THE ARMY
The great military authority, Bernhardi, in an article in _Das Jahr
1913_, points out various ways in which military science has developed
since the Franco-Prussian War and shows how completely we have had to
abandon many of the conceptions gained by a study of earlier campaigns.
Responsible in the main for the changes are the increased size of the
armies and the new technical inventions of our age.
[Illustration: Bird’s-eye View Berlin Parade Grounds]
Almost all the states of continental Europe have gone over to the
principle of universal military service, with the result that the
armies are greater now in time of peace than ever before in time of
war, and that when mobilization is called for and the reserves are
summoned, the number of men in the field amounts to millions. The first
result has been that far other means of transporting and concentrating
such masses have to be employed than used to be the case and that
networks of railroads have had to be built for purely strategic
purposes. In the maneuvers that were to have taken place this coming
autumn at Münster in Germany it had been intended to make a record in
the matter of quick transportation and to dispose of 120,000 men in
the course of a single morning without interrupting the regular
passenger traffic. The old method of victualing armies, too, has had to
be changed, for it is impossible for such hordes to nourish themselves
by what they chance to find in the enemy’s country. Problems of another
kind have arisen. Modern armies are composed of regulars and reservists
alike: the reservists are not so hardened as the regulars and often
not so efficient, so that it has become a custom to distribute them
in such a way as to achieve the best results. As a rule, the regulars
must be spared for decisive actions and reservists must occasionally be
sacrificed, apparently needlessly. There may be cases, for instance,
where the reserves must expose themselves to a murderous fire while the
regulars are engaged in the more difficult but less dangerous task of
cutting off the enemy’s line of retreat.
[Illustration: Arrival of Recruits]
[Illustration: The Field Kitchen]
Technical improvements, such as the longer range and quicker fire of
the guns, swifter means of communication and of signaling and the
like, not to speak of other considerations due to experience, have so
changed the old tactics that a line of battle is now more than ten
times as long as it was only a few years ago. At Sadowa, with 215,000
men, the Austrians had a front of only 10 kilometers; at Mukden the
attacking line of the Japanese, who had only 170,000 men, extended
for 110 kilometers. “The broken line,” writes Bernhardi, “is to-day
the only battle formation of the infantry.” To-day, officers and men
fight in trenches and take every advantage of the inequalities of the
ground; in 1870 it was considered disgraceful to take such advantages
and the officers stood erect in the most deadly fire. In consequence of
the length of the lines a check in one quarter is no longer so serious
a matter as it used to be; a modern battle is a succession of single
engagements of which the victor only needs to win a good majority.
The commander no longer takes up a position, as Napoleon did at
Leipzig, where he can oversee the whole field of operations; the best
place for him is some railroad junction or central telephone station,
with wireless and ordinary telegraph equipment, where messages can
constantly be sent and received, and to and from which he can despatch
troops, automobiles, motor-wagons or aeroplanes. One of the chief
modern problems is supplying sufficient ammunition for quick-firing
guns—the baggage trains must not be so long as to hinder the advance of
the troops, yet where there are many guns and each shoots off hundreds
of shots a minute, great quantities of ammunition are needed.
[Illustration: Transmitting and Receiving Orders by Telephone]
[Illustration: Telegrams]
[Illustration: Giving Orders]
I have spoken of military service being almost universally compulsory
in Europe. This means that every man of a certain age and with the
requisite health and strength is obliged to report for duty. It has not
hitherto meant that every eligible recruit was obliged to serve. In
Germany a large contingent, even of the capable, was formerly excused.
In 1910, for instance, nearly 235,000 were declared more or less
unfit for service, although in France they would probably nearly all
have been accepted. By the German army bills of 1911, 1912 and 1913
indeed the numbers of those required for active service were steadily
increased: 9,482 in the first named year, some 29,000 in the second,
and then the great increase of 63,000 in the third. But there were
still, up to the present mobilization, some thirty thousand able-bodied
recruits who could not be placed.
In the Prussian military-service law of 1814, and again in the
constitution of the North German Confederation of 1867, the principle
was laid down that the army should consist of one per cent. of the
population. This had long been disregarded as the population increased,
and the proportion had sunk as low as eight-tenths of one per cent.
It has now been raised to a little over the original figure. The
population as given officially in 1913 was 64,925,993, while the number
of common soldiers (I quote the figures given by Stavenhagen in the
_Handbuch der Politik_) was 647,811.[A]
[Footnote A: It may be worth giving the exact strength of the
German army on October 1, 1913: Total 790,788 and 157,816 horses.
Of these: officers, 30,253; sanitary officers, 2,483; veterinaries,
865; non-commissioned officers, 104,377; common soldiers, 647,811.
(Infantry, 515,216; cavalry, 85,593; field artillery, 126,042; sappers
and miners, 24,010; communication troops, 18,949; army service,
11,592.)]
The cost of the German army has been enormous—more than twenty-five
billion marks between 1872 and 1910, and in 1913 alone, 1,608,653,300
marks. The extraordinary defense contribution for 1913, 1914 and
1915, a tax, not on income but on capital direct, is estimated to
bring nearly 1,300,000,000 marks. Strange to say, the tax was very
popular—every party in the Reichstag voted for it, even the social
democrats, whose delight in a measure that fell most heavily on the
rich (small properties were exempted) made them swallow the fact that
the money was for national and military purposes. The yearly sums that
the sudden increase in the army entails are to be paid by a curious tax
on the increase of property value to be estimated every three years.
The estimates as to how much the army numbers when on a war footing
varies between two and three-fourths millions and four millions.
Austria’s army, on paper at least, numbers 380,000 men in time of
peace, which number gradually was to have risen to 410,000 in the next
few years. In war-time it is estimated at 1,300,000 men. Curiously
enough Italy, with a peace army of only 300,000, estimates her war army
officially at 3,400,000, or about as much as either Germany or France.
