THE SOULS WILL DIFFER AS WILL THE SENSATIONS.

6. Why (if the universal Soul possess the magnitude here attributed

to her), does she not approach some other body (than that which she

animates; that is, some individual body)? It would be this body's

(privilege or duty) to approach the universal Soul, if it be able to

do so; on approaching to her, it receives something, and appropriates

it. But would this body, that would approach the universal Soul, not

already possess her simultaneously with the soul proper to itself,

since these souls (the universal Soul, and the individual soul) do not

appear to differ from each other? The fact is, that as their sensations

differ, so must the passions that they experience likewise differ. The

things are judged to be different, but the judge is the same principle

successively placed in presence of different passions, although it be

not he who experiences them, but the body disposed in some particular

manner. It is as if when some one of us judges both the pleasure

experienced by the finger, and the pain felt by the head. But why does

not our soul perceive judgments made by the universal Soul? Because

this is a judgment, and not a passion. Besides, the faculty that judged

the passion does not say, "I have judged," but it limits itself to

judging. Thus, in ourselves, it is not the sight which communicates its

judgment to the hearing, although both of these senses made separate

judgments; what presides over these two senses is reason, which

constitutes a different faculty. Often reason cognizes the judgment

made by some other (being), while being conscious simultaneously of the

passion it experiences. But this question has been treated elsewhere.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 13 / 381 题