ADVANCE TO VENTER’S LAAGER AND ATTACK OF THE
RANGEWORTHY HILLS
At the end of Chapter II we left Sir Charles Warren across the
Tugela with all his force, including his wagons, on the night of
18th January and ready to march to Venter’s Laager on the following
morning.
As the wagons marched on the morning of the 19th in four or five
parallel columns, in length about three miles or so, the brigades
commanded by Major-Generals Hart and Woodgate also kept pace with
them until opposite Fair View, where the right of the line was to
rest in the attack of the Rangeworthy hills. The two brigades then
occupied the slopes of the adjoining hills. This march was a very
remarkable one, and it is to be doubted whether there is another
instance on record of such a force, forming a length of three or
four miles, with wagons four or five deep on the column’s reverse
flank, being successfully led by a flank march right along the face
of commanding hills held by an enemy strongly intrenched and provided
with long-range guns, on a road just out of range of effective
rifle fire, and with a rapid river on its reverse flank. It was
in accordance with the instructions, but it was a most hazardous
proceeding, and it was owing to the careful management of Sir Charles
Warren, as well as the want of initiative or military instinct on the
part of the Boer commander, that there was no disaster.
General Warren had reconnoitred the Fair View-Groote Hoek road, and
found that it led within effective rifle range round the west flank
of Spion Kop, and was therefore an undesirable road so long as Spion
Kop was held by the enemy. He then crossed the Venter’s Spruit,
near Venter’s Laager, and examined the other road by Acton Homes.
He ascertained that it led through a strongly defended pass at the
water-parting, and that on both sides it was held by the Boers, while
it was twice the length of the first road. The length was the great
defect. There was only one road leading to it, and the wagons could
only go singly. The force could not possibly watch a front of fifteen
miles occupied by the enemy. The result would be that each day’s
march must be limited by the length of road that could be watched.
The force was to be provisioned for only four days, and, even if
everything went successfully, it would take three days to get from
Venter’s Spruit by Acton Homes to the point near Groote Hoek. It was
therefore evident that the road could not be used, even if it were
not so strongly held by the enemy.
In the evening Sir Charles Warren assembled his General and Staff
Officers and the Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal
Engineers, and pointed out to them that there were only two roads
by which the wheeled transport and guns could proceed: (1) by Acton
Homes, and (2) north of Fair View by Rosalie or Groote Hoek. He
informed them that he rejected the Acton Homes road because time
would not allow of it, and his subordinate commanders concurred
unanimously. He then pointed out that the only possible way of all
getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking
three or four days’ food in their haversacks and sending all their
wagons back across the Tugela; but before this could be done the
position in front of them must be captured.
Although Sir Redvers Buller does not mention in his despatches what
information he possessed, either as to the routes to Ladysmith or as
to the measures taken by the Boers to prevent them to him, he quotes
incidentally, and in quite a different connection, the following
message which Sir Charles Warren telegraphed to him the same evening:
‘(Sent 7.54 P.M., received 8.15 P.M.) Left flank, 19th January.
‘_To the Chief of the Staff_
‘I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly
get from Trichard’s Drift to Potgieter’s, on the north of the
Tugela--one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie; the
first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for
a large number of wagons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared
out. I am therefore going to adopt some special arrangements which
will involve my stay at Venter’s Laager for two or three days. I
will send in for further supplies and report progress.
‘C. WARREN.’
This is not the sort of message he would have sent if he had been
ordered to take the Acton Homes-Ladysmith road, and it shows
unquestionably that, as to the roads and the country, very little was
known.
The reply to the message was that three days’ supply was being sent.
