THE NAVY
In 1848 the German Confederation was at war with Denmark on account
of Schleswig-Holstein. The national parliament voted six million
thalers for the creation of a fleet; it might as well have voted
sixty millions as far as the possibility of collecting it in such
disordered circumstances was concerned. But on June fourth, 1849, a
squadron of three steamships, the _Barbarossa_, the _Hamburg_ and the
_Lübeck_ did set out from the mouth of the Elbe, with decks cleared for
action. The admiral was a Saxon, Rudolph Bromme. It was known that a
Danish corvette was becalmed in the neighborhood of Helgoland. She was
sighted and some shots had already been sent through her rigging, when
suddenly from another direction, from Helgoland itself, then a British
possession, a shot was fired. It signified that the ships were within
the three-mile limit over which then and now a state’s sovereignty
extended, and that England was forbidding the fray. The “fleet”
complied with the order and Lord Palmerston took occasion to send a
diplomatic note to the German Confederation stating that ships had
been seen in the North Sea flying a black-red-gold flag and conducting
themselves as war-ships; that England would not recognize such ships
with a black-red-gold flag as war-ships, but would treat them, if need
be, as pirates.
England has more or less preserved this attitude to the present day and
has been righteously indignant whenever Germany increased her fleet.
A first lord of the admiralty once publicly declared that Britain’s
rule of the sea was part of the common treasure of mankind and that
England could never endure that another power should be able to weaken
her political influence by exerting naval pressure. Such a position, he
said, would unquestionably lead to war.
The attempts to weld Germany into a nation having failed, the fleet
was put up at auction and sold in 1852. The state of Prussia, however,
which was one of the purchasers, had by this time started her own fleet
and soon began to build the harbor in the _Jadebucht_, which is now
called _Wilhelmshaven_. One of the royal princes, Adalbert, was made
admiral and furthered the cause of the fleet in every way. Himself an
intrepid leader, he was wounded in an encounter with Morocco pirates,
who fired on one of the small boats of the _Danzig_. In 1863, however,
the fleet consisted of but four corvette cruisers, the _Arkona_,
_Gazelle_ and _Vineta_, which had each twenty-eight cannon, and the
_Nymphe_, which had but seventeen. Add to these twenty-one cannon
boats, four of which carried three cannon, the rest but two. In 1867
the Prussian fleet merged in that of the North German Confederation,
which in turn, in 1871, merged into that of the new German Empire.
In the war with France the German fleet played no rôle whatever, there
being but five ironclads in all, two of them small coast defenders, to
oppose to France’s fifty-five. There were but one or two insignificant
encounters between small single ships—one between the _Grille_ and the
_Hirondelle_ in the Baltic, and one between the _Meteor_, whose whole
crew numbered sixty-three, and the French despatch-boat _Bouvet_, with
eighty-three. The two had come upon each other in the harbor of Havana
and then tried conclusions on the high seas. But the German victories
on land had been so quick and decisive that the fleet as a whole never
came into action.
Even the successful outcome of the war did not spur Germany on to
build up a strong navy. A general, not a seaman, was made chief of the
admiralty and, although Von Stosch brought in a building plan according
to which the navy, by 1882, would have had fourteen large ironclads,
seven monitors, twenty cruisers and twenty-eight torpedo-boats, it
was carried out only in part. Stosch deserves credit, however, for
insisting that Germany should build all her own ships. The sinking of
the _Grosse Kurfürst_ in 1879, which was run into by one of her own
sister ships, was a great calamity for the navy, and the loss of her
two hundred sixty-five officers and men caused wide-spread grief.
Caprivi, the later chancellor, followed Von Stosch in 1883 as head of
the admiralty. He was conscientious, but, it would seem, altogether
without fruitful ideas. He placed all his hopes in the torpedo-boat,
and from 1883 to 1887 not a single battle-ship was built. It was
not so much to be credited to Caprivi, but to a young officer, Von
Tirpitz, now grand admiral and state secretary for the navy office,
that the German torpedo-boat fleet became the best in the world.
Tirpitz made a new weapon of it, one that could be used not merely
for coast-defense, but also for fighting on the high seas. But the
fact remains that the torpedo-boat under Caprivi’s régime was greatly
overestimated and that its usefulness has more and more been checked by
new inventions—search-lights, Gatling guns, torpedo-boat-destroyers and
the like.
Toward the end of his term indeed Caprivi began to see the importance
of a strong fleet and the idea gained ground that “a navy which has its
center of gravity on or near shore is not worthy of the name.” In 1887
was begun the Kaiser Wilhelm canal between the Baltic and the North
Sea, which enables the one fleet to operate in both waters without fear
of being intercepted. Meanwhile Germany had started on her career as
a colonial power, having acquired by purchase and by treaty tracts in
Africa and islands in the Pacific Ocean more than twice the size of her
possessions in Europe. Some of her little cruisers and cannon boats
had even seen service against unruly natives. The Reichstag, however,
showed little interest in the government’s colonial policy and was not
to be won for the building of large war-ships.
