calculating upon intelligence which he received, that Marmont would
advance to relieve the place even before the rapid plan of operations
on which he had determined could be carried through, resolved to form
a breach, if possible, from the first batteries, and storm the place
with the counterscarp entire, if he could not wait until it should be
blown up. The weather increased the difficulties of the undertaking:
while the frost continued, men could not work through the night; and
when it broke, they who were employed in the sap worked day and night
up to their knees in water, under the declivity of a hill down which
the rain had poured. Of 250 mules attached to the light division,
fifty died in conveying ammunition to the breaches, ... destroyed by
being overworked, and by want of needful rest and sufficient food.
The garrison were encouraged, not only by the confident expectation
of relief, (for they knew Marmont was strong enough to effect it,
and could not suppose that, for want of foresight, he had disabled
himself for attempting it in time,) but also by the failure of the
allies at Badajoz, and the inferiority of our engineering department.
They omitted no means of defence, and neglected no opportunity which
presented itself. On the night, between the 13th and 14th, the convent
of ♦CONVENT OF SANTA CRUZ TAKEN.♦ Santa Cruz, in which they kept a
strong guard, was attacked and taken. From the steeple of the cathedral
which commanded the plain, and where there was always an officer on
the look-out, they noticed a careless custom, that when the division
to be relieved saw the relieving division advancing, the guards and
workmen were withdrawn from the trenches to meet it; sore weariness and
pinching cold were present and pressing evils, which made them overlook
the danger of leaving the works unguarded at such intervals. Profiting
by this, some 500 men made a sortie at the right point of time, upset
most of the gabions which during the preceding night had been placed
in advance of the ♦JANUARY 14.♦ first parallel, penetrated some of
them into the right of that parallel, and would have pushed into the
batteries and spiked the guns, had it not been for the steady conduct
of a few workmen, whom an officer of engineers collected into a body;
on the approach of part of the first division, they retired into the
town.
♦CAPTAIN ROSS KILLED.♦
Captain Ross of the engineers, one of the directors, was killed by
a chain shot from St. Francisco’s: he was brother to that excellent
officer who afterward fell at Baltimore, and was himself a man of great
professional promise, uniting with military talents, a suavity of
manners, and a gentleness of disposition, especially to be prized in a
profession where humanity is so greatly needed. His friend and comrade,
Lieutenant Skelton, was killed at the same time, and buried with him,
in the same grave, in a little retired valley, not far from the spot
where they fell. Colonel (then Captain) Jones, (to whose history of the
war, and more especially, to whose Journal of the Sieges this work is
greatly indebted,) placed a small pedestal with an inscription to mark
the grave, and with prudent as well as christian feeling, surmounted
it with a cross. That humble monument has, because of its christian
symbol, been respected; ... Spaniards have been seen kneeling there,
and none pass it without uncovering their heads.
A howitzer placed in the garden of St. Francisco’s convent so as to
enfilade one of the batteries, had caused many casualties and impeded
the progress of the work. The convent also looked into the rear of the
second parallel. Two guns which were opened upon this edifice on the
14th, at the same time that twenty-five were opened against the walls
of the place, did not drive the enemy from their advantageous post; a
party, therefore, of the 40th regiment was ordered to force into it at
dusk, and as soon as they had escaladed ♦ST. FRANCISCO’S TAKEN AND THE
SUBURBS.♦ the outer wall, the French, leaving their artillery, retired
into the town, not from the convent only, but from the suburbs, which
were immediately occupied by the 40th.
The batteries had injured the wall so much on the second day, as to
give hopes of speedily bringing it down. A fog compelled them to cease
firing on the 16th; the engineers took advantage of the cover which
the fog afforded them, and placed fifty gabions in prolongation of
the second parallel. That parallel was pushed to its proper extent on
the left in the course of the night, and the lower _teson_ crowned by
it. The sappers also broke out the head of the sap: but they could
do nothing on the hill, and but little in the sap, because of their
inexperience, and because the enemy’s artillery knocked over their
gabions, nearly as fast as they could be ♦COL. JONES’S JOURNAL OF
SIEGES, 102.♦ replaced. Yet, the assistance which the engineers derived
from the men of the third division, who had been instructed in sapping
during the summer, was invaluable, and enabled them to push the
approaches three hundred yards nearer than at the attack of Badajoz,
under a much heavier fire. An unusual length of time was nevertheless
required for throwing up the batteries, owing to the small front of
the work, against which the enemy directed an incessant fire of shell;
they fired during the siege 11,000 shells and nearly 10,000 shot upon
the approaches: their practice was remarkably accurate, and not one
shot was fired at them in return. “It was not unfrequent to have three
or four large shells in the course of an hour explode in the middle
of the parapet of a battery, each having the effect of a small mine,
and scattering the ♦COL. JONES’S JOURNAL OF SIEGES, 103.♦ earth in
every direction. In consequence of this dire destruction, the parapets
were of necessity made of a great thickness.” But on the other hand, a
confidence was felt both by the officers and men, which they had not
partaken at either of the former sieges; the officers had sufficient
means at their disposal, and the men seemed, to perceive that the
operations were differently conducted. The artillery was excellent, as
well as ample in quantity, and its effect was materially improved by a
circumstance in which accident corrected an actual defect of science.
There happened to be a considerable quantity of shot in the fortress at
Almeida, and of all calibres; when there was such want of transport for
bringing shot from the rear, it became of great importance to take as
many of these as could be made serviceable: shot of a larger size than
what are commonly employed were thus accidentally brought into use,
and some 2000 or 3000 of what are termed very high shot were brought
forward during the latter days of the ♦SIR H. DICKSON, IN SIR HOWARD
DOUGLAS’S TREATISE ON NAVAL GUNNERY, P. 84.♦ siege. The consequence
was, that because the windage was thus diminished, the firing became
so singularly correct, that every shot seemed to tell on the same part
of the wall as the preceding one; whereas, when shot of the ordinary
size were fired at the same distance, some struck high and others low,
although the pointing was carefully the same.
On the 17th, a breach had been made, and the guard in the second
parallel kept up a continued fire through the night, to prevent the
garrison from clearing it. At daylight following, a battery of seven
twenty-four pounders opened upon an old tower; and next day when this
tower had nearly been brought down, and the ♦JAN. 19.♦ main breach
appeared practicable, Lord Wellington, after a close reconnoissance,
resolved upon giving the assault at seven o’clock that evening. The
enemy were perfectly prepared; they had constructed intrenchments
on the ramparts near the breach, by means of cuts through the
_terre-plein_, perpendicular to the parapet, with a breast-work in rear
of them, to enfilade and rake the whole: so that if the assailants
gained the summit of the breach, their alternative must be either to
force the intrenchments, or get down a wall sixteen feet in depth, at
the bottom of which impediments of every kind had been arrayed.
♦THE PLACE TAKEN BY ASSAULT.♦
At dusk the columns of attack were formed, and they moved forward at
the rising of the moon: 150 sappers, under the direction of Captains
M’Leod and Thomson, royal engineers, and Captain Thompson of the
74th, advanced from the second parallel to the edge of the ditch,
each man carrying two bags filled with hay, which they threw into the
ditch, reducing its depth thus from nearly fourteen feet to eight.