[Illustration: Telegraph Battalion]
[Illustration: Military Telephone Station]
[Illustration: Putting up Campaign Tents]
[Illustration: Death’s-head Hussars]
[Illustration: The Crown Prince]
[Illustration: The Crown Prince at Mess]
For the armies of the Triple Entente we have an estimate published by
the _Deutsche Tageszeitung_ in January, 1914, which is worth quoting
at some length, as it is from a well-known military writer, Lieutenant
Colonel von Bremen:
The basis of France’s military increase in 1913 is the reintroduction
of the three years’ term of service. By retaining these third-year
men the peace-showing is increased by almost a third. This year
185,000 men are to be called in. The peace strength of the French
army will, from the autumn of 1916 on, amount to 33,000 officers and
officials and some 833,000 men, while up to that period we can reckon
with 780,000 men. One must add to this, 28,000 gendarmes, customs
and forest officials, who likewise belong to the territorial army
(like the _Landwehr_). In Germany we have for 1913 and 1914, counting
officers, non-commissioned officers and men, 802,000, to which, in
1915, will be added 13,000 men. Deducting from the present strength
of both armies the mere laborers who have to do with supplies, etc.,
Germany’s peace force is momentarily the higher, but not if we reckon
France’s gendarmerie, etc. Counting in this, France, with 40,000,000
inhabitants, has a larger army in time of peace than Germany, with
65,000,000. The French army has further advantages in the longer
training and in the increased readiness for war. The troops covering
the eastern frontiers have two hundred men to a company (four-fifths
of the war strength) and even at the time when the recruits are being
mustered in, one hundred forty trained men; while our companies at
the same time can dispose of only half so strong a number. And what
it means in case of war to have at hand two fully trained years’
contingents (especially in the cavalry) during the period of training
the recruits is self-evident. Further advantages in the French army
lie in the longer training of the inactive officers and in the good
provision for officers and non-commissioned officers. In the house of
deputies negotiations are pending regarding advancement regulations
tending to lower the age limit of the whole body of officers. And,
above all, it has been made possible to create a new, twenty-first
army corps. So we see that France, in 1913, has made a very great step
forward.
The Russian armaments of 1913 are also significant. The most important
event was the appearance in October of the draft of a law to prolong
the term of active service by three months and that in the decisive
time from January first (fourteenth) to April first (fourteenth). As
in Russia, the recruits are called in at latest by November fifteenth.
Russia will, until spring, still have under arms, besides the
recruits, the trained contingents of three years in the infantry—four,
indeed, in the cavalry. That considerably increases her readiness for
war. And in addition to lengthening the term of service the number
of recruits is still further increased by twenty thousand men. The
momentary military strength of the Russian empire is about one and
one-half millions, of which about 1,200,000 concern Europe (thirty
army corps and twenty-four cavalry divisions). But already for 1914 we
can reckon on the formation of from two to three new army corps and on
a considerable increase of the artillery by at least forty batteries,
for which purpose three hundred twenty million marks have been called
for. To make mobilization speedier and to facilitate the march to the
west boundary railroads are to be built. The estimates for this are
about two hundred sixty million marks. The following stretches are
under consideration: 1. Nowogeorgiewsk to Plozk on the Vistula. 2.
Cholm—Tomoschow—Belzek. 3. Schepetowka—Proskurow—Larga. In addition a
number of lines are planned of which one is to encircle our province
of East Prussia. Along the German frontier, too, the erection of
wireless stations has energetically been taken in hand. Likewise they
have begun to modernize their fort and field artillery. Side by side
with these endeavors go intended improvements in military education
and training and organized changes in the situation of the officers’
corps and general staff in the way of raising salaries and of quicker
advancement. Thus for the Russian army, too, and its capacity for
service the year 1913 is to be looked upon as important.
Furthest in arrears of the armies of the Triple Entente is the
English, which made no progress worth speaking of in 1913. England
in her war plans against us long reckoned with landing an army of
invasion on our coast. The idea has been given up because it was
declared that probably the weak, active army would be more needed
elsewhere, especially as its maximum of about 130,000 men could not
play a decisive part against the millions-of-men armies of Germany.
Nor has the “territorial army,” destined for protection at home,
shown any progress; of its required strength there were still lacking
in October, 1913, seventy thousand men and all efforts to bring it
to the intended height of 314,000 men have failed. The thought of
tunnel connection with France, however, in spite of the dislike of the
Britisher, so proud of the isolation the sea offers him, has found
more adherents than was formerly the case.
If now we draw our conclusions from our military review of the year
1913 the armaments of Austria and Italy on the one hand and Russia
and England on the other are insignificant as compared with those of
Germany and France. The two latter remain well in the foreground, and
indeed in a European war, too, it is they who first and foremost would
have to try conclusions with each other.
These observations, made by an expert at the beginning of 1914,
are exceedingly interesting in view of what is now going on. Since
Von Bremen wrote, however, there have been several interesting
developments. In February it became known that of the French soldiers
no less than 265,000 had died, were on the sick-list, or had been
discharged during the previous month. The explanation is, that in
order to raise the figures even the poorest kind of material had
been accepted, that old unhealthy barracks were overcrowded and that
new ones had been occupied while the plaster was still wet on the
walls; that the army was short of physicians to the extent of many
hundreds. An official note in a Paris paper declares that two-thirds
of the recruits arrive in a tuberculous condition. Together with these
revelations comes a book, by a French military aeronaut, complaining of
the utter neglect of the air fleet, and declaring that at the moment
France has not one serviceable hydroplane. The whole appropriation for
air-ships in connection with the navy was but 400,000 francs in 1913,
as compared with millions appropriated by the rival powers. At the same
time come revelations regarding the regular navy itself. Although there
are nine dreadnaughts building, but two are ready, and no cruisers.
In March appeared the “general annual report of the British army,”
published by the War Office, which showed that Von Bremen’s statement
as to the shortage of men was not only not exaggerated but greatly
underestimated. The regular army is 9,211 men short, the territorial
army 66,969, the special reserve 29,370. The explanation lies in the
greater attractiveness of the navy and in the high emigration figures
(178,468 males in 1913).
[Illustration: Line Infantry]
[Illustration: Rear Guard in Ambush]
[Illustration: Artillery Patrol]
In April we hear of great appropriations in Austria both for the army
and the navy. Official estimates place the strength of the army at
390,250 men, but a German critic points out that of these 60,000 are
_Landwehr_, or reserves, and ought not to be counted. There is to
be a yearly increase of 31,300 recruits, but the measure is not to
take full effect until 1918. For the navy, 427,000,000 _kronen_ are
appropriated, of which 4,000,000 are to go for military air-ships; but
the expenditures are to be extended over a period of five years. It has
been Austria’s fate throughout the centuries always to be several years
behind.
