new English Ministry have offered, through the Ministers of Russia, a
cessation of arms to Holland, and a renewal of the treaty of 1674. M.
de Berkenrode seemed to be of the opinion, that the offer was intended
to gain time, to obstruct the concert of operations with France for
the ensuing campaign, and to prevent the conclusion of a Treaty with
America. It is apprehended, that it may have some effect in
strengthening the hands of the English party in that country, and
retard affairs a little, but it is hoped, that the proposal will not
be finally agreed to. It would indeed render the Dutch ridiculous. A,
having a cane in his hand, meets his neighbor B, who happens to have
none, takes the advantage and gives him a sound drubbing. B, having
found a stick, and coming to return the blows he received, A says, my
old friend, why should we quarrel? We are neighbors, let us be good
ones, and live peaceably by each other as we used to do. If B is so
easily satisfied, and lays aside his stick, the rest of the neighbors,
as well as A, will laugh at him. This is the light in which I stated
it. Enclosed I send you a copy of the proposition.
I see by the newspapers, that the Spaniards, having taken a little
post called St Joseph, pretend to have made a conquest of the Illinois
country. In what light does this proceeding appear to Congress? While
they decline our offered friendship, are they to be suffered to
encroach on our bounds, and shut us up within the Appalachian
mountains? I begin to fear they have some such project.
Having seen in the English prints an article from Lisbon, that two
American ships, under French colors, being arrived in that port, were
seized by the government, I asked the Portuguese Ambassador if it was
true. He said he had no advice of it, as he certainly should have had
if such a thing had happened; he therefore did not give the least
credit to it, and said, we might make ourselves perfectly easy; no
such treatment would in his opinion be offered us in their ports; and
he further observed, on the falsehood of English newspapers, their
having lately asserted, that the Congress had issued letters of marque
for cruising against the Portuguese.
With great esteem, &c.
B. FRANKLIN.
* * * * *
TO DAVID HARTLEY.
Passy, April 13th, 1782.
Dear Sir,
Since mine of the 5th, I have thought further of the subject of our
late letters. You were of opinion, that the late Ministry desired
_sincerely_ a reconciliation with America, and with that view a
separate peace with us was proposed. It happened, that, at the same
time, Lord North had an emissary here to sound the French Ministers
with regard to peace, and to make them very advantageous propositions,
in case they would abandon America. You may judge from hence, my dear
friend, what opinion I must have formed of the intentions of your
Ministers. To convince you of the truth of this, I may acquaint you,
that the emissary was a Mr Forth; and that the answer given him to
carry back to the English Ministers, was, "_that the King of France is
as desirous of peace as the King of England; and that he would accede
to it as soon as he could with dignity and safety; but it is a matter
of the last importance for His Most Christian Majesty to know, whether
the Court of London is disposed to treat on equal terms with the
allies of France_."
Mr Forth went off with this answer for London, but probably did not
arrive till after the dismission of the Ministers that sent him. You
may make any use of this information, as you judge proper. The new
Ministry may see by it the principles that govern this Court; and it
will convince them, I hope, that the project of dividing us is as vain
as it would be to us injurious. I cannot judge what they will think or
do in consequence of the answer sent by Mr Forth, if they have seen
it. If they love peace, as they have persuaded the English nation and
all Europe to believe, they can be under no difficulty. France has
opened a path, which in my opinion they may use, without hurting the
dignity of their master, or the honor of the nation. If they do not
choose it, they doubtless flatter themselves, that a war may still
produce successes in favor of England, that have hitherto been
withheld. The crowning or frustrating such hopes belongs to Divine
Providence; may God send us all more wisdom!
I am ever, my dear friend, yours most affectionately,
B. FRANKLIN.
* * * * *
TO JOHN ADAMS.
Passy, April 13th, 1782.
Sir,
Enclosed with this, I send to your Excellency the packet of
correspondence between Mr Hartley and me, which I promised in my last.
