I skip then two paragraphs.

“Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached

between Germany and Italy, and admitted that the demonstrations

of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations

without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present

time he could see no way to reconcile the conflicting interests

of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there were three

chief reasons why the German Government was urging the Austrian

Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:

“The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of his

army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike, and that

he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.

“The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for

the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger

daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more

towards the Nazis, and the dominance of the Nazi Party in

Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.”

The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been

constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with

Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany.

But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, her

diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which

influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to Germany and to

come to terms.

I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, Page 11 of the English

text. That is Document 1760-PS.

“Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave

Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the

direction of the nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given

Austria assurance of support of the most definite character

against external German aggression and on one occasion, by

mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive

action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her

Abyssinian adventure. This and the re-occupation of the

Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is

quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian

adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German

aggressive moves against Austria.”

This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the pact of July

11, 1936. On July 11, 1936 the Governments of Austria and Germany

concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the

British Delegation.

I merely ask at this point, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of

the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the

agreement of July 11, 1936 will also be proved by our British

colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the Document

which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also

contained on Pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, 1760-PS.

Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked like a great

triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect

that Austria in her policy, especially with regard to Germany, would

regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly

state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and

regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of

Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon

which Germany will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But

there was much more substance to the day’s events than appears in the

text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith’s summary as set forth on

Page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows:

“Even more important than the terms of the agreement published

in the official communiqué, was the contemporaneous informal

understanding, the most important provisions of which were that

Austria would:

“(1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s

confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the Cabinet;

(2) with the devised means to give the national opposition a

role in the political life of Austria within the framework of

the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for all Nazis, save

those convicted of the most serious offenses.”

This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands

of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of Deutsch-National

into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr.

Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund

Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

I now offer in evidence Document 2994-PS, which is an affidavit by Kurt

von Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed at Nuremberg,

Germany, on 19 November 1945. I offer this as Exhibit USA-66. The

defendants have received German translations of that evidence.

DR. LATERNSER: In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, I wish to

protest against the presentation of written evidence by the witness Von

Schuschnigg for the following reasons: Today, when a resolution was

announced, with respect to the use to be made of the written evidence of

Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very

great importance it might possibly take a different view of the matter.

With respect to the Austrian conflict this is the case, since

Schuschnigg is the most important witness, the witness who was affected

at the time in his position as Federal Chancellor. In the case of such

an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered

to, in order that the Court be in a position to ascertain the actual

truth in this case. The accused and his defense counsel would feel

prejudiced in his rights granted by the Charter, should direct evidence

be circumvented. I must, therefore, uphold my viewpoint since it can be

assumed that the witness Von Schuschnigg will be able to confirm certain

facts which are in favor of the accused Seyss-Inquart.

I therefore make the motion to the Court that the written evidence of

the witness Von Schuschnigg be not admitted.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear Mr.

Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am simply

proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing the terms

of the secret understanding between the German and Austrian Governments

in connection with this accord. It is not for any purpose to incriminate

the Defendant Seyss-Inquart that it is being offered at this point.

DR. LATERNSER: May I add to my motion that the witness, Von Schuschnigg,

on 19 November 1945, was questioned in Nuremberg, and that if an

interrogation on 19 November was possible, then a short time later—that

is now—it ought to be possible to call him before the Court, especially

as the interrogation before this court is of special importance.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this question.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to the

affidavit of Von Schuschnigg and upholds the objection.

If the Prosecution desires to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can

apply to do so. Equally if the Defense wishes to call Von Schuschnigg as

a witness, it can apply to do so. In the event Von Schuschnigg is not

able to be produced, the question of affidavit-evidence by Von

Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the strategy and

tactics of the Nazis’ concessions as indicated in the portion of the

Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions were made by

Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic formal assurance of Austrian

independence and non-intervention in Austrian internal affairs.

The release of imprisoned Nazis presented potential police problems, and

as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934 dispatch to the United States

State Department quoted on Pages 12 to 13 of his affidavit:

“Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power

would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and

judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the

future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis

even in the line of duty. The preservation of internal peace in

Austria was less dependent upon Germany’s living up to her

obligations under the accord.”

Next, Germany’s continuing program of weakening the Austrian Government.

In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or

indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, including the matter of

Austrian National Socialism.

On 16 July 1936, just 5 days later, Hitler violated that provision. I

quote from Document 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61, the reports of

Gauleiter Rainer to Commissioner Bürckel, all of which were forwarded to

the Defendant Seyss-Inquart—Page 6 of the English, and I believe, also

Page 6 of the German version.

“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party

in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian

National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was

arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the

Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer and Globocnik

visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg where they received a

clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Führer.

On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg,

where they received a complete report from Rainer on the

statement of the Führer and his political instructions for

carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiter

received organizational instructions from Globocnik and

Hiedler.”

Then skipping a paragraph I quote further from this report—in the

English that paragraph which I am skipping is omitted, so I am skipping

a paragraph in the German version:

“Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Führer named Lieutenant

General”—Gruppenführer—“Keppler as chief of the mixed

commission which was appointed, in accordance with the State

Treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of

the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority

by the Führer for the Party in Austria. After Keppler was

unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked

together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaler as leader of

the peasants, Kaltenbrunner”—that is the Defendant

Kaltenbrunner in this case—“as leader of the SS, and Doctor

Jury as deputy leader of the Austrian Party, as well as with

Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.”

A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith

describes it briefly, and I quote from Page 13 of his affidavit,

1760-PS:

“The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have

been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded

happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under

the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who, as was known

definitely, was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program

was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could

carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in

Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations

which had a legal basis, but which were simply a device by which

the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as

a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was

the Union of the East Mark,”—Ostmärkische Verein—“the sponsor

of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau.

Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi

Neustädter-Stürmer, this organization was declared legal by the

courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it

shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had

disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi

activities directed from Germany.”

At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit USA-67, a

captured German document which is a report from Von Papen to Hitler

dated September 1, 1936. This document is most interesting because it

indicates Von Papen’s strategy after July 11, 1936 for destroying

Austria’s independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward

with the agreement of July 11. It should be noted incidentally, that

after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now

his tactics were developed in the following terms—I quote the last

three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936 to the Führer and

Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph

in the English text:

“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the

present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the

Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti National

Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of

utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected

prior to the conference on the abolishing of the control of

finances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed

Minister Von Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the

portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding

principle”—Marschroute (a German word meaning the route of

march)—“I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient,

psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure

directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on

economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be

a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects.

