CHAPTER IV.

MARENGO.[8]

Anxiously Bonaparte at Paris awaited the success of the Army of the

Rhine. Matters were urgent and time was precious, for Masséna could

hold out but a few days longer at Genoa. Until the French should be

victorious in Germany, the First Consul could not expect Moreau to send

a detachment across Switzerland into Italy. As soon as word should be

brought that this re-enforcement was on its way, Bonaparte purposed

to lead the Army of Reserve across the Alps against Melas, who was

fighting the French so vigorously at Genoa and along the Var.

On the 6th of May Bonaparte left Paris to direct the operations of the

Army of Reserve. He had already assembled the several parts of that

army near Lake Geneva, and had collected vast supplies there, which

were to be used by the army in its march into Italy. On his arrival

at Dijon, he reviewed the few thousand conscripts and old soldiers

at that place. After this review, which was intended to confirm the

spies still further in their belief that the Army of Reserve was purely

imaginary, he proceeded to Geneva, and thence to Lausanne, at which

places the greater part of the army was assembled. On his arrival

there, Bonaparte began the final preparations for crossing the Alps. At

first, he thought of leading the Army of Reserve into Switzerland, in

order to unite it with Moncey's corps, which had been detached from the

Army of the Rhine, and thence march through the St. Gothard Pass into

Italy. He also considered the plan of marching into Switzerland, and

thence of descending into Italy by way of the Simplon Pass. But after

receiving the report of General Marescot, who had been sent to examine

the several passes of the Alps, he decided to conduct the greater part

of his forces over the Great St. Bernard Pass. By taking this route,

which was much the shortest, he could reach Milan earlier, and thus

gain the great advantage of time.

The plan of Bonaparte was to conduct thirty-five thousand men of the

Army of Reserve over this pass into Italy, and to send the remaining

five thousand over the Little St. Bernard Pass, which lies in the

Alps but a few miles south of the Great St. Bernard. At the same time

a small detachment was to proceed from Switzerland into Italy by way

of the Simplon Pass; and Thurreau's division of four thousand, which

formed the left of the Army of Italy, was to descend from the Mont

Cenis Pass and attack the Austrians in the vicinity of Turin. These

movements having been accomplished, Bonaparte intended to direct the

greater part of the Army of Reserve on Milan, where it was to unite

with Moncey's corps, which was marching over the St. Gothard into

Italy. Should this part of the plan be successfully executed, Bonaparte

then purposed to march south with a strong force, cross the Po near

Placentia, and occupy the Stradella Pass. This pass, which is enclosed

on the north by the Po and on the south by the spurs that shoot

northward from the main chain of the Apennines, is a strong position on

the direct road between Alessandria and Mantua. While holding the pass,

Bonaparte expected to debouch westward therefrom against Melas, who, he

calculated, would advance eastward from Alessandria and meet him in the

plains of the Scrivia.

It is clear, from the histories of this campaign, that the plan as here

set forth had not been determined on in all its details before the

movements began. In fact, until Bonaparte descended the eastern slope

of the Alps, he had not fully decided whether he would march directly

on Milan, or on Alessandria and the fortress of Tortona, in order thus

to bring relief more quickly to Masséna. Circumstances would then

determine the matter. But there is little doubt that before leaving

Paris he had mapped out in his own mind the essential features of the

plan as here set forth. Upon this point Bourrienne, in his "Memoirs of

Napoleon Bonaparte," writes as follows:--

"On the 17th of March, in a moment of gaiety and good humor, he

(Bonaparte) desired me to unroll Chauchard's great map of Italy. He

lay down upon it and desired me to do likewise. He then stuck into

it pins, the heads of which were tipped with wax, some red and some

black. I silently observed him, and awaited with no little curiosity

the result of this plan of campaign. When he had stationed the

enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins with the red heads on the points

where he hoped to bring his own troops, he said to me, 'Where do you

think I shall beat Melas?'--'How the devil should I know?'--'Why,

look here, you fool; Melas is at Alessandria with his headquarters.

There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has in Alessandria

his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, and his reserves.

Crossing the Alps here' (pointing to the Great Mont St. Bernard) 'I

shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with Austria, and

meet him here in the plains of the Scrivia' (placing a red pin at San

Giuliano). Finding that I looked on this manoeuvre of pins as mere

pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual compliments, such as

fool, ninny, etc., and then proceeded to demonstrate his plans more

clearly on the map."

The correspondence of Bonaparte at this time shows that he had a

full knowledge of the positions and condition of the Austrian forces

in Italy. From information sent him by Suchet, he learned that the

Austrian army was greatly scattered; that but a small portion of it was

occupying that part of northern Italy between the Po and Switzerland;

and that as yet General Melas did not believe in the existence of the

Army of Reserve. It was this knowledge which caused the First Consul

to believe that he could execute successfully this bold and hazardous

undertaking.

From Villeneuve, at the east end of Lake Geneva, the road across the

Alps into Italy passes through the towns of Martigny and Saint Pierre,

thence over the Great St. Bernard, through the village of Saint Remy,

into the valley of the Aosta, and thence it continues along the Dora

Baltea River, through the towns of Aosta, Châtillon, Bard, and Ivrea,

into the plains of Piedmont. Not far south of the Great St. Bernard

lies the Little St. Bernard Pass, which opens also into the valley of

the Aosta. In 1800 these two roads were much more difficult of passage

than they are at the present time. When Bonaparte crossed the Alps,

the road from Saint Pierre to Saint Remy was simply a bridle path

over which no vehicle could pass. Even now it would be a hazardous

undertaking to conduct a large army into Italy over the Great St.

Bernard. Crossing the Alps at an elevation of more than eight thousand

feet, the pass lies in a region of perpetual snow and ice, where the

glaciers, the shock of avalanches, and the frequent and blinding storms

make the passage of troops difficult and dangerous.

Having once reached the fertile valley of the Po, Bonaparte expected

to find food and forage there in abundance; but during the march from

Villeneuve to Ivrea it was necessary to provide supplies in advance

for the army. For this purpose he had collected them at Lake Geneva.

He now caused them to be distributed at different points along this

route. He also sent money to the monks in charge of the Great St.

Bernard Hospital, in order that they should purchase bread, cheese,

and wine for the soldiers. At Villeneuve, Martigny, Saint Pierre, and

Saint Remy, he established hospitals for the sick and injured. To

the foot of the defile at Saint Pierre he sent forward a company of

mechanics to dismount the guns and to divide the gun-carriages and

caissons into numbered parts for transportation on pack mules. The

ammunition too was carried in this way. But the cannon themselves could

not be thus transported. For this purpose sledges with rollers had

been made, but they were found to be of no use. Finally, the cannon

were enclosed within the trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose.

Thus protected, they were dragged across the Alps by the soldiers

themselves. A second company of mechanics was ordered to march with the

first division and to establish itself at Saint Remy, in order to put

together the carriages and caissons, to remount the pieces, and to make

the necessary repairs.

On the 14th of May Bonaparte was ready to begin the movement. The

Army of Reserve numbered forty thousand soldiers and forty cannon;

about four thousand were cavalry. Four corps of the army, numbering

thirty-five thousand men, commanded by Murat, Victor, Duhesme, and

Lannes, had taken position from Villeneuve to Saint Pierre. A fifth

corps, of five thousand men, commanded by Chabran, was in Savoy at the

foot of the Little St. Bernard Pass. Bonaparte himself was at Martigny,

at which place he issued the orders for the movement. He had sent

Berthier forward to receive the divisions on the Italian side of the

Alps.

On the 15th of May the movement began. Lannes crossed first. He began

his march from Saint Pierre at two o'clock in the morning, in order to

avoid as much as possible the danger from the avalanches, which are

less frequent in the cool of the day. He reached the summit safely, and

his soldiers were pleasantly surprised to find there the bread, cheese,

and wine which Bonaparte had provided for them. Lannes halted but a

moment at the Great St. Bernard Hospital; he then began the descent

and arrived at Saint Remy on the same day. He was followed in turn by

the corps in his rear. At the same time Chabran crossed the Little St.

Bernard Pass, and Thurreau began to advance over the Mont Cenis Pass.

The entire Army of Reserve crossed between the 15th and 20th of May.

During this famous passage of the Alps the soldiers were filled with

energy and enthusiasm. Though heavily laden, they themselves, by sheer

strength, dragged their cannon over the rough and slippery paths. No

exertion seemed to tire them. As they pressed on, all were gay and

cheerful. As they climbed the mountain side, their spirits rose. With

shouts and cheers and songs, they made that Alpine region ring. In

that cold, clear air they felt their blood quicken. They felt, too,

the energy, the enthusiasm, the magnetism, of their commander. They

not only hoped for, but they expected victory. Were they not imitating

the daring deeds of the great Hannibal? Were they not about to enter

that Italy where their comrades had fought so gloriously before? Were

they not commanded by the "Little Corporal," their idol, whose deeds

of desperate daring at the bridges of Lodi and Arcole had won their

everlasting admiration?

Thus the Army of Reserve crossed the Alps. By the 20th of May all

five corps had reached the valley of the Aosta. Owing to the careful

preparations made, there had been scarcely any accidents and no serious

delays during the passage. But the greatest difficulty was yet to be

met. Some distance down the valley of the Aosta, upon a perpendicular

rock commanding a narrow defile, Fort Bard had been constructed. Though

this fort was garrisoned by only two or three hundred Austrians, it

was impregnable and controlled the whole valley. After descending the

Great St. Bernard Pass, Lannes had pushed on down the valley, but was

stopped by the fire of the fort. At once he made an effort to capture

the place, but was repulsed. He soon saw that it could not be taken by

force. Though he gained the road that led past the fort, the deadly

fire of the Austrians prevented him from advancing. For a time it

seemed that this small but formidable fort would stop the progress of

the whole army. Lannes was greatly disturbed. He reported the matter

to Berthier, and Berthier sent at once a courier to inform Bonaparte

of the situation. The First Consul was still at Martigny, where he had

remained for the purpose of hastening forward all the artillery and

the rear divisions of the army. This news was a complete surprise to

Bonaparte. The effect which it produced upon him is thus described by

Thiers:--

"This announcement of an obstacle, considered insurmountable at

first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly,

and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing

in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that,

if one of the loftiest mountains of the globe had failed to arrest

his progress, a secondary rock could not be capable of vanquishing

his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be

taken by bold courage; if it could not be taken, it still could be

turned. Besides, if the infantry and cavalry could pass it, with but

a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivrea at the mouth of

the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns could follow them. And if

the heavy guns could not pass the obstacle which had arisen, and if,

in order to get any, those of the enemy had to be taken, the French

infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the Austrians and

take their cannon.

"Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a number

of Italian officers, and learning from them that many other roads led

from Aosta to the neighboring valleys, he wrote letter after letter

to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and

pointing out to him with wonderful precision what reconnoissances

should be made around the fort of Bard."

Having sent these instructions to Berthier and having seen the last

division well on its way, the First Consul hurried across the Alps

towards Fort Bard. Meanwhile a foot-path, leading along the mountain

side around the fort, was discovered by Lannes. By a few repairs the

path was soon rendered passable for the men and horses, but not for

the artillery. How to get the cannon past the fort was the question.

Finally, the following method was adopted. During a dark night the road

in front of the fort was strewn with manure and straw, and, to deaden

the sound of the artillery wheels, they were wrapped with tow and

straw; then the soldiers themselves quietly hauled the guns past the

fort. The stratagem succeeded; all the artillery was thus transported.

