gun. The defence had been arranged in the form

of small sangars, each held by from ten to twenty men. Some few of these

were rushed in the darkness, but the Lancashire men pulled themselves

together and held on strenuously to those which remained. The crash

of musketry woke the sleeping town, and the streets resounded with the

shouting of the officers and the rattling of arms as the men mustered in

the darkness and hurried to the points of danger.

Three companies of the Gordons had been left near Caesar's Camp, and

these, under Captain Carnegie, threw themselves into the struggle. Four

other companies of Gordons came up in support from the town, losing

upon the way their splendid colonel, Dick-Cunyngham, who was killed by a

chance shot at three thousand yards, on this his first appearance since

he had recovered from his wounds at Elandslaagte. Later four companies

of the Rifle Brigade were thrown into the firing line, and a total of

two and a half infantry battalions held that end of the position. It was

not a man too much. With the dawn of day it could be seen that the Boers

held the southern and we the northern slopes, while the narrow plateau

between formed a bloody debatable ground. Along a front of a quarter of

a mile fierce eyes glared and rifle barrels flashed from behind every

rock, and the long fight swayed a little back or a little forward with

each upward heave of the stormers or rally of the soldiers. For hours

the combatants were so near that a stone or a taunt could be thrown from

one to the other. Some scattered sangars still held their own, though

the Boers had passed them. One such, manned by fourteen privates of the

Manchester Regiment, remained untaken, but had only two defenders left

at the end of the bloody day.

With the coming of the light the 53rd Field Battery, the one which had

already done so admirably at Lombard's Kop, again deserved well of its

country. It was impossible to get behind the Boers and fire straight at

their position, so every shell fired had to skim over the heads of

our own men upon the ridge and so pitch upon the reverse slope. Yet so

accurate was the fire, carried on under an incessant rain of shells

from the big Dutch gun on Bulwana, that not one shot miscarried and that

Major Abdy and his men succeeded in sweeping the further slope without

loss to our own fighting line. Exactly the same feat was equally well

performed at the other end of the position by Major Blewitt's 21st

Battery, which was exposed to an even more searching fire than the 53rd.

Any one who has seen the iron endurance of British gunners and marvelled

at the answering shot which flashes out through the very dust of the

enemy's exploding shell, will understand how fine must have been the

spectacle of these two batteries working in the open, with the ground

round them sharded with splinters. Eye-witnesses have left it upon

record that the sight of Major Blewitt strolling up and down among his

guns, and turning over with his toe the last fallen section of iron, was

one of the most vivid and stirring impressions which they carried from

the fight. Here also it was that the gallant Sergeant Bosley, his arm

and his leg stricken off by a Boer shell, cried to his comrades to roll

his body off the trail and go on working the gun.

At the same time as--or rather earlier than--the onslaught upon Caesar's

Camp a similar attack had been made with secrecy and determination upon

the western end of the position called Waggon Hill. The barefooted Boers

burst suddenly with a roll of rifle-fire into the little garrison of

Imperial Light Horse and Sappers who held the position. Mathias of the

former, Digby-Jones and Dennis of the latter, showed that 'two in

the morning' courage which Napoleon rated as the highest of military

virtues. They and their men were surprised but not disconcerted, and

stood desperately to a slogging match at the closest quarters. Seventeen

Sappers were down out of thirty, and more than half the little body of

irregulars. This end of the position was feebly fortified, and it is

surprising that so experienced and sound a soldier as Ian Hamilton

should have left it so. The defence had no marked advantage as compared

with the attack, neither trench, sangar, nor wire entanglement, and in

numbers they were immensely inferior. Two companies of the 60th Rifles

and a small body of the ubiquitous Gordons happened to be upon the hill

and threw themselves into the fray, but they were unable to turn the

tide. Of thirty-three Gordons under Lieutenant MacNaughten thirty were

wounded. [Footnote: The Gordons and the Sappers were there that morning

to re-escort one of Lambton's 4.7 guns, which was to be mounted there.

Ten seamen were with the gun, and lost three of their number in the

defence.] As our men retired under the shelter of the northern slope

they were reinforced by another hundred and fifty Gordons under the

stalwart Miller-Wallnutt, a man cast in the mould of a Berserk Viking.

To their aid also came two hundred of the Imperial Light Horse, burning

to assist their comrades. Another half-battalion of Rifles came with

them. At each end of the long ridge the situation at the dawn of day

was almost identical. In each the stormers had seized one side, but were

brought to a stand by the defenders upon the other, while the British

guns fired over the heads of their own infantry to rake the further

slope.

It was on the Waggon Hill side, however, that the Boer exertions were

most continuous and strenuous and our own resistance most desperate.

There fought the gallant de Villiers, while Ian Hamilton rallied the

defenders and led them in repeated rushes against the enemy's line.

Continually reinforced from below, the Boers fought with extraordinary

resolution. Never will any one who witnessed that Homeric contest

question the valour of our foes. It was a murderous business on both

sides. Edwardes of the Light Horse was struck down. In a gun-emplacement

a strange encounter took place at point-blank range between a group of

Boers and of Britons. De Villiers of the Free State shot Miller-Wallnut

dead, Ian Hamilton fired at de Villiers with his revolver and missed

him. Young Albrecht of the Light Horse shot de Villiers. A Boer named de

Jaeger shot Albrecht. Digby-Jones of the Sappers shot de Jaeger. Only a

few minutes later the gallant lad, who had already won fame enough for

a veteran, was himself mortally wounded, and Dennis, his comrade in arms

and in glory, fell by his side.