You will see, that we held nearly the same language; which gives me
pleasure.
While Mr Hartley was making propositions to me, with the approbation
or privity of Lord North, to treat separately from France, that
Minister had an emissary here, a Mr Forth, formerly a Secretary of
Lord Stormont's, making proposals to induce this Court to treat
without us. I understand, that several sacrifices were offered to be
made, and among the rest Canada to be given up to France. The
substance of the answer appears in my last letter to Mr Hartley. But
there is a sentence omitted in that letter, which I much liked, viz.
"_that whenever the two Crowns should come to treat, His Most
Christian Majesty would show how much the engagements he might
enter into were to be relied on, by his exact observance of those he
already had with his present allies_."
If you have received anything in consequence of your answer by Digges,
you will oblige me by communicating it. The Ministers here were much
pleased with the account given them of your interview by the
Ambassador.
With great respect, I am, Sir, your Excellency's, &c.
B. FRANKLIN.
* * * * *
COUNT DE VERGENNES TO B. FRANKLIN.
Translation.
Versailles, April 23d, 1782.
Sir,
The Baron de Blome has just sent me the annexed Memorial, and the only
use I can make of it is to communicate it to you, persuaded that you
will forward it to Congress.
I have the honor to be, &c.
DE VERGENNES.
* * * * *
_Complaint from Denmark against an American Privateer called the
Henry._
Translation.
The Court of Denmark has been informed, that the ship Providence of
Christiana in Norway, destined from London for St Thomas, a Danish
Island, with a cargo of divers merchandise, has been stopped in the
latitude of Antigua, by an American privateer called the Henry,
Captain Thomas Benson, and has been conducted into a port of New
England, under the pretence, that the cargo might be English property.
As this act is prejudicial to the credit, security, and liberty of the
Danish flag, the underwritten has been charged, by order of his Court,
to communicate the same to his Excellency the Count de Vergennes,
requesting, that he will be pleased to effect, by his intervention, a
prompt and entire restitution of the said vessel and cargo, with
damages proportioned to the unjust detention; and that he will be kind
enough at the same time to endeavor to obtain, that precise orders be
given to the American privateers not to trouble in anywise the
navigation and commerce of Denmark, but to respect its flag.
The Court has the greater right to expect this compliance on the part
of the Americans, as they continue to enjoy every liberty, and to find
every assistance in its American islands, and they will always
experience the same kind treatment on the part of Denmark, provided
they correspond by proceedings equally amicable.
DE BLOME.
* * * * *
DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.
London, May 1st, 1782.
My Dear Friend,
I have received a packet from you containing several letters of
various dates. As I shall probably have a safe opportunity of
conveyance to you when Mr Laurens leaves this country, I am now
sitting down to write to you an _omnium_ kind of letter of various
matters as they occur. The late Ministry being departed, I may now
speak of things more freely. I will take a sentence in one of your
letters for my text. Vide yours of April 13th, 1782, in which you
say, _you were of opinion that the late Ministry desired SINCERELY a
reconciliation with America, and with that view a separate peace_ with
us was proposed. I must qualify this sentence much before I can adopt
it as my opinion. As to _reconciliation_, I never gave much credit to
them for that wish. _It is a sweet expression. It certainly means MORE
than peace._ The utmost I ever gave the late Ministry credit for, was
a wish for peace. And I still believe, that the wisest among them grew
from day to day more disposed to peace, or an abatement of the war, in
proportion as they became more alarmed for their own situations and
their responsibility. Had the war been more successful, I should not
have expected much relenting towards peace or reconciliation. That
this has always been the measure of my opinion of them, I refer you to
some words in a letter from me to you, dated January 5th, 1780, for
proof--"but for the point of sincerity; why, as to that, I have not
much to say; I have at least expected some hold upon their
_prudence_."
My argument runs thus, it is a _bargain_ for _you_ (Ministers) to be
sincere _now_. Common prudence may hint to you to look to yourselves.