In June, finally, we learn that Russia has set aside for military
expenditures in 1914 alone the monstrous sum of 2,500,000,000 marks,
and by 1916 will have _added_ 400,000 men—more than Austria’s whole
force—to her standing army, which will amount, in the winter months
at least, to 2,200,000 men. “Characteristic,” writes the _Tägliche
Rundschau_ in commenting on it, “is the strengthening of the western
boundary-strip and the improvement of the strategic network of
railroads in order to hasten the forwarding of troops.” On the other
hand, attention is drawn in the _Danziger Zeitung_ to the fact
that Russia has at the moment in the Baltic but four battle-ships,
all old-fashioned, although by 1915 it is hoped to have ready four
dreadnaughts.
* * * * *
We shall hear much in the next few months of infantry and cavalry, of
field artillery and foot artillery, of pioneers, of _Verkehrstruppen_
or communication troops, and of the _Train_ or transport division. I
therefore preface this section with the definition of these terms given
by a staff officer in the newest book of instructions for the one-year
volunteers.
[Illustration: Infantry on the March]
The infantry represent the main troops of the army. Their value lies
in their endurance when marching, in their correct shooting and in
their brave dashing against the enemy. The infantry is armed with the
ninety-eight gun and bayonet; the sword-knot non-commissioned officers
(_Portepeeunteroffiziere_), battalion-drummers and ambulance-men carry
revolvers.
To the infantry belong the sharpshooter battalions
(_Jägerbataillone_), the guard sharpshooter battalion
(_Gardejägerbataillon_) and the guard rifle-battalion
(_Gardeschützenbataillon_). The infantrymen are known as grenadiers,
musketeers and fusileers.
The cavalry is armed with lance, saber and carbine. Its chief value is
for scouting and for precautionary service, but it is also used for
riding down the enemy and piercing him with the lance. The cavalry may
also dismount and fight on foot like the infantry. For shooting it
uses the carbine.
The cavalry consists of cuirassiers, uhlans, hussars, dragoons
and mounted riflemen. (In Saxony guard-riders (_Gardereiter_) and
carbineers; in Bavaria heavy riders and light horse (_Chevaulegers_).)
The field artillery is effective through the swiftness with which
it rides up and through the certainty of aim of its quick-firing
guns. The field artillery carries batteries of cannon for firing
against visible goals and light howitzer batteries, for shooting at
objects behind cover and for demolishing light field fortifications.
The drivers carry a sword and revolver, the cannoneers a dagger and
revolver. Every man of the horse-drawn division is mounted and carries
sword and revolver.
The foot artillery has to serve the fort and siege artillery as well
as the heavy artillery guns of the field army; in attacking a fortress
it must silence the enemy’s heavy fort guns and make breaches in
the fortifications; when defending it must overcome the enemy’s heavy
siege guns. The men are called cannoneers; they carry the carbine and
the ninety-eight bayonet.
The pioneers see to the throwing up of entrenchments, the building and
destroying of bridges, obstructions, etc.; they are armed like the
infantrymen.
The communication troops consist of the railroad regiments, which in
time of war have to see to the building and running of railroads;
of the telegraph battalions, which put up telegraph lines; of the
fortress telephone companies, which attend to all telephone matters
in the fortress; of the air-ship and aeroplane battalions, who are
entrusted with spying out the land and the enemy’s positions by means
of balloons, air-ships and aeroplanes.
The communication troops are armed like the infantry.
The transport service (_Train_) supplies every kind of column of the
army with bridge materials, food, ammunition, etc. Its weapons are
swords, carbines and revolvers.
[Illustration: Floating the Pontoons]
[Illustration: Machine Guns Being Loaded on Pontoons]
It is not worth while here to enter into the question of uniforms.
In time of peace the blue coats and red collars of the infantry, the
varied colored _attilas_ and fur caps of the hussars, the helms with
the flying eagles of the guards, the tresses, the gleaming epaulettes,
the scarves, the waving plumes, are all interesting enough, especially
to the other sex; but in war that is all laid aside. In order to be as
invisible as possible to the enemy all categories of troops wear the
same ashen gray—a comparatively recent adaptation of the principle of
protective coloring.
In the German army the cavalry is merely an adjunct of the infantry. It
is the infantry which decides battles—not the cavalry, not even the
artillery. However, the infantry of to-day is something very different
from the infantry of the eighteenth and even from that of a great part
of the nineteenth century. German military writers acknowledge that
the world learned new tactics from the sharpshooters and riflemen of
the American war of the rebellion. The whole modern battle formation
rests on the idea of giving more play to the individual. In spite of
the technical progress that has made of armies great machines, more
weight than ever before is laid on quick judgment, on good shooting, on
physical bravery and endurance. I know that an idea quite contrary to
this prevails, that many consider war reduced to the art of setting off
the greatest quantities of explosives within a given time. But this is
very far from the truth. The battles of the past were of much shorter
duration than are those of the present. Wagram was won in two hours,
Mukden took three days.
One learns to adapt one’s self even to quick-firing guns and incredible
rifle-ranges. It has been mathematically demonstrated that, with the
rifles now in the hands of the German infantry, a bullet fired from
a distance of three hundred yards will pass right through five men
standing closely one behind the other and lodge in the body of the
sixth. But men in battle line no longer stand closely one behind the
other, nor even closely side by side. Even in what is considered a
thick firing line they stand about three feet apart.
[Illustration: Mountain Earthworks]
[Illustration: Pursuit]
[Illustration: Infantry Embarking]
I have said that the modern idea is to give more play to the
individual. Within certain limits the men choose their own position,
find the proper rests for their rifles, get each the range for himself,
determine the speed of their own fire and use their own judgment in the
economizing of ammunition. They are expected to advance according as
they see their opportunity.
A glance at the methods of training the infantry will give some
idea of the care and thoroughness with which the Germans have made
their preparations for war. The old drill has not been entirely
abandoned—indeed, some military critics think that there is still too
much of the goose-step marching and of the parade tricks. But these
have lost their old importance and the tendency of late years is toward
the most realistic representation of the circumstances and problems of
actual combat. The parade-ground has given place to the maneuvering
field, acres and miles in extent. For the first time in Germany, this
autumn, whole army corps were to have engaged in mock combat with one
another.
In the ordinary rifle practise the men are taught first to shoot well
individually, then in groups and detachments, next in whole troops
and companies and finally in conjunction with cavalry and artillery.
