GENOA.[4]
In the fertile valley of the Po, the Austrian army, commanded by Melas,
found supplies in abundance for both men and animals. The equipment,
discipline, and morale of the Austrians were good. The successes of the
preceding year had encouraged them. They had that confidence in their
commander so necessary to secure success. Filled with the enthusiasm of
victory and looking hopefully forward to new triumphs, they were ready
and anxious to be led against the French.
On the other hand, the Army of Italy, extending along the Apennines
and Maritime Alps, found difficulty in obtaining supplies. Cut off
from the productive basin of the Po by the Austrians on the north, and
from the commerce of the sea by the British fleet on the south, this
army had to depend almost entirely upon such supplies as could be sent
from France over the Nice-Genoa road. The French soldiers were in a
deplorable condition. Neglected by the French government, they were
ragged, half-starved, discouraged. They had been defeated again and
again. They lacked the discipline and morale so essential to success.
A few soldiers had already deserted; many were so emaciated that they
could hardly bear arms, and a number were sick with fever.
On assuming command of the Army of Italy, Masséna took steps to improve
the condition of his men. With money furnished by Bonaparte he supplied
his troops with wheat, and by his energetic measures soon brought
about better discipline. In Bonaparte's name, he published a spirited
proclamation, which did much to renew the courage of his soldiers and
to inspire in them the hope of victory.
Notwithstanding the efforts of Masséna, his soldiers were in a
destitute condition. Only the bare necessaries of life were furnished
them. Ammunition alone was sent them in abundance. Though the Army of
Italy numbered but forty thousand men and was opposed to one hundred
and twenty thousand Austrians, Bonaparte would not re-enforce it by a
single soldier. In fact, all the men and _matériel_ collected in France
were used to strengthen Moreau's army and the Army of Reserve. The Army
of Italy was left to fight, as best it could, a force overwhelmingly
superior in numbers, _matériel_, and equipment.
At the opening of the campaign, the condition of the Army of Italy was
such that but thirty-six thousand men were fit for active service. Of
this force, four thousand under Thurreau were in the Mont Cenis Pass,
so that there remained but thirty-two thousand with which to hold the
Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. Masséna's
right wing, numbering eight thousand under Miollis, held the fortified
city of Genoa, which, owing to the outlying works and natural obstacles
surrounding it, was an exceedingly strong place; his centre, twelve
thousand strong, commanded by Soult, defended the Bochetta Pass, which
opens upon Genoa, and the Cadibona Pass, which opens upon Savona; his
left, consisting of twelve thousand under Suchet, occupied the Col di
Tenda, Nice, and the line of the Var.
Inasmuch as the active French army directly in front of Melas numbered
only thirty-two thousand soldiers, and was spread out from Genoa to
Nice, he calculated that by directing twenty-five thousand men upon
Genoa and a column of forty thousand upon the centre of the French
line, he could hold in check the French right, while he broke through
their centre and cut the Army of Italy in two. This feat accomplished,
he expected that his left wing of twenty-five thousand, with the aid
of the British fleet, would be able to enclose, blockade, and capture
Genoa, while his right wing of forty thousand was forcing the remainder
of the Army of Italy across the Var.
On the French side, the plan of campaign that offered the best results
was one that Bonaparte himself had originated. He ordered Masséna
to leave only small detachments at the passes of Tenda, Ormea, and
Cadibona, and to concentrate twenty-five or thirty thousand men at
Genoa. In written instructions to Masséna, the First Consul set forth
his views as follows:--
"Take care," said he, "not to extend your line too widely. Put but
few men on the Alps, or in the defile of the Tenda, where the snow
will protect you. Leave some detachments around Nice and in the forts
in its vicinity; keep four fifths of your force in Genoa and its
neighborhood. The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction
of Genoa, on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably
on the two points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw
yourself with all your forces united upon one of the enemy's columns.
The nature of the ground will not allow him to avail himself of his
superiority in artillery and cavalry; he can only attack you with his
infantry, and yours is infinitely superior to his; and, favored by
the nature of the place, it may make up for the deficiency in number.
In that broken country, if you manoeuvre well, with 30,000 men you
may give battle to 60,000. In order to carry 60,000 light-armed
troops into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total
army of 120,000 at least. Melas possesses neither your talents
nor activity; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear in the
direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from
your position; he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria,
ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in
Piedmont."
Though this plan was excellent for holding in check the Austrians for a
time, unfortunately it was beyond the execution of Masséna. Provisions
were so scarce in Genoa that it would have been foolish to concentrate
nearly the whole of the Army of Italy there. To feed his army was the
difficulty that confronted Masséna. For this reason he scattered his
troops along the Apennines, and occupied the seaboard from Genoa to
Nice. In this position, his soldiers could seize the meagre supplies
that the barren country afforded, and could more easily obtain
provisions direct from France. Though it is doubtful whether Masséna
fully appreciated the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, nevertheless,
he would probably have carried it out, had he not been prevented from
doing so by a lack of provisions, and by the beginning of hostilities
much earlier than either he or Bonaparte expected.
