MOREAU IN GERMANY.[7]
Lying in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg
is a mountainous region known as the Black Forest, which takes its
name from the dark foliage of its pine timber. The general shape of
the Black Forest is that of a triangle; its base resting on the Rhine
between Lake Constance and Bâle, and its apex pointing north. Its total
length is ninety-three miles; its breadth varies from forty-six to
thirteen miles, and its average elevation is about three thousand feet.
On the south and west sides the mountains are rugged and steep, but on
the east side they descend gradually to the lower level of the adjacent
country.
Within its limits the Black Forest presents an almost impassable
barrier to an army attempting to enter Germany from France. A few roads
lead through it; but they lie in the fissures of the mountains, and are
therefore difficult for the passage of troops. Extending into the Black
Forest opposite Strasburg is the Kinzig Valley, and opposite Brisach
are the Höllenthal (valley of Hell) and the valley of Waldkirch. At
Bâle the valley of the Rhine is narrow, but at a short distance below
that point it begins to widen till it reaches a breadth of fifteen
miles. Good roads extend along the Rhine on both sides, and bridges
span the river at Bâle, Strasburg, and Mayence.
The opposing armies were thus stationed: Moreau's right wing,
twenty-nine thousand strong, commanded by General Lecourbe, was in
Switzerland along the Rhine from Lauffenberg to Lake Constance. Next on
the left was the reserve of twenty-six thousand, commanded by Moreau
in person; it occupied the intrenched camp at Bâle and extended some
distance along the Rhine both above and below the city. The centre,
consisting of thirty thousand soldiers, under General St. Cyr, joined
the left of the reserve near Brisach, and stretched north almost to
Strasburg. The left wing, nineteen thousand strong, under General Ste.
Suzanne, occupied Strasburg and the bridge-head of Kehl on the opposite
shore. Besides these forces, about twenty-six thousand were occupying
Switzerland and the frontier fortresses of France along the Rhine as
far north as Mayence.
On the Austrian side, sixteen thousand soldiers, under General Starray,
were posted from Mayence to Renchen; and fifteen thousand, under
General Kienmayer, were guarding the defiles of the Black Forest from
Renchen to the Höllenthal. These two corps constituted Kray's right
wing. The main body, forty thousand strong, commanded by Kray himself,
was at Villingen and Donaueschingen; and the reserve, numbering
nineteen thousand, was guarding the Austrian magazines at Stokach.
Cavalry detachments and outposts, to the number of about five thousand,
from these several corps, were observing the Rhine and the defiles
of the Black Forest; and an Austrian flotilla was on Lake Constance.
Beyond the lake was Kray's left wing, numbering about twenty-five
thousand men, of whom six or seven thousand were Tyrolese militia. This
wing was commanded by Prince de Reuss, and extended well up into the
mountains bordering eastern Switzerland, thence eastward into the Tyrol.
The natural base of operations for Kray's army was the Bohemian
Mountains and the Enns River, which are about two hundred miles east
of the Black Forest. The Austrian lines of communication to this base
were over two roads: one by way of Stokach, Memmingen, and Munich; the
other along the Danube by way of Mosskirch, Ulm, and Ratisbon. The
temporary base of operations for the Austrians in the Black Forest was
Ulm. At this place, during the preceding year, the Archduke Charles had
constructed an immense intrenched camp.
Knowing that it was necessary to gain a decisive victory over the
Austrians in the Black Forest before the Army of Reserve could begin
its operations in Italy, the First Consul submitted a plan of campaign
which he desired Moreau to carry out. Bonaparte proposed that Moreau
should concentrate his forces on the south side of the Rhine between
Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, cross the river in force, and attack
the flank and rear of the Austrians in the Black Forest. He calculated
that, by an attack in this direction, Moreau would be able to defeat
Kray, sever his communications, and either capture or destroy his army.
To this plan Moreau objected. It seemed to him a difficult operation.
Cautious by nature, he looked upon the proposed manoeuvres of Bonaparte
as being too bold and hazardous. He argued that his left and centre
would have to make long flank marches in order to join his right; and
that while the movements were taking place Kray would be given the
opportunity of concentrating his forces near Schaffhausen, where he
could oppose the passage of the French corps, or crush them in detail
as they crossed the river.
The First Consul replied that the Rhine afforded just the kind
of protection necessary to screen the French corps during their
concentration; and that these manoeuvres, if successfully executed,
would, in a short time, bring about great results.
But Moreau, who appreciated the difficulties of forcing the passage
of a large river in the face of an active enemy, believed that the
risk was too great, and therefore refused to attempt the execution of
Bonaparte's plan. Instead, he proposed the following plan. His left,
under Ste. Suzanne, was to cross the Rhine at Kehl, and his centre,
under St. Cyr, at Brisach. Both corps were to push forward, attack
Kienmayer, and drive him into the defiles of the Black Forest. Moreau
calculated that these attacks would lead Kray to believe that the
French forces were massing in front of his right wing, and would cause
him to re-enforce Kienmayer. Having driven the Austrians back into
the Black Forest, and thus given the impression that the principal
attack of the French would be made from the direction of Strasburg,
Ste. Suzanne and St. Cyr were to withdraw suddenly. The former was to
recross the Rhine at Kehl, ascend the river, cross again to the German
side at Brisach, and take the position formerly occupied by St. Cyr;
the latter was to make a flank march over the spurs and hills towards
Schaffhausen by way of St. Blazien. Meanwhile Moreau with the reserve
was to cross the Rhine at Bâle and march towards Schaffhausen, where,
upon his arrival, his right, under Lecourbe, was to cross the river
and join him. As soon as these movements were completed, Ste. Suzanne
was to march towards Lake Constance by way of Friburg, Neustadt, and
Loffingen. By this series of complicated manoeuvres, Moreau expected to
unite the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen, and to
march thence against the flank of Kray in the Black Forest.