Major-General Mackinnon followed close with his brigade, consisting of
the 45th, 74th, and 88th, ... the men jumped into the ditch upon the
bags; the enemy, though not yet wanting in heart, wanted the coolness
of deliberate courage: they had accumulated shells and combustibles
upon the breach, and at the foot of it, but they fired them too soon,
so that the tremendous discharge was mostly spent before the troops
reached their point of action. Ladders were instantly fixed upon the
bags; they were not sufficient in number, the breach being wide enough
for a hundred men abreast; but the short delay that this occasioned
produced no evil, for the 5th arrived from the right to take part in
the assault, and their eventual success was facilitated by the speedier
progress of the light division on the left. That division moved
simultaneously with Mackinnon’s column from behind the convent of St.
Francisco against the little ♦CRAUFURD MORTALLY WOUNDED.♦ breach, under
a heavy fire of musketry from the ramparts, by which Major-General
Craufurd, who commanded, and was considerably in front, animating
his men and leading them on, was mortally wounded. The counterscarp
here was not so deep, the breach was not obstinately defended, and no
interior defence had been prepared, so that the assailants carried it
without much difficulty, and began to form on the ramparts. Meantime
Major-General Mackinnon’s brigade, aided by the 5th, after a short but
severe struggle gained the summit of the great breach. Giving up the
breach, where first one mine was sprung and then a smaller, though
neither with much effect, the enemy retired behind a retrenchment,
where they stood their ground resolutely, and a severe contest ensued.
But Brigadier-General Pack, who had been ordered with his brigade to
make a false attack upon the southern face of the fort, converted it
into a real one; and his advanced guard under Major Lynch, following
the enemy’s troops from the advanced works into the _fausse braye_,
made prisoners of all opposed to them: and while the garrison was thus
disheartened on one side, the success of the light division on the
other took from them all hope as soon as it was known; they gave way at
once, and the retrenchment was carried. The brigade then dividing to
the right and left, General Mackinnon said to Ensign Beresford, “Come,
Beresford, you are a fine lad, we will go together!” ... these were
the last words which he was heard to utter, for presently some powder
exploded; Beresford was blown up, but fell without much injury into
the arms of Mackinnon’s aide-de-camp ♦MACKINNON KILLED.♦ Captain Call.
Mackinnon himself was among the many brave men killed by the explosion,
and in him the nation lost an officer of the highest promise in the
British army.
The enemy were now driven at the point of the bayonet into the great
square, and were pursued from house to house, till they threw down
their arms and called for quarter; and this was granted them, in the
first heat of the onslaught, when, as they afterwards confessed,
judging from what they themselves would have done, they expected
nothing else than to be massacred. The place was won about nine at
night: the troops, British and Portugueze, spread themselves all over
the town, and got at the stores; but fortunately a guard was placed in
time over the spirit-magazine, in which fifty pipes of good cogniac
were found: had the men got at these, the amount of deaths would have
been increased. It was a scene of wild disorder till daylight. The
night was miserably cold, and the men crowded into the ruined houses
to make fires: these rotten edifices soon caught the flames, and the
conflagration became dreadful. Very little booty was to be gained in a
town which the French had sacked, and which, indeed, had been deserted
before they occupied it upon their conquest; what the men found was
wholesome as well as welcome after their late hard fare, and they
were seen each carrying three or four loaves stuck upon his bayonet.
The enemy had pulled down many of the houses for firewood, and those
which were nearest the ramparts had been demolished by our guns, though
especial care had been taken to spare the town by battering it only in
breach.
The governor, General Banier, was made prisoner, with seventy-eight
officers and 1700 soldiers. Great quantities of ammunition and stores
were found, a well-filled armoury, and an arsenal abundantly supplied;
109 pieces of ordnance mounted on the ramparts; and moreover, the
battering-train of Marmont’s army, consisting of forty-four guns with
their carriages. The loss of the allies consisted of three officers
and seventy-seven men killed, twenty-four wounded and 500 during
the siege; six officers and 140 men killed, sixty and 500 ♦GENERAL
CRAUFURD.♦ wounded, in storming the breaches. Craufurd’s wound, though
severe, was not thought dangerous, but it proved fatal on the fifth
day. He had entered the army at the age of fifteen, and in the course
of two-and-thirty years few officers had seen so much or such varied
service. Early in life his abilities and professional zeal were noticed
by his then colonel, Sir Charles Stuart, than whom no man was better
qualified to appreciate them. During peace he pursued the study of his
profession in all its branches upon the continent for three years,
then went to India, and there distinguished himself in two campaigns
under Lord Cornwallis. He was employed on a military mission with
the Austrian armies during the years 1795, 1796, and 1797, and again
in 1799; was made prisoner in the ill-planned and not more happily
executed expedition against Buenos Ayres; and afterwards commanded the
light division of Sir John Moore’s army in Spain. With that miserable
retreat his course of ill fortune terminated. He joined Sir Arthur
Wellesley the day after the battle of Talavera; sustained a severe
attack from very superior numbers and in a perilous position upon the
Coa; signalized himself at Busaco; rejoined his division after a short
absence, when the troops were drawn up for action at Fuentes d’Onoro,
and was saluted by them with three cheers in presence of the enemy.
“I cannot report his death,” said Lord Wellington in his dispatch,
“without expressing my sorrow and regret that his Majesty has been
deprived of the services, and I of the assistance of an officer of
tried talents and experience, who was an ornament to his profession,
and was calculated to render the most important services to his
country.” He was buried with all military honours in the breach before
which he received his mortal wound.
♦GENERAL MACKINNON.♦
Mackinnon also had been interred in the breach which he had won; but
this was done hastily, by some pioneers under General Picton’s orders,
and the officers of the Coldstream guards, in which regiment he had
long served, removed his body to Espeja, and there deposited it with
due honours. In Craufurd the army lost one of its most experienced
officers; in Mackinnon one of the greatest promise, in whom were
united all the personal accomplishments, intellectual endowments,
and moral virtues which in their union constitute the character of a
perfect soldier. He was one of those men whom the dreadful discipline
of war renders only more considerate for others, more regardless of
themselves, more alive to the sentiments and duties of humanity. He was
born near Winchester in 1773, but his father was chief of a numerous
clan in the Hebrides. His military education was commenced in France,
his family having removed to Dauphiny because of his elder brother’s
state of health; and Buonaparte, then a military student, was a
frequent visitor at their house. It is one of the redeeming parts of
Buonaparte’s character, that he never forgot his attachment to that
family; that during the peace of Amiens he invited them to France,
where they might receive proofs of it; and that when he heard of
General Mackinnon’s death, he manifested some emotion. He entered the
army in his 15th year, served three years as a subaltern in the 43rd,
was employed at the commencement of the war in raising an independent
company, and then exchanged into the Coldstream guards. During the
Irish rebellion, he was attached to the staff as major of brigade to
Sir George Nugent; and distinguishing himself greatly in that horrible
service, was distinguished also for his humanity. He was in the
expedition to the Helder, volunteered to Egypt, and was at the siege of
Copenhagen. In 1809 he joined the army in Portugal, was at the passage
of the Douro, and had two horses killed under him at Talavera; how ably
he conducted himself when left in the charge of the wounded after that
action has been related in its proper place. At Busaco he displayed
so much skill and promptitude, that Sir Arthur, immediately after the
battle, returned him thanks in person. He distinguished himself also
on many occasions during Massena’s retreat, and led that last charge
against the French at Fuentes d’Onoro which drove them finally from the
ground. The unwholesome heat in the vicinity of Badajoz induced some
recurrence of a disease with which he had been attacked in Egypt, and
he returned for a few weeks to England there to recruit his health. In
1804 he had married a daughter of Sir John Call: she planted in his
garden a laurel for every action in which her husband was engaged;
and when in his last visit she took him into the walk where they were
flourishing, he said to her, that she would one day have to plant a
cypress at the end. Perhaps this country has never sustained so great a
loss since the death of Sir Philip Sidney.