In this way the Army of Reserve surmounted this obstacle, which for a

time gave Bonaparte greater anxiety than the passage of the Great St.

Bernard itself.

At this time the lower valley of the Aosta was guarded by three

thousand Austrians under General Haddick. On the 20th of May Lannes

arrived at Ivrea, which was occupied by the enemy. He attacked the

Austrian garrison there, defeated it, and captured the place. Thence,

continuing his march towards Chivasso, he again attacked the Austrians

on the Chiusella, defeated them, drove them from position to position,

and finally, having forced them back towards Turin, captured Chivasso.

Meanwhile Bonaparte, having left Chabran's corps to blockade Fort Bard,

followed Lannes with the remainder of the army.

During these operations, General Thurreau descended the Mont Cenis

Pass and attacked General Kaim, who, with five thousand men, was at

Susa guarding the Mont Cenis route into Italy. Before the spirited

attacks of Thurreau, Kaim was obliged to abandon Susa and fall back to

Busseleno on the road to Turin.

On the 27th of May Bonaparte with the greater part of the Army of

Reserve was near Chivasso, Thurreau was at Susa, a French detachment,

under Bethencourt, was descending the Simplon Pass, and Moncey's corps

was struggling heroically towards Milan over the St. Gothard. Thus far

the plans of the First Consul had been successful. He had crossed the

Alps, forced his way past Fort Bard, and driven the enemy out of the

valley of the Aosta. Now, the thunder of his cannon could be heard on

the plains of Piedmont. But what of the Austrians! Where were they?

Where was Melas?

Still incredulous as to the existence of an army of reserve, Melas

was bending every energy to capture Genoa and to force the crossings

of the Var. In the engagements and battles with Masséna and Suchet,

the army of Melas, which originally numbered one hundred and twenty

thousand, had been reduced to one hundred thousand men. These troops

were greatly scattered. On the 13th of May they were thus stationed:

thirty thousand under General Ott were besieging Genoa; twenty-five

thousand under General Elsnitz were fighting Suchet along the Var;

ten thousand under General Vukassovich were watching the Italian

entrances of the St. Gothard and Simplon passes; three thousand,

commanded by General Haddick, were in the lower valley of the Aosta,

watching the St. Bernard passes; five thousand, commanded by General

Kaim, were occupying Susa at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass; and two

thousand were scattered along the Maritime Alps near the Tenda Pass.

In addition, six thousand were on their way from Tuscany to re-enforce

Melas; three thousand remained in Tuscany, and sixteen thousand more

occupied Alessandria, the fortresses of Tortona and Mantua, and various

other garrisons of northern Italy.

Such was the situation of the Austrians when, on the 21st of May,

Melas received information of the passage of French troops over the

Great St. Bernard. Immediately he collected ten thousand soldiers from

the Austrian forces in front of Suchet and in the vicinity of the Tenda

Pass, and marched on Turin. At first, he believed that the French

troops appearing in Italy were merely a detachment sent thither to

harass his rear; but at Coni, where he arrived on the 22d of May, he

learned to a certainty that Bonaparte himself was in Italy; that the

French soldiers were already issuing into the plains of Piedmont; and

that the First Consul had with him both cannon and cavalry. Melas was

surprised. He knew not what to do. Having been repeatedly informed by

his own spies, and even by the Aulic Council, that the Army of Reserve

was a mere fiction, he could now hardly bring himself to believe that

it was a reality. It might, after all, be but a large detachment; for

how could Bonaparte cross the Alps with an army? How could he pass Fort

Bard with cannon and cavalry? It must be remembered, too, that at this

time Melas had not learned that Moncey was marching on Milan. As yet,

therefore, he was not completely undeceived. He knew that a French

force was at the foot of the Mont Cenis Pass, and that French troops

were issuing from the valley of the Aosta into the plains of Piedmont;

but he did not know the number of the French forces nor did he know the

intentions of Bonaparte. Consequently he delayed issuing the orders

for the concentration of his scattered troops.

Having reached Turin with ten thousand men, Melas was joined by General

Haddick's command, which had been driven from the valley of the Aosta

by Lannes, and by General Kaim's division, which had been driven

from Susa by Thurreau. But this junction gave Melas only sixteen or

seventeen thousand Austrians to oppose the thirty-five thousand French

near Chivasso under Bonaparte.

At this time Melas expected the French to cross the Po and attack him

near Turin; but such was not the intention of Bonaparte. In order to

deceive Melas, the First Consul ordered Lannes to make preparations

as if the French intended to cross the Po at Chivasso, then to march

rapidly down the river, through Crescentino and Candia, on Pavia. At

the same time Bonaparte himself, with the corps of Victor, Duhesme, and

Murat, set out for Milan by way of Vercelli and Novara. On the 31st of

May Bonaparte arrived at the Ticino River. To oppose the passage of

the French, Vukassovich had collected a considerable force on the east

bank. Bonaparte crossed the river, attacked and defeated the Austrians,

thence, continuing his march eastward, entered Milan on the 2d of June.

Vukassovich, having left a garrison in the castle of Milan, fell back

behind the Adda. At Milan Bonaparte delayed several days to await

the arrival of Moncey's corps, the advance guard of which was just

beginning to appear in Italy. During the delay Bonaparte directed a

part of his forces on Brescia, Lodi, and Cremona. As a result of these

movements, Vukassovich retired behind the Mincio and sought safety

under the guns of Mantua. Bonaparte also directed Murat on Placentia in

order to seize the crossings of the Po there.

Meanwhile the detachment under Bethencourt, marching by way of the

Simplon Pass, had reached Arona at the lower end of Lake Maggiore.

On the 1st of June Fort Bard surrendered to Chabran. Having left a

garrison in this place, and one also in Ivrea, he then took up a

position with the remainder of his corps along the Po from Chivasso to

the Sesia River. From the Sesia to Pavia the corps of Lannes occupied

the line of the Po. On the 1st of June Lannes had captured this place,

and had seized the large magazines there, which contained provisions,

several pieces of artillery, and a number of pontoon boats.

Thus it will be seen that the French were in possession of the whole

of northern Italy lying between the Po and Switzerland. Looking south

from Milan, Bonaparte had in his front the line of the Po, which he

held from Chivasso to Cremona. Far away to his right was the Great St.

Bernard Pass, which he had just crossed, and which was now guarded by

the French garrisons of Fort Bard and Ivrea. To his left, at a distance

of eighty miles, was the Mincio, which formed on that side the dividing

line between the French and the Austrians; and in his rear were the

St. Gothard and Simplon passes, which offered him a safe retreat

into Switzerland in case he should meet with a reverse. Already,

within this territory, he had seized all the Austrian communications,

captured several Austrian garrisons, occupied several cities, and taken

possession of immense quantities of provisions and munitions of war.

Thus situated, Bonaparte was almost ready to strike the blow that

should decide the fate of Italy. In a few days he would cross the Po,

march through the Stradella Pass, and encounter Melas on the bloody

field of Marengo. The delay at Milan was but the lull before the

storm. While Bonaparte remained there, completing his arrangements

and awaiting the arrival of Moncey, Melas was beginning to appreciate

the situation, and, though still somewhat confused and undecided, was

destined shortly to make an heroic effort to save his army.

For several days after Melas reached Turin, he remained in doubt

as to the intentions of Bonaparte. In fact, he was deceived by the

preparations that Lannes had made to cross the Po at Chivasso. Again:

in descending the river towards Pavia, Lannes so masked the main part

of the Army of Reserve, that Melas did not immediately become aware of

the movement on Milan. But on the 29th of May he learned that Bonaparte

was marching on Milan; and, on the 31st, he learned that Moreau had

defeated Kray, and that Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St.

Gothard into Italy. At once he comprehended the vast plan of Bonaparte.

He saw that nothing could now prevent the Army of Reserve from uniting

with Moncey's corps; and that, with these combined forces, Bonaparte

would doubtless march south from Milan, cross the Po, and sever the

Austrian communications. Thus he saw himself being rapidly enclosed in

a net from which there would soon be little or no hope of escape. Being

now completely undeceived as to the intentions of Bonaparte, Melas had

no further cause for delay. He must concentrate his troops at once, in

order to break through the French forces rapidly closing in upon him.

He must, if possible, preserve his communications, and thus save his

army from capture or annihilation.

Accordingly, he determined to concentrate at Placentia and the

Stradella Pass all the available Austrian troops that were fighting

the French near Genoa. By this means he hoped to seize and hold

the crossings of the Po from Pavia to Cremona, and thus to retain

possession of the great highway leading from Alessandria through the

Stradella Pass to Mantua. He also determined to unite at Alessandria

all the available Austrian troops in Piedmont and along the Var. By

this means he expected to assemble there an army of at least thirty

thousand men, and thence to proceed eastward through the Stradella

Pass to Mantua. By following this plan, he hoped to make his escape

with the greater part of his army. Having once reached the Mincio, he

could unite his forces with those of Vukassovich; and, perhaps, in this

strong position, flanked on one side by Lake Garda, and on the other

by the fortress of Mantua, he might be able to make a successful stand

against Bonaparte.

In accordance with this plan, he sent imperative orders to General

Elsnitz to quit the Var and march on Alessandria, and to General Ott to

raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to seize Placentia

and the crossings of the Po near that point. Meanwhile he himself,

having left a sufficient force to hold Thurreau in check, hastened with

the remainder of his army to march on Alessandria.

Upon receiving the orders of Melas, General Elsnitz, whose command then

numbered but seventeen thousand, began to withdraw his forces from

the Var. He directed his columns towards the Tenda Pass, expecting to

cross the Apennines at that point, and thence to march on Alessandria

by way of Coni, Alba, and Asti. But Suchet, being well aware of the

desperate situation of Melas, was anticipating the recall of Elsnitz

and was prepared for it. Suchet's forces numbered fourteen thousand

men. By skilful manoeuvring and by a rapid march across the foothills

of the Apennines, he succeeded in reaching the Tenda Pass ahead of

his adversary. Having thus turned the flank of the Austrians, and

obtained possession of their line of retreat, he fell upon them,

defeated them, cut them in two, and killed, wounded, or captured more

than half of their army. As a result General Elsnitz was compelled to

retreat eastward and cross the Apennines over the Ormea Pass. With only

eight thousand men he arrived at Ceva on the 7th of June _en route_ to

Alessandria. Meanwhile Suchet, having proceeded eastward to Savona,

was joined by a part of Masséna's command, which had marched out of

Genoa on the 5th of June. With these combined forces, Suchet marched to

Acqui, and there, still acting under the orders of Masséna, awaited the

results of Bonaparte's operations.

When, on the 2d of June, General Ott received the orders of Melas, the

negotiations for the capitulation of Genoa were pending. He delayed

until the 4th of June to receive the surrender of Masséna. On the

6th, having left a sufficient force to garrison the city, he sent a

brigade towards Placentia by way of Bobbio; and with the remainder of

his forces, numbering sixteen thousand soldiers, he himself marched

towards the same place by way of Novi, Tortona, and the Stradella Pass.

During these operations, Bonaparte remained at Milan, perfecting his

arrangements and issuing the orders for the movements of his troops. He

had already sent forward Berthier to direct the operations along the

Po. On the 6th of June Moncey's corps arrived. This re-enforcement of

fifteen thousand men increased the effective forces under the immediate

command of Bonaparte to about sixty thousand. Immediately upon the

arrival of Moncey, thirty-two thousand soldiers under Lannes, Victor,

and Murat, began to cross the Po. The remainder of the army were thus

stationed: four thousand, under Thurreau, were at the foot of the

Mont Cenis Pass; two small detachments were occupying Fort Bard and

Ivrea; ten thousand were posted at Vercelli and along the Ticino from

the foot of Lake Maggiore to Pavia; three thousand were at Milan; and

ten thousand were along the Adda, and at Cremona and Placentia. All

these troops, except the division of Thurreau, which was isolated and

held in check by an Austrian force near Turin, were available for the

operations about Milan and along the Po.