In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders

of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform

completely with the agreement of 11 July I am trying to direct

the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative

representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but

nevertheless refraining from putting National Socialists in

important positions for the time being. However, such positions

are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and

the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in

this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.”—Signature—“Papen.”

To recapitulate, this report by Von Papen to Hitler discloses the

following plan:

(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of Security

in due course;

(b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the

Fatherland Front;

(c) Not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions yet,

but using nationalist personalities;

(d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment with

slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.

My next subject is Germany’s diplomatic preparations for the conquest of

Austria.

The program of the Nazi conspiracy with respect to Austria consisted of

weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support

from without, as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the

utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the

events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed in the news of

the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner

Pass and posed there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor,

Austria.

Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria and steady increase

in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required

removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to

its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the

weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign

policy program in Europe generally.

I should like, therefore, at this juncture, to digress for a moment from

the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider

with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is

not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and

scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of probing all the

details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful

decade.

It is instead my purpose to mention very briefly the highlights of the

Nazis’ diplomatic preparation for war.

In this connection I should like to offer to the Tribunal Document

Number 2385-PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith executed on

30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the

defendants in German, as well as in English.

This is a different affidavit from Document Number 1760-PS which was

executed August 28. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit

USA-68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the

program of the Nazi Party. To a considerable extent it merely states

facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well

informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge

in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It

consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read first from

the third paragraph in the affidavit:

“As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and

Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary

categories openly acknowledged Germany’s ambitions to dominate

southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they

freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the

case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in

the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of

southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and

they did not, at that time, speak so definitely of actual

absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions,

however, were not limited to southeastern Europe. From the very

beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power,

important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that ‘it

must be our granary’ and that ‘even with southeastern Europe

under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part

of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater

Germany.’ After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post

in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German

designs in southeastern Europe. In a conversation with Von Papen

shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in

1934, Von Papen frankly stated to me that ‘southeastern Europe

to Turkey is Germany’s hinterland and I have been designated to

carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria

is first on the program.’

“As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, Von Papen in

Vienna and his colleague Von Mackensen in Budapest were openly

propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption

of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.”

Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume:

“Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a

vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate

objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact the two

immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power,

had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently

made to me: First, to bring about the complete and absolute

establishment of their power over Germany and the German people,

so that they would become in every respect willing and capable

instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; Second, the

establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in

order that the political and economic program in southeastern

Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if

necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was

characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they

emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering

air force. Göring and Milch often said to me or in my presence

that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the

weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position

and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in

the shortest time.”

Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next:

“At the same time that this rearmament was in progress, the Nazi

regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people

for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for

example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in

military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the

throwing of hand grenades, et cetera. In this connection I wrote

in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as

follows:

“‘ . . . Everything that is being done in the country today has

for its object to make the people believe that Germany is being

threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside

influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to

use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises,

and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German

people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all

comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be

otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace

unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of

complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler

and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the

moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if

it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so

carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the

German people will be with them when they want to use force and

when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry

through their objects. . . .’”

One further sentence following that I quote:

“Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled

with diplomatic preparation designed so to disunite and isolate

their intended victims as to render them defenseless against

German aggression.”

In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic

field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the

continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the

East.

“The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian

Alliance, guaranteed the territorial _status quo_ in the West.

Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were allied in the

Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by

mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 France and Poland had

likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made

plain her special interest in Austrian independence.”

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the

existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the

members of the Little Entente and the other eastern European powers.

Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of

economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries

she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards.

She offered Carinthia in Austria to Yugoslavia. She offered part of

Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland. She offered Yugoslav

territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in

Hungary to Yugoslavia.

As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit—that is 2385-PS, on Page 5:

“Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program

of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors

of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To

Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the

Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

“‘The major factor in the internal situation in the last week

has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian

Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. . . . There is very little doubt

but that Göring, when he made his trip to various capitals in

southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs that

they would get a part of Carinthia when a National Socialist

Government came into power in Austria. . . . The Nazi seed sown

in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause trouble and there are

undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal

of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in

the days following July 25.’

“Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and

to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their

acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As

I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, Von Papen and

Von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935 were spreading

the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division

Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland

the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they

knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

“The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make

inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objective. I

recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or

1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav

territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions

of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later

gave me the same information.

“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made

these promises were not only the ‘dyed in the wool’ Nazis but

more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to

lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to

the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I

wrote as follows:

“‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen,

and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are

“diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile

instruments of the regime and just because the outside world

looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more

effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they

propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the

regime.’”

I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. In

other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and

increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making

these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative

diplomats. It is true that the Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of

international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that

the real trump in Germany’s hand was its rearmament and more than that,

its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various

countries was not influenced by those considerations alone.

With all those countries, and I suppose with all persons, we are not

always completely rational, we tend to believe what we want to believe,

and if an apparently substantial and conservative person like the

Defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be

apt to believe them, or at least to act upon that hypothesis. And it

would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that

the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with

the designs of the Nazis.

Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of

limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations

treaty with England and discussed a Locarno air pact. In the case of

both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and

harped on fears of communism and war.

In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of

the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis, including

Göring, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany

would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited

Germany’s interest to do so.

I quote from the affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Page 4, beginning on the

10th line:

“High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official

contact, particularly men such as Göring, Goebbels, Ley, Frick,

Frank, Darré, and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as

to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me

that Germany would observe her international undertakings only

so long as it suited Germany’s interest to do so. Although these

statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made

to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any

secret, for on many occasions they expressed the same idea

publicly.”

France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter

Germany’s moves.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]

EIGHTH DAY

Thursday, 29 November 1945

_Morning Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume the

consideration of Mr. Messersmith’s second affidavit, Document 2385-PS,

Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the

proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first Messersmith

affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, Exhibit

USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in that affidavit made the

following general statements:

First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect the

independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very beginning to

conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen was working toward

that end.

Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the surface, to have

nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she kept up contact with

them and gave them support and instruction.

Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual use of

force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating

tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use of Christian-front

personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and could be called what they

referred to as Nationalist Opposition, and through the device of

developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be

brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively—that is as

an entire group.

Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents proved, in

support of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The

excerpts I have already read out of the report from Rainer to Bürckel,

enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, Exhibit

USA-61, showed:

First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich

although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions from the

Führer.

Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis so as

to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency.

Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau,

who had what they called good legal positions, but who could be trusted

by the Nazis; and that 5 days after the Pact of July 11, 1936 between

Germany and Austria, a pact which specifically pledged the German

Government not to interfere either directly or indirectly in the

internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National

Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzberg and

received new instructions; and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler,

whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner

as his “contact man” with the Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act

for the Führer in Austria and to work with the leaders of the Austrian

Nazis.

Then we offered Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, Von Papen’s letter to

Hitler of May 17, 1935 that showed that Von Papen had been in contact

with Captain Leopold and it showed how Von Papen got Hitler to make a

solemn promise of Austria’s independence in order to further Papen’s

internal political gain in Austria.

Then we offered Document 2248-PS, Exhibit USA-63, Von Papen’s letter of

July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation 1 year after Dollfuss’

death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made the link for

the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian

ideologies, and in which he identified himself completely with the

National Socialist goal.

We offered Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, Von Papen’s letter to

Hitler of September 1, 1936, which showed how Von Papen advised using

both economic and continuing psychological pressure; that he had

conferences with the leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was

trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get

corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front,

and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National

Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with

collaborators like Glaise-Horstenau.

I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith’s

affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German

documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits

cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I

refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith’s conversation with the Defendant

Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday. But I think

those matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the

defendant’s guilt and complicity.

Yesterday I was reading to the Tribunal selected excerpts from Mr.

Messersmith’s second affidavit, 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, relating to the

diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, I had read to the

Tribunal excerpts which established the following propositions:

First, Nazi Germany undertook a vigorous campaign to break up the

diplomatic agreements existing in 1933; first—in the West the Locarno

Pact supplemented by the French-Belgium Agreement; second—in the East

the Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and their

respective mutual assistance pacts with France, and the French-Polish

Pact; third—as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her

independence, that is for Austrian independence.

In the second place, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with

extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to

countries in southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland.

In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to

the State Department, pointing out that persons like Von Neurath and Von

Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in

doing their other work, just because they, and I quote: “propagated the

myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.”

In the fourth place, in fact, high-ranking Nazis openly stated that

Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it

suited her to do so.

There are two more excerpts which I wish to read from this affidavit:

France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter

German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an

east Locarno pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and

the other Danubian powers. Italy’s effort was to organize an economic

bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by

redoubling her promises of loot, by continuing her armament, and by

another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth-Column strategy;

that the Nazis stirred up internal dissensions within neighboring

countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims.

I read now from Page 7 of the English copy of the second Messersmith

affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the paragraph beginning in

the middle of the page:

“At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward

for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal

dissensions within these countries themselves, and in Austria

and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed so

to weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist

groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program.

Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they

came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In

Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten

Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over

6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections

in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old

differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the

restoration of the Hapsburg in Austria. It may be remarked here

that this latter was one of the principal instruments, and a

most effective one, which Nazi Germany used, as the fear in

Yugoslavia in particular of a restoration of the Hapsburg was

very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties

and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German

elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to

demand the recall of Von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in

Poland she played on the fear of communism and communist Russia.

In Romania she aggravated the existing anti-Semitism,

emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Romanian industry

and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also

financed the fascist Iron Guard through Codreanou.

“Such ‘diplomatic’ measures reinforced by Germany’s vast

rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in

Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and sufficient at least to

deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to

German designs, even if not enough to persuade them actively to

ally themselves with Nazi Germany.

“Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become

convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would

gain its ends, and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was

to play along with Germany.”

I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to read into evidence the

detailed official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American

State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland were

beginning to follow the German line.

As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord between

Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory,

particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement

with them and to block an east Locarno pact. On that I quote again from

Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the second Messersmith affidavit, in

the middle of Page 21 of the English version:

“While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in

1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the

opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England,

and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s program in

exchange for German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.”

That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German

Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 Germany

extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an

alliance which they called the “Rome-Berlin Axis.” This, together with

Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England and

greatly increased the relative strength of Germany.

And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among

others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so

that they could seriously consider plans for war and begin to outline

time tables, not binding time tables and not specific ones in terms of

months and days, but still general time tables, in terms of years, which

were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a

spur to more specific planning. And that time table was developed, as

the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937,

contained in our Document Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach

minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday

last.

In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage

aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia,

and in that order.

In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, I have

shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the

absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in Austria up to

this period, that is, November 1937.

I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic

preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in

Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in particular.

It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting of 5

November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be

recalled that in that meeting, the Führer insisted that Germany must

have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be

taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for

different eventualities but all reaching the conclusion that the problem

would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945.

Then there was envisaged the nature of a war in the near future,

specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for

the improvement of Germany’s military and political positions, it must

be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to

conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any

threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westward.

Hitler then considered that the embodiment into Germany of

Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food for

from 5 to 6 million people, including the assumption that the

comprehensive forced emigration of 1 million people from Austria could

be carried out. And he further pointed out that the annexation of the

two States to Germany, both militarily and politically, would constitute

a considerable relief since they would provide shorter and better

frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and would

make possible the reconstitution of large new German armies.

Insofar as Austria is concerned, those minutes reveal a crystallization

in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to

acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, but

that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the

independence of Austria and the use of devious means to strengthen the

position of Nazis internally in Austria.

Now, however, it became clear that the need, or the greed, for Austria,

in the light of the larger aggressive purpose of the Nazi conspirators

was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain

Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see

later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having

weakened it internally and removed from it the support of other nations,

merely by setting the German military machine into motion and making a

threat of force.

The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the country

without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war

and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action made

it possible, in the end, for them to pluck this plum without having to

fight a blow for it.

The German High Command had, of course, previously considered

preparation against Austria.

I offer in evidence another German document, C-175, as Exhibit USA-69.

It, again, is “top secret”, with the added legend in German: “Chefsache

nur durch Offizier” (matter for the chief only to be delivered through

an officer).

