“A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist
Party was held on 29 and 30 September 1934, at Bad Aibling in
Bavaria.”
Then, skipping four paragraphs and resuming on the fifth one:
“The Agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received
orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those
persons who are known to support actively the present Government
and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.
“When the next action against the Government takes place those
persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against
all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are
known to be adversaries of National Socialism.
“In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following
principles have been emphasized:
“A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the
principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria
has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value
than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat
methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.
“B. We must, on every occasion which presents itself, appear to
be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the
struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly
serious and there will be this time two centers of terror, one
along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav
frontier.”
That ends the quotation from the memorandum. I proceed with the next
paragraph of the affidavit:
“The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although
it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier,
it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had
been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received
positive information to this effect from time to time which it
passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect
from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually
saw the Legion.”
The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi Party in Austria is
corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis.
I offer in evidence our Document Number 812-PS, as Exhibit USA-61. It
contains three parts. First, there is a letter dated August 22, 1939
from Mr. Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart, then Austrian Reich Minister. That letter encloses a
letter dated July 6, 1939 written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and
Gauleiter Josef Bürckel.
DR. HANS LATERNSER: (Co-counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): I object
to the presentation of the letters contained in Document Number 812. Of
course, I cannot object to the presentation of this evidence to the
extent that this evidence is to prove that these letters were actually
written. However, if these letters are to serve as proof for the
correctness of their contents, then I must object to the use of these
letters, for the following reason: Particularly, the third document: It
is a letter which, as is manifest from its contents, has a certain bias,
for this reason, that in this letter it is explained to what extent the
Austrian Nazi Party participated in the Anschluss.
It purports, further, to expose the leading role played by the Party
group Rainer-Klausner.
From the bias that is manifest in the contents of this letter, this
letter cannot serve as proof for the facts brought forth in it,
particularly since the witness Rainer, who wrote this letter, is
available as a witness. I have discovered he is at present in Nuremberg.
I object to the use of this letter to the extent that it is to be used
to prove the correctness of its contents, because the witness who can
testify to that is at our disposal in Nuremberg.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman in answer to what has
been said. The Tribunal has not yet read the letter.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think perhaps it would be better to read the letter
before we argue about the significance of its contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you relying upon the letter as evidence of the facts
stated in it?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: From whom is the letter, and to whom is it addressed?
MR. ALDERMAN: The first letter is from Mr. Rainer who was at that time
Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, then Reich
Minister of Austria.
That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939, written by Rainer to
Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Bürckel. In that letter, in turn,
Rainer enclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933
to March 11, 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria.
I had some other matters in connection with this that I did want to
bring to the attention of the Tribunal before it passes upon the
admissibility.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think that the defendant’s counsel is really
challenging the admissibility of the document; he challenges the
contents of the document.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. On that, in the first place, we are advised by
defendant’s counsel that this man Rainer is in Nuremberg. I would assume
he is there.
We have also an affidavit by Rainer stating that what is stated in these
communications is the truth. However, it seems to us that the
communications themselves, as contemporaneous reports by a Party officer
at the time, are much more probative evidence than anything that he
might testify to before you today.
DR. LATERNSER: I have already said that this letter has these
characteristics, that it is biased, that it tends to emphasize and
exaggerate the participation of the Austrian Nazi Party on the
Anschluss. Therefore, I must object to the use of this letter as
objective evidence. It was not written with the thought in mind that the
letter would be used as evidence before a court. If the writer had known
that, the letter undoubtedly would have been formulated differently,
considering his political activity.
I believe, although I am not sure, that the witness is in Nuremberg. In
that case, according to a principle which is basic for all trial
procedure, the witness should be presented to the Court personally,
particularly since, in this case, the difficulties inherent in the
question of Messersmith do not here pertain.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the letters are
admissible. They were written to and received by the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart. The defendant can challenge the contents of the letters
by his evidence.