♦MARMONT’S MOVEMENTS DURING THE SIEGE.♦
Without delay the approaches were destroyed and the works repaired.
On the 27th the place had been again rendered defensible. Marmont
was at Toledo when he received the first tidings of its investment.
Hastening to Valladolid, he stated in his dispatches to France on the
16th, that he had collected five divisions for the purpose of throwing
supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo, but finding that force inadequate, he
had been fain to recall two divisions from the army of the north:
with these he should have 60,000 men, and events might then be looked
for as momentous in their results as they would be glorious for the
French arms. Massena had been a month in reducing that fortress; the
calculation was, that it might hold out against a regular siege,
to which there should be no interruption from without, four or
five-and-twenty days; Marmont expected to be in good time if he came to
its relief on the 29th; ... but his army was not collected at Salamanca
till the 24th; and when he announced to his own government the loss of
the place, in which he said there was something so incomprehensible
that he would not allow himself to make any observation upon it, it
was too late to make any movement for its recovery. The weather,
which had so often been unfavourable to the allies, favoured them on
this occasion; heavy rains, which cut off their communications, and
which would have rendered it impossible to fill in the trenches and
close the breaches, did not commence till four days after the place
had been rendered secure against a sudden attack; and Marmont, whose
battering-train had been captured with it, could attempt nothing more.
Castaños was present at the siege, and to him as Captain-General of
that province the place was given up. Before its capture, the Alcaldes
of 230 _pueblos_ had repaired to his head-quarters, to testify their
own fidelity and that of their respective communities. Lord Wellington
bore testimony in his dispatches as well to the loyalty and general
good-will of the Spaniards in those parts, as to the assistance he had
derived from Brigadier Alava; and from Julian Sanchez and D. Carlos
de España, who with their two bands had watched the enemy on the
other side the Tormes. A thanksgiving-service for the reconquest was
performed with all solemnity at Cadiz; and the Cortes, in conformity
with the proposal of the Regency, conferred upon Lord Wellington ♦LORD
WELLINGTON MADE DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦ the rank of a Grandee of the
first class, and the title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. The tidings
could not have been more unexpected by Buonaparte himself, than it was
by the opponents of administration in England. At the commencement of
the session, they, in their old tone of dismay, had repeated their
denunciations of discomfiture and utter failure: ministers were again
arraigned by them for their obstinate blindness, ... for their wanton
waste of money and of the public strength, and for persisting in
flattering and fallacious language when they had brought the nation
to the very brink of ruin! Sir ♦SPEECHES OF SIR F. BURDETT AND MR.
WHITBREAD.♦ Francis Burdett said, that whatever had been done by
England for the rights of the King of Spain (who had resigned his whole
pretensions to Buonaparte), nothing had been done for the Spanish
people; that even if the cause of Spain had been honourably undertaken
by the British government, it had now become perfectly hopeless; our
victories were altogether barren, and the French were making regular
and rapid strides towards the subjugation of the Peninsula: but
these evils, he said, arose from the system of corruption which an
oligarchy of boroughmongers had established; and as things now were,
the progress of France was more favourable to liberty than the success
of England would be! With more curious infelicity in his croakings,
Mr. Whitbread observed, that Lord Wellington after pursuing Massena
to the frontiers had been obliged to fall back; that his attempt upon
Ciudad Rodrigo had proved abortive; that every thing which we could
do for Spain had already been done; and though the first general of
the age and the bravest troops in the world had been sent to her
assistance, nothing had been accomplished, and, in short, the French
were in military possession of Spain. A month had not elapsed after
the delivery of these opinions, ♦VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD WELLINGTON.
HE IS CREATED AN EARL.♦ before the thanks of Parliament were voted to
Lord Wellington for the recovery of Ciudad Rodrigo, he was created
an Earl of the United Kingdom, and an additional annuity of 2000_l._
granted to him in consideration of his signal services. In the course
of the debate, Mr. Canning took occasion to state that a revenue of
5000_l._ a year had been granted to Lord Wellington by the Portugueze
government when they conferred upon him the title of Conde de Vimeiro;
that as Captain-General of Spain, 5000_l._ a year had been offered him,
and 7000_l._ as Marshal in the Portugueze service; all which he had
declined, saying, he would receive nothing from Spain and Portugal in
their present state; he had only done his duty to his country, and to
his country alone he would look for reward.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ.♦
The Earl of Wellington was already preparing for a more arduous siege.
Eighteen 24-pounders had been reserved at Lisbon for this service, when
the battering-train intended for Ciudad Rodrigo was sent from the Tagus
to the Douro. These, with some iron guns which the Russian fleet had
left there, and with the engineers’ stores, were embarked at Lisbon in
large vessels, as if for some remote destination, then transhipped at
sea into smaller craft, and conveyed up the Sadam to Alcacere do Sal.
Fascines and gabions were prepared at Elvas. The line of supply was
changed from the Douro to the Tagus; and as the Beira frontier must
for awhile be left open to the enemy’s incursions, directions were
given for forming a temporary depôt at Celorico, the nearest point
where it could be deemed safe, and a grand magazine beyond the Douro.
Ciudad Rodrigo was in some degree provisioned, as well as rendered
thoroughly defensible against any attack that the French had means of
making; and the troops were then put in motion, glad to remove from
an exhausted country, where the labour of procuring forage amounted
to constant occupation for the cavalry, none being to be found except
the straw which the peasants had reserved and endeavoured to conceal,
as the only subsistence left for their remaining cattle. Corn was so
scarce that the very few officers who could afford such an expenditure
paid the enormous price of fourteen dollars the _fanega_ for it, in
prudence, as well as in mercy to their beasts; and the owner, loading
his horse with his own precious provender, performed the march himself
on foot. One division of infantry remained on the Agueda, covered by
a few cavalry posts. The main body proceeding by rapid marches to
the Tagus crossed it, some at Abrantes, some at Villa Velha. Lord
Wellington having completed his arrangements at Ciudad Rodrigo, and
given it finally over to the Spaniards, set out for Alemtejo on the
5th of March, and on the 11th his head-quarters were fixed at Elvas.
On the 16th, the preparations being completed, a pontoon bridge was
thrown across the Guadiana about a league below Badajoz; and the light,
3rd, and 4th divisions, under Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard, Generals
Picton and Colville, crossed and invested the place without opposition.
General Graham, with the 1st, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and
Generals Slade and Le Marchant’s brigades of cavalry, advanced to Los
Santos, Zafra, and Llerena, to oppose any movements on the part of
Marshal Soult; while Sir Rowland Hill with the 2nd division, General
Hamilton’s Portugueze division, and a brigade of cavalry, moved from
their cantonments near Alburquerque to Merida and Almendralejo, thus
interposing between Soult and Marmont, if the latter should march from
Salamanca with the intention of forming a junction as in the preceding
year.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR ITS DEFENCE.♦
The governor, G. Baron Philippon, had obtained intelligence from his
spies of the preparations which were making at Elvas, and had apprised
Soult accordingly that there was probably an intention of again
besieging Badajoz; but it was not till the day before Lord Wellington
arrived at Elvas that he knew a battering-train had been collected
there, and that the allies were concentrating their forces near the
Alemtejo frontier. He had before this applied for a supply of powder
and shells, a convoy of which was twice sent from Seville, and twice
by Sir Rowland Hill’s movements forced to put back, though the Comte
d’Erlon, General Drouet, had been charged to protect it. The place had
been greatly strengthened since the last unsuccessful siege, especially
on the side which had then been attacked. Upon the spot where the
allies had planted their breaching-battery against Fort St. Christoval,
a lunette had been constructed by Marshal Soult’s orders: its ditches
were cut in the rock to the depth of 14½ feet below the _Berme_: a
powder-magazine and a bomb-proof for fifty men had been constructed
there, and every means taken for securing it against a _coup-de-main_.
