ATTEMPT ON ALICANTE. PENISCOLA BETRAYED. NEW REGENCY. TARIFA
UNSUCCESSFULLY BESIEGED BY THE FRENCH. RECAPTURE OF CIUDAD
RODRIGO AND BADAJOZ.
♦1812.♦
M. Suchet was rewarded for his services with the title of Duc
d’Albufera, and with a grant of the revenues arising from the lake of
that name near Valencia, and from the domains adjoining. He was told
that he had now to obtain possession of Alicante and Carthagena, and
then the only remaining points from which the war could be kept up on
that side of Spain would be closed. It ♦JANUARY. ATTEMPT ON ALICANTE.♦
was, indeed, considered at Cadiz, that Alicante might soon be expected
to fall in consequence of the loss of Valencia; and Carthagena was
regarded as so insecure, that the Conde de la Bisbal suggested the
propriety of occupying the heights which command it by a British
force. Before this precaution was taken, a premature demonstration
against Alicante had the effect of putting the inhabitants upon
their guard. To secure the success of Suchet’s operations against
Valencia, Marshal Marmont, pursuant to Buonaparte’s instructions,
had sent General Montbrun, with two divisions of infantry and one of
horse, to co-operate with him, by manœuvring against the corps of
Mahy and Freyre, which he was either to cut off or compel to return
into Alicante; but his orders were, at all events, to rejoin the army
of Portugal from which he had been detached by the twentieth of the
month at latest. Montbrun reached Almanza on the day that Valencia
capitulated; nevertheless, in opposition to Suchet’s advice, he
persisted in advancing to Alicante, which he summoned to surrender,
and then throwing in a few shells, commenced his return toward Madrid,
having raised the spirits of the Spaniards by this unsupported and
unsuccessful attempt, and afforded to a more vigilant enemy an
opportunity which was not lost.
♦DÉNIA SURRENDERED.♦
Suchet followed up his success by sending a division against the little
town and port of Dénia, which, though protected by a respectable
fortress, was surrendered without resistance: he then sent General
Severoli against Peniscola, a place so strong by nature, and so well
secured by art, that it had obtained the name of Little Gibraltar,
and was, in fact, impregnable ♦PENISCOLA BETRAYED BY GARCIA NAVARRO.♦
by any regular attack. But General Garcia Navarro commanded there: he
had been taken prisoner in 1810, had escaped from France, was trusted
with this important post, and now betrayed his trust, and entered the
Intruder’s service, saying, he would rather share the fate of his
country and submit to the French, than act under English orders. As
this man was one of the basest traitors who deserted his country in
its need, so was he the most unlucky in timing his treason; for so
great a change was presently effected in the relative situation of the
contending powers, as to make it apparent even to himself that he had
taken the losing side, and would have only perpetual infamy for his
reward. About the same time, but in a very ♦CARRERA KILLED IN MURCIA.♦
different manner, the Spaniards lost General D. Martin de la Carrera,
who had distinguished himself in the recovery of Galicia, and had borne
throughout the war an honourable name. He now commanded the cavalry
of the Murcian army: a French detachment from Granada under General
Soult, the Marshal’s brother, had entered the city of Murcia and
were raising contributions there, when Carrera attacked them with his
advanced guard, gallantly, but unsuccessfully; for though he took them
by surprise, their numbers were greater than he had expected to find,
and he fell in the market-place, fighting bravely till the last. The
French having sacked the city abandoned it during the night, and on the
morrow Carrera was interred with all the honours which the inhabitants
could bestow. On that day month his exequies were performed in the
cathedral as a public solemnity, the General D. Jose O’Donnell, with
Generals Mahy, Freyre, and other officers attending; the foundation
of a monument to his memory was laid upon the spot where he fell; and
O’Donnell and the other officers, touching the stains of his blood with
their swords, swore like him to die for their country whenever the
sacrifice of their lives should be called for, and added to that vow,
one of perpetual hatred towards the French.
♦NEW CONSTITUTION.♦
The Cortes, meantime, as if they were equally certain that the country
would be delivered from its merciless invaders, and that no measures
which they could take would accelerate the deliverance, employed
themselves with unhappy diligence in forming a new constitution:
a small but zealous minority succeeded in dictating this to their
reluctant but less active colleagues; and in its details, as little
regard was paid to the opinions and feelings of the people, as to
the rights of the aristocracy and the fundamental principles of the
government. The public were far more interested in a change of the
Regency ... for the removal of ♦CHANGE OF REGENCY.♦ Blake after his
manifold misfortunes was considered as a gain, even though accompanied
with the loss of an army. The new Regency consisted of the Duque del
Infantado, at that time ambassador in England; D. Joaquin Mosquera
y Figueroa, who was one of the Council of the Indies; D. Juan Maria
Villavicencio, a lieutenant-general in the navy; D. Ignacio Rodriguez
de Rivas, of the royal council, and the Conde de la Bisbal. A new army
was set on foot in Murcia, to supply the place of that which had been
carried into captivity with Blake; and the national hopes were raised
by successes in other quarters, as brilliant as they were at this time
unlooked for.
♦BALLASTEROS RETREATS TO THE LINES OF ST. ROQUE.♦
Ballasteros had been appointed to the command in Andalusia, following
a system of war like that of the Guerrillas, which was best suited
both to his own talents and the indiscipline and wretched equipment
of his troops, he had inflicted more loss upon the enemy than they
sustained from any of the regular Spanish armies. In vain did M. Soult
boast repeatedly of defeating and putting him to flight; the men who
dispersed to-day collected again on the morrow: and while the French
were rejoicing for having routed him at one point, they heard that he
had re-appeared in force at another, and made himself felt when he was
least dreaded. In September he landed at Algeziras to act in aid of the
mountaineers of Ronda: a movement was then planned by the enemy for
cutting him off, and for getting possession of Tarifa, an important
point which they had hitherto neglected, as if in full expectation
that no measures for securing it would be thought of by the Spaniards
and their allies till it should be too late. After some slaughter of
the peasantry and some partial actions, General Godinot advancing
with 5000 men from Prado del Rey, found Ballasteros well posted in
front of Ximena: he retired to collect a stronger force, and having
been joined by two columns under Generals Barroux and Semele advanced
again with from 8 to 10,000 men, meaning to march upon St. Roque,
occupy the coast, and get possession of Tarifa by a _coup de main_.
Ballasteros, who had not half that ♦OCT. 10.♦ number in a state of
discipline on which any reliance could be placed, fell back upon the
heights of St. Roque, and took a position on the right of the town:
four days afterwards the French appeared, and endeavoured to bring on
an engagement; but Ballasteros knew his own weakness: he fell back upon
the old Spanish lines, and all the inhabitants of St. Roque flying
from their town, took shelter under the guns of Gibraltar. The French
invited them to return to their houses, with promises of security and
protection; but bitter experience had now taught the Spaniards what
French protection meant, and they threw themselves upon the compassion
of their allies. Rations were allotted both for them and the Spanish
troops, and the reservoirs and tanks were emptied for their use.
