Two serious defeats had within the week been inflicted upon the British
forces in South Africa. Cronje, lurking behind his trenches and his
barbed wire entanglements barred Methuen's road to Kimberley, while
in the northern part of Cape Colony Gatacre's wearied troops had been
defeated and driven by a force which consisted largely of British
subjects. But the public at home steeled their hearts and fixed their
eyes steadily upon Natal. There was their senior General and there the
main body of their troops. As brigade after brigade and battery after
battery touched at Cape Town, and were sent on instantly to Durban, it
was evident that it was in this quarter that the supreme effort was
to be made, and that there the light might at last break. In club, and
dining room, and railway car--wherever men met and talked--the same
words might be heard: 'Wait until Buller moves.' The hopes of a great
empire lay in the phrase.
It was upon October 30th that Sir George White had been thrust back into
Ladysmith. On November 2nd telegraphic communication with the town was
interrupted. On November 3rd the railway line was cut. On November 10th
the Boers held Colenso and the line of the Tugela. On the 14th was the
affair of the armoured train. On the 18th the enemy were near Estcourt.
On the 21st they had reached the Mooi River. On the 23rd Hildyard
attacked them at Willow Grange. All these actions will be treated
elsewhere. This last one marks the turn of the tide. From then onwards
Sir Redvers Buller was massing his troops at Chieveley in preparation
for a great effort to cross the river and to relieve Ladysmith, the guns
of which, calling from behind the line of northern hills, told their
constant tale of restless attack and stubborn defence.
But the task was as severe a one as the most fighting General could ask
for. On the southern side the banks formed a long slope which could be
shaved as with a razor by the rifle fire of the enemy. How to advance
across that broad open zone was indeed a problem. It was one of many
occasions in this war in which one wondered why, if a bullet-proof
shield capable of sheltering a lying man could be constructed, a trial
should not be given to it. Alternate rushes of companies with a safe
rest after each rush would save the troops from the continued tension of
that deadly never ending fire. However, it is idle to discuss what
might have been done to mitigate their trials. The open ground had to
be passed, and then they came to--not the enemy, but a broad and deep
river, with a single bridge, probably undermined, and a single ford,
which was found not to exist in practice. Beyond the river was tier
after tier of hills, crowned with stone walls and seamed with trenches,
defended by thousands of the best marksmen in the world, supported by
an admirable artillery. If, in spite of the advance over the open and
in spite of the passage of the river, a ridge could still be carried, it
was only to be commanded by the next; and so, one behind the other,
like the billows of the ocean, a series of hills and hollows rolled
northwards to Ladysmith. All attacks must be in the open. All defence
was from under cover. Add to this, that the young and energetic Louis
Botha was in command of the Boers. It was a desperate task, and yet
honour forbade that the garrison should be left to its fate. The venture
must be made.
The most obvious criticism upon the operation is that if the attack
must be made it should not be made under the enemy's conditions. We
seem almost to have gone out of our way to make every obstacle--the
glacislike approach, the river, the trenches--as difficult as possible.
Future operations were to prove that it was not so difficult to deceive
Boer vigilance and by rapid movements to cross the Tugela. A military
authority has stated, I know not with what truth, that there is no
instance in history of a determined army being stopped by the line of
a river, and from Wellington at the Douro to the Russians on the Danube
many examples of the ease with which they may be passed will occur to
the reader. But Buller had some exceptional difficulties with which to
contend. He was weak in mounted troops, and was opposed to an enemy of
exceptional mobility who might attack his flank and rear if he exposed
them. He had not that great preponderance of numbers which came to him
later, and which enabled him to attempt a wide turning movement. One
advantage he had, the possession of a more powerful artillery, but his
heaviest guns were naturally his least mobile, and the more direct his
advance the more effective would his guns be. For these or other reasons
he determined upon a frontal attack on the formidable Boer position, and
he moved out of Chieveley Camp for that purpose at daybreak on Friday,
December 15th.
