“Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present
under all circumstances . . . only those preparatory measures
that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of
such preparations, or the intention of them must be kept in
strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of
the Reich.”
The preparations are then set out, and they include, as I have indicated
a few minutes ago, as the last one in the list, the preparations for
economic mobilization.
There are many others, of course. The preliminary mustering of
horse-drawn and motor vehicles, preparation for evacuation measures, and
so forth. We say—passing now from that document—we say the rapid
success of the German re-armament is attributable to the greatest extent
to the work of the Defendant Schacht. In the fall of 1934, the Nazi
conspirators announced the so-called “New Plan,” aiming at the control
of imports and exports in order to obtain the raw materials which were
needed for armaments and the foreign currency which was required to
sustain the armament program. This new plan was the creation of the
Defendant Schacht, and under the plan, the Defendant Schacht controlled
imports by extending the system of supervisory boards for import
control, which was previously limited to the main groups of raw
materials, to all goods imported into Germany, whether raw materials,
semi-manufactured goods, or finished products. The requirement of
licenses for imports enabled the Nazi conspirators to restrict imports
to those commodities which served their war aims.
Subsequently, in February of 1935, the “Devisen” Law was passed which
can be found by reference in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1935, Part I,
Page 105; and under it, all transactions involving foreign exchange were
subject to the approval of Devisenstellen (the Foreign Exchange Control
Offices). By thus controlling the disposition of foreign exchange, the
conspirators were able to manipulate foreign trade so as to serve their
needs and desires.
Thus every aspect of the German economy was being geared to war under
the guidance particularly of the Defendant Schacht. In a study of the
economic mobilization for war as of 30 September 1934, it was stated
that steps had already been taken to build up stock piles, to construct
new facilities for the production of scarce goods, and to redeploy
industry, to secure areas and to control fiscal and trade policies.
References were made to the fact that the task of stock piling had been
hampered by the requirement of secrecy and camouflage. Reserves of
automobile fuels and stocks of coal were being accumulated and the
production of synthetic oil was accelerated. Civilian supply was
purposely organized so that most plants would be working for the German
Armed Forces. Studies were made of the possibility of barter trade with
supposedly neutral countries in case of war.
The matter of financing the armament program presented a difficult
problem for the conspirators. In 1934 and 1935 the German economy could
by no possibility have raised funds for their extensive rearmament
program through taxes and public loans. From the outset, the armament
program involved “the engagement of the last reserves.”
Apart from the problem of raising the huge sums required to sustain this
program, the Nazi conspirators were exceedingly anxious, in the early
stages, to conceal the extent of their feverish armament activities.
After considering various techniques of financing the armament program,
the Defendant Schacht proposed the use of so-called “mefo” bills. One of
the primary advantages of this method was the fact that figures
indicating the extent of rearmament that would have become public
through the use of other methods could be kept secret through the use of
mefo bills, and mefo bills were used exclusively for armament financing.
Transactions in mefo bills worked as follows:
Mefo bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a limited
liability company, [_The Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft m. b.
H._], the initials of which spell mefo from whence the transaction takes
its name. This company had a nominal capital of 1 million Reichsmarks
and was therefore merely a dummy organization. The bills were received
by all German banks for possible rediscounting with the Reichsbank, and
the bills were guaranteed by the Reich. Their secrecy was assured by the
fact that they appeared neither in the published statements of the
Reichsbank nor in the budget figures.
The mefo bill system continued to be used until April 1 of 1938. To that
date, 12 billion Reichsmarks of mefo bills for the financing of
rearmament had been issued. Since it was no longer deemed necessary in
April of 1938 to conceal the vast progress of German rearmament, mefo
financing was discontinued at that time.
A further source of funds which the Defendant Schacht drew upon to
finance the Secret Armament Program were the funds of political
opponents of the Nazi regime, and marks of foreigners on deposit in the
Reichsbank. As Schacht stated—and I am quoting: “Our armaments are also
financed partly with the credits of our political opponents.”
That statement may be found in a memorandum from the Defendant Schacht
to Hitler, dated 3 May 1935, and it bears the number in the document
book of 1168-PS, and the specific sentence is found in the second
paragraph.
The outstanding mefo bills at all times represented a threat to the
stability of the currency because they could be tendered to the
Reichsbank for discount, in which case the currency circulation would
automatically have to be increased. Thus, there was an ever-present
threat of inflation. The Defendant Schacht continued on his course,
because he stands, he said, “with unswerving loyalty to the Führer
because he fully recognizes the basic ideas of National Socialism and
because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, can be
considered irrelevant.”
High-ranking military officers paid tribute to the Defendant Schacht’s
contrivances on behalf of the Nazi war machine. In an article written
for the _Military Weekly Gazette_ in January of 1937, it is said:
“The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one
of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its
development in accordance with the directions from the Führer
and Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s
skill and great ability that, in defiance of all currency
difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to
its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.”
After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators
re-doubled their efforts to prepare Germany for a major war. The Four
Year Plan, as we have indicated earlier, was proclaimed by Hitler in his
address at the Nuremberg Party convention on the 9th day of September in
1936, and it was given a statutory foundation by the decree concerning
the execution of the Four Year Plan dated the 18th day of October, 1936,
which is found in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1936, in the first part, on
Page 887. By this decree the Defendant Göring was put in charge of the
plan. He was authorized to enact any legal and administrative measures
deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment of his task, and to issue
orders and instructions to all Government agencies, including the
highest Reich authorities.
The purpose of the plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain complete
self-sufficiency in essential raw materials, notably motor fuel, rubber,
textile fiber, and non-ferrous metals, and to intensify preparations for
war. The development of synthetic products was greatly accelerated
despite their high costs.
Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi conspirators
required foreign exchange to finance propaganda and espionage activities
abroad; Thus, in a speech on November 1 of 1937, before the
Wehrmachtakademie, General Thomas stated:
“If you consider that one will need during the war considerable
means in order to organize the necessary propaganda in order to
pay for the espionage service and for similar purposes, then one
should be clear that our internal mark would be of no use
therefore, and that foreign exchange will be needed.”
This particular need for foreign exchange was reduced in part by the
virtue of the espionage and propaganda services rendered free of charge
to the Nazi State by some leading German industrial concerns.
I hold in my hand a document bearing the number D-206. It is dated at
Essen the 12th day of October 1935. It was found in the files of the
Krupp Company by representatives of the United States and the British
armies. I shall not read all of it unless Your Honors require it, but
I’ll start at the beginning by way of establishing its purpose and the
information contained therein. It is entitled “Memorandum.” There is a
subheading: “Concerns: Distribution of official propaganda literature
abroad with the help of our foreign connections.” It goes on to say
that:
“On the morning of October 11 the district representative of
Ribbentrop’s private foreign office (Dienststelle Ribbentrop)
made an appointment for a conference by telephone.”—and
that—“A Mr. Lackmann arrived at the appointed time. . . . “In
answer to my question with whom I was dealing, and which
official bureau he represented, he informed me that he was not
himself the district representative of Ribbentrop’s private
foreign office, that a Mr. Landrat Bollmann was such, and that
he himself had come at Mr. Bollmann’s order.”
