GENERAL COMMENTS.
While the Army of Reserve was assembling near Lake Geneva, only a few
people at Paris knew that Bonaparte himself intended to take command of
it. In fact, a provision in the constitution of the Year VIII. did not
permit a consul to command an army in person. But, as Bonaparte himself
said, it did not prevent his being present with the army; moreover,
this constitutional provision was then regarded by the French people,
and even by the Senate and Tribunate of France, as having no binding
effect on Bonaparte. Nevertheless, the First Consul did not wish to
violate it openly, and, accordingly, adopted the subterfuge of making
General Berthier the nominal commander in chief, retaining in his own
hands the entire conduct of the campaign. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, Bonaparte was the real commander of the Army of Reserve.
Having assembled the Army of Reserve at Lake Geneva, he was in a
position where, if the necessity should arise, he could march to the
assistance either of Moreau in Germany or of Suchet on the Var. Had
Melas succeeded in forcing the Var, Bonaparte would doubtless have
marched south along the west side of the French Alps in order to unite
the Army of Reserve with Suchet's forces for an attack against Melas.
The strategical skill of Bonaparte appears in this arrangement. Though
he expected to cross the Alps, yet up to the last moment his army was
so situated that he was prepared for any contingency that might arise.
Though the campaign of Marengo, as planned and executed by him, was
a bold and hazardous undertaking, yet a careful analysis of the
operations shows that nearly all of them were marked by extreme
caution. It will be found, too, that his strategy was almost perfect
for accomplishing his ends. In fact one of the great merits of Napoleon
was that he knew how to produce a maximum effect with a minimum force.
The whole theatre of war was an open book to him. He saw just where
the battle should be fought in order to produce the greatest results.
Though the Austrians in this campaign numbered nearly a quarter-million
of men, and stretched from the Gulf of Genoa to the Main River, yet
Bonaparte was able, while still at Paris, to picture in his mind the
whole strategical situation, and to indicate Stokach in Germany and the
Stradella Pass in Italy, as being the two most important points within
this immense theatre of operations. These two places were the keys of
the territory occupied by the two Austrian armies. Here the greatest
results could be produced with the smallest efforts. Here, in each
case, a victory could be obtained with the least loss to the French.
Bonaparte's caution is seen in the fact that he would not set out to
cross the Alps until Moncey's corps was well on its way towards Italy.
Before beginning the movement, he wished to be certain that he would
receive this re-enforcement, and to make sure of his communications
with Switzerland. He knew that he might be attacked in the plains of
Piedmont before he could reach Milan, and might lose his communications
by way of the Great St. Bernard Pass. If, however, Moncey succeeded in
reaching Italy, Bonaparte would then have uninterrupted communications
with the great stronghold of Switzerland.
Again: his caution is seen in the fact that, after descending the Alps
with the Army of Reserve, he immediately took measures to concentrate
his forces, instead of crossing the Po at Chivasso and of marching
directly to the relief of Masséna. He knew that a great battle was
inevitable, yet safety was his first object. He wished to gain a
position where he could bring a strong force on to the battle-field,
and where, if defeated, he could retreat without losing his army.
In fact, throughout the campaign, he kept a watchful eye upon his
communications. It was his rear that gave him the greatest anxiety.
It is always so with the great masters of war. "While the distant
spectator," says Hamley, "imagines a general to be intent only on
striking or parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred glances, a
hundred anxious thoughts, to the communications in his rear, for one
that he bestows on his adversary's front." Notwithstanding the fact
that Napoleon seemed always to take great chances in his military
career, and seemed often to stake everything on the fate of a single
battle, yet a careful analysis of his campaigns shows that no commander
has ever looked with more anxiety to his lines of retreat than did
this great master of war. At Austerlitz, where he allowed the enemy
to envelop his right and cut off his retreat on Vienna, and where he
was so certain of success that he issued a proclamation in advance
explaining the manoeuvre by which victory would be obtained, yet even
here he had provided for a retreat through Bohemia in case of defeat.
This campaign was indeed a bold one; but it must be remembered that
the very boldness of Bonaparte was one of the principal causes of
his success. By descending the Alps into Italy upon the Austrian
rear, he surprised his adversary and caused him to tremble for his
communications. By this means he struck terror into the heart of Melas
even before a battle had been fought. No sooner had French troops
reached the valley of the Po than Melas was compelled to change
his whole plan of campaign. He had then to defend himself against
Bonaparte. He could no longer think of invading France. By this bold
movement Bonaparte snatched the initiative from his adversary and
compelled him to fight on the defensive. In war, the boldest course
is often the safest. "The greatest soldiers have always been the most
daring."
From the discussion in the preceding chapter, it is evident that in
this campaign Bonaparte allowed his boldness to outrun his caution.
He attempted to grasp too much. This characteristic of Napoleon, here
exhibited for the first time in his military operations, was in after
years one of the principal causes of his fall. In his subsequent career
he fought Spain and Portugal on one side and nearly the whole of Europe
on the other. Though the greatest exemplar of concentration that the
world has ever known, yet at times he divided his forces when he should
have made peace on one side, and have concentrated on the other. In the
Russian campaign, too, he was overconfident. He was not satisfied with
ordinary victories or with ordinary results. His early successes were
so marvellous that he began to feel that he could conquer in the face
of all Europe, and in spite of the elements themselves. And yet this
very boldness, coupled with a caution that seldom failed him, was one
of the secrets of his numerous victories during so many years of war.
