If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to read the
first page of that directive, the first page of the English translation.
The paging may differ in the German original.
It is headed “The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed
Forces,” with a number of initials, the meaning of which I don’t know,
except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK chiefs, which I suppose
to be General Kommando chiefs:
“The Führer’s headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only
through officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21,
Case Barbarossa.
“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England.
(Case Barbarossa.)
“For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available
units with the reservation that the occupied territories will
have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.
“For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free such
strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick
completion of the ground operations may be expected and that
damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much
as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East
is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle
and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently
protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on
England, and especially the supply for them, must not be
permitted to break down.
“Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains
unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.
“If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for
action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended
beginning of operations.
“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not
yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15
May 1941.
“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an
attack will not be recognized.
“The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the
following basis:
“1. General Purpose:
“The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be
destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges
with tanks, and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into
the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.
“In quick pursuit, a line is to be reached from where the
Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich
territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from
Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. In case of
necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia
could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
“In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet
will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to
fight.
“Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be
prevented through powerful blows at the beginning of the
operations.”
Another secret document, captured from the OKW files. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a convenient time to
adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, another secret document
captured from the OKW files, we think establishes the motive for the
attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the full awareness of
the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would result
from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May 1941,
concerning the result of a discussion on that day with the state
secretaries concerning the Case Barbarossa. The document is initialled
by a Major Von Gusovius, a member of the staff of General Thomas set up
to handle the economic exploitations of the territory occupied by the
Germans during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document
is numbered 2718-PS in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-32.
I shall simply read the first two paragraphs of this document, including
the introductory matter:
“Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files 1a. Second copy
to General Schubert, May 2, 1941.”
“Memorandum about the result of today’s discussion with the
state secretaries about Barbarossa.
“1. The War can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by
Russia in the third year of war.
“2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us.”
That document has already been commented on and quoted from in Mr.
Justice Jackson’s opening statement. The staggering implications of that
document are hard to realize. In the words of the document, the motive
for the attack was that the war which the Nazi conspirators had launched
in September 1939 “can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by
Russia in the third year of the war.” Perhaps, there never was a more
sinister sentence written than the sentence in this document which
reads:
“There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will
be starved to death if we take out of the country the things
necessary for us.”
The result is known to all of us.
I turn now to the Nazi collaboration with Italy and Japan and the
resulting attack on the United States on 7 December 1941. With the
unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June
1941, the Nazi conspirators, and in particular, the Defendant
Ribbentrop, called upon the eastern co-architect of the New Order,
Japan, to attack in the rear. Our evidence will show that they incited
and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack
on the United States. For a time, they maintained their preference that
the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the
military implication of an entry of the United States into the war.
However, their incitement did result in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and
long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would
declare war on the United States should a United States-Japanese
conflict break out. It was in reliance on those assurances that the
Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.
On the present discussion of this phase of the case, I shall offer only
one document to prove this point. The document was captured from the
files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes dated 4 April
1941, signed by “Schmidt,” regarding discussions between the Führer and
the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Defendant
Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-33. In the original, it is in very
large, typewritten form in German. I shall read what I deem to be the
pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs;
first reading the heading, the heading being:
“Notes regarding the discussion between the Führer and the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Reich
Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of State Meissner, in
Berlin, on 4 April 1941.
“Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Führer should
instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as
broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military
Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly
concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making
available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
the latest technical improvements and inventions.”—For the
record, I am reading on what is page 6 of the German original.—
“Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United
States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore,
the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight
with the United States, because in that case America probably
would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed
that the United States could be restrained, by diplomatic
exertions, from entering the war at the side of Great Britain.
Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst
situation,—that is, with war against America. They were of the
opinion that such a war would extend for 5 years or longer, and
would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific, and
would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German
experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to
Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted
and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all
details such as periscopes and such like, could best be
exploited by Japan.
“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Führer should see to it
that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal
of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning
navy and army which were needed by the Japanese.
“The Führer promised this and pointed out that Germany, too,
considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but
that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In
Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contributions
depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this
again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war
against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening, not merely
against England, but also against America. Germany has made her
preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would
conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats
and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which
would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would
be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the
German soldiers naturally rank high above the Americans.
“In the further course of the discussion, the Führer pointed out
that Germany, on her part, would immediately take the
consequences if Japan would get involved with the United States.
It did not matter with whom the United States would first get
involved, whether with Germany or with Japan. They would always
try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
understanding with the other country subsequently, but to
liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would
strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a
conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the
tripartite powers lies in their joint action; their weakness
would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.
“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Führer might
give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German
authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the
latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to
them because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a
conflict with the United States.