The next paragraph states:
“. . . that there exists a great mixup in the field of foreign
propaganda, and that Ribbentrop’s private foreign office wants
to create a tighter organization for foreign propaganda. For
this purpose the support of our firm and above all an index of
addresses . . . were needed.”
In the next sentence, of the third paragraph, I would like to read:
“I informed Mr. L that our firm had put itself years ago at the
disposal of official bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda,
and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the
utmost.”
I now hold in my hand the document bearing the number D-167, which is
also a copy of a document found in the files of the Krupp Company by
representatives of the American and the British Armies. It is dated the
14th day of October 1937, and states that it is a memorandum of Herr
Sonnenberg on the meeting at Essen on the 12th day of October 1937 and
it indicates that one Menzel representing the intelligence of the
Combined Services Ministry, his department coming under the Defense
Office, asked for intelligence on foreign armaments, but not including
matters published in newspapers, intelligence received by Krupp from
their agents abroad and through other channels to be passed on to the
Combined Services Intelligence.
Finally, the third paragraph states that: “On our part we undertook to
supply information to the Combined Services Ministry . . . as required.”
I have concluded reading from that document, and I pass now to discuss
the conspirators’ program, which proceeded, as I have said so many times
here today, with amazing—really amazing speed. The production of steel,
for example, as shown in official German publications, rose as follows:
In the year of 1933, 74,000 tons were produced; in 1934, 105,000 tons;
1935, 145,000 tons; 1936, 186,000 tons; 1937, 217,000 tons; and in 1938,
477,000 tons. The production of gasoline increased at even a greater
tempo: from 370,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938.
The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament program
with a sense of urgency which clearly indicated their awareness of the
imminence of war. At a 4th of September meeting in 1936 Göring pointed
out that “all measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in
the state of imminent danger of war.” He pointed out that “if war should
break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we
might . . . shy away at the present moment. They are therefore to be
taken.” The extreme urgency was manifested by Göring’s remark that
“Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of carrying
us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the Führer has been
reached . . . in case of war,” he added, “they are not a reliable
backing in any case.”
By a letter marked “Top Secret”, on the 21 of August of 1936, the
Defendant Schacht was advised that Hitler had ordered that all
formations of the Air Force be ready by April 1 of 1937. This served to
accentuate the urgent sense of immediacy that had pervaded the Nazi war
economy from the outset. Flushed with their successes in the Rhineland,
the Nazi conspirators were laying the groundwork for further aggressive
action.
THE PRESIDENT: Insofar as I understand you, you have not referred us to
any document since Document 167.
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, the figures on the production of steel and of
oil are from the statistical year book for the German Reich of 1939 and
1940 and the statistical year book for the German Reich of 1941 and
’42—that is, with respect to the steel figures. And the figures which I
quoted with respect to the production of gasoline are from the
statistical year book for the German Reich in 1941 and 1942. The
statements of the Defendant Göring are based upon the document marked
EC-416, in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the document you have already referred to, isn’t
it?
MR. DODD: Yes, it has been referred to heretofore, I believe. Some of
these documents contain references to more than one part of the
presentation, and I have to refer to them at different times in the
presentation. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Go on, if you want to refer to it.
MR. DODD: The sixth paragraph on the first page:
“Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of
carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the
Führer has been reached, and then in case of war, they are not a
reliable backing in any case.”
And on the second page, the eighth paragraph down:
“If war should break out tomorrow, we would be forced to take
measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the
present moment. They are therefore to be taken.”
With reference to the assertion that the Defendant Schacht was advised
that Hitler had ordered that all formations of the Air Force be ready by
April 1, 1937, I respectfully refer to Document 1301-PS, dated 31 August
1936. I am advised that that document should bear an additional number.
It should read 1301-PS-7. On the first page, if Your Honor pleases, the
third paragraph, or the paragraph marked “3” and after the words “air
force” . . . states that according to an order of the Führer, the
setting up of all Air Force units had to be completed on April 1, 1937;
and if Your Honors will turn the page to Page 20, about midway in the
page, you will observe that a copy of this document was sent to the
president of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht.
After their successes in Austria and in the Sudetenland, the Nazi
conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip themselves for a war of
aggression, and in a conference on October 14, 1938, shortly before the
Nazi conspirators made their first demands on Poland, the Defendant
Göring stated that the Führer had instructed him to carry out a gigantic
program, by comparison with which the performances thus far were
insignificant. This faced difficulties which he would overcome with the
greatest energy and ruthlessness. And that statement may be found in the
Document 1301-PS, on Page 25 of that document, and particularly the
second sentence of the opening paragraph:
“Everybody knows from the press what the world situation looks
like, and therefore the Führer has issued an order to him to
carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous
achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the
way which he will overcome with the utmost energy and
ruthlessness.”
The supply of foreign currency had shrunk because of preparations for
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and it was considered necessary to
replenish it. “These”—and I am now referring to the third paragraph of
that same Page 25 of Document 1301-PS:
“These gains made through the export are to be used for an
increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the
export activities. He received the order from the Führer to
increase the armament to an abnormal extent, the Air Force
having first priority. Within the shortest time, the Air Force
is to be increased fivefold; also the Navy should get on more
rapidly, and the Army should procure large amounts of offensive
weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery pieces
and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go,
especially fuel, powder and explosives are to be moved into the
foreground. It should be coupled with the accelerated
construction of highways, canals, and particularly of the
railroads.”
In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills ensued
between two men, the Defendant Göring and the Defendant Schacht, as a
result of which the Defendant Schacht resigned his position as head of
the Ministry of Economics and plenipotentiary for the war economy in
November of 1937 and was removed from the presidency of the Reichsbank
in January of 1939. I do not propose, at this moment, to go into the
details of this controversy. There will be more said on that subject at
a later stage in these proceedings, but for the present, I should like
to have it noted that it is our contention that Schacht’s departure in
no way implied any disagreement with the major war aims of the Nazis.
The Defendant Schacht took particular pride in his vast attainments in
the financial and economic fields in aid of the Nazi war machine. And in
the document bearing the number EC-257, which is a copy of a letter from
the Defendant Schacht to General Thomas, in the first paragraph of the
letter:
“I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the Ministry
of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the
rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not
only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have
always considered a rearmament of the German people as _conditio
sine qua non_ of the establishment of a new German nation.”
The second paragraph is of a more personal nature and has no real
bearing on the issues before us at this time.
In the document labeled EC-252, a letter written to General Von
Blomberg, dated the 8th day of July 1937, the Defendant Schacht wrote:
“The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would
in that event never take place entirely independent from the
rest of the war mechanism, but would be aimed at accomplishment
of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic
forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this
way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to
the Defense Act.”
