living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the
German position with a good future can be attained, either by
way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal
commerce and industry.
“Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National
Socialist State policy, which is the basis”—that is the basis
of autarchy—“Assuming this can be achieved the results are as
follows:
“A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total
autarchy can be attained:
“1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw
materials, autarchy is feasible.
“2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult.
Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by
ourselves. Copper and tin, however, cannot.
“3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as
sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not
possible.
“4. Edible fats—possible.
“B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be
answered with a definite capital NO.
“The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 to
40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the
demand and an increase of personal consumption among the
producers, the farmers themselves. The proceeds from the
production increase in agriculture have been used for covering
the increased demand, therefore they represent no actual
increase in production. A further increase in production by
making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it
already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of
artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even
with the greatest possible increase in production, participation
in the world market could not be avoided.”
I interpolate, that if I understand him he means by that, “no autarchy;
we must participate in world trade and commerce.”
“The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food
by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases
catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The
possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the
increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births
would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the
child is a greater bread eater than the adult.
“Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by
lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is
impossible in a continent which has developed an approximately
equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the
unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power
of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home
production will be possible, but not a wholesale alteration of
the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes
impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies, as well
as generally.
“Participation in world economy: There are limits to this which
we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuation would be an
obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position;
international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee
for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that
since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken
place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a
period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies,
again approaches the condition which originally motivated
colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis
of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive
Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have
special difficulties in expanding economically.
“The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy,
due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis
for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by
the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a
pronounced military weakness in those states which base their
existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out
over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more
a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign
currency and this explains the great weakness of our food
situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear
imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor
which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states
and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency
finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the
security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the
space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we
will not copy liberal capitalistic policies which rely on
exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but
of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more
to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in
Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this
solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two
generations. What would be required at a later date over and
above this must be left to subsequent generations. The
development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a
slow process and the German people, with its strong racial
root”—I interpolate, there is that German word “Rassekern”
again (the racial root)—“has for this purpose the most
favorable foundations in the heart of the European continent.
The history of all times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has
proved that, every space, expansion can only be effected by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found
without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the
proprietor.”
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, after the somewhat jumbled
discussion which I have just read of geopolitical economic theory and of
the need for expansion and Lebensraum, Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach
notes, posed this question—and I quote:
“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible
conquest could be made at lowest cost.
“German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies,
England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the
center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would
oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and
overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of
all parties. Both countries would view the building of German
military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas
communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and
retroactively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.
“England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial
possessions to us, owing to the resistance which she experiences
in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has
suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian
ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected.
Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the
readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies
which at the present moment are not in British hands, for
example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same
nature.
“A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us
could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of
emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The
Führer does not share the opinion that the Empire is
unshakeable.”—Meaning, I take it, the British Empire.—
“Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered
territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and
the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard
to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a
serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which
originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into
all states, made it possible for the ancient Germans to
subjugate ancient Rome.
“Alongside the British Empire today a number of states exist
which are stronger than it. The British mother country is able
to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states
and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example,
defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern
interests against an attack by Japan?
“The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire
unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot
be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are
significant pointers in this respect:
“(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.
“(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half
measures, left the door open for Indians, at a later date, to
utilize the non-fulfilment of constitutional promises as a
weapon against Britain.
“(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by
Japan.
“(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by
virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a
genius—expands its power position and must consequently
infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome
of the Abyssinian war is a loss of prestige for Britain which
Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in
the Mohammedan world.
“It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be
held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in
spite of all the solidity of their ideals. The proportion of the
populations in the Empire, compared with that of the motherland,
is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we
expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population
to become too low.”
I take it he meant by that: “Keep the population of occupied territories
low in comparison with ours.”
“France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The
French Empire is better placed geographically; the population of
its colonial possessions represents a potential military
increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal
politics. In the life of the nations, parliamentary governments
ruled only 10 per cent of the time, approximately; whereas,
totalitarian governments ruled 90 per cent of the time.
Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political
consideration as power factors:
“Britain, France, Russia, and the adjoining smaller states.
“The German question can be solved only by way of force, and
this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great
for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had
been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870
had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place
the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the
following expositions, then we are left to reply to the
questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide
upon three different cases.”
I interpolate: The Tribunal will recall the specific allegation in the
Indictment that at this meeting there emerged three different plans, any
of which might be utilized.
“Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change
for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are
practically concluded.”