The Tête-de-Pont also had been strengthened, and its communication with
Fort St. Christoval repaired, so that on that side the place presented
a most formidable appearance. The Pardaleras too had been repaired
and strengthened, and magazines established in the castle, into which,
and into the citadel, it was the governor’s intention to retire if
the place should be rendered no longer tenable. The enemy had also
formed galleries and trenches at each salient of the counterscarp in
front of what they supposed would be the point of attack, that they
might form mines under the breaching-batteries, and afterwards sink
shafts for other mines, whereby to destroy the works in proportion as
the assailants should gain them, and thus leave only a heap of ruins
if the place should be taken. No foresight indeed had been wanting on
the governor’s part. The peasantry having taken flight at the first
siege and left their lands uncultivated, he had given directions for
ploughing them with the oxen which were intended for slaughter, and
they were sown by the soldiers within a circle of 3,000 yards: the
kitchen gardens had also been distributed among the different corps
and the officers of the staff, and in these they had a valuable
resource. Wood was wanting for blinds and for palisades, for these
had been almost wholly destroyed during the former siege: they had no
means of transport for it, and it could only have been procured from
a dangerous distance: to make charcoal, they were fain to dig up the
root of olive-trees which had been burnt. A convoy of some threescore
mules laden with flour arrived a few days before the investment, when
the garrison had about five weeks’ provisions in store. The miserable
townspeople were worse provided: most of those who could remove without
exposing themselves to extreme distress had left the city before it was
first attacked; others forsook it now, who had experienced the horrors
of two former sieges, ... old men, women, and children, carrying what
little had been left them, were on the road in every direction, flying
from a renewal of these horrors. The population was reduced from 16,000
to little more than a fourth of that number, who thought better to
abide the worst where they had a place wherein to lay their heads, than
to perish as wanderers.
Though the allied army had now no want of means as in the former siege,
they had no miners, nor was there any person there who had ever seen
such duty performed; the sappers too had had very little experience.
The only course which could be pursued was to batter from a distance
the Trinidad bastion where the counterguard in its front had not been
finished: this could be done from the hill on which the Picurina
redoubt stands; and that redoubt must be carried and connected with the
first parallel. The plan was so hazardous, and so little according to
rule, that “it never was for a moment ♦COLONEL JONES’S JOURNALS, 298.♦
approved by any one employed in drawing it up, or in the execution of
it.” No one doubted its success more than Lord Wellington himself; but
it was deemed necessary to reduce Badajoz, and there was no chance of
reducing it by any other course.
♦SIEGE OF BADAJOZ.♦
On the night of the 16th the besiegers broke ground during a storm of
wind, with heavy and uninterrupted rain. It was so dark that nothing
could be seen by the enemy, and the tempest prevented them from hearing
the working parties, who under these favourable circumstances were not
discovered till daylight, although only 160 yards from the covered way
of the fort. The ensuing night also was well employed. The weather
continued so rainy that the trenches were knee-deep in mud and water.
Had the soil been heavier, it would not have been possible to bring up
the heavy artillery; manual assistance, as well as sixteen bullocks,
being required to draw along each piece. It was a severe service for
the three divisions, who had to go through more than double the work
which had occupied four at Ciudad Rodrigo; and their tents were far
from being proof against such rain. On the 18th the garrison made a
sally with 1500 infantry and forty horse: they formed unobserved in the
communication from the lunette S. Roque to the Picurina, then pushed
forward, and were in the parallel before the workmen could stand to
their arms; at the same moment the cavalry came round the right flank
of the parallel at a hand gallop, and were presently in the depôts,
a thousand yards in the rear of the trenches. There they made great
confusion among the unarmed men, but retired on the appearance of
troops before they could destroy any thing. They took two or three
officers prisoners, tied them to their saddles, and cantered off with
them some hundred yards, but on their falling from fatigue let them go.
The infantry meantime filled in a small part of the parallel before
the coverers came to the relief of the working parties: they were then
driven back in great confusion, carrying off about 200 intrenching
tools. But this sortie cost the allies about 150 men in killed and
wounded; the commanding engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, being
among the latter.
The weather, which had at first covered the operations of the allies,
continued now so rainy as to impede them: the trenches were filled with
water, and there was no possibility of draining them, the ground being
a dead level; it was necessary to empty them and make an artificial
bottom of fascines. On the 21st the enemy advanced two field-pieces on
the right of the Guadiana to enfilade the parallel: such an intention
having been apprehended on the preceding day, the parallel had been
thrown back during the night; these guns, therefore, did little
mischief, and they were compelled to withdraw them by a few riflemen
posted on the banks of the river. But on the following night they
threw up cover for three field-pieces there, brought them out soon
after daybreak, and kept up a very destructive fire throughout the
day, their shot pitching into the parallel at a range of 1400 yards.
The inconvenience of having left the place open on that side was then
felt, and the 5th division was ordered from Campo-mayor to invest it.
That evening the trenches were again filled by one of those showers in
which the rain seems rather to pour down in streams than to fall in
drops: the pontoon bridge was carried away by the rise of the Guadiana,
and the current of that river became so rapid that the flying bridges
could with difficulty work: it became doubtful, therefore, whether the
army could be supplied with provisions, and whether guns and ammunition
could be brought over for the attack; and it began to be seriously
apprehended, that if the weather continued thus to favour the enemy the
siege must be raised.
An immediate improvement relieved that apprehension: the trenches
were rendered passable during the night; the morning was fine: it was
apparent that the enemy had mistaken the intended point of attack, for
they had large parties employed in strengthening places against which
nothing was designed: the batteries were so advanced that there seemed
no doubt of their opening on the morrow, when at three in the afternoon
the skies again began to pour down; every part of the trenches was
again filled with rain: no advance could be made next day, the ground
being so completely saturated that the water stood everywhere in pools,
... the earth was too wet to retain any form, the revetements of the
batteries fell, no solid foundation upon which to lay the platforms
could be obtained, and the guns could not be brought across the fields.
But on the following afternoon the weather became fine; the batteries
were completed in the course of the night; they opened on the forenoon
of the 25th; and being now secured by a good parallel, and the
batteries enfilading all the faces and flanks of the place which bore
on Fort Picurina, it was determined to assault that fort that night.
The enemy, as soon as they perceived what point was immediately
threatened, took every means for strengthening it, and abandoning
their works on the right bank deepened the ditch of the Picurina,
and strengthened the gorge with a second row of palisades: they also
formed galleries communicating with each other, and brought a reverse
fire to flank the ditches. Under the three angles of the glacis they
placed fougasses, and arranged upon the parapets loaded shells and
barrels of combustibles, which were to be rolled among the assailants
at the moment of assault; and that each man might have several pieces
to discharge, 200 loaded muskets were ranged along the interior crest
of the parapet. With these preparations the governor calculated upon
a good defence. Six batteries played upon the fort and the town, and
were answered from a greater number of guns: the Portugueze gunners
stood to their cannon with as much coolness, and directed them with as
much precision, as the British: it was impossible to say whether the
guns of the besiegers or of the besieged were best served, and this
uninterrupted roar of artillery was continued till sunset with great
destruction on both sides. Captain Mulcaster of the engineers, an
officer of great ability, was killed in the parallel by a cannon-shot.