“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained
further that he has always declared in his country that sooner
or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if
Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion
this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon
herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps
avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained
predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan,
many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka
was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous
thoughts. He, however, stated that if Japan continued to walk
along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway
and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances
than at present.
“The Führer replied that he could well understand the situation
of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in similar situations
(the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of
Armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
unavoidable fight, at a time when he himself was still young and
full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by
events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to
reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be
it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers
come to them, but who will bravely face them.
“Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather their ruling
politicians, had recently still attempted a last maneuver
towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan
on account of China or the South Seas, provided that Japan gave
free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to
their place of destination. However, America would war against
Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the
intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an
argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the
Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines
which many had received.
“The Führer commented on this, that this attitude of America did
not mean anything, but that the United States had the hope that,
as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could
advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in
case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally
isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
“The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans
precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the
powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other
hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a
joint action of Japan and Germany.
“Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give
to the Führer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude
inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him
regretfully of the fact that he, Matsuoka, in his capacity as
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not utter in Japan
a single word of all that he had expounded before the Führer and
the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause
him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once
before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something
about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these
things, and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he, as
Foreign Minister, had to oppose energetically, though as a rule
he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also
could not indicate how soon he could report on the questions
discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would
have to study exactly and carefully, in the first place, the
development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable
moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the
Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to
be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be
spoiled by talk.
“Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that
would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of
conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he
succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He
himself felt confident that he would succeed.
“On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the
Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the
Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however,
state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
“Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in
the matter of Singapore, because he had reason to fear that by
cabling, something might leak out. If necessary, he would send a
courier.
“The Führer agreed and assured, after all, that he could rest
entirely assured of German reticence.
“Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but
unfortunately could not say the same for Japan.
“The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some
personal parting words.
“Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. (Signed) Schmidt.”
This completes the presentation of what I have called the “handful of
selected documents,” offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these
wars of aggression, but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the
deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was
carried out.
I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological presentation of
the various stages of the aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]
SIXTH DAY
Tuesday, 27 November 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr.
Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose
of the Tribunal, when citing documents, if you would refer to them not
only by the United States exhibit number and the PS document number, but
also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I
understand it, has either a letter or a number. They are numbered
alphabetically, I think. If that is not done, when we have got a great
number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where
the particular exhibit is.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes.
May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected documents which I
presented yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war
case, as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the
phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running
account of the entire matter.
Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it might be
helpful to pause at this point, to present to the Tribunal a chart. This
chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the
Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual
summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a
background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am
quite certain that, as your minds go back to those days, you remember
the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press, as these
tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you
must have formed the concept, as I did in those days, of the gradually
developing head of a wolf.
In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower
jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took
over Austria—the Anschluss—that red portion became solid black. It
became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired,
Czechoslovakia was already, with its head and the main part of its body,
in the mouth of the wolf.
Then on chart two you see the mountainous portions, the fortified
portions of Czechoslovakia. In red, you see the Sudetenland territories
which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon
Czechoslovakia’s head became diminutive in the mouth of the wolf.
And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red, with its neck
practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of
Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf’s head became a solid, black blot on
the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions,
which, of course, occurred.
That is the visual picture that I have never been able to wipe out of my
mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything
that went along after the taking over of Austria.
The detailed more or less chronological presentation of the aggressive
war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section
is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933
to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against
Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechoslovakia.
The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the
initiation of actual war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the
Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor
presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals
with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression, by
invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. The details
on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief
Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet
Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of convenience
again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression
against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made
his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal
with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the
United States.
I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the case
concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936.
The particular section of the Indictment to which this discussion
addresses itself is paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c),
(d), (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal
will recall the allegation. It will be necessary, as I proceed, to make
reference to certain provisions of the Charter, and to certain
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty between the
United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921,
which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and
certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 October 1925.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this document book
should have some identifying letter or number?
MR. ALDERMAN: “M”, I am informed. I do not offer those treaties in
evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent
treaties in their aspect of the case.
The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after World War I.
Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature, and the fact that they
could have been interrupted at numerous points, do not detract from the
continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the Indictment on
the period from 1933 to 1945, does not disassociate these events from
what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus, the ascendancy of
Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933, was already a
well-advanced milestone on the German road to progress.
By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial
proportions. At that time, their plans called for the acquisition of
political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the
consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and
potentialities.
As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful progress along
this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become
disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing
international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the
Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the
fields necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had been an
increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that
Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and
subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of
the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was
indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which
they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan
and for the same reasons, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament
Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry
out their plans on the basis of existing international obligations or of
the orthodox kind of future commitments.
The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are
now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial
notice.
