THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO
THE
CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO
With Comments
BY
HERBERT H. SARGENT
FIRST LIEUTENANT AND QUARTERMASTER, SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED
STATES ARMY; MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL
SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS;
AUTHOR OF "NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN"
[Illustration]
LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER, & CO. LTD
PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD
1897
Copyrighted in Great Britain.
University Press:
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.
DEDICATION
_BY A SOLDIER
TO
THE SOLDIERS OF HIS COUNTRY_
It is written in a certain book, with which most of us are familiar,
that a day will come when there shall be no more wars. But that time
is far distant. When the laws of human society change, wars may cease,
but not till then. All around us is strife; the weak are ever falling
before the strong. The grass takes its strength from the soil and
air, and each blade struggles for food and light with its neighbor.
The beast consumes the grass, and man destroys the beast. We struggle
on, contending with one another and with the world, and encountering
defeat and death when we meet a stronger power than ourselves. Such is
Nature's stern law. It regulates the life of the worm that crawls at
our feet, governs the actions of men, and determines the destinies of
peoples. The conclusion is therefore reached that until man can rise
above this law, the time will not come when there shall be no further
need of armies, and when war shall be no more.
No country has ever become great without soldiers. They lay the
foundations of nations. In the history of every great people there is a
record of battles fought and battles won. At Lexington, at Bunker Hill,
at Gettysburg, men died that a nation might live. Is it any wonder
that we should be proud of our profession? "Whoever has a heart," says
Von der Goltz, "feels it beat higher and becomes enthusiastic for the
profession of the soldier." Napier says: "War is the condition of this
world. From man to the smallest insect, all are at strife; and the
glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honor,
fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the
brave man's patriotism, and is a chastening corrective for the rich
man's pride."
We cannot know whether we shall be called upon to fight for our
country; we may be called, or not; but we shall deserve no less the
gratitude of our countrymen, if we remain _always ready_. Wars have
been necessary in the past; they will be necessary in the future.
"Man needs must fight
To make true peace his own;
He needs must combat might with might,
Or might would rule alone."
"_The decisive events of the world take place in the intellect._ It is
the mission of books that they help one to remember it."
PREFACE
I have written this book for the civilian and the soldier. I cherish
the hope that it will be interesting to both.
H.H.S.
Fort Wingate, New Mexico,
December 7, 1896.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. Page
Introduction 15
Comments 30
CHAPTER II.
Genoa 54
Comments 72
CHAPTER III.
Moreau in Germany 92
Comments 109
CHAPTER IV.
Marengo 136
Comments 173
CHAPTER V.
General Comments 216
Index 233
LIST OF MAPS
AT END OF VOLUME.
Map 1 to illustrate Chapter I.
Map 2 to illustrate Chapters II. and IV.
Map 3 to illustrate Chapter III.
Map 4 to illustrate Battle of Marengo.
THE
CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.[1]
After a war one ought not only to write the history of what has taken
place, but also the history of what was intended.--Von der Goltz.
Upon Bonaparte's return from Egypt in October, 1799, he found England,
Austria, and the small states dependent upon them waging war against
France. The allies were united in an effort to crush the French
Republic. They were sanguine of success. Against this formidable
coalition France stood alone.
Before Bonaparte's return, a Russian army, commanded by Suwaroff, had
also been fighting the French in Italy and Switzerland; but, having
been defeated by Masséna, Suwaroff had retreated with the remnants of
his army into the valley of the Danube, and thence had proceeded into
Russia. The defeat of Suwaroff had caused the Russian Emperor, Paul the
First, to believe that his army had not been properly supported by the
Austrian armies. He therefore felt angry and bitter towards Austria.
As soon as Bonaparte became aware of the state of the Emperor's mind he
collected the Russian prisoners then in France, gave them new uniforms
and new arms, and sent them back to their own country. These acts and
others of a conciliatory nature pleased and flattered the Emperor Paul,
and enabled Bonaparte, soon after his return, to detach Russia from the
alliance.
Of the two great powers at war with France, England had been more
active and more successful upon the sea; Austria, upon the land. In the
battle of the Nile, Nelson had dealt the French navy a terrible blow,
from the effects of which it never recovered. England was now mistress
of the sea. Having her fleets in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of
Genoa, she was prepared to assist Austria in her efforts to overthrow
the French Republic.
During Bonaparte's absence in Egypt, Austria, aided by Russia, had
pushed forward her armies to the boundaries of France. One large
Austrian army[2] in western Germany was watching the crossings of the
Rhine; another in northwestern Italy was fighting the French along
the Apennines and Maritime Alps. From the theatre of operations made
memorable by Bonaparte's victories in 1796-97, Austria had almost
driven the French eagles. Bonaparte's battles of Montenotte, Lodi,
Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli seemed to have been won in vain.
Austria had all but reconquered Italy. Except along the narrow seaboard
between the Apennines and the sea, no French soldiers were to be found
upon Italian soil.
Such was the situation when, in November, 1799, Bonaparte became
First Consul of France. At this time his acts certainly indicated
a desire for peace. He wrote to the governments of England and
Austria, deploring the futility of a continuation of the conflict,
and suggesting that the war should cease. His overtures, however,
were coldly rejected. He was forced to fight. Against this powerful
coalition peace could be obtained only by victorious battle.
Industriously Bonaparte prepared for war. France was in a deplorable
state. The treasury was empty; the soldiers were ill fed and ill clad;
recruits and supplies were obtained with difficulty; civil war existed
in certain parts of western France; and the armies of the Republic had
met with defeat again and again. Over the French people this condition
of affairs had cast a gloom which the magic of Bonaparte's name alone
could dispel.