Major-General Kempt, who commanded in the trenches, directed the
assault of the fort. Two detachments of 200 men each were formed in
the parallel: both were to quit it at the same time by signal; the one
under Lieutenant Stanway, on the extreme left, to move round the right
flank of the work and endeavour to force the gorge; the other under
Lieutenant Gipps, from an opening about the middle of the parallel, to
move direct upon the communication from the town to the fort, leave
100 men there to prevent succour from being sent, and with the other
hundred to march upon the work with the twofold purpose, of aiding the
left detachment in forcing the gorge, and of preventing the garrison
from escaping. Another 100 men under Captain Holloway, R. E., were
formed in one of the batteries to assist the others by a front attack,
if they should find much difficulty in forcing in at the gorge. About
ten o’clock the signal was made: the left party reached the gorge
undiscovered; but when they attempted to cut down and force over the
palisades, so heavy a fire of musketry was opened upon them that none
could effect it. That half of the right detachment which proceeded
to the gorge was received also with such a fire, that their attempts
to get over the palisade were fruitless: instead of persevering in
the desperate endeavour, they drew round to the left flank of the
work where the ditch was not flanked, fixed their ladders against the
escarpe, and were presently on the top of the parapet overlooking the
enemy, who defended the rear: at the same moment Captain Holloway’s
party from the battery forced in at the salient angle, ... but both
that officer and Lieutenant Gipps were wounded. The garrison seeing
the assailants within the works ran into a guard-house, and there
barricadoed themselves: the troops were not prepared to dislodge
them; they had lost their leaders; and while they were uncertain how
to proceed, a report arose that a large detachment was coming from
the town to relieve the fort. It seemed in their confusion as if they
were on the point of abandoning the place; and the garrison supposing
this to be the case, came out of the guard-house. But at that critical
moment General Kempt by great exertions restored their confidence:
they turned upon the enemy, and of the 300 who composed the garrison
scarcely any escaped. They fought resolutely to the very last, their
officer setting them a brave example: several threw themselves into the
water and were drowned, about 70 only were made prisoners. The loss of
the assailants was greater: four officers and 50 men were killed, 15
officers and 250 men wounded. It was found, upon inspecting the fort,
that the batteries had done very little to facilitate its capture; and
the engineers said, that had they been aware how little it was injured,
they would not have recommended the escalade so soon. The advantage
which had been gained was of great importance; but those successes are
dangerous in their consequences, as well as dearly bought at the time,
in which courage performs what ought to be the effect of skill.
The enemy, who undervalued the skill of our engineers, and had such
an opinion of British valour that they thought nothing too rash or
too desperate for it to undertake, supposed that a general assault
was intended. And about the time when the Picurina had been carried,
the alarm-bell rang in the town, rockets were thrown up, and a random
fire of musketry and cannon was opened from every part of the works.
Presently, the alarm of a sortie was given by a drum beating in the
lunette of S. Roque; the guard of the trenches commenced a heavy fire,
this occasioned a heavier firing from the town, which again increased
that from the trenches, and it was not till long after midnight that
the vain alarm on both sides subsided. It had not been without some
cause; a battalion had been ordered out to succour the fort, but so
late as to sustain a heavy fire from it, which compelled them to retire
with the loss of twenty men. A lodgement was then formed on the
_terre-plein_ of the fort, which lodgement was knocked to pieces in the
course of the following day, by a constant and very heavy fire from
the town; but before night the sappers completed a fresh one. Other
batteries were now constructed, and the enemy then perceiving that the
Trinidad and Santa Maria bastions were the objects of attack, used all
possible means for strengthening them.
The enemy imputed the loss of the Picurina to the misconduct of its
garrison; the captain of artillery had been wounded in the course of
the day, and relieved by one who was thought not to have shown equal
courage: no use had been made of the loaded shells and combustibles;
but if the fort had been well defended, the governor thought the
allies would have failed, as they did in their assault during the
former siege. A singular stratagem was now practised by the commanding
officer of the engineers, Colonel Lamarre, which, if accident had not
frustrated it, would have cost the allies dear. Captain Ellicombe,
going at dusk to adjust the lines of direction of the sap for the
night, found those returns which were already begun, in a good line,
clear of enfilade, but that which was marked by the white line and
not yet commenced, fell in the direct enfilade of three guns: this he
mentioned as a lucky discovery, and it was supposed to have been the
effect of accident, the line it was thought having, at the time of
laying it down, caught unobserved in the dark against some stone or
bush. But it was afterwards ascertained that a soldier had been sent
out from the place just as evening closed, to remove it, and bring it
directly under fire.
It was against the lunette of S. Roque that these works were intended;
could the enemy be driven thence, a dam which retained the waters of
an inundation might be broken down, and the works might then be pushed
much nearer to the place. More skill and more courage could not have
been displayed than were manifested by the garrison, animated as they
were by former success, and by the expectation of being speedily
relieved. On the other hand, Lord Wellington was not without cause to
apprehend that a second battle of Albuhera might be to be fought. On
the 30th of March it was understood that Soult was advancing, and the
5th division was therefore withdrawn from before St. Christoval and
marched to the front, some Portugueze cavalry being stationed to watch
the town on that side. Two breaching batteries opened next day on the
Trinidad bastion, but these produced no considerable effect, and the
sappers had made little progress against ♦APRIL 4.♦ S. Roque’s, when
Marshal Soult advanced to Llerena. It was then intended to leave ten
thousand men for guarding the trenches, and to give him battle with
the remainder of the army: the covering army was about to fall back on
Talavera la Real. But at noon on the 5th, Lord Wellington reconnoitred
the trenches and thought they might immediately be assaulted: in the
afternoon he determined to defer the assault till the following day,
and meantime endeavour to break the curtain between the Trinidad
counterguard and an unfinished ravelin. Fourteen guns opened upon
♦APRIL 6.♦ this curtain at daylight; in two hours the walls were
brought down, and by four so practicable a breach, as it appeared,
was formed, that the assault was ordered for ten o’clock that night.
The attack was to be at three points: that of the castle by escalade;
those of the Trinidad and S. Maria bastions by storming the breaches.
The castle was to be assailed by the 3rd division under Major-General
Picton; La Trinidad by the 4th under Major-General Colville, and Santa
Maria by the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard. At the same time,
S. Roque’s was to be assaulted by a party from the trenches, and the
5th division to alarm the enemy by threatening the Pardaleras and the
works towards the Guadiana.
Meantime the French were indefatigable in preparing for defence. They
imputed it as a gross fault to the British engineers that they had not
destroyed the counterscarps, an operation which there was no time for
performing, even if it had been possible to perform it without men more
accustomed to such labours than any in the allied army: but because
this had been impossible, the enemy were enabled to form at the foot
of their counterscarps, and behind the breaches the most formidable
obstructions which destructive ingenuity could devise. Night and day
they were employed in clearing away the rubbish, destroying the ramps
of the covered way, and making retrenchments behind the trenches. The
fallen parapets were replaced with fascines, sandbags, and wool-packs;
casks filled with tarred straw, powder, and loaded grenades, were
arranged along the trenches, and large shells with them. Immediately
in front of the breaches at the foot of the counterscarp, sixty
fourteen-inch shells were placed in a circular form, about four yards
apart, and covered with some four inches of earth, and a communication
formed to them with powder hoses placed between tiles in the manner of
mine-tubes. _Chevaux-de-frise_ were formed of sabre blades; ... all the
artillery stores were turned to account; even a large boat was lowered
into the ditch and filled with soldiers to flank one of the breaches,
where it was of great use.