On the 5th of April, Melas, leaving thirty-five thousand Austrians
under General Kaim to occupy the fortresses of northwestern Italy and
to watch the passes of the Alps, advanced with sixty-five thousand[5]
to attack Masséna. His forces were divided into three columns: General
Ott with fifteen thousand men ascended the Trebbia and presented
himself before the defiles of the mountains which shoot off from the
main chain of the Apennines and extend along the east side of Genoa;
General Hohenzollern with ten thousand marched upon the Bochetta Pass
on the north side of the city; and Melas himself with forty thousand
ascended the Bormida, and attacked the forces of Soult and Suchet along
the Apennines and Maritime Alps. Confining his principal attack to the
centre of the French line, Melas succeeded, after hard fighting, in
forcing his way through the Cadibona Pass, which movement cut in two
the Army of Italy and separated Soult from Suchet. The former fell back
towards Genoa; the latter, towards Nice. In these engagements both
sides fought fiercely. Though the French had the advantage of position,
they were compelled to give way before the onslaughts of superior
numbers.
At the Bochetta Pass, the attack made by General Hohenzollern was
repulsed; but on the east side of Genoa the French, numbering less than
four thousand, could not hold the defiles and crest of the Apennines
against General Ott's force of fifteen thousand. The Austrians drove
the French across the mountains, then surrounded and invested the
French forts that protected the city on that side. By this successful
attack, General Ott gained a foothold within cannon-shot of the walls
of Genoa.
Thus far Melas had been successful. The first great step in his
undertaking had been accomplished. Now he could close in upon Masséna
with his left wing, force him back into Genoa, and hold him there as in
a vise; while with his right, strongly re-enforced, he could advance
against Suchet, perhaps crush him or drive him across the Var into
France.
Meanwhile Masséna was in a precarious situation. His army was cut
in two; his communications with France were severed. In the face of
superior numbers, Suchet was being driven back towards Nice, and Soult
was withdrawing the shattered remains of his forces towards Genoa. In
front of the city and along the Italian shore, the British fleet was
actively supporting the operations of Melas. On the east side of the
city, the Austrians had gained the crests of the mountains; and at the
Bochetta Pass they were ready to make another attack, which would prove
successful. In fact, Masséna was surrounded. The allies were closing in
upon him. Already their guns could be heard at Genoa; soon they might
force him inside the walls of the city.
But it was the want of provisions that gave Masséna the greatest
anxiety. Food was already scarce, and there was but little hope of
receiving any more. Though defeat and famine were staring him in the
face, yet he did not allow himself to be discouraged. He realized
that it was his duty to maintain a stubborn resistance, and to engage
actively as many of the Austrians as possible, in order that Bonaparte
could cross the Alps and strike the Austrian rear. By prolonging the
conflict he would gain time; and time was of the greatest importance to
the success of Bonaparte.
In order to understand how Masséna attempted to carry out his purposes,
it is necessary to describe briefly the situation of Genoa and its
fortifications. The city lies at the foot of a spur of the Apennines,
on the shore of the gulf that bears its name. This spur, running
south from the main chain towards the sea, divides into two ridges
which extend to the water's edge, one along the east side, the other
along the west side of the city. Upon the crests of the ridges, which
form two sides of a triangle, having its base on the sea, a number of
forts had been constructed and were occupied by the French. Within the
triangle was the walled city of Genoa, containing about one hundred
thousand inhabitants. Thus the city had two lines of fortifications
surrounding it: one along the ridges and crests of the Apennines, the
other along the walls of the city.
Masséna had but eighteen thousand soldiers to defend Genoa. But with
this force in so strongly fortified a place, he knew that he could hold
out as long as his provisions lasted. Perhaps, by vigorous fighting, he
might be able to unite with Suchet, and in this way re-establish his
communications with France.
For the purpose of carrying out these views, Masséna resolved to
drive the Austrians from the crest of the Apennines on the east side
of the city; then, if possible, to effect a junction with Suchet by a
movement along the Genoa-Nice road. Accordingly, on the 7th of April,
at the head of a strong force, he issued from the city and vigorously
attacked General Ott. The French drove the Austrians from the crest of
the Apennines, and, after desperate fighting, seized and reoccupied the
Austrian positions.
Having been successful in this attack, Masséna then made preparations
for a movement towards Nice. For this purpose, he divided his command
into two parts: he left Miollis with eight thousand men to defend
Genoa; and with the remaining ten thousand, divided into two columns,
one of which was commanded by Soult, the other by himself, he began
his westward march. At the same time, Suchet, who had been informed of
Masséna's plan, marched eastward from Nice to attack the Austrians from
that side. Both Masséna and Suchet met with fierce opposition. Neither
could make much headway against the overwhelming forces of Melas. For
several days the fighting was furious, desperate, and bloody. Though
Masséna captured several thousand Austrians, he was finally repulsed
and driven back. On the 18th of April he re-entered Genoa; and Suchet
again fell back towards the Var.
Masséna was now enclosed in the city. From this time dates the
beginning of the siege of Genoa,--one of the most memorable and
stubbornly contested struggles mentioned in history. In this brief
account of these operations, we shall not attempt to describe the
sufferings of the French soldiers who fought and starved and died here;
nor to dwell upon the heroic deeds of their commander,--as stubborn a
soldier and fierce a fighter as ever trod a battle-field; but rather to
point out the important facts that had a bearing upon the operations of
Bonaparte, and to show why Masséna, in the midst of a starving army and
a starving city, still continued to fight on.