There has been no better fighting in our time than that upon Waggon Hill

on that January morning, and no better fighters than the Imperial Light

Horsemen who formed the centre of the defence. Here, as at Elandslaagte,

they proved themselves worthy to stand in line with the crack regiments

of the British army.

Through the long day the fight maintained its equilibrium along the

summit of the ridge, swaying a little that way or this, but never

amounting to a repulse of the stormers or to a rout of the defenders. So

intermixed were the combatants that a wounded man more than once found

himself a rest for the rifles of his enemies. One unfortunate soldier in

this position received six more bullets from his own comrades in their

efforts to reach the deadly rifleman behind him. At four o'clock a huge

bank of clouds which had towered upwards unheeded by the struggling men

burst suddenly into a terrific thunderstorm with vivid lightnings and

lashing rain. It is curious that the British victory at Elandslaagte

was heralded by just such another storm. Up on the bullet-swept hill

the long fringes of fighting men took no more heed of the elements than

would two bulldogs who have each other by the throat. Up the greasy

hillside, foul with mud and with blood, came the Boer reserves, and

up the northern slope came our own reserve, the Devon Regiment, fit

representatives of that virile county. Admirably led by Park, their

gallant Colonel, the Devons swept the Boers before them, and the Rifles,

Gordons, and Light Horse joined in the wild charge which finally cleared

the ridge.

But the end was not yet. The Boer had taken a risk over this venture,

and now he had to pay the stakes. Down the hill he passed, crouching,

darting, but the spruits behind him were turned into swirling streams,

and as he hesitated for an instant upon the brink the relentless sleet

of bullets came from behind. Many were swept away down the gorges and

into the Klip River, never again to be accounted for in the lists of

their field-cornet. The majority splashed through, found their horses

in their shelter, and galloped off across the great Bulwana Plain, as

fairly beaten in as fair a fight as ever brave men were yet.

The cheers of victory as the Devons swept the ridge had heartened the

weary men upon Caesar's Camp to a similar effort. Manchesters, Gordons,

and Rifles, aided by the fire of two batteries, cleared the long-debated

position. Wet, cold, weary, and without food for twenty-six hours, the

bedraggled Tommies stood yelling and waving, amid the litter of dead and

of dying.

It was a near thing. Had the ridge fallen the town must have followed,

and history perhaps have been changed. In the old stiff-rank Majuba days

we should have been swept in an hour from the position. But the wily man

behind the rock was now to find an equally wily man in front of him.

The soldier had at last learned something of the craft of the hunter. He

clung to his shelter, he dwelled on his aim, he ignored his dressings,

he laid aside the eighteenth-century traditions of his pigtailed

ancestor, and he hit the Boers harder than they had been hit yet. No

return may ever come to us of their losses on that occasion; 80 dead

bodies were returned to them from the ridge alone, while the slopes,

the dongas, and the river each had its own separate tale. No possible

estimate can make it less than three hundred killed and wounded, while

many place it at a much higher figure. Our own casualties were very

serious and the proportion of dead to wounded unusually high, owing to

the fact that the greater part of the wounds were necessarily of the

head. In killed we lost 13 officers, 135 men. In wounded 28 officers,

244 men--a total of 420, Lord Ava, the honoured Son of an honoured

father, the fiery Dick-Cunyngham, stalwart Miller-Wallnutt, the brave

boy sappers Digby-Jones and Dennis, Adams and Packman of the Light

Horse, the chivalrous Lafone--we had to mourn quality as well as

numbers. The grim test of the casualty returns shows that it was to the

Imperial Light Horse (ten officers down, and the regiment commanded by

a junior captain), the Manchesters, the Gordons, the Devons, and the 2nd

Rifle Brigade that the honours of the day are due.

In the course of the day two attacks had been made upon other points

of the British position, the one on Observation Hill on the north, the

other on the Helpmakaar position on the east. Of these the latter was

never pushed home and was an obvious feint, but in the case of the other

it was not until Schutte, their commander, and forty or fifty men had

been killed and wounded, that the stormers abandoned their attempt. At

every point the assailants found the same scattered but impenetrable

fringe of riflemen, and the same energetic batteries waiting for them.

Throughout the Empire the course of this great struggle was watched with

the keenest solicitude and with all that painful emotion which springs

from impotent sympathy. By heliogram to Buller, and so to the farthest

ends of that great body whose nerves are the telegraphic wires, there

came the announcement of the attack. Then after an interval of hours

came 'everywhere repulsed, but fighting continues.' Then, 'Attack

continues. Enemy reinforced from the south.' Then 'Attack renewed. Very

hard pressed.' There the messages ended for the day, leaving the

Empire black with apprehension. The darkest forecasts and most dreary

anticipations were indulged by the most temperate and best-informed

London papers. For the first time the very suggestion that the campaign

might be above our strength was made to the public. And then at last

there came the official news of the repulse of the assault. Far away

at Ladysmith, the weary men and their sorely tried officers gathered to

return thanks to God for His manifold mercies, but in London also hearts

were stricken solemn by the greatness of the crisis, and lips long

unused to prayer joined in the devotions of the absent warriors.

The Great Boer War · 第 13 / 39 章