An extraordinary circumstance, which might be called accidental,
contributed greatly to the terrible effect of these formidable
preparations. The Spaniards at some former time intending to have
strengthened Badajoz, had commenced their improvements, as usual with
them, upon a great scale, and, as usual also, left them unfinished.
Thus they had so greatly widened the ditch as to include within it the
covered way and part of the glacis of the original trace; designing
to build a ravelin to this front, this old glacis and covered way in
the space which was to be occupied by that work were not removed, and
they remained in the ditch like an ill-shapen rock. The interior of
this being the old counterscarp, the front of it, where it had been cut
down to admit of building the new one, was very steep and difficult of
ascent. The light and 4th divisions, at the hour appointed, entered the
covered way without difficulty; bags of hay were then thrown down, and
ladders placed down the counterscarp: they descended readily, and the
ditch was presently filled with men. The 4th division, which was on the
right, mistook these old works in the ditch for the breach, cheered
each other up, and mounted with alacrity; but when they had reached the
summit they found themselves there exposed to the fire of the whole
front, with a difficult descent before them, the space between them
and the foot of the breaches appearing like a deep ditch; there were
in reality very deep excavations in many parts of it, sufficiently
extensive to prevent an indiscriminate rush forwards: and water had
been introduced along the counterscarp, by means of which all approach
to the breach either in the face or curtain was precluded, except by
passing over the seeming rock, between which and the foot of the breach
the space was so restricted that a body of men could advance in only a
very small front. The night was very dark, and this it was felt would
render any confusion irremediable; but confusion presently arose, for
the engineer who led the light division was killed before he got to
the ditch, and being the only person who knew the way to the breach
which they were to have assaulted, they were directed too much to the
right, and got upon the same summit where the 4th stood hesitating
and perplexed, and thus the confusion was increased, and both crowded
towards the great breach, instead of taking each its own. They had
only five or six ladders to descend by, which could take only four at
once, and this close under the main force of the garrison, selected and
placed there as at the post of danger, and most of them having three
spare muskets, with people to load them in the rear as fast as they
could be discharged. The assailants were so thickly crowded on the
glacis and in the ditch, that it was not necessary to aim at them; but
fire-balls were cast among them, which effected the double mischief
of increasing their confusion, and rendering all their movements as
distinctly visible as if it had been noon-day; the oldest soldiers
declared that they had never before been exposed to so rapid and
murderous a fire. Major-General Colville fell among the first, severely
wounded in the thigh, ... the last sound which he heard before he
fainted was the voice of Captain Nicholas of the engineers, exhorting
his men in the ditch. That young and excellent officer, whose charge
it was to lead the 4th division to the breach, after twice essaying
to reach the top, fell wounded by a musket which grazed his knee-pan,
a bayonet thrust in the great muscle of his right leg, his left arm
broken, and his wrist wounded by musket-shot; ... yet, in that state,
seeing his old friends and comrades, Colonel Macleod and Captain James,
fall, and hearing the men ask who should lead them to the third onset,
he rallied, and ordered two of his men to bear him up in their arms.
Two brave fellows attempted this most perilous service; they had just
reached the top when one of them was killed, and at the same moment,
Nicholas received a musket-ball, which passed through the chest,
breaking two of his ribs upon the way, upon which he fell from the top
to the bottom of the breach mortally hurt, and receiving further injury
from bruises in his fall.
Never were brave men exposed to slaughter under more frightful
circumstances. The breach would not admit of more than fifteen abreast:
the assailants repeatedly reached the summit, though the slope was
covered with planks full of spikes. There they found the entrance
closed with _chevaux-de-frise_ which it was neither possible to break
down nor to cut away, nor to get over. Many gashed their hands in
attempting to pull them down at the muzzle of the enemy’s muskets, from
which a new species of shot, which the soldiers called musket-grape,
was poured in upon them in one continuous discharge; ... it consisted
of slugs fastened together, and resembled grape-shot in miniature.
Under this incessant fire, shells, hand-grenades, bags of powder, and
every destructive form of missile or combustible that ingenuity could
invent, were hurled into the ditch. Gunpowder, it is said, had never,
since the hour of its discovery, been employed with more terrific and
terrible effect. The explosions frequently created a light more vivid
than broad day, which for a moment was succeeded by utter darkness, ...
and then again the whole ground seemed to be vomiting fire under their
feet and every where around them, while they had no possible means
either of defending themselves or of retaliating. The officers led
their men so close to the enemy’s guns, that they felt the wadding as
well as the ball; when one fell another took his place; but as it had
been impossible to recover from the first confusion, the men could not
be moved like a machine in collective strength; individual efforts were
all that could be made, and these, though made with devoted courage,
were necessarily vain, the best and bravest putting themselves
forward, and sacrificing themselves; till at length the troops, knowing
it hopeless to make any farther effort, and yet too high spirited to
retreat, stood patiently in the ditch to be slaughtered. It was not
till more than two hours after the commencement of this carnage, that
Lord Wellington, being made acquainted with their situation, ordered
these two divisions to be withdrawn and to be formed a little before
daylight for a fresh assault. He might well indeed conclude, that
after the blood which had already been shed there, success was to be
purchased at any cost; and certainly there would have been much more
chance of success in the second attempt than in the first, when it
might be made in good order, and when the enemy’s trains had been
fired, and their combustible preparations expended.
This might probably have been his determination, if no advantage
had been obtained in any other part; but immediately before he gave
this order, he received intelligence, that the 3rd division was in
possession of the castle. Major-General Kempt, who led this attack, was
wounded in crossing the river Rivellas below the inundation, a fire
having been opened upon them from the whole of the eastern works, as
soon as they reached that stream. It was General Philippon’s intention,
if the breaches should be forced, to retire into the castle, which had
the strength of a citadel: with this and the _tête-du-pont_, and Fort
Christoval, he might yet have held out some days, and give time thereby
for those movements which he supposed would again be made for his
relief. With this view he had strengthened and stored it; all its gates
had been built up, and the ramparts were covered with large Spanish
shells, stones, beams, and whatever could be thrown upon the heads
of the assailants. By means of these preparations, a most obstinate
resistance was opposed to the escalade, and for a considerable time all
who attempted to rear the ladders were destroyed. At length an entrance
was forced up one ladder at an embrasure; the defence immediately
slackened, and other ladders were quickly reared, with that alacrity
which the feeling of success inspires. An officer of the German Legion,
Girsewald by name, who was remarkable for his bodily strength, was one
of the first who mounted. A French soldier fired at and missed him,
then made a thrust with the bayonet; Girsewald, with his left hand,
parried the bayonet and seized it, and held it so firmly, that the
exertions which the Frenchman made for recovering his weapon, assisted
him in mounting, till he got high enough to aim a blow in his turn,
with which he severed his antagonist’s head from his shoulders. A false
report having been made to Philippon that one of the bastions had been
entered by the assailants, the falsehood of that intelligence made him
doubt and hesitate when he heard they were escalading the castle. Two
companies which he intended to order thither, by some mistake either in
giving or understanding the order, went to the breaches instead, where
they were not wanted; and four others, which took the right direction,
arrived too late: the castle had been taken; they were received by a
heavy fire of musketry, and dispersed with loss. One of the last shots
which were fired struck Girsewald on the knee; he would not let the
limb be amputated, and therefore the wound proved fatal.