The Army of Italy having been cut in two, Melas gave orders that
General Ott should take command of the thirty thousand Austrians then
surrounding Genoa, and, if possible, force Masséna to capitulate;
and that General Elsnitz, with twenty-five thousand, should proceed
vigorously against Suchet, whose active force at this time numbered
but ten thousand men. Masséna himself had but fifteen thousand; but
nevertheless he had resolved to hold out to the last extremity. He sent
an aid-de-camp to the First Consul to apprise him of the situation of
the Army of Italy, and to urge him to hasten the movement of the Army
of Reserve. Realizing that the scarcity of provisions would prevent
a long resistance, Masséna took possession of all the wheat he could
find in the city. Even the grain of inferior quality, such as rye and
oats, was seized and made into bread. Though the quantity of bread thus
obtained was small, and the quality poor, it sufficed to keep alive the
soldiers and the poor of Genoa during the first two weeks of the siege.
But ten days passed, and the supply of bread was almost exhausted.
Moreover, its bad quality was already causing sickness. A number of
soldiers were in the hospitals; and many were so weak and emaciated
that they could hardly bear the weight of their arms.
Though the outlook was gloomy to Masséna's soldiers, some hope yet
remained in his rugged soul. Perhaps a storm or adverse winds might
drive the English fleet off the Italian shore, and thus allow the
French ships to bring in provisions; perhaps Bonaparte, now that he
understood the situation, would hurry across the Alps into Italy, and
strike a blow that would cause Melas to raise the siege of Genoa and
set free Masséna's perishing army.
Masséna's force, exclusive of the sick, now numbered but twelve
thousand men; part of whom were occupying the outlying works, and the
remainder, within the city, were acting as a reserve. His purpose was
to attack the Austrians, whenever they advanced towards the city, and
to exhaust them as much as possible by partial engagements. By this
means he expected to prevent Melas from sending away a force, either to
aid the Austrians in front of Suchet, or to oppose the projected march
of Bonaparte across the Alps.
On the 30th of April General Ott, supported by English gun-boats in
the Gulf of Genoa, made simultaneous attacks on the east, north, and
west sides of the city. In these attacks, he met with considerable
success. On all three sides the Austrian columns advanced and occupied
more favorable positions. In fact, they gained the crests of several
mountain ridges within cannon-shot of the city, and succeeded in
capturing several French forts.
Masséna fought fiercely. Throwing his reserve first on one side of the
city and then on the other, in order to re-enforce his troops occupying
the outlying works, he finally forced back the Austrians from their
commanding positions and recovered the lost forts. The success of
Masséna at this time was discouraging to General Ott; for he knew that
he could not lay close siege to the place until his troops gained the
crests of the Apennines and invested, or captured, the outlying works.
Meanwhile the twenty-five thousand Austrians under Elsnitz had, by
vigorous fighting, driven Suchet from position to position. They had
even forced him to abandon Nice, and to fall back on the Var. On
this river, which had been strongly fortified, Suchet rallied his
scattered forces. Having received from the departments of southern
France a considerable re-enforcement, which increased his total
strength to fourteen thousand men, he was able, in this position, to
make a successful stand, and to stop the onward rush of the victorious
Austrians.
As soon as Bonaparte learned of the hopeless condition of affairs at
Genoa, he saw the necessity of hurrying across the Alps with the Army
of Reserve. But since the successful execution of his plan depended
upon his receiving a large re-enforcement from the Army of the Rhine,
and since Moreau could not safely detach this force till he had
defeated Kray and pushed him back from Lake Constance, Bonaparte was
compelled to delay his own movement. Moreau was slow to begin; and
his lingering inactivity gave Bonaparte intense anxiety, for it not
only paralyzed the operations of the Army of Reserve, but prolonged
the sufferings of the Army of Italy. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged Moreau
to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. "Hasten," said the First Consul,
"hasten by your success to accelerate the arrival of the moment at
which Masséna can be disengaged. That general wants provisions. For
fifteen days he has been enduring with his debilitated soldiers a
struggle of despair. Your patriotism is addressed, your self-interest;
for if Masséna shall be compelled to capitulate, it will be necessary
to take from you a part of your forces, for the purpose of hurrying
down the Rhone, in order to assist the departments of the south."
Finally, on the 25th of April, Moreau began his advance against Kray.
It is not the intention at this time to describe in detail these
operations. At present it is sufficient to say that Moreau executed
vigorously his part in Bonaparte's great plan. Having defeated Kray
in two battles, he detached, on the 11th of May, a corps of fifteen
thousand men from his army, gave the command of it to General Moncey,
and ordered him to march by way of the St. Gothard into Italy.
The time had come for Bonaparte to move forward the Army of Reserve.
Accordingly, on the 15th of May, he began his advance by way of the
Great St. Bernard into Italy. While this army of forty thousand and
this corps of fifteen thousand are marching hopefully forward across
the Alps, from France and Germany respectively, let us again turn our
attention to Masséna, who, amidst famine and death, is desperately
fighting on.
On the 5th of May a small vessel, containing grain sufficient to last
the besieged garrison for five days, ran the blockade and entered
Genoa. Masséna felt encouraged, and shortly afterwards made a sortie
on the east side of the city. Though he drove the Austrians from their
positions, this assault was the last of his successes. On the 13th of
May he attempted another assault, but was badly defeated. Henceforth
his soldiers were so weak that they lacked the strength to undertake
any movement beyond the walls of Genoa. In fact, many, not being
able to bear the weight of their arms, were compelled to sit down
while doing guard duty. Consequently, Masséna was obliged to limit his
efforts to the defence of the city, and to the task of providing food
for his men.