Though the First Consul was anxious to have his plan adopted; though he
had, in fact, already begun to collect boats in the Rhine preparatory
to crossing the river near Schaffhausen, yet Moreau persisted in his
own views. Nevertheless, Bonaparte hoped to convince him. With this
end in view, he explained the proposed manoeuvres and pointed out
their advantages to General Dessoles, Moreau's chief of staff. Through
this officer, who had an acute intellect and sound judgment, the First
Consul hoped to change the views of Moreau himself. Though General
Dessoles soon perceived that the plan of Bonaparte was superior to
that of Moreau, nevertheless he advised the First Consul to allow
Moreau to carry out his own ideas. "Your plan," said he to Bonaparte,
"is grander, more decisive, and probably even surer; but it is not
adapted to the genius of the man who is to execute it. You have a
method of making war which is superior to all others; Moreau has his
own,--inferior doubtless to yours, but still an excellent one. Leave
him to himself; he will act well, slowly perhaps, but surely; and he
will obtain as many results for you as are necessary for the success
of your general combinations. If, on the contrary, you impose your
ideas on him, you will disconcert him, you will wound his self-love,
and obtain nothing from him by seeking to obtain too much." The First
Consul appreciated the wisdom of these remarks, coming from such a man,
and yielded the point. "You are right," said he to General Dessoles.
"Moreau is not capable of grasping and executing the plan that I have
conceived. Let him follow his own course; only let him push back
Marshal Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and afterwards move his right
wing in time upon Switzerland. The plan which he does not understand,
and dares not execute, I myself will carry out on another part of
the theatre of war. What he dares not attempt on the Rhine, I will
accomplish on the Alps."
It being settled that Moreau should proceed against the Austrians in
his own way, Bonaparte now wished to come to an understanding with him
by which a corps of twenty or twenty-five thousand men should, at the
proper time, be detached from the Army of the Rhine, and be sent across
Switzerland to unite in Italy with the Army of Reserve. But Moreau did
not enter heartily into any of the plans proposed by the First Consul.
In fact, both he and Bonaparte seemed to distrust each other. Whether
from jealousy, or from honest convictions, Moreau opposed the plans
of Bonaparte. Moreover, he had declared that he would not serve under
the First Consul, should the latter unite the Army of Reserve with
the Army of the Rhine. Naturally this opposition created in the mind
of Bonaparte a doubt of Moreau's good faith. He feared that, at the
critical moment, the commander of the Army of the Rhine might fail to
send a corps into Italy. He was well aware that the commander of an
army is always reluctant to weaken his forces after operations have
begun; and he knew that circumstances might arise which would seem
to justify Moreau in refusing to obey the orders of his superior. He
therefore insisted that Moreau should sign a stipulation whereby he
promised that, after pushing Kray back from Lake Constance, he would
detach Lecourbe with twenty or twenty-five thousand men, and order him
into Italy. This agreement was signed at Bâle by Moreau and General
Berthier, the latter representing the First Consul.
Nearly a month had passed since the arrangements between Bonaparte
and Moreau had been completed. It was now the latter part of April,
yet Moreau had made no movement to cross the Rhine and attack Kray.
Naturally cautious and slow, he had postponed his advance from day
to day, in order, if possible, to supply his army with everything
necessary to increase its fighting power. He was short of cavalry
and artillery horses, and had little or no camp equipage, and no
intrenching tools. But at this time it was impossible for him to obtain
everything he needed. Already Bonaparte had sent to the Army of the
Rhine all the spare material of war that he could collect in France.
Now he was anxious to have Moreau advance. Masséna was hard pressed at
Genoa, and Bonaparte desired to march into Italy in order to relieve
him. But to cross the Alps and throw himself upon the rear of Melas,
while Kray remained undefeated in the Black Forest, was too hazardous
an undertaking. Much therefore depended upon the early advance of
Moreau. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged him to press forward, and finally
sent him a positive order to cross the Rhine and attack Kray.
On the 25th of April Moreau began his movement. Ste. Suzanne crossed
the Rhine at Kehl, ascended the Kinzig valley, and pushed Kienmayer's
outposts back into the Black Forest. At the same time St. Cyr crossed
at Brisach; one division of his corps then advanced towards the Kinzig
valley, while the other divisions forced back the Austrians at Friburg,
and occupied the entrance to the Höllenthal.
On the next day Kray at Donaueschingen heard of these movements.
Having received word that a part of his right wing had been attacked
by forty thousand men, he was led to believe that Moreau intended to
force his way through the Black Forest by way of the Kinzig valley. He
therefore sent seven thousand Austrians from Villingen to re-enforce
Kienmayer, and to replace these troops withdrew seven thousand men from
his reserve at Stokach. At the same time he ordered his extreme right,
under Starray, to move towards the main army into the valley of the
Murg.
On the 27th of April Ste. Suzanne withdrew his corps from its advanced
position preparatory to recrossing the Rhine at Kehl. St. Cyr, having
directed his artillery and trains to follow the river road on the right
bank towards Schaffhausen, led his infantry across the hills towards
St. Blazien. Moreau crossed the Rhine at Bâle with the reserve; one
of his divisions, commanded by General Richepanse, then ascended the
Weiss River, so as to join the right of St. Cyr's corps; the other
two, commanded by Moreau in person, marched up the Rhine towards
Schaffhausen.
On the following day Ste. Suzanne recrossed at Kehl, and proceeded up
the left bank of the Rhine towards Brisach. St. Cyr, having united a
part of his forces with Richepanse's division, occupied St. Blazien.
Moreau himself forced a passage across the Alle River, and drove back
an Austrian brigade there, which retreated towards Bonndorf.
On the 30th of April Ste. Suzanne, having arrived at Brisach, again
crossed the Rhine to the German side, and took up the position at
Friburg, at the entrance to the Höllenthal, recently occupied by St.
Cyr's troops. St. Cyr remained in the vicinity of St. Blazien. Moreau
advanced upon the Wutach River, and Lecourbe concentrated his corps on
the south bank of the Rhine near Schaffhausen, preparatory to crossing
the river at that point.
Thus the French corps continued to push forward. On the 1st of May
Moreau reached Schaffhausen, where he was joined by Lecourbe's corps,
part of which crossed the river in boats, and the remainder over
a bridge temporarily constructed for the purpose. St. Cyr reached
Stuhlingen, and Ste. Suzanne, having driven back the Austrian brigade
occupying the Höllenthal, arrived at Neustadt.
During these movements the Austrian outposts along the Rhine fell back
before Moreau to Stuhlingen, and, upon St. Cyr's arrival at that place,
retreated upon Zollhaus. Meanwhile Kray had directed part of his own
immediate command upon Loffingen and Zollhaus. Kienmayer, with the
greater part of his forces, still remained in the valley of the Kinzig,
and Starray in the valley of the Murg.