If it is true that Rainer is in Nuremberg, it is open to the defendant
to apply to the Tribunal for leave to call Rainer in due course. He can
then challenge the contents of these letters, both by the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart’s evidence and by Rainer’s evidence. The letters
themselves are admitted.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I agree quite fully with the
statement that if it had been known that these letters were to be
offered in evidence in a court of justice, they very probably would have
been differently written. That applies to a great part of the evidence
that we shall offer in this case. And I would say that if the
photographer who took the photograph of the Memorial Plaque had known
that his photographs would be introduced in evidence in a conspiracy
case, he probably never would have snapped the shutter.
The letter from Rainer to Bürckel indicates that he was asked to prepare
a short history of the role of the Party. Perhaps I had better read the
covering letter, addressed to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart:
“Dear Dr. Seyss:
“I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you
asked me to inform you what I know of those matters which, among
others, are the subject of your correspondence with Bürckel.
“I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that which has
been brought to my notice in the course of time by different
people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.
“On 5 July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich
Commissioner Gauleiter Bürckel if I was in possession of the
memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him
that I did not have this memorandum, that I never possessed a
single part of it; that I, furthermore, did not then participate
in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official
requests by Bürckel, I have entrusted him with a report
accompanied by a letter written on 6 July.
“If Bürckel now writes to you that certain statements were
confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each
of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in
single originals. I shall specially inform Bürckel of this,
adding that I have given—apart from, those written
explanations—no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms
whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have
authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.
“Since the beginning of our collaboration, I have always
expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself
and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was
the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and
March have not changed this, especially since I considered the
political success of 11 March merely as a confirmation of the
intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us
to collaborate.
“As far as Globus is concerned, you are fully, aware of his
nature, which I judged always and in every situation only by its
good side. I believe that you have already talked to Globus
about the occurrences between the 11 March 1938 and today, and I
am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering
him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your
intention.
“With best regards and Heil Hitler!
Yours, Friedl Rainer.”
And so Rainer writes his report, which is enclosed with this letter, to
show that the Party as a whole is entitled to the glory which was
excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
I refer to the third paragraph of the first enclosure, the report to
Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Josef Bürckel:
“We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual
leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not
be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was
an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped
especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler, and
also for the public, the role of the Party during the events
preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal
and written declaration to Party member Hess, and furthermore to
secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke
at every available opportunity about the fight of the Party. I
did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for
the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, and I would not do that, primarily because I
appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore, because I believe that
I would not gladden Hitler by doing so.
“I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act
crookedly, and furthermore, that Hitler does not want to commit
an act of historical justice by special preference of his
person, but rather that he is attracted to him personally. It
really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person
were more or less meritorious in this sector of the great fight
of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the
greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be
considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore,
considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for
new fertile fields of endeavor in the Party.
“If I should be asked to describe—without personal
interest—the role of the Party according to my best conviction,
I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised
yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it
available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this
abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.
“Heil Hitler! Rainer.”
Now, of course, all of these enclosures went to the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart, and he had knowledge of the contents of all of them.
It is an historical fact of which the Court will take judicial notice,
that Seyss-Inquart was the original Quisling. It so happened that the
Norwegian Seyss-Inquart gave his name to posterity as a meaningful name,
but all Quislings are alike.
The Tribunal will observe from this that the Rainer report is hardly
likely to be tendentious, as counsel says, or to be prejudiced in favor
of Defendant Seyss-Inquart’s contribution to the Anschluss. It tends, on
the contrary, to show that Seyss-Inquart was not quite so important as
he might have thought he was. Even so, Rainer gives Seyss-Inquart credit
enough.
The Rainer report further tells of the disorganization of the Nazi Party
in Austria and of its reconstitution. I now quote the second and third
paragraphs of the report, appearing on Pages 3 and 4 of the English text
of 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61; and I believe it is on Pages 1 and 2
of the original German of the report or Bericht, which is the third part
of the document:
“Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the
July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right,
the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete
destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of
fighters through imprisonment or flight into the Alt-Reich, and
with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria,
a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the Austrian State
by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen,
instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the
two States, the Führer had liquidated the first stage of the
battle, and a new method of political penetration was to begin.
By order of the Führer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved,
and the Party in Austria was left to its own resources.