They are made to adapt themselves to the most unfamiliar and unusual
surroundings. Even the targets are of the most varied description:
targets that fall to the ground when hit, targets that burst, targets
surrounded by smoking objects or colored fires so that there will be
some of the semblance of battle, fixed targets and targets that move or
that float in the air, targets that have been lying flat on the ground
but that suddenly appear here and there like an enemy issuing from the
bushes. The rifleman must learn never to be surprised at anything, but
to keep his eyes open in all directions.
The German army rifle is of a type first introduced in 1888, and so
much improved in 1898 that it is now known as the ninety-eight gun.
All the infantry carry the same, for there is no longer any essential
distinction between musketeers, fusileers and grenadiers. It is a
quick-loading rifle which renders it possible to take aim and shoot
as many as twenty-five times a minute. The caliber is seven and
nine-tenths millimeters, a fact which may not at first seem to the
American reader of great importance, but which becomes more interesting
when it is realized that this is the smallest caliber which will
inflict sufficient injury on an enemy to make its use profitable. In
other words, if it does not kill him at once it will put him out of the
fight and keep him out for a reasonable time. It was found in the
Russian-Japanese War that a smaller bullet could, and in a number of
cases did, pass through a foeman’s body without rendering him _hors de
combat_, and that no less than forty per cent. of all wounded were back
with their troops in three months.
[Illustration: Building a Pontoon Bridge]
[Illustration: Cannon for Shooting Air-ships]
[Illustration: Combination Hydro and Aeroplane]
There are Maxim rifles which can fire as many as a hundred shots a
minute and which have other advantages too; but the German government
is well satisfied with its own gun, considers it superior to that of
any of its neighbors’ and has never seriously considered the question
of changing. It has a smokeless powder, the process of manufacture of
which is a carefully guarded secret.
A recent innovation is the supplying of the infantry—for that matter of
the cavalry also—with so-called machine guns. They are the Gatling guns
of our own country, and every German infantry regiment now—since the
army reform of 1913—has a machine-gun company. It consists of ninety
men and forty horses, with six guns and three ammunition wagons. As the
newest guns can fire at the rate of six hundred shots a minute, and as
there are more than two hundred infantry regiments, not to speak of the
cavalry and artillery, which also have their companies of “Gatlings,”
one can gain some impression of the deadliness of modern campaigning.
Many of the quick-firing guns now are supplied with stands on pivots so
that they can be pointed in the air against balloons and aeroplanes.
But their chief use will be in guarding bridges and narrow passes.
Their bullets carry for two miles, but they can be silenced by heavy
artillery far beyond this range, nor can they carry enough ammunition
for long-continued use. Altogether, however, a comparison of their fire
with the simple flames of the traditional hell makes the latter place
seem a mere pleasure-resort.
The training of a soldier has of late years become more and more humane
and rational, and is no longer confined to manning guns, shooting
rifles and performing long marches. Those Germans with whom I have
spoken on the subject look back to their term of service with pleasure,
and my general conviction is that the army in time of peace is the most
perfect educational institution in existence. With school learning
every boy when he comes to “serve” is more or less equipped. What he
learns is _esprit de corps_, manly bearing, endurance and the feeling
that his tasks must be quickly and faultlessly performed—in other
words, regularity and discipline. The mere change of surroundings and
interests is a benefit, and the outlook on the world is immeasurably
broadened. The old argument against compulsory military training—that,
namely, young men in their best years are withdrawn from productive
work, does not amount to much in an age where the general complaint
is of overcrowdedness in almost every calling and profession. The
German boy does his work all the better for his military training and
the nation has thoroughly adjusted itself to the falling out of these
two years. There are dispensations for cases where the boy’s presence
at home is a vital matter for the support of others, and, as a rule, a
place that he filled before is kept open for him against his return.
[Illustration: War Dogs Used as Messengers]
[Illustration: Covered Field Artillery]
[Illustration: A Howitzer Battery Crossing a Pontoon Bridge]
One of the pleasantest recent developments has been the enthusiasm for
sport that had taken hold of the army. The authorities encouraged it in
every way, for it was in keeping with the new tactics of training the
individual to be efficient and independent. The author had the pleasure
of attending the first great military athletic meet that has ever taken
place. It was held in June, 1914, in the great stadium that has been
erected near Berlin for the Olympic games of 1916, and that army which
is now fighting so strenuously for the very existence of its country
was represented in all its pomp and glory. On an elevated terrace
was the emperor with his court. Next came the _logen_ or boxes which
were blue with the uniforms of the officers. A large majority of the
spectators were soldiers, for whom whole sections had been reserved;
they marched in in seemingly unending lines, looking very neat in
their summer undress uniforms. The exercises began with gymnastics
or _turnen_, to which, all over Germany, the greatest importance
is attached. There was the usual running, jumping and throwing of
weights—with us it is a shot, with them it is a discus. There was a
cross-country run of four miles which started and ended in the stadium,
and in which some fifty or sixty officers took part. It was won by a
splendid young prince of the royal house, Prince Frederick Leopold. The
best comment that I heard on him was that he looked like a first-class
American.
But most interesting of all was the obstacle race for the common
soldiers. A part of their regular training consists in climbing walls
and trees; and on their parade grounds you will find special tracks
with ditches, walls and palisades; while occasionally the obstacles
are of the most serious kind—iron railings with twisted spikes through
which they must make their way. In the stadium games the soldiers lined
up on the farther side of a great swimming-pool that runs along one
end of the field below the spectators. At a given signal they plunged
into the water, swam for dear life to the other side, climbed the low
protecting wall and were off helter-skelter for the hurdles and other
obstacles. Behind one of the hurdles, concealed by green boughs, was a
slimy watery hole, but it detained them but for a moment. Across the
track a high straight impromptu wall was held in place by soldiers
and up it all the contestants had to clamber. One almost stuck at
the top; you watched him breathlessly to see if he could achieve it,
but there was no jeering, as I fear there would have been at home.
The whole race, in which were some fifty or more participants, was
run with a wonderful freshness, joyousness and what the Germans call
_schneidigkeit_, which corresponds to our American slang expression
“toniness.”