A change came soon after the accession of the present emperor, William
II. One of his first acts was to reorganize the whole naval system,
separating the administrative part from the purely military. At present
Admiral von Tirpitz is at the head of the former and Prince Henry of
Prussia, subject to the emperor’s own commands, of the latter. Four
great battle-ships, all of the Brandenburg class, were begun in 1889.
England responded by ordering ten new battle-ships, but in 1890, by
ceding Helgoland in return for a correction of boundaries in East
Africa, she gave Germany an advantage worth fifty dreadnaughts. And
almost before there was any tangible fleet at all Germany was at work
scientifically, learning both by theory and by practise how a fleet
should be managed and maneuvered.
“How few these ships were,” writes a vice admiral, “and how little in
accord with modern warfare on the high seas, we all know. Imagination
often had to substitute what was lacking. School-ships, still with all
their old full rigging, represented ironclads; torpedo-boats served
as cruisers, and the _Mars_, built to be an artillery training-ship,
acted as flag-ship. In those next few years we went through a period
which—we can say it without boasting—is unique in the history of
fleets. Not but that we made mistakes—much that then seemed to us
indubitably right has since been superseded—but the German fleet,
which had fewer and less available ships than many other countries,
has outdistanced them all in tactical development. … The stake, it
is true, became greater as ships representing a capital of millions
and carrying hundreds of men took the place of the little boats, but
the method remained the same. Commander and crew, by progressing from
easier to more difficult and more warlike maneuvers, achieved that
feeling of security which is not a foolish scorn of danger but the
knowledge of power to cope with it. That is the state of mind which
makes for success in war and which enables one to win all by risking
all.”
The fleet legislation of 1898 for the first time looked ahead and
established rules as to the future number of ships and the time-limit
within which they should be built, and also laid down principles as to
the tasks that the fleet was intended to accomplish. Two squadrons, of
eight battle-ships each, were to be in constant readiness and were to
have a flag-ship at their head. Six large and sixteen small cruisers
were to act as scouts, three large and ten small cruisers as a “foreign
fleet”; two battle-ships, three large cruisers and four small ones were
to form the reserve, and the whole reorganization was to be completed
in six years—that is, by 1904. It had heretofore been provided that
in case of war each ship should give up half of its trained men as a
nucleus for the new crews of the reserve ships. This greatly weakened
the fighting power of the ships at the crucial moment, and the
legislation of 1898 abolished the compulsion for one at least of the
two squadrons.
Between 1898 and 1900 came events which greatly disquieted Germany: the
Spanish-American and Boer Wars and disturbances in Samoa. Off Manila
there were amenities between the German and American admirals which
might have ended more creditably for the former had he been able to
display more force. The legislation of 1900 was influenced by all these
factors and has a wider perspective than any that had gone before. The
preamble declared that “Germany must have a battle-fleet so strong
that even for the most powerful naval opponent a war is connected
with such dangers that that opponent’s own position as a power may
be impaired.” And further: “For this purpose it is not imperative
that the German battle-fleet be as strong as that of the greatest
maritime power, for, as a rule, a great maritime power will not be in a
position to concentrate its whole fighting force against us. But even
though it should succeed in opposing us with greatly superior forces
the subjection of a strong German fleet would so weaken an enemy
that, in spite of any victory he may win, his fleet will no longer be
sufficiently powerful to assure his own predominant position.” “For
the first time,” writes Mittler, “the so-called _risk idea_ which was
henceforth to be a determining factor in our fleet development was
clearly expressed.”
The legislation of 1900 amounted to a doubling of the fleet provided
for only two years previously. Seventeen battle-ships, four large
cruisers and sixteen small cruisers were to be in constant readiness,
while exactly as many more ships of each of the three types were to
be kept, partially manned, in reserve. In 1906, in addition to a
number of submarines, six cruisers for the “foreign squadron” were
provided for, and it was voted to raise the number of torpedo-boats
and also to provide automatically for their renewal, the life of a
torpedo-boat being estimated at twelve years. This meant that twelve
torpedo-boats would have to be built each year. England’s example in
building dreadnaughts necessitated greatly raising the appropriation
for battle-ships and also influenced the legislation of 1908, by which
the normal life of a battle-ship was declared reduced from twenty-five
to twenty years. The legislation of 1912, finally, increased the number
of active battle-ships by eight, of large cruisers by four and of small
cruisers by six, not to mention that the number of submarines is to be
brought up to seventy-two, fifty-four of which are to be always ready
for service. But as the period for finishing all the new ships is 1920
they will play little part in the present war. The reserve ships, of
course, will all now be called into action.