I remind the Tribunal that this meeting was on 5 November 1937, but he
is contemplating the period 1943-45.
“Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further
delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In
particular, the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be
safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the
current recruiting age groups and an addition from older
untrained groups would be no longer available.
“In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried
out at that time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative
power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the
absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis,
for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary
foreign currency. This must be considered a point of weakness in
the regime. Over and above that, the world will anticipate our
action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other
nations isolate themselves, we should be forced on the
offensive.
“What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45, no one
knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.
“On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for
securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its
leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the
standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no
other choice but to act. If the Führer is still living, then it
will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space
problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before
1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.
“Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an
internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the
French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war
against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia
has come.
“Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against
Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against
another state that it cannot proceed against Germany.
“For the improvement of our military political position it must
be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to
conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to
remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance
westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly
be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on
the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to
participate in the war will increase proportionally to the
degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation
could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards
the north or the west.
“Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier,
Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland
in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon.
Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as
Germany’s strength remains unshakable; should Germany have any
setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps
also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.
“Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a
planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the
behavior of France, England, Poland, and Russia would probably
have to be judged in the following manner:
“The Führer believes personally, that in all probability England
and perhaps also France, have already silently written off
Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that
this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The
difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being
entangled in another long, drawn-out European war, would be
decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a war
against Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain
without influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France,
without British support, is hardly probable, assuming that its
offensive would stagnate along our western fortifications.
Without England’s support it would also not be necessary to take
into consideration a march by France through Belgium and
Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us
in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would
have, as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally,
we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the
operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It
must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s
defense measures will increase in strength from year to year and
that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army
will also be effected in the course of years. Although the
population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin
one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would
nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5 to 6 million
people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million
from Czechoslovakia, and of 1 million from Austria could be
carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany,
militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable
relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of
fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of
reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about 12
divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.
“No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on
the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would
be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend
largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.
“The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s
attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war
against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.
“Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed
of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be
taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.
“Should case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a civil
war—then the situation should be utilized at any time for
operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous
enemy would be eliminated.
“The Führer sees case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from
the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur,
he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even
as early as 1938.
“Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the
war in Spain, the Führer does not see an early end to
hostilities there.
“Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives
by Franco,”—the English text says “France”; it means
“Franco”—“a further 3 years’ duration of war is within the
bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point
of view, a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we
are more interested in a continuation of the war and
preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco
be in sole possession of the Spanish peninsula, it would mean
the end of Italian intervention and of the presence of Italy in
the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards
continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future
policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the
Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions
in the Balearic Isles cannot be tolerated either by France or by
England and could lead to a war by France and England against
Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in White (that is,
Franco’s) hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s
enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very
unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via
Germany. The Führer believes that Italy’s military strategy
would be to remain on the defensive against France on the
western frontier and carry out operations against France from
Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions.
“As a landing of French and British troops on the Italian coast
can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to
upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably
stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines
of communication by the Italian fleet will, to a great extent,
paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa
to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany,
France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan
fighting forces.”
There again I think that must be a defective English translation.
“French lines of communication by the Italian fleet,” must mean “fresh
lines,” or something in that connection.
“If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the
Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must
be assumed that England, being at war with Italy, would not
decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British
support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be
anticipated.
“The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be
made depending upon the course of the Italian-French-English war
and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military
operations by these three States. The Führer was also not
thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete
independence and by exploiting this unique favorable
opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against
Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take
place with the speed of lightning.”—The German words are
“blitzartig schnell.”
“Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch, in
giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out
that we should not run the risk that England and France become
our enemies:
“They stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French
Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to
commence operations on our western frontier with superior
forces. Generaloberst Von Fritsch estimated the French forces
which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier
against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a
strong French superiority would still remain on our western
frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning,
attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the
lead which France has in mobilization and, quite apart from the
very small value of our then-existing fortifications, which was
pointed out particularly by General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg;
the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the
West would be more or less incapable of movement.
“With regard to our offensive in a southeasterly direction,
Feldmarschall Von Blomberg drew special attention to the
strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of
which had assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which
would present extreme difficulties to our attack.