It has amazed me beyond measure, that this principle of common selfish
_prudence_ has not had the effect which I expected. I have not been
disposed to be deceived by any conciliatory professions, which I
considered only as arising from prudence, and I hope that I have not
led you into any deception, having so fully explained myself to you on
that head. Had the American war been more prosperous on the part of
the late Ministry, I do not believe the late resignation would have
taken place. But it is evident, from the proposition to the Court of
France, which you have communicated to me, (and which I have
communicated to the present Ministry your letter) that even to the
last hour some part of the late Ministry were still set upon the
American war to the last extremity; and probably another more
_prudent_ part of the Ministry would proceed no further; which, if it
be so, may reasonably be imputed as the cause of the dissolution of
the late Ministry.
These have been the arguments, which I have always driven and insisted
upon with the greatest expectation of success, viz. _prudential_
arguments from the total impracticability of the war, responsibility,
&c. I have been astonished beyond measure, that these arguments have
not sooner had their effect. If I could give you an idea of the many
conferences, which I have had upon the subject, I should tell you,
that many times _Felix has trembled_. When reduced by the terror of
responsibility either to renounce the American war, or to relinquish
their places, they have chosen the latter; which is a most wretched
and contemptible retribution either to their country or to mankind,
for the desolation in which they have involved every nation, that they
have ever been connected with. Peace they would not leave behind them.
Their legacy to their country, and to mankind has been, _let darkness
be the burier of the dead_!
As to the proposal of a separate peace arising from a desire of
_reconciliation_, it certainly was so on the part of the people of
England, but on the part of the late Ministry, it probably arose from
the hopes of suggesting to France ideas of some infidelity on the part
of America towards them. If you should ask me, why I have _seemed_ to
conspire with this, my answer is very plain. In the first place, if I
could have prevailed with the late Ministry to have actually made an
irrevocable offer, _on their own part_, of a separate peace to
America, that very offer would in the same instant have become on
their part also a consent to a general peace; because _they_ never had
any wish to a separate contest with France, and America being out of
the question, _they_ would have thought of nothing after that but a
general peace. I never could bring them even to this. _They_ wished
that _America_ should make the offer of a separate treaty, for obvious
views. _My_ proposal was, that _they_ should offer irrevocable terms
of peace to America. If they had meant what they pretended, and what
the people of England did really desire, they would have adopted that
proposition. Then the question would have come forward upon the fair
and honorable construction of a treaty between France and America,
_the essential and direct end_ of which was fully accomplished. When I
speak of Great Britain offering irrevocable terms of peace to America,
I mean such terms as would have effectually satisfied the provision of
the treaty, viz. tacit independence.
I send you a paper entitled a _Breviate_, which I laid before the late
Ministry, and their not having acted upon it, was a proof to me that
the disposition of their heart to America was not altered, but that
all their relenting arose from the impracticability of that war, and
their want of success in it. But desponding as they were at last, it
was not inconsistent with my expectations of their conduct, that they
should make great offers to France to abandon America. It was the only
weapon left in their hands. In course of negotiating with the late
Ministry, I perceived their courage drooping from time to time, for
the last three or four years, and it was upon that ground I gave them
credit for an increasing disposition towards peace. Some dropped off,
others sunk under the load of folly, and at last they all failed. My
argument _ad homines_ to the late Ministry might be stated thus. _If
you don't kill them, they will kill you._ But the war is impracticable
_on your part_; ergo, the best thing you can do _for your own sake_ is
to make _peace_. This was reasoning to men, and through men to things.
But there is no measure of rage in pride and disappointment,
Spicula coeca relinquunt
Infixa venis, animasque in vulnere ponunt.
