I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation.

MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the United

States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its permission, a

documentary film on concentration camps. This is by no means the entire

proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to the subject of

concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a brief

and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words “concentration

camp” imply.

This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events leading up

to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as Mr. Alderman’s

presentation shows, was planned and prepared by the Nazi conspirators.

We propose to show that concentration camps were not an end in

themselves but rather they were an integral part of the Nazi system of

government. As we shall show, the black-shirted guards of the SS and the

Gestapo stood ranged behind the official pages of the

_Reichsgesetzblatt_.

We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants knew of

the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and terror and

nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments by which the

defendants retained power and suppressed opposition to any of their

policies, including, of course, their plans for aggressive war. By this

means they enforced the controls imposed upon the German people, as

required to execute these plans, and obliterated freedom in Germany and

in the countries invaded and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich.

Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in mind the

fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this Trial will

show that on some of the organizations charged in this Indictment lies

the responsibility for the origination, the control, and the maintenance

of the whole concentration camp system: Upon the SS, the SD—a part of

the SS which tracked down the victims—upon the Gestapo, which committed

the victims to the camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were

in charge of the atrocities committed therein.

Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement

explaining its source and its authenticity.

COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution Counsel for the United

States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer to Document Number 2430-PS,

concerning the motion picture entitled “Nazi Concentration Camps” and to

the affidavits of Commander James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George

C. Stevens, Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained

therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg are

also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in the record of

the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now, however,

read into the record those affidavits not appearing in the film.

THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense Counsel,

we don’t think it is necessary to read these formal affidavits.

COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now offers in evidence an

official documentary motion picture report on Nazi concentration camps.

This report has been compiled from motion pictures taken by Allied

military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the

areas in which these camps were located. The accompanying narration is

taken directly from the reports of the military photographers who filmed

the camps.

While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing life and

death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication of the films is

contained in the affidavits of the United States Army and Navy officers

to which I have referred.

As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available to all

defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information Room of the

supporting affidavits duly translated.

If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of the

film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79.

[_Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the following

affidavits while at the same time the voices of the respective affiants

were reproduced reading them._]

“I, George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United

States, hereby certify:

“1. From 1 March 1945 to 8 May 1945 I was on active duty with

the United States Army Signal Corps attached to the Supreme

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and among my official

duties was direction of the photographing of the Nazi

concentration camps and prison camps as liberated by Allied

Forces.

“2. The motion pictures which will be shown following this

affidavit were taken by official Allied photographic teams in

the course of their military duties, each team being composed of

military personnel under the direction of a commissioned

officer.

“3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, these motion

pictures constitute a true representation of the individuals and

scenes photographed. They have not been altered in any respect

since the exposures were made. The accompanying narration is a

true statement of the facts and circumstances under which these

pictures were made.

“(Signed) George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS.

“Sworn to before me this 2nd day of October 1945.

“(Signed) James B. Donovan, Commander, United States Naval

Reserve.”

“I, E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy, hereby

certify that:

“1. From 1929 to 1941 I was employed at the Twentieth Century

Fox Studios in Hollywood, California, as a director of film

effects, and am familiar with all photographic techniques. Since

6 September 1941 to the present date of 27 August 1945, I have

been on active duty with the United States Navy.

“2. I have carefully examined the motion picture film to be

shown following this affidavit and I certify that the images of

these excerpts from the original negative have not been

retouched, distorted or otherwise altered in any respect and are

true copies of the originals held in the vaults of the United

States Army Signal Corps. These excerpts comprise 6,000 feet of

film selected from 80,000 feet, all of which I have reviewed and

all of which is similar in character to these excerpts.

“(Signed) E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy.

“Sworn to before me this 27 day of August 1945.

“(Signed) John Ford, Captain, United States Navy.”

[_The film was then shown._]

COL. STOREY: That concludes the presentation.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]

NINTH DAY

Friday, 30 November 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Colonel Amen will represent the United States this

morning.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United

States): May it please the Tribunal, I propose to call as the first

witness for the Prosecution, Major General Erwin Lahousen.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to state that the evidence of the

witness whom you propose to call must be strictly confined to the count

with which the United States are dealing, Count One.

COL. AMEN: May I have a moment to discuss that with the Chief Counsel of

the United States?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, so far as

I know the Prosecution . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you state for whom you appear? Do you appear for

the Defendant Keitel?

DR. NELTE: Yes. As far as I know, an agreement was reached between the

Prosecution and the Defense, to the effect that whenever possible,

questions to be brought up in the proceedings on the following day

should be announced beforehand. The obvious purpose of this very

reasonable understanding was to enable Defense Counsel to discuss

forthcoming questions with their clients, and thus to assure a rapid and

even progress of the Trial.

I was not informed that the witness Lahousen was to be called by the

Prosecution today, nor was I told on what questions he was to be heard.

It was particularly important to know this, because today, I believe,

the witness Lahousen was not to be heard on questions connected with the

Prosecution’s case as presented during the past days.

THE PRESIDENT: That is the contrary of what I said. What I said was that

the witness was to be confined to evidence relating to Count One, which

is the Count that has been solely discussed up to the present date.

DR. NELTE: Do you mean, Mr. President, that in order to enable the

Defense to cross-examine the witness, there will be a recess after the

interrogation by the Prosecution during which Counsel may discuss the

questions with their clients? The witness Lahousen, as far as I recall,

has never until now been mentioned by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to hear Counsel for the

United States upon the agreement which counsel for the Defendant Keitel

alleges, namely, an agreement that what was to be discussed on the

following day should be communicated to defendants’ counsel beforehand.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of no agreement to inform defendants’

counsel of any witness, nor of his testimony; nor would I want to make

such. There are security reasons involved in disclosing to Defense

Counsel the names of witnesses, which I don’t need to enlarge upon, I am

quite sure.

We did advise them that they would be given information as to the

documentary matters, and I think that has been kept.

As to witnesses, however, a matter of policy arises. These witnesses are

not always prisoners. They have to be treated in somewhat different

fashion than prisoners; and the protection of their security is a very

important consideration where we are trying this case, in the very

hotbed of the Nazi organization with which some of Defense Counsel were

identified.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, that that is sufficient. If

you tell the Tribunal that there was no such agreement, the Tribunal

will, of course, accept that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of nothing of that character, relating to

witnesses. That does apply to documents.

We find it very difficult to know just the meaning of the ruling which

the Court has just announced. Count One of the Indictment is a

conspiracy count, covering the entire substantive part of the

Indictment. There are problems, of course, of overlapping, which I had

supposed had been worked out between the prosecutors until this morning.

It is impossible, trying a conspiracy case, to keep from mentioning the

fact that the act, which was the object of the conspiracy, was

performed. In fact, that is a part of the evidence of the conspiracy.

I know I don’t need to enlarge upon the wide scope of evidence in a

conspiracy case. I think, perhaps, the best way to do is to swear the

witness, and that the other prosecutors, if they feel their field is

being trespassed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we are

exceeding, raise the objection specifically; because I don’t know how we

can separate, particularly on a moment’s notice, Count One from the

other Counts.

We have tried our best to work out an arrangement that would be fair, as

between ourselves and the other prosecutors, but we find it impossible

always to please everybody.

With the greatest deference to the ruling of the Court, I would like to

suggest that we proceed. I don’t know just what the bounds of the ruling

might be, but I think the only way we can find out is to proceed, and

have specific objections to the specific things which anyone feels have

been transgressed; and in doing that, I want to say that we do it with

the greatest respect to the ruling, but that we may find ourselves in

conflict with it, because of the difficulty of any boundary on the

subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I must return to the matter raised by Doctor

Nelte, namely his statement that before the beginning of the Trial the

Defense and the Prosecution reached an agreement to the effect that the

next day’s program should always be made known to the Defense on the

previous day. Such an agreement was actually reached, and I cannot

understand why the Prosecution was not informed of it. We considered the

possibility and then reached this agreement in a conference with Doctor

Kempner, who was acting as our liaison man. I should like further to

point out the following:

The Prosecution stated that for security reasons the Defense could not

be furnished with the names of witnesses to be called during the next

day’s proceedings. The press however received, as early as yesterday,

information on the witnesses to be called today. We heard of this

through representatives of the press this morning and, as far as I know,

the information also appeared in today’s papers. I cannot understand,

therefore, why it was withheld from us, and why we were told that for

security reasons, it could not be communicated to us. I think this

amounts to a mistrust of the Defense’s discretion that is quite

unjustified. It is, furthermore, incorrect that we are now receiving

documents in good time; they still reach us belatedly. For instance, a

document which is to be dealt with in court today was put on our desks

only this morning, moreover, in a language which many of the defending

counsel cannot understand, since they do not have complete mastery of

English.

As I have already submitted this complaint to the Prosecution in

writing, may I ask the Tribunal to reach a decision in this matter as

soon as possible.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is quite correct that the name of the witness

who is to be used today was given to the press. The question of our

policy as to giving witnesses’ names was submitted to me last night

after Court recessed, because we had not been using witnesses

heretofore; and I then stated to Colonel Storey that witnesses’ names

must not be given to the Defense Counsel for security reasons.

He communicated that, I believe, to Doctor Dix. I found that later it

had been given to the press. They, of course, have had adequate

information therefore as to this witness. However, I am speaking about

the policy. We cannot be under an obligation to inform these counsel of

the names of witnesses who will be called, who are here in Nuremberg,

but not in prison; the situation does not permit that. Neither can we

furnish transcripts of testimony or that sort of thing of witnesses in

advance.

Now we want to give the Defense Counsel everything that, in the fair

conduct of the Trial, they ought to have. They are now receiving much

more than any citizen of the United States gets on trial in the courts

of the United States, in some respects, as to advance information and

copies and help and service, and I do think that to ask us to disclose

to them in advance either the names or substance of

testimony—oftentimes the substance would disclose the witness—would

not be proper. It was stated yesterday that we would take up a witness

today.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard two of the counsel on behalf of the

Defense. Have you anything to add which is different to what they have

said?

DR. DIX: Yes, I believe I can explain a misunderstanding and clarify the

whole problem.

Mr. President, as far as I am informed—I do not know what was discussed

in my absence—the situation is this:

Though discussions took place, no agreement was reached between the

Prosecution and the Defense. There is, as Your Lordship knows, only a

decision of the Tribunal regarding documents; that decision is known and

I need not repeat. As far as witnesses are concerned I think I may

assume that we are all agreed that the desire of the Defense to know the

names of witnesses ahead of time is justified.