“There was no acknowledged leader for the entire Party in
Austria. New leaderships were forming in the new Gaue. The
process was again and again interrupted by the interference of
the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and
frequently there were two, three, or more rival leaderships. The
first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaue in
Autumn 1934 was Engineer Reinthaler (already appointed
Landesbauernführer, leader of the country’s farmers, by Hess).
He endeavored to bring about a political appeasement by
negotiations with the Government with the purpose of giving the
NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political
activities. Simultaneously, Reinthaler started the
reconstruction of the illegal political organization at the head
of which he had placed Engineer Neubacher.”
Next we have secret contacts between German officials, including the
Defendant Von Papen, and the Austrian Nazis; the use by the Austrian
Nazis of front personalities.
There are two cardinal factors concerning the Nazi organization in
Austria which should be borne in mind.
First, although the Führer had, on the surface, cast the Austrian Nazis
adrift—as indicated in the document I have just read—in fact, as we
shall show, German officials, including Von Papen, maintained secret
contact with the Austrian Nazis in line with Hitler’s desires. German
officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of
the Austrian Nazis.
In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization
in Austria, organizing for the eventual use of force in a so-called
emergency. But in the meantime they deemed it expedient to act behind
front personalities, such as the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who had no
apparent taint of illegality in his status in Austria.
Mr. Messersmith relates, in his affidavit, that he got hold of a copy of
a document outlining this Nazi program. I quote from Page 8 of Document
1760-PS, USA-57, the following:
“For 2 years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the
Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic
acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and, as I recall, in
1935 and most of 1936, this inactivity was in accordance with
directives from Berlin, as direct evidence to that effect which
came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January the
Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a
document which I considered accurate in all respects, and which
stated:
“‘The German Minister here, Von Papen, on the occasion of his
last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor
Hitler for fairly long conversations and he also took this
opportunity to call on Schacht and Von Neurath. In these
conversations the following instructions were given to him:
“‘During the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which will
give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground,
everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of
Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria.
Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason, not
endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis
in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is
convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once
through a word from him. This word, however, he will not give
for foreign political reasons, being convinced that ends desired
by him may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor
Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not
indicate any disinterestedness in Austria’s independence. Also,
before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party
members in Austria, and must therefore, in spite of the very
real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to
the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria.
“‘As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the
authorization that from then on, 200,000 marks a month were to
be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in
Austria). The control and supervision of this monthly sum was to
be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that
he alone had control over the money, would have a definite
influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be
possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing
difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National Socialist
Party.
“‘The hope was also expressed to Herr Von Papen that the
recently authorized foundation of German Ortsgruppen of the
National Socialist Party in Austria, made up of German citizens
in Austria, would be so arranged as not to give the appearance
that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal
affairs.’”
The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissar Bürckel in July 1939
outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership squabbles
following the retirement of Reinthaler.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient time to break off
until 2 o’clock?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to
the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel in July
1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership
problem following the retirement of Reinthaler.
In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of the contacts
with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the
following terms. I quote from Page 4 of the English text of that report,
and I believe from Page 4 of the German text of the Rainer report, which
is 812-PS, that is Exhibit USA-61:
“In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which
were, apart from the Gauleiter”—Gau leaders—“also Globocnik
and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction
received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy
country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at
this time also established connection with departments of the
Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German racial agency, _et
cetera_), and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in
the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria.”
And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in
1936. I quote from Page 6 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the
German text:
“The principles of the construction were:
“The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the
trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple
manner and without compromise, according to the principle of
organizing an elite to be available to the illegal Land Party
Council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political
opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal
chances should be used without revealing any ties with the
illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal
Party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at
the top of the Party leadership. All connections with the Party
in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the
Führer. These said that the German State should officially be
omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP and that
auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, _et
cetera_, should be established in the foreign countries
bordering Austria.
“Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who
had connection with Dr. Waechter which originated from
Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side,
Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and
especially well-established relations with Christian Social
politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the
Styrian Heimatschutz”—home defense—“and became a Party member
when the entire Styrian Heimatschutz was incorporated into the
NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal
field was Colonel Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both
sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by
the activities of these two persons of whom Glaise-Horstenau was
designed as trustee to the Führer.”