Thus the first part of Moreau's plan was successfully executed. As
yet he had met with no reverse. His forces had driven before them the
Austrian outposts and advance brigades, till now three of his corps,
numbering eighty-five thousand men, were within supporting distance of
one another on the north side of the Rhine near Schaffhausen. From this
favorable position he could march at once against Kray in the Black
Forest, and outnumber him almost two to one; for Kray could not expect
immediate aid from his left wing, which was beyond Lake Constance on
the borders of eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol, or from his right
wing, which was far away in the valleys of the Kinzig and the Murg.
Kray now began to appreciate the insecurity of his position. He
perceived that his reserve and immense magazines at Stokach were in
danger. Should Moreau capture this place and push rapidly forward
towards Ulm, he would sever the Austrian communications, and thus place
Kray in a position where a defeat would ruin his army. In order to
prevent, if possible, such a result, Kray decided to unite his forces
at Stokach, and there give battle to Moreau. With this end in view,
Kray caused the following movements to be made. On the 2d of May the
Austrian brigade that had been driven from Neustadt by the advance of
Ste. Suzanne, moved to Bonndorf; the Austrians at Bonndorf marched to
Zollhaus; and those at Zollhaus, to Geisingen, where Kray had collected
the Austrian troops under his immediate command. On the 3d of May his
columns advanced towards Stokach over the Geisingen-Engen road.
Meanwhile Moreau was not idle. On the 3d of May he moved on Engen with
the reserve; St. Cyr on Zollhaus; and Lecourbe, having directed two
brigades to ascend the Aach River, in order to connect with the right
of the reserve, marched on Stokach with about twenty thousand men,
attacked and defeated the twelve thousand Austrians there, captured the
immense magazines, and forced the Austrians back towards Ulm by way of
Mosskirch and by way of Memmingen. But after this victory Lecourbe, not
receiving any orders from Moreau to push forward and seize Mosskirch,
remained in the vicinity of Stokach, awaiting the result of the
operations of Moreau at Engen.
Meanwhile Kray, on his way to Stokach, had reached Engen before the
arrival of Moreau. In this position his troops, numbering about
forty-five thousand men, faced south with their left at Engen and their
right extended towards Zollhaus. Moreau soon arrived with the reserve.
His forces, counting the two brigades on his right detached from
Lecourbe's corps, numbered about forty thousand men. At once Moreau
began the battle. Fiercely and desperately the French and Austrians
fought for several hours, but neither gained a decided advantage.
Finally, late in the day, St. Cyr, who had received orders from Moreau
to hurry forward from Zollhaus, arrived and began an attack upon the
right of the Austrians, which caused them to give way. But this attack
was made too late to produce any decisive result. The Austrians,
though forced at last to yield, were not crushed; in fact, Engen was
little more than a drawn battle. But, during the night, Kray, having
learned of the capture of Stokach, began to fear that Lecourbe would
push forward, seize Mosskirch, and sever his communications with Ulm.
He therefore decided to retreat. Leaving a rear guard to hold Moreau
in check, he directed his forces upon Tuttlingen, Liptengen, and
Mosskirch. At the battle of Engen each side lost in killed, wounded,
and captured, about seven thousand men.
Kray now determined to unite as many of his troops as possible at
Mosskirch, and there to make a stand against the French, who were
pushing eagerly forward towards Ulm. Already he had sent word to
General Starray and General Kienmayer to descend the left bank of the
Danube, and join him at the earliest possible moment.
On the 4th of May Moreau directed his own corps and that of Lecourbe on
Mosskirch; St. Cyr arrived at Geisingen; and Ste. Suzanne, who had been
forcing his way through the Black Forest, was at Donaueschingen.
On the following day Kray, having been joined by the remnants of
his reserve, beaten at Stokach, took position at Mosskirch with
forty thousand men. His right was at Tuttlingen, about twelve miles
distant; but Kienmayer and Starray were beyond supporting distance on
the north side of the Danube. On this day Moreau attacked Kray with
fifty thousand men, and, after hard fighting, succeeded in forcing
the Austrians back towards Sigmaringen. But Kray did not retire far.
Being anxious for the safety of the Austrian troops at Tuttlingen,
he halted, formed line of battle, and with the right of his line
strongly re-enforced, attacked the French and drove them from the
Tuttlingen-Mosskirch road. This success opened his communications with
the Austrians at Tuttlingen, and enabled them to join him. Being thus
re-enforced, he again attacked the left flank of Moreau, and attempted
to seize the Stokach-Mosskirch road. But in his attempt to outflank the
French, he was in turn outflanked by them, and was again compelled to
retire.
In the battle of Mosskirch the Austrians lost in killed, wounded, and
prisoners, about five thousand men; the French, about three thousand.
In this battle both sides fought fiercely, but neither gained a decided
success. Nevertheless, Kray saw the necessity of retreating; for St.
Cyr, who had taken no part in the battle, was now about to join Moreau;
and Ste. Suzanne was pushing rapidly forward towards Mosskirch by way
of Tuttlingen. In other words, Kray, with less than fifty thousand
men, could not expect to hold his own in a second battle at Mosskirch
against the united French corps.
Kray crossed the Danube at Sigmaringen, and, being joined by the two
corps of his right wing, retired towards Ulm by way of Rietlingen
and Biberach. He was followed by Moreau. Lecourbe marched by way of
Memmingen, St. Cyr by way of Biberach, and Ste. Suzanne descended
the Danube towards Ulm. At Biberach Kray attempted to make a stand,
in order to save the Austrian magazines there, but was defeated
with considerable loss. Lecourbe also defeated an Austrian garrison
occupying Memmingen, and captured the place.
On the 11th of May Kray continued his retreat on Ulm, which, through
the foresight of the Archduke Charles in the preceding year, had been
converted into a strongly intrenched camp. At Ulm Kray sought and found
safety for his army. Here he collected the shattered remains of his
defeated forces, and for several weeks made a successful stand against
Moreau. Here, eyeing each other with suspicion, these two armies
remained for a time, each ready to take advantage of any false movement
of the other, while more stirring operations and greater deeds were
happening in the valley of the Po.