The Tribunal must decide to what extent security reasons interfere with

this desire, which is in itself justified. That is a matter which the

Defense cannot determine. I think I understand Mr. Justice Jackson

correctly in saying that if the press is being told what witnesses will

appear on the next day, then it is a matter of course that the same

information should be given to Defense Counsel at the same time. This

was only a series of unhappy circumstances, which can be overcome by

mutual understanding and good will.

As I said, I do not know what was agreed upon before I was present here.

I cannot therefore contradict my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, in this matter.

I think it possible, however, that the misunderstanding arose as a

result of the decision of the Court to have documents submitted to us 48

hours in advance and to have the film shown to us beforehand, a decision

which led my colleague to the conclusion—and I consider it a justified

conclusion—that all matters of this sort were to be submitted to us in

advance. We do not, of course, expect to be informed of the contents of

the witness’ testimony.

After this elucidation I should like to state my request that in the

future we be informed as soon as possible which witness is to be called;

and I should also like to ask that the security considerations be guided

by the knowledge that the Defense as a body is reliable, determined and

capable of assisting the Court in reaching its verdict by submitting to

the discipline of the proceedings. I ask, therefore, that the cases in

which the security officer believes that he should not communicate the

name of the witness beforehand, should be reduced to an absolute

minimum.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the submissions which have

been made to them on behalf of Defense Counsel with reference to what

shall or what shall not be communicated to them. With reference to the

witness whom the United States desire to call, they will now be

permitted to call him. With reference to what I said about confining his

evidence to the first count, the Tribunal thinks that the best course

would be for the other prosecutors to have the opportunity now to ask

any questions which they think right, and that they may have the

opportunity, if they wish, of calling the witness later upon their own

counts.

As to cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, that will be allowed

to them in the most convenient way possible, so that if they wish to

have an opportunity of communicating with their clients before they

cross-examine, they may have the opportunity of doing so. Now we will

continue.

COL. AMEN: May we have General Lahousen brought before the Tribunal?

What is your name?

ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): Erwin Lahousen.

COL. AMEN: Will you please spell it?

LAHOUSEN: L-a-h-o-u-s-e-n.

COL. AMEN: Will you say this oath after me: “I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think the witness had better sit down?

COL. AMEN: I think he should be allowed to sit down, particularly since

he has a heart condition which may be aggravated.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may sit down.

COL. AMEN: Where were you born?

LAHOUSEN: I was born in Vienna.

COL. AMEN: On what date?

LAHOUSEN: On 25 October 1897.

COL. AMEN: What has been your occupation?

LAHOUSEN: I was a professional soldier.

COL. AMEN: Where were you trained?

LAHOUSEN: I was trained in Austria, in the Military Academy in

Wiener-Neustadt.

COL. AMEN: Were you immediately commissioned as an officer?

LAHOUSEN: In 1915 I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the

infantry.

COL. AMEN: Did you serve in the first World War?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, as second and first lieutenant in the infantry.

COL. AMEN: Were you promoted from time to time thereafter?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I was promoted under the normal regulations valid in

Austria at the time.

COL. AMEN: By 1930 what rank had you attained?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I was a captain.

COL. AMEN: And commencing in 1930 did you take any additional training?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I entered the Austrian War School, which corresponds

to the Military Academy in the German Army. There I received the

training of an officer of the General Staff.

COL. AMEN: How long did this training last?

LAHOUSEN: This training lasted 3 years.

COL. AMEN: In 1933 to what regular army unit were you assigned?

LAHOUSEN: In 1933 I was serving in the Second Austrian Division, that

was the Vienna Division.

COL. AMEN: What type of work did you do there?

LAHOUSEN: I was an intelligence officer; that branch of the service for

which I was already destined at the end of my training.

COL. AMEN: Did you then receive a further promotion?

LAHOUSEN: I was promoted normally in accordance with the regulations

valid in Austria, and roughly at the end of 1933 I became a major. About

1935 or the beginning of 1936 I was transferred to the General Staff,

and in June, or at any rate, in the summer of 1936, I became a

lieutenant colonel of the Austrian General Staff.

COL. AMEN: And were you assigned to the Intelligence Division at or

about that time?

LAHOUSEN: I entered the Austrian Intelligence Division which corresponds

technically to the Abwehr in the German Army. I must add that an

Intelligence Division was only added to the Austrian Army about this

time, i.e. 1936; before that year it did not exist. Since it was planned

to re-establish within the framework of the Austrian Federal Army the

military Intelligence Division which had ceased to exist after the

collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, I was trained to assist in

organizing this division within the framework of the Austrian Army.

COL. AMEN: After being assigned to the Intelligence Division, how were

your activities principally directed?

LAHOUSEN: My responsible chief, or more exactly, the responsible chief

at that time, was Colonel of the General Staff Böhme. He was the

division chief to whom I was subordinate, the Chief of the Intelligence

Division, the man to whom I was responsible, from whom I received my

orders and instructions; later on it was the Chief of the Austrian

General Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you shorten this, Colonel Amen? We really need not

have all this detail.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. It is, however, I think important for the

Tribunal to understand more of this information than you ordinarily

would by virtue of the fact that he was taken over subsequently to a

corresponding position in the German Army, which I did want the Tribunal

to appreciate.

Now, will you state to the Tribunal what your principal activities were

after being assigned to the Intelligence Division? What information were

you interested in and seeking to obtain?

LAHOUSEN: May I repeat—I don’t know if I understood you correctly—I

was a member of the Austrian Intelligence Division, and not of the

German Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: After the Anschluss, what position did you assume?

LAHOUSEN: After the Anschluss I was automatically taken into the High

Command of the German Armed Forces, where I did the same work. In that

position I was then a member of the Abwehr and my chief was Admiral

Canaris.

COL. AMEN: And what was the position of Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was at that time Chief of the German Abwehr, the

German Intelligence.

COL. AMEN: And will you explain briefly the responsibility of the

principal departments of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: When, after the Anschluss in 1938, I entered the Amt

Ausland-Abwehr there were three Abwehr divisions, and the division

called “Ausland,” and together they formed the organization known as

“Ausland-Abwehr.” That was the set-up of the organization in my time.

How it was composed before I became a member of it, I cannot say

exactly.

COL. AMEN: And what were your duties?

LAHOUSEN: First, I automatically came into Abwehr Division I. That was

the division concerned with collecting information. It was also called

the Secret Information Service. I worked under a divisional chief, the

then Colonel in the General Staff Pieckenbrock, whom I knew already from

my Austrian past. I also knew Canaris from my time in Austria.

COL. AMEN: Admiral Canaris was your immediate superior?

LAHOUSEN: Admiral Canaris was my immediate superior.

COL. AMEN: From time to time did you act as his personal representative?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, in all cases and on all occasions when his actual

deputy—namely, Colonel Pieckenbrock—was not present, or when Canaris,

for one reason or another, considered it necessary or advisable to have

me appear as his representative.

COL. AMEN: And in this capacity did you have any contact with Field

Marshal Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you also have contact with Jodl?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, occasionally, but to a much lesser extent.

COL. AMEN: And did you occasionally attend conferences at which Herr

Hitler was also present?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I attended a few of the sessions or discussions at which

Hitler was present and which he conducted.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether the leaders of the Abwehr

were in sympathy with Hitler’s war program?

LAHOUSEN: I have to make clear in this connection that, at that time, we

chiefs in the Abwehr were deeply influenced and captivated by the

personality of Canaris, his inner bearing was perfectly clear and

unequivocal to a small group of us.

COL. AMEN: And was there a particular group or groups in the Abwehr who

worked against the Nazis?

LAHOUSEN: Within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were two groups which in

their aims and actions were closely connected, but which, nevertheless,

must somehow be kept apart.

COL. AMEN: And what were those two groups?

LAHOUSEN: Before I answer this question, I must briefly picture the

personality of Canaris, who was the spiritual leader and focus of this

group.

COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was a pure intellect, an interesting, highly

individual, and complicated personality, who hated violence as such and

therefore hated and abominated war, Hitler, his system, and particularly

his methods. In whatever way one may look on him, Canaris was a human

being.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you refer back to the two groups of which you spoke

and tell me about each of those two groups and their respective

memberships?

LAHOUSEN: One might characterize the first of the groups as Canaris’

circle. It included the heads of the Amt Ausland-Abwehr:

Canaris himself as its spiritual leader; General Oster, Chief of the

Central Division (the head of the Abwehr); my predecessor, Lieutenant

Colonel Grosscurth, who had introduced me into the circle of Canaris in

Vienna in 1938; the Chief of Abwehr Division I, Colonel Pieckenbrock,

who was a close friend of Canaris; Pieckenbrock’s successor, Colonel

Hansen, who was executed after July; my successor, Colonel Von Freytag

Loringhoven, who committed suicide on 26 July 1944, before arrest; also,

in a somewhat different way, what applies to all these persons, the

Chief of Abwehr Division III, Colonel Von Bentivegni, and then various

people in all these divisions, most of whom were executed or imprisoned

in connection with the events of July 20, 1944.

I must also name here a man who did not belong to this group but who

knew of the actions designed to prevent the execution or issuing of

orders for murder and other atrocities, namely, Admiral Bürckner who was

Chief of the Ausland Division at that time. Those, in the main, are the

leaders of the first group called the Canaris circle.

The second and much smaller group was centered around General Oster as

its spiritual leader. This group included members of the Ausland-Abwehr

who, as early as 1938—I recognized this clearly by 1939-40 and later

on—were actively concerned with schemes and plans designed to remove

the originator of this catastrophe, Hitler, by force.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of the group to which you belonged; that

is, Canaris’ inner circle?

LAHOUSEN: On its political motives or aims, I was not informed. I can

only reiterate the thoughts and considerations which I, since I was one

of Canaris’ most intimate confidants, knew well. His inner attitude,

which influenced and moulded not only my own actions but also those of

the other men whom I mentioned, can be described as follows:

We did not succeed in preventing this war of aggression. The war implies

the end of Germany and of ourselves, a misfortune and a catastrophe of

very great extent. However, a misfortune even greater than this

catastrophe would be a triumph of this system. To prevent this by all

possible means was the ultimate aim and purpose of our struggle.

The sense of what I have just said was often expressed by Canaris among

the group of which I am speaking.

COL. AMEN: Now, did this group of which you and Canaris were members

meet frequently?

