PART I

[Transcriber's Notes

Underscores are used for italic markup; the three words that end this

sentence _are in italics_.

The spelling and hyphenation are as found in the original text.

There is one spelling mistake that deserves mention. Although

“dreadnaught” can be accepted as an older spelling of “dreadnought”,

Henderson's use of it to denote a certain type of battleship is

incorrect. Battleships of this type were called dreadnoughts after

_H.M.S. Dreadnought_, the first example of this type of ship.

There is only one footnote: it has been left inline, that is,

immediately after its flag.]

GERMANY’S FIGHTING MACHINE

[Illustration: Kaiser Wilhelm II]

GERMANY’S

FIGHTING MACHINE

_Her Army, Her Navy, Her Air-ships, and

Why She Arrayed Them Against the

Allied Powers of Europe_

BY

ERNEST F. HENDERSON

_Author of_

SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY

HISTORY OF GERMANY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

BLÜCHER, ETC., ETC.

WITH MANY ILLUSTRATIONS

INDIANAPOLIS

THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY

PUBLISHERS

COPYRIGHT 1914

THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY

CHARLES FRANCIS PRESS, NEW YORK

GERMANY’S FIGHTING MACHINE

GERMANY’S FIGHTING MACHINE

PART I

THE WAR

But a few weeks ago the author of this little book was in Germany

studying the land and its institutions and full of admiration for its

achievements in every field. Two days after he had taken ship for

America Germany was practically at war with France and Russia. England

soon joined in the conflict, and the splendid Hamburg liner on which

the author was a passenger was a hunted thing on the ocean, owing her

safety at last to a friendly fog. The great shipping company, with its

nearly two hundred vessels, was out of the running as a commercial

enterprise, a symbol of the paralyzed industries of the whole country.

To the ordinary observer the conflict came like a bolt from the blue,

but to the historian and to the man who reads the foreign newspapers it

was not unexpected. The historians recognized that it was the appointed

time for a war between the great nations. The Franco-Prussian War took

place forty-three years ago. When, since the days of the grandsons

of Charlemagne, have the chief powers kept out of war for so long a

time? In the ninth and tenth centuries the question of Lorraine was

as troublesome as it has been in the nineteenth and twentieth; in the

eleventh and twelfth an expedition against Italy was in the day’s work

of almost every German emperor; and England and Sicily were conquered

by the Normans; in 1215 took place the first general international

battle; in 1250 the final expeditions against the Emperor Frederick

II; in 1272 the Sicilian wars of the house of Anjou. The Guelphs

and Ghibellines carry us on to the Hundred Years’ War; the Hapsburg

struggles against Italy and the Turks bring us down to the invasion of

Italy by Charles VIII of France, to the campaigns of Maximilian, to the

Field of the Cloth of Gold, to the religious wars of Charles V. Close

on the heels of the latter struggles came not only the French religious

wars but the invasion of England by Philip II’s great armada. The

Thirty Years’ War, Louis XIV’s war of conquest, the Spanish Succession,

the Silesian and the Seven Years’ Wars fill the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries; the Napoleonic, Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars

the nineteenth. Yes, it was time for a new struggle.

When a great and extraordinary event takes place it is easy, somewhere

in the world, to point to omens and prophecies that have heralded it.

But in the case of the present war we can see in the German newspapers

how, from month to month of the present year, the struggle was felt to

be more and more imminent and how Russia, the power that eventually

precipitated the catastrophe, was felt to be the center of real

danger. “In well-informed diplomatic circles,” writes the _Magdeburger

Zeitung_ in January, 1914, “the impression can not be concealed that

in Russia at present there prevails a thoroughly hostile attitude to

Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that the agitation in the czar’s realm

is greater even than during the last Balkan crisis. … It looks as

though Russia were preparing to make an extraordinarily great show of

strength against a specific, not far distant date.” And the _Deutsche

Tageszeitung:_ “What is Russia’s purpose in building a mighty fleet

of dreadnaughts for the Baltic? Surely not merely to coerce Sweden.”