It has been supposed by some writers on the subject--and the popular
notion at the time certainly was that the mountainous country
suddenly ended at the western slopes of the Rangeworthy hills to
the west of Spion Kop--that Acton Homes was situated on a level
plain, and that Sir Charles Warren had only to march round by Acton
Homes, keeping the Rangeworthy hills and Spion Kop at a respectful
distance, and he would be able with little delay to take the lines
opposing Potgieter’s Drift in reverse. It does not appear whether Sir
Redvers Buller entertained this idea; if he did, he gave no definite
instructions, apparently, in that sense to Sir Charles Warren;
but if he did not, then he must have supposed that the Boer right
flank rested on the Rangeworthy hills and could be turned, and was
unaware that it extended to Acton Homes and the roads to the Orange
Free State. We can hardly suppose that when he wrote of sending
Sir Charles Warren to turn the Boer flank he expected Sir Charles
Warren to accomplish on the Rangeworthy hills, with 12,000 men and no
long-range guns, what he himself had been unwilling to attempt a week
before at Potgieter’s Drift with 20,000 men and long-range guns. If
he did, he was sending him on a hazardous undertaking, and yet this
was what opening the Fair View and Rosalie road practically meant--an
attack on the centre of the Boer position.
We have already alluded to the prejudice created against Sir Charles
Warren by the unfortunate suggestion that while Sir Redvers Buller
desired him to go by the Acton Homes road, he preferred the nearer
road to Groote Hoek and Rosalie. It is now clear that, if Lord
Roberts had not alluded to Acton Homes in this connection, the idea
would never have entered any one’s head, because such a route in
the circumstances was impossible. It might have been the conception
of a military genius to have thought that the best way of relieving
Ladysmith would be to strike at the communications of the Orange
Free State Boers on the Harrismith and other roads; but this we
need not consider, as it certainly did not suggest itself to Sir
Redvers Buller. Had Sir Charles Warren’s force been composed mainly
of well-trained mounted troops, and had the country been less hilly,
possibly the aspect of affairs would have been changed, and he
might have made a real wide turning movement; but he had hardly any
mounted troops, and the country was very hilly. He was, in fact, told
to do an impossible thing--to turn a flank at a point where there
was no flank to turn. As Mr. J. B. Atkins observes in his ‘Relief
of Ladysmith’: ‘It had been discovered that after all there was no
way round to the back of Spion Kop through open country. The hills
in which the Boers were are, in fact, a spur of the Drakensberg
mountains: wherever Sir Charles Warren might go, he must go through
mountains.
Sir Charles Warren was not consulted as to the plan of operations,
or as to the supplies, or impedimenta to accompany him, and it was
generally understood that on his arrival at Frere he had advocated
the attack of the Boers intrenched on the south of the Tugela
at Colenso, and proceeding on the lines which were eventually
successful. But, if the suggestion was made, it was not approved.
Instead, Sir Redvers Buller proposed to break through the Boer
line at Potgieter’s, just as he had tried to do at Colenso. On
11th January his force, assembled at Potgieter’s, was stronger by
two brigades of infantry and a brigade division of artillery than
it was at Colenso, and yet he hesitated, after the experience of
Colenso, to attack the Boer positions. Nevertheless, he seems to
have expected to be able to relieve Ladysmith by sending Sir Charles
Warren with 12,000 men and thirty-six field guns to attack the Boer
position in the Rangeworthy hills west of Spion Kop, while he held a
certain number of Boers in front of him by making a demonstration at
Potgieter’s.
With the map before us there is but one solution to Sir Redvers
Buller’s directions. He assumed that the Boer right rested in the
vicinity of Bastion Hill, a spur of the Rangeworthy hills, and he
wished Sir Charles Warren, pivoting on Spion Kop, to sweep round his
left to overlap that position.
Sir Charles was given no long-range guns with which to reply to
those of the Boers. He had to deal with an enemy already confident
with the victory gained at Colenso, and he was doomed to failure if
he attempted to advance before he had demoralised the enemy by a
continuous and effective artillery fire.
Had Sir Charles Warren been so ill-advised as to try to advance by
the Acton Homes road to Ladysmith, it is not difficult to prophesy
what would most probably have occurred. The Boers had strongly
fortified the hills all round the Acton Homes basin, pom-poms and
guns were in position along the western slopes of the Rangeworthy
hills, and guns and rifles on the road to the Harrismith pass. Any
force attempting to proceed by that route would no doubt have been
allowed by the Boers to enter the basin, and then would have been cut
off from Trichard’s Drift by the closing of the road below Bastion
Hill. The column, thus hemmed in and caught in a trap, would have
been compelled either to fight its way down to the Middle Drift or to
surrender. In either case Natal would have been at the mercy of the
Boers.