LAHOUSEN: I must explain that his group or circle was not to be regarded

as an organization in the technical sense, or as a sort of conspirators’

club. That would have been quite contradictory to Canaris’ nature. It

was rather, a spiritual organization of men holding the same

convictions, of men who had vision and knowledge—their official

functions provided them with knowledge—of men who understood each other

and acted, but each in his own way and in accordance with his own

individuality.

This is also the reason for the differentiation of which I spoke

earlier. The same demands were not made on each individual, but Canaris

always approached the person whose attitude he knew from personal

knowledge to be the most suitable to carry out a certain task.

COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations at these official meetings, at

which Canaris expressed his views with respect to the use of force in

Poland, for example?

LAHOUSEN: These and similar methods were repeatedly, I may say always,

discussed in our circle and they were naturally repudiated by all of us.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Canaris said about the Polish war at the

time of its commencement?

LAHOUSEN: I very clearly recall the hour at which Canaris entered,

completely shattered, to tell us that the situation had after all become

serious, although it had earlier appeared as if the matter might still

be postponed. He told us then: “This is the end.”

COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations with Canaris and the other members

of your group with respect to eliminating Nazis from your staff?

LAHOUSEN: While I was still in Vienna, before I took up my post in the

OKW, I received instructions from Canaris not to bring any National

Socialists with me to his department in Berlin. I was also instructed,

whenever possible not to employ Party members or officers sympathizing

with the Party in my division, especially in high positions. Thus the

actual organization. . . .

COL. AMEN: Did Canaris keep a diary?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, Canaris kept a diary. He did so even before the beginning

of the war—a diary to which I personally had to contribute and did

contribute much.

COL. AMEN: Was it a part of your duties to make entries in that diary?

LAHOUSEN: No, it was not a part of my actual duties, but it naturally

fell to me to write entries on the conferences which I attended with

Canaris or as his representative.

COL. AMEN: And did you keep copies of the entries which you made in

Canaris’ diary?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I kept copies, with Canaris’ knowledge and approval.

COL. AMEN: Do you have the original of some of those copies with you

here today?

LAHOUSEN: I do not have them on me, but they are available here.

COL. AMEN: And you have refreshed your recollection in reference to

those entries?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of Canaris in keeping such a diary?

LAHOUSEN: As a truthful answer to this question I must repeat what

Canaris himself said to me on this subject:

“The purpose and intention of this diary is to portray to the

German people and to the world, at some future date, the leaders

who are now guiding the fate of their nation.”

COL. AMEN: Now, do you recall attending conferences with Canaris at the

Führer’s headquarters, just prior to the fall of Warsaw?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris and I took part in discussions not in the Führer’s

headquarters, but in the Führer’s special train, shortly before the fall

of Warsaw.

COL. AMEN: And having refreshed your recollection from reference to the

entries in Canaris’ diary, can you tell the Tribunal the date of those

conferences?

LAHOUSEN: According to the notes and documents at my disposal it was on

September 12, 1939.

COL. AMEN: Did each of these conferences take place on the same day?

LAHOUSEN: The discussions in the Führer’s train took place on the same

day: September 12, 1939.

COL. AMEN: And was there more than one conference on that day? Were they

split into several conferences?

LAHOUSEN: One cannot really call them conferences; they were

discussions, conversations, of varying duration.

COL. AMEN: And who was present on this occasion?

LAHOUSEN: Present, regardless of location and time, were the following:

Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop; Keitel, the Chief of the OKW; Jodl,

head of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; Canaris; and myself.

COL. AMEN: Do you see Ribbentrop in this courtroom?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you indicate for the record where he is sitting?

LAHOUSEN: Over there. [_Indicating._] In the first row, third from the

left.

COL. AMEN: Do you also see Keitel in the courtroom?

LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is next to Ribbentrop.

COL. AMEN: Do you also see Jodl in the courtroom?

LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is in the second row, next to Herr Von Papen.

COL. AMEN: Now, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you

please explain, in as much detail as possible, to the Tribunal, exactly

what was said and what took place at this conference in the Führer’s

train?

LAHOUSEN: First of all, Canaris had a short talk with Ribbentrop, in

which the latter explained the general political aims with regard to

Poland and in connection with the Ukrainian question. The Chief of the

OKW took up the Ukrainian question in subsequent discussions which took

place in his private carriage. These are recorded in the files which I

immediately prepared on Canaris’ order. While we were still in the

carriage of the Chief of the OKW, Canaris expressed his serious

misgivings regarding the proposed bombardment of Warsaw, of which he

knew. Canaris stressed the devastating repercussions which this

bombardment would have in the foreign political field. The Chief of the

OKW, Keitel, replied that these measures had been agreed upon directly

by the Führer and Göring, and that he, Keitel, had had no influence on

these decisions. I quote Keitel’s own words here—naturally only after

re-reading my notes. Keitel said: “The Führer and Göring are in frequent

telephone communication; sometimes I also hear something of what was

said, but not always.”

Secondly, Canaris very urgently warned against the measures which had

come to his knowledge, namely the proposed shootings and extermination

measures directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, the

nobility, the clergy, and in fact all elements which could be regarded

as leaders of a national resistance. Canaris said at that time—I am

quoting his approximate words: “One day the world will also hold the

Wehrmacht, under whose eyes these events occurred, responsible for such

methods.”

The Chief of the OKW replied—and this is also based on my notes, which

I re-read a few days ago—that these things had been decided upon by the

Führer, and that the Führer, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had let

it be known that, should the Armed Forces be unwilling to carry through

these measures, or should they not agree with them, they would have to

accept the presence at their side of the SS, the SIPO and similar units

who would carry them through. A civilian official would then be

appointed to function with each military commander. This, in outlines,

was our discussion on the proposed shooting and extermination measures

in Poland.

COL. AMEN: Was anything said about a so-called “political

housecleaning”?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, the Chief of the OKW used an expression which was

certainly derived from Hitler and which characterized these measures as

“political housecleaning”. I recall this expression very clearly, even

without the aid of my notes.

COL. AMEN: In order that the record may be perfectly clear, exactly what

measures did Keitel say had already been agreed upon?

LAHOUSEN: According to the Chief of the OKW, the bombardment of Warsaw

and the shooting of the categories of people which I mentioned before

had been agreed upon already.

COL. AMEN: And what were they?

LAHOUSEN: Mainly the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy,

and, of course, the Jews.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said about possible cooperation with a

Ukrainian group?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was ordered by the Chief of the OKW, who stated that

he was transmitting a directive which he had apparently received from

Ribbentrop since he spoke of it in connection with the political plans

of the Foreign Minister, to instigate in the Galician Ukraine an

uprising aimed at the extermination of Jews and Poles.

COL. AMEN: At what point did Hitler and Jodl enter this meeting?

LAHOUSEN: Hitler and Jodl entered either after the discussions I have

just described or towards the conclusion of the whole discussion of this

subject, when Canaris had already begun his report on the situation in

the West; that is, on the news which had meanwhile come in on the

reaction of the French Army at the West Wall.

COL. AMEN: And what further discussions took place then?

LAHOUSEN: After this discussion in the private carriage of the Chief of

the OKW, Canaris left the coach and had another short talk with

Ribbentrop, who, returning to the subject of the Ukraine, told him once

more that the uprising should be so staged that all farms and dwellings

of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed.

COL. AMEN: Who said that?

LAHOUSEN: The Foreign Minister of that time, Ribbentrop, said that to

Canaris. I was standing next to him.

COL. AMEN: Is there any slightest doubt in your mind about that?

LAHOUSEN: No. I have not the slightest doubt about that. I remember with

particular clarity the somewhat new phrasing that “all farms and

dwellings should go up in flames”. Previously there had only been talk

of “liquidation” and “elimination.”

COL. AMEN: Was there any note in Canaris’ diary which helped to refresh

your recollection on that point also?

LAHOUSEN: No.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said on the subject of France?

LAHOUSEN: On the subject of France a discussion took place in the

carriage of the Chief of the OKW, in which Canaris described the

situation in the West on the basis of Abwehr reports, and said that in

his opinion a great attack was being prepared by the French in the

sector of Saarbrücken. Hitler, who had entered the room in the meantime,

intervened, took charge of the discussion, rejected in a lively manner

the opinion which Canaris had just expressed, and put forward arguments

which, looking back now, I must recognize as factually correct.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether, in the course of this conference,

Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?

LAHOUSEN: During the conversation, which was taking place in the private

coach of the Chief of the OKW, Ribbentrop was not present.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether at any time in the course of the

conferences Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?

LAHOUSEN: I repeat, in this discussion, which took place in the coach,

no.

COL. AMEN: For purposes of keeping the record straight, whenever you

have referred to the Chief of the OKW, you were referring to Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Was the Wehrmacht ever asked to furnish any assistance for

the Polish campaign?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did that undertaking have any special name?

LAHOUSEN: As is recorded in the diary of my division the name of this

undertaking which took place just before the Polish campaign, was

“Undertaking Himmler”.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the assistance

required?

LAHOUSEN: The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the

most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr.

A few days, or sometime before—I believe it was the middle of

August—the precise date can be found in the diary of the

division—Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II,

were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment, such as

identification cards and so on, for an Undertaking Himmler. This

request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was

kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the

Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I

believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned.

COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated?

LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that

it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on

which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings

without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler,

however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the

diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive

uniforms from us.

COL. AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the

Abwehr?

LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and

one day some man from the SS or the SD—the name is given in the

official war diary of the division—collected them.

COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how this Polish

material was to be used?

LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its

details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion

that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the

undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that.

COL. AMEN: Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what in fact had

happened?

LAHOUSEN: The actual course of events was the following: When the first

Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of Polish units on German

territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communiqué in his hand, and reading

it aloud, observed that now we knew why our uniforms had been needed. On

the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed

us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these

uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio

station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was

mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly General

Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had occurred

and what had happened—actually we could well imagine it, but we did not

know how it was carried out—I cannot even today say exactly what

happened.

COL. AMEN: Did you ever find out what happened to the men from the

concentration camps who wore the Polish uniforms and created the

incident?

LAHOUSEN: It is strange. This matter has always held my interest, and

even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters with an SS

Hauptsturmführer—he was a Viennese—in the hospital in which both of us

were staying, and I asked him for details on what had taken place. The

man—his name was Birckel—told me: “It is odd, that even our circles

heard of this matter only very much later, and then only by intimation.”

He added: “So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in

that action were put out of the way, that is, killed.” That was the last

I heard of this matter.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall attending a meeting in 1940 at which the name

of Weygand was under discussion?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you happen to recall the particular month in which this

discussion took place?