During the winter of 1799-1800 his energy and activity were apparent
everywhere. His proclamations aroused the spirit and patriotism of
the French people, and gave them confidence in their government, and
hope of success under his leadership. He placed the finances upon a
firm basis, crushed out the civil war, caused arms to be manufactured,
and supplies to be collected; and from the levies that he ordered
he organized sufficient forces to strengthen materially the French
military power. Of the two French armies in the field, he sent
re-enforcements to the Army of the Rhine, gave the command of it to
General Moreau, and ordered General Masséna to take command of the Army
of Italy, which, half-starved upon the rocks of Genoa, was struggling
heroically against overwhelming odds. At this time, too, he began to
collect, drill, and organize, in different parts of France, bodies of
men who were destined to unite near Lake Geneva, and together with
other troops in France already organized, were to form a third army, to
be known as the Army of Reserve.
Before entering into the details of the campaign, it is necessary to
describe the topography of the theatre of operations, to point out the
situations of the opposing forces, and to explain the plans of the
contending powers.
Bordering France on the east are Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. The
Alps, covering Switzerland like a huge network, give to this country
the appearance of an immense bastion, which, extending east, separates
Germany from Italy. From Switzerland these mountains extend through
and beyond the Tyrol. They separate the valley of the Danube from the
valley of the Po. In Switzerland they are known as the Swiss Alps;
in the Tyrol, as the Tyrolese Alps. On the north side of them are
the States of Swabia, Bavaria, and Upper Austria; on the south side,
Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venice.
Extending south from western Switzerland to within about thirty miles
of the sea, the French Alps form part of the boundary line between
France and Italy; thence, turning east, they approach the Italian
shore, and are here known as the Maritime Alps; still farther east,
along the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, they are called the Apennines.
With the exception of a few passes, this great mountain chain, almost
enclosing northern Italy, forms an insurmountable barrier to the
soldier. Even over the passes, especially across the higher ranges,
communication was, at the time of which we write, extremely dangerous.
The snow and ice, the glaciers, avalanches, frequent storms, and steep
declivities, made these mountain roads hazardous and difficult for the
passage of armies. The principal passes in the Swiss Alps are the St.
Gothard, the Simplon, and the Great St. Bernard; in the French Alps,
the Little St. Bernard, and the Mont Cenis; in the Maritime Alps, the
Col di Tenda and the Col di Ormea; and in the Apennines, the Col di
Cadibona and the Bochetta.
Lying partly or entirely within this territory are three large rivers
and their tributaries. They have their sources in or near the great
chain of the Alps, and drain the tributary country. The Po rises in the
French Alps, and flows east through northern Italy. The Danube rises in
western Germany, and flows east through Bavaria and Austria. The Rhine
rises in Switzerland, flows north into Lake Constance, thence, forming
the outlet of the lake, flows west to Bâle, where it turns abruptly and
flows north for the rest of its course.
Early in April, 1800, an Austrian army of one hundred and twenty
thousand soldiers, commanded by Marshal Kray, guarded the right bank of
the upper Rhine. The right wing extended beyond Strasburg; the left,
well up into the Alps east of Switzerland; and the centre, forming the
greater part of Kray's army, occupied the Black Forest in the angle
of the Rhine made by its change of direction at Bâle. Kray's line of
communication was along several roads down the Danube to the Austrian
capital.
Facing the Austrian army, on the opposite side of the river, was the
Army of the Rhine, commanded by Moreau. Including the French forces in
Switzerland, it numbered one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, and
extended from the St. Gothard on the right to Strasburg on the left. It
had for a base of operations the frontier fortresses of France, and
Switzerland, which was occupied by the French.
The Austrian army in northwestern Italy consisted of one hundred and
twenty thousand soldiers, and was commanded by General Melas. The
greater part of it was in the vicinity of Genoa and along the Apennines
and Maritime Alps. The remainder, occupying the fortresses and guarding
the entrances to the passes of the Alps, was scattered throughout
northwestern Italy. This army had its base of operations on the Mincio;
and its line of communication was by several roads down the valley of
the Po to its base, thence by two roads: one north through the Tyrol
across the Brenner Pass into the valley of the Danube; the other
northeast through Friuli across the Pontebba Pass to Vienna.
Opposed to the army of Melas was the Army of Italy. It consisted of
forty thousand soldiers, of whom thirty-six thousand, commanded by
Masséna, were holding the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps
from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. The remainder, four thousand strong,
commanded by General Thurreau, was guarding the Mont Cenis Pass in the
French Alps. The line of communication of the Army of Italy to its base
of operations on the Rhone was by the Genoa-Nice road.
A British fleet, commanded by Admiral Keith was in the Gulf of Genoa;
and a British corps twelve thousand strong, commanded by General
Abercromby, was at Port Mahon in Minorca.
Such were the main features of the theatre of operations, and such were
the positions and numbers of the opposing armies that were facing each
other in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy, at the beginning
of hostilities early in April, 1800. Against the Austrian armies,
supported by the British navy, and a British corps which might at any
time be thrown upon the coast of France, Bonaparte could not, with his
two armies, expect to make much headway. His chances of success were
small; the odds against him were too great. Unless he could increase
his own forces, a French victory was doubtful. Thus it was that early
in the winter he had seen the necessity of creating an army of reserve,
which could be sent to re-enforce Moreau in Germany or Masséna in
Italy as circumstances might require. But the Army of Reserve had not
yet been assembled. The divisions composing it were still scattered
throughout France. Their organization, however, was being rapidly
pushed forward, with the intention that early in May they should unite
near Lake Geneva and form an army of forty thousand soldiers.
On the French side, Bonaparte, at the head of the French Republic, had
for the first time full control of all military operations. Hitherto,
great as had been his achievements in Italy and in Egypt, he had acted
as a subordinate, merely directing the operations of his own army; but
now his military genius was to have full play.