In the spring of 1937, the Defendant Schacht participated with
representatives of the three branches of the Armed Forces in war games
in war economy which was something new by way of military exercises. The
war games in war economy were held at Godesberg, Germany. And I refer to
the document bearing the label EC-174. It has as a heading, or
subheading, under the summary: “War economy trip to Godesberg undertaken
by General Staff between the 25th of May and the 2d of June,” and it
goes on to outline in some slight detail that there was a welcome to the
General Staff war economy trip. It tells something in a rather vague and
not altogether clear way of just how a war game in war economy was
conducted but it leaves no doubt in the mind that such a war game in war
economy had been conducted at Godesberg at that time. And on the second
page of this document, the last paragraph is the translation of Part 1
of the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht. It says:
“Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war
economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you,
President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble to personally
participate in our final discussion today despite all your other
activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy
tasks shown at all times and your presence here is renewed proof
that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult
war-economic preparations and to strengthen a harmonious
cooperation with your offices.”
I should also like to call the Court’s attention to the next to the last
paragraph on the first page. It is a one-sentence paragraph, and it
simply says, “I want to point out, however, that all material and all
information received has to be kept in strict secrecy,” and it refers to
the preceding paragraph concerning the war games in war economy.
It appears that the annexation of Austria was a goal which the Defendant
Schacht had long sought, for in a speech to the employees of the former
Austrian National Bank, as set out in the document bearing the label
EC-297, and particularly the second paragraph of the first page of that
document, nearly at the end, four or five lines from the end of that
paragraph, we find these words immediately after “large applause”:
“Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the bearer
of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the German
name, especially in the direction of the southeast. Such a
mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich and
based on the power of a nation of 75 millions, which, regardless
of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and the soul of
Europe.”
Dr. Schacht goes on to say:
“We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few
days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain
degree justified, but that the method of effecting this union
was terrible. . . . This method, which certainly did not suit
one or another foreigner, is nothing but the consequence of
countless perfidies and brutal acts of violence which foreign
countries have practiced against us.”
And I refer now to Page 3 of this same document and to the fourth
paragraph, about the center of the page, and reading from it:
“I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give offense
and there I would not like to depart from this custom. I know
that there are even here, in this country a few people—I
believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with the
events of the last few days; but nobody, I believe, doubts the
goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t
satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe
in one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it,
and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and if there is
still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should
try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich, and
within the German community, but not to disturb it from
without.”
In the memorandum of the 7th of January 1939, written by the Defendant
Schacht and other directors of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urging a
balancing of the budget in view of the threatening danger of inflation,
it was stated—and I now refer to the document bearing the label EC-369
and particularly to the paragraph at the bottom of the first page of
that document:
“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact
that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the
reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It (the Reichsbank)
therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to
finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the
currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which
pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry
through the armament at once, out of nothing, and furthermore
under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy
possible.”
The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a point had
been reached where greater production of armaments was no longer
possible. We say that was merely a judgment on the situation and not a
moral principle, for there was no opposition to Hitler’s policy of
aggression. Doubts were ascertained only as to whether he could finance
that policy. Hitler’s letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht’s
departure from the Reichsbank, as contained in Document EC-397, pays
high tribute to Schacht’s great efforts in furthering the program of the
Nazi conspirators. The Armed Forces by now had enabled Hitler to take
Austria and the Sudetenland. We say Schacht’s task up to that point had
been well done. And to quote from Document EC-397 in the words of
Hitler, in a letter which he wrote to the Defendant Schacht, “Your name,
above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national
rearmament.”
Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, Schacht was
retained as a Minister without portfolio and special confidential
adviser to Hitler. The Defendant Funk stepped into Schacht’s position as
President of the Reichsbank. And I ask at this point that the Court
might take judicial notice of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of January 21,
1939. The Defendant Funk was completely uninhibited by fears of
inflation, for like Göring, under whom he had served in the Four Year
Plan, he recognized no obstacles to the plan to attack Poland.
In Document 699-PS, in a letter from the Defendant Funk to Hitler,
written on August 25 of 1939, only a few days before the attack on
Poland, the Defendant Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank was
prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international currency and
credit system occasioned by a large-scale war. He said that he had
secretly transferred all available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into
gold, and that Germany stood ready to meet the financial and economic
tasks which lay ahead.
And so it seems plain and clear from the writings, from the acts, from
the speeches of the Nazi conspirators themselves, that they did in fact
direct the whole of the German economy toward preparation for aggressive
war. To paraphrase the words that the Defendant Göring once used, these
conspirators gave the German people “guns instead of butter,” and we say
they also gave history its most striking example of a nation gearing
itself in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war. Their
economic preparations, formulated and applied with the ruthless energy
of the Defendant Göring, with the cynical financial wizardry of the
Defendant Schacht, and the willing complicity of Funk, among others,
were the indispensable first act in the heart-breaking tragedy which
their aggression inflicted upon the world.
I should like to offer, if I may at this time, Your Honor, those
documents which I have referred to in the course of this discussion. We
have here the original documents in the folders, and they compare with
the translations which have been submitted to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the defendants had the opportunity of inspecting
these documents?
MR. DODD: I doubt that they have had full opportunity to inspect them,
Your Honor. The photostats are there, but I don’t think they have had
time to inspect them because they haven’t been there long enough for
that.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that they should have full opportunity of
inspecting them and comparing with the copies which have been submitted
to us before the originals are put in.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. We may offer them at a later date, as I
understand, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
COLONEL STOREY: May it please the Tribunal: The U. S. Prosecution now
passes into the aggressive war phase of the case and it will be
presented by Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal: I rise to present on behalf of
the United States Chief of Counsel, evidence to support the allegation
of Count One of the Indictment relating to the planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging of illegal and aggressive war, and relating to
the conspiracy to commit that crime.
The aggressive war phase of the case, the aggressive war phase of the
conspiracy case under Count One, and the aggressive war phase of the
entire case is really, we think, the heart of the case. If we did not
reach it in our presentation we would not reach the heart of the case.
If we did not present it to the Tribunal in the necessary detail, we
would fail to present what is necessary to the heart of the case.
After all, everything else in this case, however dramatic, however
sordid, however shocking and revolting to the common instincts of
civilized peoples, is incidental to, or subordinate to, the aggressive
war aspect of the case.
All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early phases of
the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of terror used, the
suppressions of human freedom employed in the seizure of power, and even
the concentration camps and the Crimes against Humanity, the
persecutions, tortures, and murders committed—all these things would
have little juridical international significance except for the fact
that they were the preparation for the commission of aggressions against
peaceful neighboring peoples.
Even the aspects of the case involving War Crimes in the strict sense
are aspects which are merely the inevitable, proximate result of the
wars of aggression launched and waged by these conspirators, and of the
kind of warfare they waged—that is—total war, the natural result of
the totalitarian party-dominated state that waged it, and atrocious war,
the natural result of the atrocious doctrines, designs, and purposes of
these war-makers.
For these reasons, I repeat that in our view the phases of the case
dealing with territorial gains acquired by threats of force and with
actual aggressions and aggressive wars constitute the real heart of the
case. Accordingly, we ask the indulgence of the Tribunal if for these
reasons we make the presentation of this part of the case as detailed as
seems to us necessary in view of the outstanding importance of the
subject matter.