The force which General Buller led into action was the finest which any
British general had handled since the battle of the Alma. Of infantry
he had four strong brigades: the 2nd (Hildyard's) consisting of the 2nd
Devons, the 2nd Queen's or West Surrey, the 2nd West Yorkshire, and
the 2nd East Surrey; the 4th Brigade (Lyttelton's) comprising the 2nd
Cameronians, the 3rd Rifles, the 1st Durhams, and the 1st Rifle Brigade;
the 5th Brigade (Hart's) with the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 1st
Connaught Rangers, 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, and the Border Regiment, this
last taking the place of the 2nd Irish Rifles, who were with Gatacre.
There remained the 6th Brigade (Barton's), which included the 2nd Royal
Fusiliers, the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, the 1st Welsh Fusiliers, and the 2nd
Irish Fusiliers--in all about 16,000 infantry. The mounted men, who were
commanded by Lord Dundonald, included the 13th Hussars, the 1st Royals,
Bethune's Mounted Infantry, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, three
squadrons of South African Horse, with a composite regiment formed from
the mounted infantry of the Rifles and of the Dublin Fusiliers with
squadrons of the Natal Carabineers and the Imperial Light Horse. These
irregular troops of horse might be criticised by martinets and pedants,
but they contained some of the finest fighting material in the army,
some urged on by personal hatred of the Boers and some by mere lust of
adventure. As an example of the latter one squadron of the South African
Horse was composed almost entirely of Texan muleteers, who, having come
over with their animals, had been drawn by their own gallant spirit into
the fighting line of their kinsmen.
Cavalry was General Buller's weakest arm, but his artillery was strong
both in its quality and its number of guns. There were five batteries
(30 guns) of the Field Artillery, the 7th, 14th, 63rd, 64th, and 66th.
Besides these there were no fewer than sixteen naval guns from H.M.S.
'Terrible'--fourteen of which were 12-pounders, and the other two of
the 4.7 type which had done such good service both at Ladysmith and with
Methuen. The whole force which moved out from Chieveley Camp numbered
about 21,000 men.
The work which was allotted to the army was simple in conception,
however terrible it might prove in execution. There were two points at
which the river might be crossed, one three miles off on the left, named
Bridle Drift, the other straight ahead at the Bridge of Colenso. The 5th
or Irish Brigade was to endeavour to cross at Bridle Drift, and then
to work down the river bank on the far side so as to support the 2nd or
English Brigade,--which was to cross at Colenso. The 4th Brigade was
to advance between these, so as to help either which should be in
difficulties. Meanwhile on the extreme right the mounted troops under
Dundonald were to cover the flank and to attack Hlangwane Hill, a
formidable position held strongly by the enemy upon the south bank of
the Tugela. The remaining Fusilier brigade of infantry was to support
this movement on the right. The guns were to cover the various attacks,
and if possible gain a position from which the trenches might be
enfiladed. This, simply stated, was the work which lay before the
British army. In the bright clear morning sunshine, under a cloudless
blue sky, they advanced with high hopes to the assault. Before them lay
the long level plain, then the curve of the river, and beyond, silent
and serene, like some peaceful dream landscape, stretched the lines and
lines of gently curving hills. It was just five o'clock in the morning
when the naval guns began to bay, and huge red dustclouds from the
distant foothills showed where the lyddite was bursting. No answer came
back, nor was there any movement upon the sunlit hills. It was
almost brutal, this furious violence to so gentle and unresponsive a
countryside. In no place could the keenest eye detect a sign of guns or
men, and yet death lurked in every hollow and crouched by every rock.
It is so difficult to make a modern battle intelligible when fought, as
this was, over a front of seven or eight miles, that it is best perhaps
to take the doings of each column in turn, beginning with the left
flank, where Hart's Irish Brigade had advanced to the assault of Bridle
Drift.