The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis
during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were
maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using native
personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made
good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and
could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and
obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other
Nazis like Captain Leopold.
Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he
was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a
trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this Styrian
Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the
agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic importance of that agreement
will be considered a little later. Rainer’s report, as I have said
before, was hardly likely to over emphasize the significance of
Seyss-Inquart’s contribution.
That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust
Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in
evidence Document 2219-PS as Exhibit USA-62. This is a letter dated 14
July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Göring. The document is a typed
carbon of the letter. It ends with the “Heil Hitler” termination, and it
is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by Defendant
Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart’s
personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters
usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a
note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading,
“Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Göring’s office.” The
main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession on behalf of
one Mühlmann, whose name we shall meet later, and who, unfortunately,
got into Bürckel’s bad graces. I shall quote the extract part of the
document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I
believe, on Page 7 of the German text:
“At present in Vienna, 14 July 1939;
“To the General Field Marshal
“Sir:
“If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I
know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final
decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced
activism”—Aktivismus—“this will certainly be regarded as a
fault of my personality. Yet I know that I cling with
unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe, that is
Greater Germany”—Grossdeutschland—“and the Führer. And if some
people are already tired out from the struggle and some have
been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready
to go into action. This, after all, was also the development
until the year 1938. Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a
regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly, in whatever
form, paid my membership dues (the first one, according to a
receipt, I paid in December 1931) I probably would have been an
undisputed, comparatively old fighter and Party member of
Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I
told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime
on its own ground in order to give the Führer a chance to use
whatever method he desired.”—I would like to call particular
attention to that sentence.—“I told myself that this Austria
was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron
determination because I and my friends had to fight against the
whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short,
against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we
might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political
annihilation; it would have deprived the Führer of the means and
tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria,
as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully
conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not
comprehensible to the masses and also not to my Party comrades.
I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it
again, because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve
the Führer as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude
even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable Party
comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid
attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion
which the Führer and the men close to him have of me.”
That letter was written to one of the men close to him—Field Marshal
Göring. I think that suffices to demonstrate Seyss-Inquart as one whose
loyalty to Hitler, a foreign dictator, and to the aims of the Nazi
conspiracy, led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his
disposal.
It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a document from the
Defendant Von Papen, and to see how he thought the doctrines of National
Socialism could be used to effect the aim of the Anschluss. I offer
Document 2248-PS as Exhibit USA-63. This document is a letter from Von
Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935. It consists of a report entitled,
“Review and Outlook 1 Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.”
After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in
establishing Dollfuss as a martyr, and his principles as the patriotic
principles of Austria, Von Papen stated—and I quote the last paragraph
of the letter, beginning on Page 1 (Page 146 of the German text):
“National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian
ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is
only a centralized Reich German Party and therefore unable to
transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups
of people of a different political makeup, the answer must
rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not
have been brought about in a different way. But when the
creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be
completed, National Socialism could, in a much wider sense than
this is possible through the present Party organization—at
least apparently—certainly become the rallying point for all
racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in
regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized
tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated
clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become
possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New
Austria. A Nuremberg Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as
in old times and the proclamation of a National Socialistic
peoples’ front would be a stirring event for all beyond the
borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the
legitimistic Count Dubsky, wrote in his pamphlet about the
Anschluss: ‘The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not
be at all. National Socialism must win it or perish if it is
unable to solve this task.’”
We have other reports from Von Papen to Hitler which I shall offer in
evidence presently, showing that he maintained covert contact with the
National Socialist groups in Austria. It is certainly interesting that
from the very start of his mission, Defendant Von Papen was thinking of
ways and means of using the principle of National Socialism for national
Germans outside the border of Germany. Papen was working for the
Anschluss, although he preferred to use the principles of National
Socialism rather than rely on the Party organization as a necessary
means of establishing those principles in the German Reich.
Next we have some assurance and reassurance to Austria. The German
Government did no more than keep up a pretense of non-interference with
Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of providing
assurances that it had no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria
could find hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find
her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain relief from the
economic and internal pressure.