This was a top-secret directive of 24 June 1937 of the Reichsminister

for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Von

Blomberg. The importance of this top-secret directive is indicated by

the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander-in-Chief of the

Navy, was one of only four copies establishing the directive for a

unified preparation for war of all the Armed Forces.

This directive from General Von Blomberg states that although the

political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack

from any side it also states that Germany does not intend to unleash a

European war. It then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the

English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, third paragraph, of the

German text:

“The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little

by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation,

which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a

continued preparedness for war by the German Armed Forces: (a)

To counter attacks at any time; (b) To enable the military

exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they

occur.”

The directive then indicates that there will be certain preparations for

war of a general nature. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2,

on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:

“(2) The preparations of a general nature include:

“(a) The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German

Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament, and full

preparedness for war.

“(b) The further working on ‘mobilization without public

announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to

begin a war suddenly and by surprise, both as regards strength

and time.”

And the directive finally indicates that there might be special

preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, (1) Special

Case Otto, Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text.

“Case Otto”, as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for

aggressive war against Austria. I quote:

“Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the

monarchy.

“The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed

force to give up a restoration.

“Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian

people, the march in will be made in the general direction of

Vienna, and will break any resistance.”

I should now like to call attention to two conversations, held by United

States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendants Schacht and Göring, in

November 1937.

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): I should like to

state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been

treated. This document is a study made by the General Staff, which was

conceived to meet many different eventualities of war. It even mentions

the possibility that Germany might have to go to war with Spain, and

might have to carry out a military attack on her.

Only part of this document was read, the part relating to Austria; and

thus the impression was given that a plan had been made to march against

Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to

attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities.

I should like to request that the reading of this document be

supplemented by reading at least the headings of the paragraphs of this

document. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the

Court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against

Austria, but simply a document preparing for all eventualities.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the

admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The

Tribunal has already informed defendants’ counsel that they will have an

opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their

defense, to refer to any documents, parts of which have been put in by

the Prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then,

and to make what criticism they think necessary then.

Your objection is therefore premature, because it does not go to the

admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of

it should be read. You will have the opportunity later to read any parts

of the documents which you wish.

MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental

basis of the objection just stated by the distinguished counsel, must

have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade

Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded

Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken.

I had adverted to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador

Bullitt with the Defendant Schacht and the Defendant Göring, in November

1937.

For this purpose, I offer in evidence our Document L-151, offered as

Exhibit USA-70. It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador

in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on 23 November 1937.

Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because that

document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal.

It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel.

If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. On

top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State,

November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin en

route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Göring, among others.

On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the report:

“Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal

with Hitler was not through political discussion but through

economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in

economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore

possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic

domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, and it might be

possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into

arrangements in the political and military field, in which he

was intensely interested. Hitler was determined to have Austria

eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy

for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not

vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his”—that is

Schacht’s—“opinion, it might be possible to maintain the

Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia,

and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the

Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.”

And for the Defendant Göring’s statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read

from the second memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation between

Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Göring,” on Page 2 of that

document, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below

the middle of the page:

“The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the

refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital

national necessities.

“If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany,

should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in

Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her

legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict

between France and Germany.

“I asked Göring what aims especially he had in mind. He replied:

“‘We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who

are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body

of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by

the Treaty of Versailles.’

“I asked Göring if he meant that Germany was absolutely

determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this

was an absolute determination of the German Government. The

German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this

matter because of certain momentary political considerations,

especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would

tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the

consolidation of Austria in the German Reich.

“He then added a statement which went further than any I have

heard on this subject. He said:

“‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria,

Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg

at the head of the union. Such a solution is absolutely

unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an

agreement would be an immediate _casus belli_.’ Göring used the

Latin expression _casus belli_; it is not a translation from the

German, in which that conversation was carried on.

“I asked Göring if the German Government was as decided in its

views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia, as it was with

regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final

solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the

German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the

Reich.”

These, if the Tribunal please, are official reports made by the

accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of

business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report

made by a responsible official to his own government, recording

contemporaneous conversations and events.

My next subject is pressure and threats resulting in further concessions

by Austria: a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938.

As I have stated before, the Austrian Government was laboring under

great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure,

including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was

what the Defendant Von Papen called “slowly intensified psychological

pressure.” There were increasing demonstrations, plots, and

conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold and

approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart,

the new Councillor of the State of Austria. In this situation,

Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden.

The official communiqué of this conference is quite calm; I invite the

Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is Document 2461-PS, the

official German communiqué of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at

Obersalzberg, 12 February 1938, taken from the official _Dokumente der

Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 124, Number 21-a.

The communiqué states that the unofficial meeting was caused by the

mutual desire to clarify by personal conversation the questions relating

to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria.

The communiqué lists among those present:

Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign

Minister Ribbentrop, and the Defendant Von Papen.

The communiqué concludes on a rather bright note saying, and I quote:

“Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them

constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the

peaceful development of the European situation.”

A similar communiqué was issued by the Austrian Government. But in fact,

and as I think history well knows, the conference was a very unusual and

a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German

Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the

official Austrian communiqué of the reorganization of the Cabinet and

the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1938.

That communiqué, as taken from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_,

Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our Document 2464-PS

and I invite the Court’s judicial notice of that communiqué.

That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet,

including, most significantly, the appointment of the Defendant

Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior,

where he would have control of the police. In addition, announcement was

made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes.

Two days later another concession was divulged.

I invite the Court’s judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a

translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué concerning

the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria,

18 February 1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page

128; Number 21-d.

That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference,

the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland

Front, the single legal political party of Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents

were?

MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is

exhibit what?

MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn’t read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to

take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden.

The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature

involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently

established from captured German documents.

I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, which I offer

in evidence as Exhibit USA-71.

This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen’s own notes on his

last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last

two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen speaking, in his own

notes:

“I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion

that he”—that is, Schuschnigg—“had acted under ‘brutal

pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been

able to state that he had always and at every point had complete

freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied that he had actually

been under considerable moral pressure; he could not deny that.

He had made notes on the talk which, bore that out. I reminded

him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make

any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he

would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in

the evening. He answered: ‘To be honest, no.’”

And then Von Papen says:

“It appears to me of importance to record this statement.