So busy and so stimulating a scene had not been witnessed from
Gibraltar since the last siege of the rock. The fugitives, without
any other accommodation or means of subsistence than what charity
could supply them, were scattered about in all directions near the
bay-side barrier; the French occupied the heights, and Ballasteros,
with his hardy and half-naked bands, remained under protection of the
rock, waiting in hope that want would soon compel the enemy to retire,
for previous arrangements had been made for annoying them in ♦TARIFA
ATTEMPTED BY THE FRENCH.♦ the rear and cutting off their supplies.
Godinot was not more successful in his design of seizing Tarifa.
Aware that such an attempt would be made, and warned by the example
of Tarragona to take measures for resisting the enemy in time, the
Spanish government dispatched a force under D. Francisco de Copons to
garrison the town; and 1000 British infantry, with a detachment of
artillery under Colonel Skerrett, embarked at the same time for the
same service. This, it was supposed, would also operate as a diversion
in favour of Ballasteros. The British troops landed on the very day
that Ballasteros fell back under the rock; but a strong easterly gale
delayed the Spanish part of the expedition. On the 18th about 1500
of the enemy advanced against Tarifa by the pass of La Pena; but the
road could be commanded from the sea, and our vessels fired upon them
with such effect that they turned back. Godinot meantime felt severely
the want of supplies; for the mountaineers of Ronda, and the parties
which Ballasteros had appointed for that purpose, intercepted his
communications and cut off his detachments. Three days, therefore,
after his ineffectual demonstration against Tarifa, he retreated by
Ximena upon Ubrique. Ballasteros was soon at his heels, and falling
upon the division which composed the rear-guard, put it to flight,
pursued it for three leagues, and brought away prisoners, knapsacks,
and arms in abundance. He soon obtained a more important advantage:
dividing his army for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, he collected
it by a ♦NOV. 5.♦ general movement from different directions to one
point, in the village of Prado del Rey, and marching from thence by
night, surprised Semele at daybreak. This general had taken his station
at Bornos upon the right bank of the Guadalete, with 2000 foot, 160
horse, and three pieces of artillery. All the mules and baggage fell
into the hands of the Spaniards; about 100 prisoners were taken, and
the corps was put ♦OCT. 5.♦ to flight. This fresh misfortune proved
fatal to Godinot, whom Soult recalled to Seville. On his arrival in
the evening he went to rest; early the next morning he came out of his
chamber, took the musket of the sentry unobserved, and blew out his own
brains.
The plans of Marshal Soult, however, were not to be frustrated by
partial reverses, though they were impeded by them. France has rarely
or never had an abler man in her service than this general, nor
one who might have attained a higher reputation, if his consummate
abilities had not been devoted to the service of a tyrant, and sullied
by cruelties which bring disgrace upon France and upon human nature.
He had lost Tarifa by relying too confidently on the supineness and
inattention of the allies. The French entered it when they first
overran Andalusia; and having, as they thought, taken possession,
passed on to other points of more immediate importance. The governor
of Gibraltar, General Colin Campbell, seized the opportunity, and
occupied it with about 250 men and thirty gunners under Major Brown of
the 28th. A few weeks afterwards, a thousand French arrived to garrison
it: the general hatred of the Spaniards prevented them from getting
any information but what their own people, and the few traitors whom
they had seduced, could supply; and their troops were under no little
surprise when they found the gates closed against them. They drew up
below the eastern hills, within musket-range, and poured their bullets
into the town; and they entered the suburbs, where several of our men
were killed; but they were without artillery, and seeing a detachment
issue through the sea-gate to take possession of the south-east hills,
and bring some guns to bear upon their flank, they hastily retired, and
made no farther attempt to occupy the place, till this time.
♦TARIFA.♦
Tarifa is believed to have been a settlement of the Phœnicians. It
derives its present name from Tarik, who first led the Moors into
Spain, and who is said to have built the castle. The town had long·
been declining, till the late wars in which Spain had been involved
with England, in consequence of her unhappy connexion with France,
gave it a new importance: for a little island which stands out boldly
into the Straits off the town rendered it a favourable station for gun
boats; and during the late war these boats inflicted greater losses
upon the trade of Great Britain than it suffered from all the fleets
of all her enemies. There were two half-moon batteries and a martello
tower on the island; but when the Spaniards at the commencement of
this dreadful struggle formed their alliance with Great Britain,
these works, with the whole line of defence along the Straits, were
dismantled, lest the French should at any time turn it against the best
ally of Spain. The enemy occupied no point which in so great a degree
commanded the straits; and Soult was now the more desirous of obtaining
it, because he was at this time negotiating with Morocco, and the
possession of Tarifa, which is only five leagues distant from Tangiers,
would render it impossible for England with all her naval means to
prevent him from receiving corn; and thus the difficulty of supplying
the French armies would be greatly lessened, if not altogether removed.
♦TARIFA REGARRISONED BY THE ENGLISH.♦
The little garrison which had saved this important place was withdrawn
for the expedition under Generals Lapeña and Graham, and when the
latter re-entered the Isle of Leon, he left Tarifa uncovered;
but General Colin Campbell a second time secured it, by sending
thither the marines from the ships at Gibraltar. Soon after it was
re-garrisoned, Major King of the 82nd was appointed to the command,
and he and the Spanish governor, D. Manuel Daban, delayed not to take
precautions against a danger, the approach of which now began to be
apprehended. Piquets were placed at La Pena, at Facinas, and Port
Alanca, and provisions were laid in for a siege. The first movement
of the enemy indicated their ultimate object; D. Antonio Begines de
los Rios, an officer who had distinguished himself daring General
Lapeña’s expedition, and who was now stationed at Algeziras, made a
representation of the approaching danger, and General Campbell directed
that some field works should be thrown up on the island to secure a
retreat, in case a retreat should be unavoidable. These works excited
some jealousy in the governor; but Major King explained to him their
use and necessity; and Ballasteros, who inspected them about the same
time, expressed in animated terms his gratitude to the British nation,
seeming at that time, like a brave and generous man, to feel no petty
suspicions, or lingering of old prejudices, or resentment of false and
ill-directed pride.
♦COL. SKERRETT AND COPONS ARRIVE THERE.♦
In the middle of October, Colonel Skerrett arrived with about 1200 men,
and took the command of the garrison; and in a few days D. Francisco
de Copons followed him with 900 Spaniards and about 100 cavalry. The
Spanish general demanded that the keys of the town should be given
up to him, and Colonel Skerrett would have acceded to this, if it
had not been represented, that his predecessors had kept possession
of the keys, first to guard against any treachery; secondly, because
the brother of the governor was in the French service; and, thirdly,
as it was more conformable to the honour of the British nation. The
validity of the two former reasons had been but too often proved: the
latter might well have been dispensed with; on the part of England
there was no point of honour implicated, and the British officer acted
as he did for the welfare and security of Spain. The question was
referred by Colonel Skerrett to Governor Campbell’s decision; and the
rapid approach of the enemy, and the hearty co-operation of the allies
against him, removed all jealousies which otherwise might have arisen.
