POSITION OF AFFAIRS
Leaving Sir Charles Warren on the north side of the Tugela in advance
of Trichard’s Drift and Sir Redvers Buller at Spearman’s Hill, with
Major-General Lyttelton at Potgieter’s, let us pause to consider the
general position of affairs. In order to understand it we must know
the features of the country between the Tugela and Ladysmith, the
relief of which was the object of the operations; the numbers of the
forces employed on each side; the positions occupied by the enemy,
and the ways in which they could best be attacked.
We cannot do better, in the first instance, than quote from Sir
Charles Warren himself as to the country between the Tugela
and Ladysmith and the strategy adopted. The extract is from a
contribution last autumn to the ‘National Review’ entitled ‘Lessons
from the South African War.’
‘If the Colonial farm map[3] is examined it will be seen that
immediately south of Ladysmith is the rugged country of Grobelaar’s
Kloof, extending to the Tugela and Colenso, some twelve miles from
Ladysmith, and that the only practicable directions of advance
within easy access of the rail-head at Frere were that to the
right, following the line of railway to Pieters through very rugged
mountains, and that to the left, by Potgieter’s and Skiet’s Drifts,
through comparatively open country, with a fairly good wagon road
of sixteen miles from Frere to Potgieter’s Drift, and a good wagon
road of fourteen miles into Ladysmith over open country, the only
hills to be met with being those commanding Potgieter’s Drift from
the south, and Lancers Hill, held by the Boers investing Ladysmith
and six miles from that city. This open country is, however,
commanded on the south by the Doorn Kloof range resting on the
Tugela.
‘It was the left-hand advance that was chosen, but, though the Boer
lines on the north side of the Tugela about Potgieter’s Drift and
Vaalkrantz were commanded by the high ground of Mount Alice and
Zwart Kop, 1,000 feet above the Tugela, the attack was not at once
made upon their position. Again, there was a choice of making a
détour, either to the right by Doorn Kloof, or to the left over the
Spion Kop range and its adjuncts.
‘So far as the map will indicate there is much in favour of an
advance by Doorn Kloof, particularly because its possession seemed
to be a necessity to cover the advance over the open country
between Potgieter’s Drift and Lancers Hill.
‘On the left is the Spion Kop range, stretching ten miles north
from the Tugela and separating the open country about Acton Homes
from the open country about Potgieter’s. This range is 1,000 to
1,500 feet above the Tugela, and behind it lay the principal camps
of the Boer army. The result of taking the left-hand route would
very much increase the distance for wagons into Ladysmith.
From Potgieter’s Drift to Lancers Hill, 8 miles.
” ” ” past Fair View to Lancers Hill, 24 miles
” ” ” past Acton Homes to Lancers Hill, 35 miles.
Moreover, Acton Homes was on the line of communication of the
Orange Free State Boers with some of their mountain passes, and
they kept a large force in the hills above to secure their retreat.’
As to the strength of the Boer force opposed to the British on the
Tugela there is the greatest difference of opinion. Sir Redvers
Buller has put it at some 7,000 men, a Boer writer says it was
little over half that number, while Sir Charles Warren thinks it was
much greater than 7,000. It is generally agreed that the British
Intelligence Office rightly estimated the combined forces of the
enemy at about 60,000, increased probably by foreigners and rebels to
80,000, and that about half of that number were in Natal. If, then, a
very liberal allowance be made for the numbers required to guard the
lines of communication to the Orange Free State and the Transvaal,
to carry on the investment of Ladysmith, to patrol and reconnoitre
the country, a very large force would still be available for watching
the British Brigade at Chieveley and opposing the British forces at
Potgieter’s and Trichard’s Drifts; and whatever the number may have
been on the Tugela the Boers were all mounted and acting on interior
lines, and could easily and rapidly concentrate a large force in any
direction on the Tugela front.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that during the month which had
elapsed since the battle of Colenso the Boers had largely increased
their forces on the Tugela, and we know that they had been busy
preparing long lines of intrenchment in favourable positions right
away beyond Acton Homes to the positions defending the roads leading
to the passes to the Orange Free State. All round the Acton Homes
basin the hills had been fortified, pom-poms and guns were in
position along the western slopes of the Rangeworthy hills, and guns
and rifles on the road to the Harrismith Pass. The Boers were quite
prepared all along the line, and, although they were uncertain where
the British were going to cross the river and strike, and were so
badly commanded that they allowed the crossings to be made without
serious resistance, they were quite ready with camps in sheltered
positions, with retired ‘schanzes’ on the hills, with outposts on the
slopes to the river, to concentrate a large front in any direction
from which they might be attacked.
Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, in his ‘London to Ladysmith via
Pretoria,’ thus describes the position in front of Sir Redvers Buller
and Sir Charles Warren:--
‘When Buller had arrived at Potgieter’s he found himself confronted
by a horseshoe position of great strength, enclosing and closing
the debouches from the ford where he had secured a practical
bridgehead. He therefore masked Potgieter’s with seven battalions
and twenty-four guns, and sent Warren with twelve battalions and
thirty-six guns to turn the right, which rested on the lofty
hill--almost mountain--of Spion Kop. The Boers, to meet this
turning movement, extended their line westwards along the heights
of the Tugela valley almost as far as Acton Homes. Their whole
position was therefore shaped like a note of interrogation laid
on its side, --◠, the curve in front of General Lyttelton, the
straight line before Sir Charles Warren. At the angle formed by
the junction of the curve and the line stands Spion Kop--“Look-out
Hill.” The straight position in front of Sir Charles Warren ran in
two lines along the edge and crest of a plateau which rises steeply
two miles from the river, but is approachable by numerous long
arêtes and dongas.’
Let us now consider what were the operations Sir Redvers Buller
proposed to execute. The instructions[4] he issued to Sir Charles
Warren are necessarily the official record of what was in his mind
at the time. But they are vague where they should be definite, and
definite where they should be elastic. They tell Sir Charles Warren
that, finding the Boers in front of Potgieter’s too strongly posted
to allow of a direct attack upon their positions, his chief has
decided to send him with the larger part of the army to turn their
flank by crossing the Tugela near Trichard’s Drift and ‘moving up to
the west of Spion Kop.’
But what the west of Spion Kop meant, whether the road by Acton
Homes, or that by Fair View and Groote Hoek or Rosalie, the former
twice as long as the latter, is not explained and it is impossible
to gather from these instructions. Lord Roberts, in his despatch,
though evidently in some perplexity, seems to think it meant the
Acton Homes road.
Next Sir Charles Warren was instructed to act as circumstances
require, but he was to continue to refuse his right and throw his
left forward till he gained the open plain north of Spion Kop,
where he was told he would command the rear of the position facing
Potgieter’s Drift, which he would be able to render untenable. While
Sir Charles Warren was so employed, Sir Redvers Buller undertook to
threaten both of the positions in front of Potgieter’s and also to
attempt a crossing at Skiet’s Drift, so as to hold the enemy off Sir
Charles Warren as much as possible.
But the turning force of 12,000 men had fifteen miles of wagons
accompanying it, and was to take with it only four days’ provisions,
which, of course, could be filled up by Sir Redvers Buller so long
as it was in road communication with him; but, as soon as this was
broken, Sir Charles Warren’s operations were limited to what he
could do in four days. And that Sir Redvers Buller intended the
road communication to be broken is shown by his request in the
instructions that as soon as Sir Charles Warren had made the passage
of the river he should, if possible, send the pontoons to him.
Finally, Sir Charles Warren was directed by these instructions to
send the eight naval 12-pr. guns to Sir Redvers Buller, a step which
had a very important bearing upon the final issue of the undertaking.
The success of Sir Charles Warren, therefore, depended upon his
being able to accomplish his flanking movement in four days from the
time of leaving his temporary base, upon his having no necessity for
long-range guns, and upon the right flank of the Boers, which he was
to turn, being within easy reach.