Under an unanswered and therefore an unaimed fire from the heavy guns
the Irish infantry moved forward upon the points which they had
been ordered to attack. The Dublins led, then the Connaughts, the
Inniskillings, and the Borderers. Incredible as it may appear after the
recent experiences of Magersfontein and of Stormberg, the men in the two
rear regiments appear to have been advanced in quarter column, and not
to have deployed until after the enemy's fire had opened. Had shrapnel
struck this close formation, as it was within an ace of doing, the loss
of life must have been as severe as it was unnecessary.
On approaching the Drift--the position or even the existence of which
does not seem to have been very clearly defined--it was found that the
troops had to advance into a loop formed by the river, so that they were
exposed to a very heavy cross-fire upon their right flank, while they
were rained on by shrapnel from in front. No sign of the enemy could be
seen, though the men were dropping fast. It is a weird and soul-shaking
experience to advance over a sunlit and apparently a lonely countryside,
with no slightest movement upon its broad face, while the path which
you take is marked behind you by sobbing, gasping, writhing men, who can
only guess by the position of their wounds whence the shots came which
struck them down. All round, like the hissing of fat in the pan, is the
monotonous crackle and rattle of the Mausers; but the air is full of
it, and no one can define exactly whence it comes. Far away on some
hill upon the skyline there hangs the least gauzy veil of thin smoke to
indicate whence the six men who have just all fallen together, as if it
were some grim drill, met their death. Into such a hell-storm as this
it was that the soldiers have again and again advanced in the course
of this war, but it may be questioned whether they will not prove to be
among the last of mortals to be asked to endure such an ordeal. Other
methods of attack must be found or attacks must be abandoned, for
smokeless powder, quick-firing guns, and modern rifles make it all odds
on the defence!
The gallant Irishmen pushed on, flushed with battle and careless for
their losses, the four regiments clubbed into one, with all military
organisation rapidly disappearing, and nothing left but their gallant
spirit and their furious desire to come to hand-grips with the enemy.
Rolling on in a broad wave of shouting angry men, they never winced
from the fire until they had swept up to the bank of the river. Northern
Inniskilling and Southern man of Connaught, orange and green, Protestant
and Catholic, Celt and Saxon, their only rivalry now was who could
shed his blood most freely for the common cause. How hateful seem those
provincial politics and narrow sectarian creeds which can hold such men
apart!
The bank of the river had been gained, but where was the ford? The
water swept broad and unruffled in front of them, with no indication
of shallows. A few dashing fellows sprang in, but their cartridges and
rifles dragged them to the bottom. One or two may even have struggled
through to the further side, but on this there is a conflict of
evidence. It may be, though it seems incredible, that the river had been
partly dammed to deepen the Drift, or, as is more probable, that in the
rapid advance and attack the position of the Drift was lost. However
this may be, the troops could find no ford, and they lay down, as had
been done in so many previous actions, unwilling to retreat and unable
to advance, with the same merciless pelting from front and flank. In
every fold and behind every anthill the Irishmen lay thick and
waited for better times. There are many instances of their cheery and
uncomplaining humour. Colonel Brooke, of the Connaughts, fell at the
head of his men. Private Livingstone helped to carry him into safety,
and then, his task done, he confessed to having 'a bit of a rap meself,'
and sank fainting with a bullet through his throat. Another sat with a
bullet through both legs. 'Bring me a tin whistle and I'll blow ye any
tune ye like,' he cried, mindful of the Dargai piper. Another with his
arm hanging by a tendon puffed morosely at his short black pipe. Every
now and then, in face of the impossible, the fiery Celtic valour flamed
furiously upwards. 'Fix bayonets, men, and let us make a name for
ourselves,' cried a colour sergeant, and he never spoke again. For five
hours, under the tropical sun, the grimy parched men held on to the
ground they had occupied. British shells pitched short and fell among
them. A regiment in support fired at them, not knowing that any of the
line were so far advanced. Shot at from the front, the flank, and the
rear, the 5th Brigade held grimly on.