LAHOUSEN: The discussion took place in the winter of 1940, either in

November or December, as far as I recall. I have recorded the precise

date in my personal notes, with the knowledge and desire of Canaris.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, who was

present?

LAHOUSEN: The three divisional chiefs and the Chief of the Ausland

Division, Admiral Bürckner, were present nearly every day during the

daily conference on the situation.

COL. AMEN: What were you told at this meeting by Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: In this discussion Canaris revealed to us that already for

some considerable time Keitel had put pressure on him to arrange for the

elimination of the French Marshal, Weygand; and that naturally I—that

is my division—would be charged with the execution of this task.

COL. AMEN: When you say “elimination”, what do you mean?

LAHOUSEN: Killing.

COL. AMEN: What was Weygand doing at this time?

LAHOUSEN: Weygand was, so far as I recall, in North Africa at that time.

COL. AMEN: What was the reason given for attempting to kill Weygand?

LAHOUSEN: The reason given was the fear that Weygand together with the

unconquered part of the French Army might form a center of resistance in

North Africa. That, in the main, was the reason, as far as I remember

today; it may be that there were other contributing factors.

COL. AMEN: After you were so informed by Canaris, what else was said at

this meeting?

LAHOUSEN: This request which was first put to the military Abwehr so

openly and in such an undisguised form by a representative of the Armed

Forces, was decidedly and indignantly rejected by all those present. I,

myself, as the person most involved, since my division was expected to

carry out this task, indicated flatly before all present that I had not

the slightest intention of executing this order. My division and my

officers are prepared to fight but they are neither a murderers’

organization nor murderers.

COL. AMEN: What then did Canaris say?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris said: “Calm down. We’ll have a word together later,”

or something to that effect.

COL. AMEN: Did you then talk it over later with Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: When the other gentlemen had left the room, I spoke with

Canaris alone and he told me immediately: “It is quite obvious that this

order will not only not be carried out, but it will not even be

communicated to anybody else,” and that, in fact, happened.

COL. AMEN: Were you subsequently questioned as to whether you had

carried out this order?

LAHOUSEN: On one occasion when Canaris was reporting to Keitel, and I

was present, Keitel mentioned the subject to me, and asked me what had

happened or what had been done in this matter up to now. The date of

this incident was recorded in my notes, on Canaris’ suggestion and with

his knowledge.

COL. AMEN: What reply did you make to Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot, of course, recall my precise words, but one thing is

certain; I did not answer that I had no intention of carrying out this

order. That I could not tell him, and did not tell him; otherwise, I

would not be sitting here today. Probably, as in many similar cases, I

replied that it was very difficult but everything possible would be

done, or something of that sort. Naturally, I cannot recall my precise

words.

COL. AMEN: Incidentally, are you the only one of this intimate Canaris

group who is still alive today?

LAHOUSEN: I believe I am at least one of the very few. Possibly

Pieckenbrock is still alive; perhaps Bentivegni, who, however, did not

belong to the inner circle. Most of the others were liquidated as a

result of the events on July 20.

COL. AMEN: I have another subject to take up now. In 1941 did you attend

a conference at which General Reinecke was present?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Who was General Reinecke?

LAHOUSEN: General Reinecke was at that time Chief of the General

Wehrmacht Department, which was part of the OKW.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date of that meeting?

LAHOUSEN: It was roughly in the summer of 1941, shortly after the

beginning of the Russian campaign; approximately in July.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you

state exactly who was present at that conference?

LAHOUSEN: At this conference, which is also recorded in the notes taken

for Canaris, and in which I participated as his representative, the

following were present:

General Reinecke as the presiding officer, Obergruppenführer Müller of

the RSHA, Colonel Breuer representing the Prisoners of War Department,

and I, as the representative of Canaris, of Ausland-Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Müller was and why he was at this

meeting?

LAHOUSEN: Müller was a division chief in the Reich Central Office of

Security (RSHA), and took part in the session because he was responsible

for putting into practice the measures for the treatment of Russian

prisoners of war, that is, responsible for carrying out the executions.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Colonel Breuer was and why he was there?

LAHOUSEN: Colonel Breuer was the representative of the Prisoners of War

Department. I do not know of which organization this department was a

part at that time. At any rate, he was responsible in the OKW for

questions relating to prisoners of war.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of this conference?

LAHOUSEN: The purpose of this conference was to examine the orders

issued for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, to comment on

them, to explain and account for them on reasonable grounds.

COL. AMEN: Did you learn from the conversation at this conference what

the substance of these orders under discussion was?

LAHOUSEN: These orders dealt with two groups of measures which were to

be taken. Firstly, the killing of Russian commissars, and secondly, the

killing of all those elements among the Russian prisoners of war who,

under a special selection program of the SD, could be identified as

thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives of the Bolshevist

ideology.

COL. AMEN: Did you also learn from the conversation what the basis for

these orders was?

LAHOUSEN: The basis for these orders was explained by General Reinecke

in its outlines as follows:

The war between Germany and Russia is not a war between two states or

two armies, but between two ideologies—namely, the National Socialist

and the Bolshevist ideology. The Red Army soldier must not be looked

upon as a soldier in the sense of the word applying to our western

opponents, but as an ideological enemy. He must be regarded as the

archenemy of National Socialism, and must be treated accordingly.

COL. AMEN: Did Canaris tell you why he was selecting you to go to this

conference?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris gave me two or perhaps three reasons and motives for

ordering me to this conference although he himself was in Berlin.

Firstly, he wanted to avoid a meeting with Reinecke, for whom, as the

prototype of the ever-compliant National Socialist general, he possessed

strong personal dislike. Secondly, he told and directed me to attempt

through factual argument—that is, through appeals to reason—to have

this brutal and completely senseless order rescinded or at least

mitigated in its effects as far as possible. He also selected me for

tactical reasons since he, as department chief, could by no means be as

outspoken as I, who, thanks to my subordinate position, could use much

stronger language. Thirdly, he was well acquainted with my personal

attitude, especially in this question, an attitude which I manifested

wherever possible during my many journeys and trips to the front where I

witnessed ill-treatment of prisoners of war. This is also clearly

recorded in my notes.

COL. AMEN: Did Canaris and the other members of your group have a

particular name for Reinecke?

LAHOUSEN: Not only among our group but also in other circles, he was

known as the “little Keitel” or the “other Keitel”.

COL. AMEN: Prior to your going to this conference, did Canaris make any

other comment on these orders?

LAHOUSEN: Even at the time when these orders were issued, Canaris

expressed strong opposition to them in our circles—when I say our

circles, I mean mainly the divisional chiefs—and had a protest made

through the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. I no longer

remember whether it was made in writing or whether Bürckner made it

orally to Keitel directly; I think it was done in both ways. Bürckner

should be well informed about this.

COL. AMEN: When you say “protested through Bürckner,” what do you mean?

LAHOUSEN: When I say Bürckner, I mean his division, or a group, or

perhaps even a representative in his office, where questions of

international law were dealt with by Count Moltke who, incidentally,

also among the circle. . . .

COL. AMEN: Will you repeat that?

LAHOUSEN: This protest or this counter-argument on the question of the

treatment of Russian prisoners of war was forwarded by Canaris through

the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. The Ausland Division

included a section which dealt with questions of international law, and

the competent authority in that section was Count Moltke who was a

member of Oster’s inner circle, and who was executed after the 20th of

July.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Until 2 o’clock.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Amen.

[_Witness Lahousen resumed the stand._]

COL. AMEN: Prior to the luncheon recess you were testifying about a

conference in 1941 with Reinecke and others. Prior to that conference

did Canaris tell you what kind of appeal to make to those present at the

meeting?

LAHOUSEN: Before the discussion Canaris said, as I have already pointed

out, that I should use factual arguments in order to have this order

withdrawn or at least to weaken its effects, but that otherwise I should

not take it into my head to use arguments of a humanitarian nature lest

I make a fool of myself.

COL. AMEN: And now will you explain to the Tribunal, to the best of your

recollection, exactly what happened and what was said in the course of

that conference?

LAHOUSEN: The discussion was opened by General Reinecke, and he

explained these orders in the manner in which I described them before

the recess. He said that these measures were necessary and that it was

essential that this idea should also be made clear to the Wehrmacht, and

particularly to the officers’ corps, since they apparently were still

entertaining ideas which belonged to the Ice Age and not to the present

age of National Socialism.

COL. AMEN: What views did you present at this conference?

LAHOUSEN: According to instructions I held the view of the Amt Ausland

Abwehr—that is of Canaris—and in the main I pointed out, first of all,

the most unfavorable effect of such measures on the troops, namely on

the front troops, that they would never understand such orders,

particularly not the simple soldier. Besides, we had reports that the

executions were sometimes carried out before their eyes.

Secondly, I brought forward the objections of my office in regard to

activities of the office itself, the unfavorable effect of these

measures on the enemy, that is, the virtual hindering of Russians, who

were surrendering to the last man without resistance, from deserting;

and furthermore, the great difficulties which beset the Abwehr Division

in acquiring agents, that is, people who, for various reasons, had

voluntarily declared themselves ready to help the Germans.

COL. AMEN: In order that this may be clear on the record, because I

think there was quite a bit of confusion in the translation, I want to

point out one or two of those arguments again. What did you say at this

conference about the effect of the execution of these orders on Russian

soldiers?

LAHOUSEN: I pointed out, first of all, that through these orders some

elements among the Russian soldiers who were inclined to surrender were

prevented from doing so. Secondly, that people who for any reason would

have offered their services to the Abwehr would also be hindered by

these measures. And that, _in summa_, an effect opposite to that which

they had desired would result and the resistance of the Red Army

soldiers would be increased to the utmost.

COL. AMEN: And in order that we may be perfectly clear, what did you say

about the effect of the execution of these orders on the German troops?

LAHOUSEN: I said, that from several reports we had from the front, the

effect on the morale and on the discipline of the troops was

devastating.

COL. AMEN: Was there any discussion about international law at this

conference?

LAHOUSEN: No. In this connection there was no discussion of

international law. The manner of selection of the prisoners of war was

particularly stressed. It was completely arbitrary apart from the

general order in itself.

COL. AMEN: We will get to that in a moment. Were your views accepted at

this conference?

