that in case the said ship, which is now expected to be soon in the
European seas on her return, should happen to fall into your hands,
you would not consider her as an enemy, nor suffer any plunder to be
made of the effects contained in her, nor obstruct her immediate
return to England, by detaining her or sending her into any other part
of Europe or America, but that you would treat the said Captain Cook
and his people with all civility and kindness, affording them, as
common friends to mankind, all the assistance in your power, which
they may happen to stand in need of. In so doing, you will not only
gratify the generosity of your own dispositions, but there is no doubt
of your obtaining the approbation of Congress, and of your own
American owners.
I have the honor to be, &c.
B. FRANKLIN,
_Minister Plenipotentiary from the Congress of the_
_United States to the Court of France_.
* * * * *
TO DAVID HARTLEY.
Passy, March 21st, 1779.
Dear Sir,
I received duly yours of the 2d instant. I am sorry you have had so
much trouble in the affair of the prisoners. You have been deceived as
well as I. No cartel ship has yet appeared; and it is now evident,
that the delays have been of design, to give more opportunity of
seducing the men by promises and hardships to seek their liberty in
engaging against their country; for we learn from those who have
escaped, that there are persons continually employed in cajoling and
menacing them; representing to them that we neglect them; that your
government is willing to exchange them; and that it is our fault it is
not done; that all the news from America is bad on their side; we
shall be conquered and they will be hanged, if they do not accept the
gracious offer of being pardoned, on condition of serving the King,
&c. A great part of your prisoners have been kept these six months on
board a ship in Brest road, ready to be delivered; where I am afraid
they were not so comfortably accommodated, as they might have been in
French prisons. They are now ordered on shore. Doctor Bancroft has
received your letter here. He did not go to Calais.
Knowing how earnestly and constantly you wish for peace, I cannot end
a letter to you without dropping a word on that subject, to mark that
my wishes are still in unison with yours. After the barbarities your
nation has exercised against us, I am almost ashamed to own that I
feel sometimes for her misfortunes and her insanities. Your veins are
open, and your best blood continually running. You have now got a
little army into Georgia, and are triumphing in that success. Do you
expect ever to see that army again? I know not what General Lincoln or
General Thomson may be able to effect against them, but if they stay
through the summer in that climate, there is a certain _General
Fever_, that I apprehend will give a good account of most of them.
Perhaps you comfort yourselves that our loss of blood is as great as
yours. But as physicians say, there is a great difference in the
facility of repairing that loss between an old body and a young one.
America adds to her numbers annually one hundred and fifty thousand
souls. She, therefore, grows faster than you can diminish her, and
will out-grow all the mischief you can do her. Have you the same
prospects? But it is unnecessary for me to represent to you, or you to
me, the mischiefs that each nation is subjected to by the war; we all
see clear enough the nonsense of continuing it; the difficulty is,
where to find sense enough to put an end to it.
Adieu, my dear friend, and believe me, &c.
B. FRANKLIN.
* * * * *
DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.
London, April 22d, 1779.
My Dear Friend,
The bearer of this, and some other papers, is a very sensible and
worthy gentleman, with whom I had the pleasure of contracting an
acquaintance since the commencement of the American troubles,
originally upon the business of the American prisoners. It is a
satisfaction to me at all times to have found him a friend to the
restoration of peace between the two countries. It has likewise been
an additional satisfaction and confirmation to me in my own thoughts
upon that subject, to find that his sentiments, I think upon most, or
all of the subjects upon which we have conversed, have coincided with
mine. We both seem possessed of the opinion, that some plan of opening
a negotiation upon preliminaries, which each side might find to be a
sufficient security to itself, might be practicable; and then your
sentiment, which you gave me in a letter some years ago, might have
its free scope and effect, viz, _A little time given for cooling might
have excellent effects_.
The sentiments I have opened to you in my late letters for some months
past, and which I have reduced in an enclosed paper into a more
specific shape, seem to me, upon very repeated reflection, to promise
the fairest ground of good expectation. These propositions originate
from myself, as a mediator; I have communications with both sides, but
certainly no authority to make proposals from either; and perhaps
neither side, if I were to make the propositions separately to each,
(being myself unauthorised) might give me positive consent. Each side
separately might say, No, from what is called political prudence; and
yet each side might secretly wish that the offer could be made, with a
_done first_, from the other party. I think the proposition of a truce
for five or seven years, leaving all things in the present dispute _in
status quo_, must be advantageous to all parties, if it were only in
consideration that a general satisfactory peace to all parties _may_
come among the _excellent effects of time given for cooling_. We can
but fight it out at last. War never comes too late; wisdom may step in
between. These matters have stolen upon us, and have arisen to great
and formidable consequences, from small and unexpected beginnings; but
henceforward, we should know by experience what to expect. If the rage
of war could but be abated for a sufficient length of time for reason
and reflection to operate, I think it would never revive. I cannot
pretend to forecast the result of any negotiation, but I think war
would not revive; which is all that I want for my argument. Peace is a
_bonum in se_; whereas the most favorable events of war are but
relatively lesser evils; certainly they are evils; _mala in se_, not
_bona in se_.