The crossing of the Alps with the Army of Reserve was undoubtedly a
hazardous undertaking, yet it was so carefully planned in all its
details that it was completely successful. During the operations of
Masséna in Italy, and of Moreau in Germany, Bonaparte had displayed
marvellous energy in hastening the preparations for crossing the great
chain of the Alps. In this famous passage, nothing, however trivial,
that could contribute to the success of the operation was beneath the
attention of Bonaparte. Referring to the activity and care displayed by
the First Consul at this time, Thiers, in his "History of the Consulate
and Empire," writes as follows:--
"Himself toiling day and night, corresponding with Berthier, who
was organizing the divisions of infantry and cavalry; with Gassendi
and Marmont, who were organizing the artillery; with Marescot, who
was reconnoitring the whole line of the Alps; he urged every one
to exertion, with that headlong energy and ardour which sufficed
him to carry the French from the banks of the Po to the banks of
the Jordan, from the banks of the Jordan to those of the Danube
and Borysthenes. He would not leave Paris in person until the last
moment, not wishing to abandon the political government of France,
and leave the field clear to intriguers and conspirators for a longer
time than was absolutely necessary. Meanwhile, the divisions ordered
from La Vendée, from Brittany, from Paris, and from the banks of the
Rhone, traversed the widespread territory of the Republic, and the
heads of their columns were already appearing in Switzerland. The
depots of some corps were still at Dijon, besides some conscripts and
volunteers, sent thither to give credence in Europe to the opinion
that the army of Dijon was a pure fable, destined solely to alarm
Melas. Up to this moment everything had gone well; the illusion of
the Austrians was complete. The movement of the troops advancing
towards Switzerland was little noticed, because the corps were so
much dispersed, that they passed for re-enforcements sent to the
army in Germany.... To such a point had he carried his foresight
as to establish saddlers' workshops at the foot of the defile, for
the repair of the artillery harness. On this apparently trivial
matter he had already written several letters; and I mention this
circumstance for the instruction of those generals and governments
to whom the lives of men are intrusted, and who too often, through
indolence or vanity, neglect such particulars. Nothing, in fact, that
can contribute to the success of operations, or to the safety of
soldiers, is below the genius or rank of commanding officers."
One of the secrets of Napoleon's success in war was the fact that he
bestowed great care on all military matters. Whether his operations
were simple or complex; whether his attention was called to the ration
of a single soldier, or to the subsistence of a hundred thousand men;
whether his mind was occupied with the trivial details of routine duty,
or was evolving the grandest strategic conceptions, he was the same
painstaking, orderly, careful man. "His plan," says Napier, referring
to Napoleon's projects in the war with Spain, "embraced every probable
chance of war, and even provided for the uncertain contingency of an
English army landing upon his flanks at either end of the Pyrenean
frontier. Neither his power nor his fortune nor the contempt he felt
for the military power of the Spaniards made him remiss. The conqueror
of Europe was as fearful of making false movements before an army of
peasants as if Frederick the Great had been in his front."
In the campaign of Marengo Bonaparte displayed excellent judgment in
selecting his subordinates. However much he may have failed in this
respect in his subsequent career, certainly at this time his success
was due in great measure to the fact that he selected Masséna to
command the Army of Italy, and Moreau to command the Army of the Rhine.
Masséna was peculiarly fitted both by birth and character to perform
the duty required of him. Born at Turbia near Nice, he was familiar
with every foot of country bordering on the Gulf of Genoa. Moreover,
he had fought in the same theatre of operations under Bonaparte in
1796-97. In action he was cool, clear-headed, obstinate, and brave.
When the battle was at its height, and the struggle fierce and
desperate, then his genius shone forth with great brilliancy. Probably
no other soldier of France could have made such an heroic struggle
at Genoa. Though he had some traits of character that stained his
reputation and dimmed his glory, he was nevertheless a great soldier,
perhaps the greatest of all those remarkable men who were afterwards
made marshals of France. His characteristics were thus set forth by
Napoleon at St. Helena:--
"Masséna was a man of superior talent. He generally, however, made
bad dispositions previous to a battle, and it was not until the dead
fell around him that he began to act with that judgment which he
ought to have displayed before. In the midst of the dying and the
dead, of balls sweeping away those who encircled him, then Masséna
was himself--gave his orders and made his dispositions with the
greatest _sang froid_ and judgment.... By a strange peculiarity of
temperament, he possessed the desired equilibrium only in the heat
of battle; it came to him in the midst of danger. The sound of the
guns cleared his ideas and gave him understanding, penetration, and
cheerfulness. He was endowed with extraordinary courage and firmness.
When defeated he was always ready to fight again as though he had
been the conqueror."
Though Moreau failed to appreciate thoroughly the strategical situation
in Germany, nevertheless the First Consul showed wisdom in appointing
him to command the Army of the Rhine. Moreau was familiar with this
theatre of operations, and possessed the confidence of the soldiers
under him. Moreover, he was brave and cautious, and wonderfully cool
and collected on the battle-field. Though he failed to do all that he
might have done, yet he was generally successful, and, on the whole,
justified the confidence bestowed on him by the First Consul.
In this connection it is worthy of remark that Desaix was ranked
by Napoleon as one of the greatest of his subordinates. Had he not
been killed at Marengo, he would undoubtedly have been made one of
Napoleon's marshals. At St. Helena Napoleon spoke of him as follows:--
"Of all the generals I ever had under me, Desaix and Kléber possessed
the greatest talents--especially Desaix; as Kléber only loved glory
inasmuch as it was the means of procuring him riches and pleasures,
whereas Desaix loved glory for itself, and despised everything else.