I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA-64. It is a letter
from Von Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated May 17, 1935.
Von Papen’s letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright credible
statement by Germany reassuring Austria, would be most useful for German
diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of relationship between
Austria and German groups in Austria.
He had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Christian Social forces
against Starhemberg, the Vice Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by
Mussolini. Von Papen hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces
with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Von Papen
indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the
illegal National Socialists in Austria.
I quote from his letter, starting at the second paragraph of the second
page. This is Von Papen writing to “Mein Führer” Hitler:
“I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The
fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian
Social forces, who are opposed to a home-front dictatorship,
against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures
arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to
him in such a way that he would submit the offer to the
Government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of
interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of
the NSDAP in Austria, Captain Leopold, the totalitarian
principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the
beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian Social
elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If
Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and
guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition,
then, as a result of such a compromise, the Austrian Government
would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these
forces. . . . A further consequence of this step would be the
possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact,
which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the
settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a
measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European
situation, and especially on our relationship with England.
“One may object that Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to
follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability
immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.
“Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of
setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of
go-betweens. The possibility exists. If Herr Schuschnigg finally
says ‘no’ and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation
would not be any worse, but on the contrary, the efforts of the
Reich Government to make peace with Austria would be revealed,
without prejudice to other interests. Therefore, even in the
case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider
it completely possible, that in view of the farspread dislike in
the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course, and in view of
the sharp tensions between the Federal
Government”—Bundesregierung—“Herr Schuschnigg will grasp this
last straw, always under the supposition that the offer could
not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears
all the marks of an actually honest compromise with Austria.
“Assuming success of this step we would again establish our
active intervention in central European politics, which, as
opposed to the French, Czech, and Russian political maneuvers,
would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.
“Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in
the way of explorations and conferences, an immediate decision
is necessary.
“The Reich Army Minister”—Reichswehrminister—“shares the
opinion presented above, and the Reich Foreign
Minister”—Reichsaussenminister—“wants to discuss it with you,
my Führer.”—Signed—“Papen.”
In other words, Von Papen wanted a strong assurance and a credible
assurance of the preservation of Austria’s independence. As he put it,
Germany had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere effort
at peace, and she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an
Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would
vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally Von Papen urged haste.
Exactly 4 days later, in a Reichstag address, Hitler responded to Von
Papen’s suggestion, and asserted:
“Germany neither intends nor wishes, to interfere in the
internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an
Anschluss.”
The British will present a document covering that speech. I merely
wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence quite well
known to history.
It is appropriate to take notice of this assurance at this point, and to
note that for a complexity of reasons Von Papen suggested, and Hitler
announced, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which
had been, and continued to be, to interfere in Austria’s internal
affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.
There was then a temporary continuance of a quiet pressure policy.
On May 1, 1936, Hitler blandly in a public speech branded as a lie any
statement that “tomorrow or the day after” Germany would fall upon
Austria. I invite the Court’s attention to the version of the speech
appearing in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, SD—that is South Germany—2
to 3 May 1936, Page 2, and translated in our Document 2367-PS.
Without offering that document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice
of that statement in that well-known speech.
If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and
misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon Austria
“tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.” For the conspirators well knew
that the successful execution of their purpose required for a little
while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria.
I now offer in evidence our Document L-150, “Memorandum of Conversation
between Ambassador Bullitt and the Defendant Von Neurath, on 18 May
1936” as Exhibit USA-65. This document unfortunately again appears in
your document books in German. Due to an error, it has not been
mimeographed in English. German counsel have the German copies.
I shall read from it and at the same time, hand to the interpreter
reading the German, a marked copy of a German translation. I might read
one sentence from the first paragraph:
“I called on Von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 18
and had a long talk on the general European situation.
“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the
Rhineland had been ‘digested.’
“He explained that he meant until the German fortifications had
been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German
Government would do everything possible to prevent, rather than
encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue
a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our
fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central
Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all
these countries will begin to feel very differently about their
foreign policies and a new constellation will develop.’”