LAHOUSEN: My views which were the views of the Amt Abwehr, which I was

representing, were opposed in the sharpest possible manner by Müller,

who with the usual cliches rejected the arguments that I had produced,

and who made the sole concession that the executions, out of

consideration for the feelings of the troops, should not take place

before them but at a place some distance apart. He also made a few

concessions in the question of the selection, which was completely

arbitrary, and was just left to the Kommando leaders or to the prejudice

of the Kommando leaders.

COL. AMEN: And subsequent to this conference did you learn whether an

order was issued with respect to having these killings take place

outside the sight of the German troops?

LAHOUSEN: Except for Müller’s promise, which I have just mentioned, I

heard no more about it at the time. I found a confirmation of the

results of this conference and the promises then made to me in an order

which was submitted to me only now.

COL. AMEN: Was there a conversation at this conference about the manner

in which these orders for the killings were being executed?

LAHOUSEN: Yes. In the course of discussions the entire problem was under

discussion including the manner in which these orders were carried

out—according to my recollection—by the Einsatzkommandos of the SD.

These SD squads were in charge both of singling out of persons in camps

and in assembly centers for prisoners of war, and of carrying out the

executions.

Reinecke also discussed measures regarding the treatment of Russian

prisoners of war in the camps. Reinecke emphatically accepted the

arguments put forth, not by me but by Müller, and voiced his conviction

in very decisive and excessively sharp manner.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you explain to the Tribunal from what you learned

at this conference the exact manner in which the sorting of these

prisoners was made and in what way it was determined which of the

prisoners should be killed?

LAHOUSEN: The prisoners were sorted out by Kommandos of the SD and

according to peculiar and utterly arbitrary ways of procedure. Some of

the leaders of these Einsatzkommandos were guided by racial

considerations; particularly, of course, if someone were a Jew or of

Jewish type or could otherwise be classified as racially inferior, he

was picked for execution. Other leaders of the Einsatzkommando selected

people according to their intelligence. Some had views all of their own

and usually most peculiar, so that I felt compelled to ask Müller, “Tell

me, according to what principles does this selection take place? Do you

determine it by the height of a person or the size of his shoes?”

Müller was very emphatic in rejecting these and any other objections,

and Reinecke adopted rigidly the same point of view as Müller, instead

of accepting my opinions, that is, those of the Amt Ausland Abwehr,

which were offered him as a “golden bridge” for his acceptance. That was

essentially the contents of the discussion in which I participated.

COL. AMEN: And had you received knowledge about the manner in which

these orders were executed through official reports which you received?

LAHOUSEN: We were currently informed of all happenings by our officials

at the front or in the camps. Officers of the Abwehr Division III were

active in these camps, and in this way, that is, through the normal

service channels, we were informed by reports and oral presentation of

all these measures and of their effects.

COL. AMEN: Was the information which you received secret and

confidential information not open to others?

LAHOUSEN: The information was confidential in accordance with the manner

in which our offices were run. _De facto_, however, the happenings in

the camps and the occurrences taking place at the selections were known

to large groups of the Wehrmacht.

COL. AMEN: Now, at this conference did you learn anything from Reinecke

with respect to the treatment of Russian prisoners in prison camps?

LAHOUSEN: In this discussion the treatment of Russian prisoners in the

camps was discussed by Reinecke, and Reinecke was of the opinion that in

the camps their treatment must not be the same as the treatment of other

allied prisoners of war, but that here, too, appropriate and

discriminating measures must be applied. The camp guards, at all events,

had to be furnished with whips, and at the slightest sign of an

attempted escape or other undesirable act, the guards should have the

right to resort to arms.

COL. AMEN: Besides the whips, what other equipment were the Stalag

guards given?

LAHOUSEN: Those are details which I do not remember for the moment. I

can only say what was mentioned in this discussion.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Reinecke say about the whips?

LAHOUSEN: Reinecke said that the guards, that is, the guard details,

should make use of their whips or sticks or whatever instruments they

had.

COL. AMEN: Now, through official channels did you learn of an order for

the branding of Russian prisoners of war?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think you should refer to them as

“Soviet”, not “Russian” prisoners.

COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Honor.

[_Continuing the interrogation._] Did you learn of such an order?

LAHOUSEN: I have heard about it in one of the discussions at which most

of the previously mentioned divisional chiefs were usually present. At

least a majority of them must have been present.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether any protests were made with respect to

that order?

LAHOUSEN: When the intention of branding these Soviet prisoners was made

known, a very sharp protest was voiced at once by Canaris through the

Amt Ausland, that is, by Bürckner himself.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Canaris tell you with regard to this

order?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris told us that the question had already been expounded

in a medical opinion by some physicians; and that there were actually

people to lend themselves to treating such a mad subject in a written

medical opinion. That was the main topic of this discussion.

COL. Amen: What information, if any, did you receive through official

channels regarding plans to bring Soviet prisoners back to German

territory?

LAHOUSEN: In the same context and in the same circle—I must always

repeat it—that is, in discussions between Canaris and the chiefs of his

divisions I learned that the General Staff had prepared to bring Soviet

prisoners into Germany, but that their transportation was suddenly

abandoned. I remember that this was by direct order of Hitler—which

resulted in the conditions developing in camps in the theater of

operations where prisoners were crowded together, could not be fed, and

could not be adequately clothed or housed, so that epidemics and

cannibalism resulted in these camps.

COL. AMEN: I am not sure but what we missed some of your previous

answer. Will you start again to tell us about the change which was made

in these orders?

LAHOUSEN: Will you please repeat the question?

COL. AMEN: You referred to a change in the plans to take the Soviet

prisoners back to German territory. Is that correct?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were not brought back into Germany.

COL. AMEN: And what was the result of this action, namely of their not

being brought back at the direct order of Hitler?

LAHOUSEN: The result was as described just now.

COL. AMEN: But I want you to repeat it because we lost some of the

answer in the interpreting process. Please just repeat it again.

LAHOUSEN: The enormous crowds of prisoners of war remained in the

theater of operation, without proper care—care in the sense of prisoner

of war conventions—with regard to housing, food, medical care; and many

of them died on the bare floor. Epidemics broke out, and

cannibalism—human beings driven by hunger devouring one

another—manifested itself.

COL. AMEN: Were you personally at the front to observe these conditions?

LAHOUSEN: I made several trips with Canaris and I saw some of these

things which I have just described, with my own eyes. At the time I made

notes of my impressions which were found amongst my papers.

COL. AMEN: Did you also obtain information as to these matters through

official channels of the Abwehr?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I received this information through the office

subordinate to me and through the Amt Ausland.

COL. AMEN: From your official information, to what extent was the

Wehrmacht involved in the mistreatment of these prisoners?

LAHOUSEN: According to my information, the Wehrmacht was involved in all

matters which referred to prisoners of war, except the executions, which

were the concern of the Kommandos of the SD and the

Reichssicherheitshauptamt.

COL. AMEN: But is it not a fact that the prisoner-of-war camps were

entirely under the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, prisoners of war were under the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

COL. AMEN: But before they were placed in these camps, the Special

Purpose Kommandos of the SS were responsible primarily for the

executions and the selection of the people to be executed, is that

correct?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you receive through official channels information

regarding the existence of an order for the killing of British

Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: What action, if any, did Canaris or yourself take with

respect to this order?

LAHOUSEN: The order, and as far as I remember, even the mere intention

that such an order was to be issued, was discussed in our circle, that

is between Canaris and his section chiefs. We all, of course,

unanimously agreed on its rejection. The reasons, apart from the aspects

of international law, were that the Amt Ausland had under its command a

formation, which was attached to our section named “Regiment

Brandenburg” which had a task similar to the Commandos. As the head of

the section to which this regiment was attached and for which I

considered myself responsible, I immediately and most emphatically

protested against it in view of the retaliation measures which were to

be expected as a result of this order.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally assist in the drafting of these protests?

LAHOUSEN: I know that twice a protest was lodged against this order by

Canaris, and by Amt Ausland, through Bürckner. The first time orally, or

in writing as soon as the order was issued, and the second time after

the first executions had been carried out in pursuance of this order. I

myself helped to draft one of these written protests—I do not know

whether the first or the second—making a contribution in the interest

of my section, and the Regiment Brandenburg, whose functions were

similar, very similar, to those of the Commandos.

COL. AMEN: To whom in the ordinary course did these protests go?

LAHOUSEN: The protests were addressed to Canaris’ superior officer, that

is to say, to the Chief of the OKW.

COL. AMEN: Who was that?

LAHOUSEN: It was Keitel, at that time.

COL. AMEN: Did these protests in the ordinary course go also to Jodl?

LAHOUSEN: That I cannot say, but it is possible.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell the Tribunal what were the grounds of the

protests which you made?

LAHOUSEN: The grounds were above all, that it was contrary to the

interpretation of international law that soldiers, that is to say, not

agents or spies, but soldiers clearly recognizable as such, should be

killed after they had been taken prisoner. That was the main point which

was also of concern to my section since it also comprised soldiers who

had to carry out such or similar tasks in their capacity as soldiers.

COL. AMEN: Were there any other grounds urged in protest against these

orders?

LAHOUSEN: Certainly. Other reasons were also mentioned in accordance

with the interests of the different sections affected by these orders.

For the Amt Ausland, it was the point of view of international law. The

Abwehr Division III was particularly interested in the interrogation of

soldiers captured in commando raids, but never in seeing them killed.

COL. AMEN: Were there any other chiefs of the Abwehr Department who

assisted in the preparation of these protests?

LAHOUSEN: As far as I remember today, no.

COL. AMEN: You mentioned Admiral Bürckner, did you not?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, Bürckner was not the chief of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, but

only of the Amt Ausland.

COL. AMEN: Now, have you ever heard of an operation known as “Gustav”?

LAHOUSEN: The name “Gustav” was applied not to an operation but to an

undertaking similar to the one which was demanded for the elimination of

Marshal Weygand.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what was the meaning of “Gustav”?

LAHOUSEN: “Gustav” was the expression used by the Chief of the OKW as a

cover name to be used in conversations on the question of General

Giraud.

COL. AMEN: When you say the Chief of the OKW, are you referring to

Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And are you referring to General Giraud of the French Army?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, General Giraud of the French Army, who, according to my

recollection, fled from Königstein in 1942.

COL. AMEN: Do you know of any order issued with respect to General

Giraud?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Who issued such an order?

LAHOUSEN: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel, gave an order of this kind to

Canaris, not in writing but an oral order.

COL. AMEN: How did you come to know about this order?

LAHOUSEN: I knew of this order in the same way as certain other chiefs

of the sections, that is Bentivegni, Chief of Abwehr Section I,

Pieckenbrock and a few other officers. We all heard it at a discussion

with Canaris.