I hope that a cessation of hostilities would produce a renewal of
reflection; but even to take the argument at the worst advantage, the
two parties are at a cooling distance of three thousand miles asunder.
If the flames of war could be but once extinguished, does not the
Atlantic ocean contain cold water enough to prevent them bursting out
again? I am very strongly of opinion that the two nations of Great
Britain and North America, would accord to the proposition of a truce
_for cooling_. I cannot say whether a British ministry would accord to
it, because they will not tell me; nor can I say whether an American
Plenipotentiary would accord to it, because, probably, you will not
tell me. I put myself into your hands, however, when I tell you
frankly, I am of opinion that both would accord to it, if there could
be a _done first_ on either side, to bind the bargain fast. You have
the odds of me in this matter, because you know one half of the
question; and I cannot give you any proof on the other side, but only
my own presumptive judgment upon observation, and upon a course of
reasoning in my own thoughts.
But for France. My judgment would be, that if the proposition of the
proposed preliminaries should be agreeable to America, France would do
very unhandsomely to defeat it by their refusal. I likewise think it
the interest of France, because their interest leads them to go to a
certain point, and no further. There is a disparity in the operation
of the terms of the alliance on the part of France, and on the part of
America. The more vigorously France interposes, the better for
America; in proportion to their exertions, they create, less or more,
a diversion of the British force; this reasoning goes straight forward
for America; but it is not so with France. There is a certain point to
France, beyond which their work would fail, and recoil upon
themselves; if they were to drive the British Ministry totally to
abandon the American war, it would become totally a French war. The
events of a twelvemonth past seem to bear testimony to this course of
reasoning. The disadvantage upon the bargain to America is, that the
efficacy of the French alliance to them presupposes their continuance
in the war. The demur to France is, that the liberation of their new
ally recoils with double weight of the war upon themselves, without
any ulterior points of advantage in view, as dependent upon that
alliance. I think the interest of all parties coincides with the
proposition of preliminaries.
The proposed preliminaries appear to me to be just and equitable to
all parties; but the great object with me is to come to some
preliminaries. I could almost add, whatever those preliminaries might
be, provided a suspension of arms for an adequate term of years were
one, I think it would be ten thousand to one against any future
renewal of the war. It is not necessary to enter at large into the
reasons which induce me to think, that the British Ministry, as well
as the American Plenipotentiary, would consent to the terms of the
proposed preliminaries; for indeed I do not know that I am founded in
that opinion with respect to either, but still I believe it of both.
But what can a private person do in such a case, wishing to be a
mediator for peace, having access to both parties, but equally
uncertain of the reception of his mediation on either side? I must
hesitate to take any public step, as by a proposition in Parliament,
or by any other means to drive the parties to an explanation upon any
specific proposals; and yet I am very unwilling to let the session
pass without some proposition, upon which the parties may meet, if
they should be so inclined, as I suspect them to be. I have been
endeavoring to feel pulses for some months, but all is dumb show. I
cannot say that I meet with anything discouraging, to my apprehension,
either as to equitableness or practicability of the proposition for
preliminaries. If I could but simply receive sufficient encouragement,
that I should not run any hazard of obstructing any other practicable
propositions by obtruding mine, I should be very much satisfied to
come forward in that case with mine, to furnish a beginning at least,
which might lead to peace.
There is nothing that I wish so much as to have an opportunity of
seeing and conversing with you, having many things to say to you; but
if that cannot yet happen, I have only to say, that whatever
communication you may think proper to make to me, which may lead to
peace, you may be assured that I shall be most strenuous in applying
it to that end. In all cases of difficulty in human life, there must
be confidence somewhere, to enable us to extricate nations from the
evils attendant upon national disputes, as they arise out of national
passions, jealousies, and points of honor. I am not sure whether the
extreme caution and diffidence of persons in political life be not the
cause, almost as frequently, of the unnecessary protraction of the
miseries of war, as of the final production of any superior good to
any State. Peace now is better than peace a twelvemonth hence, at
least by all the lives that may be lost in the meanwhile, and by all
the accumulated miseries that may intervene by that delay. When I
speak of the necessity of confidence, I would not have you to think,
that I trust to all professions, promiscuously, with confidence; my
thoughts are free respecting all parties; and for myself, if I thought
it necessary for the end of attaining any additional confidence in
your esteem, to enable me to co-operate the more effectually towards
the restoration of peace, there is nothing that I would wish you to be
assured of but this; that no fallacious offers of insincerity, nor any
pretexts for covering secret designs, or for obtaining unfair
advantages, shall ever pass through my hands.