The general scope of the case to be presented by the American
Prosecution has been stated in the opening address by Mr. Justice
Jackson. That address indicated to the Tribunal the general nature and
character of the evidence to be offered by the American Prosecution in
support of the allegations with which I shall deal. However, before
approaching the actual presentation of that evidence, it seems to us
that it would be helpful to an orderly presentation of the case, to
address the Tribunal in an introductory way concerning this specific
segment of the Prosecution’s case. In doing so, I shall not attempt to
retrace the ground so ably covered by Mr. Justice Jackson. On the
contrary, I shall confine my introductory remarks to matters
specifically and peculiarly applicable to that part of the American case
relating to the crime of illegal warfare, and the Common Plan or
Conspiracy to commit that crime.
The substantive rule of law which must guide the considerations of the
Tribunal on this aspect of the case, and the rule of law which must be
controlling in the final judgment of the Tribunal on this part of the
case, is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal. Article 6, so far as pertinent here, reads as
follows:
“_Article_ 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred
to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major
war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the
power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of
the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.
“The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be
individual responsibility:
“(a) _CRIMES AGAINST PEACE_: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances,
or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing. . . .”
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 6 are not pertinent to this aspect
of the case. However, the unnumbered final paragraph of Article 6 is of
controlling importance on this aspect of the case. That paragraph reads:
“Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”
In receiving evidence on this aspect of the case I would request the
Tribunal to have in mind five principles derived from the portions of
the Charter I have just read:
(1) The Charter imposes “individual responsibility” for acts
constituting “Crimes against Peace”;
(2) The term “Crimes against Peace” embraces planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of illegal war;
(3) The term “Crimes against Peace” also embraces participation in a
Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit illegal war;
(4) An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. These
two kinds of illegal war might not necessarily be the same. It will be
sufficient for the Prosecution to show that the war was aggressive
irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements, or
assurances. On the other hand it would be sufficient for the Prosecution
to show that the war was in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances irrespective of whether or not it was a war of
aggression. We think the evidence in this case will establish
conclusively that the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged by
these defendants, and the wars which were the object of their common
plan and conspiracy, were illegal for both reasons.
The fifth principle which I ask you to bear in mind, is that individual
criminal responsibility of a defendant is imposed by the Charter not
merely by reason of direct, immediate participation in the crime. It is
sufficient for the Prosecution to show that a defendant was a leader, an
organizer, instigator, or accomplice who participated either in the
formulation or in the execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit
Crimes against Peace. In the case of many of the defendants the evidence
will show direct and immediate personal participation in the substantive
crime itself. In the case of some of the defendants the evidence goes to
their participation in the formulation and execution of a Common Plan or
Conspiracy. In the case of each defendant, we think, the evidence will
establish full individual responsibility for Crimes against Peace, as
defined in the Charter of this Tribunal. In this connection I wish to
emphasize that the Charter declares that the responsibility of
conspirators extends not only to their own acts, but also to all acts
performed by any persons in execution of the conspiracy.
It is familiar law in my country that if two or more persons set out to
rob a bank, in accordance with a criminal scheme to that end, and in the
course of carrying out their scheme one of the conspirators commits the
crime of murder, all of the participants in the planning and execution
of the bank robbery are guilty of murder, whether or not they had any
other personal participation in the killing. This is a simple rule of
law declared in the Charter. All the parties to a Common Plan or
Conspiracy are the agents of each other and each is responsible as
principal for the acts of all the others as his agents.
So much for the terms of the Charter having a bearing on this aspect of
the case.
I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the portions of the Indictment
lodged against the defendants on trial which relate to the crimes of
illegal war or war of aggression. Particularly I ask the Tribunal to
advert to the statements of offense under Count One and Count Two of the
Indictment in this case.
The statement of offense under Count One of the Indictment is contained
in Paragraph III. The offense there stated, so far as pertinent to the
present discussion, is:
“All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period
of years preceding 8th May 1945, participated as leaders,
organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or
execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, or which
involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, as defined in
the Charter of this Tribunal. . . . The Common Plan or
Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace, in
that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged wars
of aggression, which were also wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, or assurances.”
The statement of offense under Count Two of the Indictment is also
relevant at this point. It must be obvious that essentially Counts One
and Two interlock in this Indictment. The substance of the offense
stated under Count Two, Paragraph V of the Indictment is this:
“All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period
of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning,
preparation, incitation, and waging of wars of aggression which
were also wars in violation of international treaties,
agreements, and assurances.”
The emphasis in the statement of offense under Count One of the
Indictment is on the Common Plan or Conspiracy. The emphasis under Count
Two of the Indictment is on the substantive crimes to which the
conspiracy related and which were committed in the course of and
pursuant to that conspiracy.
I should hasten to add at this point that in the division of the case as
between the Chief Prosecutors of the four Prosecuting Governments,
primary responsibility for the presentation of evidence supporting Count
One has been placed on the American prosecutor, and primary
responsibility for the presentation of the evidence supporting Count Two
of the Indictment has been placed on the British prosecutor.
But as we shall show somewhat later, there will to some extent be a
cooperative effort as between the two prosecutors to present certain
phases of both counts together. In addition to the statement of offense
relating to illegal war in Paragraph III under Count One of the
Indictment, Count One also contains what amounts to a bill of
particulars of that offense. In so far as those particulars relate to
illegal war, they are contained in Paragraph IV (F) of the Indictment
which is set out in the English text on Page 7 through the top of Page
10 under the general heading “Utilization of Nazi Control for Foreign
Aggression.” The allegations of this bill of particulars have been read
in open court, in the presence of the defendants, and the Tribunal, as
well as the defendants, are certainly familiar with the contents of
those allegations. I call attention to them now, however, in order to
focus attention on the parts of the Indictment which are relevant in
consideration of the evidence which I intend to bring before the
Tribunal.
My introduction to the presentation of evidence in this matter would be
faulty if I did not invite the Tribunal to consider with me the
relationship between history and the evidence in this case. Neither
counsel nor Tribunal can orient themselves to the problem at
hand—neither counsel nor Tribunal can present or consider the evidence
in this case in its proper context, neither can argue or evaluate the
staggering implications of the evidence to be presented—without reading
that history, reading that evidence against the background of recorded
history. And by recorded history, I mean the history merely of the last
12 years.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, of the U. S. Supreme Court, found in his
judicial experience that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”
My recollection is that he stated it perhaps better, earlier in the
preface to his book on the common law where he said, I think, “The life
of the law has been not logic but experience.” I submit that in the
present case a page of history is worth a hundred tons of evidence. As
lawyers and judges we cannot blind ourselves to what we know as men. The
history of the past 12 years is a burning, living thing in our immediate
memory. The facts of history crowd themselves upon us and demand our
attention.
It is common ground among all systems of jurisprudence that matters of
common knowledge need not be proved, but may receive the judicial notice
of courts without other evidence. The Charter of this Tribunal, drawing
on this uniformly recognized principle, declares in Article 21:
“The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.”