COL. AMEN: What was the substance of the order?

LAHOUSEN: The essential part of this order was to eliminate Giraud, in a

fashion similar to Weygand.

COL. AMEN: When you say “eliminate” what do you mean?

LAHOUSEN: I mean the same as in the case of Marshal Weygand, that is, it

was intended and ordered that he was to be killed.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date when this order was given

by Keitel to Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: This order was given to Canaris several times. I cannot say

for certain when it was given for the first time as I was not present in

person. It was probably after the flight of Giraud from Königstein and

prior to the attempt on the life of Heydrich, in Prague. According to my

notes, this subject was discussed with me by Keitel in July of the same

year, in the presence of Canaris.

COL. AMEN: Well now, what did Keitel first say to you personally about

this affair?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot repeat his exact words, but the meaning was that he

proclaimed the intention of having Giraud killed, and asked me, as in

the case of Weygand, how the matter was progressing or had progressed so

far.

COL. AMEN: And what did you say to him on that occasion?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the exact words. I probably gave some

evasive answer, or one that would permit gaining time.

COL. AMEN: Now, was this question later discussed by you at any time?

LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection, this question was once more

discussed in August. The exact date can be found in my notes. Canaris

telephoned me in my private apartment one evening and said impatiently

that Keitel was urging him again about Giraud, and the section chiefs

were to meet the next day on this question.

The next day the conference was held and Canaris repeated in this larger

circle what he had said to me over the phone the night before. That is,

he was being continually pressed by Keitel that something must at last

be done in this matter. Our attitude was the same as in the matter of

Weygand. All those present rejected flatly this new demand to initiate

and to carry out a murder. We mentioned our decision to Canaris, who

also was of the same opinion and Canaris thereupon went down to Keitel

in order to induce him to leave the Military Abwehr out of all such

matters and requested that, as agreed prior to this, such matters should

be left entirely to the SD.

In the meantime, while we were all there, I remember Pieckenbrock spoke,

and I remember every word he said. He said it was about time that Keitel

was told clearly that he should tell his Herr Hitler that we, the

Military Abwehr, were no murder organization like the SD or the SS.

After a short time, Canaris came back and said it was now quite clear

that he had convinced Keitel that we, the Military Abwehr, were to be

left out of such matters and further measures were to be left to the SD.

I must observe here and recall that Canaris had said to me, once this

order had been given, that the execution must be prevented at any cost.

He would take care of that and I was to support him.

COL. AMEN: I don’t think you have yet told us just who was present at

this conference.

LAHOUSEN: The three Abwehr chiefs were present, Colonel Pieckenbrock,

whom I have already mentioned, Colonel General Bentivegni, and I.

Probably, also General Oster, and possibly Bürckner, but I cannot

remember clearly. In my notes only those three chiefs are mentioned who

all strictly rejected the proposal.

COL. AMEN: What was the next occasion when this matter was again brought

to your attention?

LAHOUSEN: A little later, it must have been September, the exact date

has been recorded, Keitel, then chief of the OKW, rang me up in my

private apartment. He asked me, “What about ‘Gustav’? You know what I

mean by ‘Gustav’?” I said, “Yes, I know.” “How is the matter

progressing? I must know, it is very urgent.” I answered, “I have no

information on the subject. Canaris has reserved this matter for

himself, and Canaris is not here, he is in Paris.” Then came the order

from Keitel, or rather, before he gave the order, he put one more

question: “You know that the others are to carry out the order?” By “the

others,” he meant the SS and SD. I answered, “Yes, I know.” Then came an

order from Keitel to immediately inquire of Müller how the whole matter

was progressing. “I must know it immediately,” he said. I said, “Yes,”

but went at once to the office of the Ausland Abwehr, General Oster, and

informed him what had happened, and asked for his advice as to what was

to be done in this matter which was so extremely critical and difficult

for Canaris and me. I told him—Oster already knew as it was—that

Canaris so far had not breathed a word to the SD concerning what it was

to do, that is, murder Giraud. General Oster advised me to fly to Paris

immediately and to inform Canaris and to warn him. I flew the next day

to Paris and met Canaris at a hotel at dinner in a small circle, which

included Admiral Bürckner, and I told Canaris what had happened. Canaris

was horrified and amazed, and for a moment he saw no way out.

During the dinner Canaris asked me in the presence of Bürckner and two

other officers, that is, Colonel Rudolph, and another officer whose name

I have forgotten, as to the date when Giraud had fled from Königstein

and when the Abwehr III conference had been held in Prague and at what

time the assassination of Heydrich had taken place. I gave these dates,

which I did not know by memory, to Canaris. When he had the three dates,

he was visibly relieved, and his saddened countenance took on new life.

He was certainly relieved in every way. I must add that—at this

important conference of the Abwehr III Heydrich was present. It was a

meeting between Abwehr III and SD officials who were collaborating with

it—officials who were also in the counter-intelligence.

Canaris then based his whole plan on these three dates. His plan was to

attempt to show that at this conference he had passed on the order to

Heydrich, to carry out the action. That is to say, his plan was to

exploit Heydrich’s death to wreck the whole affair. The next day we flew

to Berlin, and Canaris reported to Keitel that the matter was taking its

course, and that Canaris had given Heydrich the necessary instructions

at the Abwehr III conference in Prague, and that Heydrich had prepared

everything, that is, a special purpose action had been started in order

to have Giraud murdered, and with that the matter was settled and

brought to ruin.

COL. AMEN: There was a mistake I think in the translation back a little

way. So if you don’t mind, will you please go back to where you first

referred to Heydrich in the conversation with Canaris, and repeat the

story, because I think that the translation was incorrect. In other

words, go back to the point where Canaris suddenly seemed relieved, and

started to tell you what the apparent solution might be.

LAHOUSEN: All those present saw that Canaris was much relieved, as he

heard the three dates from me. His whole plan or his maneuvering—and

that was typical of his personality—was a purely intellectual or

spiritual combination, built up on these three dates, essential being

the date of the escape of Giraud, and the Abwehr III conference, for if

the Abwehr III conference had taken place prior to Giraud’s escape, then

this combination would probably not have stood the test.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, what is the reason for the repetition?

COL. AMEN: There was a mistake in the record. If it is the wish of the

Tribunal, I shall not have him repeat it any further.

THE PRESIDENT: It seems clear to the Tribunal what was said.

COL. AMEN: Very well.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, happened next insofar as the affair Giraud

was concerned?

LAHOUSEN: Nothing more happened. Giraud fled to North Africa, and much

later only I heard that Hitler was very indignant about this escape, and

said that the SD had failed miserably—so it is said to be written in

shorthand notes in the records of the Hauptquartier of the Führer. The

man who told me this is in the American zone.

COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Colonel Rowehl?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Who was he?

LAHOUSEN: He was an officer. He was a colonel of the Luftwaffe.

COL. AMEN: What was the work of the special squadron to which he was

attached?

LAHOUSEN: Rowehl had a special squadron for altitude flying which

operated together with the Ausland Abwehr for the reconnaissance of

certain territories or states.

COL. AMEN: Were you ever present when he reported to Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: I was present occasionally.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Rowehl told Canaris on those occasions?

LAHOUSEN: He reported on the results of the reconnaissance flights and

submitted his photographs, I believe, to Abwehr I, Section Luft which,

competent for this work, made some evaluation of them.

COL. AMEN: Did you know over what territories these reconnaissance

flights had been made?

LAHOUSEN: They were taken over Poland, England and in southeastern

Europe; I cannot be more explicit as I do not know the specific

territories or countries of southeastern Europe. All I know is that this

squadron was stationed in Budapest for the purpose of making such

reconnoitering flights.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally see some of these photographs?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Now will you tell the Tribunal the dates when you know that

these reconnaissance flights over London and Leningrad were being made?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot give the exact dates. I only remember, being present

at discussions between Rowehl and Canaris—sometimes Pieckenbrock was

there too—that these reconnaissance flights did take place in the

aforementioned areas, that photographic material was furnished and that

the squadron operated from Hungarian air fields in the vicinity of

Budapest. I know this because once I myself flew back from Budapest to

Berlin in such a plane, and also from knowing some of the pilots and

their activities.

COL. AMEN: What I am going to ask you about now is the year, or years we

will say, when these reconnaissance flights were being made.

LAHOUSEN: They were undertaken in 1939 before the beginning of the

Polish campaign.

COL. AMEN: Were these flights kept secret?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course they were secret.

COL. AMEN: And why were these flights being made from Hungary, if you

know?

LAHOUSEN: A Luftwaffe expert would have to give this information.

COL. AMEN: Do you have in your possession a report of the treatment of

the Jews in certain territories?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have a report which probably came to us through Abwehr

Department III, and I made several copies for Canaris and one for

myself. This report deals with the shooting of Jews in Borrisov.

COL. AMEN: Is that an official report?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, it is. The report came by way of the Abwehr. The files

would show from what office it came to us. In connection with these

shootings of Jews in Borrisov the name of a counter-intelligence

officer, whom I knew quite well and who was an Austrian like me, was

mentioned.

COL. AMEN: Now, may it please the Tribunal, I should like to offer in

evidence a photostatic copy, or copies, of the entries made by the

witness in every detail, together with a photostatic copy of the report.

The originals are here in court, but cannot be lifted out of the box in

which they are contained. They are so much damaged by a bomb explosion

that if they were to be lifted out of the box, they would be destroyed

beyond use, but we have had them photostated, and the photostatic copies

are now available. That letter would be Exhibit USA-80, 3047-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand, Colonel Amen, that only such portions of

these documents as are read in Court will be in evidence?

COL. AMEN: Well, these have been used by the witness to refresh his

recollection.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they have.

COL. AMEN: And none of them have been read in full in court, but they

may be so read at any time, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want them to go into evidence as documents, you

must read them, of course. Colonel Amen, do you want to use the

documents any more than you already used them for the purpose of

refreshing the witness’ memory?

COL. AMEN: I do not, Sir, except having used them in this fashion, I now

think it is only fair to offer them in evidence for the information and

scrutiny of the Tribunal; as far as I’m concerned they have served their

purpose.

THE PRESIDENT: If the Defense wants to see them for the purpose of

cross-examination, of course, they may do so.

COL. AMEN: Oh, yes, Sir. I have offered them already Sir, to be Exhibit

USA-80, 3047-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: But otherwise they may not be put in evidence.

COL. AMEN: Correct.