Believe me truly to be, not only a lover of my country, but a sincere
friend to peace and to the rights of mankind; and ever most
affectionately yours.
D. HARTLEY.
* * * * *
_Observations by Mr Hartley._
Lord North consented to Mr Hartley's proposition, for endeavoring to
procure from the American Plenipotentiary or Plenipotentiaries some
opening, that they would be willing to commence a parley, on
propositions of peace between Great Britain and America; and supposed
the terms, which Mr Hartley had in view, would be something like a
tacit cession of independence to America, with a truce for a certain
term of years, to serve as a basis for a general treaty of
accommodation and final settlement.
This last application (which was made on the 20th of April, 1779) of
Mr Hartley to Lord North, after several previous conferences on the
subject, is the ground of the present confidential communication with
Dr Franklin, on the part of Mr Hartley, who states to Dr Franklin, as
he did to Lord North, that an auspicious beginning of a negotiation is
_dimidium facti_.
Mr Hartley's ideas of the probable course of the negotiation would be
to the following effect;
1. Five Commissioners (or any three of them) to be appointed on the
part of His Britannic Majesty to treat, consult, and agree upon the
final settlement and pacification of the present troubles, upon safe,
honorable, and permanent terms, subject to ratification by Parliament.
2. That any one of the aforesaid Commissioners may be empowered to
agree, as a preliminary, to a suspension of hostilities by sea and
land, for a certain term of five or seven years.
3. That any one of the aforesaid Commissioners be empowered to agree,
as a second preliminary, to suspend the operation and effect of any
and all acts of Parliament respecting America, for a certain term of
five or seven years.
4. That it is expected, as a third preliminary, that America should be
released, free and unengaged, from any treaties with foreign powers,
which may tend to embarrass or defeat the present proposed
negotiation.
5. That a general treaty for negotiation shall be set on foot as soon
as may be, after the agreement of the foregoing preliminaries.
* * * * *
_N. B._ A doubt seeming to arise from Lord North, relative to the
probability of any explanatory communication on the part of Dr
Franklin, Mr Hartley expressed, he thought it possible, that as a
known friend to peace, he might be considered by Dr Franklin as a
depot of any communications, which may serve from time to time to
facilitate the terms of peace; which therefore prevents this
communication from being considered as any direct overture from Lord
North to Dr Franklin, or from Dr Franklin to Lord North; but as it is
merely a mediatorial proposition of Mr Hartley, as a private person,
for the purpose of bringing the parties to a parley.
* * * * *
INSTRUCTIONS
_To John Paul Jones, Commander of the
American Squadron in the Service of the United States, now in the
Port of L'Orient._
1st. His Majesty, having been pleased to grant some troops for a
particular expedition, proposed to annoy our common enemy, in which
the sea-force under your command might have an opportunity of
distinguishing itself, you are to receive on board the ships of war,
and the other vessels destined for that purpose, the troops that shall
present themselves to you, afford them such accommodation as may be
most proper for preserving their health, and convey them to such port
or place as their commander shall desire to land them at.
2dly. When the troops are landed, you are to aid, by all means in your
power, their operations, as they will be instructed in like manner to
aid and support those you may make with your ships, that so by this
concurrence and union of your different forces, all that such a
compounded strength is capable of may be effected.
3dly. You are during the expedition never to depart from the troops,
so as not to be able to protect them in case of a repulse, and in all
events you are to endeavor to effect their complete re-embarkation on
board the ships and transports under your command, when the expedition
shall be ended.
4thly. You are to bring to France all the English seamen you may
happen to take prisoners, in order to complete the good work you have
already made such progress in, of delivering by an exchange the rest
of our countrymen now languishing in the gaols of Great Britain.
5thly. As many of your officers and people have lately escaped from
English prisons, either in Europe or America, you are to be
particularly attentive to their conduct towards the prisoners, which
the fortune of war may throw into your hands, lest resentment of the
more than barbarous usage by the English in many places towards the
Americans should occasion a retaliation, and an imitation of what
ought rather to be detested and avoided, for the sake of humanity and
for the honor of our country.
6thly. In the same view, although the English have burnt wantonly many
defenceless towns in America, you are not to follow this example,
unless where a reasonable ransom is refused, in which case your own
generous feelings, as well as this instruction, will induce you to
give timely notice of your intention, that sick and ancient persons,
women, and children may be first removed.