It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic operation was
preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all
participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a
long-prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary step in
the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently
committed.
To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be the unnecessary
laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bringing to
light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were
hitherto unavailable.
The three things of immediate international significance referred to in
this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are:
First, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and,
third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each
of these steps was progressively more serious than the matter of
international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the
possibility of sanction being applied by other countries and, in
particular, a strong military action from France, with the possible
assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that
nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also
estimated correctly, that no one or combination of Big Powers would
undertake the responsibility of such a war. The withdrawal from the
Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course,
action that did not violate any international obligation. The League
Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case
and as part of the bigger plan, the significance of these actions cannot
be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plans for
aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military
service was a more daring action with a more overt significance. It was
a violation of Versailles, but they got away with it. Then, came the
outright military defiance, the occupation of the demilitarized zone of
the Rhineland.
Still on the Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges the
determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of
Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very
early is not only confirmed by their own statements, but they boasted
about their long planning and careful execution.
I read to you yesterday at length from our Exhibit 789-PS, Exhibit
USA-23, Hitler’s speech to all Supreme Commanders, 23 November 1939. I
need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to
wipe out Versailles. After 4 years of actual war, the Defendant Jodl, as
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to
the Reich and to the Gauleiter in which he traced the development of
German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of
fighting sovereignty, including conscription, occupation of the
Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air
forces.
I have, if the Tribunal please, our Document Number L-172. It is a
photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that
photostat as Exhibit USA-34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only
a part of that, but starting at the beginning.
The speech is entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the
Fifth Year of War.” It is a kind of retrospective summary by the
Defendant General Jodl. “A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces to the Reich- and Gauleiter, delivered in Munich on 7
November 1943.” I am reading from the English translation:
“Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you
a review today of the strategic position at the beginning of the
fifth year of war.
“I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I
undertook this none-too-easy task. It is not possible to do it
justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to talk
about what will come but one must say frankly what the situation
is. No one, the Führer has ordered, may know more or be told
more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no
doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great
deal, in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your
Gaue, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the
widespread enemy propaganda, defeatism, and malicious rumors are
concentrated. Up and down the country the devil of subversion
strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call
it—a political solution. They say we must negotiate while there
is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use
of to attack the natural feeling of the people, that in this war
there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of
the nation; the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy
propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to
know the true situation, and for this reason I believe that I am
justified in giving you a perfectly open and unvarnished account
of the present state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure
of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify
the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided
by force of arms, but by the will to resist of the entire
people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home.
Italy suffered not military defeat but moral defeat. She broke
down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected
but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate a
thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side
would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you,
gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data
concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as
your secret; all the rest is at your disposal, without
restriction, for application in your activities as leaders of
the people.
“The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and
everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of
Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried the
danger which menaced us . . . both from Poland and from the
Western Powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the
direction of the Mediterranean and into Russia—these also
aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war, so
long as we were successful. It was not until more serious
set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to
become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask
themselves whether, perhaps, we had not undertaken more than we
could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this
questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for
use in your own work of enlightenment, is one of the main points
of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:
“I. A review of the most important questions of past
developments;
“II. Consideration of the present situation;
“III. The foundations of our confidence in victory.
“In view of my position as Military Advisor to the Führer, I
shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own
personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time,
that in view of the Protean nature of this war, I shall in this
way, be giving expression to only one aspect of the events.
“I. The review:
“1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its
struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles, is
not one on which I need expatiate, in this circle. I should
like, however, to mention at this point how clearly all
thoughtful professional soldiers realize what an important part
has been played by the National Socialist movement in
reawakening the military spirit (the Wehrwille), in nurturing
fighting strength (the Wehrkraft), and in rearming the German
people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the
numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope
with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of
action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at—and has so happily
been successful in bringing about—was the fusion of these two
forces.
“2. The seizure of power . . .”—I invite the Tribunal’s
attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in
all of these documents.—“The seizure of power by the Nazi Party
in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration of
military sovereignty.”
That is the German word “Wehrhoheit”—a kind of euphemism there—“the
highness of defense.” I think it really means “fighting sovereignty.”
Wehrhoheit also meant conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and
rearmament, with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern
armored and air arm.
“3. The Austrian Anschluss . . .”—Anschluss means “locking on
to,” I think. They latched on to Austria and—“The Austrian
Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment
of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of
reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving
our strategic position. Whereas, up until then, the territory of
Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into
Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base
for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself
was now enclosed by pincers.”
I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment and see that
worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General Jodl calls a “wasp waist
in the direction of France,” and then he very accurately described what
happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss, that the “wasp waist”
was “enclosed in the pincers.”