Desaix was wholly wrapped up in war and glory. To him riches and
pleasure were valueless, nor did he give them a moment's thought. He
was a little, black-looking man, about an inch shorter than I am,
always badly dressed, sometimes even ragged, and despising comfort
or convenience. When in Egypt, I made him a present of a complete
field-equipage several times, but he always lost it. Wrapt in a
cloak, Desaix threw himself under a gun, and slept as contentedly as
if he were in a palace. For him luxury had no charms. Upright and
honest in all his proceedings, he was called by the Arabs _the just
Sultan_. He was intended by nature for a great general. Kléber and
Desaix were a loss irreparable to France."
It is worthy of remark that many of the generals that fought in the
French armies during these operations afterwards became marshals of
Napoleon. In the Army of Italy there were Masséna, Soult, and Suchet;
in the army of Reserve, Lannes, Victor, Murat, Berthier, Marmont,
and Davoust; and in the Army of the Rhine, St. Cyr, Moncey, and the
immortal Ney, "the bravest of the brave."
The knowledge that Bonaparte displayed of his adversaries' doings in
this campaign is indeed wonderful. From reports sent him by Suchet,
Masséna, and Moreau, and from information obtained from spies, he had
not only a knowledge of the positions occupied by the Austrian armies,
but, in addition, was accurately informed as to their numbers and plans
of operations. A single example will suffice to illustrate the accuracy
of his information, and his remarkable intuition, before the beginning
of hostilities, as to the movements and plans of Melas. It will be
remembered that while still at Paris he wrote to Masséna as follows:--
"The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction of Genoa,
on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably on the two
points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw yourself
with all your forces united, upon one of the enemy's columns.... In
that broken country, if you manoeuvre well, with 30,000 men you may
give battle to 60,000; in order to carry 60,000 light-armed troops
into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total army of
120,000 men at least."
Compare now the prediction of Bonaparte with what happened. Melas _had_
one hundred and twenty thousand men. He advanced against Masséna in
two columns: one, numbering twenty-five thousand men, divided into two
parts, advanced on Genoa; the other, forty thousand strong, advanced on
Savona. The movements of Melas were carried out exactly as Bonaparte
had predicted. In the letter to Masséna, the Austrian plan, as well as
the numbers with which Melas was about to attack the Army of Italy,
were set forth with wonderful accuracy. When it is remembered that at
this time Bonaparte was at Paris, and that the great chain of the Alps
intervened between him and the Austrians in Italy, no one can fail to
be impressed by the foresight of Bonaparte and the accuracy of this
prediction made before the event. Wellington once said that he had been
trying all his life to find out what the other fellow was doing over
the hill. Bonaparte, at Paris, knew what Melas was doing over the hill.
In the campaign of 1796-97 in Italy, Bonaparte had shown himself a
consummate master of tactics and of strategy. In the campaign of
Marengo he exhibited, in addition to these qualities, great organizing
power. When he returned from Egypt, civil war existed in certain
parts of France, the finances were in a deplorable state, and the
French armies had been everywhere defeated. In a few months, under
his leadership, all was changed. He crushed out the civil war, placed
the finances on a firm basis, sent re-enforcements to the Army of the
Rhine, and organized the Army of Reserve. Referring to this period,
Alison says:--
"The sudden resurrection of France, when Napoleon assumed the helm,
is one of the most extraordinary passages of European history....
After the fall of the Committee of Public Safety, the triumph of
France centered in Napoleon alone; wherever he did not command
in person, the greatest reverses were experienced. In 1795 the
Republicans were defeated by Clairfait on the Rhine; in 1796 by the
Archduke Charles in Germany. In 1799 their reverses were unexampled
both in Italy and Germany; from the 9th Thermidor to the 18th
Brumaire, a period of about five years, the fortunes of the Republic
were singly sustained by the sword of Napoleon and the lustre of his
Italian campaigns. When he seized the helm in November, 1799, he
found the armies defeated and ruined; the frontier invaded both on
the sides of Italy and Germany; the arsenals empty; the soldiers in
despair, deserting their colours; the Royalists revolting against
their government; general anarchy in the interior; the treasury
empty; the energies of the Republic apparently exhausted. Instantly,
as if by enchantment, everything was changed; order reappeared out
of chaos, talent emerged from obscurity, vigour arose out of the
elements of weakness. The arsenals were filled, the veterans crowded
to their eagles, the conscripts joyfully repaired to the frontier,
La Vendée was pacified, the exchequer began to overflow. In little
more than six months after Napoleon's accession, the Austrians were
forced to seek refuge under the cannon of Ulm, Italy was regained,
unanimity and enthusiasm prevailed among the people, and the revived
energy of the nation was finally launched into a career of conquest."
At the beginning of the campaign of Marengo, Kray's army, numbering one
hundred and twenty thousand men, occupied western Germany. The army of
Melas, one hundred and twenty thousand strong, occupied northwestern
Italy; a British corps of twelve thousand was in Minorca, and a British
fleet in the Gulf of Genoa.
To oppose the forces of the allies, Bonaparte had three armies: the
Army of the Rhine, numbering one hundred and thirty thousand men, was
facing the Austrians in Germany; the Army of Italy, forty thousand
strong, was along the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and the Army of
Reserve, numbering forty thousand, was assembling near Lake Geneva.
It will thus be seen that the allies had two hundred and fifty-two
thousand men to oppose the two hundred and ten thousand under the First
Consul; and that they possessed the additional advantage of being
supreme on the sea.
Such was the situation in the spring of 1800. On the 5th of April
Melas began active operations along the Apennines. On the 14th of
June the campaign ended at Marengo. In two months and ten days the
French, guided by the genius of Bonaparte, had compelled Kray to
seek safety in the fortified camp of Ulm, and had defeated Melas and
gained possession of northern Italy. These great results were due to
Bonaparte. It was he that crossed the Alps. In his brain was born the
strategy that led to victory.