On the 6th of June Lannes and Victor crossed the Po near Belgiojoso,

a few miles below Pavia, and marched thence to the Stradella Pass.

On the following day Murat crossed at Placentia. In these passages

the French met with considerable opposition from small detachments of

cavalry and infantry that Melas had directed thither from Alessandria

and elsewhere to hold the crossings of the Po until General Ott should

arrive; but these detachments having been defeated and driven back, the

French occupied Placentia and the Stradella Pass. At the latter place

a fortified camp was constructed, and between Pavia and Placentia five

bridges were built for the use of the French in case they should be

forced to retreat.

During these operations two Austrian couriers were captured. One was

carrying despatches from Melas to Vienna; the other, from the Aulic

Council to Melas. The despatches of the former told of the surrender

of Genoa, and of the plans and movements of Melas. Those of the latter

informed the Austrian commander that the Army of Reserve was a mere

myth, and that he should pay no attention to the rumors concerning it,

but should make every effort to capture Genoa and force the crossings

of the Var.

The news that Genoa had surrendered was discouraging to Bonaparte,

for he at once appreciated the fact that he must now fight the forces

of General Ott in addition to those which Melas was assembling at

Alessandria. There was, however, a compensating advantage in knowing

the plans of his adversary, for, having learned that General Ott

was marching on Placentia, he at once saw that he might defeat this

corps, and perhaps destroy it, before it could reach Placentia or unite

with Melas. Accordingly, he sent to Berthier, Lannes, and Murat the

following instructions: "Concentrate yourselves at the Stradella. On

the 8th or 9th at the latest, you will have upon your hands fifteen or

eighteen thousand Austrians, coming from Genoa. Meet them and cut them

to pieces. It will be so many enemies less upon our hands on the day

of the decisive battle which we are to expect with the entire army of

Melas."

In accordance with these instructions, Lannes and Victor faced

about their columns and proceeded westward towards Tortona. Lannes,

commanding the vanguard, preceded Victor by a distance of five miles.

The remainder of the French forces on the south bank of the Po marched

to the Stradella Pass. On the 9th of June Lannes with nine thousand men

encountered the sixteen thousand under Ott at Montebello. Immediately a

furious battle began. For several hours both sides fought desperately.

The Austrian superiority in numbers would have crushed an ordinary

soldier, but Lannes was of uncommon mould. Impetuous, stubborn, brave,

fierce, and terrible on the battle-field, he would not yield. In the

face of a deadly fire he encouraged his soldiers, and by his presence

and heroic action held them firm before the repeated onslaughts of the

Austrians. Nevertheless, he would eventually have been defeated had not

Victor arrived opportunely on the battle-field with six thousand men.

This re-enforcement turned the tide of battle in favor of the French.

The Austrians were defeated, cut to pieces, and compelled finally to

retreat. They lost in killed, wounded, and captured five thousand men;

the French, three thousand. With the remnants of his corps General Ott

fell back across the Scrivia, and thence proceeded to Alessandria. This

battle secured for Lannes the title of "Duke of Montebello." It covered

him with glory, and brought to his name an imperishable renown.

The First Consul, who had left Milan on the morning of the 9th of

June, arrived at Montebello just at the termination of the battle.

Expecting that Melas would at once advance with all the troops that

he had collected at Alessandria, Bonaparte began on the 10th of June

to rearrange his troops, and to make preparations for battle. Being

deficient in both cavalry and artillery, while Melas was well supplied

with both, Bonaparte decided to fall back to a position near Casteggio,

in front of the Stradella Pass, where his flanks would be protected by

the Po on one side, and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other.

With the corps of Lannes and Victor he made a retrograde movement to

this point. Here he collected all his forces south of the Po, now

numbering twenty-nine thousand men. In this strong position he remained

for several days, expecting hourly that the Austrians would push

forward from Alessandria and attack him. But they failed to appear.

On the 11th of June General Desaix, who had served under Bonaparte

in Egypt, arrived at the French headquarters. He was a distinguished

general, and a warm friend of the First Consul. At once Bonaparte gave

him the command of a corps, consisting of two divisions.

On the following day Bonaparte, surprised at the non-appearance of the

Austrians, began to fear that they were trying to escape. He thought

that Melas might attempt to evade him, either by marching directly on

Genoa, or by crossing the Po at Valenza, and thence marching on Pavia

and Milan. Finally, he could bear the suspense no longer. He decided

to advance and seek Melas. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 12th

of June, having left a force to occupy the intrenched camp at the

Stradella Pass, he advanced towards Alessandria. At Tortona he left

a force to blockade the fortress. On the 13th of June he crossed the

Scrivia and debouched into the plain of Marengo, which lies between

the Scrivia and Bormida rivers. Thus far he had met with no Austrians.

His anxiety increased. He had but few cavalry, and, consequently, was

unable to make a thorough reconnoissance of the surrounding country.

During the afternoon of that day, he directed Victor on Marengo. Here

the French found only a small detachment, which was quickly driven

across the Bormida. A party sent forward to reconnoitre the crossings

of the Bormida, reported that no Austrians were to be found there in

force.

From all these indications, Bonaparte came to the conclusion that the

Austrians had left Alessandria. He reasoned that, if Melas intended

to attack the French and force his way through the Stradella Pass, he

would neither have given up the plain without a struggle, nor have

failed to occupy in force the village of Marengo. Moreover, he thought

that Melas would surely not neglect to hold the Bormida with a strong

force so long as he remained at Alessandria. But if he had gone, what

route had he taken?

On that day Bonaparte received word that no Austrians had appeared at

Pavia or along the Ticino. It seemed probable, therefore, that Melas

might be marching on Genoa; and that he would attempt either to make

a stand there, where he could be supported by the British fleet, or

else to march thence through Bobbio, Placentia, and Cremona to Mantua.

With this thought in his mind, Bonaparte directed Desaix with one

division of his corps, numbering six thousand men, on Novi, in order to

intercept Melas, should he be attempting to escape by this route.

Thus it happened that on the evening of the 13th of June Bonaparte was

unprepared for the battle of the next day. His forces were scattered.

Desaix was on his way to Novi; Victor was at Marengo; Lannes and Murat

were on the plain in rear of Victor; the Consular Guard, two regiments

of cavalry, and Monnier's division, which belonged to the corps of

Desaix, were along the Scrivia near Tortona. These forces numbered

twenty-eight thousand men, of whom three thousand and five hundred were

cavalry. Bonaparte had about forty cannon. That night he slept in a

small town about two miles east of San Giuliano. He expected to receive

on the next day some information that would enlighten him as to the

movements and intentions of Melas; but he had no thought of a battle on

the morrow.

Meanwhile, at Alessandria there was much confusion. By the defeat of

General Ott at Montebello, Melas had lost possession of the direct

road from Alessandria through the Stradella Pass to Mantua. He could

not, therefore, make his escape by this route without first defeating

the French. He hardly knew what to do. Already his communications were

severed. Doubtless the French would soon advance towards Alessandria.

Perhaps, in a few days, they would force the crossings of the Bormida,

and attempt to shut him up within the city. In this uncertain State

of mind Melas called a council of war. To the officers composing the

council three plans suggested themselves. Should they cross the Po at

Valenza, march to Pavia, and attempt to make their escape by forcing

their way across the Ticino; or should they march to Genoa, and in that

place, supported by the British fleet, make preparations to stand a

siege; or, lastly, should they cross the Bormida, meet the French face

to face, and fight to recover their communications and save their army?

The third plan was adopted. The Austrian officers reasoned that it was

doubtful whether either of the first two plans would succeed; that the

false position that they now occupied was due neither to Melas nor to

themselves, but to the Aulic Council, which had repeatedly misinformed

them as to the actual state of affairs; and that now the only honorable

course was to fight, and, if possible, cut their way through the French

forces. "If we succeed," said they, "victory will regain for us the

road to Placentia and Mantua; if not, we shall have done our duty, and

the responsibility of any disaster that may befall us will rest upon

other heads than ours."

Melas concurred in the views of his officers. Though seventy years

old, age had not dimmed his courage. His army at Alessandria numbered

thirty-two thousand men, and contained two hundred pieces of artillery

and seven thousand cavalry. On the 13th of June he decided that on the

next day he would cross the Bormida and attack Bonaparte.

The plain of Marengo lies between the Scrivia and Bormida rivers, which

rise in the Apennines and flow northward towards the Po. The town of

Marengo, from which this battle takes its name, is situated near the

east bank of the Bormida on the great highway leading from Alessandria

to Mantua. About two miles north of Marengo is the village of

Castel-ceriolo. On the main road, just east of Alessandria, two bridges

span the Bormida. They were held by the Austrians, and were defended

by a single bridge-head on the right bank. The surrounding country is

generally quite flat, but towards the village of San Giuliano, which

lies on the main road about three miles east of Marengo, several

hillocks thereabout render the ground uneven.

At daybreak on the morning of the 14th of June, the Austrians began

to cross the Bormida and to issue from the bridge-head on the right

bank. Three thousand soldiers under General O'Reilly crossed first.

They drove back the French outposts and advanced towards Marengo. This

vanguard was followed by a division under Haddick, and that in turn by

another under Kaim. At eight o'clock these forces, having deployed,

began the battle. Being well supplied with cannon, they opened the

attack with a heavy artillery fire, then pressed forward towards

Marengo.

Meanwhile, word was sent to Bonaparte that the whole Austrian army was

advancing. During the deployment of the Austrians, Victor at Marengo

had taken up a position in front of the village along the muddy stream

of Fontanone. Here he received the attacks of the Austrians, and

finally succeeded in driving them back. But the Austrian line was soon

strongly re-enforced. Melas directed two more divisions on Marengo,

and, having detached Ott's division, directed it on Castel-ceriolo, in

order to take the French in flank on that side.

About ten o'clock Lannes brought his corps into line on the right

of Victor. He was supported by a cavalry brigade under Champeaux.

Kellerman's brigade of cavalry supported Victor. Meanwhile General

Ott, having arrived near Castel-ceriolo, began to threaten the French

right, which movement obliged Lannes to form front in that direction

with a part of his corps. The French line of battle, numbering about

fifteen thousand men, was about two miles long. It followed the

general direction of the Fontanone northward from Marengo towards

Castel-ceriolo, and westward from Marengo towards the Bormida. Facing

this line were the Austrian troops, numbering twenty-nine thousand

five hundred men. General Ott formed the left, and the reserve under

General Elsnitz was in the rear. Having been informed that Suchet had

reached Acqui, Melas had, during the morning, sent two thousand five

hundred of his reserve cavalry to reconnoitre in that direction.