But fortunately their orders to retire were at hand, and it is certain
that had they not reached them the regiments would have been uselessly
destroyed where they lay. It seems to have been Buller himself, who
showed extraordinary and ubiquitous personal energy during the day, that
ordered them to fall back. As they retreated there was an entire absence
of haste and panic, but officers and men were hopelessly jumbled up, and
General Hart--whose judgment may occasionally be questioned, but whose
cool courage was beyond praise--had hard work to reform the splendid
brigade which six hours before had tramped out of Chieveley Camp.
Between five and six hundred of them had fallen--a loss which
approximates to that of the Highland Brigade at Magersfontein. The
Dublins and the Connaughts were the heaviest sufferers.
So much for the mishap of the 5th Brigade. It is superfluous to point
out that the same old omissions were responsible for the same old
results. Why were the men in quarter column when advancing against an
unseen foe? Why had no scouts gone forward to be certain of the position
of the ford? Where were the clouds of skirmishers which should precede
such an advance? The recent examples in the field and the teachings of
the text-books were equally set at naught, as they had been, and were
to be, so often in this campaign. There may be a science of war in the
lecture-rooms at Camberley, but very little of it found its way to
the veld. The slogging valour of the private, the careless dash of the
regimental officer--these were our military assets--but seldom the care
and foresight of our commanders. It is a thankless task to make such
comments, but the one great lesson of the war has been that the army is
too vital a thing to fall into the hands of a caste, and that it is
a national duty for every man to speak fearlessly and freely what he
believes to be the truth.
Passing from the misadventure of the 5th Brigade we come as we move from
left to right upon the 4th, or Lyttelton's Brigade, which was instructed
not to attack itself but to support the attack on either side of it.
With the help of the naval guns it did what it could to extricate and
cover the retreat of the Irishmen, but it could play no very important
part in the action, and its losses were insignificant. On its right in
turn Hildyard's English Brigade had developed its attack upon Colenso
and the bridge. The regiments under Hildyard's lead were the 2nd West
Surrey, the 2nd Devons (whose first battalion was doing so well with the
Ladysmith force), the East Surreys, and the West Yorkshires. The enemy
had evidently anticipated the main attack on this position, and not only
were the trenches upon the other side exceptionally strong, but their
artillery converged upon the bridge, at least a dozen heavy pieces,
besides a number of quick-firers, bearing upon it. The Devons and the
Queens, in open order (an extended line of khaki dots, blending so
admirably with the plain that they were hardly visible when they
halted), led the attack, being supported by the East Surrey and the West
Yorkshires. Advancing under a very heavy fire the brigade experienced
much the same ordeal as their comrades of Hart's brigade, which was
mitigated by the fact that from the first they preserved their open
order in columns of half-companies extended to six paces, and that the
river in front of them did not permit that right flank fire which was so
fatal to the Irishmen. With a loss of some two hundred men the leading
regiments succeeded in reaching Colenso, and the West Surrey, advancing
by rushes of fifty yards at a time, had established itself in the
station, but a catastrophe had occurred at an earlier hour to the
artillery which was supporting it which rendered all further advance
impossible. For the reason of this we must follow the fortunes of the
next unit upon their right.
This consisted of the important body of artillery who had been told off
to support the main attack. It comprised two field batteries, the 14th
and the 66th, under the command of Colonel Long, and six naval guns (two
of 4.7, and four 12-pounders) under Lieutenant Ogilvy of the 'Terrible.'
Long has the record of being a most zealous and dashing officer, whose
handling of the Egyptian artillery at the battle of the Atbara had much
to do with the success of the action. Unfortunately, these barbarian
campaigns, in which liberties may be taken with impunity, leave an evil
tradition, as the French have found with their Algerians. Our own close
formations, our adherence to volley firing, and in this instance the
use of our artillery all seem to be legacies of our savage wars. Be the
cause what it may, at an early stage of the action Long's guns whirled
forwards, outstripped the infantry brigades upon their flanks, left the
slow-moving naval guns with their ox-teams behind them, and unlimbered
within a thousand yards of the enemy's trenches. From this position he
opened fire upon Fort Wylie, which was the centre of that portion of the
Boer position which faced him.