On the Austrian side, the Aulic Council, consisting of twenty-one
members, directed all military operations. This council, which held
its sessions at Vienna, not only made the plans of campaign, but also
issued detailed orders to the Austrian commanders, and furnished them
information regarding Bonaparte's plans and manoeuvres.
At this time the ablest soldier in Austria was the Archduke Charles.
Already he had greatly distinguished himself in several campaigns. He
reasoned that, inasmuch as Austria, England, and Russia had failed to
crush the French Republic in 1799, before Bonaparte's return to France,
the allies stood little hope of success after Russia had withdrawn
from one side, and Bonaparte had been added to the other. He therefore
advised his government to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace. To the
Aulic Council he also gave valuable advice upon the military situation.
But no attention was paid to his suggestions. In fact, before the
campaign opened, the Archduke was relieved of his command in the army,
and sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile.
The plan of campaign adopted by the allies was that the Austrian army
under Kray in Germany should remain on the defensive, holding Moreau
in check if possible, while the Austrian army under Melas in Italy
attacked the Army of Italy along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. By
this means, the allies expected that the Austrian forces in Italy, so
superior in numbers to the French, would be able with the help of the
British fleet to blockade Genoa, and to drive the Army of Italy across
the Var into southern France. This movement being accomplished, the
purpose was that Melas, supported by the British navy and Abercromby's
corps, should invade France, and attack and capture Toulon.
Furthermore, the allies hoped, by adopting this plan, to receive some
support from the Royalists in the south of France. If this operation
succeeded, it was expected that Moreau would detach a sufficient
force from the Army of the Rhine to march on Toulon for the purpose
of driving back the allies: whereupon Kray could attack the Army of
the Rhine, thus weakened, with much hope of success; that, in fact, he
could take the offensive, force the crossings of the Rhine, and invade
France.
In this calculation no plans were made to attack the French forces in
the great stronghold of Switzerland. If, however, the allies succeeded
in their designs, Kray and Melas could unite their armies in France,
thus cut the communications of the French forces in Switzerland, and
smother them, as it were, between the two great Austrian armies.
In view of the facts that the allies were flushed with their recent
victories, were superior to their adversary in numbers, and also held
the mastery of the sea, they expected great results in the coming
campaign. With so many advantages on their side, their plans seemed
both reasonable and accomplishable; but they reckoned without the
genius of Bonaparte.
On the other side, Bonaparte had two plans, both of which it will be
well to examine, that the reader may grasp the breadth of Bonaparte's
intellect in originating strategic conceptions. Both plans were based
upon the fact that the great stronghold of Switzerland, extending like
a huge wedge between the Austrian army in Germany and that in Italy,
was occupied by the French. This natural fortress, almost impregnable,
could be used as a base of operations from which to attack either Kray
in Germany or Melas in Italy.
The first plan conceived by Bonaparte was to leave Masséna in Italy on
the defensive to hold Melas in check, then to unite the Army of Reserve
with Moreau's army, cross the Rhine in force between Schaffhausen
and Lake Constance, and attack that part of Kray's army occupying
the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance
and Strasburg. By an attack in this direction, Bonaparte calculated
that he could defeat Kray, drive him north, sever his communications
with Vienna, and either destroy or capture his army. If successful in
this operation, he could descend the Danube and seize the Emperor's
capital; then by taking possession of the Tyrol and the Carnic Alps,
he could occupy the Brenner and Pontebba passes, which operation would
sever the communications of Melas in Italy and cut him off from Vienna.
With Kray's army captured or destroyed, with the French holding the
only passes by which the Austrians in Italy could retreat, and with
Bonaparte in possession of the Austrian capital, the campaign must
end; the Austrian Emperor would be compelled to make peace. This plan
had many advantages. It would, if successful, be far-reaching in
its results; it would not only destroy Kray, but would paralyze the
operations of Melas; it would, to use Bonaparte's expressive words,
"reconquer Italy at Vienna."
Though this plan promised great results it was not carried out. A
rivalry between Moreau and Bonaparte was the principal cause. The
former, being jealous of the latter, refused to serve under him. Though
the First Consul had shown his confidence in Moreau, and, by appointing
him to command the Army of the Rhine, had recognized his great military
abilities, nevertheless Moreau objected to having Bonaparte direct the
operations of the combined armies in person. In fact, he stated that he
would send in his resignation if the First Consul took command of the
Army of the Rhine. At a later day this would undoubtedly have resulted
in Moreau's losing his command; but at this time Bonaparte was not in
a position to force a quarrel with him. He had need of Moreau's great
military talents. Furthermore, the commander of the Army of the Rhine
had the unbounded confidence of the soldiers under him, and was at that
time the only general in France, except Masséna and Bonaparte himself,
who was able to direct successfully the operations of a large army.
Victory was Bonaparte's object. To be victorious, it was necessary to
utilize the services of every great soldier of France.
Doubtless, too, in adopting another plan, Bonaparte was influenced
somewhat by the hope of gaining a great victory with the army that
he himself had created. If he could cross the Alps with the Army of
Reserve and strike a blow which would decide the fate of Italy, he
alone would reap the glory. Moreover, by following in the footsteps of
Hannibal, he would be more likely to dazzle the French people, and to
fix deeply in their minds the splendor of his achievements.
Bonaparte's second plan was that Moreau should cross the Rhine and
attack Kray in such a direction as to push him back from Lake Constance
towards the north; that he should then detach a corps of twenty or
twenty-five thousand soldiers from his army and send them across
Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass into Italy, where they were to
unite with the Army of Reserve to be led by Bonaparte in person over
the Great St. Bernard Pass. With these forces Bonaparte purposed to
march south, cross the Po, seize the line of retreat of the Austrians,
and force them to fight a battle to recover their communications.