In this campaign Bonaparte calculated carefully every movement; he
left nothing to chance. Though fortune favored him in many ways,
nevertheless his success was due to his genius and to his mastery of
his profession. Strategically these operations were almost perfect, yet
they were faulty in execution. "The campaign of Marengo," says William
O'Connor Morris, "at least in design, was one of the most dazzling of
Napoleon's exploits in war. The plan of issuing from Switzerland by
a double movement in the rear of the enemy in Swabia and Italy was
perhaps equal to any formed by Hannibal; but the execution of it was
far from perfect. Moreau completely failed to cut off Kray. Napoleon
made a distinct mistake in marching into the plain of Marengo, and he
exhibited in this instance a fierce resolve to encounter his adversary
at any risk, which cost him dear on more than one occasion. The most
striking feature of this part of his career is the restoration of order
in France, her sudden and rapid rise out of misfortune, and the revival
of her military power; and though this was largely due to the energy
and resource of a great nation not often quelled by disaster, it
should perhaps be mainly ascribed to Napoleon's genius." At this time
Bonaparte was thirty years of age; he was vigorous in mind and body.
He was ambitious, and had a massive determination to succeed. He had a
will which no obstacle could daunt, a mind original, bold, profound,
quick, and penetrating. His eye pierced the depths and reached the
heights of things. With a marvellous intuition he was able at times to
foresee just what course his adversaries would take. So accurate was
his information, so profound his knowledge of military matters, that
he was often able to predict what, under certain conditions, would
happen. "He had," says Morris, "a faculty of organisation perhaps never
equalled, and a power of calculation, a force of insight and industry,
and a capacity of mastering details, which Nature has seldom bestowed
on man." Moreover, he had made a profound study of the campaigns of the
great commanders, and had read many books of history, the perusal of
which, says Lamartine, "changes theories into actions, and ideas into
men." In short, he was a consummate master of war. The fact that he
was a great organizer, a great tactician, and a great strategist, is
the real reason why he was so successful in war. Among all other great
soldiers of the world, it would be difficult to select a single one who
possessed in so marked a degree all these qualities. As an organizer,
he was not excelled by either Cæsar or Alexander; as a tactician he was
equal to Marlborough or Frederick; as a strategist, he surpassed every
soldier of ancient or of modern times. Take him all in all he was,
perhaps, the foremost soldier of the world.
* * * * *
Twenty-one years after this campaign, the Emperor Napoleon lay dying at
St. Helena. His thoughts were with his army. During a long delirium,
while a fierce storm was raging on the island, he was heard to say:
"mon fils ... l'armée ... Desaix." These were his last words. Perhaps,
amidst the shock of the billows and the battle-like roar of the storm,
the great captain believed himself once more with Desaix on the
tumultuous field of Marengo.
INDEX.
Abercromby, General, commands British corps in Minorca, 22.
Alesia, battle of, 86.
Alexander the Great, compared with Napoleon, 232.
Alison, Archibald, sets forth Napoleon's organizing ability, 228, 229.
Allies, plans of, seemed reasonable, 25;
advantages possessed by, 229.
Alps, description of, 18;
Swiss, Tyrolese, French, and Maritime, 19;
passes of, 19.
Apennines, description of, 19.
Archduke Charles, ablest soldier in Austria, 23, 50;
relieved of command, 23;
opposes Napoleon in 1809, 38;
quotation from, 45;
his views sound, 50;
should have been allowed his way, 51;
had constructed an intrenched camp at Ulm, 94;
reference to, 107;
defeats the Republicans, 228.
Arcole, battle of, 17, 76;
campaign of, 33.
Army of Italy, struggles heroically, 18;
strength and position of, 21, 55, 79-80, 229;
line of communication of, 21;
necessity for its remaining along the Apennines, 46;
in a destitute condition, 55;
is cut in two, 63;
its active operations terminate, 72;
nothing done to improve condition of, 88;
sufferings of, 89.
Army of Reserve, the third army, 18;
scattered throughout France, 22;
destination of, to be kept secret, 28;
caricatured 29;
concentrates, 29;
will cross the Alps, 29;
could re-enforce either Moreau or Masséna, 31, 216;
not imaginary, 74;
strong enough at vital point, 90;
crosses the Alps, 142;
passes Fort Bard, 145;
strength and position of, 229.
Army of the Rhine, re-enforcement sent to, 18;
size of, and position of, 20, 229.
Aulic Council, description of, 23;
reference to, 42;
errors of, 51;
ignorant of military matters, 51;
reasons for failure of, 52;
gives orders to Kray, 111;
informs Melas that Army of Reserve is a mere fiction, 148;
sends despatches to Melas, 156, 162.
Austerlitz, battle of, 39.
Austria, wages war against France, 15;
successful on the land, 16, 41;
assisted by England, 16;
aided by Russia, 16;
had almost reconquered Italy, 17;
spies of, gather at Dijon, 29;
directs Melas to take offensive, 41;
not aware of existence of Army of Reserve, 42;
should take the offensive in Germany, 45;
might have avoided error, 46.
Austrians, must outnumber the French to succeed, 43;
discipline and morale of, 54.
Bard, fort of, 143;
is surrendered to the French, 150.
Bassano, battle of, 76.
Berthier, General, is sent forward, 142;
directs operations along the Po, 155;
made nominal commander in chief, 216;
became a marshal, 226.
Bethencourt, descends the Simplon, 146;
arrives at Arona, 150.
Black Forest, description of, 92;
mountain system of, 110.