Again the Madgeburg paper: “The Russian government, which already owes

French capitalists twelve billions, has received a new loan of two

billions five hundred millions, of which five million are yearly to be

issued in Paris. This whole gigantic sum is exclusively to be spent

for building strategic railways along the German-Russian boundary. …

France compelled Russia to do this. The French general staff thinks

that Russia, because of her clumsiness in mobilizing, but especially

for lack of tracks leading to the German frontier, will not be able, in

a new war with Germany, to bring help to France in time. Russia has now

fulfilled France’s wishes in this regard. Thus does the Franco-Russian

alliance, which of late seemed to be falling into oblivion, celebrate

its resurrection.”

In February the _Hallesche Zeitung_ writes: “To keep friendship with

Russia is one of the chief aims of our foreign policy, but it is

sometimes made very hard for us indeed. … They keep the peace because

it is to the advantage of the czar’s empire to do so; but they are

to be had for every combination directed against Germany.” And the

_Dresdener Nachrichten:_ “The Russian-German relations leave very much

to be desired at the moment. The Russian government fails to show the

least approachableness in foreign questions and Russian society and

the press are in an extremely anti-German mood. Evidences of the same

thing are to be seen in their attitude to Austria. … The Russian policy

lets itself be taken more and more in tow by the French desires, and

has nothing but polite speeches left for Germany.” The _Weser Zeitung_

finds the explanation of the hostility in Germany’s efforts to help the

Turks reorganize their army, and declares, “Here we have touched

one of the weakest spots in Russia’s world-policy, her endeavor to

get to the Mediterranean.” The _Fränkische Kurier_ thinks that Russia

intends to form a protectorate over the Balkan states as a military

weapon against Austria and her allies: “The soul of this endeavor is

the Russian diplomacy and the Servian minister-president, Pasitsch.”

The _Dresdener Anzeiger_ observes that the influence of the Pan-Slavist

party over the Russian government is steadily growing and that the

extraordinary activity in military matters ill suits the constant peace

assurances: “The measures are pointed against Austria-Hungary.”

[Illustration: The Crown Prince and Crown Princess]

[Illustration: Prince Henry of Prussia, the Emperor’s Brother]

On March second an article in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ aroused great

excitement all over Germany. It declared that Russia was not yet in a

position to supplement political threats by military action, however

much France might “rattle with the Russian saber.” But in three years

all the enormous preparations would be completed, and already “it is

openly said even in official military periodicals, that Russia is

arming for war against Germany.” There is no immediate danger, the

article continued, but the legend of the historical German-Russian

friendship had better be thrown to the dogs.

The papers took different attitudes toward this article, but there

were not wanting those who considered the warnings of the _Kölnische

Zeitung_ justified. General Keim, in the _Tag_, declares that the

German-Russian boundary is one huge camp, that the underlying thought

of the whole armament is an offensive war against Germany, that France

had proceeded in the same way just before 1870 and that the recent

visit to St. Petersburg of President Poincaré and his chief of staff

Joffre had not been merely a pleasure jaunt. Had not a French general,

only last summer, declared in a treatise published anonymously that

the tension between Russia and Austria was ground for a European war

“perhaps in the near future”? And had not this French officer even

gone so far as to spread the legend that in case of war Germany would

disregard the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg in order to be able

to envelop the French left wing?

Several of the March newspapers bring the Russian hostility into

connection with the commercial treaty that has only about two years

more to run. Russia, by making a bold front, can gain from Germany

better terms than she has had in the past. “Russia, with her military

preparations,” writes the _Pester Lloyd_, “wishes to put Austria

and Germany under military pressure in order to achieve diplomatic

successes and harm her neighbors economically.” The idea that

France is behind it all crops out repeatedly. The _Neue Preussische

Zeitung_ speaks of the pressure “ever stronger, that the French

need for revenge is exercising on the Russian ally and debtor.” The

_Hannöverische Courier_ accuses the French press of having first caused

the agitation of public opinion in Russia, on which it afterward

comments as so remarkable. As far back as March 10th, 1913, the

_Kölnische Zeitung_ had written: “Never was our relation to our western

neighbor so strained as to-day, never has the idea of vengeance shown

itself so openly and never has it been made so evident that in France

the Russian alliance, the English friendship, are claimed only for the

purpose of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine. In whatever corner of the

world the flame starts up it is quite certain that we shall have to

cross swords with France. When that will be, no one can tell.”