To resume, then, and to be more specific, the actual German fleet,
counting ships expected to be ready in the course of 1914, numbers
thirty-eight ships of the line, fourteen armored cruisers, thirty-eight
protected cruisers, two hundred twenty-four torpedo-boats and thirty
submarines. There are no torpedo-boat-destroyers as in other navies,
the small cruisers being supposed to take their place. The battle-ships
are ranged in classes. There are three of the “King class” (the
_König_, the _Grosser Kurfürst_ and the _Markgraf_), which have a
displacement of nearly 26,000 tons and are equipped with every possible
modern improvement, such as net protection against torpedoes, turbine
engines, provision for oil-fuel, torpedo tubes, etc. It is from these
monsters, of which each carries ten of the largest guns, not to speak
of the smaller ones, that we shall probably hear most in the course
of the war, though not perhaps in the beginning, as they are not
fully completed. They are to be joined in 1915 by a sister-ship, the
_Kronprinz_.
[Illustration: H. M. Man-of-War _Wittelsbach_ Passing under a High
Bridge in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal]
[Illustration: H. M. Ship _Seydlitz_ in Dry-Dock]
[Illustration: Signaling on Submarine]
The _König_ class is to be larger in dimension, in horse-power and in
displacement, though not in speed or armament than the _Kaiser_
class, of which there are five ships: The _Kaiser_, the _Kaiserin_,
the _Friedrich der Grosse_, the _Prinzregent Luitpold_ and the _König
Albert_. Next come the _Helgoland_ class (_Helgoland_, _Ostfriesland_,
_Thüringen_, _Oldenburg_) and the _Nassau_ class (_Nassau_,
_Westfalen_, _Rheinland_, _Posen_) after which, with the _Deutschland_
class (13,200 tons), we are out of the region of the dreadnaughts.
There is a dreadnaught cruiser, the _Derfflinger_, just ready, with a
greater displacement (28,000 tons), and of course, with far greater
speed than any of the battle-ships. Next comes the _Seydlitz_ (25,000
tons), then the _Moltke_ and the _Goeben_ (23,000 tons), and the _Von
der Tann_ (19,500 tons). The _Goeben_ has already been practically
captured, as has also the _Breslau_ (4,550 tons). They are now in the
Dardanelles, and the Turkish government is considering their purchase.
Twenty-three of the protected cruisers bear the names of German cities
(like the _Breslau_, _Colberg_, _Dresden_, _Königsberg_), while the
rest for the most part have such names as the _Gazelle_, the _Medusa_,
the _Niobe_, the _Undine_.
Some fifteen of the largest and best-known passenger ships of the
Hamburg and Bremen lines were to have served as auxiliary cruisers,
but a number of these now are in foreign ports and far from the needed
protection of their fleets. It remains to be seen what use will be
made of the _Imperator_, which is still at Cuxhaven or Hamburg.
In concluding our list of ships in the German navy it may interest
Americans to know that there is one called the _Alice Roosevelt_. It is
not likely to influence the progress of the war or even to come into
action. Its special title is _Stationsjacht_, and it is at the service
of the general inspector of the navy, Prince Henry of Prussia.
Germany’s ally, Austria, although in May, 1914, she appropriated more
than 400,000,000 _kronen_ for her fleet, makes at present a very
weak showing. She has fifteen ships of the line, of which three are
dreadnaughts, two armored cruisers and seven protected cruisers.
England, Germany’s chief naval opponent, has sixty-three ships of the
line as compared to her own thirty-eight, and of these twenty-four
are dreadnaughts, as compared to seventeen. England has forty-four
armored cruisers, of which ten are dreadnaughts; Germany has but
fourteen armored cruisers, and but five of them are dreadnaughts. In
protected cruisers the ratio is still more in England’s favor, while
with torpedo-boats Germany is comparatively well provided—one hundred
fifty-four as against one hundred ninety. It may be mentioned here,
as a bit of interesting history, that the majority of great naval
victories have been won over numerically superior fleets.
France has ten dreadnaught battle-ships, on paper, but no dreadnaught
cruisers, and is said to have had difficulty in officering the ships
that she has. Moreover, of the ten dreadnaughts six are only what are
called half-dreadnaughts and only three of the others are ready for
service. Russia is practically without a fleet, though she has four
battle-ships and fourteen cruisers in the Baltic and four battle-ships
and two cruisers in the Black Sea. Next year she expects to have ready
for use in the Baltic four new dreadnaughts.
Naval warfare has been so far from our thoughts these many years, its
terms have become so unfamiliar that it is worth dwelling for a while
on the different types of ships and showing their special uses and
their special tasks in battle.
Most important of all, with their supremacy unassailed by any of the
newly invented types, are the battle-ships or ships of the line.