At ten o'clock Melas attacked with fury the whole French line. He made

a determined effort to drive back Victor's corps and to gain possession

of Marengo. Along the stream in front of the village the struggle was

fierce and bloody. Both sides fought desperately. Melas felt that he

_must_ conquer. Knowing that his situation was critical, and that

nothing short of victory could save his army, he fought with the

courage of despair. The French, too, fought like demons. Their victory

at Montebello had encouraged them; and now, having sought and found

their enemy, they expected to be again triumphant. With determination

they resisted the onsets of Melas. Before the furious attacks of

superior numbers, in the face of cannon, sabre, and steel, they stood

to their work like men. But all their efforts were unavailing. Against

so fierce an attack Victor could not long hold his position. He was

compelled to fall back to Marengo, where he again made a desperate

effort to stop the advance of the Austrians. For a time he held on to

the village, but was finally forced to give way. His corps was routed;

his soldiers became demoralized. In disorder they retired towards San

Giuliano, followed by the victorious Austrians. Meanwhile, Lannes had

held his position against the attacks of Melas in his front and of

Ott on his right. But when Victor gave way, Lannes found himself in a

desperate situation. This movement uncovered the left of his corps and

threatened it with destruction. Thus outflanked on both wings and hard

pressed in front, he saw defeat near at hand. In fact the Austrians

were on the point of sweeping everything before them. Though the French

were still fighting bravely, it was evident that they must soon fall

back into the plain, or else be routed and destroyed.

Such was the situation at eleven o'clock when Bonaparte arrived. Having

received word early in the morning that the whole Austrian army was

advancing towards Marengo, he immediately sent Desaix orders to return,

then hurried to the front with all the troops that he could collect.

He brought with him the Consular Guard, Monnier's division, and two

regiments of cavalry,--in all about seven thousand men. A single glance

sufficed to show Bonaparte what should be done. He formed the Consular

Guard into squares to hold the Austrian cavalry in check, directed a

column on Castel-ceriolo, sent the greater part of Monnier's division

to re-enforce Lannes, and ordered Murat with the reserve cavalry to

protect as best he could the retreat of Victor's corps. Again the

struggle was renewed with increased fury; but all the efforts of

Bonaparte and of Lannes could not now turn the tide of battle in favor

of the French. With an almost resistless momentum, Melas pressed

forward. Seeing victory just within his grasp, he strained every nerve

to crush and annihilate his adversary. He ordered his reserves to the

front and threw them into the fight. Repeatedly his cavalry charged the

French, cut in on their flanks, and threatened them with destruction;

and, while the left of his line was resisting bravely the heroic

efforts of Lannes, he himself issued from Marengo with his victorious

troops, and directed them upon the flank of the French.

It was no longer possible for Bonaparte to hold his ground. He ordered

a retreat. Again the heroism of Lannes displayed itself on that

sanguinary field. Fighting as he retired, he fell back slowly and in

admirable order. For more than two hours he prolonged the conflict,

while being forced back from position to position over a distance of

nearly two miles. But, finally, his indomitable spirit was compelled

to yield. His corps was driven from the field. At length, shattered,

crushed, almost demoralized, it retired behind the hillocks near San

Giuliano, where the remnants of Victor's corps had assembled.

The Austrians had conquered. On the plain of Marengo Melas had defeated

Bonaparte. The victory seemed complete. There appeared to be no longer

any hope for Bonaparte. The French had been driven three miles beyond

Marengo. The greater part of their cavalry had been destroyed. More

than two thirds of their cannon had been captured. Fragments only

of their infantry organizations remained. On that bloody field six

thousand French soldiers had been killed, wounded, or captured. Such

was the result of the struggle at Marengo on the morning of the 14th

of June, 1800. Who would have thought that before the close of that

eventful day the vanquished would become the victors?

Thus far Melas had exhibited great energy and courage; but when the

French had been driven from the field, and the excitement of the

conflict had ended, he felt deeply the effects of his exertion. The

weight of years, too, bore heavily upon him. Fully convinced that he

had gained a complete victory over Bonaparte, he left the command

of the army to his chief of staff, General Zach, and, having sent

despatches to his government announcing the result, returned to

Alessandria exhausted with fatigue.

General Zach now rearranged his troops for the purpose of following the

French, whom he believed to be completely routed. But the Austrians

were not in a condition to pursue the enemy promptly and vigorously.

Their cavalry, in particular, had been roughly handled by Victor and

Lannes during the morning; and, moreover, it was much weakened by the

two thousand five hundred men that Melas had detached towards Acqui to

observe Suchet. Considerable time was therefore spent in perfecting the

arrangements of Zach. In fact, it was near four o'clock when he began

to advance. At the head of about five thousand Austrians he pushed

forward along the high-road leading from Marengo to San Giuliano. He

was followed at a distance of three quarters of a mile by the corps

of Kaim, and it in turn by the Hungarian infantry. At the same time

General Ott marched eastward from Castel-ceriolo towards Ghilina. The

Austrian troops were only partially deployed. Not expecting great

resistance, they were moving forward in marching order rather than in

order of battle.

Meanwhile the French, not being vigorously pursued, had halted, and,

unperceived by the Austrians, had begun to rally behind the hillocks

near San Giuliano. At this time Bonaparte was awaiting anxiously the

arrival of Desaix. Early in the morning he had sent him an order to

return; but before it reached its destination Desaix, having heard the

sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo, halted his division. Judging

from the thunder of the guns that a battle had begun between the French

and Austrians on the plain of Marengo, he hurriedly despatched several

cavalry troops to Novi, in order to assure himself that no Austrians

were in that vicinity, then faced about his troops and marched to the

sound of the cannon. Hour after hour he pushed eagerly forward. At

about four o'clock in the afternoon the head of his column appeared

near San Giuliano.

Upon the arrival of Desaix Bonaparte's spirits rose. Though most of

the French officers favored a retreat, Bonaparte was opposed to this

course. Desaix, too, concurred in the views of the First Consul. In

fact, Desaix was anxious to renew the struggle. Though he saw that the

battle was lost, he did not despair of yet gaining another.

Accordingly, Bonaparte at once formed Desaix's division, and the French

troops about San Giuliano, into line of battle. Desaix's division was

placed across the highway along which the Austrians were advancing. On

his right were Lannes, Monnier, and the Consular Guard; in his rear

was Victor. Kellerman's brigade of cavalry took a position to the left

and rear of Desaix, and Champeaux's brigade to the right and rear of

Lannes. Bonaparte had only twelve guns remaining. He placed them on the

right of Desaix towards the front of the battle-line.

Such were the positions of the French, when suddenly there appeared

from behind the rising ground in their front the column of Zach. Though

this column was preceded by an advance guard with cavalry on each

flank, the greater part of the Austrian troops were marching somewhat

carelessly, and were surprised when they came thus unexpectedly upon

the whole French army in position for battle. Immediately, the French

guns opened upon Zach; at the same time Desaix made a furious assault

upon him. Kellerman, too, having been directed towards the right and

rear of Desaix's division during the early stages of the battle, then

moved forward past the right of Desaix and attacked vigorously the

Austrian cavalry. Having routed it, he wheeled his troopers to the left

and struck in flank the Austrian column, which was already much shaken

by the assault of Desaix. Everywhere the Austrians were overwhelmed;

two thousand were captured, among whom was General Zach himself.

Bonaparte now pushed eagerly forward with his entire force, and in turn

attacked and defeated the corps of Kaim and the Hungarian infantry.

Continuing to advance, he forced the Austrians back to Marengo. Here

they attempted to make a stand, but were again defeated and routed. In

disorder they retired towards Alessandria.

Meanwhile General Ott, hearing the firing towards Marengo, marched in

that direction; but he only arrived in time to cover the retreat of

the main body across the Bormida. By ten o'clock that night all the

Austrian troops had recrossed the river. Thus Bonaparte won in the

afternoon the battle that he had lost in the morning. Thus a great

disaster was turned into a great victory. Once more the Austrians were

crushed; once more the French were triumphant.

On the following morning, Bonaparte made preparations to assault the

bridge-head and to cross the Bormida, in order to attack the Austrians

in Alessandria. But in the meantime Melas sent an officer to the French

headquarters to propose terms of surrender. On the same day, the 15th

of June, the negotiations were completed, and an armistice between

Melas and Bonaparte was signed. By the terms of surrender Melas was

allowed to march out of Alessandria with the honors of war, and to

proceed thence to Mantua; in return, he was to evacuate the whole of

northern Italy as far as the Mincio, to surrender the fortresses of

Coni, Alessandria, Genoa, and Tortona, and the fortified cities of

Milan, Turin, Pizzighettone, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, and Arona.

In proportion to the number of combatants at Marengo the losses on both

sides were large. Seven thousand Austrians were killed or wounded, and

three thousand were captured. The French loss in killed and wounded was

equal to that of the Austrians, but only one thousand were captured.

Among the first of the French soldiers killed in the battle of the

afternoon was Desaix. While gallantly leading his division against

the Austrians he was shot through the body and fell dead on the

battle-field. His loss was deeply felt by the First Consul and by the

French nation.

On the 15th of May Bonaparte had begun the passage of the Great St.

Bernard with the Army of Reserve. On the 15th of June he received the

surrender of the Austrian army in Italy. In one month, he had crossed

the Alps, entered Milan, severed the Austrian communications, fought

and won a great battle, and, as a result, obtained possession of the

greater part of northern Italy.

Thus ended the campaign of Marengo. It brought about a temporary peace

between France and Austria; it excited to a high pitch the military

spirit of the French people; and it fixed ultimately upon the head of

Bonaparte an emperor's crown. Upon the political history of Europe

it produced far-reaching results. It precipitated a contest between

England and France, between France and Europe, which, at irregular

intervals for fifteen years, was destined to continue, until, finally,

on the field of Waterloo, Napoleon's cannon were silenced forever.

COMMENTS.

At the outset one hundred thousand Austrians were occupying northern

Italy. Fifty-five thousand were at Genoa and along the Var; two

thousand along the Maritime Alps; five thousand at the foot of the

Mont Cenis Pass; three thousand in the valley of the Aosta; and ten

thousand in the vicinity of Milan. The remaining twenty-five thousand

were scattered throughout northern Italy. They were engaged mostly

in garrisoning the fortresses and fortified cities, and in holding

possession of the country.

It will be seen that Melas had so stationed his troops that he was

weak at all points. Except at Genoa and along the Var, the Austrian

army may be said to have been composed of a number of detachments

scattered throughout northern Italy. Melas seemed to think that he must

occupy every fortress, and guard every road and pass, in order to make

secure his position in Italy. Herein lay his great fault; for, his

forces being thus scattered, he could not unite them readily to oppose

Bonaparte. Though Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on

Milan more than two weeks before the battle of Marengo, yet he was able

to assemble only thirty-two thousand men at Alessandria to oppose the

French.

The main cause, however, of the defeat of Melas was the fact that he

was completely deceived as to the intentions of the First Consul. He

had no expectation that Bonaparte would cross the Alps; in fact, he did

not believe in the existence of an army of reserve. Having reached this

conclusion from the reports of his own spies, and from the instructions

sent him by the Aulic Council, he was utterly confounded when the

French descended into Italy from the Mont Cenis, the Great St. Bernard,

the Simplon, and St. Gothard passes. Not knowing by which route the

strongest column was entering Italy, he knew not where to strike.

Consequently, he hesitated and was lost.

Had he fathomed the designs of his adversary in time, he might have

rapidly united his forces, and have defeated the several French columns

in succession before they could have united in Italy; for, inasmuch

as Bonaparte's object was to unite his columns within the Austrian

theatre of operations, Melas could concentrate there more quickly than

Bonaparte.