The 5th division were not less successful, though the party with the
scaling ladders lost their way, and Lieutenant-General Leith could not,
in consequence, move till it was after eleven o’clock. The bastion
of S. Vicente which he attacked was fully prepared for defence, and
the troops were discovered when on the glacis; yet they forced in
by escalade. Major-General Walker then advanced along the ramparts
to fall on the rear of the enemy who were defending the breaches;
the troops, when driving the French before them, were opposed by a
single field-piece placed on the _terre-plein_ of the curtain; the
gunner lighted a port fire as they approached: at the sudden blaze of
light, one who was among the foremost in pursuit cried out “A mine!”
That fearful word ran through the line of pursuers; the very men who
had so bravely won the bastion, as if their nature had been suddenly
changed, took panic, and in spite of their general’s efforts, who was
severely wounded while endeavouring to rally them, were driven back by
the bayonet to the place whereat they had entered: but by this time
the reserve had formed there, the pursuers in their turn were checked,
and the British marched immediately to the breaches, from which the
defenders then dispersed, seeing that all was lost. This attack might
have been spared if any signals had been agreed upon by which Picton’s
success should have been made known; for want of such concertment,
General Leith’s attack was made after the escalade had succeeded;
he met with the same opposition as if the fate of the place had not
been decided in another quarter, ♦COL. JONES’S SIEGES, 303.♦ and thus
Badajoz may be said to have been twice carried that night. Philippon
with his staff retired into Fort Christoval, and surrendered in the
morning.
The place was plundered during the remainder of the night and on the
following day, nor could order be restored till the day afterwards.
The doors were forced by firing through the locks, and most of the
inhabitants had placed a table immediately in the entrance of their
houses, with a candle and a bottle of brandy, supposing that this
would content the soldiers: the consequence was that, excited as they
already were, they became half mad with the fiery spirit. But whatever
excesses they committed, their excitement took the form of good
fellowship toward their defeated enemies; and they were seen walking
about with the French soldiers, arm in arm, inviting them to drink, and
taking every care of them. As soon as fresh troops could be brought
up from the corps of observation, they were marched in, and order was
then restored. 59 officers and 744 men were killed on the night of the
assault; 258 officers wounded and 2600 men; the total number of killed
and wounded during the siege was 5000. The garrison consisted of nearly
5000, of whom about 3500 were made prisoners.
♦SOULT ADVANCES TO RELIEVE THE PLACE, ... AND RETREATS.♦
On this occasion the French Marshals had been less alert than during
the former siege, and they had not acted so well in concert. Marshal
Soult left Seville on the 1st, with all the force he could collect. On
the 4th he reached Llerena; and having arrived at Villa-Franca, two
marches only from Badajoz, on the 8th, he there learned that the city
had been taken on the night of the 6th. The inhabitants reported, that
his chagrin at this intelligence was manifested in fits of intemperate
anger, and that he broke nearly all the plates and dishes within his
reach. Before daylight he commenced his retreat; the allied cavalry
immediately followed his march, and on the 11th, attacked his rear
guard (consisting of General Drouet’s cavalry, 2500 in number) at
Usagre, and drove them to Llerena, killing many, and bringing away
about 150 prisoners, and nearly as many horses. It was believed
throughout this part of the country, that Ballasteros had entered
Seville; and the people giving, with their characteristic credulity,
implicit belief to the idle rumour, made rejoicings everywhere for
the supposed success, and seemed wholly to disregard the recapture of
Badajoz.
If Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned at this time as it ought to,
and as Lord Wellington expected it would have been, his intention was
immediately after the capture of Badajoz to have advanced upon Seville
with 40,000 men; that movement would instantly have raised the siege
of Cadiz, and Soult might probably have been obliged to withdraw from
Andalusia, and take up a defensive position on the Tagus. But the
British Commander’s operations were still crippled by the insufficiency
of his means; the Spaniards were not to be relied on for any exertions,
however necessary, for their own deliverance; the Portugueze were
paralysed by the poverty to which the government and the nation were
reduced; and the British ministry were not yet sufficiently encouraged
by success and by popular opinion, to increase their efforts and
therewith an expenditure ♦MARMONT ENTERS BEIRA.♦ already unexampled in
amount. Marshal Marmont, meantime, supposing that Soult would be able
to raise the siege of Badajoz, thought the opportunity favourable for
an attempt upon the Beira frontier. Lord Wellington had foreseen this,
and had ♦ARRANGEMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THAT FRONTIER.♦ little means of
providing against it. Relying, however, upon the officers whom he had
left in command at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, for all that could be
done by vigilance and sound judgment, he had directed General Bacellar
to collect the Portugueze militia corps and march thither, ... Sylveira
to protect the Tras-os-Montes, and Brigadier-Generals Sir Nicholas
Trant and Sir John Wilson to cover that part of Beira extending from
the Douro along the Coa to Sabugal, with especial orders to look to the
safety of a considerable magazine of ammunition at Celorico. Bacellar
fixed his head-quarters at Lamego; the two Anglo-Portugueze Brigadiers
had about 3500 men, but only a single squadron of dragoons between
them, and but a small proportion of the men had served with them in the
former campaigns. In Portugal, the militia is a service in which no
man willingly either enters or continues, for they receive only half
the pay of the regular soldier, and half the ration of provisions,
and are clothed at their own expense. This body is composed wholly
of married men, or of widowers having children, these being the only
persons exempted from the conscription: such men were naturally anxious
and desirous of returning home, whenever, by means of favour or of
corruption, they could obtain leave; in the interval of the campaign,
their places were supplied by others of the same class; two-thirds
at least of the whole number consisted of such raw recruits, and the
others had not been exercised one day since they were disbanded in the
spring of the preceding year.
♦MARMONT DETERRED BY A FEINT FROM ASSAULTING ALMEIDA.♦
Marmont did not know how weak a force could be brought into the
field rather to observe his movements than to oppose them; but he
knew that Ciudad Rodrigo was ill-stored with provisions, and that
the injury which Brennier had done to the fortifications of Almeida
when he abandoned that place had been insufficiently repaired.
Advancing, therefore, from Salamanca with about 20,000 men, including
1200 cavalry, he summoned Ciudad Rodrigo: the Spaniards had made so
little progress in repairing the works, that he might probably have
carried it by escalade; but the French had now lost something of
their confidence; he was afraid of committing himself, and leaving
one division to blockade it, proceeded with the rest of his army
towards Almeida. Colonel Le Mesurier commanded in that fortress, and
its safety depended much more upon the character of its commander
than upon its own strength or that of the garrison, which consisted
entirely of militia. Trant, arriving with his division upon the Coa
just at this time, and receiving intelligence there of the enemy’s
movements, proceeded without delay to occupy the position of the Cabeço
Negro, which Lord Wellington had occupied during Massena’s operations
against Almeida: the French were already arriving before that place,
and it was with difficulty that a corps of between 7 and 800 Spaniards
under D. Carlos d’España escaped their close pursuit and effected a
junction with this body of Portugueze. It was of great consequence to
communicate with Colonel Le Mesurier now. Trant, though exposed to the
fire of the French advanced posts, effected this, and during a short
interview, they agreed upon the course to be pursued in case Almeida
should be seriously threatened; and also, that during the night an
attempt should be made to impose upon the French by making show as of
a considerable force upon the left bank of the Coa. Accordingly, fires
were kindled to the right and left of the position; and the enemy,
deceived by this easy stratagem into a belief that a corps of British
troops was present, gave up their intention of assaulting the fortress;
they only threw forward a reconnoitring party upon the glacis, which
the Governor drove back with loss.