The Russian military preparations cause the German papers much concern

in the month of April also. The _Vossische Zeitung_ considers them a

gigantic bluff, and declares that they have been worth millions to the

Russian government. “For only because France thinks that in Russia she

possesses an ally ready for war has she heaped billions and billions

on her in the form of loans. … That the latest French loans to Russia

were accompanied by instructions seriously to take up the anti-Austrian

and anti-German preparations no one doubts. Just as little is it

doubted that Pan-Slavism is not pleased with the latest changes in the

Balkans or that the freedom of the Dardanelles and the seizure of

Constantinople still present themselves as the goal of Russian policy.

Hatred of the Germans is increasing. … One thing is certain: Russia is

arming to a gigantic extent. She wishes to throw a heavy weight into

the scale of the national quarrels. Germany and Austria have every

reason to be on their guard.” The _Allgemeine Zeitung_, of Chemnitz,

writes that “The goals of French and Russian policy are unattainable

without world-shattering callings-to-account,” and the _Weser Zeitung_,

after speaking of Pan-Slavism as threatening the existence of the

Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, finally exclaims, “It neither can nor

should be concealed that if—which God forbid!—this direction gain

the upper hand in Russian politics it would mean the very war-danger

against which we sought and found refuge in the Triple Alliance.”

[Illustration: The Unworldly Kaiserin as the Protectress of the

Fatherless]

[Illustration: Princess Victoria Louise, the Emperor’s Only Daughter]

The newspapers of May have a somewhat calmer tone than those of March

and April. “There is, to be sure,” writes the _Tag_, “danger for peace

in the possibility that the anti-German tendency in Russia may prove so

strong that the government will not be able to check it. Another danger

lies in the relations of Russia and Austria. … Although there is much

talk to the effect that we shall once more be compelled to fight for

our national existence, it is not absolutely necessary that such a

war shall come.” On the other hand, Admiral Breusing, in the _Tägliche

Rundschau_ of May the seventh, writes: “The striving of the Slavic and

Mongolian races to extend their power and possessions will surely lead

to an encounter with the German race.” The _Rheinisch-Westphälische

Zeitung_ declares of France that “public sentiment in military and

political circles has long gone over from the defensive to the

offensive. Apparently the aim is to create a situation where Germany

will have to choose between receding or attacking.” The _Dresdener

Anzeiger_, too, thinks that the “relations between Germany and France

give the key to the grouping of the European powers,” and the _Berliner

Tageblatt_ says, “The future and salvation of Europe and its culture

lies solely in a German-French-English rapprochement; that alone will

guarantee the world-peace.” Toward the end of the month the _Dresdener

Anzeiger_ writes: “The German-Russian relations have latterly taken a

remarkable change for the worse. Certainly the nationalistic elements

in Russia are once more conspicuously active. … Should the whole mass

of the Russian people once become conscious of its nationality the

world will see the most mighty movement both as regards extent and

elemental intensity. … For Russia, Pan-Slavism is the idea of the

Russian leadership over all Slavs.”

Already in May, more than two months before there is a sign that the

conflict is at hand, doubts begin to be expressed whether Italy’s

alliance would be of any value in case of war. The Berlin _Neueste

Nachrichten_ has to acknowledge that as far as Austria is concerned the

alliance is “more a matter of the intellect than of the heart;” while

the _Rheinisch-Westphälische Zeitung_ reports on May twelve that “in

more than ten years such a senseless agitation against Austria has not

been seen in Italy. … The Italian government is by no means master of

the difficult situation in which it is placed by the demonstrations

of protest against Austria-Hungary. … _Were war to break out to-day

the easily excited Italian people would compel any government of

theirs, however friendly to the Triple Alliance, to declare against

Austria-Hungary._”