It is difficult to estimate accurately the losses sustained by the
contending armies in these operations. Probably the loss of the
Austrians was about twenty thousand men; that of the French, about
fifteen thousand. At the opening of hostilities, Kray's forces, not
counting the left wing under the Prince de Reuss, since it took no part
in the active operations, numbered ninety-five thousand men. At Ulm
Kray had seventy-five thousand. On the other hand, Moreau had crossed
the Rhine with one hundred and four thousand soldiers, and had reached
Ulm with nearly ninety thousand; but he was about to send fifteen
thousand men into Italy, which would leave the opposing armies about
equal in numbers.
The time had arrived for the commander of the Army of the Rhine to
carry out the agreement entered into between himself and the First
Consul. In fact, since the battle of Engen, Bonaparte had awaited
anxiously for Moreau to start the promised re-enforcements towards
Italy. Fearing that Moreau might still delay in the matter, the First
Consul had sent Carnot, the French minister of war, to Moreau's
headquarters, in order to make the necessary arrangements, and to
insist that the troops should be detached and ordered forward at the
earliest possible moment.
Moreau did not comply fully with the agreement entered into with the
First Consul, but on the 11th and 12th of May he selected fifteen
thousand men from the different French corps, united these troops into
a single corps and ordered it to proceed into Italy.
Though Moreau had not succeeded in severing the communications of
Kray, and in capturing or destroying his army, he had been generally
successful in his manoeuvres; he had pushed the Austrians back from
Lake Constance, defeated them at Stokach and Engen, forced them to
retreat after the battle of Mosskirch, and compelled them to seek
security in the intrenched camp of Ulm. Though he had retained General
Lecourbe and his corps in the valley of the Danube, and had failed to
send into Italy the full number agreed upon in the stipulation with
the First Consul, nevertheless, he had weakened his army by fifteen
thousand men, and, by so doing, had given Bonaparte the opportunity of
bringing to a successful issue one of the most striking and dramatic
campaigns of his career.
COMMENTS.
In order to understand clearly the strategical problems presented by
these operations, it is necessary to keep in mind the positions of the
French and Austrian forces, and the topography of the country in which
these manoeuvres and battles took place.
Picture to yourself the French forces occupying Switzerland and France
on the left bank of the Rhine as far north as Strasburg; and on the
opposite side of the river, the long line of the Austrians, their left
on the borders of eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol, their right
extending far to the north, even to Mayence, and their centre, forming
the main part of the Austrian army, occupying the Black Forest with
advanced brigades and outposts pushed forward almost to the banks of
the Rhine. Picture to yourself the triangular mountain system of the
Black Forest, lying in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance
and Strasburg, like a huge bastion, its south and west sides steep and
rugged, and its hills and mountains covered with a dark forest of pines
and firs. Picture to yourself the fifteen thousand Austrians, under
Kienmayer, along the rugged west face of this mountain group; the forty
thousand, under the immediate command of Marshal Kray, lying on the
eastern slope of this great barrier of mountains and hills; the reserve
of nineteen thousand at Stokach on the direct road between Schaffhausen
and Ulm, and but a day's march from the French in Switzerland; the
magazines at Stokach, Engen, Mosskirch, and Biberach, upon which Kray
depended for his supplies; and the immense intrenched camp at Ulm,
which, lying in his rear upon the Danube, was the temporary base of the
Austrians in the Black Forest.
By occupying all the valleys, roads, and prominent points in the
theatre of operations, the Austrians expected to hold military
possession of the country. Their system of war was to form a chain of
posts--a cordon--along the line to be occupied; and by this means they
expected to prevent the advance of the enemy. Thus the Austrian army
was scattered over a great extent of country from the Tyrol to Lake
Constance, thence through the Black Forest to the Main River. Their
line was more than three hundred miles in extent.
Kray had extended his right wing as far north as Mayence, in order
to protect the troops in the Black Forest from a French attack on
that side. Since Moreau held the line of the Rhine, possibly he
might attempt to cross at Mayence, thence, using the Main River to
screen his movements, might march to Wurtzburg, and from that point
march south on Ulm. By such a manoeuvre, he could sever Kray's
communications, take the Austrians in rear in the Black Forest, and
compel them to fight with their face towards Vienna, in order to
recover their communications. But, in order to protect himself on this
side, Kray had extended Starray's corps too far north; it consisted
of but sixteen thousand soldiers, and was so scattered from Mayence
to Renchen, a distance of one hundred miles, that it was weak at all
points. Moreover, it was so far distant from the main Austrian forces
in the Black Forest that it could neither readily aid them in case they
should be attacked in force, nor be readily aided by them should Moreau
attempt to make a flank movement against the Austrian right.
But a greater fault in the situation of the Austrian army was due to
the fact that the Aulic Council had given orders that Kray's left
wing, under the Prince de Reuss, should remain on the borders of
eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol. This wing could not, therefore,
re-enforce Kray in the Black Forest. With his left thus paralyzed by
the action of the Aulic Council, Kray found himself hampered throughout
the campaign.
Kray committed another error in collecting immense magazines at
Stokach; for this place, being but a day's march from the French forces
in Switzerland, was not only the most vulnerable but also the most
important point occupied by the Austrians. Lying in a gap between Lake
Constance and the mountains of Switzerland on one side, and the Black
Forest on the other, and being on the direct road from Schaffhausen
to Ulm, it was, so to speak, the vital point of the long Austrian
line. Along this route the French would be most likely to advance
into Germany; for they could ascend the Rhine by the river roads,
thence proceed to Stokach, and thus avoid the great natural barrier
of the Black Forest. Moreover, by adopting this plan there were great
strategical advantages to be gained.
First: Should the French capture Stokach, they would permanently
separate the Austrian left from the centre and right. Thus they would
divide the forces of the Austrians, and might thereafter be able to
defeat them in detail.
Second: Should the French capture Stokach, they would be in a favorable
position to march north against the Austrians and sever their
communications with Ulm. In this position, the French, if defeated,
could fall back to Schaffhausen, and recross the river there with
little or no danger of losing their communications; but the Austrians,
being obliged to form their line of battle parallel, or nearly so,
to the roads leading to their base, would, if defeated, be thrown
back into the Black Forest, where doubtless they would be captured
or destroyed. In short, the success of the French at Stokach would
enable them to carry out two great principles of war: not only would
they divide the forces of their enemy, and thus eventually be able
to defeat them in detail; but they would gain a position where they
could threaten the communications of Kray in the Black Forest without
exposing their own to his attacks.