Should he succeed in this manoeuvre, a single victorious battle would
decide the fate of the Austrians in Italy; for it would sever their
communications and cut them from their base of operations. To Melas,
therefore, a defeat would mean the ruin, capture, or annihilation of
his army; to Austria it would mean the loss of Italy.
The success of this plan depended upon the skill with which Bonaparte
could deceive the Austrians in Italy as to his intentions; for should
they learn of the existence of the Army of Reserve, and of Bonaparte's
intention to cross the Great St. Bernard, they could concentrate near
the Italian entrance to the pass, and overwhelm the French divisions
in detail as they issued into Italy. It was necessary, therefore, that
the strength, destination, even the existence of the Army of Reserve,
should be kept as secret as possible. To accomplish this, Bonaparte
published in the newspapers, and announced in various ways, that the
Army of Reserve was assembling at Dijon in France, and that it would
soon be sent to re-enforce the Army of Italy. At the same time he took
care to collect there only a few thousand men, consisting mostly of
conscripts and old soldiers.
The wide publicity given the matter caused the spies of England
and Austria to gather at Dijon, but finding there only unorganized
conscripts and veterans too old for active service, they sent word to
their governments that no such army existed. Consequently the Army of
Reserve was believed to be imaginary, and was ridiculed and caricatured
throughout Europe.
Both Melas and Kray were completely deceived. Feeling certain that
there were but two French armies with which to contend, they had great
hope of success. Moreover, the information received from the Aulic
Council confirmed them in this opinion. Melas, in particular, regarded
the matter as a ruse of Bonaparte, intended to divert the Austrians in
Italy from invading France. He therefore felt secure in his positions,
and pushed forward his forces with renewed energy. Feeling certain that
he had fathomed Bonaparte's stratagem, he rested in a security which
doomed him to defeat.
Meanwhile the divisions of the Army of Reserve were concentrating. They
were marching through France; and were rapidly assembling near Geneva,
from which place they were to be led across the Alps into Italy. This
army, so secretly organized, and so derided throughout Europe; this
army, whose very existence was doubted by the allies, was destined
to amaze the world by the brilliancy of its exploits. Bonaparte will
lead it over the Great St. Bernard Pass across the Alps, descend like
an avalanche into the valley of the Po, cut the communications of
the Austrians, and defeat them in the hard-fought battle of Marengo.
He will emulate the deeds of Hannibal. He will lead forty thousand
soldiers across the highest mountains of Europe, surmount every
obstacle in his pathway, overthrow every force sent to oppose his
progress, and by a single march and a single battle reconquer northern
Italy.
COMMENTS.
In making war upon France the Austrian forces were obliged to advance
along both the Danube and the Po; for if they confined their operations
exclusively to the valley of the Danube, they must yield northern Italy
to the French; or if they restricted their operations wholly to the
valley of the Po, they must lose western Germany, and leave unguarded
the direct route between France and Austria. The Austrian forces
were, therefore, divided into two armies: one of which confined its
operations to the valley of the Danube; the other, to the valley of
the Po. In advancing towards France, these armies became farther and
farther separated from each other. Kray's army in western Germany and
the army of Melas in northwestern Italy were separated by Switzerland
and the great chain of the Alps. As Switzerland and the passes of
the Swiss Alps were held by the French, there could be no direct
communication between Kray and Melas. Though the great highway of the
Tyrol, which crossed the Alps over the Brenner Pass, was in possession
of the Austrians, it was so far in rear of the Austrian armies that
re-enforcements could not be sent over it from one army to the other
without making a march of several hundred miles. In fact, the nature of
the country was such that during active operations neither army could
expect to receive any support from the other. They were independent
armies of equal strength. Each had a separate commander, and each had
its own line of operations and its own line of retreat.
On the other hand, the three French armies were so situated that they
could support one another. With Moreau's army on the Rhine, Masséna's
along the Apennines, and the Army of Reserve between them near Lake
Geneva, Bonaparte could move the last along the roads of eastern France
to re-enforce either of the others as circumstances might require. In
this way Bonaparte could re-enforce Masséna with the Army of Reserve,
which would increase the Army of Italy to eighty thousand combatants.
Or, should Masséna be driven back across the Var into France, Bonaparte
could leave Moreau on the defensive along the Rhine with a part of his
army, withdraw the remainder, unite it with the Army of Reserve, and
with these combined forces added to the remnants of Masséna's army,
destroy Melas in the south of France.
Had the Austrian armies succeeded in invading France simultaneously,
Bonaparte would have detached a containing force[3] against one
army, and then have massed his remaining forces against the other.
By repeating this manoeuvre, first against one army and then against
the other, he would have attempted to defeat both. In this case, the
Austrian armies would enter France from different directions; one from
the east, the other from the southeast, separated by Switzerland and
the French Alps; and since the French armies, even while falling back,
would still be between the Austrian armies, Bonaparte would, from his
central position, have the advantage of interior lines, and could
rapidly combine his forces against his adversaries in succession.
How well he would have succeeded in this manoeuvre can best be judged
by what he accomplished by similar manoeuvres.
In the Italian campaign of 1796-97, when the Austrians advanced
against Bonaparte on both sides of Lake Garda, he united his forces
at the foot of the lake; and, by throwing a strong force against one
and then against the other of the advancing armies, defeated both in
succession before they could unite. In these manoeuvres, with a total
force of forty-five thousand soldiers, he defeated seventy-two thousand
Austrians.
In the campaigns of Arcole and Rivoli, the Austrians likewise
advanced with divided forces. In the former, forty thousand Frenchmen
opposed seventy thousand Austrians; in the latter, forty-four
thousand Frenchmen opposed sixty-five thousand Austrians. By skilful
combinations, similar to those just described, Bonaparte defeated the
Austrian armies in both campaigns.