The facts of recorded history are the prime example of facts of common
knowledge which require no proof. No court would require evidence to
prove that the Battle of Hastings occurred in the year 1066, or that the
Bastille fell on the 14th of July 1789, or that Czar Alexander I freed
the serfs in 1863, or that George Washington was the first President of
the United States or that George III was the reigning King of England at
that time.
If I may be allowed to interpolate, an old law professor of mine used to
present the curiosity of the law: that a judge is held to responsibility
for no knowledge of the law whatsoever, that a lawyer is held to a
reasonable knowledge of the law, and a layman is held to an absolute
knowledge of all the laws. It works inversely as to facts, or facts of
common knowledge. There, the judge is imputed to know all of those
facts, however many of them he may have forgotten as an individual man.
So one of the purposes of this presentation will be to implement the
judicial knowledge which by hypothesis exists, and which probably
actually exists.
It is not our purpose however, to convert the record of these
proceedings into a history book. The evidence which we offer in this
case is evidence which for the moment has been concealed from
historians. It will fill in recorded history, but it must be read
against the background which common knowledge provides. The evidence in
this case consists primarily of captured documents. These documents fill
in the inside story underlying the historical record which we all
already knew. This evidence which we will offer constitutes an
illustrative spot check on history—on the history of the recent times
as the world knows it. The evidence to be offered is not a substitute
for history. We hope the Tribunal will find it to be an authentication
of history. The evidence which we have drawn from captured documents
establishes the validity of the recent history of the past 12 years—a
history of many aggressions by the Nazi conspirators accused in this
case.
As I offer to the Tribunal document after document, I ask the Court to
see in those documents definite additions to history, the addition of
new elements long suspected and now proved. The elements which the
captured documents on this particular aspect of the case will add to
recorded history are the following:
(1) The conspiratorial nature of the planning and preparation which
underlay the Nazi aggressions already known to history;
(2) The deliberate premeditation which preceded those acts of
aggression;
(3) The evil motives which led to the crimes;
(4) The individual participation of named persons in the Nazi conspiracy
for aggression;
(5) The deliberate falsification of the pretexts claimed by the Nazi
aggressors as the reasons for their criminal activities.
These elements the captured documents will demonstrate beyond possible
doubt, and these elements, in the context of historical facts, we think
are all that need to be shown.
The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and the initiation
of the first war of aggression was a very short period. This critical
period of a lawless preparation and illegal scheming which ultimately
set the whole world aflame was unbelievably short. It covered only 6
years, 1933 to 1939. The speed with which all this was accomplished
evidences at once the fanatical intensity of the conspirators and their
diabolical efficiency. Crowded into these 6 short years is the making of
the greatest tragedy that has ever befallen mankind.
A full understanding of these 6 years, and of the vibrant 6 years of war
that followed, demands that we see this period of time divided into
rather definite phases, phases that reflect the development and
execution of the Nazi master plan. I suggest that the Tribunal as it
receives evidence, fit it into five phases. The first was primarily
preparatory, although it did involve overt acts. That phase covers
roughly the period from 1933 to 1936. In that period the Nazi
conspirators, having acquired governmental control of Germany by the
middle of 1933, turned their attention toward utilization of that
control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this stage was to acquire
military strength and political bargaining power to be used against
other nations. In this they succeeded. The second phase of their
aggression was shorter. It is rather interesting to see that as the
conspiracy gained strength it gained speed. During each phase the
conspirators succeeded in accomplishing more and more in less and less
time until, toward the end of the period, the rate of acceleration of
their conspiratorial movement was enormous. The second phase of their
utilization of control for foreign aggression involved the actual
seizure and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia in that order. By
March, the third month of 1939, they had succeeded in that phase. The
third phase may be measured in months rather than years: from March 1939
to September 1939. The previous aggression being successful, having been
consummated without the necessity of resorting to actual war, the
conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were
ready to undertake further aggressions, by means of war if necessary. By
September 1939 war was upon the world. The fourth phase of the
aggression consisted of expanding the war into a general European war of
aggression. By April 1941 the war which had theretofore involved Poland,
the United Kingdom, and France, had been expanded by invasions into
Scandinavia and into the Low Countries and into the Balkans. In the next
phase the Nazi conspirators carried the war eastward by invasion of the
territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and finally,
through their Pacific ally, Japan, precipitated the attack on the United
States at Pearl Harbor.
The final result of these aggressions is fresh in the minds of all of
us.
I turn now to certain outstanding evidence at hand. While on this phase
of the case we shall not rest exclusively on them alone; the essential
elements of the crime which I have already pointed out can be made out
by a mere handful of captured documents. My order of presentation of
these will be first to present one by one this handful of documents,
documents which prove the essential elements of the case on aggressive
war up to the hilt. These documents will leave no reasonable doubt
concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war or concerning the
conspiratorial premeditation of that war. Some of this group of
documents are the specific basis for particular allegations in the
Indictment. As I reach those documents, I shall invite the attention of
the Tribunal to the allegations of the Indictment which are specifically
supported by them. Having proved the corpus of the crime in this way, I
will follow the presentation of this evidence with a more or less
chronological presentation of the details of the case on aggressive war
producing more detailed evidence of the relevant activities of the
conspirators from 1933 to 1941.
The documents which we have selected for single presentation at this
point, before developing the case in detail, are 10 in number. The
documents have been selected to establish the basic facts concerning
each phase of the development of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression.
Each document is conspiratorial in nature. Each document is one, I
believe, heretofore unknown to history and each document is
self-contained and tells its own story. Those are the three standards of
selection which we have sought to apply.
I turn to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by an
orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the period
covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, to be
found at Page 7 of the printed English text. The essential character of
this period was the formulation and execution of the plan to re-arm and
to re-occupy and fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of
Versailles and other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and
political bargaining power to be used against other nations.
If the Tribunal please, we have what have been referred to as document
books. They are English translations of German documents, in some cases
German versions. I shall ask that they be handed up and we will hand one
copy at the moment to counsel for the defendants. It has been physically
impossible to prepare 21 sets of them. If possible we shall try to
furnish further copies to the defendants, the original German
documents. . . .
DR. DIX: I would be very much obliged. In order that there should be no
misunderstanding we have arranged that tomorrow we will discuss with the
Prosecution in what way the whole of the evidence may be made available
to all the Defense Counsel. It is, of course, necessary that no one
should have the advantage over the other. For this reason, while I
appreciate the good will of the Prosecution to overcome the
difficulties, I must refuse their kind offer of a copy of the book,
because I feel that in so doing I would have an unfair advantage over
the others. I am not in a position during the proceedings to hand the
evidentiary document to my colleagues. I ask you therefore to appreciate
the reasons why I have refused this document. I am convinced that
tomorrow we shall be able to agree about the way in which we can receive
evidence, and I suggest that today we try to continue as we have done up
to now.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, can you inform the Tribunal how many copies
of these documents you will be able to furnish to the Tribunal by
Monday?