THE PRESIDENT: From this damaged paper, it seems to contain a report on

the execution of Jews in Borrisov.

COL. AMEN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: That again will not be in evidence unless you read it.

COL. AMEN: Correct, Sir. We will include that in the offer which I just

made to you, that unless what we are offering is desired by the Court I

will not offer it in evidence or read it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Court does not desire it.

COL. AMEN: Very well. [_Turning to witness._] As a member of the Abwehr,

were you generally well informed on the plans of the German Reich for

the waging of war?

LAHOUSEN: Insofar as the effects of the plans concerned the preparatory

activities or co-operation of the Amt Ausland Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: Did any intelligence information ever come to your attention

which was not available to an ordinary person, or to an ordinary officer

in the Army?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, certainly. That was in the nature of my office.

COL. AMEN: And, on the basis of the knowledge which you so obtained, did

you in your group come to any decisions as to whether or not the attack

on Poland, for example, was an unprovoked act of aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: Well. . . .

LAHOUSEN: Would you be kind enough to repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: That is one principal question which this Court has to

decide. You cannot produce evidence upon a question which is within the

province of the Court to decide.

COL. AMEN: Very well, Sir. The witness is now available for

cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it the Soviet Prosecutor’s wish to ask any questions

of this witness? General Rudenko?

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Witness

Lahousen, you have made definite replies to questions by Colonel Amen

and I should like to have certain details. Am I to understand you

rightly that the insurgent units of the Ukrainian nationalists were

organized under the direction of the German High Command?

LAHOUSEN: They were Ukrainian immigrants from Galicia.

GEN. RUDENKO: And from these immigrants were formed Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: Yes. “Commando” perhaps is not quite the right expression.

They were people who were brought together in camps and were given a

military or a semi-military training.

GEN. RUDENKO: What was the function of these Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: They were organizations of immigrants from the Galicia

Ukraine, as I already previously stated, who worked together with the

Amt Ausland Abwehr.

GEN. RUDENKO: What were these troops supposed actually to accomplish?

LAHOUSEN: Tasks were assigned to them before each combat by the office

in charge of the command, that is, in the case of orders originating

from the office to which I belonged, they were determined by the OKW.

GEN. RUDENKO: What functions did these groups have?

LAHOUSEN: These Commandos were to carry out sabotage of all kinds behind

the enemy’s front line.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is to say in what territory?

LAHOUSEN: In those territories with which Germany had entered into war,

or speaking of the concrete case here in question, with Poland, or to be

more correct in Poland.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course in Poland. Well, sabotage and what else?

LAHOUSEN: Sabotage, such as wrecking of bridges and other objectives of

military importance. The Wehrmacht operational staff determined what was

of military importance; details of that activity I have just described,

namely, destruction of militarily important objectives or objectives

important for a particular operation.

GEN. RUDENKO: But what about terroristic activities? I am asking you

about the terroristic activities of these units.

LAHOUSEN: Political tasks were not assigned to them by us, that is, by

the Amt Ausland Abwehr. Political assignments were made by the

respective Reich offices responsible, where it should be said, often as

a result of erroneous. . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: You have misunderstood me. You are speaking about sabotage

and I was asking you concerning terroristic acts of these organizations.

Do you understand me? Was terror one of their tasks? Let me repeat

again, as well as the sabotage acts, were there any terror acts assigned

to them?

LAHOUSEN: On our part never.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have told me that from your side there was no question

of terrorism; from whose side was the question put, who worked on this

aspect?

LAHOUSEN: Well, that was the whole point all the time. Each one of these

military Abwehr units was asked again and again to combine our purely

military tasks which were determined by the needs of the Wehrmacht

leadership with political or terroristic measures, as is clearly shown

by the memorandum on our files concerning preparation of the campaign

against Poland.

GEN. RUDENKO: Answering the question of Colonel Amen as to whether the

Red Army man was looked upon as an ideological enemy and was subjected

to corresponding measures, what do you mean by corresponding measures? I

repeat the question. You have said that the Red Army man was looked upon

by you, I mean by the German High Command as an ideological enemy and

was to be subjected to corresponding measures. What does it mean? What

do you mean by saying corresponding measures?

LAHOUSEN: By special measures I mean quite clearly all those brutal

methods which were actually used and which I have already mentioned and

of which I am convinced there were many more, more than I could possibly

have seen in my restricted field and more than was known to me.

GEN. RUDENKO: You already told the Tribunal that there were special

Commandos for the screening of prisoners of war. I understand that they

were screened in the following way: Into those who were to be killed and

the others who were to be interned in camps, is that right?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, these special Commandos of the SD were concerned,

however, solely with the execution of those selected amongst the

prisoners of war.

GEN. RUDENKO: That of course makes the chief of the Commandos

responsible and decisive for the question as to who was to die and who

was not to die.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, in the course of a discussion with Reinecke, the question

was raised whether to give to the head of one such Commando unit the

right to decide who, in view of the order, was to be looked upon as

Bolshevistically tainted or not.

GEN. RUDENKO: And the chief of the Commando unit decided upon his own

authority, what to do with them.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, at least up to the date of the discussion in which I

participated, upon an order from Canaris. This point was one of the most

important ones of this discussion.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have told us about your protest and the protest of

Canaris against these atrocities, killings, and so forth. What were the

results of these protests?

LAHOUSEN: As I have already stated, there were some very modest results,

so modest that, you can hardly call them results at all. For the fact

that executions were not to take place in sight of the troops but only

at a distance of 500 meters can in no way be called a good result.

GEN. RUDENKO: What conversation did you have with Müller on this

subject, concerning concessions he had made? You told us when you were

asked by General Alexandrov. . . .

LAHOUSEN: Who was Alexandrov?

GEN. RUDENKO: You were questioned by Colonel Rosenblith, a

representative of the Soviet Delegation. I am sorry I made a mistake.

Perhaps you will remember your communication to Colonel Rosenblith

regarding the conversation and the concessions that Müller made. I shall

ask you to tell us that part again.

LAHOUSEN: The name of Alexandrov does not mean anything to me. What has

the name Alexandrov to do in this connection?

GEN. RUDENKO: Alexandrov was a mistake on my part. Forget it. I am

interested in the question of Müller, concerning the shootings,

torturings, and so forth.

LAHOUSEN: I had a long conversation with Müller, especially with regard

to making the selections. I cited, to be concrete, as an example of the

methods used, the case of the Crimean Tartars, Soviet Russian soldiers

who, according to their nationality, originated from the Crimea; and

cases where, for certain reasons, Mohammedan people were declared Jews,

and were then executed. Thus, aside from the brutality of these and all

other similar measures, this proved the entirely irrational point of

view, incomprehensible to any normal person, which characterized the

handling of the entire matter. To that, among other things, I made

reference.

GEN. RUDENKO: You told us how these measures were carried out.

THE PRESIDENT: He doesn’t hear you, carry on but go a little bit more

slowly.

GEN. RUDENKO: Have you finished your report concerning the conversation

with Müller?

LAHOUSEN: No, I didn’t quite finish, I had many discussions with Müller

on the subject—it was the central point of all these conversations. All

the subjects about which I have given evidence were discussed first with

Müller, who was the competent man, at least in his sector. As for

Reinecke, he then merely decided according to his ideas, which were

contrary to those held by me and my office. I would be grateful if you

would tell me what particular points you would like to have me explain

and I would gladly repeat anything.

GEN. RUDENKO: Your usual topic of discussion was murders, shootings, and

so forth, especially shootings. I am interested in all that. What did

Müller say about it? How were shootings to take place, especially in

relation to your protests?

LAHOUSEN: He told me in a rather cynical way, that if the troops were so

terribly disturbed by these shootings, as you claim, and their morale is

suffering therefrom the shootings would simply take place at some

distance, et cetera. That was the main meaning of what he said.

GEN. RUDENKO: That was the result of your protests?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, that was the very poor result of the protest, and then

still a certain concession. . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question. The conditions of the concentration

camps where Soviet prisoners were taken and where mass destruction of

prisoners was committed was all this dependent on directives of the

German High Command?

LAHOUSEN: In some sort of cooperation with the competent authorities,

the Reich Main Security Office. In addition to all I have stated, I must

point out that at the time, I myself did not read the orders and that I

learned of the collaboration, or the coordination in this question

mainly from the conversation with Reinecke, who came to me as a

representative of the OKW and with the aforementioned Müller.

GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me, did you get that information in private or

official sessions or conversations?

LAHOUSEN: It was a strictly official meeting called by General Reinecke

as chairman. I was not there as “Lahousen,” but as a representative of

the Amt Ausland Abwehr.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did the orders which were passed on in these sessions come

to you directly from the German High Command?

LAHOUSEN: They came from the German High Command and from one of the

highest offices of the RSHA according to what Reinecke said. I have

never seen or read them with my own eyes, therefore this is all I can

state.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you have heard during these meetings where they were

discussed and when they were discussed.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, during the discussion, the course of which I have already

described, or at least its essential aspects, of course.

GEN. RUDENKO: And during these sessions which you mentioned were the

questions raised about murders and burning of cities?

LAHOUSEN: There was no talk at these discussions about setting on fire,

but mention was made of the orders which had been issued with respect to

the prisoners.

GEN. RUDENKO: About the murders only.

LAHOUSEN: About the executions.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

MR. DUBOST: One single question. Who gave the orders for the liquidation

of the Commandos?

LAHOUSEN: What was it exactly that you meant? Presumably the killing of

members of the Commando troops?

MR. DUBOST: Who gave the orders for the execution?

LAHOUSEN: I did not read the order myself, but according to what was

said in our circles about this subject, the idea came from Hitler

himself; but who was responsible for transforming this idea into an

order, I do not know.

MR. DUBOST: The Defendants Keitel, Jodl—what orders did they handle;

what orders did they give?

LAHOUSEN: I cannot say that because I do not know it.

MR. DUBOST: What were the reasons for these orders, as far as you know?

LAHOUSEN: Not merely was it my opinion, but it was common knowledge,

that the reasons for these orders were to cause an intimidating effect

and thus to prevent and paralyze the activity of the Commandos.

MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to have General Giraud executed or

murdered?

LAHOUSEN: I did not hear the first part of the question.

MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to kill Weygand and Giraud?

LAHOUSEN: The order to liquidate, that is, to be explicit, to murder

Weygand and Giraud, was given to me by Canaris, who received it from

Keitel. This order and this intention regarding the matter Weygand, were

furthermore transmitted to me through direct speech with Keitel. Keitel

asked me after Canaris had read to him a report in my presence, on

December 23, 1940, according to my notes, about the progress in the case

Weygand.