They are called _of the line_ because that is their natural position
in battle, the position that renders the fire of their guns most
effective. This does not mean that their bows are to be all in a line,
though that position may sometimes have to be adopted; but rather that
they are to string out, one behind the other at stated intervals,
so as to be able to fire a vast broadside often miles in length. It
may be that the line must be slanting or again that the position must
be constantly changed as new exigencies arise. The ruling idea, of
course, is to strike the right balance between the amount of surface
presented as a target for the enemy’s guns and the ability to keep
up the most effective running fire. All this is diligently practised
in time of peace in the so-called maneuvers. The utmost exactness of
calculation is required, for the nearer together the ships the more
effective is their fire; indeed the great distinction between modern
naval encounters and those of former times lies in this team work, if
we may call it so. The great dreadnaughts, with their turbine engines
and carefully adjusted steering apparatus, are much more manageable
and can be brought much closer to one another than was the case with
old-fashioned battle-ships. The distance between the bow of one ship
and the stern of the next one is reckoned in practise at a hundred
yards or less; one can see what an advantage it is to have the eight
ships of a squadron all of about the same size and speed. This idea
has been carried so far in the German fleet that, even after the
superiority of the turbine engine had been demonstrated the ships
required to complete a squadron were built in the old style. Single
encounters like those which make up such thrilling pages in history
are not likely often to occur again, and if they do, will not come to
boardings and to hand-to-hand conflicts.
[Illustration: For Raising Sunken Submarines]
[Illustration: The Second Squadron Passing the Friedrichsort Light]
[Illustration: H. M. Cruiser _Breslau_]
[Illustration: H. M. Royal Yacht _Hohenzollern_ with His Majesty on
Board in the Lock at Kiel]
The range at which the great naval battles of the future will be
fought will be very great, all the way up to ten thousand yards. The
great guns can easily shoot that distance, while a reason for not
coming nearer until, at least, the heavy ammunition is gone, is that
at that range each fleet will be practically safe from the torpedoes
of the other. The German fleet often practises at that range, firing
at a moving target which is dragged along by another boat. On each
modern gun is a telescope, and there are instruments for determining
the distance at any given moment, as well as complicated adjustments
for sighting and aiming. The projectiles used in the biggest guns
weigh each nearly a ton and cost well up into the thousands, so every
precaution is taken not to waste them. We can no longer speak of a
cannon-ball, for the modern charges are cylindrical, pointed and filled
with explosives so as to inflict the utmost damage for the money.
Experience has shown that at very close range they will pass through
blocks of steel more than a yard thick!
The bore of the greatest guns in the German navy has hitherto
been a little over thirty centimeters, but is fast reaching the
forty centimeter mark; the guns themselves are from forty-five to
fifty-eight feet long and weigh correspondingly. The best are from
the foundries of Krupp, who, when he died, left his daughter the
richest woman in Germany. The Krupps have a special steel of the
utmost toughness and resistance. The gun-barrel is made of a single
block, which is regularly excavated or bored; it is then protected
by innumerable rings, which are put on when red-hot, and sit firmly
ever after. The “kick” of the gun has been entirely eliminated by an
ingenious contrivance. Altogether the cannon of to-day have become
so complicated and so perfect as instruments that it takes longer to
manufacture them than it does to construct the ship, and the English
navy gives its orders for them about six months before even the keel
is laid. And the life of such a gun is short. It is said that some of
the guns on the new English, Japanese and Italian ships will be useless
after they have fired eighty shots; on the American, French and German
after from one hundred and fifty to two hundred. The difference lies
in the construction of the gun-barrel, and there are controversies
and rivalries over which methods are the best, just as there are over
almost everything else that pertains to warfare: over the best shells,
the best powder, the best mechanical contrivances for loading, for
getting the range, etc. Dreadnaughts have scarcely yet been tried in
actual warfare, and the nation that has made mistakes in theory may
live to rue them bitterly in practise.
The guns are placed, two and two, in turrets on the battle-ships,
and can be turned in any direction; if need be they can fire a whole
broadside; while, as two turrets are elevated above the rest, a volley
can be fired of four guns direct from the bow or stern. The turrets
are armored with tough hard steel and their surface is curved so that
a shot will glance off. The _King_ and the _Kaiser_ classes carry ten
great guns, the _Helgoland_ and _Nassau_ classes even twelve, but the
latter are no more effective, as they have not the two elevated turrets
for shooting over the other guns. Some of the new French and American
ships are to have three and even four guns to a turret, but the German
navy is conservative enough not to wish to try the experiment.
Theoretically at least a great dreadnaught is almost unsinkable. Not
only is its hull divided into a great number of cells and compartments
but many of the cells themselves are armored, so that even if a torpedo
penetrates to them it will not have things all its own way. All
vulnerable places, too, are heavily armored with plates that extend
away below the water line; while the powder magazines and torpedo tubes
are well down in the depths of the ship.
It is the heavy armament that has conditioned the size of the ships,
for they have few other advantages than the ability to carry the extra
weight, and they have increased the cost of navies enormously. The
appropriations of eight great powers for 1914-1915 come to not far
from three billion five hundred million marks, England leading with
more than one billion. And the expenses do not cease with the building
of the ships, for docks, dry docks, canals, etc., have to be enlarged
accordingly. The Kaiser Wilhelm canal, built between the years 1887 and
1895, at a cost of one hundred fifty-six million marks, had already
outgrown its usefulness ten years after its opening. Its widening,
which will not be fully completed until 1915, is to cost two hundred
twenty-three millions in addition.
We have thus far spoken only of ships of the line, and, although we
shall have to return to them in a moment, a few words must first be
said as to the use of the other categories of ships in actual warfare.