It is, however, well to read the views of others on the spot of the
intentions of Sir Redvers Buller.
Thus Bishop Baynes of Natal, in ‘My Diocese during the War,’ gives
some information on the subject, which was obtained at first hand
from Major-General Lyttelton. On pages 180 and 181 he says:
‘_Tuesday, Jan. 16th._--I went up the hill after breakfast: when
I came back to lunch I found the camp in a stir. At last the
orders had come to move, and the plan of campaign was declared,
and General Lyttelton explained it to me. Our brigade is to move
off about 2.30 to the river, and two battalions are to cross
Potgieter’s Drift to-night and the rest to-morrow. To-morrow
our big guns will open on the Boers and we shall make a big
demonstration. Meanwhile Sir Charles Warren, with his other brigade
(General Woodgate’s), and with General Clery’s Division (consisting
of General Hildyard’s and General Hart’s brigades), is to move away
to a point five or six miles higher up the river, cross there, and
approach the flank of the Boer position up the slopes of Spion
Kop. The hope is that the Boers will not be able to spare men
enough from here (besides Colenso and Ladysmith) to offer effective
opposition to Sir Charles Warren, or, if they do, then we may get
through their defences here. General Lyttelton called the colonels
of his battalions together and explained the plan to them.’
Mr. J. B. Atkins, in his ‘Relief of Ladysmith,’ writes:
‘On Friday, January 19, I crossed Waggon Drift and rode some five
miles further to the advanced position of Sir Charles Warren, who
was now marching west. Obviously the plan was this: Warren was to
make a long march round and attack the Boer hills in the rear,
and the force remaining at Potgieter’s Drift would simultaneously
attack them in front. Warren’s troops were, in a word, to become a
detached force; they would disappear round the stretching hills,
and when we heard them banging away behind Spion Kop, we, who
stayed behind, would have our signal to advance.’
Mr. Bennet Burleigh, in ‘The Natal Campaign,’ says:
‘Whilst this demonstration was proceeding near Potgieter’s, Sir
Charles Warren, with his guns and part of Clery’s division,
advanced towards a drift near Trieghardt’s Farm, commonly so
called, six miles west of Mount Alice.[5] It was upon the direct
Acton Homes road and led to the rough ground, foothills, and
detached ranges behind, on the west of Spion Kop. The possession of
these, it was trusted, would drive the Boers from the vicinity of
Potgieter’s, and Spion Kop must fall into our hands.’
It is now understood that Sir Redvers Buller intended Sir Charles
Warren to advance by the Fair View and Groote Hoek or Rosalie road,
because he says in the memorandum ‘not necessarily for publication,’
just published: ‘From the first there could be no question but that
the only practicable road for his column was the one by Fair View.
The problem was to get rid of the enemy who were holding it.’ And
it seems more likely he would call the Fair View road that from
Fair View to Groote Hoek than that to Acton Homes, which he would
probably call the Acton Homes road. And, indeed, there is this
corroboration--that the troops were furnished with a list of the
wells of water on the road from Trichard’s Drift to Groote Hoek, or
Rosalie, by Fair View Farm. The length of the road from Fair View to
a point near Groote Hoek is nine miles, and the length of the road
to the same point by way of Acton Homes is twenty miles, more than
double the length. Yet Lord Roberts had both Buller’s memorandum and
also his secret instructions to Warren before him when he wrote in
his covering despatch:
‘The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the
despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the
accompanying documents that the original intention was to cross the
Tugela at or near Trichard’s Drift, and thence, by following the
road past Fair View and Acton Homes, to gain the open plain north
of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being
too strong to be taken by direct attack.’