ATTACK OF THE RANGEWORTHY HILLS
Sir Charles Warren had assured himself by his reconnaissance that
no wide outflanking movement was possible, and he had come to the
conclusion that the only way to carry out his instructions was
to capture the positions in front of him, creeping up the dongas
and long arêtes, alluded to by Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, and
getting his artillery to work so as to bring an effective fire on
the Boer trenches, and, after a complete artillery preparation, to
make an infantry attack--certainly in the first instance a frontal
attack, because it always must be a frontal attack when an enemy
defending a position and acting on interior lines is more mobile than
the attacking force--to break through the Boer lines, rolling them
up from each flank, and, having cleared the front, and opened the
road from Fair View to Rosalie, to send the wagons back, and, with
supplies for four days in the haversacks, to march round Spion Kop
to the appointed position. These were the ‘special arrangements’ to
which he referred in his telegram to the Chief of the Staff on 19th
January.
Looking at matters as we now know them, it seems a foolhardy
proceeding to send a general with 12,000 infantry and guns inferior
in range to those of the enemy to attack a large force strongly
intrenched on commanding positions, flanked by infantry fire and
long-range guns, and at the same time to issue an order that there
must be no turning back.
Sir Charles Warren believed that by adopting a plan which he employed
later successfully at Pieters--a continuous fire of artillery for
some days in order to demoralise the enemy, and an attack with a
long line, with very weak supports, because the Boers have none,
every man being in the fighting line--he might be successful. At
Pieters the artillery fire on the Boer lines was continuous from
22nd to 27th February--that is, five or six days--and with as long a
period of artillery fire on the Rangeworthy hills, it is probable
that the Boers would have retired, as it is known they were getting
demoralised on 23rd January and had begun to move their wagons to the
west.
Sir Charles Warren lost no time after his reconnaissances in making
his dispositions for attack, and issued the following instructions to
Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery dated 19th January:
‘_General Officer Commanding 2nd Division_
‘I shall be glad if you will arrange to clear the Boers out of
the ground above that at present occupied by the 11th Brigade,
by a series of outflanking movements. In the early morning an
advance should be made as far as the Hussars reconnoitred to-day,
and a shelter-trench there made across the slope of the hill. A
portion of the slopes of the adjoining hill to the west can then
be occupied, the Artillery assisting, if necessary, in clearing
the western side and upper slopes. When this is done I think that
a battery can be placed on the slopes of the western hill in such
a position that it could shell the schanzes of the Boers on Spion
Kop and the upper portion of the eastern hill. When this is done
a further advance can be made on the eastern hill, and artillery
can be brought to bear upon the upper slopes of the western hill.
It appears to me that this might be done with comparatively
little loss of life, as the Boers can in each turn be outflanked.
The following Cavalry are at your disposal: two squadrons Royal
Dragoons and 5th Divisional Squadron.’
General Clery accordingly moved at 3 A.M. on 20th January with a
force of four batteries Royal Field Artillery and the 5th and 11th
Brigades of Infantry to occupy the heights to the west and north-west
of Spion Kop. The eastern spur[6] was occupied with two battalions
of the 11th Brigade, and the spur immediately to the west of the
latter with the two remaining battalions of the 11th Brigade. On
occupying these heights Lieut.-General Clery found himself in front
of a semicircular range of heights completely overlooking the heights
he had arrived on. The left of this high ridge almost rested on Spion
Kop, while the right extended to the spur overlooking Fair View Farm.
The road which would have to be used for wagons in the advance
passed on the left of this position, but the enemy’s position was
very strong, with a glacis reaching down to the heights occupied by
Lieut.-General Clery. The ground on the other flank (left) afforded
a good deal more cover for advance, and Lieut.-General Clery hoped,
if he succeeded in occupying that flank of the ridge, to swing round
to the right and take the remainder of the enemy’s position in flank.