But his two unhappy batteries were destined not to turn the tide of
battle, as he had hoped, but rather to furnish the classic example
of the helplessness of artillery against modern rifle fire. Not even
Mercer's famous description of the effect of a flank fire upon his troop
of horse artillery at Waterloo could do justice to the blizzard of lead
which broke over the two doomed batteries. The teams fell in heaps, some
dead, some mutilated, and mutilating others in their frantic struggles.
One driver, crazed with horror, sprang on a leader, cut the traces and
tore madly off the field. But a perfect discipline reigned among the
vast majority of the gunners, and the words of command and the laying
and working of the guns were all as methodical as at Okehampton. Not
only was there a most deadly rifle fire, partly from the lines in front
and partly from the village of Colenso upon their left flank, but the
Boer automatic quick-firers found the range to a nicety, and the little
shells were crackling and banging continually over the batteries.
Already every gun had its litter of dead around it, but each was still
fringed by its own group of furious officers and sweating desperate
gunners. Poor Long was down, with a bullet through his arm and another
through his liver. 'Abandon be damned! We don't abandon guns!' was his
last cry as they dragged him into the shelter of a little donga hard by.
Captain Goldie dropped dead. So did Lieutenant Schreiber. Colonel Hunt
fell, shot in two places. Officers and men were falling fast. The guns
could not be worked, and yet they could not be removed, for every effort
to bring up teams from the shelter where the limbers lay ended in the
death of the horses. The survivors took refuge from the murderous fire
in that small hollow to which Long had been carried, a hundred yards
or so from the line of bullet-splashed cannon. One gun on the right was
still served by four men who refused to leave it. They seemed to bear
charmed lives, these four, as they strained and wrestled with their
beloved 15-pounder, amid the spurting sand and the blue wreaths of the
bursting shells. Then one gasped and fell against the trail, and his
comrade sank beside the wheel with his chin upon his breast. The
third threw up his hands and pitched forward upon his face; while the
survivor, a grim powder-stained figure, stood at attention looking death
in the eyes until he too was struck down. A useless sacrifice, you may
say; but while the men who saw them die can tell such a story round the
camp fire the example of such deaths as these does more than clang of
bugle or roll of drum to stir the warrior spirit of our race.
For two hours the little knot of heart-sick humiliated officers and
men lay in the precarious shelter of the donga and looked out at the
bullet-swept plain and the line of silent guns. Many of them were
wounded. Their chief lay among them, still calling out in his delirium
for his guns. They had been joined by the gallant Baptie, a brave
surgeon, who rode across to the donga amid a murderous fire, and did
what he could for the injured men. Now and then a rush was made into the
open, sometimes in the hope of firing another round, sometimes to bring
a wounded comrade in from the pitiless pelt of the bullets. How fearful
was that lead-storm may be gathered from the fact that one gunner was
found with sixty-four wounds in his body. Several men dropped in these
sorties, and the disheartened survivors settled down once more in the
donga.
The hope to which they clung was that their guns were not really lost,
but that the arrival of infantry would enable them to work them once
more. Infantry did at last arrive, but in such small numbers that it
made the situation more difficult instead of easing it. Colonel Bullock
had brought up two companies of the Devons to join the two companies (A
and B) of Scots Fusiliers who had been the original escort of the guns,
but such a handful could not turn the tide. They also took refuge in the
donga, and waited for better times.