[Illustration: Rough Riding]
[Illustration: Effect of Two Shells on a Six-Foot Reinforced Concrete
Wall]
[Illustration: Scaling Barricades]
Even in the ordinary practise on the parade-ground an adjutant keeps
a record of the time that the soldiers need to overcome the different
obstacles. Whole companies have to pass the required tests. The whole
thing is already reduced to such a system that in war an officer will
know to the smallest detail what he can expect of his men. Great
importance is attached to swimming, for occasions are sure to arise in
a campaign when streams are to be forded or where the pontoon divisions
have to be assisted.
On the whole the rise of sport has had a great leveling influence in
the army. Soldiers and officers do not, indeed, compete with each other
as a rule; but they take part in the same meets, and I have observed
that the soldier seems to rise in importance while the tendency of the
officer is to forget himself in the excitement of the moment. I have a
vision of non-participants flying across the field with the tails of
their long coats flapping behind them to carry tidings or encouragement
to some tired runner—which denotes a very great change from the
unswervingly dignified bearing of other days. Soldiers and officers
now are encouraged to join athletic associations, which makes for less
exclusiveness.
If the infantry is the mainstay of the German army, the cavalry is
indispensable for reconnoitering, for making raids and for pursuit.
Each cavalryman, as has been said, carries a lance, a sword and a
carbine. Much time is spent in training the men to the use of the
lance, which is of hollow steel. Men of straw, for instance, are placed
on the ground and the lancer, riding by, has to inflict a wound in
exactly the place designated. Or a straw head is placed on a stake and
must be knocked off in passing. The carbines, which are stuck in the
saddle, are of a perfected modern type and are but little inferior to
the muskets of the infantry.
Cavalry regiments, with which speed of progress is the first
consideration, carry their own bridge-wagons, so that they can either
repair bridges that have been destroyed, or construct entirely new
ones. It has been found that rafts made of fodder-bags stuffed with
straw and held together by lances, boards, logs, etc., can carry
comparatively heavy weights. Six such bags as I have described can, at
a pinch, carry six men. Barrels and chests are still more useful if
they happen to be at hand. Needless to say, the cavalry bridge-wagons
also carry explosives for destroying the enemy’s bridges and other
defenses.
[Illustration: Lancer Practising with Straw Man]
[Illustration: Cavalry Patrol]
[Illustration: Building a Bridge with Sacks]
It has been thought in some quarters that aeroplanes and other
contrivances for scouting and communication would supersede cavalry,
but the German army administration evidently does not think so, as it
has more than 150,000 horses in use even in time of peace. In time
of war all private horses are subject to requisition, as are also
automobiles, motor-trucks, motor-wheels and aeroplanes. The better
riders in a regiment train the horses for the rest, and there is a
constant mustering out of the inferior ones in favor of others that are
stronger or younger or more docile. There are military riding schools
at Hanover, Dresden and Munich, where officers are taught not only to
ride well and to instruct others but also to break in young horses.
Prussia has her own stud-farms in which the royal family, since the
days of Frederick William I, has taken the greatest interest. There
is a regular Prussian type, small and tough. The theory has lately
been advanced that Asiatic horses are more free from disease and that
they proved more enduring in the recent Turkish-Bulgarian War, while
the Prussian horse, through faults in the manner of raising, has
degenerated during the long period of unbroken peace. This, however,
is simply an academic question and nothing short of war itself can
demonstrate that under all conditions another type of horse will be
preferable.
The Russian-Japanese War brought the old cavalry raid, such as we
associate with the names of Sheridan and Wilson, once more to honor,
and an expedition of Mischtschenko’s in February, 1905, though not
wholly successful, aroused much interest in cavalry circles in Europe.
It is considered not unlikely that such “raids” will play a great part
in the present war. The Germans use the American word for the maneuver.
If cavalry is merely an adjunct of infantry, this is still more true of
artillery. Its function, according to the latest German writers, is to
facilitate the advance of the infantry, or, in other words, to break
and open the path by which the infantry shall storm. It has sometimes
been thought of the battle of the future that it would consist of two
parts: the great artillery duel and the infantry struggle; and that the
infantry would have to stand aside until the artillery duel was over.
The contrary is the case. The two, in this coming war, will fight side
by side: the artillery opening the breach, the infantry coming in.
[Illustration: A Field Gun]
[Illustration: Wheel Belt for Cannon]
[Illustration: A Howitzer Battery]
German batteries consist of six guns, while those of the French have
only four. Good authorities, even in Germany, prefer the French
system, but the change would mean more expense than was considered
warrantable. A novelty is that the guns now have great steel shields
that protect the gunners. Another most useful innovation is the
so-called wheel belt. A number of flat blocks or shoes, wider than the
tire and hinged so as to form a great chain, protect the wheels of the
gun-carriage and prevent them from sinking into the mud. Formerly a
supply of beams, jackscrews and the like had to be carried along for
use in extricating the cannon when they stuck fast. Now every large
gun in the army has its belt, which can be removed and put on again at
will, the operation lasting but six minutes.
The largest guns accompanying the infantry have a bore of twenty-one
centimeters, which is much less, of course, than the fixed guns in
fortresses or those used for coast defense. The size of these is ever
increasing, and there is already talk of forty centimeter guns. The
field guns fire shells and shrapnel and there is a so-called “unit
charge” which is a combination of the two. A shrapnel is a thin metal
ball filled with explosive bullets and can be discharged either by
ignition or percussion. It is considered preferable to have it burst in
the air, just above the point aimed at, as the shock is downward. Krupp
has patented a shell that explodes by clock-work.
One further fact concerning artillery may interest those who follow
the present campaigns. In all the older famous battles the greatest
efforts were made to drag the artillery up the hills and have it crown
the heights. According to recent strategy it chooses rather low-lying
protected spots. Howitzers can shoot right over a hill and have the
shell curve and descend on the other side. The calculations as to just
where it will strike are made with astounding accuracy, even though the
goal itself may be invisible. The guns are being constantly improved,
but the greatest secrecy is observed with regard to them. They are
shrouded as they pass through the streets and no one can inspect them
without a written order.
The low situation has its great advantages as well as its
disadvantages, but the latter can be counteracted. In order to be able
to overlook the field, each battery now has an observation ladder or
column, of which the parts can be telescoped into short space and
carried between two wheels. When desired it is projected into the air.
One advantage of this new invention is that the wheeled observation
ladder can be sent off to quite a distance carrying a portable
telephone by means of which it is possible at all times to communicate
with the gunners.