He therefore moved up the artillery to the eastern spur and moved
the 5th Brigade to reinforce the two battalions of the 11th Brigade
already on the western spur, placing the whole of this latter force
under Major-General Hart, and directing him to move forward against
the left flank of the enemy’s position. This was done, and a series
of kopjes was occupied in succession, which brought the force that
evening within reach of storming the enemy’s position.
In a despatch dated 20th January 1900 Sir Charles Warren says:
‘After successfully carrying some of the hills General Clery
reported that he had now reached a point which it would be
necessary to take by frontal attack, which he did not think would
be desirable. To this I replied: “I quite concur that a frontal
attack is undesirable, and that a flank attack is more suitable.
I intended to convey that we should hold what we get by means
of intrenchments when necessary, and not retire, continuing the
advance to-morrow if it cannot be done to-night; frontal attack,
with heavy losses, is simply playing the Boer game.”’
On the same day Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed to the Secretary of
State for War:
‘General Clery with part of Warren’s force has been in action from
6 A.M. till 7 P.M. to-day. By judicious use of his artillery he has
fought his way up, capturing ridge after ridge, for about three
miles. Troops are now bivouacking on the ground he has gained, but
main position is still in front of them.’
Bishop Baynes of Natal, in ‘My Diocese during the War,’ writes:
‘_Saturday, January 20th._--The fighting is continuous, but the real
battle is on the other side of the hill, where Sir Charles Warren
is swinging his line round. His right wing, which is only some five
miles from us over the ridge of Spion Kop, is the pivot, and while
that remains more or less stationary, a long line is gradually
swinging round to his left, so bringing the Boers into a =V=.’
On 20th January ‘the cavalry on the extreme left, under Lord
Dundonald, demonstrated effectively,’ says Mr. Winston S. Churchill,
‘and the South African Light Horse, under Colonel Byng, actually
took and held, without artillery support of any kind, a high hill
(Sugarloaf Hill), called henceforward Bastion Hill, between the Dutch
right and centre.’
Mr. Bennet Burleigh says: ‘Warren prosecuted his turning movement,
sending his right and centre well in, whilst Hildyard on the left
with Hart’s Brigade moved forward. Clearly the object in view was to
seize Bastion Hill, as we have dubbed it from its shape, and roll up
the Boer right towards Spion Kop over the direct Ladysmith road viâ
Potgieter’s.... Still, it was with his left that he pushed hardest
with Hildyard’s and Hart’s Brigades--the latter thrown further
forward.’
On 21st January it was found that the enemy had evacuated the
position during the night, and it was occupied by Major-General
Hart’s Brigade in the morning. Two battalions had been detached from
the 2nd Brigade on the previous evening to assist the troops on the
heights, and were directed to co-operate with Major-General Hart by
attacking the enemy’s right flank. When the enemy’s position of the
previous day had been thus occupied it was discovered that the enemy
had fallen back to a second strong position in near, the advance to
which was over open ground and entailed a frontal attack.
Sir Redvers Buller, who went over to see Sir Charles Warren on the
21st, warned him that the enemy had received large reinforcements,
some 2,500 men, to strengthen their right flank, and ordered two
batteries to move from the hill on the right to ground on the left,
where they came into action against the enemy’s right flank. A fire
was kept up all day, but it was not considered advisable to make a
frontal attack on his position.
It is only reasonable to suppose that Sir Charles Warren explained
verbally to Sir Redvers Buller, on this first occasion of meeting
him since his reconnaissance, what his plans were--i.e. the ‘special
arrangements’ he had alluded to in his telegram of 19th January--the
continual bombardment, the advance on both sides of an arête, and the
alternate turning of the Boer position on the right hand and on the
left, with the ultimate intention, when the position was gained, of
sending the wagons back and advancing in light order with provisions
carried in the haversack.
Sir Charles Warren, on 21st January, asked to be supplied with
another infantry brigade to extend his line to the left, with
howitzers and long-range guns. The infantry brigade and howitzers
were sent to him, but not the long-range guns.
Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War on
21st January:
‘Warren has been engaged all day, chiefly on his left, which he has
swung round about a couple of miles. The ground is very difficult,
and, as the fighting is all the time up-hill, it is difficult
exactly to say how much we gain, but I think we are making
substantial progress.’
Early on the morning of the 22nd four howitzers arrived, and Sir
Redvers Buller, who came over about the same time, gave directions
where they were to be placed. Two were brought into action on the
height close to the batteries already in action there; the others
came into action on the left to keep down the Boer fire from Acton
Homes. They were all effective in reaching the enemy’s position,
and fire was kept up by both sides until near sundown. Both sides
retained generally the same positions at the close of the day.
It was on the 22nd that Sir Redvers Buller held a consultation with
Sir Charles Warren and his Generals on the situation. Sir Charles,
it is understood, pointed out that it would be impossible to get the
wagons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless Spion Kop
were first taken; and Sir Redvers, who, it is believed, strongly
objected to the wagons being sent back, agreed that Spion Kop would
have to be taken; but he preferred to make an attack from the British
left flank from Bastion Hill, and proposed that it should be made
that night. Both Sir Charles Warren and Lieut.-General Clery were,
it is gathered, opposed to the proposal as a hazardous proceeding,
because, if successful, it would mean to take the whole line of the
enemy’s position, which they might not be able to hold.
We learn from Sir Redvers Buller’s own despatch that he was impatient
of delay, and wanted an immediate attack, either to the right or to
the left, preferably to the left, but an attack at once. It would
seem that, in deference to the opinions expressed at the conference,
Sir Redvers did not further press the attack from the left on that
day, and Sir Charles Warren decided to attack Spion Kop that night,
because, if the force must take the wagons, it was only possible to
do so by making the road from Fair View to Groote Hoek safe for them,
and the road could only be made safe for them by the capture of Spion
Kop, which, as Sir Redvers Buller has observed, was evidently the key
of the position.
We now see why Spion Kop was attacked. The Acton Homes route was out
of the question, and there remained three courses or lines of action
for consideration:
(1) The attack from the left, on Salient, from Bastion Hill
(favoured by Sir Redvers Buller, but deemed to be very hazardous by
Sir Charles Warren and other generals);
(2) The attack from the right, on Spion Kop, which, if successful,
would turn the enemy’s position and the Boers would have to go;
(3) Continuous long-range and high-angle artillery fire on the Boer
positions and trenches, by which the Orange Free Staters would be
worn out and demoralised, leaving only the Transvaal Boers to be
dealt with.
Sir Redvers Buller, commanding in chief, advocated the first. Sir
Charles Warren, second in command, was in favour of the third. But as
Sir Redvers Buller insisted on either the first or second, and Sir
Charles Warren objected to the first, the second--that is, the attack
from the right on Spion Kop--was decided upon.
Sir Charles Warren had been reinforced at noon of the 22nd by the
10th Brigade under Major-General Talbot Coke. The Brigades of both
Major-Generals Hildyard and Hart were on the hills, as we have seen,
in touch with the enemy. The choice, therefore, of a column for the
assault of Spion Kop was limited to the 11th Brigade forming the
right attack, or the 10th Brigade just arrived. Sir Charles Warren
selected the latter, and put Major-General Coke in orders to command
the attack that same night. General Coke, however, asked for a delay
of twenty-four hours to enable him to reconnoitre the position with
the officers commanding the battalions to be employed in the assault,
and to this Sir Charles assented.
On 23rd January Sir Redvers Buller again visited Sir Charles Warren,
and, as he states in his despatch, again advocated an attack from
the left. This, we have seen, Sir Charles Warren and his Generals
had deemed too hazardous when considered on the previous day; and
in the light of Sir Redvers Buller’s memorandum ‘not necessarily
for publication,’ in which he mentions how he went over to tell Sir
Charles Warren that the Boer right was being strongly reinforced on
the 21st, and also of his Vaal Krantz despatch of 8th February, in
which he again mentions that the Boer right had been considerably
strengthened, so much so that on 25th January any attempt to advance
his left would probably have been unsuccessful, it is strange that he
should on 23rd January have been so desirous to try his fortune in
that direction.