MR. ALDERMAN: I cannot at the moment. If Your Honor pleases: may I make
this suggestion in connection with it, which I think may be of help to
all concerned? I think many of us have underestimated the contribution
of this interpreting system to this Trial. We all see how it has speeded
the proceeding, but in so far as my presentation of German documents is
concerned, I shall let the documents speak. I expect to read the
pertinent parts of the documents into the system so that they will go
into the transcript of record. Counsel for the German defendants will
get their transcripts in German; our French and Russian Allies will get
their transcripts in their language, and it seems to me that that is the
most helpful way to overcome this language barrier. I can recognize that
for Dr. Dix to receive a volume of documents which are English
translations of German documents might not seem very helpful to him.
Further, as an aid, we will have original German documents in court—one
copy; and if the Court will allow, I would ask that the original German
document, from which I shall read, would be passed to the German
interpreter under Colonel Dostert, so that instead of undertaking to
translate an English translation back into perhaps a bad German, he will
have the original German document before him and in that way, the exact
German text will be delivered in the daily transcript to all of the
counsel for the defendants. I hope that may be a helpful suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: That to some extent depends, does it not, upon how much
of the document you omit?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is quite true, Sir. As to these 10 documents with
which I propose to deal immediately, I expect to read into the
transcript practically the whole of the documents, because the whole of
them is significant, much more significant than anything I could say.
Also all of these 10 documents were listed in the list of documents
which we furnished counsel for the defendants, I believe, the 1st of
November.
THE PRESIDENT: You say that they were. . . .
MR. ALDERMAN: In the list. But of course I recognize that a list of
documents is very different from the documents themselves.
THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents very long?
MR. ALDERMAN: Some of them are very long and some of them are very
short; you can’t generalize. Whenever it is a speech of Adolf Hitler you
can count it is fairly long.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you not by Monday have in the hands of every member
of the Defense Counsel copies of these 10 documents? It is suggested to
me that photostating could be done quite easily.
MR. ALDERMAN: I understand that both our photostatic facilities and our
mimeographing facilities are right up to the hilt with work. It is a
very difficult mechanical problem.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please: In further explanation, the
documents which Mr. Alderman intends to offer were on the defendants’
list filed in the Document Center on the 1st day of November 1945.
Lieutenant Barrett had 23 copies of each one photostated as far as he
could on that list. Six copies went into the defendants’ Information
Center. Now, we can’t say at this time whether six copies—that, is
photostatic copies of each one—have been furnished to the defendants,
but whenever they wanted copies of any particular one, either the
original was exhibited to them or photostatic copies were made.
Again, Sir, I call attention to the physical problems that are almost
insurmountable: to make 23 photostatic copies which are required of
every document. Now then, Sir. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: If I may interrupt you, I imagine that the list which was
deposited on the 1st of November didn’t contain only these 10 documents
but contained a great number of other documents.
COL. STOREY: That is correct, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: So that the defendants’ counsel wouldn’t know which out
of that list of documents were going to be relied upon.
COL. STOREY: Except, Sir, they were notified that the Prosecution would
use all or some of those documents if necessary, and if the copies were
not furnished upon request, they have been made and delivered to them.
May I say, Sir, that working 24 hours a day, we are trying to furnish 10
sets of all of these to defendants’ counsel, and they will be. . . . One
complete set was delivered to defendants’ counsel here now as a
convenience to follow. The other sets, I feel certain, will be in their
hands sometime Sunday, but one complete list we now turn over to
them—not a list, complete copies.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I should like to
point out one fact. The Prosecution declared this morning that the
documents that will be put before us today are contained in the list
which was submitted on the 1st of November, that is—in the list which
was submitted this morning. This morning a list was made available to us
in room 54. I have it in my hand. This morning nine documents were
named. Of these nine documents, only one, contrary to what the
Prosecution said, was found in the old list; the other eight documents
were neither in the old list nor in the new list. The eight other
documents are, as I ascertained at lunch time today, not in the document
room. Neither are they available in photostatic copies, so they could
not be made available to me. I think, gentlemen, that it will not be
possible for us to work on this basis. I therefore request that we
should be allowed to wait until we know the result of the discussion
which we are told will take place tomorrow with the Prosecution, so that
we may then. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal proposes to adjourn now and to give Defense
Counsel the opportunity of meeting Counsel for the Prosecution tomorrow
morning. Both Counsel for the Prosecution and Defense Counsel appear to
be perfectly ready to make every possible effort to deal with the case
in the most reasonable way, and at that meeting you will be able to
discuss these documents which you say have been omitted and the Counsel
for the Prosecution will try to satisfy you with reference to the other
documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I have one more request. The Prosecution has just said
that it will hardly be possible to make 23 photostatic copies. I
believe, gentlemen, that if these documents are as important as the
Prosecution said today, it is a _conditio sine qua non_ that every
defense counsel and every defendant should have a photostatic copy of
these documents.
As we all know it is easy to produce a photostat in a few hours. With
the excellent apparatus here available to the Prosecution it should, in
my opinion, be easy to produce 20 or 40 photostats of these 10 documents
in 48 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will meet the Counsel for the Prosecution
tomorrow and attempt to come to some satisfactory arrangement with them
then; and now the Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]
FIFTH DAY
Monday, 26 November 1945
_Morning Session_
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): May it please
the Court, I should like to make an application. I am Dr. Sauter,
counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. On 30 October the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop requested that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, at
that time in the Remand Prison in Nuremberg, be placed at his disposal
in order that he might dictate his reply to the Indictment, as well as a
description of the manner in which he performed his official duties in
the last 7 or 8 years.
On 11 November 1945 the Tribunal allowed this request. The Defendant Von
Ribbentrop was therefore able to dictate for a few hours, but this was
stopped for reasons unknown to him. Neither has the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop had returned to him the shorthand notes or the typed
transcript. He has not been able to dictate any more to Fräulein Blank.
On 15 November Ribbentrop repeated his request regarding the witness
Blank, but up to the present she has not been placed again at his
disposal. The Defendant Ribbentrop therefore requests the President to
give instructions that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, again be
placed at his disposal in order to take down the necessary notes from
dictation. Such permission appears to be absolutely essential to enable
the Defendant Ribbentrop properly to prepare his own testimony and the
testimony of the defense witnesses.
Particularly in the case of Von Ribbentrop, the material to be treated
is so voluminous, that no other way of treating it appears feasible to
us. The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has a further request to make. He has
repeatedly asked that some of his former colleagues, in particular
Ambassador Gauss, Ambassador Von Rintelen, Minister Von Sonnleitner,
Professor Fritz Berber, and Under State Secretary Henke, be brought to
Nuremberg as witnesses, and that he be permitted to speak to these
witnesses in the presence of his counsel. This request had in part been
refused by the Court on 10 November. The remaining part has not yet been
decided.
It is quite impossible for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to give a clear
and exhaustive account of the entire foreign policy for the last 7 or 8
years if nothing is placed at his disposal except a pencil and a block
of writing paper. Even the White Books of the Foreign Office, for which
he has asked, could not be placed at his disposal. In view of the fact
that the data concerning Germany’s foreign policy during the last 7 or 8
years is so extensive, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot possibly
recall every single date, every event, every document, _et cetera_,
unless his memory is refreshed by his being able to speak with his
former colleagues.