“Generaloberst Von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of
a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the
possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia,
with special consideration of the conquest of the
Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also
stated that, owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have
to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10
November. This intention was countermanded by the Führer, who
gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to
be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by
General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch
regarding England and France’s attitude, the Führer repeated his
previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain’s
non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in
military action by France against Germany. Should the
Mediterranean conflict, already mentioned, lead to a general
mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence
operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the
powers who are not participating in the war should declare their
disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have
to side with this attitude.
“In view of the information given by the Führer, Generaloberst
Göring considered it imperative to think of a reduction of our
military undertaking in Spain. The Führer agreed to this,
insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a
suitable date.
“The second part of the discussion concerned material armament
questions. (Signed) Hossbach.”—There are other notations.
In this connection I invite the Court’s attention to the allegation in
Paragraph 3 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment; Page 7 of the
printed English text, relating to a meeting of an influential group of
Nazi conspirators on 5 November 1937. The document just introduced and
read in evidence gives the specific evidentiary support for that
allegation.
The record of what happened thereafter is well known to history. The
Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred
in March 1938. We shall give you detailed evidence concerning that in
due course. So will we as to details of the aggression against
Czechoslovakia, including the pressure on Czechoslovakia that resulted
in the Munich Pact of September 1938, and the violation of that Pact
itself by Germany, on 15 March 1939. There is much of interest in the
secret documents relating to those aggressions.
At this point, however, I desire to bring to the attention of the
Tribunal one more captured document, which reveals in all its nakedness
the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggression against
Czechoslovakia. This document consists of a file, a file kept by Colonel
Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. The file was found by one of the units of
the 327th Glider Infantry, in a cellar of the Platterhof, Obersalzberg,
near Berchtesgaden. The file represents a work-file of originals and
duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of
Czechoslovakia. I should like to ask the Tribunal to examine
particularly the photostat of the original German of this file. We have
copies of those photostats. Something in physical form is lost in
transcribing a translation. The picture of the original file, including
photographs of the telegrams, gives a sense of the reality of the
evidence that is lost in the transcribed translation. The file is
Document Number 388-PS, in our numbered series of documents. I have here
the original file, as found.
I thought perhaps I might read the German title. It is “Chefsache Fall
Grün,” that is the main plan for “Case Green,” “Green” being a code word
for the aggression against Czechoslovakia.
I offer the entire file in evidence as Exhibit USA-26 and will ask that
photostats be passed to the Court. I offer the file, if the Tribunal
please, with, of course, the understanding and realization that only
such parts of it as I read will immediately go into evidence; but we
shall refer to other parts from time to time later, in the presentation
of the case. The material in this file will be dealt with in greater
detail at a later point in my presentation. However, at this point, I
desire to call attention to item number 2 in the file.
Item number 2 is dated 22 April 1938. It is the second sheet of the
English translation. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the
adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and the
Defendant Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file,
relates to Fall Grün, or Case Green. As I said, Case Green was a secret
code word for the planned operations against Czechoslovakia. This
meeting occurred within approximately 1 month following the successful
annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became
necessary to revise the Plan Grün to take into account the changed
attitude, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall
now read item number 2 of this file:
“Berlin, 22 April 1938. Bases of the Dissertation on ‘Grün.’
“Summary of discussion between Führer and General Keitel of 21
April:
“A. Political aspect.
“1. Strategic surprise attack, out of a clear sky without any
cause or possibility of justification, has been turned down. As
result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a
critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the
elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.
“2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually
come to a crisis and lead to war.
“3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for
example, the assassination of German Ambassador in connection
with an anti-German demonstration.)
“B. Military conclusions.
“1. The preparations are to be made for the political
possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since Grün
will have taken security measures.
“2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the
divisions by rail—which is unavoidable, but should be cut down
as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at
the time of the action.
“3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with a
view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous
points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts
are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads,
of targets, composition of the columns according to their
individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air
Force.
“The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example
dive-bombers; sealing of installations at penetration points,
hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal
communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons).
“4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the
decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a
European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must
prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw
Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize
‘Grün.’
“Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and
employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and
ruthless thrust by a motorized army (for example via Pilsen,
Prague).
“5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘Rot’ from
‘Grün’.”
‘Rot’ was the code name for their then plan against the West.
“A simultaneous strategic concentration ‘Rot’ can lead ‘Rot’ to
undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to
put ‘Fall Rot’ (Case Red) into operation at any time.
“C. Propaganda.
“1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia
(Grünland).
“2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs
(Grünen).”
This is initialled by Schmundt.