By the 20th of May the bread and meat were exhausted; even the horses
had all been consumed. All the linseed, starch, and cacao found in the
city were then collected and made into a kind of bread, which was all
but indigestible. This wretched and repulsive food, and a soup made of
herbs were all that remained to sustain life. Nevertheless, Masséna
would not capitulate. Stubborn and courageous to the last, he seemed
bent on defying even starvation and death. Possibly Bonaparte might yet
come; for word had been brought that he had crossed the Alps. It was
reported that, on the 20th of May, his army had been seen descending
the Great St. Bernard into Italy. If so, why did he not come? It was
now the 30th of May, and not another word had been heard of him. Could
he have met with defeat? Could he, whose movements were usually so
rapid, whose blows were so terrible and unexpected--could he have been
ten days in Italy, and not yet have struck the blow that was to shatter
the Austrian rear and bring relief to Masséna's perishing soldiers?
With intense anxiety these despairing men looked for the coming of
Bonaparte. But he came not. Already discouraged, they now lost all
hope. A few went so far as to destroy their arms. Some plotted; others
talked wildly of the sufferings and horrors that they were called upon
to endure. All urged Masséna to surrender; but he would not yield. He
begged his soldiers to hold out a little longer. He told them that the
First Consul was advancing to their relief; that if they capitulated
now, they would lose the results of all their heroism, all their
sufferings. "Yet a few days," said he, "nay, a few hours, and you will
be delivered."
Thus, for a brief time, Masséna succeeded in raising the hopes of his
soldiers. Again they looked expectantly towards the Apennines. Never
was anxiety more intense. In every sound, in every echo, in every flash
of light along the northern horizon, they thought that they saw signs
of the coming of Bonaparte. But they were mistaken. Despair seized
them; no hope remained. Even Masséna saw that the end had come; for
the last ounce of that wretched food composed of linseed, starch, and
cacao, had been consumed. It was now absolutely necessary to surrender.
Yet Masséna's inflexible nature would not wholly yield. He declared
that he would never capitulate, unless his soldiers should be allowed
to march out with the honors of war, and with the liberty to fight
again when beyond the enemy's line. And he kept his resolution. The
Austrians were compelled to accept these terms.
That the reader may understand why General Ott did not continue the
struggle a few days longer, and thus force Masséna to surrender
unconditionally, let us consider for a moment the situation at this
time in the valley of the Po.
On the 2d of June, two days before Masséna capitulated, Bonaparte
entered Milan, and there awaited Moncey's corps, which did not arrive
till the 6th of June.
On the 29th of May Melas learned that Bonaparte was advancing on
Milan. On the 31st he learned that Moreau had defeated Kray, and that
Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. Gothard into Italy.
At once he comprehended the vast plan of the First Consul. Melas
was in consternation; he had been surprised. To him the Army of
Reserve was no longer imaginary; it was a reality. Moreover, it was
rapidly approaching a favorable position from which it could strike
a formidable blow at the Austrian communications. Melas saw the
necessity of concentrating immediately his scattered forces. He must,
if possible, break through the French Army before it closed in upon
him. Accordingly, on the 31st of May, he sent orders to General Elsnitz
to quit the Var and march on Alessandria; and instructed General Ott to
raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to defend the line
of the Po.
General Ott received this order on the 2d of June, during the
negotiations for the capitulation of Genoa. He realized that he must
either raise at once the siege of the city or else accept Masséna's
terms.
On the 4th of June Masséna surrendered. On the 5th his active force,
numbering eight thousand men, set out over the Genoa-Nice road to
join Suchet, who at this time was following closely upon the rear of
the Austrians in his front, as they withdrew towards Alessandria. In
addition to his active force, Masséna surrendered four thousand sick
soldiers at Genoa; but it was stipulated that they should be cared for,
and upon their recovery should be sent back to join the French army.
Having made these arrangements, Masséna himself proceeded by sea to
join Suchet.
During these operations the English fleet in the Gulf of Genoa actively
supported the Austrians; but the English corps in Minorca remained
inactive. No effort was made to land it either at Genoa or at any other
point along the Italian or French coast.
During these engagements the fighting on both sides was desperate, the
loss heavy. In prisoners, killed, and wounded, the Austrians lost about
twenty thousand; the French, about fourteen thousand. But the loss of
the latter was in reality much greater; for out of Masséna's active
force of eight thousand that had marched out of Genoa to join Suchet,
probably six thousand were unfit for arduous service. The total number,
therefore, on the French side put _hors de combat_, for the time
being, may be reckoned at about twenty thousand men.
The active operations of the Army of Italy were ended. They had begun
on the 5th of April, and had terminated on the 4th of June. For two
months Masséna had shown himself firm as a rock,--had gloriously
performed his part in Bonaparte's great plan.
COMMENTS.
At the outset the Austrian forces were greatly scattered. A few
thousand were in Tuscany and in the Papal States; an Austrian garrison
was occupying the fortress of Mantua, which is situated on the Mincio
about twenty miles south of Lake Garda; twenty-five thousand were
moving forward in two columns to attack Genoa; forty thousand were
being directed on the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and thirty-five
thousand were occupying the fortresses of northwestern Italy, and
guarding the Italian entrances to the passes of the Alps.