♦THE FRENCH INVEST THE TOWN.♦
The French advanced in such superior numbers, that little attempt
could be made to oppose or impede them. They took possession of the
surrounding hills on the 19th of December, and lighted fires, which
were supposed to be for the purpose of misleading our gun-boats; for
these vessels annoyed them materially by keeping up a brisk fire upon
the pass of La Pena and the hills near the beach. By the following
night the town was closely invested, after a warm day’s work, in which
the artillery on both sides played with destructive effect. One of the
enemy’s shells killed an artillery driver and eight artillery horses;
fourteen Spaniards were killed by another. The allies lost seventy-one
in killed and wounded; the loss of the enemy was also great. Four
ten-inch mortars on the island were seen to do terrible execution; one
of their shells burst in the centre of a column, and towards evening,
when the enemy were most heated and exposed themselves most, they were
evidently checked by the unexpected resistance which they met with. The
siege was now fairly commenced, and the cavalry and staff-horses, as
no longer useful, were sent to the island, from thence to be embarked
on the first opportunity. An account of the enemy’s force was obtained
from a serjeant who was brought in prisoner; there were 11,000 men, he
said, with eighteen pieces of cannon, long sixteen pounders, and two
howitzers; Marshal Victor commanded. The prisoner entreated that he
might not be given up to the Spaniards. When he was asked whether he
thought the French would succeed in the siege, he replied, “That their
Emperor Napoleon had given them positive orders to take the place,
and he generally provided means adequate to the end in view.” The man
appeared sensible and well informed; this confidence in the wisdom with
which their operations were directed was probably common to the whole
French army, and it constituted half their strength.
♦DOUBTS WHETHER THE TOWN COULD BE DEFENDED.♦
The allies were not equally confident that they should be able to
defend the place; and the commanding-officer of the flotilla surveyed
the coast of the island, to fix upon a spot for embarking the garrison,
if they should be compelled to evacuate both posts. A precaution of
this kind, if it had been publicly known, might have contributed, by
disheartening the men, to produce the catastrophe which it seemed to
anticipate; but it was the duty of the commanders to think of the
worst result, while they hoped and acted for the best; and when they
remembered what weak walls and insufficient works were opposed to a
numerous enemy, experienced in all the arts of war, and more especially
in the attack of fortified places, it was not without good reason that
they thought it expedient to provide a place for embarkation. Hitherto,
however, the defence had been well and fortunately conducted; and
the fire of the gun boats and from the island was so well directed,
that great part of the enemy’s stores and their heavy artillery had
not yet been able to come through the pass of La Pena. By daybreak on
the 24th, the French had brought their approaches within 400 yards,
immediately opposite the north-east tower. That morning an express
arrived from Cadiz, with orders for Colonel Skerrett to embark his
brigade: a council of war was held, but not for the purpose for which
such councils under such circumstances are usually convened; ... a
right spirit prevailed among the British officers, and they determined
that the place should not be abandoned. To go once in his life, as
Colonel Skerrett had done, to the relief of a besieged town, and
see its imminent distress, without bearing part in its defence, was
sufficient grief for a brave and generous man; the French had insulted
and vilified him for not having done at Tarragona what no want of will
prevented him from doing; opportunity was now given him of showing them
his real character, and he did not fail to improve it.
♦DECEMBER.♦
On the night between Christmas eve and Christmas day, the French
broke ground opposite the east tower at 400 yards distance, and on
the following night they strengthened their approaches at all points,
and advanced 150 yards nearer to the east and north-east towers. At
both points they opened a fire from a number of wall-pieces, and fired
musketry and wall-pieces through pyramids of earth-sacks from the
summit of one of the hills. Thence they poured their bullets over the
whole town, but the men were so well covered that little hurt was done.
The fire of the garrison was equally brisk and more successful; ...
it was not, however, possible to prevent the enemy from advancing in
works, carried on upon the perfect rules of art; and in case it should
be found impossible to maintain Tarifa, final arrangements were made
for the order of retreat, and signals established with the island,
to signify when the island was to fire on the breach, the suburbs,
and on the town, so that our troops might be saved from any error in
the possible confusion, and as much loss as possible inflicted on the
assailants.
A heavy fire was opened on the 29th from two batteries; one bore upon
the flotilla boats, which were then at anchor in the eastern bay,
and they were fain to cut their cables and put to sea. This battery
then threw shot and shells to almost every part of the island. The
men received little hurt, for they were at work at the traverses;
but two of the female inhabitants of the town, who had taken refuge
there, were wounded, one losing a leg, and several horses and mules
were killed. The other was a breaching battery planted in the valley,
nearly opposite the Retiro tower, at three hundred yards distance. By
the evening a breach about five feet wide was made to the right of this
tower. The eastern tower was as yet untouched, but the enemy approached
it by sap within fifty yards. Some of the inhabitants were killed and
wounded in the course of the day retreating to the island. The men
suffered little, for they were ordered to keep under cover. Their
spirit was manifested upon an occasion which might have led to the
worst consequences. One of our artillery officers spiked two guns; the
troops were exceedingly indignant when it was whispered among them, and
they expressed their discontent at the apprehension of being made to
abandon the town, without having a fair set-to with the enemy. General
Copons appeared highly enraged when he was informed of what had been
done; and the temper which both Spaniards and English displayed at this
circumstance taught them how well each might rely upon the other in
this their common cause.
♦DEC. 30.
THE GARRISON SUMMONED.♦
The next day, by ten in the morning, the breach had been enlarged
to three-and-twenty yards, and about noon a flag of truce arrived;
... it was a service of danger to carry it, the day being so foggy,
that the flag could scarcely be seen. General Leval who commanded the
besieging troops, summoned the governor, saying, “that the defence made
by the fortress under his command had sufficiently established that
fair name which is the basis of military honour: that in a few hours
the breach would be practicable, and that the same honour which had
prompted him to resistance, imposed it now as a duty upon him to spare
the lives of a whole population, whose fate was in his hands, rather
than see them buried amid the ruins of their town.” Copons answered in
these words: “When you propose to the governor of this fortress to
admit a capitulation, because the breach will shortly be practicable,
you certainly do not know that I am here. When the breach shall be
absolutely practicable, you will find me upon it, at the head of my
troops to defend it. There we will negotiate.” After receiving his
reply, the French renewed their fire upon the breach, but most of the
balls passed through it into the houses which stood opposite.