[Illustration: Observation Column]
[Illustration: Observation Ladder]
Many cannon now have telescopes attached to them to assist the gunner
in taking aim. When we reflect that some of the guns can shoot five
and six miles, the necessity of this will be apparent.
[Illustration: Covered Field Artillery]
For storming fortifications there are special heavy siege guns. A
modern fortress is something very different from a medieval or even
from an early nineteenth century one. The old city walls, however
solidly built, are now regarded as mere pleasant bits of antiquity, and
in dozens of German towns have been razed to the ground and converted
into rings or boulevards. So in the city of Cologne, in Ulm. In their
place we now have groups of sunken guns, of protected batteries and
of underground bomb-proof rooms with walls of reinforced concrete
twelve and fifteen feet thick. Here and there armored turrets project
a few feet above the ground. Some of the rooms are large enough for
a whole company of infantry. The sunken guns can rise from their
resting-places, fire their charges and sink back into their beds.
Germany has twenty-eight land forts in all, of which nine are modern in
every regard, and eight coast fortifications. Should the Russians enter
Prussia we may hear much of the great forts at Königsberg, Graudenz and
Thorn, at Danzig, Kulm and Marienburg, or of the Silesian forts Glogau,
Neisse and Glatz, which played a part already in the wars of Frederick
the Great. In the west, Metz and Strasburg have been immeasurably
strengthened since they passed into German hands, and Mainz, Coblenz,
Cologne, Germersheim and Wesel are all formidable. To the south are Ulm
and Ingolstadt, while in the north are Kustrin and Spandau, the latter
but a few miles from Berlin. In Saxony is the Königstein, which, by
reason of its natural position, is considered as impregnable as any
fortress can be.
Whether the Germans will ever be forced back into these strong
positions remains to be seen. Their policy is to keep to the offensive
and spare their own land as much as possible. However, what strength
of arms may fail to accomplish may be reserved for famine. With her
commerce entirely cut off, the food supply for the nation at large will
be but scanty, and of all the criticisms I have read on the German army
during the last six months those on the commissariat department have
been the most severe. A change in the whole administration was ordered
a few months before the war broke out, but it has scarcely as yet had
time to go into full effect.
_The Army of the Air_
Probably the greatest difference between ancient and modern warfare
lies in the systematic use that is now made of balloons, air-ships,
aeroplanes and kites, also of telegraphy, both fixed and wireless, and
of the telephone. I should add to these, automobiles, motor-trucks,
motorcycles and simple bicycles.
[Illustration: Military Airdome at Cologne Showing _Zeppelin Number II_]
[Illustration: Cabin of the Zeppelin Airship _Hansa_]
It may not be generally known that as far back as 1870 Germany
attempted to make regular use of military balloons, and that two
balloons and equipment were purchased from an English aeronaut.
Several ascents were successfully made with a member of the general
staff as passengers. Before Paris, however, it proved impossible to
obtain the gas for inflation, and the whole balloon detachment was
dissolved. Fourteen years later, in 1884, regular experiments regarding
the taking of observations and the exchanging of signals were begun.
Fifty thousand marks a year were set aside for the purpose, and so
satisfactory were the results that in 1887 a regular balloon corps
was organized with a major, a captain, three lieutenants and fifty
non-commissioned officers and men. The discovery that the gas could be
transported in steel cases in a greatly condensed form placed military
ballooning on a much securer basis and the corps, greatly increased,
has taken part in the yearly maneuvers since 1893. The captive balloon
is still used as a sort of training-ship for recruits, but the free
balloon has been practically superseded.
The first Zeppelin and the first Parseval air-ships were acquired in
1907 and, in spite of frequent accidents, have become as much a part
of the armed forces as have batteries or battle-ships. There are now
no less than five air-ship battalions under the “general board of
inspection of military, air and power transport matters.” The combined
appropriations of Prussia, Bavaria and Württemberg for their air
fleets in 1913 amounted to 70,000,000 marks. The recent ships, which
are not necessarily confined to the Zeppelin type, though built along
the same lines, are almost as large as ocean steamships. Last year the
“L II” carried twenty-eight passengers on its trial trip. It exploded
in mid-air and twenty-seven were killed, among them almost all of
Germany’s chief military aeronautic experts. “L III,” which is nearly
completed, will have a displacement of 32,000 cubic meters. The largest
and newest ship at present, the Schütte-Lanz II, has a displacement
of between 23,000 and 24,000 cubic meters, is run by four Maybach
motors, each of one hundred seventy horse-power, and beats the previous
Zeppelin record for speed (seventy-nine kilometers or forty-nine and
three-eighths miles an hour) by six kilometers. No other country has
any air-ship that can in any way compare with this. Under construction
is the twenty-fifth Zeppelin, which will have a length of some four
hundred fifty feet. All modern air-ships are equipped with wireless
telegraphy having a range of about four hundred kilometers, and can
carry light Gatling guns. They can lift a weight of some 16,000
pounds and their cost is from 700,000 marks upward. The Germans have
practised very industriously with their air-ships—only the other day a
pilot completed his seven hundredth trip.
[Illustration: Military Airship in Process of Construction]
[Illustration: Gondola of the _Schütte-Lanz I_ Airship]
[Illustration: Airship _Parseval_]
Whether in war the Zeppelins will come up to the expectations that have
been formed of them remains of course to be seen. One can conceive
of a single ship, under favorable conditions, throwing down enough
explosives on an army to put it completely to rout. But the Zeppelin is
a very big target and its motors make enough noise to warn a whole city
of its approach. Russia and Germany herself now have many vertical guns
for shooting air-ships. On the other hand, a Zeppelin can fly very high
and can take refuge behind a cloud. Its chief objects of attack will
doubtless be arsenals, dockyards, bridges and tunnel-mouths, though no
fleet near the shore and no camp can feel quite safe from it in future.
It would be so tempting to drop a shell in the midst of an enemy’s
general staff and thus bring confusion into the whole guidance of the
army!
The Zeppelin has dangerous enemies in the ordinary aeroplanes. A
Frenchman has just vowed to run the nose of his “plane” into the first
air-ship that appears over Paris. It is possible for the airman to
shoot, too, at close range, or to fly above the monster and let down
ropes with hooks that shall tear its sides. The new ships, however,
as I have said, can carry Gatling guns, and it is only a question of
how they can best trail them on the enemy. The latest idea is a shaft
that shall extend right through the body of the Zeppelin and come out
on the upper surface. This arrangement has been tried on the newest
Schütte-Lanz.