Armored cruisers in themselves are nothing new. England has forty-four
of them, France nineteen, Japan fifteen and Germany and the United
States each fourteen. But _great armored battle-cruisers_ have existed
only since 1907 and are possessed as yet by only three powers: England
has ten; Germany has, or had, five (for the _Goeben_ is out of the
running), and Japan has two.
The big battle-cruiser is as long as a battle-ship, or even longer;
it, also, is called a dreadnaught. It has guns as large, but fewer
of them; eight instead of ten. Where, then, is the difference? The
difference is in the lines, which are long and slender, like those of
a yacht, and in the speed, which is from twenty-eight to thirty knots
instead of twenty-two or twenty-three. The cruiser has been described
as a sort of naval cavalry that can fly to any weak point of the enemy,
can chase a single ship or can outflank a line of ships, bring them
between two fires, thus deciding the battle. The cruisers can also
fight each other. A new instrument of war has thus been introduced that
may, after all, once more make naval contests thrilling and dramatic
instead of being mere pounding competitions.
The small cruiser, in contradistinction to the large armored one, has
but a light iron belt and carries only light guns and deck torpedo
tubes. Its purpose is not to engage in battle, unless it be with a
torpedo-boat, but rather to avoid it. It combines the qualities of
scout and of torpedo-boat-destroyer, which latter type is altogether
lacking in the German navy. Its chief quality is swiftness, and a swarm
of small cruisers accompanies the fleet when it puts to sea, darting
here and there to make sure that none of the much-dreaded little
enemies is approaching.
Of large torpedo-boats the German fleet has one hundred fifty-four,
all of its own special type. The value of the type has at times been
overestimated, at times underestimated, but the recent gains in
speed and in seaworthiness have made it no contemptible adversary.
Practically its only weapon is the torpedo, for projecting which it
carries four tubes on deck; its small guns are merely for use against
other torpedo-boats. Its chief defense is its extreme swiftness, for
some of the boats have a speed of thirty-eight miles an hour. It can
turn, too, incredibly quickly, for it has a rudder in the bow as
well as in the stern. It is unarmored, but is painted black for its
protection. For it is a creature of the night, stealing up in the
darkness with its deadly weapon and scarcely ever exposing itself to
the enemy’s guns by the light of day. It has one enemy, to be dreaded
above all others, the search-light.
[Illustration: H. M. Cruiser _Goeben_]
There are hundreds of the little black devils in the navy, and they
have every sort of trick for concealment and escape. By running very
swiftly they can keep the smoke from rising vertically from their
funnels and thus betraying their presence. They often go forth in
flotillas and if an enemy start to chase them they scatter, having
previously arranged where they are to meet again. They come bow on to
the ship they mean to injure, for the distance between them will then
increase more rapidly. If brought to bay a torpedo-boat turns its
own search-light on the commander of the other vessel and tries to
blind him with its glare. It is a risky business, that of torpedo-boat
commander, and requires men of the very highest training and courage.
The reason there are such numbers of the little craft is that many are
sure to go to the bottom in the course of a campaign. Germany expects
that her flotilla will be of great help in a war with England, for
when a torpedo hits the damage is apt to be severe. Dynamite is mild
compared to the new melanite and lyddite that are used in charging.
[Illustration: Submarine Fleet in Harbor at Kiel]
[Illustration: Armored Cruiser _Moltke_]
If the torpedo-boat is a fiend that works mainly at night, its sister,
the submarine, works only by day. If the submarine has not, as was
at one time expected, completely revolutionized naval warfare, it
has at least so far asserted itself that it can never be left wholly
out of the reckoning. Its improvement has kept pace with that of the
torpedo-boat in stability, in size and in manageableness. The newest
boats have a displacement of a thousand tons, and long sea voyages are
now possible. Germany has far fewer torpedo-boats than has England, but
claims that hers are much stronger and much better adapted for service
in rough weather and on the high seas.
When there is no enemy in the immediate vicinity the submarine rides
the waves like any other boat; when there is danger she dives like
a duck. Just before firing her torpedo she comes to the surface for
an instant to get one last good look. She is helpless at that moment,
of course, but trusts to not being seen in time. When under water
her speed is only about ten miles an hour, as the pressure is very
great; on the surface she can travel about sixteen. Her slowness is
a disadvantage, for she can only lurk for and intercept a fleet, not
pursue and overtake it. She labors under another disadvantage, too,
for she has to carry two motors and can not use the same one above and
under water. Why? Because the one is an oil motor and generates gases
which would be fatal when all outlets are closed. The other is run by
an electric storage battery, the filling of which requires time and
patience.
How can the submarine communicate with its own fleet? It has wireless
telegraphy and also deep-water signals, but these do not work so well
as might be desired. It has one other connection with the visible
world as wonderful as anything described by Jules Verne in his _Twenty
Thousand Leagues Under the Sea_, the periscope, or literally the
“looker round.” I can not do better than describe it in the words of a
naval officer, Count Ernest zu Reventlow:
Roughly speaking, the apparatus consists in this: If the boat is under
water and yet wishes to see what is going on above, it pushes up a
long thin pipe until the surface is reached and a little beyond. At the
farther end of this pipe is a contrivance with glass prisms, or mirrors
and lenses. This throws down the image reflected from the surface of
the water, through the vertical pipe, into the interior of the boat.