The purpose of Melas was to push forward across the Apennines and
Maritime Alps, force the line of the Var, and invade France. How best
to accomplish this project was the problem before him. Having an army
of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers and being opposed to but
forty thousand, he believed that his force was sufficiently large to
undertake the invasion of France. Since the French line directly in
his front extended along the mountains from Genoa to the Col di Tenda,
Melas could easily overwhelm the French centre and cut the Army of
Italy in two; then, by leaving a sufficient force to surround Genoa, he
could push forward vigorously to the Var with the bulk of his forces,
and perhaps carry the position there before the French had time to make
the necessary dispositions for defending it. Had he adopted this plan,
and made arrangements with Admiral Keith and General Abercromby to have
the English corps in Minorca landed at the same time on the coast of
Italy or France, he would doubtless have been successful.
He was not successful because he did not thoroughly appreciate the
situation. He did not know how to handle his army. He scattered his
forces, and thus dissipated his strength. He spent too much energy at
Genoa, and not enough along the Var. His rear guard, which consisted of
the thirty-five thousand soldiers under General Kaim in Piedmont, and
of twenty thousand scattered throughout Italy, was unnecessarily large,
and yet was so divided, subdivided, and dispersed that it was weak at
all points. In short, Melas committed many errors.
First: In advancing against Genoa with twenty-five thousand men,
divided into two columns, and against the centre of the French line
with a third column of forty thousand, Melas gave to Masséna the
opportunity of holding in check with small forces two of the columns,
while he concentrated his remaining forces against the third. In fact,
this was exactly what Masséna did. He left eight thousand soldiers in
and around Genoa to hold the place, then united the rest of his troops
near Savona to attack Melas. When it is remembered that these three
Austrian columns of attack were separated by impassable obstacles, and
could not support one another, the errors of Melas become apparent
to every soldier. That, in spite of such errors, he was successful
in cutting the Army of Italy in two and in gaining the crest of the
mountains on the east side of Genoa was due to his great superiority in
numbers. His attacking force numbered sixty-five thousand men, while
Masséna had but thirty-two thousand.
In this connection it is worthy of notice that numbers alone can
neutralize and finally overcome any advantage of position or of
generalship. Thus mediocrity may triumph over genius. Even a Napoleon
cannot conquer in the face of odds sufficiently great. At Leipsic
one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, commanded by him, were
defeated by two hundred and ninety thousand allies. In the Waterloo
campaign, which, from a strategical point of view, is a masterpiece in
generalship, his army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men was
crushed and overwhelmed by the armies of England and Prussia, numbering
two hundred and eighteen thousand soldiers. Hence follows the first
principle of war: _Be as strong as possible at the vital point_.
Second: A victory on the Var was of much greater importance to Melas
than was the capitulation of Genoa; for should this river be once
forced, there would be no further obstacle to the invasion of France;
and, besides, a successful attack on Suchet would hopelessly deprive
Masséna of all support, and would in time force him to surrender.
In truth, the great effort for success should have been made on the
Var. But Melas failed to appreciate this fact. After he had separated
Masséna from Suchet by forcing the centre of the French line, he
directed his greatest efforts to the capture of Genoa. For this purpose
the troops surrounding the place were increased to thirty thousand men,
and were kept at or about this strength till Masséna surrendered; while
on the Var the Austrian forces actively engaged during these operations
numbered but twenty-five thousand. Since, at the outset, Masséna had
only eighteen thousand combatants at Genoa, and since this number was
rapidly reduced from day to day by casualties and sickness, it is
evident that Melas could have surrounded the place and have maintained
the siege there with less than thirty thousand soldiers. The increase
of his troops beyond the number necessary to hold securely the place
was injudicious; for the surplus could have been used with greater
effect on the Var. Moreover, the surplus did not hasten the surrender
of Masséna; for he was able to hold out against thirty thousand till
his provisions were exhausted. Against ten thousand less he could
have held out no longer. Again and again Melas assaulted the works
surrounding the city, but his efforts were, to a great extent, a waste
of energy; for they resulted in a greater loss to the Austrians than to
the French, and had little or no effect in hastening the surrender of
Masséna.
In the treatment of fortresses, it is worth while to compare the
methods of Bonaparte with those of Melas. In the Italian campaign of
1796-97, the strong fortresses which were held by the allies, and which
were on the direct line of Bonaparte's operations, did not stop his
progress for a moment. Though from a lack of siege artillery, he could
not completely invest them, he pushed forward past them to decide, if
possible, their fate upon the open battle-field. In that campaign he
invested the fortress of Mantua, containing twelve thousand combatants,
with ten thousand men; and though the besieged were finally increased
to twenty thousand soldiers, he continued with ten thousand or less
to hold them in check for seven months, while he won the battles of
Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano, San Georgio, Arcole, and
Rivoli. "It is upon the open field of battle," said Napoleon, "that the
fate of fortresses and empires is decided."
Third: The Austrian rear guard was unnecessarily large. It consisted
of fifty-five thousand soldiers. At present it is not the purpose to
point out in detail the errors that Melas committed by leaving so large
a force inactive in Italy, but rather to show that this force was
larger than necessary, and that the surplus troops composing it could
have been used to much greater advantage along the Var. The necessity
for a strong rear guard in northwestern Italy becomes apparent when
it is remembered that Thurreau was occupying the Mont Cenis Pass with
four thousand men, and might at any time attempt to issue therefrom
upon the flank and rear of Melas as he advanced towards the Var.