In 1814, when the Prussians, under Blucher, and the Austrians, under
Schwarzenberg, were advancing from different points of the French
frontier upon Paris, the results obtained by Napoleon's leaving a
retarding force before one army, and by massing his remaining forces
against the other, were still more remarkable. With a force numerically
inferior to either army opposed to him, he succeeded in winning battle
after battle. Though in the campaign of 1814 we find strategical
problems with which we are not now concerned, yet Napoleon's victories
there in the face of such odds show what he might have accomplished had
Kray and Melas crossed the French frontiers and advanced on Paris.
But the combination that offered Bonaparte the greatest chance
of success yet remains to be considered. Should Masséna be able
single-handed to hold in check the Austrians in Italy, Bonaparte could
unite the Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong, to Moreau's army of
one hundred and thirty thousand. This junction would give Bonaparte
one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers with whom to attack the
one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians under Kray. With such a
superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would probably have annihilated the
Austrian forces in the valley of the Danube.
But the mere superiority in numbers, which, by this combination,
might have been obtained in Germany, is not the only advantage which
Bonaparte could have derived from the positions of the opposing armies.
In order to understand the subject better and see, perhaps, in a
measure, the whole strategical situation as it appeared to Bonaparte
himself, it will be necessary to examine somewhat carefully the
positions of the opposing forces, and point out the advantages which
the possession of Switzerland gave to the French.
Since Moreau's army was in position in France along the west bank of
the Rhine from Strasburg to Bâle, and extended into Switzerland along
the south bank of the Rhine from Bâle to Lake Constance, Bonaparte
could use either France or Switzerland as a base of operations from
which to attack the Austrians in the Black Forest. This angular base
gave to Bonaparte a great advantage. His adversary could not know
on which side to expect him. By making demonstrations on one side,
Bonaparte might deceive Kray as to the real point of attack; then, by
massing his forces on the other, he might surprise and overwhelm him.
Moreover, by crossing the Rhine in force between Lake Constance and
Schaffhausen, he could strike the left flank of the Austrian divisions
in the Black Forest, and might be able to defeat them in detail
before they could unite. Even should Kray succeed in concentrating
his divisions, he would be compelled to face south in order to give
battle. In this position, his line of battle being parallel to his
line of retreat, he must, if defeated, lose his communications. In
this position, defeat meant ruin to his army; for with the loss of his
communications he could not escape capture or annihilation.
On the other hand, Bonaparte's line of battle would face the north,
and be perpendicular to his line of retreat. If defeated, he could
fall back and cross the Rhine with little danger of losing his
communications.
By uniting the Army of Reserve to Moreau's army, and by crossing the
Rhine in force near Schaffhausen, Bonaparte could not only greatly
outnumber Kray upon the battle-field, but could force him to fight in a
position where an Austrian defeat would be fatal to the Austrian cause.
By this manoeuvre Bonaparte would threaten the communications of the
enemy without exposing his own, and would, if victorious, decide in a
single battle the fate of the Austrians in the valley of the Danube.
He could then march rapidly upon the Austrian capital, and could seize
the Brenner and Pontebba passes, the possession of which would sever
the communications of the Austrians in the valley of the Po. Such a
manoeuvre would paralyze the operations of Melas in Italy, and compel
the Austrian Emperor to sue for peace.
Though this plan offered Bonaparte great results, yet in several
respects it was somewhat difficult to execute. In order to gain a
favorable position for attacking Kray in the Black Forest, Bonaparte
would have to make a flank march from Bâle to Lake Constance; and
consequently would have to expose his own flank to the attacks of
the enemy. But in this case the French flank would be protected by
the Rhine; and as Bonaparte would march rapidly, he would in all
probability succeed in crossing the river in force near Lake Constance
before his adversary should discover his plan. Nevertheless, this flank
march would be attended with considerable danger. In fact, every flank
march in the vicinity of an active enemy is dangerous; for a commander
who gains a position on the enemy's flank must necessarily expose his
own flank to the attacks of the enemy. Even when his flank is protected
by a river, he cannot cross it without taking some risks. Had Kray's
army been assembled in force near Schaffhausen, where it could have
attacked the French divisions in detail as they crossed the Rhine,
Bonaparte would have had much difficulty in carrying out successfully
this plan of campaign. "Of all the operations of war," says Jomini,
"there is none more hazardous and difficult than the passage of a large
river in the presence of an enemy."
Had Bonaparte adopted this plan, he would undoubtedly have attempted to
deceive Kray as to the real point of attack. If we form a judgment of
what he would have done by what he afterwards did in the Ulm campaign,
we can safely assume that he would have ordered at least one division
to cross the Rhine from France, and to advance directly eastward upon
Kray's army in the Black Forest. The march of this division would have
deceived Kray, and would probably have led him to expect the entire
French army from that direction. Bonaparte could then have made his
flank march in safety, and could have crossed the river with little
danger of having his divisions defeated in detail.
As a matter of fact, however, Kray had his army so widely dispersed
that he could not in any case have concentrated a sufficient force in
time to oppose successfully the progress of Bonaparte. Even had he been
able to assemble his entire army near Schaffhausen, it is doubtful
whether, in the face of such odds, he could have prevented Bonaparte
from crossing the river. Perhaps it will be well to substantiate this
statement by an example. In the two passages of the Danube by Napoleon
at Lobau near Vienna in 1809, the difficulties were greater and the
odds less than in the hypothetical case now before us. Furthermore, in
these operations Napoleon was opposed by that illustrious soldier, the
Archduke Charles. Surely, these facts warrant the conclusion that an
army of one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers, led by the greatest
captain of modern times, could have successfully crossed the Rhine
in spite of one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, commanded by
Marshal Kray.