The image is caught on a plate and the commander of the submarine,
although he may be several yards under water, can see everything that
is floating and happening on the surface and consequently can make his
attack with the sole guidance of this image and steer the boat until it
is at the right distance for firing the torpedo.
It sounds like magic, and indeed the witches were not in it when it
comes to the achievements of modern science. But Reventlow has to
confess that in practise the periscope is not so wonderful as it sounds
in theory. The splashing of the salt water, unless the sea be perfectly
calm, which it seldom is, soon dims and even effaces the image. It was
long before the inventors could bring the periscope to reflect more
than a small section of the horizon, but that difficulty seems to have
been overcome.
It is possible, with map, clock and compass, to take reckonings and
keep on a course even when deep down under water. Deeper than ninety
feet the submarine seldom goes. It has found a new and unexpected
enemy in the air-ship or aeroplane, for it is a well-known fact that
from a height on a clear day, at least, you can see very far into the
water. But what, one will ask, can the aeroplane do about it even if it
sights a submarine far down beneath the surface? Projectiles would not
be likely to do much damage. At the same time it can warn ships and can
pursue and worry the submarine.
That the latter is not a perfect instrument goes without saying;
indeed, when it darts about blindly it becomes a menace to its own
ships. Its arrangements are so complicated, too, with all the letting
in and out of water, the diving and coming up, the changing of motors
and providing artificial air that things are very apt to go wrong. The
service is extremely exhausting for the men and extremely dangerous.
Yet all the same the value of submarines is universally acknowledged
and every great navy has them. They will probably prove useful in
planting that new instrument of destruction, the floating mine, about
which a few words must be said here: “It is to be presumed,” writes
Reventlow, “that in the next naval war [how little he dreamed in
November, 1913, that that war was so close at hand!] mines will play an
important part not merely in coast defense but also in sea fights as a
weapon with the same justification as artillery and torpedoes and that
their use will materially influence the tactics to be employed.” As
such a weapon of attack mines were first used in the Japanese-Russian
War.
[Illustration: A Submarine Flotilla]
[Illustration: Torpedo Boat]
[Illustration: Search Lights]
[Illustration: A Submarine About to Dive]
A mine, as the reader probably knows, is a cask filled with high
explosives and fastened by means of weights and anchors so that it
floats some feet below the surface. Mines can be planted in fields,
as it were, by torpedo-boats or submarine and then a hostile fleet
can be lured or chased in among them. The North Sea, as we know, is
at present thickly strewn with them and fatal results have already
been chronicled. Air-ships and aeroplanes can help by finding the
whereabouts of the hostile fleet and designating by wireless the spots
where the mines should be planted.
Air-ships and aeroplanes will possibly find their chief use as
coast-defenders. They need refuges to which they can retire, which
limits their use on the high seas. But along the shore they can scout
for hostile ships and also can detect submarines and mines. They can
throw down explosives and, if they are near enough to the enemy’s
harbors, can destroy docks and demoralize shipping. Already there is
talk of specially armored decks and of great iron grills for protecting
the openings of funnels.
* * * * *
More than six months ago a thoughtful German, Rudolf Troetsch, wrote a
book called _Germany’s Fleet in the Decisive Struggle_, in which he
weighs the different tasks the fleet will be called upon to perform in
case of war, and comes ever and again to the conclusion that a battle
on the high seas is the only possible option—a battle _im grossen
Stile_, in the grand style. Even if the enemy’s fleet is not conquered
it can be greatly weakened and strategy and tactics will go far to make
up for want of numbers.
Troetsch begins by showing the different methods an enemy will be
likely to pursue; and one sees throughout that he has England in mind.
First of all will come—as has already happened—the so-called cruiser
war or attempt to destroy the country’s commerce by snapping up her
merchant ships. This can eventually end the war by the starvation
process; that is, by cutting off all food and other supplies. According
to the Paris international agreement of 1856 there shall be no
privateering, which means that individuals may not fit out ships and
take prizes, but does not mean that the property of individuals, if
they are subjects of one or other of the warring powers, may not be
seized. Prizes of war may either be towed into the nearest port or,
after the crews and passengers have been taken off, may be sent to the
bottom with all their cargo. To be effective, however, this method of
warfare must be methodically pursued, which means regularly employing
a force of swift cruisers. The method had its warm advocates in naval
circles, especially in France about thirty years ago. There is a strong
feeling at present that the game is not worth the candle and that
there are other tasks for the cruisers to perform which are of more
importance. For a country which has few foreign coaling stations into
which the prizes can be towed but very little is to be gained; while a
naval battle is greatly to be preferred to having an enemy try these
tactics.