Finding that his proposal to attack from the left was not concurred
in by his juniors, Sir Redvers Buller would not take upon himself the
responsibility of ordering it, and gave no direction to Sir Charles
Warren beyond that which he mentions in his despatch--that he must
either attack or his force would be withdrawn. Retirement was the
last thing to be thought of, especially bearing in mind the general
order to the troops in which Sir Redvers Buller told them there
would be no turning back. Sir Charles Warren states in his despatch
that, being given the alternative to attack or retire, he replied
that he should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, showed the
Commander-in-Chief the orders of the previous evening, and explained
the reason of the postponement of the attack for twenty-four hours.
On this same 23rd January Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed to the
Secretary of State for War the following despatch, and it is a matter
to note as we go along that in no one of these telegraphic despatches
is there the slightest hint or expression that would lead the reader
to suppose Sir Redvers Buller had any cause of dissatisfaction,
or that Sir Charles Warren was not carrying out the operations in
accordance with his wishes:
‘Warren holds the position he gained two days ago. In front of him,
at about 1,400 yards, is the enemy’s position west of Spion Kop.
It is on higher ground than Warren’s position, so it is impossible
to see into it properly. It can only be approached over bare, open
slopes. The ridges held by Warren are so steep that guns cannot
be placed on them, but we are shelling the enemy’s position with
howitzers and field artillery, placed on the lower ground behind
the infantry. Enemy reply with Creusot and other artillery. In the
duel the advantage rests with us, as we appear to be searching
his trenches, and his artillery fire is not causing us much loss.
An attempt will be made to-night to seize Spion Kop, the Salient
which forms the left of the enemy’s position facing Trichard’s
Drift, and divides it from the position facing Potgieter’s. It has
considerable command over all the enemy’s intrenchments.’
It was on 23rd January that Sir Redvers Buller altered Sir Charles
Warren’s disposition, and directed him to hand over to Major-General
Coke the command of the 5th Division, retaining the command of the
whole force across the Tugela. This step was no doubt taken to
relieve Sir Charles Warren from over-work, and to free his hands for
the more important duties of the general command; but at such a time
any change of the kind was unfortunate, and such a change naturally
caused an entire alteration of arrangements, because there was no
Staff supplied for the commander of the whole force, and the Staff of
the 5th Division had carried on both the divisional duties and those
for the whole force.
He had now to improvise a Staff for himself, and as he could get no
regimental officers, as all regiments were short, he had to work with
a very attenuated Staff.
‘The Commander-in-Chief,’ says Sir Charles Warren, ‘then desired that
I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition’ to attack
Spion Kop.
Sir Redvers Buller says he ‘suggested that as General Coke was still
lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who
had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.’
Whether the word ‘desired’ or ‘suggested’ was used, it was regarded
as an order, and Major-General Woodgate was detailed for the duty,
while Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt--an officer of Sir Redvers Buller’s
Staff--was directed to accompany him.
Now Major-General Talbot Coke was well known as an intelligent
officer, much impressed with the use of the spade in war, and the
importance of intrenching, and it was doubtless on this account that,
in spite of his being slightly lame, he was selected by Sir Charles
Warren for the command of the assaulting column.
It has been asked why Sir Charles Warren, whose activity and energy
are so marked a feature of his character, did not lead the attack
in person, and Lord Roberts regrets that he did not visit Spion Kop
during the afternoon or evening of the 24th. It is stated on very
good authority that he proposed to command the attack in person, but
was forbidden by Sir Redvers Buller on the very reasonable and proper
ground that, as commander of the whole force across the Tugela, it
was not his province to lead a portion of it: that he might have to
give orders to his left as well as to his right, and for this reason
he should not go up Spion Kop, but occupy a central position, whence
he could issue orders to right and left, and be in communication with
the Commander-in-Chief.