Blucher, opposes Napoleon in 1814, 33.
Bochetta, pass of, 19.
Bonaparte, First Consul, returns to France from Egypt, 15;
collects Russian prisoners, 16;
detaches Russia from alliance, 16;
his absence in Egypt, 16;
his victories in 1796-97, 17;
became First Consul, 17;
prepared for war, 17;
magic of his name, 17;
his energy, 17;
his chance of success small, 22;
had full control of military operations, 22;
his achievements in Italy and Egypt, 22;
his plans, 25;
first plan, 25;
rivalry between him and Moreau, 26;
Victory his object, 27;
wishes to dazzle the French people, 27;
second plan, 27;
will emulate Hannibal, 30;
could re-enforce Masséna or Moreau, 31;
would have had the advantage of interior lines, 32;
defeated the Austrians at Arcole and Rivoli, 33;
as the situation appeared to him, 34, 52;
could use either France or Switzerland as a base, 34;
could decide the fate of the Austrians in a single battle, 36;
could compel the Austrian Emperor to make peace, 36;
his plan difficult, 36;
his advantages in Italy, 39;
important for him to deceive Melas, 40;
could assemble his forces and decide the fate of Italy by a single
battle, 40;
important that he should take the offensive, 44;
writes to Masséna, 57, 85, 226;
must hurry across the Alps, 66;
sends Moreau instructions, 67;
advances, 67;
enters Milan, 70;
methods of, in the treatment of fortresses, 76;
might have been obliged to change his plan, 83;
his plan, 84-85;
the problem before him, 87-88;
if necessary, would sacrifice Masséna, 90;
nature was his re-enforcement, 90;
marches on to victory, 91;
submits a plan to Moreau, 95;
tried to convince Moreau, 97;
replies to General Dessoles, 97;
makes an agreement with Moreau, 98;
urges Moreau to hasten, 100;
his plan compared to that of Moreau, 117, 119, _et seq._;
makes preparations to cross Rhine, 123;
his chances of success in Germany, 134, 135;
anxiously awaits developments, 136;
leaves Paris, 136;
prepares to cross the Alps, 137;
his plan, 137, 138;
his knowledge of his adversaries' positions, 139;
is surprised, 144;
crosses the Alps, 145;
studies his maps, 145;
hurries to Fort Bard, 145;
marches on Milan, 149;
seizes crossings of the Po, 150;
delays at Milan, 150;
receives news of Masséna's surrender, 156;
arrives at Montebello and prepares for battle, 158;
advances towards Marengo, 159;
detaches Desaix, 160;
loses touch of his adversary, 161;
arrives on the battle-field of Marengo, 166;
retreats, 167;
is defeated, 167;
forms a new line of battle, 170;
forces the Austrians back to Marengo, 171;
receives surrender of Melas, 172;
his operations worthy of careful study, 176;
gained northern Italy, 177;
the plans which he might have adopted, 178;
deceived Melas, 179, 180;
is not deterred from his undertaking, 181;
his reasons for taking this course, 181, 182;
commits an error, 184, 199;
the problem before him, 184, 195;
his reasons for not marching through Switzerland, 187;
criticisms of, 190, 191;
his critical manoeuvre, 192-194;
his strong position, 195, 196, 197;
anxious for fear Melas might escape, 199;
in a state of doubt, 199;
risks too much, 200, 220;
courses that he might have taken, 201-203;
his chances of success on another field, 203;
his brilliant strategy, 204;
his reasons for advancing to Marengo, 206-208;
was surprised and deceived, 207-209, 213;
hastens the return of Desaix, 210;
defeated the Austrians in detail, 213;
his merit at Marengo, 214;
fortune favored him, 214, 215;
his operations faulty in execution, 215;
was the real commander of the Army of Reserve, 216;
was prepared for any contingency, 217;
his caution, 217-219;
his boldness, 219;
his activity and care, 221, 222;
his judgment in selecting his subordinates, 223;
his knowledge of his adversaries' doings, 226;
his brain the birthplace of victory, 230;
his success due to his genius, 230;
his characteristics, 230-232.
Bourrienne, extract from his "Memoirs of Napoleon," 139.
Brenner, pass of, 26.
Cæsar, compared with Napoleon, 232.
Campaign of 1814, example from, 33.
Campaign of 1796-97, example from, 33;
reference to, 47, 227.
Carnot, minister of war, sent to Moreau's headquarters, 108.
Castiglione, battle of, 17, 76.
Chabran, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142;
crosses the Alps, 142.
Champeaux, General, commands cavalry brigade at Marengo, 164, 170.
Clairfait, General, defeats the Republicans, 228.
Col di Cadibona, pass of, 19.
Col di Ormea, pass of, 19.
Col di Tenda, pass of, 19.
Comments, on the strategical situation, 30, _et seq._;
on the operations of Masséna and Melas, 72, _et seq._;
on Moreau's operations in Germany, 109, _et seq._;
on Bonaparte's operations in Italy, 173, _et seq._;
general, 216, _et seq._
Danube, river, description of, 20.
Davoust, became one of Napoleon's marshals, 226.
Dego, battle of, 48.
Desaix, General, arrives at the French headquarters, 159;
marches on Novi, 160;
returns and advises Bonaparte to fight, 170;
assaults Zach, 171;
is killed, 172;
marches to the sound of the cannon, 211, 214;
compared with Grouchy, 211;
how ranked by Napoleon, 225;
mentioned by Napoleon on his death-bed, 232.
Dessoles, General, Moreau's chief of staff, 97;
gives advice to Bonaparte, 97.
Duhesme, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142;
marches on Milan, 149.