Apart from this the Defendant Von Ribbentrop has been in the habit of
taking a great many soporifics during the last 4 years, especially
bromides, and his memory has suffered in consequence. It would not be
very helpful to the investigation of historical truth in a field which
interests not only this Court, but also, to an even greater extent, the
outside world, if Von Ribbentrop during his examination, might have to
state at every turn that he could no longer recollect these details.
Defendant Von Ribbentrop therefore applies to the Court and begs that
his above-mentioned colleagues be brought here and that he receive
permission to discuss with them matters pertaining to the Trial, in
order that he may prepare for further proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already intimated to defendant’s counsel
that all applications should, as far as practicable, be made in writing,
and they consider that the applications which have how been made orally
should have been made in writing. They will consider the facts with
reference to the applications in respect of the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop’s secretary. The other applications as to witnesses and
documents, which have been made in writing, have been considered, or
will be considered by the Tribunal.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I say in this connection that the
applications which I have today submitted have been repeatedly lodged
with the Court in writing, but my client is anxious lest he experience
difficulties in preparing for his own hearing and the hearing of the
defense witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: As was announced at the sitting on Friday, Counsel for
the Prosecution were to try to arrange with defendants’ counsel some
satisfactory arrangement with reference to the production of documents
in the German language. In accordance with that announcement, Counsel
for the Prosecution saw Counsel for the Defense, and representatives of
the Prosecution and the Defense appeared before the Tribunal and the
Tribunal has provisionally made the following arrangement:
1. That in the future, only such parts of documents as are read in court
by the Prosecution shall in the first instance be part of the record. In
that way those parts of the documents will be conveyed to defendants’
counsel through the earphones in German.
2. In order that defendants and their counsel may have an opportunity of
inspecting such documents in their entirety in German, a photostatic
copy of the original and one copy thereof shall be deposited in the
defendants’ counsel room at the same time that they are produced in
court.
3. The defendants’ counsel may at any time refer to any other part of
such documents.
4. Prosecuting counsel will furnish defendants’ counsel with 10 copies
of their trial briefs in English and five copies of their books of
documents in English, at the time such briefs and books are furnished to
the Tribunal.
5. Defendants’ counsel will be furnished with one copy of each of the
transcripts of the proceedings.
That is all. I call upon the prosecuting counsel for the United States.
MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, may I make, Mr. President, one
inquiry with regard to your reference to trial briefs? On my section of
the case I shall not expect to hand up trial briefs to the Court.
Whatever I have in the nature of trial briefs will be put over the
microphone. I wonder if that is satisfactory?
THE PRESIDENT: I think what I said meets that case.
MR. ALDERMAN: I thought so, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Because what I said was that the defendants’ counsel
would be furnished with 10 copies of the trial briefs in English at the
same time that they are furnished to the Tribunal. Therefore, if you
don’t furnish the trial briefs to the Tribunal, none will be furnished
to the defendants’ counsel.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. When the Tribunal rose on Friday last, I had just
completed an introductory statement preliminary to the presentation of
evidence on the aggressive war aspect of the case. In that introductory
statement I had invited attention to the parts of the Charter and to the
parts of the Indictment which are pertinent to this aspect of the case.
I had also discussed the relationship between recorded history and the
evidence to be presented, indicating what sort of additions to recorded
history would be made by the evidence contained in the captured
documents.
I then indicated to the Court that I would first proceed by presenting
singly a handful of captured documents, which, in our opinion, prove the
corpus of the crime of aggressive war, leaving no reasonable doubt
concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war, or concerning the
conspiratorial premeditation of that war. I indicated to the Tribunal
that after proving the corpus of the crime in this way I would follow
the presentation of this evidence with a more or less chronological
presentation of the case on aggressive war, producing evidence in
greater detail of the relevant activities of the conspirators from 1933
to 1941.
As the members of the Tribunal may understand, it is easier to make
plans about presentation than to keep them. There have been, by
necessity, some changes in our plans. I indicated on Friday that to a
certain extent the American case under Count One and the British case
under Count Two would interlock. The British Chief Prosecutor, Sir
Hartley Shawcross, is by force of circumstances, required to be in
London this week. He expects to be back next week. The intention now is
that when he returns Monday he will make his opening statement covering
Count Two of the Indictment and such interrelated parts of Count One of
the Indictment as have not by then been presented. So that what is at
the moment planned, if it meets with the Court’s views, is that I shall
continue, as far as I may within 2 days of this week, on the detailed
story as to aggressive war; that thereupon we shall alter the
presentation and present some other matters coming under Count One.
Then, following the British Chief Prosecutor’s opening statement on
Monday of next week, we shall continue jointly with the chapters on
Poland, Russia, and Japan, as parts of both Count One and Two. While
that may not be strictly logical, it seems to us the best method with
which to proceed under the circumstances.
I turn now to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by an
orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the period
covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of IV (F) of the Indictment. This may be
found at Page 7 of the printed English text of the Indictment.
The essential character of this period was the formulation and execution
of the plan to rearm and to reoccupy and fortify the Rhineland in
violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, in order to
acquire military strength and political bargaining power to be used
against other nations.
Hitler’s own eloquence in a secret speech delivered to all Supreme
Commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to
characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy. This document comes to
hand as a captured document found in the OKW files—OKW is Ober Kommando
der Wehrmacht (the High Command of the Army, Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces)—and was captured at Flensburg. The document is
numbered 789-PS in our numbered series of documents.
I have in my hand, if the Court please, the German original of this
document in the condition in which it was captured, and I wish to offer
the document in evidence and have it given the proper serial number as
the United States prosecutor’s exhibit. The serial number, I understand,
is United States Exhibit 23. I would ask that the German text of the
original be handed to the German interpreters.
If the Court please, understanding the ruling just made by the presiding
justice, although I have offered the entire document, as it is a very
long speech, I shall not read into the record the entire speech. Of
course the presiding judge said defense counsel may insert any other
parts of it as they wish.
I shall begin reading at the beginning, and read a little more than half
of the first page in the English text. I am advised that the German
original is marked with a blue pencil at the point where I shall stop
reading. I will read the English translation:
“November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Führer, to
which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Führer gives the
following speech:
“The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the
world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of
future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of
our Armed Forces was only possible in connection with the
ideological”—the German word is “weltanschaulich”—“education
of the German people by the Party.”
If I may interpolate just to comment on that interesting German word
“weltanschaulich”, I take it that ideological is about as close a
translation as we can get, but the word means more than that. It means a
whole attitude towards the world, a way of looking on the world.
“When I started my political task”—I am quoting again—“in
1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough
observation of the events of the day and the study of the
reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief
in the midst of setbacks which were not spared me during my
period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought
me success. Moreover, I had a clear recognition of the probable
course of historical events and the firm will to make brutal
decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I, after long
internal conflict, became a politician and took up the struggle
against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I
had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal.