The truth is that the information possessed as to the country was
extremely small. No general description of it was available. There
were no road reports, no reconnaissances--in fact, it was to all
intents and purposes ‘an unknown country.’ From the high ground on
the south side of the Tugela the hills to the north could be scanned,
and it could be seen that to the west of Spion Kop the Rangeworthy
hills appeared to terminate abruptly in the Bastion or Sugar Loaf
Hill. Here it was supposed that the Boer trenches ended and were held
by only a small force. It was this range that Sir Charles Warren
was directed to attack, by pivoting the right of his line on Spion
Kop and swinging round his left until he gained the so-called open
country to the north of Spion Kop.
Beyond, towards Acton Homes, other hills could be seen, but nothing
was known about them. It was generally supposed that the ground was
good for cavalry for a certain distance; but the information given
was that the Acton Homes road, leading through Clydesdale, passed
through a country full of dongas and small kopjes, and passed eight
or nine miles north of Potgieter’s. The open country immediately
north of Spion Kop could only be reached by wagons by the road
leading past Fair View to Groote Hoek. The farm map, procured from
the office of the Surveyor-General of Natal and available for the
troops, gave a fairly good idea of the ground about Spion Kop; but
it was uncertain how far it could be relied upon. It showed that
mountain ranges beyond Spion Kop extended to the west, range after
range, with a large hill both to the north and north-east of Acton
Homes, the high road from Acton Homes to Ladysmith passing up a
valley between high hills. It was also evident, from the lines taken
by the rivers and streams, that the water-parting continues from
Spion Kop several miles to the north-east of Acton Homes.
The Orange Free State Boers encamped on the Tugela drew their
supplies from Harrismith. Their communications were by two roads
leading through the Drakensberg mountains to the south of Van
Reenan’s pass, the more southerly passing Oliver’s Hoek. These two
roads meet at Acton Homes. Acton Homes, which lies in a basin,
is surrounded on three sides by hills, and these hills formed an
important strategic position. On the north and north-east they
guarded the investing lines of Ladysmith, and on the north-west and
west the communications of the Orange Free State Boers with their
base. It was not difficult to believe that these hills were covered
with intrenchments strongly held, or able at short notice to be
strongly held.
In regard both to the positions held by the Boers and the numbers of
the enemy there was a good deal of information which must have been
at the disposal of Sir Charles Warren; but the difficulty would no
doubt have been to know how much of it was reliable.
It seems to have been certainly known that, since the troops had
marched westwards to Potgieter’s on 10th January, large bodies of
Boers had been moving up the river from the neighbourhood of Colenso,
and massing behind Spion Kop and Acton Homes, and that near the
latter place there was a large Boer camp which supplied the camp
behind Spion Kop with provisions.
It was also understood that the Orange Free State Boers were posted
along the right of the line as far as Spion Kop, and that thence the
Transvaal Boers were extended to the left or eastward; that, in the
vicinity of Spion Kop and Groote Hoek, there were five or six large
camps, their position being very central, as from that point the
Boers could easily go in an hour either west to Acton Homes on the
one side, or east to Doorn Kloof on the other.
Thus, in whatever direction our troops marched along the Boer lines,
they were always confronted by a large body of Boers.
A trench had been cut along the Boer lines behind Potgieter’s Drift
as far west as Spion Kop, with a number of men always in it so long
as the main body of the British force faced them. On Spion Kop
itself, on the east side, were four guns, which, it was said, would
rake Trichard’s Drift at long ranges, while to the west of Spion Kop,
on the Rangeworthy hills, an intrenchment had been made and was held
by the enemy, who could be readily reinforced should the British
cross the drift.
It must not, however, be supposed that Boers can fight only behind
prepared trenches. They are experts at quickly raising up ‘schanzes,’
which they make in a few minutes, and they only construct regular
trenches when they have considerable time at their disposal, or
when there is no natural material lying handy on the ground. On
Spion Kop, and to the west over the Rangeworthy hills and beyond,
the Boers did not require trenches to make an effectual resistance.
There was plenty of material to enable them to hold the crests of the
hills against a far superior force; but they preferred to make their
position almost impregnable by selecting continuous grassy slopes,
over which an advance would be impracticable in daylight. From such
positions nothing but artillery fire could drive them out.