On the 29th of May Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on

Milan. He then had a splendid opportunity to strike Bonaparte a telling

blow. His command at Turin numbered sixteen or seventeen thousand

men. In his front at Chivasso and along the Po was Lannes with six or

seven thousand. On his left was Thurreau with four thousand. Had Melas

left four or five thousand men to hold Thurreau in check, and boldly

attacked Lannes with the remainder of his forces, he could easily have

defeated Lannes, and have immediately thereafter obtained possession

of Bonaparte's communications with France. Such a master stroke would

have greatly embarrassed Bonaparte; for he would then have been

obliged either to turn back and fight Melas, in order to recover his

communications with France, or to push on and fight Vukassovich, in

order to establish his communications with Switzerland. Had Bonaparte

adopted the former course, Vukassovich could have closed in on the

French rear and have thus aided Melas; had he adopted the latter

course, Melas could have aided Vukassovich.

That Melas did not carry out this course was due to the fact that

no sooner had he learned of the destination of the Army of Reserve

than he began to tremble for the safety of his own army. He at once

perceived that it was the intention of Bonaparte to sever the Austrian

communications. He therefore abandoned any intention which he may have

had of attacking Lannes and of seizing the communications of Bonaparte,

in order to take the necessary measures for the preservation of his own

communications.

Consider now the operations of Bonaparte; they are worthy of careful

study. No one who stops to consider the smallness of the means with

which he defeated the Austrians in this campaign can fail to appreciate

his genius.

At the outset an Austrian army of one hundred thousand men, led

by a courageous commander, was in possession of northern Italy.

Everywhere Melas had defeated the French. Masséna at Genoa was about

to surrender; and Suchet along the Var was fighting desperately to

prevent the invasion of France. Melas, encouraged by these successes,

looked hopefully forward to new triumphs. Such was the situation when

Bonaparte entered Italy with his columns, numbering in all a little

less than sixty thousand men. With these forces he plunged into the

Austrian theatre of operations, and in a month ended the campaign.

He so manoeuvred that a victory of twenty-eight thousand Frenchmen

over twenty-nine thousand five hundred Austrians decided the fate of

one hundred thousand Austrians and gained for him the greater part of

northern Italy.

How, in so short a time and with so few forces, did Bonaparte

accomplish such results? In these comments an attempt will be made to

answer this question. It is our purpose to analyze somewhat critically

the strategical manoeuvres of Bonaparte, to compare the things he did

with what he might have done, and to show why the whole of northern

Italy fell into his possession as a result of the victory at Marengo.

It is our purpose, also, to discuss the battle of Marengo from a

tactical point of view, and to set forth some of the reasons why the

battle, lost in the morning, was won in the afternoon.

The portion of northern Italy then occupied by the Austrians is divided

by the Po and Apennines into three unequal parts, through all which

roads pass eastwardly from the French frontier to Mantua. Bonaparte,

having decided to lead the Army of Reserve into Italy, might have

adopted any one of three plans. He might have marched into the southern

part of the Austrian theatre of operations, lying between the Apennines

and the Gulf of Genoa; or into the middle part between the Apennines

and the Po; or into the northern part between the Po and Switzerland.

Let us examine each of these plans, in order to determine, if possible,

which would have procured him the greatest advantages.

Inasmuch as the mountainous and narrow strip of country lying between

the Apennines and the sea was peculiarly fitted for the operations of

an inferior army, composed mostly of infantry, and inasmuch as the Army

of Reserve was deficient in both cavalry and artillery, it might seem

that Bonaparte should have united his army with Suchet's forces on the

Var for an attack against Melas. But other considerations deterred

Bonaparte from doing so. His objections to this course were that even

if he succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Var, the Austrians,

as they fell back from position to position, would be constantly

re-enforced, and could maintain the siege of Genoa. And again: if he

succeeded in driving them across the Apennines and in defeating them

at Genoa, they could still fall back along their communications to

their base of operations on the Mincio, where they would be protected

by Lake Garda on one side and by the fortress of Mantua on the other.

Even should the Army of Reserve and all the undefeated portions of

the Army of Italy be united into one army, Bonaparte's total strength

would not exceed seventy thousand men. With this force he could hardly

expect to defeat one hundred thousand Austrians flushed by their recent

successes. Furthermore, by adopting this plan, no opportunity would be

offered him of severing the Austrian communications.

"An ordinary general," says Jomini, "alarmed by the victorious attitude

of the Austrians in Piedmont, would have gone in all haste by Dauphiné

toward Provence, and made the Alps the theatre of operations. But

Bonaparte appreciated too well the difficulties of a frontal attack. He

preferred to cross the mountains upon the rear of the imperial forces

and gain the Ticino unopposed, where his presence could not fail to

recall his adversaries, and compel them to accept battle with all the

chances of success against them."

In order to accomplish this result, Bonaparte had purposely led Melas

to believe that the Army of Reserve was intended to re-enforce the

Army of Italy. Though Melas did not believe in the existence of an

army of reserve, he knew that an effort was being made to organize

troops in France, and he believed that they would eventually be sent

to join Suchet. But the First Consul had no intention of doing what

Melas expected him to do. It was necessary to the success of Bonaparte

that he should conceal as much as possible his own purposes, in order

to be able to surprise his adversary. In war it is always wise to

lead the enemy to believe that an attack will be made in a different

direction from that intended. "In whatever way strategy is employed,"

says Colonel Maurice, "surprise and concealment are essential to

success. On this account it will continually happen, in selecting a

line of operations or a scheme of campaign, that the most important

point of all is to carry out just what an enemy does not expect. Very

often successful campaigns, the method of which has been subsequently

much criticised, have owed their success to the fact that, from a nice

calculation of time and distance, the successful general has seen that

he could carry through an operation dangerous in itself, but sure not

to be the one expected by his opponent. For the same reason, in all the

brilliant and successful efforts of strategic skill, steps have been

taken beforehand to carry out the preliminary movements of an army in

such a way as to leave an enemy up to the last moment uncertain in what

direction the blow would be struck."

Had Bonaparte marched into the middle part of the Austrian theatre

of operations, it would have been necessary to cross the Alps over

the Mont Cenis Pass. The objections to this plan were that the

country lying between the Apennines and the Po contained the strong

fortifications of Turin, Coni, Alessandria, and Tortona, which would

enable the Austrians to hold Bonaparte in check long enough for Melas

to concentrate his scattered forces. Furthermore, by entering Italy

over this pass, Bonaparte would approach the centre of the Austrian

line, which would enable the Austrians to concentrate against him more

rapidly than if he moved against either flank of their position. Again:

since the Austrians held the passes of the Apennines, they could delay

the advance of the French on Genoa and continue the siege; or, if

defeated, could fall back along the great highway leading from Piedmont

through the Stradella Pass to Mantua.

Though the great chain of the Alps seemed to present an almost

impassable barrier to an army attempting to enter the extreme northern

part of Italy from France or Switzerland, Bonaparte did not allow

this fact to deter him from his great undertaking. There were several

reasons why he adopted this plan.

First: He knew that Melas was not expecting the French to enter this

part of Italy.

Second: He knew that the country lying between the Po and Switzerland

contained but few fortifications, and was occupied by only a few

thousand Austrians.

Third: Owing to the fact that he had deceived Melas as to the existence

and destination of the Army of Reserve, Bonaparte believed that he

could cross the Alps with this army, march to Milan, and there be

joined by Moncey's corps before Melas should discover his plan.

Fourth: Inasmuch as all the roads leading from the French frontier

to the Austrian base of operations on the Mincio passed through

the country lying between Milan and Placentia, he hoped that, by

adopting this plan, he would be able to assemble his forces in this

space, seize the roads there, and thus completely sever the Austrian

communications and place Melas in a position where he must fight under

a great disadvantage. With the French in possession of these roads,

Melas would be compelled to concentrate and fight in order to recover

his communications and save his army. In doing so he would be forced

to raise the siege of Genoa and to abandon the attempted invasion of

France.

Fifth: Should Bonaparte succeed in concentrating his forces as here set

forth, the advantages of his position would be immense. The St. Gothard

and Simplon routes in his rear would give him a safe retreat into the

great stronghold of Switzerland in case of defeat; the Ticino would

protect his right flank, the Adda his left; and the fertile plains of

the Po would furnish the necessary supplies for his men and animals,

while he was making ready to fight the Austrians or awaiting their

attack.

Such are the principal reasons that decided Bonaparte to march the

Army of Reserve into that part of Italy lying between the Po and

Switzerland. But, having decided on this course, he had yet to

determine whether he would lead the Army of Reserve across the Great

St. Bernard, or march it into Switzerland and thence descend into Italy

by way of the St. Gothard or the Simplon. It will be remembered that

for a time he was undecided as to what course to take, and did not

fully make up his mind until some time after the Army of Reserve had

assembled at Lake Geneva.

In several respects the safest course that Bonaparte could have taken

was to conduct his army into Switzerland, unite it with Moncey's corps,

and march on Milan by way of the St. Gothard Pass. Had he adopted this

course, he would have entered Italy with united forces along a single

line of operations, and would have avoided the dangerous flank march

from Ivrea to Milan within the enemy's territory. At this time his

objective was Milan. His purpose was to assemble his army and the corps

of Moncey in that vicinity. By crossing the Great St. Bernard with the

Army of Reserve, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard Pass,

Bonaparte gave Melas the opportunity of concentrating the Austrian

forces between the Army of Reserve and Moncey's corps, and of crushing

each in turn with superior numbers.

In the comments on Moreau's operations in Germany, it has already

been remarked that it is always a dangerous operation to attempt a

concentration upon some designated place within the enemy's lines,

for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there more rapidly than

the commander of an invading army; that in fact many a campaign has

failed because the commanding general has attempted to concentrate

his scattered forces upon some point within the territory held by

the enemy. By so doing he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his

forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to

bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Yet in these

operations Bonaparte not only committed this error, not only did what

he had condemned Moreau for doing, but he also violated the principle

which he himself had so often set forth and had so often exemplified,

namely, _not to invade a country with a double line of operations_.

Why then did Bonaparte take this course? To answer satisfactorily this

question it is necessary to bear in mind that, at this time, Suchet was

fighting greatly superior forces on the Var, and that Masséna was in

desperate straits at Genoa. The problem before Bonaparte was not merely

to assemble his forces in the vicinity of Milan, but so to assemble

them there as to stop the projected invasion of France and bring speedy

relief to Masséna.

The most direct route from Lake Geneva to Milan is by way of the Great

St. Bernard Pass, and thence through northern Italy. Had, therefore,

Bonaparte taken the longer route through Switzerland by way of the

St. Gothard, the Austrians, in the meantime, could have forced the

crossings of the Var, and have compelled Masséna to surrender. Indeed,

these events were the more likely to happen, inasmuch as the Army of

Reserve, during its march through Switzerland, would not threaten in

the least the Austrian communications.

The importance of crossing the Great St. Bernard with the Army of

Reserve is seen in the fact that no sooner had French troops appeared

in the valley of the Aosta than Melas at once withdrew ten thousand men

from Suchet's front and ordered them to march on Turin. Thus, by the

mere crossing of the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve, the

projected invasion of France was brought to an end. It was inevitable

that such should be the case; for as soon as the French appeared in the

extreme northern part of Italy, their mere presence there threatened

the communications of the Austrians. It was therefore necessary that

Melas should abandon the invasion of France, in order to destroy, if

possible, the French troops that were threatening his rear. In war, it

will ever be thus. No commander can afford to take the risk of pushing

forward to new conquests so long as his communications are seriously

threatened by his enemy.