That Bonaparte could have executed this plan of campaign admits of
little doubt. We have already shown why the plan was not adopted. But
it is worthy of notice that afterwards, in the Ulm campaign, along
almost identical lines, he carried out this great strategic conception
with remarkable results. It is worthy of notice that, in 1805 at Ulm in
the valley of the Danube, he captured an Austrian army, under General
Mack, by manoeuvres similar to those by which in 1800 he purposed to
overwhelm Marshal Kray in the Black Forest. It is worthy of notice
that he then descended the Danube, and seized the Austrian capital,
and that this march paralyzed to a certain extent the operations of
the Archduke Charles in Italy. It is worthy of notice that this march
was the principal cause which led the Archduke Charles to retreat
before Masséna; and that the Archduke's army would have been captured
or destroyed, had not Napoleon been compelled to march north from
Vienna in order to meet the Austrian and Russian armies on the field of
Austerlitz.
Consider now the situation in northwestern Italy. Since the French were
holding the Apennines and Maritime Alps on the south, the French Alps
on the west, and Switzerland on the north, they were in possession
of the three sides of a rectangle, which almost enclosed Melas in
Italy. Should Bonaparte decide to take the offensive there, he could
attack the Austrians from the south, from the west, or from the north.
This situation gave him several advantages; for Melas could not know
on which side to expect the French. Bonaparte might surprise his
adversary; he might deceive him as to the real point of attack, and
then mass his forces at some unexpected point where he would have the
advantage of position.
On the other hand, Melas within the rectangle had the advantage
of interior lines. He could therefore, other things being equal,
concentrate his forces more quickly upon any side than could Bonaparte.
Should he learn in time where Bonaparte would enter Italy, he could
defeat the French divisions in detail as they issued from the passes of
the Alps. But in order to take advantage of his central position, he
must be accurately informed of Bonaparte's movements. He must fathom
his adversary's designs; otherwise the advantage of position could
avail him nothing. Thus it is seen how the element of surprise became
such an essential factor in these operations, and how important it was
that Bonaparte should deceive the Austrians as to his real intentions.
The success of the entire plan, the fate of Italy itself, hinged on
this fact. It was the first great step towards success; it was the
entering wedge to victory. Long before the campaign opened, Bonaparte
saw clearly this fact. In the midst of untiring activity at Paris,
while momentous questions were engaging his attention, he contrived the
stratagem that deceived his adversary, and worked out the details that
led ultimately to his triumph at Marengo.
Already some of the advantages which the possession of Switzerland
gave to Bonaparte have been pointed out. It will now be noticed that
he could safely assemble a large force in this almost impregnable
stronghold, and could debouch therefrom upon the rear of the Austrians
in Italy. In this way he could descend upon the Austrian communications
with little danger of losing his own with Switzerland. Even should
the army of Italy be driven back to the line of the Var, as long as
the French held this river and the French Alps on one side of the
Austrians, and Switzerland on the other, Bonaparte had the advantage of
an angular base, from either side of which he could march to attack the
Austrians in Italy. In fact, the possession of Switzerland, extending
east from the French frontier, gave to Bonaparte the advantage of an
angular base in his operations against either Kray in Germany or Melas
in Italy. Moreover, Switzerland offered him a secure place where he
could assemble his forces and strike either Austrian army a vital blow.
Upon these facts was based not only the plan of campaign that decided
the fate of Italy, but that grander conception which offered still
greater results.
As previously stated, the Austrian plan of campaign was that Kray
should remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the
offensive in Italy. There were several reasons for adopting this plan.
First: Austria had in the preceding year been remarkably successful in
northern Italy. Step by step she had driven the French from the Adige
to the Apennines. Being anxious to hold what she had conquered, and
hoping to continue her success in Italy, she gave Melas one hundred
and twenty thousand soldiers, and directed him to take the offensive
against Masséna.
Second: By making her principal efforts there, she could receive the
support of the British fleet in the Gulf of Genoa, and possibly that of
the British corps in Minorca.
Third: The English favored this plan; for they saw in it a chance
to gain possession of Toulon, which was a desirable acquisition on
account of the naval establishments there.
Fourth: The Royalists of southeastern France were in sympathy with
England and Austria, and might possibly aid them at the first
opportunity.
Fifth: Since Austria knew that Moreau's army was large, and that the
Army of Italy was small, she believed that, by taking the defensive in
Germany and the offensive in Italy, she could hold in check the larger
army, while she overwhelmed the smaller with greatly superior numbers.
Consider for a moment the situation as it must have appeared at this
time to Austria. Not aware of the existence of the Army of Reserve,
she saw only Moreau's army along the Rhine, and Masséna's along the
Apennines. Was it not reasonable to suppose that the one hundred and
twenty thousand Austrians in Germany might hold in check Moreau's army
of one hundred and thirty thousand, while the one hundred and twenty
thousand Austrians in Italy destroyed the forty thousand French under
Masséna?
On the other hand, there were several reasons why this plan should not
have been adopted by the Aulic Council.
With the Army of Italy in possession of the Apennines and Maritime
Alps, flanked on the right by the fortified city of Genoa, Masséna
had the advantage of a strong defensive position. Without an enormous
superiority in numbers, it was a difficult matter for Melas to drive
back the French. And even should he succeed in this undertaking, there
still remained the line of the Var, a strongly fortified position,
flanked on the north by the Alps and on the south by the sea; a
position which could neither be turned nor be forced, except with
greatly superior numbers and desperate fighting.
To succeed offensively in Italy, the Austrians had therefore to
outnumber greatly the French. The French superiority in position
counterbalanced the Austrian superiority in numbers. The Austrian plan
allowed Bonaparte with inferior forces to hold in check for a time a
large Austrian army in Italy, and left him free to direct his remaining
forces upon the important points of the theatre of operations. By
uniting the Army of Reserve with Moreau's army, he could outnumber his
adversary in Germany; or by uniting the Army of Reserve with a corps of
Moreau's army, he could descend upon the rear of Melas, and decide in a
single battle the fate of Italy.