♦THE FRENCH REPULSED IN AN ASSAULT.♦
Preparations were now made on both sides for the assault, and at
eight on the following morning the enemy advanced from their trenches
in every direction. 2000 of their men moved by the bed of the river
in front of the breach; the 87th regiment flanked the breach to the
north and south, leaving two companies in reserve to bayonet the
assailants if they should leap the wall. This, however, was not much
to be apprehended; for the town is built in a hollow, and in that part
the wall on the inside was fourteen feet lower than on the out. The
breach opened into a narrow street, which had been barricaded on each
side, and was well flanked and secured with _chevaux-de-frize_, for
which the iron balconies, commonly used in Spanish towns, furnished
ready and excellent materials. When Colonel Gough saw them advancing,
he drew his sword, threw away the scabbard, and ordered his band to
strike up the Irish air of _Garry-Owen_. The men immediately cheered,
and opened their fire. The 47th, who lined a wall which descended from
the south-east tower, and flanked the enemy’s columns, did the same,
and the carnage made among the enemy was such, that they halted for
a moment, as if dismayed, then ran to the edge of the breach. This
they saw was impracticable, and hurrying off under the wall, they made
a dash at the portcullis. Here the barricade was impenetrable, and
finding themselves in a situation where courage could be of no avail,
and where they were brought down by hundreds, they fled. Colonel Gough
seeing them fly, bade his band strike up _St. Patrick’s Day_, and the
men were so inspirited, that it was scarcely possible to restrain them
from pursuing the fugitives up to their very trenches[33].
The enemy suffered severely in their flight; hand-grenades from
the houses were thrown upon those who fled by the wall, in hope of
security, and a six-pounder on the north-east tower flanked them. The
two leading officers of the column remained under the wall, and were
taken prisoners. A flag of truce was soon sent, to ask permission to
bury the dead. About 500 had fallen; and it was a miserable sight to
see the wounded crawling under the breach: about forty, many of whom
were officers, were brought into the town. On the part of the garrison
ten were killed and seventeen wounded.
♦JANUARY.
EFFECTS OF A STORM ON BOTH PARTIES.♦
The old year was now terminated with triumph and rejoicing at Tarifa,
but the new one came in with mourning. A dreadful storm of wind and
rain came on from the eastward, and two Spanish gun-boats, full of
fugitives from the town, were wrecked under the guns of the island.
Two-and-forty persons perished. The inhabitants who were hutted on
the eastern side of the island, were overwhelmed by the surge, all
lost their property and many of them their lives. Many more perished
by the storm than had fallen in repelling the assault. The weather,
however, brought with it some compensation to the Spaniards for this
destruction; the few shells which the enemy threw during the day fell
dead, giving proof that their ammunition had suffered, and neither
that day nor the next did they make any farther attempt on the breach,
nor move any of their guns to batter a more assailable point. During
the night of the first, the wind blew up many of the tents on the
island, and exposed the men to the storm. On the second, the rain
increased, and the wind fell; in the course of the ensuing night, a
party sallied, and found the lower trenches of the enemy so flooded
by the rains, that their piquets had abandoned them. Some deserters
now came in, and declared that two regiments had refused to assault
the breach a second time; that the sufferings which they endured from
the weather had excited a mutinous expression of discontent among the
foreigners in their army and that Victor had, in consequence of these
things, thought it necessary to send for Soult, who was arrived, and
now at the convent of La Luz. Other deserters confirmed this account,
and added, that there were about 1000 sick, and that the swelling of
the rivers cut off their supplies, and was likely to cut off their
retreat.
The besieged did not rely too confidently upon their good fortune,
and these favourable tidings, which all appearances, as far as they
could, seemed to corroborate. Ballasteros, with 2000 of his best
troops, embarked at Algeziras, to assist in the defence of Tarifa;
but the weather prevented him from sailing, and the commander seeing
that the enemy were removing their guns higher up, and expecting that
another breach would be made, applied to General Colin Campbell for a
reinforcement. The light companies of the 9th regiment were immediately
dispatched, and landed in the course of the day, and in the following
night farther succours arrived. Toward evening, a column of the enemy
was seen advancing from La Luz, and a deserter brought intelligence
that they proposed to attack at the same time the town, the island,
and St. Catalina, ... a conical hill on the land side of the isthmus,
which was occupied as an outwork to the island; if they failed in these
simultaneous attacks, they meant to raise the siege. About an hour
after night had closed, they approached close to the eastern wall, and
poured a fire of musketry into the town; the whole of the garrison
immediately repaired to their alarm posts, and the guards on the wall
returned their fire with good effect. It was intended only for a feint,
and the enemy presently withdrew. About midnight, the garrison were
again called out by a firing on all sides of the town; the firing
suddenly ceased, and a little before daybreak it was discovered that
the enemy had retreated during the darkness. ♦JAN. 4.♦ When morning
opened, nothing but their rear guard was in sight; the light troops
pursued them as far as the river Salado, ... memorable as the place
where the Moors made their last great effort for the conquest of Spain,
and where they received from the allied armies of Castille and Portugal
one of the greatest and most important defeats which history has
recorded.
The French buried their cannon and left behind them great part of
their stores, and what they attempted to remove, the weather and the
state of the roads compelled them to abandon upon the way. Their loss
was computed at not less than 2500 men, ... a number exceeding that
of the garrison. The siege had continued seventeen days; the wall in
front of the town was but a yard thick, and incapable of bearing heavy
artillery; a breach had been open in it for seven days. Here for the
first time, the French learned in what manner Englishmen could defend
stone walls, and Lord Wellington was about to show that they could
attack them with the same spirit and the same success.
♦GEN. HILL OCCUPIES MERIDA.♦
General Hill, after his surprisal of the French at Arroyo Molinos, had
returned to his cantonments in Alentejo, watching an opportunity for
a second blow. Towards the end of December, he made a rapid movement
upon Merida in the hope of surprising them there also, but this was in
part frustrated by the accident of falling in with a detachment which
was on a plundering excursion, and which retreating with great skill
and bravery before our advanced guard, gave the alarm. Upon this the
enemy evacuated the city, leaving unfinished the works which they were
constructing for its defence, and abandoning a magazine of bread and
a considerable quantity of wheat. The British general, then hearing
that Drouet was collecting his troops at Almendralejo, marched upon
that town: but the French had retired, leaving there also a magazine
of flour; the state of the weather and of the roads, which were
daily becoming worse, prevented General Hill from pursuing; having,
therefore, cleared this part of Extremadura of the French (for they
retreated to the south), he cantoned his troops in Merida and its
vicinity, and waited for other opportunities and a fairer season.