Had Marmont assaulted the place, he might probably have captured it,
and would have found there a battering-train, which would have enabled
him to break ground before Ciudad Rodrigo. On the following morning he
withdrew, and leaving Almeida in the rear proceeded to Sabugal, where
he established his head-quarters: it was now at his option either
to advance upon the Tagus by Castello Branco, or by Guarda upon the
Mondego and Celorico; but his operations had neither been ♦ADVANCE OF
THE FRENCH TO CASTELLO BRANCO AND THEIR RETREAT.♦ well concerted, nor
were they vigorously pursued. His advanced guard followed the first
hussars, who had been left under Major-General Alten in front of Ciudad
Rodrigo, through Lower Beira, but at a distance; and they entered
Castello Branco, that officer having fallen back thither, and retiring
from thence before them with Brigadier-General Le Cor’s brigade of
militia which had been stationed there. The hospital and the stores
were removed beyond the Tagus. The enemy did not cross the river in
pursuit, and when Alten and Le Cor recrossed, the French retreated,
evacuating the city two days after they had taken possession of it.
♦MARMONT ATTEMPTS TO SURPRISE THE PORTUGUEZE AT GUARDA.♦
Meantime Bacellar, who had removed his head-quarters to Celorico,
instructed Trant and Wilson to occupy Guarda, relying upon Dumouriez’
erroneous opinion of the advantages of a position which Lord Wellington
afterwards pronounced to be the most treacherous one in Portugal. They,
though they were not at that time aware of the defects of the ground
which they were ordered to take, would far rather have moved behind the
Mondego, from whence the magazines at Celorico might have been better
protected. The French were dispersed over a large extent of country
for the purpose of procuring provisions, and for plunder; but Marmont,
having collected about 10,000 of his men and half his cavalry, on the
evening of the day on which his advanced guard retired from Castello
Branco, advanced upon Guarda, expecting to surprise the Portugueze
divisions there. A hundred men under a Captain and two Lieutenants
had been stationed about half a mile in front of the town, on the
Sabugal road. Marmont himself advancing with 500 cavalry, surprised and
captured the out-piquet of the party, and pushed on within 200 yards
of the city, but hearing the drums beat to arms, and being unsupported
by infantry, he thought it prudent to fall back upon his main force.
The Portugueze, who at that moment could have offered little resistance
even to a less formidable enemy, soon drew up on the outside of the
town, towards the danger; it was just at daybreak, and they ascertained
the great superiority of the French in time to commence their retreat.
Guarda being untenable, and the troops having only rations for the
present day, and depending upon Celorico for supplies which would now
be cut off, Trant, therefore, in concurrence with Wilson’s opinion,
resolved to retire behind the Mondego, which was about six miles
distant. Two battalions were continued in position, while the remainder
retired through the town, and took up ground in its rear unobserved by
the enemy; but no sooner were the whole set in motion than the French
cavalry followed, threatening to charge the columns. The ground for
about five miles was entirely open; but a regiment was successively
halted in echelle for the protection of the troops in march, and by
this means the movement went on in perfect order, till the moment when
all danger seemed to be at an end.
♦FLIGHT OF THE PORTUGUEZE MILITIA BY THE MONDEGO.♦
Immediately before the road to Celorico reaches the Mondego, it
descends a sloping ground, much broken and covered with wood. The
enemy’s horse was by this time pressing them close; Trant, therefore,
halted his rear-guard of one battalion within the wood, about a hundred
yards from the summit of the hill, where they could not be attacked
by cavalry, and where by making a stand, they might have gained time
for the rest of the troops to ford the river and form on the opposite
side. But it had not ceased raining for some hours, and when they
were ordered to fire upon some of the French who dismounted, and were
firing their carabines upon them, very few of the firelocks went off;
the men instantly lost confidence, and every one thought to escape
unnoticed by favour of the ground. Trant presently found himself with
not more than a hundred men besides the officers of his staff and of
the regiment. The panic which these fugitives spread was increased
by the small party of Portugueze cavalry, which having been employed
thus far in watching the enemy, retreated with too much precipitation
through the rear-guard, glad to find themselves in comparative safety
among the trees; and some of them escaping to the main body, it was
supposed from their report that the whole of the rear-guard had been
cut off. All efforts of the officers were in vain; they took to flight;
the enemy’s cavalry descended the hill unopposed, and made about two
hundred prisoners without killing or wounding a single man. Five
colours were lost in this rout, the bearers having either hid them in
the wood, or thrown them into the Mondego; and a few men were drowned
in hurrying over the river. Some of the fugitives hastened to Celorico,
declaring that the enemy were in full pursuit, and continuing their
flight, they spread the same report all the way to Coimbra. It had this
ill effect at Celorico that the officer in charge of the depôt there
set it on fire, concluding hastily, that what these persons reported as
eye-witnesses, must to its ♦MARMONT RETREATS.♦ whole extent be true.
But night had closed opportunely for the Portugueze; their officers
succeeded in rallying them beyond the river, and the French did not
attempt to pass, waiting till the morning: during the night Marmont
received unwelcome tidings that Badajoz had fallen, and that Lord
Wellington was on his way to the north; he therefore retraced his
steps towards Sabugal, concentrated his army there, and then commenced
his retreat upon Salamanca, raising the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. The
enemy in this expedition had robbed and murdered the inhabitants as
usual; but they derived no advantage from it whatever, having attempted
more than they could execute, and leaving unattempted what they might
have achieved.
Marshal Beresford noticed the conduct of the militia in the severest
terms; and it is worthy of remark, that the order which contained this
censure found its way into the Moniteur, ... of so much consequence
was it deemed at Paris to depreciate the Portugueze soldiers now
when the French had begun to find them formidable. An _alferes_ and
two serjeants were brought to trial at Coimbra, for cowardice, and
for spreading fearful and false reports upon their flight: they were
condemned to death and executed. The Porto militia regiment in which
the panic had begun was deprived of its colours till it should recover
its character in the presence of the enemy; two other regiments which
had lost theirs were not to have them restored till, in like manner,
they had effaced the stain of their late conduct; and the Penafiel
militia, which had lost one and preserved the other, was ordered to
deposit that other with the _Camara_ of their town till they should
have approved themselves worthy to be intrusted with it again. As this
was the only instance in which the Portugueze had disgraced themselves
since their military establishment had been reformed, it was treated
with the greatest severity.
♦LORD WELLINGTON RETIRES TO BEIRA.♦
Lord Wellington, as soon as he heard of Soult’s retreat, had put
his army in motion toward the Beira frontier. He established his
head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo; the troops were cantoned between
the Agueda and the Coa; and though the magazines at Celorico had been
destroyed, those beyond the Douro sufficed for their supply. Here,
therefore, they rested awhile to recruit their strength. Their means of
transport were employed in provisioning Badajoz, and Lord Wellington
prepared to follow up the brilliant successes of the campaign.