By remaining on the defensive in Germany, Kray gave Bonaparte the
opportunity of taking the offensive there. This allowed him to make
use of the angular base of operations formed by eastern France and
northern Switzerland. Bonaparte, however, could derive no advantage
from the angular base except by taking the offensive; for should he
simply defend the line of the Rhine, he would be obliged to occupy
both the Swiss and French sides of the river. In other words, he would
be obliged to divide his forces, to lengthen and weaken his line, thus
giving his adversary the opportunity either to defeat the French forces
in detail, or to force a passage across the river at some weak point.
Furthermore, it was important that Bonaparte should take the offensive
for other reasons than those already given; for should he once force
the position of the Rhine and Black Forest, he would find no other
great natural obstacles in his front as he descended the Danube towards
the Austrian capital.
Because the strong position of the Rhine and Black Forest is a long
distance from Austria; because the more direct route between France and
Austria is through the valley of the Danube; because no great natural
obstacles, forming strong defensive positions, lie across this route
near the Austrian capital; and because a French victory in the valley
of the Danube would probably give the French commander an opportunity
to make such dispositions as should paralyze the operations of an
Austrian army in Italy,--it follows that the main effort for supremacy
between France and Austria should take place in the valley of the
Danube. There Austria should take the offensive; there she should show
her full strength; there she should make one mighty effort to decide
her own or her adversary's fate. "It is in the valley of the Danube,"
says the Archduke Charles, "that the blows are to be struck which are
decisive of the fate of France or Austria."
Austria did exactly the reverse of what she should have done. By taking
the offensive in Italy, and by remaining on the defensive in Germany,
she gave Bonaparte the opportunity to remain on the defensive in Italy
and to take the offensive in Germany. She gave him the opportunity to
carry out a plan of campaign which offered him the greatest results,--a
plan which was perhaps, on the whole, one of the grandest strategic
projects ever conceived by the mind of man.
"To invade a country," says Napoleon, "upon a double line of operations
is a faulty combination." Though the Austrian plan was that Kray should
remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the offensive in
Italy, yet both armies were, under certain circumstances, expected
to invade France. Separated as they were by impassable obstacles,
Bonaparte could leave a containing force to hold one in check, while
he massed overwhelming numbers to crush the other. Thus by adopting a
double line of operations, Austria gave Bonaparte the opportunity of
bringing superior numbers against either Austrian army. As the first
principle of war is to be stronger than the enemy at the vital point,
it is always of the greatest importance that no plan of campaign be
adopted which shall, at the very start, allow the enemy to bring
superior numbers upon the battle-field. For the battle-field _is_ the
vital point.
The error of adopting a double line of operations might easily have
been avoided by Austria. Had she left fifty thousand soldiers in Italy
to hold Masséna in check, and concentrated one hundred and ninety
thousand in Germany to act on the offensive, she would have confined
her main efforts to the more important route between France and
Austria, and would have had greater chances of success.
Had this plan been followed, Bonaparte could not, by any strategical
combination, have outnumbered the Austrians in Germany. Since it was
necessary that the Army of Italy should remain along the Apennines
and Maritime Alps to prevent the invasion of France on that side, the
maximum strength which Bonaparte could direct against the Austrians in
Germany was Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand and the
Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong. In other words, Bonaparte could
bring only one hundred and seventy thousand Frenchmen to oppose one
hundred and ninety thousand Austrians.
Furthermore, northern Italy offered Melas many advantages for a
defensive campaign. If hard pressed by Masséna, he could fall back to
the Mincio, a strong position, flanked on the right by Lake Garda and
on the left by the fortress of Mantua. If defeated in this position,
he could retire into the Tyrol, where he would directly cover his
communications with the valley of the Danube. In the mountains and
defiles of the Tyrol, he could, if hard pressed, fall back to another
strong position, fight again, and thus prolong the conflict. Moreover,
Masséna could not advance eastward through Friuli towards Austria so
long as fifty thousand Austrians remained in the Tyrol; for they could
then descend upon the flank and rear of the Army of Italy, and could
sever the French communications without exposing their own to Masséna's
attacks. Of still greater importance, however, is the fact that, had
Masséna driven Melas through the Tyrol, or across the Carnic Alps,
his success would have had little or no effect upon the operations of
the one hundred and ninety thousand Austrians in the valley of the
Danube. And why? Because the route between France and Austria through
northern Italy was longer than that through the valley of the Danube.
Because the mountains of Austria on the side towards Italy offered
strong defensive positions near the Austrian capital. Because the vital
point of the theatre of operations was in western Germany, and not in
northern Italy.
The proof of this will be apparent when we examine the Italian campaign
of 1796-97. Though Bonaparte fought his way through northern Italy,
and crossed the Alps into Austria, this movement had scarcely any
effect upon the operations of the Austrian army that was facing the two
French armies, under Moreau and Hoche, on the Rhine in the vicinity of
the Black Forest.
In this discussion it has been assumed, in order to point out some of
the advantages of a defensive campaign in northern Italy, that forty
thousand Frenchmen, commanded by Masséna, might have driven fifty
thousand Austrians, under Melas, from the Apennines to and even beyond
the Mincio. But this assumption is altogether improbable. Undoubtedly
Melas could have held in check the Army of Italy along the Apennines.