In the reading of this document, the Tribunal doubtless noted
particularly Paragraph 3, under the heading “Political Aspect,” which
reads as follows: “Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident
(example: Assassination of German Ambassador as an upshot of an
anti-German demonstration).” The document as a whole, establishes that
the conspirators were planning the creation of an incident to justify to
the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes, I
submit, that consideration was being given to assassinating the German
Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. This is alleged
in Paragraph 3 (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at
Page 8 of the printed English text.
As the Indictment was being read, at the opening of the case, when this
particular allegation was reached, the Defendant Göring shook his head
slowly and solemnly in the negative. I can well understand that he would
have shaken his head, if he believed the allegation of the Indictments
to be untrue. In the course of Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening address,
when this same matter was referred to, the Defendant Göring again
solemnly shook his head. On this allegation the Prosecution stands on
the evidence just submitted, the denials of the Defendant Göring,
notwithstanding.
If the Court please, would this be a convenient time to recess?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested earlier, the
next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the
plan to attack Poland and with it the resulting initiation of aggressive
war in Poland in September 1939. This is covered by Paragraphs 4 (a) and
(b) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment appearing on Page 9 of the
printed English text.
Here again the careful and meticulous record-keeping of the Adjutant
Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own handwriting, which
lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a troublesome colloquialism to
translate. I do not know. The document consists of minutes of a
conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the
Führer’s study in the New Reich Chancellery. The Defendant Göring was
present.
[_The Defendant Frick interrupted at this point and said: “This year is
surely not correct.” This statement in German was not translated._]
MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had referred to
the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is shown by the original
document.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the document to which you are referring?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is Document. L-79. As I said, the Defendant Göring
was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. The Defendant Keitel was
present. The subject of the meeting was, I quote: “Indoctrination on the
Political Situation and Future Aims.” This document is of historical
importance, second not even to the political will and testament of the
Führer, recorded by Adjutant Hossbach.
The original of this document when captured, found its way through the
complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United States. There, it
was found by members of the staff of the American Prosecution, by them
taken to London, and thence to Nuremberg. The “L” on the identifying
number indicates that it is one of the documents which was assembled in
London and brought here from there. We think the document is of
unquestioned validity. Its authenticity and its accuracy, as a record of
what transpired at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the
Defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is
Document L-79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit
USA-27.
This document also is of such great importance historically and as
bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal, that I feel obliged
to read most of it. At the top:
“Top Secret (Geheime Reichssache). To be transmitted by officer
only.
“Minutes of a conference on 23 May 1939. Place: The Führer’s
study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: Lieutenant
Colonel (G. S.) Schmundt.
“Present: The Führer, Field Marshal Göring, Grand Admiral
Raeder, Colonel General Von Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel,
Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Halder, General
Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel (G. S.)
Jeschonnek, Colonel (G. S.) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel (G.
S.) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander
Albrecht, Captain V. Below (Army).
“Subject: Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future
Aims.
“The Führer defined as the purpose of the conference:
“1. Analysis of the situation;
“2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from
that situation;
“3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks;
“4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting
from those consequences. Secrecy is the first essential for
success.
“The Führer’s observations are given in accordance with their
meaning. Our present situation must be considered from two
points of view: 1) The actual development of events between 1933
and 1939; 2) the permanent and unchanging situation in which
Germany lies.
“In the period 1933-39, progress was made in all fields. Our
military situation improved enormously.
“Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained
the same.
“Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The
balance of power had been effected without the participation of
Germany.
“This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the
necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges
as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘encroachments’.
The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere
than of the simple threat of force.
“A mass of 80 million people has solved the problems of ideals.
So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can
evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for
this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The
principle by which one evades solving the problem by adapting
oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must
rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion
of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.
“Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is
the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the
problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The
choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’
time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German
statesman can evade the question longer than that.
“We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is
shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.
“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
harmony with our aims.
“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:
“The national political unity of the Germans has been achieved,
apart from minor exceptions.”—I suppose they were those in the
concentration camps.—“Further successes cannot be attained
without the shedding of blood.
“The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
“The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on
the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship,
Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every
opportunity to do us harm.
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a
question of expanding our living space in the East and of
securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic
problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly
populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility,
thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the
surplus.
“There is no other possibility for Europe.
“Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not
solve the food problem. Remember: blockade.
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be
able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than
in peace.
“The population of non-German areas will perform no military
service, and will be available as a source of labor.
“The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.
“Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is
doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against
Russia.
“It is questionable whether military success in the West can be
achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude
of Poland.
“The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia.
Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will
attempt to rob us of the victory.
“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
left with the decision: _To attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity_”.—That, if the Court please, is underscored in the
original German text.—
“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will
be fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the
isolation will be decisive.
“Therefore, the Führer must reserve the right to give the final
order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the
Western Powers (France and England).
“If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not
lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily
against England and France.
“Fundamentally, therefore: Conflict with Poland, beginning with
an attack on Poland, will only be successful if the Western
Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be
better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same
time.
“The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.
“Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first, for various
reasons, her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool
and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to
take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.
“Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political
relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in press
comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to
be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia
take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become
closer.
“If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia
against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to
attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The
Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with
England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England
sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would
weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict
with England will be a life-and-death struggle.
“_What will this struggle be like?_”—Underscored in the German
original.—
“England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few
powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should
be brought as near to the Ruhr Basin as possible. French blood
will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr Basin
will determine the duration of our resistance.
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If
England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to
lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in
their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order
finally to force them into cooperation.
“Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to
pressure.
“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at
securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.
“The war with England and France will be a life-and-death
struggle.
“The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no
such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a
question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80
million human beings.
“Question: Short or long war?
“Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short
war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of
10 to 15 years’ duration.
“History has always shown that people have believed that wars
would be short. In 1914 the opinion still prevailed that it was
impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still
persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will
hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some
grave weakening (for example Ruhr Basin). England has similar
weaknesses.
“England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world
power.
“England is the driving force against Germany.”—which translated
literally means: “England is the motor driving against Germany.” I
suppose that is the French “force motrice.”
“Her strength lies in the following:
“1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious,
firm in resistance, and gifted as organizers. They know how to
exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure
and the bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by
dispersal. The German average is higher.
“2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years.
Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely
something concrete, but must also be considered as a
psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this
immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.
“3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a
courageous air force.
“England’s weakness:
“If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two
cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had been begun in
the morning, the British Fleet would have been defeated and
England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of
this war.”—that war, I take it—“It was formerly not sufficient
to defeat the Fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat
England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that
is no longer possible.
“The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced
to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the Fleet’s
protection.
“If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will
not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the Fleet is
destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.
“There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick
decision. It would be criminal, however, for the Government to
rely entirely on the element of surprise.
“Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:
“1. Disclosure coming from a large circle of military experts
concerned;
“2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole
enterprise;
“3. Human failings;
“4. Weather conditions.
“The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance.
Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must
be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise
intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.
“This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.
“1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or
the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong or
treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be
possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account
of Poland.
“2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long
war must be made, while opportunities on the continent for
England are eliminated.
“The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and
Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and
held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions
for a successful war against England will have been secured.
“England can then be blockaded from western France at close
quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines
can extend the range of the blockade.
“Consequences:
“England will not be able to fight on the continent; daily
attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
time will not be on England’s side; Germany will not bleed to
death on land.
“Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and
subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for
the following strategic considerations which are imperative:
“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a
wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end
would have been different.
“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is
impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the
lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter
measures.
“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.
“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy,
has taken the most important positions, industrial production
will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army’s
battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.
“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions.
Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.
“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.
“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.
“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning
battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.
“This applies to gas, submarines, and air force. It would be
true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet
had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case
in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be
effective, as the Polish Army possesses no countermeasures.
“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be
decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise
and by masterly handling.”
The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more in detail
with military plans and preparations. I think it unnecessary to read
further.
The document just read is the evidence which specifically supports the
allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment,
appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text, relating to the meeting
of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved in those
allegations.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the last page and
the last five lines, because they refer in terms to one of the
defendants.
MR. ALDERMAN: I didn’t read these, Mr. President, simply because I am
convinced that they are mistranslated in the English. I will be glad to
have them read in the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.
MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is wrong?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong.
MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph headed
“Working principles”?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter read that, as
it can be translated into the other languages. It is on Page 16 of the
original.
BY THE INTERPRETER: “Page 16. Purpose:
“1. Study of the entire problem;
“2. Study of the events;
“3. Study of the means needed;
“4. Study of the necessary training.
“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical
training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with
sober sceptic powers of understanding.
“Working principles:
“1. No one is to take part in this, who does not have to know of
it.
“2. No one can find out more than he must know.
“3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest?