Inasmuch as Thurreau's detachment occupied a favorable position from
which to attack the Austrians, it was necessary, perhaps, that Melas
should leave ten or twelve thousand men to hold this force in check.
There was, too, some likelihood that French troops might issue into
Italy from Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass or the Simplon; a few
thousand troops were therefore needed in that vicinity to give warning
in case the French attempted to enter Italy from that direction. At
this time Melas doubted the existence of the Army of Reserve; but, had
he believed it to be a reality, doubtless he would not have expected
Bonaparte to cross the Great St. Bernard. And even had he expected
him from that direction, perhaps no better arrangement of his rear
guard could have been made than to leave five thousand men before the
St. Gothard, five thousand before the Great St. Bernard, and twenty
thousand near Turin with their left flank well extended towards the
Mont Cenis Pass. In this central position the rear guard could march
rapidly to attack the French, should they enter Italy by any one of
these passes, and could hold them in check till a larger Austrian force
could be concentrated. Had Melas known that Bonaparte expected to cross
the Alps with the Army of Reserve, no better method could have been
devised to prevent the projected march of Bonaparte than to force the
Var and invade France. This undertaking being accomplished, there would
be no further danger of Bonaparte's crossing the Alps; for he must then
fight on the west side of the mountains to save France from invasion.
The surest way to protect the Austrian rear was to force the Var. Every
spare man should have been directed there. Twenty thousand could have
held Genoa; thirty thousand would have sufficed for a rear guard; and
of the remaining seventy thousand, probably fifty or sixty thousand
could have united in an attack upon Suchet.
Fourth: Had the English corps of twelve thousand men been thrown upon
the coast of France just in rear of Suchet, while sixty thousand
Austrians were attacking him in front, who can doubt what the result
would have been? Suchet had but fourteen thousand men; and against such
overwhelming odds he would have been compelled to yield.
With a large and brave army, capable of doing great things, if it had
been properly led, Melas so scattered it and dissipated his strength
that he virtually accomplished nothing. Though he commanded one hundred
and twenty thousand men, he brought but twenty-five thousand upon the
vital point. In short, he committed blunder upon blunder, and finally
failed in his undertaking.
The problem before Masséna was to hold in check the Austrians in Italy
until Bonaparte could perfect his arrangements, cross the Alps, and
strike the Austrian rear. Masséna could not expect to do more than
this; for he could not take the offensive single-handed against an
Austrian army three times the size of his own. Moreover, he was in
possession of the strong defensive positions of Genoa, of the Apennines
and Maritime Alps, and of the line of the Var, where inferior numbers
could make a vigorous resistance against greatly superior forces.
Masséna could not know how soon Bonaparte would cross the Alps. His
object, therefore, was so to arrange his troops as to enable them to
hold out as long as possible.
At the outset of the campaign the Army of Italy was stationed as
follows: eight thousand were at Genoa; twelve thousand, in the vicinity
of Savona; twelve thousand, at the Tenda Pass, at Nice, and along
the Var; and four thousand, in the Mont Cenis Pass. By examining the
several positions on the map, it will be seen that the French forces
were greatly scattered. Thirty-two thousand, under the direct command
of Masséna, were defending the line of the Apennines and Maritime Alps
from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, a distance of about seventy-five miles;
and four thousand, under Thurreau, were holding the Mont Cenis Pass,
which lies in the French Alps about one hundred and twenty miles north
of Nice.
Inasmuch as the direct road from Italy into France crossed the Alps
over this pass, it was necessary to leave Thurreau's detachment there.
Otherwise an Austrian corps of several thousand could have crossed the
Alps at this point, thence have marched south along the west side of
the mountains, and have attacked the French on the Var in rear, while
Melas with his main forces was advancing across the Apennines to attack
them in front. Moreover, in this favorable position, Thurreau, unless
strongly opposed, could descend the Alps and fall upon the flank and
rear of the Austrians as they advanced towards Nice. It was necessary,
therefore, for Melas to leave ten or twelve thousand soldiers of the
Austrian rear guard near the Italian entrance to the Mont Cenis Pass
in order to hold Thurreau in check. Thus, though this French detachment
could take no active part in the engagements along the Apennines and
Maritime Alps, its four thousand men did good service in the struggle
by rendering nugatory the fighting power of a much larger Austrian
force.
Since the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps occupied a front
of about seventy-five miles in extent, they could not concentrate
rapidly. Consequently, Melas could throw a strong force against some
point of their long line with great hope of success. In fact, by
attacking the centre of their line with superior numbers, he could cut
the Army of Italy in two. Having in this way separated Masséna from
Suchet, Melas could concentrate an overwhelming force against each in
succession, and thus defeat them separately. Moreover, this movement
would cut the communications of Masséna with France, and compel him to
seek safety in Genoa, where the opposition of superior numbers and the
scarcity of provisions must eventually force him to surrender.
Strategically, therefore, the situation of the Army of Italy was
faulty; yet it must be remembered that the lack of provisions was the
principal cause that led Masséna to adopt this plan. In order better
to subsist his troops, he had scattered them. But was there no other
course that offered him greater advantages? A discussion of the subject
should throw light on this question.