♦ATTEMPT TO CARRY OFF SOULT.♦
The Guerrillas failed about the same time in an attempt which, if it
had proved successful, would in the highest degree have gratified
the vindictive spirit of the Spaniards. Zaldivar laid an ambush for
Marshal Soult, and if a goatherd had had not apprized him of his
danger, that able commander would have been at the mercy of men as
merciless as himself. A successful achievement by D. Julian Sanchez
perhaps induced Zaldivar to undertake this well-planned, though less
fortunate, adventure. That chieftain, soon after the relief of Ciudad
Rodrigo, formed a scheme for driving off the cattle, which had been
introduced into the city, and were driven out every morning to graze
under the guns of the place. He not only succeeded in taking the
greater part of them, but made the governor, Regnauld, prisoner, who
with ♦OCT. 15.♦ a small escort had crossed the Agueda, thinking himself
perfectly safe, within sight of the fort and under its guns. About the
same time an accident occurred, which showed the gratitude as well
as the enterprise of the Spaniards. Colonel Grant, of the Portugueze
♦COL. GRANT RESCUED BY THE GUERRILLAS.♦ army, who had on many occasions
distinguished himself, was surprised at El Aceuche, and made prisoner.
D. Antonio Temprano, who commanded a squadron of hussars, obtained
intelligence that he had passed through Oropesa, on the way to
Talavera; “and because,” he said, “of the singular estimation in which
this officer deserved to be held for his services,” he determined,
if it were possible, to rescue him: for this purpose he placed an
ambush within shot of Talavera during five successive days; and on the
fifth, succeeded in delivering Colonel Grant and a Portugueze officer,
his companion in misfortune, at a time when they both expected to be
consigned to hopeless captivity.
♦STATE OF FEELING AT MADRID.♦
That Temprano’s detachment should have remained five days so near a
populous city like Talavera, and no information be given to the French
garrison, is one of the many proofs which were daily occurring, how
entirely the Spanish people hated the government which Buonaparte was
endeavouring to force upon them. Meantime, even from Madrid, in spite
of the vigilance of a French police, and the rigour of a military
government, which, knowing itself to be detested, sought only to
maintain itself by fear, the inhabitants found means of sending not
only intelligence, but even supplies, to their brethren in arms. It is
related in one of the Spanish journals, as a proof of the patriotism of
the capital, and the confidence which the Spaniards there placed in
each other, that a lady gave into the hands of a carrier, whom she met
in the street, and had never seen before, a large bundle of lint and
bandages, for the nearest military hospital of her countrymen, and it
was accordingly delivered to the Junta of Leon, to be thus disposed of.
Romana’s army was clothed by contributions from Madrid.
The ambition of the French government has been at all times well
seconded by the activity and talents of its subjects, and by that
lively interest, which more than any other people they feel for the
glory of their country; but its policy has always been counteracted by
other parts of the French character. While the Intrusive Government and
the generals upon every occasion reminded the Spaniards that they were
orthodox Roman catholics like themselves, and that the English were
heretics endeavouring thus, by raising religious animosities, to excite
disunion between them and their allies, they could not refrain from
outraging the feelings of the Spaniards, by the grossest mockery of all
things which were held sacred. Masquerades were given at Madrid on the
Sundays in Lent, and the people were shocked at seeing masks in the
characters of nuns, friars and clergy in their surplices, in the public
places of promenade, and at the theatre. They were still more offended
at beholding one in episcopal habits, and another with a cope, and
the other habits of the altar. At Albarracin and Orihuela, the French
gave balls, and exhibited a bull-fight on Holy Thursday, the cost of
which they levied upon the villages round about. “The robbery,” said
the Spaniards, “can surprise no one after our long experience of their
insolence and rapacity; but that which wounds to the quick a feeling
and pious soul, is the atrocious and sacrilegious insult which these
wretches offer to human nature, and to the religion of that God whom
they profess to adore. Common banditti commit murder after robbery,
... but to suck the blood of a victim, to expose him to a thousand
torments, and to compel him after all to outrage religion, the only
consolation and hope which he has left, and to make him with his last
tears deplore the most sacrilegious of their excesses, this is peculiar
to Buonaparte and his soldiers.”
♦STATE OF THE COUNTRY.♦
The conduct of the French in other respects was such as heightened
this feeling of abhorrence; everywhere the people groaned under their
exactions, their cruelties, and their intolerable insolence. It seemed
as if it were the wish of Buonaparte and his ferocious agents utterly
to depopulate a country which they found it impossible to subdue.
Dreadful as war always is, no ordinary war could have brought upon any
nation such complicated miseries. It was impossible for those even who
would have been contented to bow, like bulrushes, before the storm, to
obtain security by any course of conduct; the orders of the Intrusive
Government were met by counter orders from the legitimate authority;
and they who obeyed that authority were, on the other hand, exposed
to the penalties enacted in the Intruder’s name. Buonaparte and his
wicked agents expected to govern Spain by terror, little thinking,
when the plan of usurpation was laid, that the character of the nation
would compensate for the imbecility of its rulers; that his system of
terror would be met by counter terrors; and that the people for whom he
proclaimed there was no safety but in obedience would, on their part,
proclaim that obedience, when carried farther than mere passive and
inevitable submission to immediate force, was a crime which would draw
upon the temporizing and the timid the very evil they sought to avert.
Nothing but that patient, persevering, obstinate, inflexible, and
invincible spirit of local patriotism which for more than two thousand
years has distinguished the Spaniards above all other nations, could
have supported them through such a struggle; while the allies, by whom,
under Providence, their deliverance was to be effected, were acquiring
confidence in their own strength, and experience, and some of that
wisdom in which at the beginning of the contest they were lamentably
wanting. But, meantime, the sufferings of the Spaniards were of the
severest kind, and as general as they were severe. There was scarcely a
family in the Peninsula, from the highest to the lowest, of which some
member had not been cut off by the sword. The affluent were deprived
of their property; the industrious of their employment; men of letters
were bereaved of the books and papers which had been the occupation and
delight of their laborious, and honourable, and disinterested lives;
and they who had grown grey in convents were driven out to beg for
bread among those who were themselves reduced to want.
The Intruder, meantime, was in a condition which was truly pitiable,
if one who had allowed himself to be made the ostensible cause of such
wide-spreading misery and desolation had not forfeited all claim to
pity. This phantom of a king had neither money to pay his ministers
and dependents, nor authority over the armies which acted in his
name. The Frenchified Spaniards who composed his ministry, and the
French generals, agreed in despising him, ... this being almost the
only point in which they agreed: on the part of Urquijo Azanza, and
their colleagues, there was some commiseration mingled with their
contempt; their object had been to effect a change of dynasty, under
the protection of France, not to reduce Spain to the state of a
province; and they could not perceive that Joseph Buonaparte was the
mere puppet of his perfidious brother, without self-reproaches and
unavailing regret. For their own sakes, therefore, they preserved the
forms of respect toward him; but the generals were restrained by no
such feeling; they set his orders at nought, and looked only to France
for instructions. The object of the officers was to enrich themselves
by pillage; that of the commanders was to carve out dukedoms, and
provinces, and principalities, which they might govern by the sword
while Buonaparte lived, and perhaps maintain for themselves by the same
tenure after his death.