In the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg, Kray
had but eighty thousand soldiers. Upon this force he had to rely in
order to repel any attack which the French might make in the Black
Forest; for his extreme right, under Starray, and his left, under
Prince de Reuss, were too far away to support his centre before the
French could unite to attack it. Bearing in mind that the French
crossed the Rhine with one hundred and four thousand soldiers, we
perceive that the opportunity was offered Moreau of bringing superior
numbers against Kray. In other words, should both opposing commanders
succeed in uniting all their available forces upon a battle-field in
the Black Forest, Moreau would outnumber Kray in about the proportion
of four to three. As the first principle of war is to be stronger than
the enemy at the vital point, it is always of the greatest importance
that no plan of campaign be adopted, which shall, at the very start,
allow the enemy to bring superior numbers on the battle-field.
In withdrawing seven thousand men from Stokach to replace the seven
thousand sent from Villingen to re-enforce Kienmayer, Kray committed
another error. In fact, at the outset of the campaign he weakened
the garrison of the most important point of the whole Austrian line,
by sending away more than one third of the troops there. Thus,
unconsciously, he played into the hands of his adversary; for at
the very time that these troops were leaving Stokach, Moreau was so
regulating his manoeuvres as to make in the near future his first great
effort against Kray at or near that place.
Had the left wing of the Austrian army not been ordered to remain along
the eastern borders of Switzerland, it would seem that it might have
marched north along the east side of Lake Constance, and have struck
the flank and rear of the French as they proceeded from Stokach towards
Ulm. Doubtless such a manoeuvre would have produced great results; but
it must be remembered that the French, still in Switzerland, might then
have crossed the Rhine above Lake Constance, and have attacked the
flank and rear of the Austrian left wing.
Says General Hamley:--
"In former years the base of the Republican armies operating in
Germany had been some part of the straight course of the Rhine,
from its corner at Bâle to Dusseldorf. Their eminent adversary, the
Archduke Charles, says that the strong line of the Rhine, and the
line of French fortresses behind it, can only be assailed by the
Austrians in circumstances unusually favorable. All that can be done
is to approach and choose a position where the plans of the enemy may
be defeated, his advance stopped, and the country behind covered.
"The armies on the Rhine had hitherto been on parallel fronts;
the Austrians generally on the defensive, since the exceptionally
favorable circumstances which could alone enable them to assume the
offensive by passing the Rhine had not existed. The French, breaking
out at one or the other of the bridge-heads which they possessed on
the river, would try to press forward into Germany; the Austrians,
drawing together on the threatened points, would oppose them: and the
result was that, in 1800, the river still formed the frontier line
between them.
"But in 1800 a new condition had entered into the problem of a
campaign on the Rhine. The French had occupied Switzerland, an act
which entailed military results such as few generals of that time
had the foresight to appreciate. One was to carry the French base
onward from Bâle, round the angle to Schaffhausen. Thus that base,
originally straight, was now rectangular, and enclosed within it a
part of the theatre of war."
Herein is to be found in part the explanation of Kray's faulty
arrangement of his forces. Had Switzerland been neutral territory, his
reserve and magazines at Stokach would not have been within striking
distance of the French. Had Switzerland been neutral territory, the
French could not have made a flank movement against his forces in the
Black Forest, and thus have been given the opportunity of severing his
communications with Ulm. In fact, the possession of Switzerland gave
many advantages to Moreau, and enabled him to force the Austrians back
to Ulm, notwithstanding the fact that he committed many errors and
gained no great victory.
It will now be apparent that Kray had taken up a position too far
to the front; and that, by so doing, he had allowed the French to
take advantage of the angular base of operations formed by northern
Switzerland and eastern France. "Although Kray showed himself
superior to Moreau," says Colonel Macdougall, "his faults were
serious. He disseminated his army along the line of the Rhine in too
forward a position, since his rear was exposed to attack by a French
force operating from Schaffhausen. He established his magazines at
Stokach, Engen, and Mosskirch, close to a part of the French base. If
Switzerland had been friendly or neutral, his magazines in those places
would have been well placed, since they would in that case have been
covered by the defiles of the Black Forest; as it was, they were quite
at the advanced posts."
Moreau's plan of campaign did not differ greatly from that of
Bonaparte. In fact, both he and the First Consul aimed to concentrate
the French in force between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance. In order
to effect the concentration, however, Moreau purposed to cross the
Rhine at four points, then by a series of complicated manoeuvres to
unite the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen. On the
other hand, Bonaparte's plan was to assemble the French corps on the
south side of the Rhine opposite Schaffhausen, to cross the river in
force near that place, and thence proceed against Kray. In an able and
interesting discussion of these two plans, General Hamley says:--
"The plans of campaign of Napoleon and of Moreau had this in
common, that both aimed at the communications of the Austrians by
an advance from the extreme point of the angular base; but in the
mode of effecting the common object they differed materially, and
the difference was the result of the individual characters of the
projectors. When Napoleon's glance was once fixed on the point where
decisive success lay, the obstacles in his way lost, in his mind,
much of their importance, and were viewed merely as difficult steps
to his object. Hence, though he neglected no provision nor precaution
which prudence and experience could suggest for overcoming them, yet
he never allowed them to assume an importance sufficient to deprive
his plan of campaign of its fullest significance. Disregarding,
therefore, the fact that he must throw his army entire at one point
across a great river which was observed by the enemy, he looked only
to the great results that must flow from the advance of that army,
concentrated, upon the vital point of an enemy whose forces would
still be in greater or less degree dispersed.
"Moreau, cautious and forecasting by nature, saw in his mind's eye
the Austrian army assembled opposite Schaffhausen to oppose his
passage,--baffling the whole plan. All his precautions, therefore,
were framed to obviate the danger of crossing in the face of the
enemy. Only one corps was to cross at Schaffhausen,--another, the
reserve, was to cross at Bâle to cover the passage; this entailed the
movement of a third through the mountains to cover the long flank
march of the reserve along the river; and a fourth was to make a
false attack in order to detain the Austrian troops in the defiles as
long as possible, and prevent them from re-enforcing the left.
"It is probable that Napoleon's plan would have miscarried in the
hands of Moreau; but looking at other achievements of Bonaparte,--his
descent on the Austrian rear in Italy a few weeks later,--his
decisive march to the Danube in 1805 on the other side of the present
theatre,--it is not to be denied that, executed by himself, the
design might have fulfilled all his expectations."