To the value of aeroplanes as instruments of war Germany awakened
late. Not until after an exhibition of the American, Orville Wright,
on the Templehof field near Berlin in 1910 was the matter taken very
seriously. Now there are four flying battalions in the army with nearly
fifteen hundred men, and it is believed that the machines are more
solid and stable than those of the French. All records were broken
by German machines during the past year, and the great Prince Henry
races in May, though fatal accidents occurred, demonstrated very well
about what may be expected from a troop of airmen in time of war. The
conditions were extremely severe and the weather was not favorable, yet
twelve out of twenty-nine starters achieved the final goal within the
time limit.
[Illustration: Austrian Military Airship _Parseval_]
[Illustration: Marine Airship]
[Illustration: A Zeppelin over the Kiel Bay]
The favorite machine in the German army is the Albatross-Taube, which
looks quite warlike with its metal armor covering motor and all. Both
monoplanes and biplanes are used. In case of war all aeroplanes, even
the stock in trade of the manufacturer, are commandeered. These
aeroplanes are easily transportable by rail so that a number of them
can be concentrated close to the scene of action. They will be used for
scouting, carrying despatches and dropping bombs, and undoubtedly will
have a great effect upon warfare. It is likely that more maneuvering
will be done under the cover of night than formerly in order to escape
the spying eyes of the birdmen, that false marches and maneuvers will
be undertaken, that bivouac fires will be lighted in unoccupied places
merely for the purpose of deceiving. It will be easy to conceal cannon
by covering them with green boughs.
The German soldiers are already being trained for these new night
operations which the aeroplane and air-ship will necessitate. They are
taught to make their way by the moon and stars, to place their ears
to the ground and catch and interpret sounds. It is possible for a
finely trained ear to tell in the case of a passing horse whether it
is running free or whether it is carrying a load, also to estimate the
approximate number of a passing troop. Silent marching is practised,
too, the greatest care being taken that the objects carried shall not
clash or rattle. The enemy carries powerful electric search-lights
against aeroplanes; a single apparatus requires several vehicles,
each drawn by four horses. There must be a motor, a dynamo, a great
mirror, a water wagon and a portable tower thirty feet high. The
infantry carries lighter apparatus, too, that can now be loaded on an
automobile, the motor of which can be used for running the dynamo.
Aeroplanes, too, now carry search-lights.
An enormous number of automobiles are used in the army. The German
government has a special arrangement with motor-truck owners (the same
is done with steamship companies) by which it pays a subsidy for new
trucks on the understanding that they shall be at its disposal in time
of need. It has been estimated that nine motor-wagons can replace one
hundred thirty-nine horses and will need thirty instead of one hundred
two men. Such a wagon will carry easily four tons of baggage.
_The Officers_
With all the technical aids and inventions, however, the decisive
factor in a war remains the men and more especially the officers.
[Illustration: Albatross-Taube Model 1914]
[Illustration: Albatross-Taube Packed for Shipping]
[Illustration: Double Monoplane]
[Illustration: Albatross Hydro and Aeroplane]
I recently overheard a well-known Boston woman teacher holding
forth with the positiveness of complete conviction on the subject
of the German officer and commiserating him on the life of idleness
circumstances forced him to lead “except, of course, during the three
or four hours a day when he is obliged to exercise.” The remark was
addressed to a distinguished Harvard professor—anti-military,
however, to the core—who had no contradiction to offer. I should have
marked both of these great people zero for flat ignorance of the
subject had I had them in a class. The German officer, I grant, may
occasionally seem as idle and as frivolous as the son of a new American
millionaire: the only difference would be that the American conceals
his idleness under a show of industriousness, sending telegrams when
he has nothing else to do, while the German conceals the fact that he
has been up since four in the morning training a mass of raw recruits,
that he has spent several hours at the _Kriegsakademie_ studying
languages, geography, political economy and the like and that he has as
a permanent job some important problem in tactics to work out. Those
who know the methods of the Prussian government could never accuse it
of giving its employees too little work. A list is kept of all officers
in which their industry, their interest in their work and their general
good conduct is noted. The ideal that is kept before them may not be
exactly our ideal, but it is a wonderful one of knightly virtue all the
same. The man may never forget that he is a leader of men; he must grip
his standard of honor, such as it is, like grim death and be willing
unhesitatingly to lay down his life for it. If he flinch or falter in
physical encounter or in any way is “guilty of conduct unbecoming an
officer” he has to resign his position. He has to conform not only to
the rule of his superiors but also to the code of his fellow officers.
There are things in that code that one would like not to see there and
one misses much that might well be included, but to down the profession
as a sinecure “except, of course, during the three or four hours a day”
is the purest folly.
And peace-time is the mere waiting-period, the period of training
for the real work. In war-time the fate of the whole country hangs
on the officer. An Italian, Mangiarotti, recently inquired of some
two thousand soldiers who had just taken part in the African campaign
regarding their sensations when facing the enemy. “The great ideals
of God, king and fatherland,” he writes, “incorporate themselves in
one single personality, the officer.” The lieutenant who does his
duty in the firing line is an absolute hero to his men. But only real
superiority of mind and body can keep him at this height.
There are more than thirty thousand officers in the regular standing
army, the great majority of them belonging to the nobility, who feel
that they have a hereditary right to these positions. I am inclined to
think that this feeling of caste will not be disadvantageous in war.
The military career from youth up has been the one serious object and
occupation in life. The memory of Jena has been preventative of
pride and an incentive to hard work. The habit of commanding gained as
lord of the manor—as _Herr Graf_ or as _Herr Baron_—will not be useless
in the field.
[Illustration: A Taube over the Military Flying Grounds at
Johannisthal, near Berlin]
[Illustration: Biplane]
[Illustration: Airship Transportation Wagon]
Price Collier, in his _Germany and the Germans_, gives the officer a
bad character for arrogance and instances the fact that an officer will
crowd a woman off the sidewalk. Such cases are very rare to-day, much
rarer than they were some thirty years ago. The Zabern affair, however,
has thrown a glaring light on a certain presumptuousness in the army
and aroused at the time very bitter passions. There was a contempt for
the ordinary laws of justice connected with the trial that is likely
to avenge itself in time if it has not already done so. But no human
institution is perfect, and the officer has at present far other things
to think of than presumptuousness.