Again: it will be remembered that no sooner had Melas learned that the

Army of Reserve was marching on Milan than he sent orders to General

Elsnitz to abandon the Var and to General Ott to raise the siege of

Genoa. Even the mere knowledge of Bonaparte's destination, before the

movement on Milan had actually been completed, was of itself sufficient

to cause Melas to change immediately his entire plan of campaign. Had

not Masséna, at the time, been just on the point of giving up Genoa,

General Ott would not have delayed there two or three days to await the

capitulation. In fact, had Masséna known of the exact state of affairs,

he doubtless would have held out a day or two longer, and saved

himself the humiliation of a surrender. Even without a battle, the

concentration of the French forces between Milan and Placentia would,

in a short time, have set free Masséna's soldiers; for Melas would then

have been obliged to concentrate and fight, in order to recover his

communications and connect with his base of supplies. Bonaparte saw

clearly this fact. Though he did not know how long Masséna could hold

out at Genoa, he realized that matters there were rapidly approaching

a crisis, and that it was of the utmost importance that the Army of

Reserve should reach Milan at the earliest possible moment. He realized

that upon the direction given his columns and upon the rapidity of

their movements depended the fate of Suchet on the Var and of Masséna

at Genoa.

Other reasons, too, deterred Bonaparte from marching the Army of

Reserve through Switzerland. In this rough and mountainous country,

supplies could not be easily obtained. Especially was this true of the

St. Gothard route, which had been overrun by the French during the two

previous years. Besides, this route was reserved for Moncey's corps,

which, of itself, would tax to the utmost the resources of the country.

Moreover, this road, a mere bridle path in places, passes through

narrow defiles and across lofty and rugged mountains. Evidently a large

army issuing into Italy by this route would be so stretched out that

the advance divisions could be defeated before the rear divisions could

re-enforce them.

The Simplon route was shorter than the St. Gothard route, but the

difficulties to be overcome on each were of the same character.

Inasmuch, however, as Lake Maggiore lies between these two routes, it

will be observed that, had Bonaparte advanced into Italy by way of the

Simplon, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard, Melas might

have assembled a strong force at the foot of the lake, and, from his

central position, have thrown superior numbers against each French

column in succession. In this way he might have defeated both in detail

before they could have united at Milan.

The principal reasons why Bonaparte chose the Great St. Bernard route

having been considered, it will now be of interest to point out the

several courses that he might have taken after having descended the

Alps into the lower valley of the Aosta. It will be remembered that

on the 27th of May Bonaparte was between Ivrea and Chivasso with

thirty-five thousand men, and that Melas was at Turin with sixteen or

seventeen thousand. At this time Bonaparte might have taken any one

of three courses. He might have advanced on Turin, driven back Melas,

united with Thurreau's division at Susa, and thus have secured his

communications with France by the Mont Cenis route; or he might have

crossed the Po at Chivasso, attacked and driven Melas from Turin, then

have marched on Genoa by way of Alessandria; or, lastly, he might

have marched on Milan, and there have united his army with Moncey's

corps. In his memoirs Napoleon himself has discussed the advantages and

disadvantages of these plans as follows:--

"Of these three courses, the first was contrary to the true

principles of war. Since Melas had considerable forces with him, the

French army, therefore, would run the risk of fighting without having

a certain retreat, Fort Bard not being then taken. Besides, if Melas

should abandon Turin and move on Alessandria, the campaign would be

a failure, and each army would find itself in its natural position:

the French army resting upon Mont Blanc and Dauphiné; and that of

Melas with its left at Genoa, and in its rear the fortified places of

Mantua, Placentia, and Milan.

"The second course appeared impracticable: how hazardous would have

been the situation of the French between the Po and Genoa, in the

midst of an army so powerful as that of the Austrians, without any

line of operations[9] (communication), any assured retreat.

"The third course, on the other hand, presented every advantage:

the French army, once in possession of Milan, would secure all the

magazines, depots, and hospitals, of the enemy's army; it would join

the left under General Moncey, and have a safe retreat by the Simplon

and St. Gothard. The Simplon led to the Valais and Sion, whither

all the magazines of provisions for the army had been sent. The St.

Gothard led into Switzerland, of which we had been in possession for

two years, and which was covered by the Army of the Rhine then on the

Iller. In this position the French general was at liberty to act as

he pleased; if Melas should march with his whole army from Turin upon

the Sesia and the Ticino, the French army could give him battle with

this incalculable advantage, that, if it should be victorious, Melas,

with his retreat cut off, would be pursued and driven into Savoy; and

if it should be defeated, it could retreat by the Simplon and the St.

Gothard. If Melas, as it was natural to suppose, should move towards

Alessandria in order to join the army coming from Genoa, it might be

hoped that, by advancing towards him and crossing the Po, he might

be met and be forced to fight before he could reach Alessandria. (In

other words, before the troops of Melas, and of General Ott, coming

from Genoa, could unite at Alessandria.) The French army having its

rear secured by the river, and by Milan, the Simplon, and the St.

Gothard; while the Austrian army, having its retreat cut off, and

having no communications with Mantua and Austria, would be liable

to be thrown upon the mountains of the western coast of Genoa, or

entirely destroyed, or taken at the foot of the Alps, at the Col

di Tenda and in the county of Nice. Lastly, by adopting the third

course, if it should suit the First Consul, when once master of

Milan, to suffer Melas to pass, and to remain between the Po, the

Adda, and the Ticino, he would thus, without a battle, reconquer

Lombardy, and Piedmont, the Maritime Alps, and the Genoese territory,

and raise the blockade of that city; these were flattering results to

anticipate."

Bonaparte has been severely criticised for not taking the second

course, which he has so briefly discussed in his memoirs. It has

been represented that in marching on Milan, he sacrificed Masséna,

when he might have marched directly to the relief of Genoa by way of

Alessandria, and thus have saved his lieutenant the humiliation of a

surrender. But what are the facts? They are that Melas sent orders to

General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa before the Army of Reserve

had even reached Milan. Had, therefore, Bonaparte crossed the Po at

Chivasso, attacked and driven back Melas, and marched on Alessandria,

he could not have brought relief to Masséna any earlier.

If Bonaparte had crossed the Po, he could undoubtedly have defeated

Melas and driven him back to Alessandria; but here the Austrian

commander, protected by the fortifications of the city, would doubtless

have made a stand, and would have collected a large force to oppose

Bonaparte. In this position, Melas would be joined by General Elsnitz,

already marching on Alessandria, and could receive re-enforcements

from General Ott and from General Vukassovich. Thus, in a short time,

he could outnumber Bonaparte's army. Moreover, at Alessandria he could

prevent the junction of Moncey's corps with the Army of Reserve, and

might possibly be able to defeat them in detail.

In this position, Bonaparte, if defeated, would have no unobstructed

line of retreat, for Fort Bard was still held by the Austrians;

and, if victorious, he could do no more than force Melas back along

the great highway to Mantua. In fact, should Melas be defeated at

Alessandria, he could fall back to the fortress of Tortona or to the

Stradella Pass, and there occupy another strong position. Here, with

the re-enforcements that would doubtless join him from Genoa, from

Vukassovich's corps, and from the fortresses in his rear, he would

still have great chances of success.

In short, it would have been the height of folly for Bonaparte, with

no secure line of retreat, to march into the centre of the Austrian

theatre of operations, and expect to conquer Italy with but thirty-five

thousand men. Even though it had been necessary to sacrifice Masséna,

Bonaparte would have been justified in marching on Milan; for, in no

other way could he be joined by Moncey's corps; in no other way could

he sever the Austrian communications, and in no other way could he hope

to defeat Melas and conquer Italy. Victory was his object.

The most critical part of Bonaparte's operations was the flank march

from Ivrea to Milan; for at this time his only line of retreat was by

way of the Great St. Bernard; and even on this route the Austrians

still held Fort Bard.

Under ordinary circumstances, a flank march is always more or less a

hazardous undertaking. When a commander makes this movement and is

attacked in route, he must form front to a flank,[10] and fight with

his battle-line parallel to his communications, while the enemy can

fight with his front perpendicular to his communications. In this

position the advantage of the enemy is enormous. If victorious, he

severs the communications of his adversary, and may then capture or

destroy his army; if defeated, he can retreat in safety along his

communications, or fall back to a new position, fight again, and

thus prolong the conflict. An army without communications is like a

rudderless ship adrift on the ocean. In order to fight, soldiers must

have food and ammunition. No greater calamity, short of defeat, can

befall a commander than to be cut from his base of operations and lose

his source of supply.

Had, therefore, the Army of Reserve been defeated while marching from

Ivrea to Milan, it would have lost its line of communication by way

of the Great St. Bernard. In that case it would undoubtedly have been

captured or destroyed; for since the Italian entrances of the St.

Gothard and Simplon passes were then held by ten thousand Austrians

under Vukassovich, Bonaparte could not have retreated into Switzerland.

That Bonaparte appreciated the critical features of the situation is

seen in the skill with which he planned and executed the march. By

ordering Lannes to make preparations to cross the Po at Chivasso,

Bonaparte gave Melas the impression that the French intended to cross

the Po and attack the Austrians near Turin. Thus Melas was deceived.

Meanwhile Bonaparte, with the greater part of the Army of Reserve,

marched rapidly on Milan. During the march Lannes descended the

Po towards Pavia, thus covering as with a screen the movements of

Bonaparte. So skilfully were these manoeuvres made that Melas did not

even attempt to cross the river, in fact, did not even learn of the

march of Bonaparte until the 29th of May, two days after the movement

had begun. On the 31st Bonaparte arrived on the Ticino; and on the 2d

of June, having driven back Vukassovich's corps, he entered Milan. Here

the critical part of his march ended, for he was then sure of being

joined by Moncey's corps, and had, in case of need, a safe line of

retreat into Switzerland by the St. Gothard and Simplon passes.

Another circumstance that aided Bonaparte in this march was the

presence of Thurreau's division of four thousand men at Susa. Melas,

being ignorant of the strength of this division, hesitated to push

forward and attack Lannes, so long as these troops remained undefeated

on his flank and rear. On this point General Hamley makes the following

comments:--

"Thurreau's force, being entirely separated from the main army

throughout the operations, was useful only as leading the enemy to

a false conclusion. But its value in that respect was incalculable.

There were sufficient Austrian troops round Turin to check Thurreau

and crush Lannes, thus laying bare the rear of the French army. But

the road of the Mont Cenis was both more practicable and more direct

than that of the St. Bernard; moreover, Thurreau had artillery,

and Lannes, at first, had not, for his guns had been delayed by

the difficulties of passing the Austrian fort of Bard. It was but

a natural error, therefore, for Melas to believe that Thurreau was

backed by the whole French army."

Upon his arrival at Milan a threefold problem confronted Bonaparte.