It is certainly an interesting fact that, notwithstanding the
objections of Bonaparte to Moreau's plan, nevertheless the commander of
the Army of the Rhine succeeded in assembling the bulk of his forces in
the vicinity of Schaffhausen. In his own way he executed the manoeuvres
which, even to Bonaparte, seemed fraught with danger. As a matter of
fact, the assembling of the French corps in this position was the most
critical part of the whole campaign; and it mattered not whether the
concentration was made by marching on the German side of the Rhine, or
by marching on the Swiss side; in either case, skill and generalship
were required to carry out successfully these manoeuvres. It will now
be interesting to compare the plans of these two soldiers.
The line of the Rhine divided the opposing armies. At the outset
the French corps crossed the river at Strasburg, Brisach, Bâle, and
Schaffhausen. Moreau then attempted to unite these corps before
proceeding to attack Kray in force. It is always a dangerous operation
to attempt a concentration upon some designated place within the
enemy's lines; for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there
more rapidly than can the commander of an invading army. In fact, many
a campaign has failed because the commanding general has attempted to
unite his scattered forces at some point within the territory held by
the enemy. By so doing, he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his
forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to
bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Thus, when
Moreau crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, Brisach, Bâle, and Schaffhausen,
he gave Kray the opportunity of defeating in detail the several French
corps so widely separated from one another. Though the topography
of the country was such that it did not allow Kray to concentrate
his forces and throw them readily upon the separated French corps
in succession, yet, had he foreseen the design of his adversary,
undoubtedly he could have massed his forces between Schaffhausen and
Bâle, along the Wutach, and have thus intervened between Lecourbe's
corps and that of Moreau. By such a manoeuvre, he would have stood a
good chance of crushing both Moreau and St. Cyr, before they could have
been re-enforced by either Ste. Suzanne or Lecourbe.
Again: Moreau's plan necessitated that his own corps and that of St.
Cyr should make long flank marches on the German side of the river.
In making these marches, the French corps necessarily exposed their
own flanks to the attacks of the enemy. In fact, Kray might have
issued in force from the Black Forest, and have attacked both Moreau
and St. Cyr with great chances of success. Had he done so, doubtless
these two French corps would have been destroyed; for they would have
found themselves enclosed between a victorious enemy on one side and
an impassable river on the other. Even when protected by a river, or
other great natural obstacle, a flank march, in the vicinity of an
active enemy, is often a difficult manoeuvre; but when undertaken in
an enemy's country, between an unfordable river on one side, and an
active enemy on the other, it then becomes an extremely delicate and
dangerous operation.
It will also be noticed that though St. Cyr, in his march across
the hills and mountains from Friburg to St. Blazien, and thence to
Stuhlingen, flanked and protected the reserve in its march from Bâle
to Schaffhausen, yet he was obliged to send his artillery by the river
road. Had he, therefore, been attacked in force during this movement,
he would have been compelled to fight without his artillery. Thus the
fighting power of his corps would have been diminished; and his efforts
would have been directed towards the protection of his cannon, which,
under ordinary circumstances, should have strengthened, instead of
weakened, him.
In commenting on these operations of Moreau, General Hamley says:--
"The false attacks of Ste. Suzanne and St. Cyr had the effect not
only of detaining Kienmayer's sixteen thousand men in the defiles,
but of causing Kray to move thither six or seven thousand additional
troops. But they had no influence in detaining Starray, who was
already so distant on the right that it would be impossible for him
in any case to join Kray in time for the first operations. We find,
then, that at first forty-nine thousand French were employed in
detaining less than half their number; and when St. Cyr had joined
the reserve, still Ste. Suzanne did not probably neutralise a greater
number of the enemy than his own corps. The detached operations of
Ste. Suzanne appear, therefore, dangerous and fruitless."
Consider now the plan of Bonaparte. It is evident that the line of
the Rhine from Strasburg to Lake Constance would have screened the
French corps during their concentration. Since this unfordable river
and the bridges crossing it were in possession of the French, there
was little probability that the French corps would have been attacked
in flank during their march up the Rhine to Schaffhausen. In fact, the
Rhine and the mountains of the Black Forest, behind which the greater
part of the Austrians lay, would have formed such a complete screen to
the operations of Bonaparte that it is not improbable to suppose that
the proposed French concentration, preparatory to crossing the river,
might have been completed before Kray discovered what was in progress.
Moreover, since this plan involved no complicated manoeuvres, it could
have been carried out more quickly than the plan of Moreau. Thus time
would have been saved; and _time_ was then of the greatest importance
to Bonaparte, inasmuch as Masséna was in desperate straits at Genoa.
The same reason makes it probable that the passage of the river
at Schaffhausen, the most difficult problem of Bonaparte's plan
of campaign, might have been accomplished before Kray learned the
designs of his adversary. Another fact confirms this view. It will be
remembered that, after Moreau crossed the Rhine with his four corps,
twenty-six thousand French soldiers still remained in Switzerland
and in the French fortresses along the Rhine. Inasmuch as a part of
this force was occupying Strasburg, it is quite probable that, had
Bonaparte's plan been adopted, a division of four or five thousand men
would have issued from the bridge-head opposite this place, and have
attacked the Austrians on the west side of the Black Forest. Such an
attack would probably have deceived Kray, and have left him in doubt
as to where the French intended to cross the river in force; it would
probably have caused him to leave Kienmayer's corps in its position,
and have prevented him from uniting a sufficient force in the vicinity
of Schaffhausen to oppose the passage of the French.
It will be remembered that Bonaparte had already made some preparations
for crossing the Rhine near Schaffhausen; he had secretly collected a
number of boats on the river between Bâle and Lake Constance. These
boats were to be used for the crossing of the advance divisions. The
purpose also was to throw two or three bridges across the river; the
material for which could have been collected and prepared by Lecourbe's
corps while the remaining corps were ascending the Rhine.
It will also be noticed that the point selected by Bonaparte for the
crossing was a favorable one. During the passage Lake Constance would
have protected the right flank of the French corps from an Austrian
attack, and would have continued to protect them as they marched
towards Stokach.