In time of war many more officers are needed than in time of peace.
This is provided for in Germany by a different and less perfect
system than in France. From the one-year volunteers, of whom there
are about 15,000 yearly, are taken the “officer aspirants,” who then
undergo supplementary training, returning at intervals in later life
for further instruction and practise. The general structure of the
army does not change in time of war. Instead of numbering five or
six hundred men the size of a battalion is raised to eleven hundred
or more. There are supplementary troops in all branches, consisting
partly of retired soldiers and partly of raw recruits, who must be
licked into shape as quickly as possible, but who serve mainly to fill
up the ranks at the front as they become depleted. Every able-bodied
man must leave his occupation and take to the ranks whether he has had
military training or not. Even a German in foreign lands, if he fail to
report for duty to his consul, is liable on his return to a sentence
of six years in the penitentiary. How many will hasten to naturalize
themselves in other countries is one of the problems of the war.
Horses, too, are called in in great numbers as soon as mobilization is
ordered. In time of peace the twenty-five army corps, each numbering
about forty thousand men, require 157,000 horses; in time of war the
demand, of course, will be much larger, and this is provided for by
instant requisition. But not at random. A list or census is regularly
kept of practically all the horses in the country; it is revised at
stated intervals and commissioners note the adaptability of every
animal to this or that purpose. In times of mobilization the animals
are brought before final commissions, consisting partly of military,
partly of civilian members, who appraise their value and declare them
confiscate. The transferring of horses to the rallying centers is
one of the chief difficulties of the railroads, which, as is well
known, belong to the state and are altogether closed to general traffic
during the mobilization period.
[Illustration: Uhlans Crossing River]
[Illustration: Patrol of Uhlans]
[Illustration: Uhlans Fording River]
[Illustration: Easily Upset]
Germany is putting, so it is estimated, some four million men into the
field. And behind them, should the war last long, are nearly a million
boys who belong to the Prussian _Jung Deutschland_ and to the Bavarian
_Wehrkraftverein_. Boy scouts, we should call them in our country,
but in Germany they are regularly trained by officers in the army—an
occupation of these sinecure-holders that I omitted to mention. They
are taken in squads on long tramps, are trained to use their eyes
and ears and enjoy the life of the hills and woods. They carry their
cooking utensils and prepare their own meals. The government encourages
the institution by large grants and often places barracks and tents at
the disposal of the boys for longer expeditions. Public and private
generosity, too, has provided homes in out-of-the-way places where the
boys can take shelter over night.
How deadly an instrument for war is the German army remains to be seen.
That it has already accomplished many fine things in time of peace is
undoubted. Not the least of these is the spread of hygienic knowledge
and the encouragement of manliness.
By the terms of the German constitution the Kaiser is head and chief
of the whole German army and, notwithstanding concessions made to
Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony for the period when it remains on
a peace-footing, is absolute commander in time of war. Whether he
will personally take the field or not is another question. If he
does he will be upheld by an enormous wave of loyalty, but, on the
other hand, the presence of a monarch in camp is often a hindrance to
the operations. His own great-grandfather, and at the same time the
Austrian emperor, made life very bitter for Blücher and the other real
fighters in 1814.
The real business of commanding a modern army is done by the chief of
the general staff. It is of good augury that the present holder of
that position is again a Moltke. On him falls the planning and the
responsibility for carrying out of the plans, though he has under him a
huge staff of subordinates—more than two hundred in all—whose duty is
to collect information, make reports and even tender advice. The older
Moltke once wrote: “The make-up of the headquarters of an army is of an
importance not always sufficiently realized. Some commanders need no
advice, but weigh and decide things for themselves. Their subordinates
have merely to carry out instructions. But such stars of first radiance
are only to be found about once in a century. Only a Frederick the
Great takes counsel with no one and determines everything himself. As
a rule the leader of an army can not do without advice.” The old plan
was to hold a council of war and abide by its decisions; the new one is
for the commanding general to use every aid from others but to take the
whole responsibility himself.
Headquarters travels with the army and with it goes the imperial
chancellor, ready to take advantage of every happening in the field
to influence the course of negotiations. The minister of war remains
at home to see to the prompt forwarding of troops and supplies. In
1870 and 1871 Bismarck had much to suffer from female influences—royal
ladies who objected to the bombardment of beautiful cities and the
like. There are at present no royal ladies in Germany who are likely to
interfere. Blücher used to insist that the most merciful way of making
war was to be absolutely relentless in pursuit—to the last man and to
the last horse. The worst thing that can happen is to have the campaign
drag on slowly with necessity of renewing battles. This phase of the
matter royal ladies do not always understand.
If the example of the Franco-Prussian War is followed the Germans will
put as many as six different armies into the field, each with some four
army-corps. There are twenty-five army-corps, and the fighting part
of a single army-corps, which numbers some 41,000 men, strings out on
an ordinary road to a distance of twenty-six kilometers or more than
sixteen miles. As the food supplies, medical and surgical apparatus
and ammunition wagons have to follow at a considerable distance we
may estimate the length of the whole column at more than double this
amount. Were the whole standing army (not to speak of the reserves)
to travel along the same road it would take twenty-five days to pass
a fixed point. It may be said here that the number of direct roads
passing from Germany into France is small and that for purposes of
invasion the possession of Belgium was a strategic necessity. Its
occupation meant victory or defeat in the great struggle and the devil
take the consequences. Belgium and France are so at one that the French
have so trusted to the forts of Liege and Namur, which they believed to
be impregnable, that they have done little to fortify their own borders
in that direction.
Who the commanding generals of the German army are to be has not yet
been made public in America. Judging by the holders of high positions
in peace-time they will be Grand Duke Frederick II of Baden, Duke
Albert of Württemberg, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria and the generals
Bülow, Eichhorn, Heeringen and Prittwitz. Whether or not the German
crown-prince will be given a command is doubtful. He is brave and
dashing but impetuous and unbalanced, and his relations with his father
have been somewhat strained. I am told that at maneuvers he expects
far too much from his men and horses, though his pleasant manners and
his joking way make him very popular. He may, of course, prove the
Frederick the Great of the campaign should it last sufficiently long
for him to gain the proper experience.