In the meanwhile the attention of Generals Buller and Clery had been
called to the desperate position of the guns, and they had made their
way to that further nullah in the rear where the remaining limber horses
and drivers were. This was some distance behind that other donga in
which Long, Bullock, and their Devons and gunners were crouching. 'Will
any of you volunteer to save the guns?' cried Buller. Corporal Nurse,
Gunner Young, and a few others responded. The desperate venture was
led by three aides-de-camp of the Generals, Congreve, Schofield, and
Roberts, the only son of the famous soldier. Two gun teams were taken
down; the horses galloping frantically through an infernal fire,
and each team succeeded in getting back with a gun. But the loss was
fearful. Roberts was mortally wounded. Congreve has left an account
which shows what a modern rifle fire at a thousand yards is like. 'My
first bullet went through my left sleeve and made the joint of my elbow
bleed, next a clod of earth caught me smack on the right arm, then my
horse got one, then my right leg one, then my horse another, and
that settled us.' The gallant fellow managed to crawl to the group of
castaways in the donga. Roberts insisted on being left where he fell,
for fear he should hamper the others.
In the meanwhile Captain Reed, of the 7th Battery, had arrived with two
spare teams of horses, and another determined effort was made under his
leadership to save some of the guns. But the fire was too murderous.
Two-thirds of his horses and half his men, including himself, were
struck down, and General Buller commanded that all further attempts to
reach the abandoned batteries should be given up. Both he and General
Clery had been slightly wounded, and there were many operations over
the whole field of action to engage their attention. But making every
allowance for the pressure of many duties and for the confusion and
turmoil of a great action, it does seem one of the most inexplicable
incidents in British military history that the guns should ever have
been permitted to fall into the hands of the enemy. It is evident that
if our gunners could not live under the fire of the enemy it would be
equally impossible for the enemy to remove the guns under a fire from
a couple of battalions of our infantry. There were many regiments which
had hardly been engaged, and which could have been advanced for such a
purpose. The men of the Mounted Infantry actually volunteered for this
work, and none could have been more capable of carrying it out. There
was plenty of time also, for the guns were abandoned about eleven and
the Boers did not venture to seize them until four. Not only could
the guns have been saved, but they might, one would think, have been
transformed into an excellent bait for a trap to tempt the Boers out of
their trenches. It must have been with fear and trembling that Cherry
Emmett and his men first approached them, for how could they believe
that such incredible good fortune had come to them? However, the fact,
humiliating and inexplicable, is that the guns were so left, that the
whole force was withdrawn, and that not only the ten cannon, but also
the handful of Devons, with their Colonel, and the Fusiliers were taken
prisoners in the donga which had sheltered them all day.
We have now, working from left to right, considered the operations of
Hart's Brigade at Bridle Drift, of Lyttelton's Brigade in support, of
Hildyard's which attacked Colenso, and of the luckless batteries which
were to have helped him. There remain two bodies of troops upon the
right, the further consisting of Dundonald's mounted men who were to
attack Hlangwane Hill, a fortified Boer position upon the south of the
river, while Barton's Brigade was to support it and to connect this
attack with the central operations.
Dundonald's force was entirely too weak for such an operation as the
capture of the formidable entrenched hill, and it is probable that the
movement was meant rather as a reconnaissance than as an assault. He had
not more than a thousand men in all, mostly irregulars, and the position
which faced him was precipitous and entrenched, with barbed-wire
entanglements and automatic guns. But the gallant colonials were out
on their first action, and their fiery courage pushed the attack home.
Leaving their horses, they advanced a mile and a half on foot before
they came within easy range of the hidden riflemen, and learned the
lesson which had been taught to their comrades all along the line, that
given approximately equal numbers the attack in the open has no possible
chance against the concealed defence, and that the more bravely it is
pushed the more heavy is the repulse. The irregulars carried themselves
like old soldiers, they did all that mortal man could do, and they
retired coolly and slowly with the loss of 130 of the brave troopers.
The 7th Field Battery did all that was possible to support the advance
and cover the retirement. In no single place, on this day of disaster,
did one least gleam of success come to warm the hearts and reward the
exertions of our much-enduring men.