Though the crossing of a large river in the face of an active enemy
is a difficult operation, yet it is generally successful, because
great pains is nearly always taken to deceive the enemy, and because
great preparations are nearly always made to insure the success of
the operation. "If," says Jomini, "we take into consideration the
great care and precautions that are requisite, the immense amount
of materials employed in such an operation, the concurrence of
circumstances necessary to secure success, and the difficulties which
may be occasioned by the slightest derangement on the part of the
enemy, it is really surprising that an operation of this kind ever
succeeds. Nevertheless, wonderful as it may seem, the most difficult
military enterprises are commonly the most successful, from the simple
fact that greater care and precautions are employed in their execution."
From the foregoing it is apparent that the manoeuvres of Moreau were
not wisely planned. In appearance only they seemed to be less hazardous
than those of Bonaparte. After magnifying the difficulties of crossing
the Rhine with the four French corps at Schaffhausen, Moreau adopted a
course which was much more complicated, which required a longer time
to execute, which involved several strategical errors, and which, as
will be shown later, did not allow Moreau to take all the advantages
of the angular base of operations due to his possession of Switzerland.
Though these manoeuvres were successful, it is not because they were
wisely planned, but because there was little or no opposition to their
execution. They were successful because Kray, not appreciating the
situation, failed to profit by the mistakes of his adversary.
It will now be of interest to examine into the operations of Moreau
after he had united the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of
Schaffhausen.
On the 1st of May the four French corps were thus stationed: Moreau's
and Lecourbe's at Schaffhausen, St. Cyr's at Stuhlingen, and Ste.
Suzanne's at Neustadt. From these positions the French advanced to
attack Kray. Lecourbe with twenty thousand men marched on Stokach to
capture that place, and to drive back the Austrian reserve of twelve
thousand there; Moreau moved on Engen with forty thousand men and there
encountered Kray with forty-five thousand; St. Cyr directed his corps
on Zollhaus; and Ste. Suzanne remained in the vicinity of Neustadt. In
front of St. Cyr and Ste. Suzanne there were a few thousand Austrian
troops more or less scattered. Kienmayer's corps yet remained along the
western edge of the Black Forest, and Starray's corps was still farther
away toward the north.
Though Moreau had assembled three of his corps, numbering eighty-five
thousand men, in such positions that they could easily have
concentrated upon a single battle-field, and have outnumbered Kray
almost two to one; yet, at the battle of Engen, he was outnumbered by
his adversary. St. Cyr's corps was so far away to the left that it
had scarcely any effect in deciding the battle. Evidently this corps
should have been so directed that it could have re-enforced the right
of Moreau or the left of Lecourbe. Had this been done, the battle of
Engen would have been a great victory. Then Moreau could have hurled
the Austrians back into the Black Forest, and have severed their
communications with Ulm. In short, Moreau should have advanced with his
right, instead of his left, strongly re-enforced. In order to reap the
full advantages of the flank position which he occupied, every effort
should have been made so to defeat the Austrians as to get possession
of their communications. Moreau failed to appreciate this fact. His
faulty movements enabled Kray, after the battle of Engen, to fall back
to Mosskirch; and, by so doing, to retain possession of the road to Ulm.
It is evident, too, that Lecourbe's corps, after its victory at
Stokach, should have pushed forward and seized Mosskirch and the roads
leading to Ulm; but it failed to do so, because Moreau did not send
Lecourbe the necessary orders. After the capture of the most important
place occupied by the Austrians, this corps remained inactive for a
time, knowing not what to do or where to march.
Why did Moreau fail to send the necessary orders to Lecourbe? Why
did he thus scatter his three corps? Why was St. Cyr directed upon
Zollhaus, instead of upon Engen or Stokach? These are interesting
questions, and their answers will perhaps enable us to form a correct
estimate of the military ability of Moreau.
In retaining the direct command of a corps, Moreau committed a fault.
He should have appointed a corps commander of the reserve, and have
left himself free to give greater attention to the movements of his
entire army. As it was he was wrapped up in what his own corps was
doing. As long as the soldiers directly under him were victorious, he
seemed to be satisfied. Perhaps, from this cause, or from the fact that
he failed to appreciate the strategical situation, the significance and
importance of Lecourbe's victory at Stokach did not impress itself upon
him. Thus no orders were given for Lecourbe's corps to hasten forward
and seize Mosskirch. Moreau's military horizon was limited; his glance
failed to sweep the whole theatre of operations.
That his corps were scattered was due in great measure to the plan of
campaign that he had adopted. In carrying out this plan, Ste. Suzanne
had marched through the Höllenthal, and was near Neustadt when the
French attacked the Austrians at Engen and Stokach. Moreau realized
that Stokach and Engen were the important points of the Austrian line;
yet, rather than leave Ste. Suzanne's corps isolated at Neustadt, where
possibly it might be crushed by overwhelming numbers, he directed St.
Cyr's corps on Zollhaus, so that it might, if necessary, re-enforce
Ste. Suzanne. Thus it was that his four corps were spread out from
Stokach to Neustadt; and that St. Cyr's corps was directed upon the
left instead of upon the right of Moreau. Thus it was that his plan
prevented him from taking full advantage of the angular base which the
possession of Switzerland gave to the French.
But, notwithstanding the fact that Ste. Suzanne's corps was at
Neustadt, St. Cyr's corps should not have been directed upon Zollhaus.
Now, it might seem to us, as it undoubtedly seemed to Moreau, that, had
St. Cyr's corps marched directly to the support of the French at Engen
or Stokach, Ste. Suzanne's corps would have been left in an isolated
and dangerous position where it could have been captured or destroyed.
But such was not the case; indeed, there were several reasons why Kray
would not have attempted to concentrate against Ste. Suzanne.
First: The movement of the French right on Stokach and Engen
threatened the communications of Kray, without in the least exposing
the communications of Moreau to an Austrian attack. In accordance
with a maxim of war, proved by experience, Kray would therefore have
abandoned any intended attack upon Ste. Suzanne, in order to fight
for the preservation of his own communications. "The commander," says
Hamley, "who finds himself on his enemy's rear, while his own is still
beyond the adversary's reach, may cast aside all anxiety for his own
communications, and call up every detachment to the decisive point,
certain that the enemy will abandon his own designs, in order, if
possible, to retrieve his position." Had Moreau appreciated this fact,
he could have safely united three of his corps near Stokach, and have
overwhelmed the Austrians with superior numbers.