No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.
“On Göring’s question, the Führer decided that:
a) The armed forces determine what shall be built;
b) In the shipbuilding program nothing is to be changed;
c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or
1944.”—Schmundt certified this text.
MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer than I had
anticipated.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document leaves
nothing unproved in those allegations in the Indictment. It demonstrates
that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. It
demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It
demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had
agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions,
but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of
aggressive expansion for food and “Lebensraum.”
In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the initiation
of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal
a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief
military commanders, at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939, just one week
prior to the launching of the attack on Poland.
We have three of these documents, related and constituting a single
group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other two
I shall offer.
The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into
our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and
purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg,
transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we
had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person
who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our
Prosecution to see if it could find something better. Fortunately, we
did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day
made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as
indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By comparison of
those two documents with the first document, we concluded that the first
document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches.
On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg the three
Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as
the commanding generals bearing the title Commanders-in-Chief
(Oberbefehlshaber).
I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the
Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this
day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the OKW at
Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces), there were uncovered two speeches delivered by Hitler
at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are Documents Numbers 798-PS
and 1014-PS, in our series of documents.
In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal please, we
have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for
identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, I offer the second document,
798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit USA-29, and the third document, 1014-PS,
as Exhibit USA-30.
These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, and
I shall not necessarily read the entire speech.
Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Führer speaks to the
Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: “I have called you
together. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place?
MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?
MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication “Obersalzberg” came from the
first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt
that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this
speech.
The place is not very significant; it is the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]:
“I have called you together to give you a picture of the
political situation, in order that you may have insight into the
individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in
order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss
military details.
“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the
spring.”—I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the
May document, which I have already read, L-79.—“But I thought I
would first turn against the West in a few years, and only
afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed.
One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation.
I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in
order to fight first against the West, but this plan, which was
agreeable to me, could not be executed, since the essential
points have changed.
“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a
conflict with the West.
“Poland wants access to the sea.
“The further development became obvious after the occupation of
the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the
circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an
inopportune moment.
“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two
personal constitutions”—I suppose he means “personalities”;
that probably is an inapt translation—“my own personality, and
that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence,
because of my political ability.”
I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of a
war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending upon one man’s
personality.
“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have
the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will
probably never again be a man in the future with more authority
than I have. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great
value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an
idiot.
“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also
decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the
Alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the
Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in
the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with
the strongest nerves in Italy.
“The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only
benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s
personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness
of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the
fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our
internal unity.
“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive
personalities are concerned: There is no outstanding personality
in England or France.”—I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must
have overlooked one in England, perhaps many.—
“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to
lose—we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because
of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few
years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must
act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little.
England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have
men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men
of action.”
I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he meant
by no personalities—no masters having the authority that he had over
his nation.
“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is
favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry between Italy,
France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the
alarming of the Mohammedan world.
“The English empire did not emerge from the last war
strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was
achieved; conflict between England and Ireland, the South
African Union became more independent, concessions had to be
made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries.
A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.
“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the
Mediterranean.
“Further favorable factors for us are these:
“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal
situation.
“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and
vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since
Kemal’s death Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady
weak men.
“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2
or 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore
conflict better now.
“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement
politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was
achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is
necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by
general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.
“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy
hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My
propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by
England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The
initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment
is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or
Mussolini’s would change the situation to our disadvantage. One
cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A
suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our
convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again
in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing
prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will
not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution.
A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We
are facing the alternative to strike or be destroyed with
certainty sooner or later.”—We skip two paragraphs.—
“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron
resolution. . . .”
A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to read, and
then towards the end, four paragraphs from the bottom, I resume:
“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which
demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.”—And
then the last paragraph of one sentence—“Göring answers with
thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the Armed Forces
will do their duty.”
I believe I have already offered Exhibit 30, which is a shorter note
entitled: “Second Speech of the Führer on 22 August 1939.” Reading then
from United States Exhibit 30, headed “Second Speech by the Führer on 22
August 1939:
“It may also turn out differently regarding England and France.
One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade
barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most
iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing.
Everybody shall have to make a point of it, that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. A
struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as
she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,
greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by
getting used to the heaviest strain. A long period of peace
would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect
everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each
other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental
factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In
1918 the Nation fell down because the mental pre-requisites were
not sufficient. Frederick the Great secured final success only
through his mental power.