“In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that

Austria could have maintained her status with the help of

non-German, European combinations. This question could be

decided only according to the interests of the German people. He

asserted that he held the same conviction and would act

accordingly.”

Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg’s contemporary

statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him as

recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry.

For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up

the pretense that there had been no pressure applied.

But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current events in

his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General

Jodl’s handwritten diary in German script which I can’t read. It is our

Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72.

I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that this

is his genuine diary in his handwriting.

This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but also

the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and Admiral

Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order,

obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the

agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be

noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the

Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart

as Minister of the Interior and Security.

And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with threats

of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to

produce the desired effect on President Miklas.

I quote from General Jodl’s diary, the entries for February 11, February

13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February:

“In the evening and on 12 February General K.”—Keitel—“with

General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg.

Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under

heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours

Schuschnigg signs protocol.

“13 February: In the afternoon General K.”—Keitel—“asks

Admiral C.”—Canaris—“and myself to come to his apartment. He

tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect that military

pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until

the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted

and submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval.

“14 February: At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer

arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence

Office VII and initiates the different measures.

“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is

created that Germany is undertaking serious military

preparations.”

The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant Jodl are

set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, which I offer

in evidence as Exhibit USA-73.

The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath his

signature appears a note that the Führer approved the proposal. In the

original document that note is handwritten in pencil.

The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria make

very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs of the

suggested order:

“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or

Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

“2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the

conclusion of military preparations against Austria:

“(a) Through V-men”—V-Männer—“in Austria.

“(b) Through our customs personnel”—staff—“at the frontier.

“(c) Through travelling agents.

“3. Such news could be:

“(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of

the VII A.K.

“(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and

Regensburg.

“(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has

been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact,

this is the case.”

—That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who used to argue a

matter at great length, and then he would end up by saying, “and,

incidentally, it is the truth.”

“(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have

called up reinforcements.

“(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the

Mountain Brigade”—Gebirgsbrigade—“in the region of

Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden.”

The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due

course, as, we have already seen from the communiqués referred to,

President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement which foreshadowed

National Socialist Austria and then the events culminating in the actual

German invasion on 12 March 1938.

Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of

the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March

1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and the preparations for both

German and Austrian National Socialists.

The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of Austria,

Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the

Court to take judicial notice of the official German communiqué covering

that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appears in the _Dokumente

der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-c, a copy of

which will be found in our Document 2484-PS.

On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of

the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of

the National Socialists in Austria—3 weeks after the Nazis began to

exploit their new prestige and position with their quota of further

victories—Schuschnigg made an important announcement.

On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite

throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to

be submitted in the plebiscite was: “Are you for an independent and

social, a Christian, German, and united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this

question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German

Government on 11 July 1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12

February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a

plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently

appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote on the question put by

Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the

possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government.

In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn the

Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the

evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization received word about it earlier

in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler

what to do about the situation (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that

they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from

Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler’s approval,

Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details

of the plebiscite.

This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter Rainer to

Reich Commissioner Bürckel, transmitted as I have already pointed out to

Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence—our

Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61.

I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English text, the paragraph beginning

on Page 11 of the German original:

“The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite

through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m.

At the session which was called immediately afterwards,

Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a

few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had

given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the

talks he made us understand that the illegal information we

received was based on truth, and that in view of the new

situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from

the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and

Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at

10 a.m. There it was decided that:

“First, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the

opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by

way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to

Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the

Government until clear instructions and orders were received

from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a

letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to

the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9

March 1938.

“Negotiations with the Government were not successful.

Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with

the instructions he received from the Führer. . . . On 10 March

all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already

had been made . . . and the necessary orders given to all unit

leaders . . . . During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik

returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer

gave the Party freedom of action . . . and that he would back it

in everything it did.”

—That means the Austrian Nazi Party.

Next, Germany’s actual preparations for the invasion and the use of

force.

When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous

amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to

tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers

and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria.

On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why

he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant

Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von

Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.

The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a

vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10

March:

“By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg

ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring

strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or

preparation. The Führer is determined not to tolerate it.

“This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General

Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee.

General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister

Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter

Bürckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the

facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I

follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn,

to give him all drafts. ‘Prepare Case Otto.’

“1300 hours, General K.”—which I think plainly means

Keitel—“informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris,

Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the

Foreign Office. Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to the

Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini

and the reasons are developed which forced the Führer to take

action.

“1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the

8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without

Reserve Army.” (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72).

Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical

hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant

Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become

President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of

foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the

diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister

in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of

troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a

neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former

position in the Nazi conspiracy.

I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured

German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command

of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed

by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler’s mixed political and

military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive.

First the caption, “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” with some

initials; “referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies.” This is the 11th

copy; top secret:

“1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade

Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions

and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German

population.

“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this

operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on

12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right

to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and

to decide the actual moment for invasion.

“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we

do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in

our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out

without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry

welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be

avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken

ruthlessly by force of arms.”

I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit

USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl,

and it provided as follows:

“Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.

“Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the

Armed Forces Number 427/38,”—with some symbols.—

“Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops

or militia units on Austrian soil.

“1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered

in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.

“2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends,

especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in

the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme

Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.”

Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us

in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor

details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were

used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it

appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full

account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1938

deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First I shall give the report of

the day’s events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to

Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich

Commissioner Bürckel, and I shall read from Page 8 of the English

version. For the benefit of the German interpreter I am starting

following a tabulation: First case, second case, third case, and

following the sentence, “Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with

the Gauleiter.”

“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in

Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with

Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the

Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer,

Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, and

Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks

with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the

proposal of the two ministers.

“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, Von Klausner ordered that the

Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400

hours, signed by legal political ‘front’ men, including both

Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, for the

establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free and secret

ballot in accordance with the constitution.

“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had

brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of

copies, and a telegram to the Führer calling for help were

prepared.

“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions

in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a

session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with

Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer

and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same

time he would start all necessary actions to take over power

unless he received news from the session of the Ministers’

Council before that time. During this time all measures had been

prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and informed

him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and

had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused to call a new

plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for

maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two Ministers had

resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, ‘No.’ Rainer informed the

Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, and received an answer

from Göring through the same channels, that the Führer will not

consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign.

Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Mühlmann.

Talks were held between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg.

Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures

the Party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the

Government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the Party, and

calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force.

Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but

very soon the announcement followed that everything might be

threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile

word arrived from the German Embassy that the Führer expected

the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a

national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission

for the Legion”—that is the Austrian Legion in Germany—“to

return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise

German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. At 5 p.m. Rainer

and Globocnik, accompanied by Mühlmann, went to the Chancellor’s

office to carry out this errand.

“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a

government which included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists,

and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The

latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to

negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and

therefore a weak and unfavorable political situation for the

cause might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto. Director of

the Cabinet Hüber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation

Councillor Stein, Military Attaché General Muff, and the

Gruppenführer Keppler,”—whose name I told you would reappear

significantly—“who had arrived in the meantime, were already

negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations

again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to

appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case

of a German invasion.

“Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not yet

have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first

be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most

dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any

moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to demonstrate at

3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the Chancellor’s

palace in order to force the reconstruction of the Government.

The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by

Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8 p.m. the SA

and the SS marched in and occupied the Government buildings and

all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m.

Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of

Austria to take over power in all eight gaue of Austria, with

the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all

Government representatives who try to resist, should be told

that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

“With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the

complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking

over of all important posts by the Party.

“The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported by the

Führer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of

Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the form

of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart was due to

the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand, and the

political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on

the other; but both factors may be considered only in relation

to the Führer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian

problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently

issued by the Führer.”

We have at hand another document which permits us virtually to live

again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in

most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the

Defendant Göring and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly

interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe

headquarters headed as usual “Geheime Reichssache” (top secret). The

letterhead is stamped “Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt”. If I

can get the significance of the German, Forschungsamt means the Research

Department of Göring’s Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic

German folder and on the back it says, “Gespräche Fall Österreich”

(Conversations about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside

has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter to

read; but it looks to me as if it is “Privat, Geheime Archive,” which is

Secret Archive, Berlin, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Case Austria). I

offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in

the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit

USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job’s outcry, “Oh, that

mine enemy would write a book!”

The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this research

organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the Defendant

Göring, states in substance—well, I will read the English translation.

It starts; “To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered,

the copies of your telephone conversations.”

Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone

conversations which he had with important persons regarding the Case

Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by his Research Department.

Most of the conversations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have

offered, were conducted by the Defendant Göring, although at least one

interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our

staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying

letter running from “A” through “Z” and then to “AA.” Eleven of these

conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant

to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which

have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the

document books handed to the defendants. The original binder contains,

of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive and

interesting account of events with which we are much concerned can be

developed from quotations from these translated conversations.

I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in

Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal Göring, who was

identified by the letter “F” for Field Marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who

was identified as “S”. The transcript prepared by the Research Institute

of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and

is in part a summary of the actual conversations. I quote from Part A of

this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript

and its obvious authenticity, I propose to quote this conversation in

full.

“F”—hereafter I shall use Göring and Seyss-Inquart—

“F: ‘How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘No.’”

Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:

“Göring: ‘How are things with you? Have you resigned or do you

have any news?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for

Sunday, and therefore he has put S’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘and the

other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called

off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being

ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p.m.’

“Göring replied that in his opinion the measures taken by

Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At

this moment he could not commit himself officially. Göring will

take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he

could see a postponement only, not a change of the present

situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the

Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.

“Thereafter a conversation took place between Göring and the

Führer. Afterwards Göring again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. This

conversation was held at 15:05.

“Göring told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever

with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did

not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government because he

had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and therefore further

confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the

national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being

requested immediately to hand in their resignations to the

Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Göring

added that if after a period of 1 hour no report had come

through, the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would

no more be in a position to telephone. That would mean that the

gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was

then told to send the telegram to the Führer as agreed upon. As

a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal

President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow

Schuschnigg’s resignation.”

Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Göring told Seyss-Inquart over the

telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the

elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state

that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When

informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed

out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head

of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one of these?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the

conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this

morning, the Defendant Göring telephoned to Dombrowski in the German

Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation

marked “TT” on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that

conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Göring showed concern

that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely

legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript:

“Göring: ‘Now to go on, the Party has definitely been

legalized?’

“Dombrowski: ‘But that is—it is not necessary even to discuss

that?’

“Göring: ‘With all of its organizations.’

“Dombrowski: ‘With all of its organizations within this

country.’

“Göring: ‘In uniform?’

“Dombrowski: ‘In uniform.’

“Göring: ‘Good.’

“Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have

already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything

is all right.”

In addition, Göring stated that the Cabinet—the Austrian Cabinet—must

be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered

to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote

from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:

“Göring: ‘Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Führer,

and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One

thing I have forgotten: Fischböck must have the Department of

Economy and Commerce.’

“Dombrowski: ‘That is understood.’

“Göring: ‘Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security

and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian Army is to be

taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the

Justice Department.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes, yes.’

“Göring: ‘Give me the name.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Well, your brother-in-law, isn’t that right?’”

—That is Hüber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Göring.—

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘That’s right, and then also Fischböck.’”

And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Göring was faced with the news

that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as

Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to

be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between

Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with

capital R, Pages 1 and 2:

“Göring: ‘Now remember the following: You go immediately,

together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal

President that if the conditions which are known to you are not

accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at

and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the

whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General

Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference

immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas’

position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just

through the false report we received before, action was delayed,

but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will

begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be

stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are

informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal

Chancellorship.’”

—There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken

up.—“‘M.’”—I suppose that means Lieutenant General

Muff.—“‘does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate

restoration of the Party with all its organizations.’”

—There is again an interruption in the transcript.—“‘And then

call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They

should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given

by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with

you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not

understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in

4 minutes.’”

An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Göring had an extensively interrupted

telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he

told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Göring

said—I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page:

“Göring: ‘Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go

upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S.

I.’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘shall call on the National Socialist

guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.’”

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed

the Defendant Göring that Miklas was still sticking to his old

viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there

might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded

as follows—I quote from Page 2 of Part H, beginning about the middle of

the page:

“Göring: ‘Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he

comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the

Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can

hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do

so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power.

All right?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘But if he threatens?’

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Well, I see; then we shall be ready.’

“Göring: ‘Call me via Blitz.’”