Second: Though Ste. Suzanne seemed to be in a dangerous position,
he was not so in reality. In fact, had Kray attacked Ste. Suzanne
in force near Neustadt, he would have given the French at Engen and
Stokach an immense advantage; for the farther he proceeded into the
Black Forest towards France, the more easily could the French sever his
communications and destroy or capture his army.
Third: Instead, therefore, of Moreau's being fearful lest the Austrians
should concentrate against Ste. Suzanne, he should rather have hoped to
see them carry out this movement. But, in either case, he should have
strongly re-enforced his right by every means in his power.
After the battle of Engen, Moreau continued to commit errors. At
Mosskirch he attacked the Austrians with but fifty thousand men. At the
beginning of the battle Kray had but forty thousand men, yet before it
ended he was strongly re-enforced. During the battle St. Cyr's corps
was near Geisingen and Ste. Suzanne's at Donaueschingen. Thus, for the
second time, Moreau fought the Austrians with two of his corps absent.
Moreover, they were far away on his left flank, when they should have
been near him, or on his right flank, where they would have been able
to overwhelm Kray, and sever his communications with Ulm. Had Moreau
re-enforced strongly his right, and attacked Kray at Mosskirch with his
four corps, or even with three of them, who can doubt what the result
would have been? Undoubtedly he would have destroyed the Austrians
between his army and the Danube, and could then have rapidly crossed
the river and have intercepted the corps of Kienmayer and Starray. In
truth, Moreau's faults allowed Kray to escape, when he should have been
destroyed. They allowed him to seek safety in Ulm, where for several
weeks he was able to make a successful stand.
This part of Moreau's campaign, from the time he left Schaffhausen
till he arrived at Ulm, was a series of errors. Though in a measure
successful in his operations, he was outgeneralled by Kray. In this
campaign every opportunity was offered Moreau to win a great name, but
he did not possess the necessary military ability. He was in command
of the largest and best equipped army of France; instead of gaining
merely two or three indecisive victories and forcing Kray back to Ulm,
he should have united his forces, crushed his enemy, severed Kray's
communications, and captured his army; and then should have marched
on Vienna and compelled the Austrian Emperor to sue for peace. But
such fame was not for him. It was reserved for that greater genius,
who, beyond the Alps, on the plains of Italy, should, with inferior
forces, do greater deeds and accomplish far greater results. It was
reserved for him who, daring to follow in the footsteps of the great
Carthaginian, was destined to startle the world by the splendor of his
achievements.
* * * * *
If there was one distinguishing peculiarity in Napoleon's system of
war, it was that of so manoeuvring as to divide the forces of his enemy
and then to defeat them in detail. In the early part of his career
he was fortunate in being opposed to the Austrians, whose system of
scattering their troops enabled him to defeat separately the fragments
of their armies. He believed in concentrating his troops. He was, in
fact, the greatest exemplar of concentration that the world has ever
known. His plan was to mass his forces against some vital point of
the enemy, and to attack him on one line, and in such a direction
as to place him at a disadvantage. If the enemy's line was too much
extended, he struck at the centre and broke through it, then attacked
and defeated in detail the separated parts. If the enemy advanced to
attack with his army separated into parts by impassable obstacles,
Napoleon manoeuvred so as to crush in succession these isolated parts
before they could unite. In this way, by fighting a part of the enemy's
army at one time, he was nearly always stronger than the enemy on the
battle-field. With him this was the important point. His rapid marches,
his strategical manoeuvres, his combinations, had nearly always this
object in view. He believed that success in battle depended principally
on numbers. "God," said he, "is on the side of the heaviest battalions."
But notwithstanding the fact that this was the distinguishing
peculiarity of Napoleon's system of war, yet he did not always follow
this system. Several times in his career he won a great victory by
making a flank movement against his enemy. Such a movement was made at
Marengo, at Ulm, and at Jena.
Between these two methods of attack there is, as a rule, this
difference. By striking at the centre of the enemy's line, his army
can be separated into two parts, and then be defeated in detail. In
this case the aim is so to manoeuvre as to outnumber the enemy on
the battle-field. But by striking at the flank, the enemy is often
given the opportunity of concentrating his forces. Even if one flank
is defeated, it can fall back upon the other, and perhaps even then
make a successful stand against the attacking army. In this case
the advantages generally aimed at are to threaten or sever the
communications of the enemy, and to force him to fight a battle where a
defeat will ruin his army. From the foregoing, it is evident that these
two methods of attack have a tendency to produce opposite results. A
direct attack upon the enemy, if successful, breaks up and scatters
his forces. On the other hand, a flank attack gives him a chance to
concentrate, but at the same time places him in a position where a
defeat will ruin him.
In making a choice between these two methods of attack, the able
general will be guided in great measure by the positions occupied by
the enemy's forces. But, as a rule, if he adopt one method, he must
abandon the advantages to be derived from the other. Thus, should he
decide to attack the centre of the enemy's line, he may reasonably
expect to divide the forces of the enemy, and afterwards to defeat
them in detail; but he cannot expect to threaten at the same time
their communications, and cut them from their base of operations. On
the other hand, if he make a flank attack, he may reasonably expect to
sever the communications of the enemy, and thus force him to fight a
battle under disadvantageous circumstances; but he cannot expect to
defeat in turn the several parts of the enemy's army.
But in the campaign between Moreau and Kray, it is a remarkable fact
that the positions of the Austrian forces were such that the advantages
of both a front and flank attack could be obtained by the French.
By crossing the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and by attacking the flank
of Kray in the Black Forest, the French would not only separate the
Austrian left from the Austrian centre and right, but would threaten
the Austrian communications with Ulm. From the beginning Bonaparte saw
clearly this fact. His eye took in the entire situation. Thus it was
that he was anxious to have Moreau undertake this movement. Thus it was
that he himself had thought seriously at one time of uniting the Army
of Reserve with the Army of the Rhine, and of moving against the left
flank of Kray's forces in the Black Forest.
From this discussion, it is evident that, had Moreau made no errors,
even after he assembled his three corps near Schaffhausen, he could
have brought superior numbers upon every battle-field in Germany, and
thus have won more decisive victories and have accomplished far greater
results. What, then, might not Bonaparte himself have accomplished
had he directed in person one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers
against the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Germany? When
it is remembered that he never lost a battle in which he was superior
to his adversary in numbers, it cannot be doubted what the result would
have been.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 7: See Map 3.]