First: He might have left detachments to hold the Cadibona and Ormea
passes, and have concentrated the bulk of his army in rear of the Tenda
Pass in the vicinity of Nice. Had he adopted this course, his troops
would have been united, and could have drawn their provisions direct
from France. But no other advantages would have resulted. With the
French in this position, Melas could have attacked the passes of the
Apennines in force, and have gained possession of the Genoa-Nice road;
which operation would have compelled Masséna to fall back on the Var.
There he might have been able to make a successful stand for a time.
But should the Austrians once force this position, there would be no
further obstacle to the invasion of France. To adopt this plan would
undoubtedly have been a mistake; for it involved the abandonment of
Genoa, which was so strong, both naturally and artificially, that a
small force could hold it for a long time against superior numbers.
Moreover, in a defensive campaign, when the odds are greatly in favor
of the attacking army, and when the object is to gain time, advantage
should be taken of every strong position.
Second: Masséna might have left small detachments to hold the passes
of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, and have concentrated the rest
of his army at Genoa. Indeed this was the plan that Bonaparte had
ordered Masséna to carry out; but it presented great difficulties.
Provisions were scarce at Genoa. Had Masséna increased his strength
there to thirty thousand soldiers, starvation and disease would sooner
have done their deadly work. Moreover, the greater fighting power thus
obtained would have availed him nothing; for with half the number he
in fact held the city till the food was exhausted. Had Masséna adopted
this course, undoubtedly he must have surrendered at least three weeks
earlier. In that case, the Austrians would have crossed the Var into
France, and Bonaparte would have abandoned his march into Italy. In
that case, the decisive struggle between Melas and Bonaparte would
doubtless have taken place in the valley of the Rhone instead of in
the valley of the Po. Indeed, it is not improbable to assume that,
had Masséna attempted to carry out either one of the plans mentioned,
Bonaparte would have been obliged to change the entire conduct of the
campaign. In war small matters often determine great events.
Under the circumstances then existing, Masséna was justified in not
carrying out Bonaparte's instructions; nevertheless, had he fully
appreciated the advantages of the plan, he would undoubtedly have made
a greater effort to collect supplies at Genoa. Inasmuch as he took
command of the Army of Italy before the arrival of the British fleet
in the Gulf of Genoa, possibly he might have shipped sufficient grain
from Toulon to supply the Army of Italy during a siege of several
months. For the purpose of this discussion, let us assume that he had
done so; and that, in accordance with Bonaparte's orders, he had left a
few thousand men to hold the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps,
and had collected about thirty thousand at Genoa. What would have been
the result? What are the advantages of this situation? Surely, they are
many; for Bonaparte himself originated the plan.
Since the mountains and outlying works surrounding Genoa made it a
veritable stronghold, Bonaparte calculated that the Army of Italy could
maintain itself there against greatly outnumbering forces; and that the
Austrians would hardly dare to force the Apennines and push forward in
order to invade France while thirty thousand men remained undefeated in
their rear. In this position, too, Masséna could, at any time, leave a
small force to hold Genoa, then march rapidly westward along the south
side of the Apennines, and arrive before any one of the threatened
passes with almost his entire army; or should the Austrians force
the Apennines and advance towards France, he could fall upon their
flank and rear, and perhaps sever their communications, while his own
communications with Genoa would be protected by the mountains on one
side and by the sea on the other. In fact, this position would enable
him to take advantage of the topography of the country to the fullest
extent. If he should make an attack in force upon the Austrians from
one of the passes in his possession, the mountains would protect him
during his concentration, and would give strength to his position after
his forces had united. If he should remain at Genoa, the fortifications
and natural obstacles there would increase enormously his fighting
power. It is evident, too, that he might march out of the city, force
his way through the Apennines, and cut the communications of the
Austrians in the valley of the Po. If, while holding the Apennines, he
should advance with his main army over the Genoa-Nice road to attack
the Austrians, he would be in a position where a victory would bring
him great results, and where a defeat would do him but little harm.
Should he be successful, he could sever the Austrian communications
and perhaps ruin their army; should he be repulsed, he could fall back
and seek safety in Genoa. "If," says Bonaparte in his instructions to
Masséna, "Melas appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa,
let him come on, stir not from your position: he will not advance far
if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or
upon the troops left in Piedmont."
In short, Bonaparte's design was so to make use of the works of nature
and of art as to prolong the conflict and increase the effectiveness
of Masséna's small army. Thus it was that Bonaparte expected thirty
thousand French to defeat sixty thousand Austrians. Thus it was that he
expected the Army of Italy to hold out against overwhelming odds till
he himself could strike the decisive blow.
Though from a strategical point of view the plan set forth in
Bonaparte's instructions to Masséna possessed many advantages, yet
it had one great defect. With the main bulk of Masséna's forces
concentrated at Genoa, and with small detachments holding the line of
the Apennines and Maritime Alps, it is evident that Melas could force
his way across the mountains between Genoa and the Tenda Pass, and
thus cut the communications of Masséna and enclose him in Genoa. It is
evident, too, that Melas could surround Masséna and eventually force
him to capitulate. The French might fight desperately and hold out for
months; yet, in time, they would be compelled to yield. The histories
of wars and of sieges show that, when a commander allows himself to be
enclosed in a fortification, he is doomed to defeat in the end. "_Great
armies_," says Von der Goltz, "_which are shut up in a fortress after
lost battles, are, as the history of investments from Alesia down
to Metz proves, almost always lost_." Again he says: "Among all the
relations between fortress and field army, the latter must make it a
supreme rule _never to allow itself to be thrown into a fortress_. Even
to pass through it is dangerous, because the army may be kept prisoner
there against its will. _Fortresses protect the troops they contain,
but, at the same time, anchor them to the spot. An army can easily be
got behind fortifications, but only with difficulty back again into
the open field, unless it be that strong help from without lends it a
hand._" When the commander of an army is hard pressed, and there is
near at hand a strongly fortified place with outlying works of great
strength, and provisions and water within, the temptation is great to
seek security there. Second rate generals accept such opportunities,
but in doing so they make fatal mistakes. The great masters of the art
of war manoeuvre for position, and become themselves the besiegers,
or decide upon the open battle-field the fate of their fortresses and
their armies.