♦THE INTRUDER GOES TO FRANCE.♦
Sick of his miserable situation, the Intruder went to France, to
represent the deplorable state of Spain, and press upon Buonaparte the
necessity of providing an adequate support for the government which he
had established, if he could not send into the Peninsula such a force
as should expel the English, and bear down all resistance. He himself
perhaps would have rejoiced if Buonaparte would have executed his old
threat of annexing Spain to the French empire, and treating it openly
as a conquest, ... for Joseph had neither the talents nor the temper
of an usurper: without virtue to refuse obedience to his tyrannical
brother, and yet without those vices which would make him heartily
enter into his plans, his only resource was in sensualities, for his
criminal compliance had left him no other consolation. This propensity
he would far rather have indulged in retirement and security: but the
views and wishes of his ministers were widely different: the direct
usurpation of Spain by Buonaparte would have reduced them at once to
insignificance, and placed them upon a level with Godoy, whom they,
perhaps, as well as their worthier countrymen, regarded as a traitor;
for certain it is, that among these unhappy men there were some who
began their career with good feelings, and a sincere love of their
country, and who were betrayed by error and presumptuousness, and their
connexion with France, into guilt and infamy. They dreaded nothing so
much as Joseph’s retirement, and rejoiced in his return to Spain as at
a triumph.
♦DISTRESS BOTH OF THE INTRUSIVE AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT.♦
It suited not the immediate policy of Buonaparte to displace his
brother. Moscow instead of Madrid occupied at this time his ambitious
thoughts, and supplying with men the Intrusive Government, he left it
to shift as it could for means. So distressed was Joseph for money,
that the plate of the royal chapel at Madrid was sent to the mint,
though such an act would make him at once odious for sacrilege, and
contemptible for poverty, in the eyes of the people. In want of other
funds for his emissaries to America, he sent a large quantity of
quicksilver to be sold at Alicante: the governor there discovered
for what use the produce was designed, and seized 1700 _arrobas_,
and the agents who had it in charge. A great effort was made to pay
some of the public arrears on Buonaparte’s birthday, the fifteenth of
August, for which day St. Napoleone had been foisted into the Spanish
calendar. 100,000 _reales de vellon_ were paid on this anniversary to
the ministers. Lledo, the comedian, received 18,000, and 100 each were
distributed to some ladies of rank, who were reduced to petition the
Intruder for bread! A bull-fight was given at Madrid on this day, at
which all the bulls were white; long preparation therefore must have
been necessary for collecting them: D. Damaso Martin, the Empecinado’s
brother, carried off from the meadows of Puente de Viveros 300, which
had been destined for these ferocious sports in the capital.
The legitimate government, meantime, was not less distressed than that
of the Intruder: as far as the contest lay between them, it was carried
on on both sides almost without any certain revenue on which either
could rely. The chief resources of the Spaniards, at the commencement
of the struggle, had been in America, and these had been cut off by
a series of deplorable events, in which it is difficult to say which
of the opposite parties was most culpable. This was now the fourth
year of the war; the spirit of the people, and the defects of their
military system, had been abundantly proved; nothing was wanting but
to remedy those defects by raising an army under the direction of Lord
Wellington, who had delivered Portugal, and might by similar means
speedily and certainly have delivered Spain. Many causes prevented
this; one is to be found in a jealousy or rather dislike of England,
which had grown up in the liberal party with their predilection for
republican France, and which continued with other errors from the same
source, still to actuate them. The pride of the Spanish character was
another and more widely influencing cause: the Spaniards remembered
that their troops had once been the best in the world; and this
remembrance, which in the people so greatly contributed to keep up
their spirit, in the government produced only a contented and baneful
torpor which seemed like infatuation. The many defeats, in the course
of four years, which they had sustained, from that at Rio Seco to the
last ruinous action before Valencia, brought with them no conviction to
the successive governments of their radical weakness and their radical
error. After Lord Wellington had driven Massena out of Portugal, it was
proposed that the command of the frontier provinces should be given
him, and that an army should be raised there under him: it was debated
in a secret sitting, and rejected by an hundred voices against thirty.
“There are three classes of men,” said Dueñas, “who will break up
the Cortes, unless the Cortes breaks down them: they who refuse to
acknowledge the sovereignty of the nation, calling it a mere chimera,
and saying there is no sovereignty except that of the king; they who
distrust our cause, and say that the few millions who inhabit Spain
cannot make head against all Europe; and, lastly, they who imagine,
that as the French have conquered while they despise God, we may do the
same.” The deputy’s fears of the first and third of these classes were
groundless, and there were but few of the second, ... but few Spaniards
who despaired of Spain. Nothing, however, could tend so much to
increase their number as the conduct of the government; it might well
be feared that a system, if system it could be called, which trusted to
its allies, and to the events that time and chance might bring forth,
would at length exhaust the hopes and the constancy, as well as the
blood, ♦SCHEMES FOR STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT.♦ of the Spaniards.
All considerate persons could not but perceive that the present
government was in no respect more efficient than that of the Central
Junta had been, which, for its inefficiency, would have been broken up
by an insurrection, if it had not prevented such a catastrophe by a
timely abdication. As a remedy for this evil, the Cortes thought at one
time of taking the executive into their own hands, and administering it
by a committee chosen from their own members; but the resemblance which
this bore to the system pursued by the French National Convention,
during the worst stage of the revolution, deterred those who favoured
it from bringing forward a proposal that would reasonably have alarmed
the greater part of the assembly, and have disgusted the nation.
They who were of opinion that the Regency would be more effective if
vested in a single person than in three or five, knew not where that
person was to be found who should unite ♦CARDINAL BOURBON.♦ legitimate
claims with individual qualifications. Cardinal Bourbon occurred to
them, but as one who had neither the personal respectability, nor
the ♦THE INFANTE D. CARLOS.♦ capacity desired. The Infante D. Carlos
was supposed to possess sufficient strength of character, and it was
not doubted, that if opportunity of attempting to escape could be
offered him, he would be not less desirous to avail himself of it
than Ferdinand had, luckily for himself, been found of shrinking from
the danger; but the failure in Ferdinand’s case had greatly increased
both the difficulties and dangers of ♦THE PRINCESS OF BRAZIL.♦ such
an attempt. There remained the princess of Brazil, whose right to the
Regency, under existing circumstances, was admitted by the Council of
Castille. She had spirit and abilities equal to the charge; but, on
the other hand, she was known to be of an intriguing and dangerous
disposition, ... one who, being, by reason of her station, sure of
impunity in this world for any thing which she might be inclined to
commit, believed that her father-confessor could at all times make her
equally secure in the next, and was notoriously disposed to make full
use of these convenient privileges whenever any personal inclination
was to be gratified or any political object to be brought about. Yet
with this knowledge of her character, those British statesmen who
were best acquainted with the affairs of the Peninsula at that time,
and with what advantages we might carry on the war there, if it were
vigorously pursued, and what were the impediments which in far greater
degree than the entire force of the enemy impeded our progress, agreed
in opinion, that it should be the true policy of England to support
her claim, regarding the possible consequences in Portugal, of her
appointment to the Spanish Regency, as a consideration of inferior
moment. There would yet be a difficulty concerning the place to be
fixed on for her residence: Lisbon it could not be: ... pre-eminently
fitted as that city was to be the capital of the united governments,
the ill-will between the Portugueze and Spaniards, which the
circumstances of the present war unhappily had not tended to diminish,
rendered this impossible; and, for the same reason, Cadiz was hardly
less objectionable. It was thought, therefore, that the princess might
best reside at Madeira, and govern in Spain through a Vice-Regent.