Of Barton's Brigade there is nothing to be recorded, for they appear
neither to have supported the attack upon Hlangwane Hill on the one side
nor to have helped to cover the ill-fated guns on the other. Barton
was applied to for help by Dundonald, but refused to detach any of his
troops. If General Buller's real idea was a reconnaissance in force in
order to determine the position and strength of the Boer lines, then
of course his brigadiers must have felt a reluctance to entangle their
brigades in a battle which was really the result of a misunderstanding.
On the other hand, if, as the orders of the day seem to show, a serious
engagement was always intended, it is strange that two brigades out of
four should have played so insignificant a part. To Barton's Brigade
was given the responsibility of seeing that no right flank attack was
carried out by the Boers, and this held it back until it was clear that
no such attack was contemplated. After that one would have thought that,
had the situation been appreciated, at least two battalions might have
been spared to cover the abandoned guns with their rifle fire. Two
companies of the Scots Fusiliers did share the fortunes of the guns.
Two others, and one of the Irish Fusiliers, acted in support, but the
brigade as a whole, together with the 1st Royals and the 13th Hussars,
might as well have been at Aldershot for any bearing which their work
had upon the fortunes of the day.
And so the first attempt at the relief of Ladysmith came to an end. At
twelve o'clock all the troops upon the ground were retreating for
the camp. There was nothing in the shape of rout or panic, and the
withdrawal was as orderly as the advance; but the fact remained that
we had just 1200 men in killed, wounded, and missing, and had gained
absolutely nothing. We had not even the satisfaction of knowing that
we had inflicted as well as endured punishment, for the enemy remained
throughout the day so cleverly concealed that it is doubtful whether
more than a hundred casualties occurred in their ranks. Once more it was
shown how weak an arm is artillery against an enemy who lies in shelter.
Our wounded fortunately bore a high proportion to our killed, as they
always will do when it is rifle fire rather than shell fire which is
effective. Roughly we had 150 killed and about 720 wounded. A more
humiliating item is the 250 or so who were missing. These men were the
gunners, the Devons, and the Scots Fusiliers, who were taken in the
donga together with small bodies from the Connaughts, the Dublins, and
other regiments who, having found some shelter, were unable to leave
it, and clung on until the retirement of their regiments left them in
a hopeless position. Some of these small knots of men were allowed to
retire in the evening by the Boers, who seemed by no means anxious
to increase the number of their prisoners. Colonel Thackeray, of
the Inniskilling Fusiliers, found himself with a handful of his men
surrounded by the enemy, but owing to their good humour and his own tact
he succeeded in withdrawing them in safety. The losses fell chiefly on
Hart's Brigade, Hildyard's Brigade, and the colonial irregulars, who
bore off the honours of the fight.
In his official report General Buller states that were it not for the
action of Colonel Long and the subsequent disaster to the artillery he
thought that the battle might have been a successful one. This is a hard
saying, and throws perhaps too much responsibility upon the gallant but
unfortunate gunner. There have been occasions in the war when greater
dash upon the part of our artillery might have changed the fate of the
day, and it is bad policy to be too severe upon the man who has taken
a risk and failed. The whole operation, with its advance over the open
against a concealed enemy with a river in his front, was so absolutely
desperate that Long may have seen that only desperate measures could
save the situation. To bring guns into action in front of the infantry
without having clearly defined the position of the opposing infantry
must always remain one of the most hazardous ventures of war. 'It would
certainly be mere folly,' says Prince Kraft, 'to advance artillery to
within 600 or 800 yards of a position held by infantry unless the latter
were under the fire of infantry from an even shorter range.' This 'mere
folly' is exactly what Colonel Long did, but it must be remembered in
extenuation that he shared with others the idea that the Boers were up
on the hills, and had no inkling that their front trenches were down at
the river. With the imperfect means at his disposal he did such scouting
as he could, and if his fiery and impetuous spirit led him into a
position which cost him so dearly it is certainly more easy for the
critic to extenuate his fault than that subsequent one which allowed
the abandoned guns to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nor is there any
evidence that the loss of these guns did seriously affect the fate of
the action, for at those other parts of the field where the infantry had
the full and unceasing support of the artillery the result was not more
favourable than at the centre.