As regards the second case, that is the case Giraud, I had it from

Canaris himself that the order was sent to him by Keitel—as did also

the other chiefs who were present. I further heard of it a second time

during a report from Canaris to Keitel, in my presence, in July 1942,

when this order was communicated to me in a manner similar to that of

the case Weygand, and, finally, I received it in a direct manner from

Keitel through telephone conversation which I described here, and

transmitted as urgent intelligence.

[_The British Prosecutor indicated that he had no questions._]

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask any questions, Dr. Nelte?

DR. NELTE: The witness, Lahousen, has given very important evidence,

particularly charging in a grave manner the Defendant Keitel,

represented by me. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to make a speech now?

DR. NELTE: My client, the Defendant Keitel, would like to put numerous

questions to the witness after he has had a discussion with me. I

therefore ask the Tribunal to allow either that there may be a

considerable adjournment now or that at the next session these questions

may be discussed in cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. You shall have an opportunity to cross-examine

at 10 o’clock tomorrow. Does any member of the Tribunal wish to ask any

questions of the witness now?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I should like to ask the witness whether the

orders to kill the Russians and in connection therewith the treatment of

the prisoners were in writing.

LAHOUSEN: As far as I know, yes, but I did not see or read these orders

myself.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they official orders?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were official orders, of course, though the facts

were brought out in a roundabout way. It was these orders which Reinecke

and the others discussed and this is how I learned about the essential

points of these orders. I did not read them myself at that time. But I

knew that they were not oral agreements because they were commented

upon; consequently I knew that something existed in writing. Only I

could not and cannot say whether there were one or more orders, and who

signed them. This I did not claim to know. I submitted my knowledge

which is based solely on discussions and reports from which I quite

clearly could deduct the existence of orders.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know to whom or to what organizations

such orders were usually addressed?

LAHOUSEN: Orders of this kind, involving the question of principle, went

to the OKW, because things relating to prisoners of war were and had to

be the concern of the OKW, and in particular of Reinecke, which also

explains the discussions with Reinecke.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So usually the members or some of the members

of the General Staff would have known of such orders, would they not?

LAHOUSEN: Certainly, many members of the Wehrmacht knew of the essential

contents of this order, for the reaction of the Wehrmacht against this

order was tremendous. Apart from official discussions which I have

reported here, these orders were discussed a great deal in casino clubs

and elsewhere, because all these matters became manifest in the most

undesirable form and had a most undesirable effect on the troops. As a

matter of fact, officers, and high-ranking officers at the front, either

did not transmit these orders or sought to evade them in some way and

this was discussed a great deal. I have named some of these officers;

some are listed in the notes, diary, _et cetera_. It was not an everyday

occurrence, and it was then the topic of the day.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And were the orders known to the leaders of

the SA and SD?

LAHOUSEN: They must have been known to them, for the ordinary soldiers

who watched all these proceedings knew and spoke about them. To a

certain extent they were even known to the civilian populace; civilians

learned far more details about these matters from wounded soldiers

returning from the front than I could tell here.

THE PRESIDENT: General Nikitchenko wants to ask a question.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko): You have told us that

you received instructions about the murder of prisoners of war and

brutal treatment. You received these orders from Reinecke?

LAHOUSEN: Well, I must correct something that I said. It is not I and

not the Amt Ausland Abwehr who got the order, because we had nothing to

do with it, but I knew about it, as I was present at this conference as

a representative of the Amt Ausland Abwehr. But we ourselves had nothing

to do with the treatment of prisoners of war, and certainly not in this

negative sense.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Apart from these meetings, the meetings

of the High Command, were such instructions ever given? Were there any

meetings of the High Command headquarters about killings and

ill-treatment of prisoners of war?

LAHOUSEN: There certainly must have been a number of discussions on this

subject, but I was present at only one of them, which I have already

described, so I cannot say anything more about it.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At headquarters?

LAHOUSEN: In the OKW—at headquarters.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At the headquarters of the German Army?

LAHOUSEN: Certainly in the OKW where Amt Ausland Abwehr had sent a

delegate in my person, if for no other reason than to enter protest. As

a matter of fact our Amt had nothing to do with prisoners of war in this

sense. But contrarywise we were, because of technical and easily

understandable reasons, interested in proper treatment of the prisoners.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The meetings were not about good

treatment of prisoners, but rather about ill-treatment and killing them?

Was Ribbentrop also present at these meetings?

LAHOUSEN: No! On no account. This discussion—I mean the one conference

about which I have given testimony—took place after the accomplished

fact. Everything had already happened; executions had taken place, and

now effects began to make themselves felt. Protests of all kinds, from

the front and from other places, such as, for example, our own office,

Amt Ausland Abwehr, followed. This conference was intended to show the

necessity for the orders which had already been given, and to justify

measures already taken. These discussions took place after the beginning

of the operations, after the orders which had been given had already

been carried out, and all that I have touched upon or stated had already

happened and produced its evil effects. The accomplished fact had been

thoroughly discussed with the idea of making one more attempt, a last

attempt on our part, to put to an end, and break off, the matter.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did all these conversations bring about

results?

LAHOUSEN: That is what I talked about, and that was the subject of the

discussions with Reinecke in which I took part. I did not take part in

the other discussions and therefore can say nothing about them.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At which other meetings had orders been

given about killings of Ukrainians and burning of towns and villages in

Galicia?

LAHOUSEN: I would like to achieve clarity relative to what the General

has in mind. Am I being asked about the conference in the Führer’s train

in 1939 prior to the fall of Warsaw? According to the entries in

Canaris’ diary, it took place on 12 September 1939. This order or

directive which Ribbentrop issued and which Keitel transmitted to

Canaris, Ribbentrop also giving it to Canaris during a brief discussion,

was in reference to the organizations of National Ukrainians with which

Amt Abwehr cooperated along military lines, and which were to bring

about an uprising in Poland, an uprising which aimed to exterminate the

Poles and the Jews; that is to say, above all, such elements as were

always being discussed in these conferences. When Poles are mentioned,

the intelligentsia especially are meant, and all those persons who

embodied the national will of resistance. This was the order given to

Canaris in the connection I have already described and as it has already

been noted in the memorandum. The idea was not to kill Ukrainians but,

on the contrary, to carry out this task of a purely political and

terroristic nature together with the Ukrainians. The cooperation between

Amt Ausland Abwehr and these people who numbered only about 500 or 1000,

and what actually occurred can be clearly seen from the diary. This was

simply a preparation for military sabotage.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): These instructions were received from

Ribbentrop and Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop. Such orders which concerned

political aims couldn’t possibly come from Amt Ausland Abwehr because

any. . . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you whether they could

or could not. I am asking you where they came from.

LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop, as is seen from the memorandum.

This is the memorandum that I made for Canaris.

DR. DIX: I have three short questions. May I put them?

THE PRESIDENT: It is now past 4, and we have to hear the requests of the

Defendant Hess, and the Court has to be cleared for them. So I think you

had better postpone them until tomorrow.

[_A recess was taken and all defendants except Hess were removed from the

courtroom._]

THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the Defendant Hess.

DR. GÜNTHER VON ROHRSCHEIDT (Counsel for Defendant Hess): May it please

the Tribunal, I am speaking as counsel for the Defendant Rudolf Hess.

In the proceedings which have already been opened against Hess, the

Court is to decide solely the question whether the defendant is fit or

unfit to be heard, and further, whether he might even be considered

entirely irresponsible.

The Court itself has posed this question affecting the proceedings

against Hess by asking the experts to state their opinion, firstly, on

whether the defendant is in a position to plead on the charge; secondly,

on his state of mind, whether he is mentally sound or not.

With regard to question 1 (Is the defendant in a position to plead?) the

Tribunal asked the experts specifically whether the defendant is

sufficiently in possession of his mental faculties to understand the

proceedings and to conduct his defense adequately—that is, to repudiate

a witness to whom he has objections and to understand details of the

evidence.

The experts to whom this task was entrusted have, in separate groups,

examined Hess for a few days and have stated their expert opinion on

these questions in writing. As the defendant’s counsel I consider it my

duty, after studying the reports of these experts, which unfortunately,

I could not do as carefully as I desired since time was short, and in

view of my knowledge of the defendant and my experience in almost daily

contact with him, to state my opinion that the defendant Hess is not in

a position to plead in the case against him.

I am therefore obliged to file the following applications on behalf of

the Defendant Hess:

Firstly, I request a ruling to suspend the proceedings against Hess

temporarily. Secondly, if his inability to plead is recognized by the

Tribunal, I request that the proceedings against the defendant be not

conducted in his absence. Thirdly, if the Tribunal rules that Hess is

fit to plead, I request that in addition other competent psychiatrists

be consulted for an authoritative opinion.

Before I come to the reasons for my applications, I should like to say,

at the request of the defendant, that he himself considers he is fit to

plead and would himself like to inform the Court to that effect.

May I now state the reasons for my application:

In regard to my first application: If the defendant is not fit to plead,

I request that the proceedings against Hess be temporarily suspended.

In this connection may I refer to the opinions already submitted to the

Tribunal.

After examining the questions placed before them by the Tribunal, the

experts have come to the conclusion which is embodied in what I may call

the main report signed by a mixed delegation consisting as far as I

could determine of English, Soviet, and American experts, and dated 14

November 1945.

This report states, I quote: “The ability of the Defendant Hess is

impaired”—that is—“the ability to defend himself, to face a witness,

and to understand details of the evidence.” I have cited this part of

the report because it is closest to the questions put to the experts by

the Tribunal.

Another opinion says that “. . . even if Hess’ amnesia does not prevent

the defendant from understanding what happens around him and to follow

the proceedings in Court. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: Would you speak a little more slowly? The

interpreters are not able to interpret so fast.

Would you also refer us expressly to those parts of the medical reports

to which you wish to draw our attention?

Do you understand what I said?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes. I am sorry I cannot refer to the pages of the

original or English text, as I only have the German translation; so I

can only say that the first quotation. . . .

THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: You can read the words in German, and

they will be translated into English.

Which report are you referring to?

DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I was referring to the report of 14 November as far

as I can see from my German translation. This report seems to have been

drawn up by a delegation of English, Soviet, and American experts, and

accompanied the report of 17 November 1945. What I quoted was the

following—may I repeat:

“The ability of the Defendant Hess to defend himself, to face a

witness, and to understand details of the evidence is impaired.”