In other words, Göring and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for

Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan

which was already discussed involved the use of both the National

Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing

the borders. Later that night Göring and Seyss-Inquart had another

conversation at about 11 o’clock. This was after the ultimatum had

expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring that Miklas was still refusing to

name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as

follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder:

“Göring: ‘OK’”—What’s the German word for OK? Schön.—“‘I shall

give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get

the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I

shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes

resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial,

the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Including leading personalities; it does not make any

difference.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes, they have given the order not to offer any

resistance.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not

authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, now you are officially authorized.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.’”

I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o’clock, instead of 11. I

meant to say 8 o’clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the

Defendant Göring was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he

planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German

court martial, the leading personalities.

So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for

taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that

subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts

indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed

over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart

sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send

troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A

conversation held at 8:48 that night between Göring and Keppler

proceeded as follows—I read from Page 1 of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is

that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the

radio stations occupied.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, we represent the Government now.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen

carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by

Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian

Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg

Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order

in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request

for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this

purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as

soon as possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but

everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the

professional groups.’”

Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA

and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a

few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2

of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Then our troops will cross the border today.’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as

possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the

office of the Federal Chancellor.’

“Göring: ‘Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell

him that we are asking him—well, he does not even need to send

the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, “Agreed.”’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘He should call me at the Führer’s or at my place.

Well, good luck. Heil Hitler.’”

Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Göring

wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the

first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Göring had requested

Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was

so urgent that Göring dictated the exact wording of the telegram over

the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between

Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading

from Part M:

“Dietrich: ‘I need the telegram urgently.’

“Keppler: ‘Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart

agrees.’

“Dietrich: ‘This is marvelous. Thank you.’

“Keppler: ‘Listen to the radio. News will be given.’

“Dietrich: ‘Where?’

“Keppler: ‘From Vienna.’

“Dietrich: ‘So Seyss-Inquart agrees?’

“Keppler: ‘Jawohl.’”

Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria

were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in

motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document

C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045

hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive,

initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of

Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The

directive reads:

“Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme

Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,”—with other symbols—“35

copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy”—pencil note—“has been informed.

Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.

“1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian

Government have not been fulfilled.

“2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw

before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. The

Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

“3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of

the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to

Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all

forces to the full as quickly as possible.”

Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like

Warlimont.

And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility

of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Göring

had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question

mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian

border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1934—the Putsch. Italy had

traditionally been the political protector of Austria.

With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from

Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just

come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole

thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by

the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows

the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the

telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half

of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title

Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. “H” is Hessen and “F” is

the Führer.

“Hessen: ‘I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce

accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you

his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave

him the news. He had then said it would be a complete

impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be

done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus,

and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that

Austria would be immaterial to him.’

“Hitler: ‘Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for

this.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes.’

“Hitler: ‘Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still

ready to make a quite different agreement with him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, I told him that, too.’

“Hitler: ‘As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I

shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing

matters.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in

fear of the terrible position which would have existed

militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell

him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I

forget that.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he

should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be

convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even

if the whole world were against him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl’s diary to the letter

which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be

found in the official publication _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_,

Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to take judicial

notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing in our

Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that Austria had been

declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote—and I quote:

“I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland—order

and tranquility—and to give to the popular will the possibility

of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by

its own decision.”

He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile

intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler was at

Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more in

the famous telegram which the world so well remembers. I again cite

_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 156, Number 29, the

translation of the telegram being in our Document 2467-PS, and the

document reads: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.”

We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene,

I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate to come back

to Vienna just long enough to recall that late in the evening of March

11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor.

The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15

p.m. This is noted in _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I,

Page 137, Number 25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our

Document 2465-PS.

Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over there and,

accordingly, one more act played on the international scene is set down

in the Air Ministry telephone transcript. On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the

day after the invasion, Defendant Göring who had been left in Berlin in

charge of the Reich by Hitler, who had gone to his fatherland, phoned

Defendant Ribbentrop in London. I find this conversation very

illuminating as to the way in which these defendants operated, using, if

I may employ American vernacular, a kind of international “double talk”

to soothe and mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of

Document 2949-PS:

“Göring:”—speaking to Ribbentrop in London:—“‘As you know, the

Führer has entrusted me with the administration of the current

government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte), and

therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in

Austria, that you can hear over the radio.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?’

“Göring: ‘Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely

overshadowed. The Führer was deeply moved, when he talked to me

last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw

his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political

things. Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just

foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist

Ministers and the representatives of the people

(Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on more

and more prominent people of the movement participated, and as a

natural result, the Austrian National Socialist Ministers asked

us to back them up so that they would not be completely beaten

up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told

them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war,

under any circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order

or with his consent, the communists and the Reds had been armed

and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed

with “Heil Moskau” and so on. Naturally, all these facts caused

some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that

Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Vaterländische

Front would fight to the last man. One could not know that they

would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who

already had taken over the Government, asked us to march in

immediately. We had already marched up to the frontier before

this, since we could not know whether or not there would be a

civil war. These are the actual facts which can be proved by

documents.’”

There the Defendant Göring was giving to the Defendant Ribbentrop the

proper line that he should take in London as to how to explain what had

happened in Austria. Of course, when the Defendant Göring said that his

story about this matter could be proved by documents, I don’t think he

had in mind that his own telephone calls might constitute documents.

Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English text of

this Part W—still Göring talking to Ribbentrop in London. This is at

the bottom of the page:

“Göring: ‘No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you

had spoken already to these people. I want you once more,—but

no, not at all once more, but generally speaking—tell the

following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that

Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg,

because the ultimatum was presented to him by Seyss-Inquart,

Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we

have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but that

it also was given by the others, and as far as I know, just a

military attaché came along, asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of

a technical question.’”—you will recall that he was a

lieutenant general directed by Göring to go along—“‘He was

supposed to ask whether, in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the

support of German troops, Germany would grant this request.

Furthermore, I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us

expressly, by phone and by telegram, to send troops because he

did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and

so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he

could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they

always had had such a big mouth.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘Herr Göring, tell me, how is the situation in

Vienna; is everything settled yet?’

“Göring: ‘Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with

some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and they were

received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17th division

marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also, I want to

point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw, but that

they got together and fraternized immediately with the German

troops, wherever they were stationed.’”