During all Napoleon's military operations he never allowed himself to
be besieged in any place. How, then, are we to reconcile this fact with
the instructions that he sent to Masséna? Why should he order Masséna
to take up a position which would allow his army to be besieged, and
finally to be captured or destroyed? To answer satisfactorily these
questions, it is necessary to consider the operations of Masséna in
connection with the projected operations of Bonaparte. The Army of
Italy was essentially a containing force. Its duty was to hold Melas
in check for a time. How Masséna could best _prolong_ the conflict was
the problem that Bonaparte was solving. That the Army of Italy should
finally be defeated was of small consequence; that it should not be
defeated before Bonaparte had time to effect the destruction of Melas
was of great consequence. If it could hold out till then, the victory
of Bonaparte over Melas would render nugatory the triumph of Melas over
Masséna. If it could hold out till then, the success of Melas at Genoa
would avail him nothing; for it would be swallowed up by a greater
success, which was destined to produce far greater results.
Bonaparte believed that Masséna was strong enough to hold Melas in
check; and since every spare man was needed to strengthen Moreau's army
and the Army of Reserve, he would not send any re-enforcements to the
Army of Italy. Doubtless an ordinary general would have marched the
entire Army of Reserve to the support of Masséna. What would have been
the result? With only eighty thousand Frenchmen to oppose one hundred
and twenty thousand Austrians, there would have been a long struggle in
Italy. Guided by the genius of Bonaparte the French might have repeated
the successes of 1796-97; but even had they done so, months of hard
fighting would have been necessary in order to drive the Austrians
out of northern Italy. In the Marengo campaign Bonaparte expected to
accomplish as great results in less time. The struggle for the mastery
was to take place, not along the Apennines, but in the valley of the
Po. Thus it was that no re-enforcements were sent to Masséna, and that
little or nothing was done to improve the condition of the Army of
Italy. "It must be admitted," says Thiers, "that the army of Liguria[6]
was treated a little as a sacrificed army. Not a man was sent to it.
Materials of war only were supplied to it; and even under that head
such only as were absolutely needful. It was in a different direction
that the great efforts of the government were exerted, because it was
in a different direction that the great blows were to be dealt. The
army of Liguria was exposed to destruction in order to gain the time
which should render the others victorious. Such is the hard necessity
of war, which passes over the heads of these to strike the heads of
those; obliging those to die that these may live and conquer."
It seems hard that Masséna's soldiers should have starved and died,
and no help have been sent them. It seems hard that they should have
struggled on, performing heroic deeds, with little or no hope of
victory. But such is war; some must fail in order that others may
triumph. In beleaguered Genoa, at the bridge of Arcole, amid the snows
of Russia, men must die. But do they die in vain? Perhaps so: and yet,
who shall say?
Victory was Bonaparte's object; and to obtain it, he would, if
necessary, sacrifice the Army of Italy. He had an eye for great
results. His glance penetrated the most complicated military problems.
It was his merit that he knew how, with the forces at hand, to do
great things. He did not fritter away his strength by sending useless
detachments here and there. The four thousand men under Thurreau were
a necessity in the Mont Cenis Pass; the Army of Italy, with Masséna at
its head, was large enough, but not too large, to do the work expected
of it; and the Army of Reserve, re-enforced by a corps of Moreau's
army, was of sufficient strength to produce the desired effect at the
vital point. Even Genoa, the Alps, and the Apennines were made to
serve Bonaparte. Nature was his re-enforcement. Like a mighty tide he
moved on, neither deterred by the sufferings of the Army of Italy, nor
stopped by the great chain of the Alps.
He who would censure Bonaparte for not marching to the relief of
Masséna must remember that such a course would have prolonged the
struggle and ultimately would have led to a greater destruction
of life. Yet humane considerations probably did not influence his
decisions one iota. Let us not, then, attribute to him the virtues of
a Lincoln; but let us set forth with fairness what he did and why he
did it. We may not admire the man who can thus sacrifice an army to
attain his ends; but we must admire the soldier who penetrates the
future, who sees what to do and how to do it, who bends every energy to
the accomplishment of the task, and with relentless purpose, turning
neither to the right hand nor to the left, marches on to victory.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 4: See Map 2.]
[Footnote 5: In addition to the forces of Melas mentioned above, twenty
thousand Austrians were scattered throughout northern Italy, several
thousand of whom were in Tuscany, in the Papal States, and in the
fortress of Mantua.]
[Footnote 6: In the "History of the Consulate and Empire" by Thiers, he
often refers to the Army of Italy as the "army of Liguria."]