The conduct of the Cortes in arrogating the title of Majesty, and
exercising, as, in fact they did, the executive government through
successive Regencies, which they nominated and dissolved at pleasure,
made persons who were otherwise averse to it accede to this scheme as
involving fewer inconveniences than any other which could be proposed.
♦STATE OF THE PORTUGUEZE GOVERNMENT.♦
Some change also, and of the same kind, appeared to be not less
desirable in Portugal. The arrangement which placed the Portugueze
army under a British general, introducing at the same time a large
proportion of British officers into that army, and that which placed
the whole military establishment under a British commander-in-chief,
had been necessary, and the Portugueze themselves were sensible that it
was so. But it was not wisely done to put the Portugueze fleet under
a British admiral, nor to make the British ambassador a member of the
Regency: in the first instance, a great expense was incurred in time
of extreme want; in both, some offence was given to national feeling;
and in neither was there any advantage gained. Sir Charles Stuart was
in no enviable situation; there was a constant opposition between
him and the Souzas, who had great influence at the court of the Rio,
whose intentions were not to be suspected, and whose abilities were
of no common order, but whose deep prepossessions prevented them from
adapting their views to the actual circumstances of the country. When
he exerted himself to rectify habitual disorders, and provide for
demands which were continually recurring, and which it was ruinous
to neglect, the whole host of intriguers was in action against him,
and he incurred the dislike of the prince, of whose ear his opponents
had possession: on the other hand, the repeated complaints from
head-quarters against the misconduct of the Portugueze government
under which the native army was mouldering away more rapidly than it
had been formed, seemed to include him of course among the persons
upon whom the blame was laid. Yet his colleagues, as well as he, were
more to be pitied than condemned, for what they left undone. The whole
revenues of the house of Braganza were at this time remitted to Brazil,
... no unfit arrangement, as the family was there to be supported.
But the court received also the revenues from Madeira and the Western
Isles, and the establishments in Africa, and yet called for money from
Portugal! It had left so great a part of the old court establishment
there that the expenses of that part exceeded the whole produce of the
crown lands; and it was continually sending persons from Brazil, to be
provided for at home; ... this, at a time when Portugal with only half
its former revenues, and with a ruined people, had to support an army
fourfold more numerous than in its days of prosperity!
The prince of Brazil was jealous of his prerogative; ... and there were
those about him who lost no opportunity of insinuating that England
aimed at establishing a permanent influence over the government of
Portugal. This was so old an art of faction, that even from new
circumstances it could derive no strength; and although, if he were
at Lisbon, he would be within reach of the insidious proposals of the
French, who would have no difficulty in finding intriguers to second
them, yet, on the whole, those persons whose opinions carried most
weight thought it desirable that he should be urged to return, his
presence nearer Lisbon being as necessary as that of the princess
was deemed to be at Cadiz. But the statesmen who advised this seem
to have overlooked the circumstances of Brazil, where at that time
the presence of the court was the only check upon the revolutionary
spirit which was then gathering strength: that consideration alone must
have detained the prince there; and if the claim of the princess had
been more popular than it was at Cadiz, the conduct of the Portugueze
diplomatists on this occasion was sufficient to ruin it.
♦M. WELLESLEY’S VIEWS.♦
Marquis Wellesley, whose views were always comprehensive, thought that
nothing of importance could be done in the field, unless an efficient
Spanish army were raised of 30 or 40,000 men. To expect any thing from
it under its present establishment, he argued, would be to deceive
ourselves; ... any thing short of a thorough reform under a British
commander and British officers, Great Britain providing also for the
pay and subsistence of the whole, would be fruitless; and this we could
not afford. But we might take into our pay an army of 30,000 men, and
assist Spain with a loan of five or six millions for raising another:
a much larger sum would be saved by this expenditure if it shortened
the war a single year; and that it might be so shortened, no one who
had faith in British courage, and knew the capacity of the British
commander, could doubt. But Marquis Wellesley had not that ascendancy
in the cabinet to which in the opinion of his admirers he was entitled,
and which, perhaps, he had expected to assert. His colleagues might
have acted with more vigour, if their tenure of the government had been
more secure; the sense of that insecurity, and the constant struggle
wherein they were engaged at home, made them regard difficulties as
insuperable, which would have disappeared if they had had sufficient
confidence in themselves.
This want of energy must have been fatal, if Lord Wellington had not
been eminently qualified for the arduous situation in which he was
placed. Both his mind and body were equal to all that was required from
them. He rose about four, and after a slight breakfast was usually
on horseback from daylight till about the hour of noon. He was then
employed till three, in transacting business with the officers of the
army, or in writing his orders and letters, answering every dispatch
and letter as it was brought before him. At three he dined, was on
horseback again at five, till evening closed, and was then employed
in business till ten, when he retired to rest. Mortifying as it was,
having in himself glorious anticipations of what he could effect with
adequate means, at the same time to feel himself crippled for want of
them; no embarrassments ever had the effect of perplexing his judgment,
or leading him to despond; but making his preparations with long
forethought, he waited the opportunity for attempting whatever his
means allowed him to undertake.
♦LORD WELLINGTON PREPARES FOR THE SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
The force with which he intended to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo consisted of
17,000 British, and 14,000 Portugueze, ... so inferior to what Marmont
might bring into the field against him, that every thing depended
upon secrecy in his plans, and celerity in their execution. That he
would undertake the siege was what every officer who reasoned, or
talked about the ensuing campaign, could not but conclude; but when
it was his intention was not communicated even to those persons in
whom he placed most confidence, and of whom he entertained the[34]
highest opinion. The works of Almeida which Brennier had demolished,
when with so much credit to himself he abandoned the place, were
restored; British and Portugueze troops in equal numbers being
employed upon them, and receiving working money, and such of them as
were bricklayers or stonemasons, and acted as artificers, double pay.
This, which the French might consider a defensive measure, was for
the purpose of providing a safe depôt for the battering train. That
train was conveyed up the Douro forty miles, farther than the boats
of the country had navigated the river before, our engineers having
removed the impediments which rendered it innavigable. There had been
such difficulty in obtaining means of transport, that for this reason
alone, Lord Wellington had been obliged to undertake feeding all the
Portugueze troops that were incorporated in the British divisions.