So much for the argument of the _breviate_, as far as it respected the
late Ministry. It was a test which proved that they were not sincere
in their professions. If they had been in earnest, to have given the
war a turn towards the House of Bourbon, and to have dropped the
American war, a plain road lay before them. The sentiments of the
people of England were conformable to the argument of that breviate;
or rather I should say, what is the real truth, that the arguments of
the breviate were dictated by the notoriety of that sentiment in the
people of England. My object and wish always has been to strike at the
root of the evil, the American war.
If the British nation have jealousies and resentments against the
House of Bourbon, yet still the first step in every case would be to
rescind the American war, and not to keep it lurking in the rear, to
become hereafter, in case of certain events, a reversionary war with
America for unconditional terms. This reversionary war was never the
object of the people of England; therefore the argument of the
breviate was calculated bona fide to accomplish their views, and to
discriminate the fallacious pretences of the late administration from
the real wishes of the country, as expressed in the circular
resolution of many counties in the year 1780, first moved at York, on
March 28th, 1780. Every other principle and every mode of conduct only
imply, as you very justly express it, a secret hope that war may still
produce successes, and then--. The designs which have been lurking
under this pretext could not mean anything else than this. Who knows
but that we may still talk to America at last. The only test of clear
intentions would have been this, to have cut up the American war, and
all possible return to it for any cause, or under any pretext. I am
confident that the sentiment of the people of England is, and always
has been, to procure peace and reconciliation with America, and to
vindicate the national honor in the contest with the House of Bourbon.
If this intention had been pursued in a simple and direct manner, I am
confident that the honor and safety of the British nation would long
ago have been established in a general peace with all the belligerent
powers. These are the sentiments upon which I have always acted in
those negotiations, which I have had upon the subject of peace with
the late Ministry; reconciliation with America, and peace with all the
world, upon terms consistent with the honor and safety of my own
country.
Peace must be sought in such ways, as promise the greatest degree of
practicability. The sentiments of individuals as philanthropists may
be overborne by the power of ancient prejudices, which too frequently
prevail in the aggregates of nations. In such case, the
philanthropist, who wishes the good of his own country and of mankind,
must be the bulrush bending to the storm, and not the sturdy oak,
unavailingly resisting. National prejudices are, I hope, generally
upon the decline. Reason and humanity gain ground every day against
their _natural_ enemies, folly and injustice. The ideas of nations
being _natural_ enemies to each other are generally reprobated. But
still _jealousies_ and ancient rivalships remain, which obstruct the
road to peace among men. If one belligerent nation will entertain a
standing force of three or four hundred thousand fighting men, other
nations must have defended frontiers and barrier towns, and the
barrier of a neighboring island, whose constitution does not allow a
standing military force, must consist in a superiority at sea. It is
necessary for her own defence. If all nations by mutual consent will
reduce their _offensive_ powers, which they only claim under the
pretext of necessary _defence_, and bring forward the reign of the
millennium; then away with your frontiers and barriers, and your
Gibraltars, and the key of the Baltic, and all the hostile array of
nations,
Aspera compositis nitescant sæcula bellis.
These must be the sentiments of every philanthropist in his interior
thoughts. But if we are not to seek peace by some practicable method,
accommodated to the remaining prejudices of the multitude, we shall
not in our own time, I fear, see that happy day. If Great Britain and
France are ancient rivals, then, until the reign of the millennium
shall approach, arrange that rivalship upon equitable terms, as the
two leading nations of Europe, set them in balance to each other; the
one by land, the other by sea. Give to France her elevated rank among
the nations of Europe. Give to Great Britain the honor of her flag,
and the security of her island by her wooden walls, and there would be
no obstruction to general and perpetual peace. The prejudices of
disrespect between nations prevail only among the inferior ranks.
Believe me, for one at least, I have the highest sentiments of
respect for the nation of France. I have no other sentiments of
hostility but what are honorable towards them, and which, as a member
of a rival State at war with them, consists in the duty of vigilance
which I owe towards the honor and interests of my own country. I am
not conscious of a word or a thought, which on _the point of honor_ I
would wish to have concealed from a French Minister.