Dumas, quotation from his life of Napoleon, 208.
Elsnitz, General, proceeds against Suchet, 63, 147;
drove Suchet back, 65;
is ordered to quit the Var, 70;
quits the Var, 153;
is defeated and retreats, 154;
commands reserve at Marengo, 164, 165.
Engen, battle of, 104;
loss at, 105.
England, wages war against France, 15;
is successful on the sea, 16;
spies of, gather at Dijon, 29;
army of, 75.
France, stands alone against coalition, 15;
in a deplorable state, 17;
civil war in, 17.
Frederick the Great, might have failed, 49;
reference to, 223;
compared with Napoleon, 232.
French, occupy a more favorable position, 43.
Front to a flank, definition of, 193.
Genoa, a strongly fortified place, 56;
provisions scarce in, 58;
description of, and its fortifications, 61;
siege of, 63, _et seq._
Grouchy, Marshal, compared with Desaix, 211.
Haddick, General, occupies valley of Aosta, 146, 147;
attacks at Marengo, 163.
Hamley, General, his remarks on the operations in Germany, 115,
118, 121;
quotation from, 129, 195, 201, 219.
Hannibal, Bonaparte follows in footsteps of, 27, 30, 131, 143.
Hart, Colonel, quotation from, 197;
his remarks on the errors at Marengo, 210.
Hohenzollern, General, advances on Bochetta Pass, 59;
is repulsed, 59.
Italy, might be reconquered at Vienna, 26.
Jomini, General, quotation from, 37, 52, 179;
his remarks on the passage of a river, 124.
Kaim, General, watches the passes of the Alps, 58;
holds Susa, 146, 147;
attacks at Marengo, 163;
follows General Zach, 169.
Keith, Admiral, commands British fleet in Gulf of Genoa, 22.
Kellerman, General, commands cavalry brigade at Marengo, 164, 170;
attacks Austrian cavalry, 171.
Kienmayer, General, guards defiles of Black Forest, 93;
remains in Kinzig Valley, 102;
descends the Danube, 105.
Kléber, General, how ranked by Napoleon, 225.
Kray, Marshal, commanded Austrian army, 20;
was to remain on the defensive, 23;
was deceived, 29;
his army separated from that of Melas, 30;
must lose his communications if defeated, 35;
his army widely dispersed, 37;
gave Bonaparte an advantage, 43;
lacked military ability, 49;
commands main body in Germany, 94;
hears of Moreau's movements, 100;
re-enforces Kienmayer, 100;
moves on Loffingen and Zollhaus, 102;
appreciates his faulty position, 103;
attempts to unite his forces at Stokach, 103;
at Engen, 104;
unites his forces at Mosskirch, 105;
crosses the Danube, 106;
marches on Ulm, 107, 108;
his strength and losses, 107;
position of his troops, 110;
commits an error, 111, 112, 114;
faulty arrangement of his forces, 111-117;
outgenerals Moreau, 130;
position of his army, 229.
Lamartine, quotation from, 231.
Lannes, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142;
crosses the Alps, 142;
is checked at Fort Bard, 144;
passes the fort, 145;
defeats Haddick, 146;
captures Pavia, 150;
crosses the Po, 155;
fights battle of Montebello, 157;
secured the title of "Duke of Montebello," 158;
at Marengo, 164, _et seq._;
was badly shattered, 213;
became a marshal, 226.
Lecourbe, General, commands Moreau's right wing, 93;
marches on Stokach, 103;
is victorious, 104;
delays there to await Moreau's operations, 104;
captures Memmingen, 107.
Lincoln, Abraham, virtues of, 90.
Lodi, battle of, 17.
Lonato, battle of, 76.
Macdougall, Colonel, criticizes operations in Germany, 116.
Mack, General, his army captured by Napoleon, 38.
Mantua, fortress of, location of, 72.
Marengo, campaign of, 88, 173;
plain of, 163;
battle of, 163, _et seq._;
opposing forces at, 212.
Marescot, General, reports on the passes of the Alps, 137.
Marlborough, Duke of, compared with Napoleon, 232.
Marmont, General, became a marshal, 226.
Masséna, General, takes command of Army of Italy, 18;
to remain on the defensive, 25;
had the advantage of a strong position, 42, 43;
could not have driven Melas through Italy, 48;
brings about better discipline, 55;
holds Genoa, 56;
his difficulties, 57-58;
failed to appreciate the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, 58;
in a precarious situation, 60;
was surrounded, 60;
not discouraged, 60;
his plan, 61, 64;
attacks General Ott, 62;
advances towards Nice, 62;
is again repulsed, 62;
heroic deeds of, 63;
resolves to hold Genoa at all hazards, 63;
urges the First Consul to hasten, 63;
has hope, 64;
strength of his forces, 64;
fought fiercely, 65;
is partially successful, 65;
fights on amidst famine and death, 67, 68;
would not surrender, 68, 69;
surrenders, 71, 176;
joins Suchet, 71;
firm as a rock, 72;
the problem before him, 79;
plans that he might have adopted, 82-86;
was justified in not carrying out Bonaparte's orders, 83;
received no re-enforcements, 89;
hard pressed at Genoa, 89, 184;
was doubtful of the outcome, 211;
his characteristics, 223, 224;
became a marshal, 226.
Maurice, Colonel, his remarks on surprise and concealment, 180.