First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to
educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After
15 years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and
many setbacks. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the
most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing
before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything,
beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the
Armed Forces. First, reorganization of the interior, abolishment
of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to
heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second
task: To release Germany from its international ties. Two
particular characteristics are to be pointed out: Secession from
the League of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament
Conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who
predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland
was large, the number of believers was very small. I was
supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I
carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament.
Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted
misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction
of compulsory armed service. After that, militarization of the
Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that
time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small.
Then, beginning of the fortification of the whole country,
especially in the west.
“One year later, Austria came.”—I suppose he meant Austria
went.—“This step also was considered doubtful. It brought about
a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was
Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also was not possible to
accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western
fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach
the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment
that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory.
That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into
Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the
Protectorate, and with that the basis for the action against
Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that time whether I
should start first against the East and then in the West, or
vice versa.”
There are some curious antitheses of thought in that speech, as in most
of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by
Providence with the making of brutal decisions. He constantly speaks of
how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German people
were with him. But he does give a brief summary of the gist of what is
contained in the allegations of the Indictment, to which I have invited
your attention:
The organization of the mass of the people, then extending to the Armed
Forces, and the various brutal decisions that he did make, about which
history knows.
That long document contains other material of great interest. It may be
that we shall advert to other portions of it later. At this point,
however, I have simply asked the Court to focus attention on the matter
I have just read and its bearing on the development of the conspiracy
during the period 1933 to 1936.
Another captured document is sufficient to demonstrate the preparations
for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during this period.
I refer to a top-secret letter dated 24 June 1935 from General Von
Brauchitsch to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.
Attached to that letter is a copy of a secret Reich Defense Law of 21
May 1935 and a copy of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on
the Council for the Defense of the Reich.
These documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. This group
of documents is numbered 2261-PS in our numbered series of documents. It
seems to us one of the most significant evidences of secret and direct
preparations for aggressive war.
I gave expression to a typographical error. That was General Von
Blomberg instead of Brauchitsch.
I have the original of these documents. I ask that they be admitted into
evidence as Exhibit USA-24.
The top page of that document, which I shall read in full, is the letter
signed “Von Blomberg, Berlin, 21 June 1935, Top Secret”; headed “The
Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, No.
1820/35 Top Secret L II a.”
“To: The Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of
the Navy, the Supreme Commander of the Air Forces.
“In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the
defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935, and of a decision of the
Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich Defense
Council. The publication of the Reich Defense Law is temporarily
suspended by order of the Führer and Reich Chancellor.
“The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of
the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be
‘Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy.’
“I request that the copies of the Reich Defense Law needed
within the units of the Armed Forces, be ordered before 1 July
1935 at Armed Forces Office (L) where it is to be established
with the request that the law should only be distributed down to
corps headquarters outside of the Reich Ministry of War.
“I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.”
Signed by “Von Blomberg.” Underneath that is an indorsement:
“Berlin, 3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To
Defense-Economic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl.”
“There is attached thereto, if the Tribunal please, the statute referred
to as the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, or rather it was enacted by
the Reich Cabinet, and it starts with the statement: “The Reich Cabinet
has enacted the following law that is hereby made public.”
There follows a law in detail covering preparations for state of
defense, mobilization, appointment of this Plenipotentiary-General for
War Economy, with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation
of the war, and a Part III providing for setting of penalties.
The law is signed:
“The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reich Minister of
War, Von Blomberg; the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick,” one of
the defendants. And at the bottom of it there is this note—that is on
Sheet 4 of the original German, I think:
“Note on the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935.
The publication of the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21
May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May
1935. The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler.”
So that although the law itself stated that it was made public, the
publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler; although the law became
immediately effective.
There is further attached a copy of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of
21 May 1935 on the council for the defense of the realm which deals
largely with organization for economic preparation for the war and which
I think was discussed by my colleague, Mr. Dodd, last week.
There can be no question that this law of May 21, 1935 was the
cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators. The
relationship of the Defendant Schacht to this preparation is made
transparently clear by this captured document.
So much, for the time being, on the preparatory phase of the conspiracy,
1933 to 1936.
As indicated earlier, the next phase of aggression was the formulation
and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that
order.
This is the phase of the aggression covered by Paragraphs 3 (a), (b),
and (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Pages 7 to 8
of the printed English text.
One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents
which have come to hand is a document which we have come to know as the
Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November
1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours, in the course of which Hitler outlined to
those present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their
foreign policy, and requested—I quote: “That his statements be looked
upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.” And so
with this document we shall present to the Tribunal and to the public
the last will and testament of Adolf Hitler as he contemplated that last
will and testament on 5 November 1937. The document comes to hand
through the United States Department of State and it is authenticated by
the seal of the Secretary of State of the United States. It is Document
Number 386-PS in our series of numbered documents. I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-25.
Before reading it, I note at the start that the recorder of the minutes
of this meeting, then Colonel Hossbach, was the Führer’s adjutant. I
note also the presence at this conspiratorial meeting of the Defendant
Erich Raeder. The Defendant Constantin von Neurath was present. The
Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Göring was present. The minutes of this
meeting reveal a crystalization towards the end of 1937 in the policy of
the Nazi regime. Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by
force. They would provide Lebensraum (living space) and improve
Germany’s military position for further operations. While it is true
that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat different manner
than that outlined at this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at
the meeting were carried out. The document destroys any possible doubt
concerning the Nazis’ premeditation of their Crimes against Peace. This
document is of such tremendous importance that I feel obliged to read it
in full into the record:
“Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the
Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.
“Present: The Führer and Reich Chancellor; the Reich Minister
for War, Generalfeldmarschall Von Blomberg; the C-in-C Army,
Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch; the C-in-C Navy,
Generaladmiral Dr. H. C. Raeder; the C-in-C Luftwaffe,
Generaloberst Göring; the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs,
Freiherr Von Neurath; Oberst Hossbach” (the adjutant who took
the minutes).
“The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s
conference was of such high importance that its detailed
discussion would certainly in other states take place before the
Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided
not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich
Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements
were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences
of his 4½ years in government; he desired to explain to those
present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and
necessities of expanding our foreign policy, and in the
interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his
statements be looked upon, in the case of his death, as his last
will and testament.
“The Führer then stated: The aim of German policy is the
security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation.
This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation
comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of
individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a
homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be
found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the
demand for larger living space more than for any other nation.
If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands
of this racial body for living space, then that is the result of
historical development spread over several centuries and should
this political condition continue to exist, it will represent
the greatest danger to the preservation of the German
nation”—The German word used there, is not “nation”; it is
“Volkstum”—“at its present high level. An arrest of the
decrease of the German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia
is just as little possible as the preservation of the present
state in Germany itself.”
I interpolate that I can but think that this is not a good translation
of the German because to me the sentence seems meaningless.
“Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a
consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a
number, of years, because political and philosophical ideas are
of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce
the basis for the realization of the actual claim of the
existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent
exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a
solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period,
about one to three generations.