“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the
elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of
Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of
the season.
“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting
and making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory.
“Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people shall get
what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The
strongest has the right. Greatest severity.
“Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German
soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders
give way.
“First aim: Advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical
superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly
created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war
of attrition.
“New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a
protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be
influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland
is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until
complete elimination.
“Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements.
The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.”
That ends the quotation. The Tribunal will recall that in fact the start
was actually postponed until September 1.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, may I
make a short statement on the two documents which have just been read.
Both the documents which were read and also the third which was not read
but to which reference was made, are not recognized by the Defense. I do
not wish this objection to appear unjustified; may I therefore give this
explanation:
Both the documents which were read contain a number of factual errors.
They are not signed. Moreover, only one meeting took place, and that is
the cause for the inaccuracy of these documents. No one present at that
meeting was charged with taking down the events in the meeting
stenographically, and since there are no signatures, it cannot be
determined who wrote the documents and who is responsible for their
reliability. The third document which was not read is, according to the
photostatic copy in the Defense’s document room, simply typewritten.
There is no indication of place or time of execution.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got nothing to do with the third document,
because it has not been read.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless been
published in the press and was apparently given to the press by the
Prosecution. Consequently both the Defense and the defendants have a
lively interest in giving a short explanation of the facts concerning
these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in accordance with the
evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press, and the third
document is not in evidence before us.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize that counsel
wonder how these two documents which I have just read are in our hands.
They come to us from an authentic source. They are German documents.
They were found in the OKW files. If they aren’t correct records of what
occurred, it surprises us that with the great thoroughness with which
the Germans kept accurate records, they would have had these records
that didn’t represent the truth in their OKW files.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course hear what
evidence the defendants choose to give with reference to the documents.
MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that if any of
these defendants have in their possession what is a more correct
transcription of the Führer’s words on this occasion, the Court should
consider that. On the other question referred to by counsel, I feel
somewhat guilty. It is quite true that, by a mechanical slip, the press
got the first document, which we never at all intended them to have. I
feel somewhat responsible. It happened to be included in the document
books that were handed up to the Court on Friday, because we had only
intended to refer to it and give it an identification mark and not to
offer it. I had thought that no documents would be released to the press
until they were actually offered in evidence. With as large an
organization as we have, it is very difficult to police all those
matters.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know how many of
these documents are given to the press.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can’t answer that.
COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding that as
and when documents are introduced in evidence, then they are made
available to the press.
THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?
COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250
mimeographed copies.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the defendants’ counsel should
have copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the
press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen of the press the
defendants’ counsel should have the documents.
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I understand that these
gentlemen had the 10 documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning.
They had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents
that have been read today, down in the Information Center.
THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangement
which was made, and which was made upon your representations, that 10
copies of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents
should be given to the defendants’ counsel.
COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited in the
room.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey,
is that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then
the defendants’ counsel should not be limited to five copies.
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the 250 copies are the mimeographed
copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my
hands, or in my briefcase here, a receipt that the document books and
the briefs were delivered 24 hours in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to understand what I am putting to you,
which is this: That if you can afford to give 250 copies of the
documents in English to the press, you can afford to give more than five
copies to the defendants’ counsel—one each. Well, we do not need to
discuss it further. In the future that will be done.
DR. DIX: May I say, then, that of every document in evidence each
defense counsel will receive one copy; it will not be just one for
several members of the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in September
1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly after the initial
assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of
aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into
the Balkans. Under the division of the case between the Four Chief
Prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to presentation by the
British Chief Prosecutor.
Another change that we have made in our plan, which I perhaps should
mention, is that following the opening statement by the British Chief
Prosecutor on Count Two, we expect to resume the detailed handling of
the later phases of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British,
instead of the Americans, will deal with the details of aggression
against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in Europe and then,
as a joint part of the American case under Count One and the British
case under Count Two, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and
the Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects,
with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, and now by
presentation of specifically significant documents, are the case of the
attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 22nd of June
1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany
and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December
1941.
As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall at this
point present two documents. The first of these two documents
establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the
attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the
Nazis had a code name for the secret operation “Case Green”, so in the
case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name “Case
Barbarossa.”
THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?
MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser
Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret
directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer’s headquarters on 18
December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than
six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the
planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is
initialled by the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel. This secret
order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of
these nine copies. It is Document Number 446-PS in our numbered series.