To prove this statement, consider for a moment what Bonaparte did
in the same theatre of operations in 1796. Though he defeated fifty
thousand allies with forty thousand Frenchmen, his success was due
in great measure to the faulty position of the allies. They were
greatly subdivided and separated. Their front was widely extended. At
Montenotte he broke through their long line, then defeated them in
detail at Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. Their faulty position was due
to the fact that the Sardinian army, based upon Turin, and the Austrian
army, based upon the Mincio, were attempting to cover their divergent
lines of communication back to their bases of operations. Moreover, as
they fell back along these divergent lines, they became farther and
farther separated from each other. The error of separating their armies
and of scattering their forces, caused by the attempt to cover directly
their communications, made it easier for Bonaparte to defeat them than
if they had been united into a single army, and had adopted a single
base of operations. For Masséna to defeat fifty thousand Austrians,
based upon the Mincio, would therefore be a more difficult undertaking
than was that of Bonaparte in 1796. But to do even what Bonaparte did
in the early days of the first Italian campaign required a greater
soldier than Masséna,--a Frederick himself might have failed.
To the plan of campaign that we have suggested, there was one
objection: Marshal Kray did not have sufficient military ability to
handle an army of one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers. To direct
successfully the operations of so large an army is a great undertaking.
Even to command and care for a much smaller one is no small task.
Hundreds of matters must be carefully considered. Not only the
strategical and tactical manoeuvres by which the commander concentrates
his forces and wins his victories, but his communications, his means of
transportation, the supplies for his army, the equipment and discipline
of his troops, the abilities of his subordinate commanders, the
topography and resources of the country, give him the greatest anxiety.
He must give close attention to all these matters; for the neglect of
a single one may lead to disaster. He must be brave, clear-headed,
cool, cautious, and fearless; and be able to make a quick decision in
critical times. He must have an eye for facts. He must weigh correctly
all reports and rumors, and out of the doubtful information at hand
sift the true from the false. He must see everything that is going on
around him. His glance must penetrate the enemy's line, his vision
sweep the whole theatre of operations.
As an army increases in size, so, likewise, the difficulties of
commanding it increase. To manoeuvre one hundred and ninety thousand
soldiers, so as to obtain from them a fighting power proportionate to
their numbers, requires the genius of a great captain. Neither Marshal
Kray nor General Melas was equal to the task. Though both were brave
soldiers, who had distinguished themselves in previous campaigns,
neither had great military ability. In fact, the Archduke Charles was
the only soldier in Austria capable of handling so large an army. He
had already shown himself to be a great general. His views upon war
were largely the outgrowth of his own successes. He was not wedded
to the past. He saw the errors in the system of war so persistently
advocated by the Aulic Council. He perceived the reasons for many of
Bonaparte's previous successes. He had fought Bonaparte in Italy; and
he comprehended, though somewhat dimly, Bonaparte's system of war.
Moreover, his views upon the military situation were sound. Though
he was far inferior to Bonaparte in military ability, yet, being the
ablest soldier of Austria, he should have been made commander in chief
of the Austrian armies, and should have been allowed to conduct the
campaign in his own way. Probably he would not have succeeded against
Bonaparte; and yet, who can say what the result would have been had he
commanded one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers in the valley of
the Danube? Austria was perishing for want of a leader, yet among her
distinguished sons she saw not her ablest soldier.
Why was the Archduke Charles not made commander in chief? Why did
Austria deprive herself of his services at the beginning of a great
war? It was because the Aulic Council, which decided all military
questions and directed the operations of the Austrian armies, did not
approve of the Archduke's views upon the military situation. He had
advised Austria to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace, and had pointed
out that, in case of war, the principal effort against France should
be made in the valley of the Danube. But the members of the Aulic
Council knew little about military matters; they could see no merit
in these suggestions. With a narrowness which they had many times
exhibited before, they continued to blunder on, neither willing to
take the advice of their only great soldier, nor able to comprehend
the strategical combinations which their errors allowed Bonaparte to
make. They originated faulty plans, sent unreliable information to the
Austrian armies, and exercised over Melas and Kray a fatherly control
which hampered them throughout the campaign. In short, they failed
completely to appreciate the situation. "To the Aulic Council," said
Jomini in 1804, "Austria owes all her reverses since the time of Prince
Eugene of Savoy."
That the Aulic Council should fail was inevitable. In war the opinion
of a trained soldier on military matters is worth more than that of
a congress of a hundred men. Whenever the members of a senate, a
council, or a congress, attempt to decide military questions, they are
sure to err; for, being absent from the theatre of operations, they
can neither see clearly the military situation, nor render decisions
with promptness in critical times. Besides, their decisions are often
halfway measures, neither one thing nor the other; like the laws passed
by a bicameral legislature, they are nearly all compromises. In war
there must be resolution, boldness, decision; to compromise is to court
defeat.
In this chapter we have attempted to point out the strategical
situation as it appeared to Bonaparte at the beginning of the campaign.
In subsequent chapters we shall try to show how Bonaparte carried
out some of his strategical conceptions; and how the operations of
Masséna at Genoa, and of Moreau in the Black Forest, affected those of
Bonaparte in Italy. Before closing the discussion, it will be well to
remark that the most perfect strategy is of little value, unless it is
executed with energy and culminates in victory. The difficulty lies
not so much in the conception of great strategical projects, as in the
execution of them. Strategy is only a means to an end. It does not win
victories; but it clears the way for the winning of them, and adds to
their value. It aims to bring a stronger force upon the battle-field,
or to place an army in a position where victory will bring great
results. But the battle must decide the struggle. "Even the weakest
combatant does not lay down his arms to strategical manoeuvres." It is
victory upon the battle-field which settles the disputes of contending
powers. There, amidst the clash of arms and the roar of cannon, amidst
the shouts of triumph and the cries of despair, amidst the wounded, the
dying, and the dead, victory decides the fate of armies and of empires.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: See Map 1.]
[Footnote 2: Though troops from several of the small German States
dependent upon Austria formed a part of this army, it is referred to as
an "Austrian army," because the bulk of the troops composing it were
Austrians.]
[Footnote 3: Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty
of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the
enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another
portion of the hostile forces.--Wagner.]