Melas, General, commanded Austrian army in Italy, 21;
will attack the Army of Italy, 24;
deceived, 29;
was doomed to defeat, 29;
separated from Kray, 30;
could not know where to expect the French, 39;
difficult for him to drive back the French, 43;
many advantages offered him, 46;
could have held Masséna in check, 48;
lacked military ability, 50;
his plan, 56;
advances against Masséna, 58, 229;
cuts in two the Army of Italy, 59;
sends orders to Ott, 63;
hears of Bonaparte's movements, 70;
is in consternation, 70;
sends orders to Elsnitz and Ott, 70, 153, 186;
his purpose, 72;
his errors, 73-80;
assaulted again and again, 76;
his methods in treatment of fortresses, 76;
doubted existence of Army of Reserve, 77;
accomplished almost nothing, 79;
could force Masséna to capitulate, 86;
makes every effort to capture Genoa, 147;
receives notice of passage of Alps, 148;
marches on Turin, 148;
is surprised, 148;
forms a junction with Kaim's and Haddick's commands, 149;
is deceived, 151;
finally comprehends Bonaparte's plan, 152;
his plan, 152, 153;
marches on Alessandria, 153;
calls a council of war, 162;
begins battle of Marengo, 163, 164;
sends cavalry to Acqui, 165, 210, 212;
attacks French with fury, 165;
makes a great effort, 167;
defeats Bonaparte, 167;
returns to Alessandria, 168;
surrenders, 172;
was weak at all points, 174;
causes of his defeat, 174-177;
his success in Italy, 176;
had to abandon invasion of France, 185;
in doubt as to Thurreau's strength, 194;
knew he must conquer or lose all, 204, 205;
his situation unfavorable, 209;
failed to occupy Marengo, 209;
commits another error, 209;
number of his forces, 212;
outnumbered Bonaparte, 213;
defeated French in detail, 213;
position of his army, 229.
Metz, battle of, 86.
Millesimo, battle of, 48.
Minorca, English corps in, 71.
Miollis, General, defends Genoa, 62.
Moncey, General, leads a corps into Italy, 67;
arrives at Milan, 70, 155;
became a marshal, 226.
Mondovi, battle of, 48.
Monnier, General, commands a division at Marengo, 166, 170.
Mont Cenis, pass of, 19.
Montenotte, battle of, 17, 48.
Moreau, General, commands Army of Rhine, 18;
rivalry between Bonaparte and him, 26;
his talents, 27;
position of his army, 34;
his army strengthened, 55;
slow to begin, 66;
advances against Kray, 67;
executes vigorously his manoeuvres, 67;
defeats Kray and detaches a corps, 67;
commands reserve, 93;
objects to First Consul's plan, 95, 98;
proposes a plan of his own, 96, 97;
declares he will not serve under Bonaparte, 98;
is cautious and slow, 99;
begins his movement, 100;
crosses Rhine, 101;
is joined by Lecourbe, 102;
his plan successfully executed, 102;
at battle of Engen, 104;
marches on Mosskirch, 105;
at battle of Mosskirch, 105;
marches on Ulm, 106;
his strength and loss, 107;
orders 15,000 men into Italy, 108, 109;
was generally successful, 108;
commits errors, 117-121, 134;
his plan compared to that of Bonaparte, 122, 124, _et seq._;
his characteristics, 118, 224, 225;
discussion of his operations 125, _et seq._;
his faulty movements, 126-132;
outgeneralled by Kray, 130.
Morris, William O'Connor, his remarks on Marengo, 230;
on Napoleon, 231.
Mosskirch, battle of, 105, 106.
Murat, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142;
marches on Milan, 149;
crosses the Po, 156;
became a marshal, 226.
Napier, Colonel, remarks on Napoleon's projects, 222, 223.
Napoleon I., his victories in 1814, 33;
his passages of the Danube, 38;
opposed to Archduke Charles, 38;
greatest captain of modern times, 38;
in the Ulm campaign, 38;
seized Austrian capital, 38;
meets Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz, 39;
quotation from regarding fortresses, 77;
never allowed himself to be besieged, 87;
peculiarity of his system of war, 131-135;
quotation from, 132, 201;
his remarks on the operations in Italy, 189, 190;
his wrong use of the expression, "lines of operations," 189;
on the art of war, 197;
his theory of war, 197;
his skill in strategy and war, 198;
is outnumbered at Marengo, 198;
might never have fallen, 211;
kept an eye on his communications, 218;
his boldness carried him too far, 220;
bestowed great care on military matters, 222;
his projects in Spain, 223;
his remarks on Masséna, 224;
same on Desaix and Kléber, 225;
fortunes of Republic sustained by his sword, 228;
was a great organizer, 231;
perhaps the foremost soldier of the world, 232;
the Emperor, his last words, 232.
Nelson, Lord, dealt the French a terrible blow in the battle of the
Nile, 16.
Ney, General, "the bravest of the brave," became a marshal, 226.
Nile, battle of, 16.
Ott, General, advances on Genoa, 58;
is successful, 59;
takes command of Austrians at Genoa, 63;
attacked three sides of the city, 65;
failed to continue the struggle, 70;
is ordered to raise siege of Genoa, 70;
besieges Genoa, 147;
receives surrender of Masséna, 154, 186;
marches on Placentia, 154;
is defeated at Montebello, 158;
retreats on Alessandria, 158;
commands Austrian left at Marengo, 164;
marches on Ghilina, 169;
retreats, 171.
O'Reilly, General, commands vanguard at Marengo, 163.
Paul I., Russian Emperor, felt bitter towards Austria, 15;
flattered by Bonaparte, 16.
Po, river of, description of, 20.
Pontebba, pass of, 26.
Prince de Reuss, commands Kray's left wing, 94, 111.
Prussia, army of, 75.
Rhine, river, description of, 20.
Rivoli, battle of, 17, 77;
campaign of, 33.
Roveredo, battle of, 76.