These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum was by

Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Göring; that Lieutenant General Muff, the

military attaché, was along just to answer a technical question, and

that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and telegram for troops.

But, perhaps to understand this conversation, we must try to create

again the actual physical scene of the time and place as Göring talked

over the phone. I quote eight lines from Page 11 of the English text,

about in the middle, Part W:

“Göring: ‘Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘I shall see you this afternoon.’

“Göring: ‘The weather is wonderful here—blue sky. I am sitting

here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air,

drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in. I have to make

the speech. And the birds are twittering, and here and there I

can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful

over there.’”—that is, Vienna.

“Ribbentrop: ‘That is marvelous.’”

May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of the

material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment I shall

take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the

developments which took place after the German troops marched across the

border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but before developing

the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause briefly for just a moment.

I think that the facts which I have related to the Tribunal today show

plainly certain things about the defendants involved in the conspiracy,

and among the conspirators who particularly took action in the Austrian

matter were Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and

Göring.

First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. They used

their power without a bridle. They used their power to override the

independence and freedom of others. And they were more than bullies

squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly bullies. They compounded

their force with fraud. They coupled threats with legal technicalities

and devious maneuvers, wearing a sanctimonious mask to cover their

duplicity. I think they are dangerous men.

In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document C-182,

Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak,

12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people

announcing the invasion, and purporting to justify it. I refer again to

_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 140, Number 27,

“Proclamation of Hitler.” The British Government and the French

Government filed protests. The German Government and the Austrian

National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart

welcomed Hitler at Linz, and they both expressed their joy over the

events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of

the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. I refer to the speech of

Seyss-Inquart at Linz on 12 March 1938, as contained in the _Dokumente

der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I

ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and which you will find

translated in our Document 2485-PS.

For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence our

Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to the American

Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-78. I

quote it in full:

“Secretary of State, Washington; March 12, noon.

“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets

‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession, National

Socialist Austria and her new Government in true indivisible

Union.’

“Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and

impending arrival Austrian Legion. SS and SA in undisputed

control in Vienna. Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg

and Schmidt rumored arrested. Himmler and Hess

here.”—Signed—“Wiley.”

The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the task of

consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer the

Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of the English

translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative acts in

evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial notice of

them.

First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to _Dokumente

der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. Our

translation is in our Document 2466-PS.

In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Göring’s telephone

conversation as shown in Document 2949-PS, that in view of Miklas’ delay

in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. Seyss-Inquart

became both Chancellor and President.

He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 for the

reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated

into the Reich Statute of Reunion, passed the same day, German law. I

cite for that the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 237, Number

21, a translation of which will be found in our Document 2307-PS.

This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the

German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany

violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided (by the

way, on the Constitutional Law to which I just referred there appear as

signatories the following names:

Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor; Göring, General Field

Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the

Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess,

Deputy Führer.)

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80

of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote:

“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of

Austria within the frontier, which may be fixed in a treaty

between that state and the principal Allied and Associated

Powers. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable.”

(JN-2)

Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St.

Germain, which provides:

“The independence of Austria is inalienable, otherwise than with

the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

Consequently, Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent

of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might

directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her

independence, particularly until her admission to membership of

the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of

another power.” (JN-3)

This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10

April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a mere formality.

The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared in the law. It

could not undo Germany’s union with, and control over, Austria.

To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured

under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is not necessary

to do more than review some of the acts passed within the month.

Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command and

required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler

as their Supreme Commander. A translation of the pertinent document will

be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer to the instruction of the Führer

and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13,

1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 150.

Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an

oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Führer of the German Reich

and people. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted to take the

oath.

I refer to a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the

administration of oath to the officials of the Province of Austria,

March 15, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, Number 24,

the translation being in our Document 2311-PS.

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich Laws,

including the law of 1933 against the formation of new political

parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of Party and

State.

I refer to the first decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor

concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March

1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number 25, the

translation being in our Document 2310-PS.

Hitler, Frick, and Göring ordered that the Reich Minister of the

Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of

Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the law

concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 16, 1938,

_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number 25, translated in

our 1060-PS.

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to insure

acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that Goebbels

established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna.

I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda

Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1,

Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS.

The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German

soldiers” asked the voters whether they agreed with the accomplishment

and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting of Austria with

Germany.

I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the

Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938,

Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS.

The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for

German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13.

Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we run that

screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court will

remember the chart.

The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the head of the

wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany’s desire to consummate

the Anschluss with Austria and her determination to execute that aim in

the way and at the time that she did—that is, with threat of military

force, quickly, and despite political risk—was due to the importance of

Austria in her further plans of aggression.

The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive war in

Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food through

expulsion of a million people and the effective increase in fighting

strength, in part through the improvement in the frontier.

I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to yield to

Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided ready cash taken

from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.

One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed

by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht for the transfer to

the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. I refer to the

order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank,

March 17, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 254, Number 27,

translated in our 2313-PS.

Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the Anschluss

there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, Austrian men,

to report for active military service. I refer to the decree regarding

registration for active military service in Austria during 1938,

_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated in our 1660-PS.

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position

of the German Army. I invite the Court’s attention to a document which I

introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, L-172, Exhibit

USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the

German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the

Gauleiter. Only one page of that lecture appears in this particular

document book, and I quote from one paragraph on Page 5 of the English

text, which is Page 7 of Jodl’s lecture, which reviewed the situation in

1938:

“The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only

the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect

both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially

improving our strategic position. Whereas, until then the

territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way

right into Germany—a wasp waist in the direction of France and

an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia—Czechoslovakia

herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position

had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a

victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective

aid from the west could be expected to arrive.”

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of

this second phase of their aggression and to take over Czechoslovakia.

Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point with

the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained earlier in

the week we have had to change our plans somewhat from a strictly

logical order, and the plan at present is that on Monday I shall go

forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the aggressive war case.

At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, and

it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements in the

courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, those

arrangements could be made.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of the picture

will take?

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we now, or

until the picture is ready?

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what Mr.

Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation to some

extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for interrogation.

Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley Shawcross will make the

opening statement for the British Empire on Tuesday morning.

The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants’ counsel, made in

writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants’ counsel on day

before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally requested Dr.

Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel to witness the film.

Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me kindly that he would not come

unless he was forced to come.