His object was to prevent the escape of the Austrians, to preserve his

communications with Switzerland, and, in case of an Austrian attack,

to make a quick concentration for battle. The skill with which he

solved this complex problem will become apparent, if we turn to the

map and study the positions of the French forces immediately after the

arrival of Moncey's corps. These forces numbered fifty-five thousand

men. Thirty-two thousand were stationed along the Po from Placentia

to the Stradella Pass on the great highway leading from Alessandria

to Mantua; ten thousand were stationed on the Ticino; ten thousand on

the Adda; and three thousand at Milan. Thus it will be seen that these

forces were occupying the sides of the triangular space enclosed by

the Ticino, the Po, and the Adda; and that they held possession of

all the roads leading from the Alps to the Austrian base of operations

on the Mincio. The ten thousand men on the Ticino not only protected

the Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the west side, but they

were in a position to dispute the passage of the Ticino, should Melas

cross to the north side of the Po and attempt to reach Mantua by way

of Pavia and Milan. In the event that Melas should adopt this plan,

the resistance that these ten thousand men could offer him would give

Bonaparte time to unite all his forces for battle on the north side of

the Po. The thirty-two thousand men on the south side of the Po closed

with a barrier of steel the great highway leading from Alessandria to

Mantua. On this road they had fortified a camp at the Stradella; and

across the Po they had constructed five bridges, which would enable

Bonaparte, in an emergency, to recross the river rapidly with these

troops. The ten thousand men along the Adda not only covered the

Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the east side, but they were

in a favorable position for holding in check Vukassovich's corps,

should it attempt to march westward to the relief of Melas. It will

be observed, too, that, should Melas attempt to escape by marching to

Genoa, and thence to Mantua by way of Bobbio and Placentia, the French

forces about Placentia and along the Adda could delay the progress of

the Austrians long enough for Bonaparte to concentrate all his forces

against them.

Occupying a triangle in the heart of northern Italy, the French corps

and divisions supported one another. In a few hours Bonaparte could

concentrate nearly the whole of his army on the Po, on the Ticino,

or on the Adda. In this position he held complete possession of the

Austrian communications, and had his own with Switzerland strongly

guarded. In this position he could concentrate quickly, and fight with

nearly every advantage in his favor.

"Napoleon has told us," says Colonel Hart, "that the whole art of

war--the secret of success--consists in being strongest at the decisive

point." Even when making a great flank or turning movement against

his enemy, Napoleon kept this principle constantly in view. Thus,

in these operations, though at the outset the several columns under

his immediate command, numbering nearly sixty thousand men, entered

Italy from different directions, separated by intervening obstacles

and great distances, yet, by deceiving his adversary and by skilful

manoeuvres, he succeeded in conducting fifty-five thousand men into

such positions that they could, in an emergency, support one another

on a single battle-field. His theory of war was concentration. His

constant endeavor was to outnumber the enemy in battle. In order to

accomplish this result, he nearly always made a great effort to

call in his detachments just previous to a general engagement. His

skill in strategy consisted in so directing his columns that when

needed they could be quickly assembled on the battle-field. His skill

in war consisted in the fact that he nearly always brought greater

numbers against his enemy on the day of battle, even when he was

outnumbered within the theatre of operations. On the battle-field,

too, when it was impossible to outnumber his adversary, his quick eye

discerned the vital point, the key of the position, so to speak; and

there, neglecting the less important points, he massed his troops and

overwhelmed his enemy. But in this campaign, strange to relate, after

the battle of Montebello, and prior to the battle of Marengo, he seemed

to neglect the principle of calling in his columns. When he assembled

his forces south of the Po in the Stradella Pass, he felt certain

that Melas would shortly advance eastward from Alessandria to attack

him; yet he issued no orders for his forces north of the Po to join

him. Again: at Marengo he was outnumbered, while ten thousand French

soldiers along the Ticino, but a short distance away, had not a single

Austrian in their front.

Inasmuch as Bonaparte held the crossings of the Po between Pavia

and Cremona, he could easily have assembled the greater part of his

army on the south side of the Po, and have brought greatly superior

numbers against Melas. But Bonaparte feared that, if he adopted this

plan, Melas might cross the Po and make his escape by way of Pavia

and Milan. It will be remembered that, just prior to the battle of

Marengo, Bonaparte was completely in the dark as to the movements of

his adversary. He did not know but that the Austrian commander was

making preparations to escape. As a matter of fact Bonaparte had lost

touch of his enemy. He was in a state of confusion and uncertainty as

to the intentions of Melas. He could not understand why the Austrians

did not march eastward from Alessandria and attack the French, unless

it was because they were about to attempt their escape by way of Pavia

and Milan, or by way of Genoa. Had Bonaparte known the true state of

affairs; had he known that the Austrians would soon cross the Bormida

to attack the French, undoubtedly he would have assembled on the

battle-field the ten thousand men stationed along the Ticino. That

he did not do so was an error; perhaps, under the circumstances, an

unavoidable one, but nevertheless an error, for he was outnumbered at

Marengo when he might easily have outnumbered his adversary. In fact,

nearly all his operations after the battle of Montebello are open to

criticism. They are not up to the standard of the ordinary operations

of Napoleon. His forces were scattered when they might have been

united. He attempted too much. In order to win everything, he incurred

unnecessary hazard. In order to prevent the Austrians from escaping, he

took too great a risk on the battle-field.

It will be borne in mind that it is easy for any one, having a fair

knowledge of the science of war, to point out, after the event, the

mistakes that were made. During active operations confusion and doubt

are constant factors that cannot be ignored by a commander. Neither

Bonaparte nor his officers knew, or could know, the facts as we know

them to-day. Thus the military student is able, after months of study,

to point out the errors made by a great master of war. He approaches

the subject from a different point of view from that of the commanding

general. He is cognizant of facts, many of which at the time were

unknown to the head of the army. He writes in the light; Napoleon

marched in the darkness. He has the details of the campaign at his

finger's end; Napoleon had to form his conclusions from the doubtful

information at hand. Thus it is that mediocrity can criticise what

genius alone can conceive and execute.

Again: it must be remembered that the really great soldier is not he

who never makes a mistake, but he who in the aggregate makes the fewest

mistakes. In war the conditions are such that a commander cannot by

any possibility always know the truth. He must often decide momentous

questions on the spur of the moment, basing his decisions on unreliable

information obtained mostly from reports and rumors. "Speak to me of

a general who has made no mistakes in war," says Turenne, "and you

speak of one who has seldom made war." "In the profession of war," says

Napoleon, "the game is always to the one who makes the fewest mistakes."

If Bonaparte had withdrawn all his forces to the south side of the Po,

Melas might have made his escape by way of Pavia and Milan, but even

then Bonaparte would have won northern Italy without a battle. Had

Melas taken this course, it is evident that he would have severed the

communications of Bonaparte with Switzerland. Though the loss of the

French communications would doubtless have inconvenienced Bonaparte,

it would not have put a stop to his active operations, nor have proved

fatal to his army; for he could then have united his forces with those

of Suchet, and have at once established another line of communication

with France by way of Nice. On this point General Hamley, one of the

greatest of military critics, comments as follows:--

"There was a special circumstance in this campaign which should have

induced Napoleon to bring his whole army to the south bank. For if

Melas moved through Milan he would leave the country south of the Po

clear for Napoleon to establish another and better communication

with France by the south of the Apennines, and, moreover, a junction

with Suchet would be effected, and the territory which was to be the

prize of the campaign would be lost to the Austrians. But Napoleon

could not be satisfied to let the enemy escape, even at such a

sacrifice of territory, and therefore it was that he left the Ticino

guarded."

In studying these operations, one cannot but be struck by the fact

that Bonaparte seemed extremely anxious to retain his communications

with Switzerland. The arrangement of his forces was admirable for

this purpose. Even when he fought at Marengo, he had unobstructed

communication across the Po to Milan, and thence to the St. Gothard

Pass. Rather than weaken his communications by withdrawing his forces

from the Ticino, he seemed to prefer the hazard of battle with a

superior enemy. In a critical examination of these operations, it is

almost impossible not to come to the conclusion that Bonaparte had a

good reason for holding on to his communications with Switzerland.

Being at the head of the French government, he had control of the

armies of the Republic. He had crossed the Alps to conquer. Much

depended on his success, for his own destiny hung in the balance.

Undoubtedly he intended to return to France triumphant, whatever should

be the cost. He was bold enough to stake all on a single throw--to

hazard his own and his country's fate on a single battle. If he should

be defeated at Marengo and be driven out of the valley of the Po, might

he not retreat through Switzerland into Germany with the remnants of

his forces? Might he not unite them with Moreau's army, crush Kray in

the valley of the Danube, march on the Austrian capital, and "conquer

Italy at Vienna"? Is it not possible that this may have been the reason

why he held on so persistently to his communications with Switzerland?

In this discussion it has just been assumed that Bonaparte might

have been driven out of the valley of the Po. But this assumption

is altogether improbable. Even if Bonaparte had been defeated at

Marengo, the chances of his success on another field in Italy would

still have been greatly in his favor. It needs but a glance at the

situation to substantiate this statement. It is evident that if Melas

had been victorious at Marengo, he would have attempted to open up

his communications with Mantua, by marching eastward from Alessandria

through the Stradella Pass. His victorious troops would have numbered

at the most but twenty-three thousand men. Doubtless Bonaparte, while

holding the Stradella Pass with the detachment already there, would

have fallen back across the Po with the remnants of his defeated

forces, numbering not less than eighteen thousand men; and would have

united them with his columns on the north side of the river. In this

way he could have collected in a short time on the north bank of the

Po an army of about forty thousand men to oppose the twenty-three

thousand under Melas. In this position the French communications would

have been in no danger; but the Austrians, in order to recover their

communications, would have been obliged to force the intrenched camp

of the Stradella; which operation would have given Bonaparte time to

cross the Po and attack the Austrians in flank. Having the advantage of

position and an overwhelming superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would

undoubtedly have crushed and destroyed the army of Melas. If this

statement seems too strong, reflect a moment, remember that during his

entire career Napoleon never lost a battle in which he outnumbered his

adversary.

In the result of the victory at Marengo is seen the brilliancy of

Bonaparte's strategy. Having finally won the battle, northern Italy as

far as the Mincio at once fell into his hands. Notwithstanding the fact

that he failed to outnumber his enemy on the battle-field of Marengo,

his strategy was such that he could fight there with the assurance that

he would lose little if he were defeated, but would gain much if he

were victorious.

On the other hand, Melas fought the battle, knowing that he must

conquer or lose all. Already his communications were in the hands of

Bonaparte. Nothing short of overwhelming victory could wrest them from

the French. Though Melas did not know the number of French troops in

his front, yet, having once decided upon the course to take, he made an

heroic effort to save his army. Courageously he faced the inevitable.

Brave man that he was, when the time came he fought as a soldier should

fight.

After the battle of Montebello, Bonaparte united near the Stradella

Pass all his forces south of the Po. Here he collected twenty-nine

thousand men. Being deficient in cavalry and artillery, while Melas

was well supplied with both, Bonaparte decided to occupy this strong

position, where his flanks would be protected by the Po on one side

and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other. He had every reason

to believe that Melas would shortly advance from Alessandria, cross

the Scrivia, and attempt to cut his way through the French army. If,

therefore, Bonaparte should push westward from the Stradella, he must

expect to meet the Austrians in the plain lying between the Scrivia

and Bormida rivers. Here, however, the superiority of the Austrians

in cavalry and artillery would give them a great tactical advantage.

On the plain their artillery would have full sweep, and their cavalry

could manoeuvre with freedom against the flanks of the French.

Moreover, Bonaparte believed that the Austrian forces, under the

immediate command of Melas, outnumbered those of the French.

It was, therefore, neither wise nor prudent for Bonaparte to leave this

strong position and march westward into the plain of Marengo. Other

reasons, however, caused him to take this course.

First: He feared lest the Austrians should escape. While he remained in

this position, they might march on Genoa, or cross the Po at Valenza,

thence proceed to Pavia and force the crossings of the Ticino.

Second: He wished to attack and defeat the Austrians under Melas before

they could be re-enforced by the numerous other Austrian detachments

scattered throughout Italy. Bonaparte had already delayed his movements

several days to await the arrival of Moncey's corps. During the delay

Masséna had surrendered. Now, Bonaparte was anxious to bring matters to

an issue before other advantages should accrue to the Austrians.