Royalists, might support allies, 24;
sympathize with England and Austria, 42.
San Georgio, battle of, 60.
Schwarzenberg, General, advances on Paris in 1814, 33.
Simplon, pass of, 19.
Soult, General, commands centre of Army of Italy, 56;
falls back to Genoa, 59;
commands one of Masséna's columns, 62;
became a marshal, 226.
Starry, General, commands Kray's right, 93;
remains in valley of Murg, 102;
descends the Danube, 105.
St. Bernard, Great, pass of, 19, 137;
Little, pass of, 19, 137.
St. Cyr, General, commands Moreau's centre, 93;
crosses Rhine at Brisach, 100;
marches on St. Blazien, 101;
at Engen, 104;
marches on Ulm, 106;
his movement criticised, 120;
became a marshal, 226.
Ste. Suzanne, General, commands Moreau's left wing, 93;
crosses the Rhine, 100, 101;
recrosses, 101;
marches on Ulm, 107.
St. Gothard, pass of, 19.
Stokach, battle of, 103, 104.
Stradella, pass of, 138.
Suchet, General, commands left of Army of Italy, 56;
falls back towards Nice, 59;
marches eastward from Nice, 62;
again falls back, 62;
rallies his troops, 65;
follows the Austrians, 71;
defeats Elsnitz and marches to Acqui, 153, 154;
fights along the Var, 176;
might have marched to Marengo, 211;
became a marshal, 226.
Suwaroff, General, fights in Italy and Switzerland, 15;
retreats into valley of the Danube, 15.
Switzerland, base of operations, 25;
separates two Austrian armies, 32;
possession of, advantageous to Bonaparte, 40.
Thiers, historian, quotation from, 89, 144, 145, 221.
Thurreau, General, guards the Mont Cenis Pass, 55, 79, 80, 90;
could fall on the flank of the Austrians, 80;
crosses the Alps, 142;
attacks Kaim, 146;
is held in check, 155;
at Susa, 194, 195.
Turenne, his remarks on mistakes in war, 201.
Tyrol, highway of, in possession of the Austrians, 31.
Ulm, intrenched camp of, 94, 110.
Var, river of, effort for success should have been made on, 75.
Victor, General, commands a corps under Bonaparte, 142;
marches on Milan, 149;
crosses the Po, 155;
re-enforces Lannes at Montebello, 158;
arrives at Marengo, 160;
at battle of Marengo, 164, _et seq._;
was crushed, 213;
became a marshal, 226.
Von der Goltz, General, his remarks on writing history, 15;
his views regarding fortresses, 86-87.
Vukassovich, General, watches the St. Gothard and Simplon passes, 147;
is defeated, and retreats to the Mincio, 150.
Wagner, Major, his definition of _containing force_, 32.
Waterloo, battle of, reference to, 211.
Wellington, Duke of, saying of, 227.
Zach, General, chief of staff, succeeds Melas in command at Marengo, 168;
advances against Bonaparte, 169, 171;
is taken prisoner, 171.
[Illustration:
Map 1.
MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE THE
CAMPAIGN
OF
MARENGO]
[Illustration: Map 2.]
[Illustration: Map 3.]
[Illustration: Map 4.
BATTLE-FIELD
OF
MARENGO]
END
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN.
With Comments by Herbert H. Sargent, First Lieutenant Second Cavalry,
United States Army. Crown 8vo. 231 pages, with maps. $1.50.
Since its publication this work has received the enthusiastic praise of
Press and Public, and has taken an important, and in many respects a
unique, place in the ranks of Napoleonic contributions.
The peculiar conciseness and lucidity of the style, and the
discriminating avoidance of technical and unessential details, have
invited the attention of a non-military public; while the preservation
of the strategic essence of the history has insured for the work a
permanent interest to the student of the art of war. The book has
been officially recognized by the United States Government,--the War
Department having purchased one hundred copies for distribution in the
service; and it has received the hearty commendation of the commander
in chief of the British army.
SOME COMMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESS.
_The Nation, New York._
The work is so clearly done, and the sketch maps so well illustrate the
successive stages of the campaign, that the general reader can follow
the story with satisfaction, and understand wherein Bonaparte was
really great.
_The Outlook, New York._
So carefully and accurately written is this volume, that the _London
Times_ pays our compatriot the compliment of begging him to continue
his history through the other campaigns of Napoleon.
_New York Herald._
Our author has been unusually successful in presenting his subject in
such a plain and easily comprehended fashion, that if we know nothing
about the strategy of the battle-field we follow him with increasing
curiosity and pleasure.
_Chicago Evening Post._
The author's method of study is simple: to give a careful yet simple
description of a battle and then to comment upon it. Its non-technical
character and the fascination of its subject make it an acceptable
volume for popular reading.
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_The Times, London._
No one, whether he be civilian or soldier, can, after the perusal of
this small volume, fail to realize vividly the stupendous genius of
Napoleon Bonaparte as manifested even in the earliest years of his
service in the field.... Valuable as is this book as a treatise on
strategy, its worth in this respect is far surpassed by its value as a
life-like portrayal of Napoleon, not only the strategist and tactician,
but the general "heaven born."
_Army and Navy Gazette, London._
A volume that is well worthy to be ranked with Lord Wolseley's "Decline
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do not know where to find a firmer or better picture of the Italian
campaign than in Lieutenant Sargent's volume.
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_William O'Connor Morris, author of "Napoleon: Warrior, Ruler."_
I hope you will let me express to you how much I admire your work on
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I think your success in eliminating from your narrative all the
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End of Project Gutenberg's The Campaign of Marengo, by Herbert H. Sargent