Another method that may be applied against Germany is the blockading
of her North Sea coast. A blockade, according to the Paris declaration
of 1856 and again according to the London conference of 1908, must
be effective in order to be binding; a country may not, in other
words, simply declare an enemy’s coasts in a state of blockade, but
must have enough ships there to enforce the regulations. A successful
blockade hinders even neutral ships from landing and is the best
way of preventing the entry of contraband of war and of paralyzing
all commerce. The form of Germany’s coast line fairly invites to a
blockade, much more than do the coasts either of England or France.
A line drawn from Holland to Denmark would form the hypothenuse of
a triangle including the mouths of Germany’s chief rivers, her main
seaports as well as all her North Sea islands. The Baltic, too, could
be easily shut off from the ocean, and with the enemy’s ships all
bottled up there would be no fear of a descent on the coasts of England.
This sounds well in theory, but in practise the difficulties will be
well-nigh insuperable. Those who know the coast will remember the
miles and miles of shallows—the so-called _Wattenmeer_ so difficult to
navigate. In time of war all lighthouses and buoys are removed and, if
they approach the shore, the English ships will inevitably run aground,
while the German torpedo-boats and submarines will be in their very
element. Floating mines, too, will get in their deadly work, as will
also the strings of fixed mines which are ignited not by percussion but
by means of an electric current controlled from the shore. The German
fleet can retire well up the great streams and menace the enemy there;
while it must not be forgotten that the great cannon of the coast
defenses can shoot fifteen kilometers (nine and three-eighths miles)
or more. Finally the islands in the neighborhood, notably Borkum and
Wangerood, are fortified, and last but not least, there is Helgoland
far out in the sea. A whole fleet could not take this Gibraltar of
the North. The rocky walls are very hard; indeed, with true German
thoroughness, they have been tested to see if they would successfully
withstand bombardment. Under their shelter a harbor for torpedo-boats
and submarines has been built at a cost of thirty million marks. From
here they can issue forth and here, protected from afar by the great
guns, they can take refuge and form new projects.
Troetsch considers it more than likely that England will proceed to
a blockade, but a blockade not in the narrow but in a broader sense.
One objection to the narrower blockade would be that her naval bases,
necessary for repairs, fuel and ammunition, would be very far away. But
this can be obviated if the blockading line begin somewhere between
Dover and Calais, extend along the east coast of Scotland, with bases
at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, and end near the southernmost point of
Norway, Cape Lindesnaes. This would shut every exit from the North Sea
to the Atlantic and at the same time encircle all the exits from the
Baltic: the Skager Rak and Cattegat and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. Here
England could carry on what is known as an “observation blockade,”
biding her time to fall upon the enemy’s fleet.
The great disadvantage is that the blockading line will have to be so
very long. The surface of the North Sea is about equal to that of the
whole German Empire, and such a line as we have traced would extend
for two hundred fifty or three hundred miles. It is a question if even
England’s enormous fleet can spare the requisite number of ships. Such
a blockading fleet consists not only of a long chain of vessels close
together but also of a supporting fleet and, behind that, of the real
battle squadrons. The whole force must be nearly double that of the
enemy, as it operates on a much broader line. The foggy stormy weather
that is apt to prevail in the North Sea will also render the blockade
less efficient.
Germany is likely to attempt to break it and to bring about a great
naval battle at the earliest opportunity. But that opportunity may not
come so very soon. Reventlow, speaking indeed of a hypothetical war,
declares that such a blockade may last a year or longer. Germany has
too much at stake to risk her small but excellent fleet before the
tactical moment has come. Will her Zeppelins help her to victory? That
is the question that all are asking now. They are but fragile toys
in a stormy sea, but, with circumstances in their favor, may achieve
wonderful results.
When it does come to the battle on the high seas into which Germany
will surely force England, we shall see modern tactics put to their
supreme test, for only by tactical superiority can Germany hope to win.
In an old-fashioned battle in which the ships rushed at each other
pellmell, or in one in which the rival fleets simply lie to and pound
each other she would be sure to lose. A modern battle is much more a
game of skill in which the victory is not to the strongest but to the
cleverest.
In a modern battle the ships are ever and always moving. Not that the
maneuvers are necessarily complicated, but there goes on the whole time
a constant thrust and parry. There are different kinds of encounters.
First there is the running fight, in which the two fleets, the vessels
one behind the other, run in the same direction, firing all the while.
Here the strength of the ships, the power of the guns and the quickness
of the gunners play the decisive part. The more turrets, funnels,
engine-rooms and stearing gear put out of commission, so much the
better. The so-called passing fight, where the fleets run not in the
same but in opposite directions, is apt to be preferred by a fleet
that is numerically weaker. The agony is less prolonged and escape is
easier. Then there is the circular fight, in which the fleets are like
great serpents trying to catch one another’s tails. The circular fight
can follow directly after the passing fight when the fleets have not
been seriously crippled.
But the crown and acme of all fleet maneuvers is the so-called crossing
of the T.