The nearer we approach to the crisis the more serious is the situation

regarded by the better newspapers. The _Neue Preussische Zeitung_ in

June tells of the surprising spirit of sacrifice there is in France and

of the quiet efforts that are being made to strengthen the army: “If

the revenge cries have almost ceased that does not in the least mean

that the idea has been given up; on the contrary, they already reckon

on the war as on a sure thing.” Of the Russian military preparations,

the Vienna _Neue Freie Presse_ writes on June twelve: “About two

months ago it became known that Russia had set aside two hundred

sixteen million _kronen_ (a _krone_ is about a franc) for military

exercises and especially for a ‘mobilization.’ The great amount of

this sum will be realized when one remembers that Austria spends about

ten millions for all of its military exercises put together. Under the

harmless title of ‘trial-mobilization’ and the still more harmless

one of ‘exercises for the reserves’ Russia, then, for a period of six

weeks, is placing its giant army practically on a war-footing. Think

of 1,800,000 men holding military exercises at a time when Austria has

200,000, Germany from 300,000 to 400,000 trained men at her immediate

disposal! Whether it be intentional or not this implies so imminent a

threat that the neighbors will need the greatest ‘cold-bloodedness’

to allow these ‘military exercises’ to pass without friction. _These

exercises signify the most colossal endangering of the peace that was

ever attempted under the form of a periodically recurring measure of

organization_, and it would not be surprising if all those who long for

a peaceful turn of political affairs were to be completely embittered….

_To add to this dark aspect comes the relatively enormous credit

demanded by the Servian military administration_—123,000,000. It is as

much in proportion as though Austria were to demand a billion and a

half. Since 1908 Servia has been arming uninterruptedly, and now again

spends this sum on military purposes the tendency of which practically

amounts to a direct threatening of her neighbors.” The _Hallesche

Zeitung_ on the twenty-third of June discusses the various alliances:

“Originally the Russian-French alliance was a military convention,

in the last few months there has been added a naval agreement. It is

desired to enter with united forces into the great decisive struggle

for the division of the world. Russia wants elbow-room as far as the

North Atlantic Ocean and the Southern Baltic, besides free entry into

the Mediterranean.”

I have quoted all these newspaper extracts because they seem to me

absolutely indicative of the sentiment that prevailed in Germany just

before the war broke out, whether that sentiment be based on correct

impressions or not. We have the Russian side of it in an article

written by Professor Maxim Kowaleski, for the _Frankfurter Zeitung_:

“In Russia people believe that Germany and Austria are arming against

Russia, in Germany and Austria they take for granted that the opposite

is the case.”

[Illustration]

[Illustration: General von Heeringen]

[Illustration: General von Eichhorn]

[Illustration: General von Bülow]

[Illustration: General von Prittwitz]

To the unprejudiced observer it looks very much as though Servia,

thinking her hour had come and feeling sure of Russia’s support,

had instigated the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne with

the deliberate intention of starting a great conflagration. The

preliminary inquiry into the matter, which was carried on very

deliberately by Austria, with no sensational charges or accusations,

revealed a great plot reaching to the very steps of the Servian

throne. Around that throne, as the world well knows, were the men who

had deliberately murdered their own previous king and queen and who

had been rewarded with high positions for their share in that dark

transaction. It was proved to Austria’s satisfaction—and she had so

much to lose by a war of aggression that no ulterior motive could

have influenced her—that the royal Servian arsenal had provided the

weapons of death and that a high official in the army had been directly

concerned. Servia’s attitude during the preliminary investigation had

been provocative. Then Austria hurled her ultimatum.

It was an unheard-of ultimatum—that much an Austrian friend

acknowledged to me at the time. But, he added, the whole situation

was equally unheard of. In Germany, except in the ranks of the social

democrats, who glory in having no national sentiments, Austria’s act

met with the most complete approval. Truth to tell, no one had expected

such firmness and decision. The seriousness of the matter was not for

a moment overlooked. In my own immediate neighborhood and, I imagine,

from end to end of Germany, the first impulse on hearing the news

was to sing national hymns. One heard them throughout that whole

night—especially the solemn “_Gott erhalte Franz den Kaiser_” and

“_Deutschland, Deutschland über alles_.” There was a resigned feeling,

too, a feeling that Servia had been such a menace since 1908 that the

time had come when something must be done. My Austrian friend believed

that the powers would sympathize with his country’s desire to chastise

a band of assassins; that the Russian czar especially would never take

sides with regicides; that England would see fair play.