So much for Colenso. A more unsatisfactory and in some ways inexplicable
action is not to be found in the range of British military history.
And the fuller the light which has been poured upon it, the more
extraordinary does the battle appear. There are a preface and a sequel
to the action which have put a severe strain upon the charity which
the British public has always shown that it is prepared to extend to
a defeated General. The preface is that General Buller sent word to
General White that he proposed to attack upon the 17th, while the
actual attack was delivered upon the 15th, so that the garrison was
not prepared to make that demonstration which might have prevented the
besiegers from sending important reinforcements to Botha, had he needed
them. The sequel is more serious. Losing all heart at his defeat,
General Buller, although he had been officially informed that White had
provisions for seventy days, sent a heliogram advising the surrender
of the garrison. White's first reply, which deserves to live with the
anecdote of Nelson's telescope at his blind eye, was to the effect that
he believed the enemy had been tampering with Buller's messages. To
this Buller despatched an amended message, which with Sir George White's
reply, is here appended:
Message of December 16th, as altered by that of December 17th, 1899.
'I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed; the enemy is too strong for my
force except with siege operations, and these will take one full month
to prepare. Can you last so long?
'How many days can you hold out? I suggest you firing away as much
ammunition as you can, and making best terms you can. I can remain here
if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in. I
find my infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp, and then
only if water can be got, and it is scarce here. Whatever happens,
recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code books, and all
deciphered messages.'
From Sir G. White to Sir R. Buller. December 16th, 1899.
'Yours of today received and understood. My suggestion is that you take
up strongest available position that will enable you to keep touch of
the enemy and harass him constantly with artillery fire, and in other
ways as much as possible. I can make food last for much longer than a
month, and will not think of making terms till I am forced to. You may
have hit enemy harder than you think. All our native spies report that
your artillery fire made considerable impression on enemy. Have your
losses been very heavy? If you lose touch of enemy, it will immensely
increase his opportunities of crushing me, and have worst effect
elsewhere. While you are in touch with him and in communication with
me, he has both of our forces to reckon with. Make every effort to get
reinforcements as early as possible, including India, and enlist every
man in both colonies who will serve and can ride. Things may look
brighter. The loss of 12,000 men here would be a heavy blow to England.
We must not yet think of it. I fear I could not cut my way to you.
Enteric fever is increasing alarmingly here. There are now 180 cases,
all within last month. Answer fully. I am keeping everything secret for
the present till I know your plans.'
Much allowance is to be made for a man who is staggering under the
mental shock of defeat and the physical exertions which Buller had
endured. That the Government made such allowance is clear from the fact
that he was not instantly recalled. And yet the cold facts are that we
have a British General, at the head of 25,000 men, recommending another
General, at the head of 12,000 men only twelve miles off, to lay down
his arms to an army which was certainly very inferior in numbers to
the total British force; and this because he had once been defeated,
although he knew that there was still time for the whole resources of
the Empire to be poured into Natal in order to prevent so shocking a
disaster. Such is a plain statement of the advice which Buller gave and
which White rejected. For the instant the fate not only of South Africa
but even, as I believe, of the Empire hung upon the decision of the old
soldier in Ladysmith, who had to resist the proposals of his own General
as sternly as the attacks of the enemy. He who sorely needed help
and encouragement became, as his message shows, the helper and the
encourager. It was a tremendous test, and Sir George White came through
it with a staunchness and a loyalty which saved us not only from
overwhelming present disaster, but from a hideous memory which must have
haunted British military annals for centuries to come.