“The maneuver of the crossing of the T,” writes Troetsch, “consists in
endeavoring to bring one’s own line at right angles across the head,
or also across the tail, of the hostile line—of enfilading it, as the
expression goes, so that the opposing lines come into the relative
positions of the two bars of the Latin T…. Such a movement renders it
possible to concentrate the entire fire of one’s own broadsides on
the ship that is at the head of the enemy’s fleet. In this way one
increases the effectiveness of one’s own fire to the very highest
degree, inasmuch as all the shots which go too far to one side will
strike the hinder ships of the long hostile line. The ships at its
head must gradually succumb to the concentrated fire, while one’s own
line is exposed only to the guns in the opponent’s bow and to the
fire of the few guns which can be pointed from the sides at such an
angle as still to reach the enfilading ships. This position signifies
for the fleet that succeeds in shoving itself across the head of the
enemy’s line the most effective application of the principle of the
concentration of power, which is based on the endeavor always to bring
into play when attacking the enemy a greater number of guns than he
in his momentary position has at his disposal. If one can open fire
in this position it may prove of the greatest significance for the
whole battle. … There are cases where the advantage of this position
is gained by mere chance, as when the two fleets come upon each other
in that formation in thick or foggy weather. … It is difficult to
assume the position of crossing the T when the fighting is already in
progress. …
The fleet against which the crossing of the T is attempted can seek
to lessen its effect by various counter maneuvers. It can turn in the
same direction and take a parallel course with the enveloping fleet,
whereby if it be swift enough it has the advantage of being on the
inner or shorter line: the battle then becomes a simple running fight,
or it can simply turn and follow the tail of the hostile line or
engage with the head of the line in a passing fight.”
We can even imagine the line of ships, the bow of which has been
crossed, executing a sort of dance with its opponent in order to bring
its broadsides into play—the first ship turning to the right, the
second to the left, the third to the right again and so on until all
are opposite and parallel to the enemy.
And so the war is on which brings Germany’s fleet and army into play—to
the last man and to the last gun. We have suddenly found ourselves in
the midst of a struggle which makes even the wars of Napoleon seem
trifling.
As many men are now engaged simultaneously as were then called out
in the course of years. And the instruments of death are a hundred
times more deadly. From the skies above destruction rains down; from
subterranean forts and from the depths of the sea it wells up. The
difference between hand labor and machinery has been transmitted into
terms of killing; we have artificial earthquakes and eruptions.
How shall we name the war? The War of 1914? But it may last on into the
next year, and the next and the next. As I know Germany she will never
now submit to being conquered unless the social democrats gain the
upper hand. And even then I am not sure that the social democrats are
prepared to draw the last consequences of their long agitation against
the imperial, or against any national government. Our descendants may
look back on it as the Thousand Years’ War, for one fails to see how
the passions now unchained can ever again be calmed. And there are
signs that we are at the beginning of a colossal shoving around of
races that will make our children mock at the awe with which their
fathers read of the so-called wandering of the nations. All the Suevi
and Allemanni and Goths, Vandals and Visigoths that ever overran Gaul
would have made but a few corps in the great Teuton army that is now
pressing into France.
Russia, with her one hundred sixty millions, is likely to claim a much
vaster influence than she has yet had. Napoleon would once have been
willing to share Europe with Czar Alexander; will some such partition
enter into the new treaty of peace? Will it perhaps be between Teuton
and Slav and will England have to move to Canada and France to
Africa? I can not believe, in any case, that Germany will succumb.
She is reproached now by sentimental ladies with having devoted such
serious study to the work of destruction. She devotes serious study to
everything that she attempts. Only recently I was initiated into the
splendid methods by which she runs her labor-exchanges and also into
the workings of her prisons and penitentiaries. Everything is foreseen,
everything provided for. And so it is with her fighting force. Every
single problem is attacked theoretically as well as practically, and in
almost every regard we other nations are but as untrained children to
her.
Once more, who is to blame for the horrible war? A clever writer,
such as we have for detective stories, would have little difficulty
in convincingly foisting the guilt on each of the great powers in
succession. Austria is to blame for her ultimatum to Servia, Russia
for mobilizing against Austria, France for entering the conflict when
the matter did not concern her at all, Germany for demanding Russian
demobilization, England for stabbing Germany in the back when she was
already struggling with enemies on either side, Japan for her bumptious
self-assertion.
It is the twilight of the gods. Is Germany the Walhalla that is to
fall in ruins? Or is she merely about to build a Walhalla that shall
project over all other political edifices? The moment is a serious one
for us Americans. Where shall we stand in the new order of things? Will
a Japan that has conquered a China, a Russia and a Germany submit to
American exclusion acts? Her fleet already outnumbers ours in ships of
all types except ships of the line, and her naval appropriations are
progressing more steadily than our own. And when Japan secures what she
wishes from us, China will be ready to make the same demands. It is a
far cry since Austria interpreted the five vowels in her favor: _Alles
Erdreich ist Österreich unterthan_ (all earthly kingdoms are subject to
Austria). Which will be the next world-power?
THE END