To blame the German emperor for what followed is the attitude of the

uninformed. Germany has foreseen the struggle, as our extracts from

the newspapers show, but her one idea has been self-defense. The worst

that can be said of her is that her wonderful prosperity has made her

a little boastful and that she has talked too much about her share

in world politics and her own “place in the sun.” That indeed was

an unfortunate remark of his imperial majesty. In general, however,

he has honestly tried to keep the peace, and that Germany, with her

blooming trade, her model educational system and her splendid fleet and

army should have a larger voice in the affairs of nations was not an

unreasonable aim. Those who accuse her of greed for territory should

look at the history of their own country and see if they are entitled

to throw stones. Nor should they attribute her recent army-increase to

a mere spirit of aggression. So hemmed in is Germany, so exposed are

her frontiers in every direction, that she can not help taking alarm

at the movements of her neighbors. Actually touching her borders are

nations with a total population more than doubling her own, not to

speak of England with her enormous fleet.

England of late has stood for the restriction of armaments provided her

own naval superiority be preserved in the present proportions. Germans

believe, probably falsely, that before making such a proposition

England hastily ordered the laying of the keels of three new

battle-ships which in the ordinary course of events would not have been

begun until later. At any rate England leads in the matter of supplying

other countries with deadly instruments of war and her attitude is not

unlike that of her own rich beer-brewing families to the temperance

question. They preach against the use of alcohol, but go on deriving

their income from it. The largest factory of Whitehead torpedoes is at

Fiume, in Austria; Armstrong and Vickers have branches in Italy and

supply that government with naval guns; while the British Engineers’

Association, with a capital of $350,000,000, is endeavoring to corner

the trade of the world in firearms. England introduced dreadnaughts

and not only builds them for herself but also furnishes them on

demand to Japan and South America. With a cannon factory on the Volga

and an arsenal equipped by Armstrong and Vickers on the Golden Horn,

England has fairly fattened of late on war. By building the first

dreadnaught, indeed, she did herself a poor service. Previously Germany

was out of the running as regards the number of ships; now, where

only dreadnaughts count, she is becoming a good second. Was there not

something more than naïvete in Sir Edward Grey’s serious proposal that

Germany and England should restrict the number of their battle-ships

but always preserve the proportion of ten to six in England’s favor?

We have here, I think, the whole gist of the differences between

the two countries. England has steadily preserved her attitude of

superiority everywhere its basis was disappearing. She has been jealous

of Germany’s commerce, of her colonial progress. These Germans are to

England upstarts who need to be kept in their place and are not to

be allowed to have a word in the larger world-policies. Almost every

Englishman feels that a German is his social inferior. Such assumptions

provoke bumptiousness and self-assertion, which, I do not deny, have

at times been evidenced. Just before this war broke out, indeed, the

feeling of mutual antagonism seemed to be lessening. The English fleet

was welcomed at Kiel, the English trade delegation in Berlin. The

press of both countries had softened and sweetened.

[Illustration: The Kaiser with the Bürgemeister of Aix-la-Chapelle on

the Balcony of the Town Hall]

[Illustration: The Emperor at Maneuvers]

[Illustration: Duke Albert of Württemberg]

[Illustration: Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria]

[Illustration: Grand Duke Frederick II of Baden]

As for England’s present alliance with Russia against Germany, it is

the most monumental act of folly in modern history. Has Britannia been

attacked by sclerosis? At home a maudlin sentiment keeps her from

enforcing obedience to her laws and abroad she allows her real enemies

to pull her about by the nose. It is as though in the middle ages a

Henry or an Edward had joined hands with a Genghis Khan or a Timour the

Tartar. Can England gain anything whatever by humiliating Germany and

furthering Pan-Slavism? A little commercial advantage, possibly, though

America will be correspondingly strengthened and the final result will

be no better. Britannia, wake up! It is less far from the Mediterranean

to the Atlantic than it is from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

Gibraltar will soon be as irksome to Pan-Slavism as are now the forts

on the Dardanelles. Your own race is made up mainly of Angles and

Saxons—all your ideals, all your real interests are far closer to

those of the Germans than they are to those of the Russians. The time

may come, and very soon, when you are only too glad to throw yourself

around Germany’s neck and beg her aid in opposing the hordes from the

East. In Russia’s wake are your allies, the Japanese, who now for

the first time have taken a hand in European affairs. Japan has been

likened by a bright American girl to a man who has never been invited

to dinner in certain circles but who at last has invited himself and

simply can not be turned out of the house.