Done at Passy, this 28th day of April, 1779.
B. FRANKLIN,
_Minister Plenipotentiary from the United_
_States to the Court of France_.
* * * * *
TO DAVID HARTLEY.
Passy, May 4th, 1779.
Dear Sir,
I received your several favors, viz. one of April the 10th, one of the
20th, and two of the 22d, all on the same day, but by different
conveyances.
I need not repeat, what we have each of us so often repeated, the wish
for peace. I will begin, by frankly assuring you, that though I think
a direct, immediate peace, the best mode of present accommodation for
Britain, as well as for America, yet if that _is not_ at this time
practicable, and a truce is practicable, I should not be against a
truce; but this is merely on motives of _general humanity_, to obviate
the evils men devilishly inflict on men in time of war, and to lessen
as much as possible the similarity of earth and hell. For with regard
to particular advantages, respecting the States I am connected with, I
am persuaded it is theirs to continue the war, till England shall be
reduced to that perfect impotence of mischief, which alone can prevail
with her to let other nations enjoy, "_Peace, Liberty, and Safety_." I
think, however, that a _short_ truce, which must, therefore, be an
_armed_ truce, and put all parties to an almost equal expense with a
continued war, is by no means desirable.
But this proposition of a truce, if made at all, should be made to
France at the same time it is made to America. They have each of them
too much honor, as well as too much sense, to listen separately to any
propositions, which tend to separate them from each other.
I will now give you my thoughts on your ideas of a negotiation, in the
order you have placed them. If you will number them in your copy, you
will readily see to which my observations refer, and I may therefore
be more concise.
_To the 1st_,--I do not see the necessity or use of five
Commissioners. A number of talkers lengthens discussions, and often
embarrasses instead of aiding a settlement. Their different particular
views, private interests, and jealousies of each other, are likewise
so many rubs in the way, and it sometimes happens, that a number
cannot agree to what each privately thinks reasonable, and would have
agreed to, or perhaps proposed, if alone. But this as the parties
please.
_To the 2d_,--The term of twentyone years would be better for all
sides. The suspension of hostilities should be expressed to be between
all parties at war; and that the British troops and ships of war now
in any of the United States be withdrawn.
_To the 3d_,--This seems needless, and is a thing that may be done or
omitted as you please; America has no concern about those acts of
parliament.
_To the 4th_,--The reason of proposing this is not understood, nor the
use of it, nor what inducement there can be for us to agree to it.
When you come to treat with both your enemies, you may negotiate away
as much of these engagements as you can; but powers, who have made a
firm solid league, evidently useful to both, can never be prevailed
with to dissolve it, for the vague expectation of another _in
nubibus_; nor even on the certainty, that another will be proposed,
without knowing what are to be its articles. America has no desire of
being free from her engagements to France. The chief is, that of
continuing the war in conjunction with her, and not making a separate
peace; and this is an obligation not in the power of America to
dissolve, being an obligation of _gratitude and justice_ towards a
nation, which is engaged in a war on her account, and for her
protection; and would be forever binding, whether such an article
existed or not in the treaty; and though it did not exist, an honest
American would cut off his right hand, rather than sign an agreement
with England contrary to the spirit of it.
_To the 5th_,--As soon as you please.
If you had mentioned France in your proposed suspension of arms, I
should have immediately shown it to the Minister, and have endeavored
to support that idea. As it stands, I am in doubt whether I shall
communicate your paper or not, though by your writing it is so fair it
seems as if you intended it. If I do, I shall acquaint you with the
result.
The bill, of which you send me a copy, was an excellent one at the
time, and might have had great and good effects, if, instead of
telling us haughtily, that our humble petition should receive no
answer, the Ministry had received and enacted that bill into a law. It
might have erected a wall of brass round England, if such a measure
had been adopted, when Friar Bacon's brazen head cried out, TIME IS!
But the wisdom of it was not seen, till after the fatal cry of TIME'S
PAST!
I am, my dear friend, &c.
B. FRANKLIN.
* * * * *
TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
Passy, May 26th, 1779.
Gentlemen,
The Marquis de Lafayette, who arrived here the 11th of February,
brought me yours of October 28th, and the new commission, credentials,
and instructions, which the Congress have honored me with. I have not
since had an opportunity of writing, that I could trust, for I see by
several instances, the orders given to private captains to throw their
despatches into the sea, when likely to be taken, are sometimes
neglected, and sometimes so badly executed, that the letters are
recovered by the enemy, and much inconvenience has attended their
interception. You mention, that you should speedily have opportunities
of forwarding duplicates, and triplicates of the papers; none of them
has ever come to hand, nor have I received any other line from you of
later date.