Third: Though from a tactical point of view the chances of success in

the open country were unfavorable to Bonaparte, yet from a strategical

point of view they were greatly in his favor. He had severed the

Austrian communications by closing the great highway leading from

Alessandria to Mantua. Along the Ticino he had a strong force to

prevent Melas from escaping in that direction; in the Stradella Pass

he had established a fortified camp; and from Pavia to Cremona he held

the line of the Po, across which he had constructed five bridges that

could be used for a retreat in case he should be defeated. In the open

country, therefore, a defeat would, at the most, be but a temporary

check, for he could fall back, cross the Po, unite his defeated troops

with the French forces on the north side of the river, and be ready

in a short time to fight another battle. On the other hand, since the

communications of the Austrians were already in possession of the

French, the defeat of Melas must result in the capture or destruction

of his army, and in the loss of northern Italy. It follows, therefore,

that in the plain of Marengo Bonaparte could gain much more by a

victory than he could lose by a defeat.

Fourth: He never was satisfied to take up a defensive position, and

there await an adversary. He seldom fought defensive battles. He

believed in the offensive. His method of making war was to march and to

fight. It was necessary to seek the enemy, to meet him face to face, to

crush him on the battle-field.

At the battle of Marengo, Bonaparte was surprised. Having but a small

cavalry force under his immediate command, he held it in reserve in

rear of his infantry in order that it might, in case of battle, be

used against the Austrian cavalry, which greatly outnumbered his own.

Had he ordered it to the front to seek the Austrians and to screen the

movements of Victor and Lannes, doubtless he would not have remained

completely in the dark as to the position and intention of his enemy.

It has been said that "Cavalry are the eyes of an army." Certainly for

the want of it at Marengo, or for the failure to use what he had for

screening and reconnoitring purposes, Bonaparte lost touch of his enemy.

Again: when he found that the village of Marengo was not occupied in

force by the Austrians, he was led to believe that Melas was trying to

escape. He was still further confirmed in this belief by the result

of the reconnoissance made on the 13th of June from Marengo towards

Alessandria. Though the Austrians were occupying the bridge-head on

the right bank of the Bormida and the two bridges in rear of it, the

French officer in command of the reconnoitring party failed to learn

this fact. Indeed, he reported that no Austrians were to be found in

force along the Bormida. Dumas tells us that "Bonaparte would not go

to bed until he made sure whether the Austrians had a bridge over the

Bormida. At one o'clock in the morning the officer in charge of this

mission returned and reported that it did not exist. This announcement

quieted the First Consul. He required a last account of the position

of his troops, and went to sleep not believing that there would be an

engagement the next day." This false information deceived Bonaparte. It

was, in fact, one of the causes that led to his defeat on the following

morning.

If this reconnoitring party had done its duty, Bonaparte would

undoubtedly have been prepared for battle. In that case he would

have held on to Desaix, and would have concentrated his forces at

Marengo and along the Fontanone. Had he occupied this position with

twenty-eight thousand men, he might have defeated the Austrians in

detail as they crossed the Bormida. Even had Melas succeeded in

crossing the Bormida with his entire army, he would then have been

obliged to fight a great battle with an unfordable river directly in

his rear. Thus situated, the defeat of Melas must have resulted in the

capture or annihilation of his army.

For several days Melas hesitated whether he should cross the Bormida

and attack the French. Owing, however, to the fact that he did not

decide until the 13th of June to attack Bonaparte, he neglected to

occupy Marengo. This neglect permitted Victor to occupy the village,

and aided him materially in resisting the attacks of the Austrians

on the next day. Yet, on the whole, this blunder of Melas proved to

be more advantageous to the Austrians than to the French; for it led

Bonaparte to believe that Melas had no intention of crossing the

Bormida and of attacking the French in the plain of Marengo.

In sending two thousand five hundred cavalry to Acqui to watch Suchet,

Melas committed an error that probably lost him the battle. There was

little or no excuse for this error; for Suchet was so far away that

he could not possibly arrive at Marengo in time to take part in the

battle. Had Melas kept this cavalry force on the battle-field, and

thrown it vigorously against the French as they fell back towards San

Giuliano, he would undoubtedly have won the battle. It was the failure

of the Austrians to pursue the French promptly that enabled Bonaparte

to rally the scattered remnants of his defeated forces near San

Giuliano. Says Colonel Hart:--

"When a great battle is imminent, it is unwise for a commander to

detach any part of the force available, unless he is very confident

of victory. There are many examples in history of misfortune, or

misfortune narrowly escaped, in consequence of doing so. Melas would,

in all probability, have made perfectly certain of the victory at

Marengo, if he had not unnecessarily detached 2500 cavalry to arrest

the march of Suchet, who was at too great a distance to be taken

into consideration. Napoleon himself at Marengo, although ultimately

victorious, was as nearly as possible defeated because he detached

Desaix to reconnoitre towards Rivalta; indeed, he was at first

defeated, but the return of Desaix restored the battle."

It is here worthy of notice that while Melas was sending away this

detachment of two thousand five hundred men, Bonaparte was making every

effort to hasten the return of the six thousand men under Desaix.

At the sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo, Desaix faced about

his command and hurried forward to aid Bonaparte. It was fortunate that

the First Consul had Desaix for a lieutenant at Marengo. Had Grouchy

marched to the sound of the cannon at Waterloo, and supported his chief

as loyally as did Desaix at Marengo, Napoleon might never have fallen.

If Suchet, who was at Acqui with the remnants of the Army of Italy,

numbering about twenty thousand men, had pushed on vigorously towards

Marengo, and had arrived there on the morning of the 14th of June, the

battle would have been decided in favor of the French early in the day.

Such a movement would have given Bonaparte an overwhelming superiority

in numbers, and would probably have resulted in the destruction or

capture of the whole army of Melas.

That Suchet did not take this course was due to several causes. The

soldiers of the Army of Italy had just finished a great fight. They

had already performed heroically their part in the great struggle.

Many of them, too, having starved and suffered at Genoa, had become so

emaciated that they could hardly bear the weight of their equipments.

Moreover, Suchet, who was still acting under the orders of Masséna, had

been cautioned not to peril his army by advancing too far. Inasmuch

as Bonaparte had been more than twenty days in Italy, and had not

yet destroyed Melas, Masséna was somewhat doubtful of the outcome.

Consequently he wished to hold the Army of Italy well in hand, so that,

in case Bonaparte should be defeated, it could fall back to the Var,

and, being there re-enforced from the departments of southern France,

make another effort to save France from invasion.

On the morning of the 14th of June the forces of Melas concentrated at

Alessandria numbered thirty-two thousand men. He held the two bridges

spanning the Bormida, and the bridge-head on the right bank. On the

opposite side of the river the French forces available for battle

numbered twenty-two thousand men. In addition, Desaix's division,

if it could be recalled in time, would increase the French forces

to twenty-eight thousand. Early in the day Melas had despatched

two thousand five hundred men of his reserve cavalry on Acqui. It

will thus be seen that the opposing forces at Marengo were about

equal in strength: the Austrians numbered twenty-nine thousand five

hundred men; the French, twenty-eight thousand. But at the outset the

advantages were greatly in favor of Melas. He outnumbered Bonaparte in

both cavalry and artillery, and the plain of Marengo was especially

favorable to these arms. His forces were united; the French were

scattered. Desaix's division was marching on Novi; and the remainder of

Bonaparte's forces extended over a distance of ten miles from Marengo

to and even beyond the Scrivia. Moreover, Bonaparte was not expecting

a battle. Thus it happened that when the Austrians crossed the Bormida,

the French were surprised and outnumbered. At first Victor bore the

brunt of the fight; then he and Lannes were attacked by nearly the

whole Austrian army. By the time Bonaparte arrived on the field with

the Consular Guard, the reserve cavalry, and Monnier's division, Victor

was crushed and Lannes badly shattered. It was then too late for the

re-enforcement under Bonaparte to turn the tide of battle. That too was

soon overwhelmed. In short, Melas defeated the French forces in detail.

During that morning he was always stronger than his adversary at the

decisive points.

In the afternoon all was changed. The Austrians were scattered; they

stretched from Marengo to San Giuliano. Moreover, they were marching

carelessly and had no expectation that Bonaparte would attack them.

Meanwhile, Desaix had returned, and Bonaparte's forces had rallied

behind the hillocks near San Giuliano. In a short time Bonaparte

overthrew the advance under Zach, then proceeding westward, gathering

momentum and strength as a result of his first success, he outnumbered

and crushed in succession the several Austrian organizations. Thus the

Austrians were defeated in detail in the afternoon as the French had

been defeated in the morning. Here again is seen the necessity of

outnumbering an enemy at the vital point of the battle-field. Courage

and heroism on the field of battle are of little avail, unless a

commander concentrates his forces and outnumbers his adversary at the

decisive point. The brain of the commanding general is the birthplace

of victory.

In this battle the genius of Bonaparte is seen, not in the knowledge

he displayed of his adversary's doings, for Bonaparte was completely

surprised at Marengo; not in the arrangement of his forces, for that

could hardly have been worse; not in any deeds of surpassing courage,

for no one could excel the heroism of Lannes on that battle-field; but

in his complete mastery of the situation,--in the fact that, amidst

turmoil, ruin, and death, he saw just when and where and how the blow

should be struck to change disaster into victory. This was the merit of

Bonaparte at Marengo. On that field he was a great tactical captain.

While the storm of battle was at its height, and the dying and the

dead were around him, he was cool, clear-headed, and vigilant. While

disaster was staring him in the face, he saw the vulnerable spot in

the formation of his adversary's forces, and by massing troops there,

crushed and overwhelmed them.

In this campaign Bonaparte was fortunate in having a Masséna at Genoa,

a Suchet on the Var, and a Lannes at Montebello and at Marengo. He was

fortunate, too, in having a Desaix near at hand, who dared march to

the sound of the cannon, and who counselled hope when he might have

counselled despair.

Though these operations of Bonaparte were brilliant in strategic

manoeuvres and in far-reaching results, nevertheless they were faulty

in execution. Out of a total force of fifty-five thousand men, the

greater part of whom might have been present on the battle-field of

Marengo, only twenty-eight thousand fought there. Instead of calling

in his detachments before the engagement, and of outnumbering his

enemy on the battle-field, as had always been his plan heretofore, he

permitted himself to be outnumbered by Melas. Rather than let a single

Austrian escape, he took great chances on the battle-field. In short,

he attempted to grasp too much; and, by doing so, sacrificed a certain

amount of safety. Doubtless within his breast there was the feeling

that he would stake all and abide by the consequences. Reckless of the

sequel, he pressed on with the faith of a fatalist, little realizing

how much glory and how much gloom yet remained in store for him. It

would seem that his triumph was written in the stars; perhaps, too, his

fall was written there.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 8: See Maps 2 and 4.]

[Footnote 9: In his memoirs and in other places Napoleon often speaks

of "lines of operations," meaning "lines of communication." Every

advancing army must necessarily have a line of operations. If the roads

leading from an army to its base are held by the enemy, the army is

said to have lost its communications; in other words, to have lost

its line of communication with its base of operations. The point that

Napoleon intended to make in the discussion is this: Fort Bard being

at the time in possession of the Austrians, the French army had no

unobstructed line of communication back to its base of operations at

Lake Geneva; hence, if defeated, it would find great difficulty in

retreating by this route.]

[Footnote 10: An army _forms front to a flank_ when it operates on a

front parallel to the line communicating with its base.]