In the mode which I have proposed of unraveling the present subjects
of jealousy and contest, I would make my proposals openly to France
herself. Let America be free, and enjoy happiness and peace forever.
If France and Great Britain have jealousies or rivalships between
themselves, as European nations, I then say to France, let us settle
these points between ourselves, if unfortunately we shall not be able
by honorable negotiation to compromise the indispensable points of
national honor and safety. This would be my language to France, open
and undisguised. In the meanwhile I desire you to observe, that it
would not be with reluctance that I should offer eternal freedom,
happiness, and peace to America. You know my thoughts too well to
suspect that. I speak only as in a state of war, desirous to arrange
the complicated interests, and to secure the respective honor of
nations. My wishes are, and always have been for the peace, liberty,
and safety of mankind. In the pursuit of those blessed objects, not
only this country and America, but France herself and the House of
Bourbon, may justly claim the conspiring exertions of every free and
liberal mind, even among their temporary enemies and rivals.
I am, &c.
D. HARTLEY.
* * * * *
_Breviate mentioned in the preceding Letter._
_February 7th, 1782._--It is stated, that America is disposed to enter
into a negotiation of peace with Great Britain, without requiring any
formal recognition of independence; always understood, that they are
to act in conjunction with their allies, conformable to treaties.
It is therefore recommended to give for reply, that the Ministers of
Great Britain are likewise disposed to enter into a negotiation for
peace, and that they are ready to open a general treaty for that
purpose.
If the British Ministers should see any objection to a general treaty,
but should still be disposed to enter into a separate treaty with
America, it is then recommended to them to offer such terms to America
as shall induce her to apply to her allies for their consent, that she
should be permitted to enter into a separate treaty with Great
Britain. The condition of which being the consent of allies, no
proposition of any breach of faith can be understood to be required by
them, by the requisition of a separate treaty.
The British Ministers are free to make any propositions to America,
which they may think proper, provided they be not dishonorable in
themselves, which in the present case is barred by the supposition of
consent being obtained. In this case, therefore, if they should be
inclined to offer a separate treaty, it is recommended to them to
offer such terms to America, as should induce her to be desirous of
closing with the proposal of a separate treaty, on the grounds of
national security and interests, and likewise such as may constitute
to them a case of reason and justice, upon which they may make
requisition to their allies for their consent. It is suggested, that
the offer to America of a truce of sufficient length, together with
the removal of the British troops, would be equivalent to that case,
which is provided for in the treaty of February 6th, 1778, between
America and France, viz. _tacit_ independence; and the declared ends
of that alliance being accomplished, it would not be reasonable that
America should be dragged on by their allies in a war, the continuance
of which, between France and Great Britain, could only be caused by
separate European jealousies and resentments (if unfortunately for the
public peace any such should arise) between themselves, independent
and unconnected with the American cause. It is to be presumed, that
France would not in point of honor to her allies refuse her consent so
requested, as any rivalship or punctilios between her and Great
Britain, as European nations, (principles which too frequently disturb
the peace of mankind) could not be considered as _casus foederis_ of
the American alliance; and their pride as a belligerent power would
not permit them to claim the assistance of America as necessary to
their support, thereby proclaiming their nation unequal to the contest
in case of the continuance of a war with Great Britain, after the
settlement and pacification with America. Their consent, therefore, is
to be presumed. But if they should demur on this point, if Great
Britain should be disposed to concede _tacit_ independence to America
by a long truce, and the removal of the troops, and if the obstruction
should evidently occur on the part of France, under any equivocal or
captious construction of a _defensive_ treaty of alliance between
America and France, Great Britain would from thenceforward stand upon
advantage ground, either in any negotiation with America, or in the
continuance of a war including America, but not arising from any
further resentments of Great Britain towards America, but imposed
reluctantly upon both parties by the conduct of the Court of France.