Germany, though drawn into the matter merely by the plain terms of her

alliance with Austria, stands virtually alone, for Italy is faithless

and Austria, as usual, is only half prepared. We may see a recurrence

of those exciting days when for seven years Frederick the Great of

Prussia—of a Prussia less than half the size that it is now—held his

own not only against the great powers of Europe but against the rest

of Germany as well. The help that he had from England was not greater

than may be expected from Austria to-day, and even the English deserted

him at last. Again and again Frederick risked, even as our contemporary

Hohenzollern is likely to do, _le tout pour le tout_. And like

Frederick, I think that William, because of better equipment, better

discipline and better strategy, is likely to prevail even over the many

millions arrayed against him.

England to-day throws the whole blame for the terrible war on Germany,

who was lukewarm, so England declares, in counseling Austria not

to let her strained relations with Servia develop into war; and in

the English press at least there are no words too scathing for the

violation by Germany of Belgium neutrality. The average Englishman, I

am sure, considers that the reason for England joining in the struggle.

Yet what are we to think of Sir Edward Grey’s own words in the

“Correspondence respecting the European Crisis” laid before the Houses

of Parliament and received here from London August twenty-fifth.

_July 31._—The German ambassador asked me to urge the Russian

government to show good-will in the discussions and to suspend their

military preparations. … I informed the German ambassador that, as

regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged

to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance

of her troops into Servia.

_August 1._—I told the German ambassador to-day … if there were a

violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the

other respected it it would be extremely difficult to restrain public

feeling in this country. … He asked me whether, if Germany gave a

promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain

neutral. I replied that I could not say that. … The ambassador pressed

me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would

remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her

colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse

definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could

only say that we must keep our hands free.

So England, directly from the first, took sides with Servia in a matter

that concerned only Servia and Austria. She “could not see how Russia

could be urged to suspend preparations” and would not, even for the

sake of Belgium, state the terms on which she would agree to remain

neutral in the new German-Russian mobilization dispute. Why Germany

finally did violate Belgian neutrality is explained by a telegram from

the German foreign office to the German ambassador in London, Prince

Lichnowsky, on August four. … “Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that

German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which

was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany

had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a

question of life or death to prevent French advance.”

All eyes then are likely for the next few months to be fixed on the

German army and it has seemed worth while to me hastily to collect and

publish all the items concerning the land, naval and aerial forces

that will be of general interest in America. No one will look, I hope,

for much originality in a work of this kind. My information is taken

from Major von Schreibershofen’s excellent book _Das deutsche Heer_,

from Colonel von Bremen’s _Das deutsche Heer nach der Neuordnung von

1913_; from Lieutenant Neumann’s _Luftschiffe_ and his _Flugzeuge_;

from Count Reventlow’s interesting _Deutschland zur See_; Troetsch’s

_Deutschland’s Flotte im Entscheidungskampf_ and Toeche-Mittler:

_Die deutsche Kriegsflotte_. The three last mentioned works, and

also Von Bremen’s, are absolutely new, having been published in 1914;

Schreibershofen’s dates from 1913. The two others have no date but one

can see that they have appeared very recently. The large new works _Das

Jahr 1913_, _Deutschland unter Kaiser Wilhelm II_, and the _Handbuch

der Politik_ have also been of use to me. For the last six months I

have followed very carefully in the _Zeitungs-Archiv_ all the newspaper

extracts bearing on our subject. The war has doubtless interrupted the

publication of the _Archiv_, so that I shall remain “up to date” for

some little time to come.

Germany's Fighting Machine Her Army, her Navy, her Air-ships and Why She Arrayed Them Against the Allied Powers of Europe · 第 1 / 3 章