The system of the Portugueze commissariat was to embargo carts and
cattle for this service, ... a grievous evil to the owners, who knew
that they were likely never to be paid, and that their beasts would
probably be worked to death; unless, therefore, they were closely
watched, they, as might be expected, deserted, and left the supplies
to take their chance. Nor, when British faith was pledged for payment
of the commissariat accounts, was there any perceptible amendment,
so long as the means of transport were to be supplied by the local
authorities: these authorities showed little alacrity in executing
the orders of government, and the people as little in obeying their
requisitions; for the magistrates being delivered from immediate danger
had relapsed into that apathy which had long pervaded every department
of the body politic. There were 20,000 carts in Alentejo, and yet,
when Lord Wellington was on that frontier, it was with difficulty that
600 could be procured for the service of the army. The institutions of
the country were excellent; but government could not enforce the laws,
and the magistrates would not: the British were the only persons who
observed them, and by that observance, subjected themselves to serious
inconvenience; they depended upon the civil magistrate, who neglected
his duty, and they were then left to shift for themselves. To prevent
this evil, a waggon train was now attached to the British commissariat,
and upwards of 600 carts, each capable of carrying eight hundred
weight, and upon a better construction than the primitive carts of
the country, were built at Lisbon, Porto, and Almeida. To this latter
place the battering train was conveyed towards the close of November;
and when relying upon Lord Wellington’s comparative weakness, and the
improbability of his attempting any serious operation at that season,
Marmont had detached Montbrun to the eastern coast, and Dorsenne
had ordered two other divisions to Asturias and the Montaña: the
allied troops began to make fascines and gabions at their respective
head-quarters on the 27th of December; and the 6th of January was fixed
for the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo.
♦1812.
JANUARY.♦
The time of year, and the exhausted state of the country, contributed
to deceive the French: they did not suppose that Lord Wellington would,
in the depth of winter, undertake an operation of such importance,
nor that his army could long endure the privations to which they must
be exposed. Every thing which could serve for the support of man or
beast had been consumed for miles and miles around; and on that part
of the frontier there was little grain at any time, the tract for corn
commencing at Salamanca and its neighbourhood, where the enemy were
cantoned. The allied troops were four days together without bread; and
the officers purchased it at the rate of three shillings the quartern
loaf, and at one time five. The horses, though hardy as if they had
never stood in a stable, and rough as if never groom had laid his hand
upon their coats, began to fail; all the straw having been consumed,
they had nothing to subsist on except coarse long grass pulled up from
under the trees, and so thoroughly sun-dried that little nourishment
was left in it. Because of this scarcity, the three brigades of cavalry
took the outpost duty in rotation, ... and the regiments lost about
fifty horses each by starvation.
A heavy rain fell on the first night of the new year; and the weather
continued so inclement till the fifth, that the investment was
necessarily deferred till two days later than the time originally
fixed. General Mackinnon’s brigade marching from Aldea da Ponte to
Robledo, six-and-twenty miles through a continued oak forest, had in
many places to make their way knee-deep in snow; between 300 and 400
men were left on the road, of whom some died on the march, several
afterwards of fatigue. There was no camp-equipage with the army,
nor cover near the town; the troops were therefore cantoned in the
nearest villages, and it was regulated, that the light, first, and
third divisions, should alternately take the duties of the siege, each
remaining four-and-twenty hours on the ground.
♦CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
Ciudad Rodrigo stands in the middle of a plain some sixteen miles in
circumference, surrounded by hills, which rise gradually, ridge behind
ridge above each other on every side, far as the eye can reach. From
those heights, at a distance of ten or twelve miles, the movement of
the British army might be perceived; but the enemy seem at this time
to have exercised no vigilance, and voluntary information was never
given them by the Spaniards. The city is on a rising ground, on the
right bank of the Agueda, which in that part of its course forms many
little islets. The citadel standing on a high mount has been likened,
for its situation, to Windsor Castle. The works were old, and in many
respects faulty; and the suburbs, which are about three hundred yards
from the town on the west, had no other defence, at the time of the
former siege, than a bad earthen intrenchment hastily thrown up; but
the French had made strong posts of three convents, one in the centre
of the suburbs, and one on either flank; and they had converted another
convent just beyond the glacis on the north-west angle of the place
into an infantry post. Being thus supported, the works of the suburbs,
bad as they were, were thought fully capable of resisting a ♦COLONEL
JONES’S JOURNAL OF THE SIEGE, PP. 82–3.♦ _coup de main_. The ground is
every where flat and rocky except on the north, where there are two
pieces of rising ground, one at the distance of six hundred yards from
the works, being about thirteen feet higher than the ramparts, the
other at less than a third of that distance, nearly on a level with
them: the soil here is very stony, and in the winter season water rises
at the depth of half a foot below the surface. The enemy had provided
against an attack on this side, by erecting a redoubt upon the higher
ground, which was supported by two guns, and a howitzer in battery on
the fortified convent of S. Francisco at four hundred yards distance;
and a large proportion of the artillery of the place was in battery to
fire upon the approach from the hill.
On this side, however, it was deemed advisable to make the attack,
because of the difficulty of cutting trenches in a rocky soil, and the
fear of delay in winning the suburbs, ... the garrison being sure of
relief if they could gain even but a little time. On this side, too,
it was known, by Massena’s attack, that the walls might be breached
at a distance from the glacis; whereas, on the east and south it was
doubtful, because of a fall in the ground, whether this could be done
without erecting batteries on the glacis: but here a small ravine at
the foot of the glacis and its consequent steepness, would conceal the
workmen during their operations for blowing in the counterscarp, a
circumstance which had great ♦COLONEL JONES’S JOURNAL, 84.♦ weight in
forming the plan of an attack, where not a single officer had ever seen
such an operation performed.
Time was of such importance, and such preparations had been made
before the army moved from its quarters, that ground was broken on
the very night of the investment. At nine that night, a detachment
under Lieutenant ♦A REDOUBT CARRIED.♦ Colbourne of the 52nd attacked
the redoubt on the upper _teson_ or hill. Lieutenant Thomson (of the
Royal engineers) preceded the detachment with a party of men carrying
ladders, fascines, axes, &c.: he found the palisades to be within three
feet of the counterscarp, and nearly of the same height: fascines were
immediately laid from the one to the other, by which, as by a bridge,
part of the storming party walked over. When they came to the escarpe,
which was not revêted, the men scrambled up, some of them sticking
their bayonets into the sods, and so entered the work; while another
party went round to the gorge, where there was no ditch, and forced the
gate. Only four of the garrison escaped into the town, and only three
were killed; two officers and forty-three men were made prisoners; the
loss of the assailants was six men killed, three officers and sixteen
men wounded. A lodgment was then made on the hill near the redoubt, and
with little loss, because the enemy directed their fire chiefly into
the work; and a communication was opened to it.