CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE FRENCH ENTER GALICIA. LORD WELLINGTON THREATENS CIUDAD RODRIGO,

WHICH IS RELIEVED BY MARMONT. GENERAL HILL SURPRISES THE ENEMY AT

ARROYO MOLINOS. SIEGE OF MURVIEDRO. DEFEAT OF BLAKE, AND CAPTURE

OF VALENCIA.

♦1811.

AUGUST.

STATE OF PORTUGAL.♦

At no time had Lord Wellington’s situation been more uneasy than at

this: not so much because of the inadequacy of his means in the field,

for, such as they were, he was able to oppose the enemy and baffle him

at all points; as because of the distressed state of the Portugueze

Government, and the apprehended instability of his own. Marlborough

had had more various and conflicting interests to adjust and keep in

unison, but he had no other difficulty with his allies: he could rely

upon a sure support in the British cabinet, till he had beaten down

all opposition in the field; and the feelings both of the army and the

nation were with him. Lord Wellington might rely upon himself with a

confidence as well founded, but he could have no other trust. Nothing

was to be expected from any government which the Spaniards might form

for themselves; and it now began to appear that the inert part of the

nation, which must every where be the majority, would have been best

pleased to remain neuter if that had been possible, and let the French

and English fight the battle and bear the cost. Portugal, indeed,

had been delivered from the enemy: but there Lord Wellington had to

contend with intrigues and jealousies in the Government both at Lisbon

and Rio de Janeiro; and with the difficulties arising from want of

provisions, want of transports, and the state of the commissariat,

the persons employed in which were for the most part either idle

or dishonest, or ignorant of their duty; so that at this time the

Portugueze army, though brought by Marshal Beresford and the British

officers to an efficient state of discipline, was reduced to half its

nominal strength. Their troops were starving in the field, and dying in

the hospitals, for want of money. If there was much to complain of here

on the part of the Portugueze ministry, the conduct of Great Britain

itself was neither consistent nor generous. Engaged as we were in the

war, Lord Wellington thought we ought to have entered upon it with a

determination of carrying Portugal through it at whatever cost; that

for this purpose we should have required an efficient control over all

the departments of the state, have seen the resources of the country

honestly and exclusively applied to the objects of the war, and have

made up the deficiency whatever it might be: this he had recommended

from the beginning, but the influence which was exercised was less at

this time than it had been when the Convention of Cintra was concluded.

♦EXPECTATION OF PEACE.♦

No general ever more anxiously desired to be placed at the head of an

army than Lord Wellington did now to be relieved from the command; but

of this he had no prospect, except from such a peace as would in its

certain consequences have given Buonaparte all that he was seeking

vainly to obtain by war. There was great apparent danger of this at

this time. In case of the death of the king, or the acknowledged

unlikelihood of his recovery (which now daily became more unlikely),

the French speculated upon a change of administration in England, and

the accession of the Whigs to power. The French officers eagerly

looked for this, expecting to make such a peace as would enable them to

withdraw from the Peninsula without loss of credit, and to re-enter it

as soon as their perfidious policy should have prepared a favourable

opportunity. In our own army also there were many who regarded the

probability of peace with as much complacency as if the end for which

the war had been waged would have been secured by it. These were

persons who neither by their acquirements, nor pitch of mind, were

qualified for the rank which they had attained in their profession;

who had not the slightest feeling or perception of the great interests

which were at stake, but knowing little, understanding nothing, and

criticising every thing, infected all about them with despondency and

discontent.

♦DISPOSITION OF THE CONTINENTAL POWERS TO RESIST BUONAPARTE.♦

On the other hand, there was at this time, in many parts of Europe,

hopeful symptoms, of which Lord Wellington was well informed. Even when

Austria had concluded the most unfortunate of its struggles, with loss

of honour as well as loss of territory, one of the wisest heads in

Germany assured the British Government, that although the German courts

swarmed with men who were great calculators of all possible disasters,

and who knew nothing more of the human heart than its weaknesses and

its selfishness, ... the Germans themselves, though subjugated, were

not yet debased by their subjugation; they would one day revenge their

wrongs; a warlike spirit would be developed among them, which had been

neglected or suppressed by their feeble and corrupt governments; and

it would then be seen that there are times when enthusiasm judges more

wisely than experience, and when elevation of mind creates resources

for the talents which it calls forth. Russia, which had so long

been duped by Buonaparte, became sensible of his perfidy, when, in

violation of the treaty of Tilsit, he incorporated the Hanse towns and

the duchy of Oldenburgh with the French empire. An opposition to the

tyrant’s schemes was manifested in Sweden, where it was less to have

been expected: for when the French government demanded permission to

march troops through Sweden into Norway, and embark them there for

the purpose of invading England, the Swedish government refused, and

communicated its refusal to the British cabinet. Prussia, meantime,

was silently preparing to break its yoke; and in the course of this

autumn, arms, stores, and artillery to a considerable amount, were

shipped from England for its use. This was so secretly done, that not

a rumour got abroad of any expectations from that quarter; and if the

British ministry had acted with as much ability in the management of

the war, as in its other foreign relations, its conduct would now have

been entitled to unqualified praise: but no representations could as

yet induce it to make exertions proportionate to the opportunities that

invited, or the necessity that called for them. Whether Buonaparte

apprehended, or not, any opposition to his ambitious career in

the north of Europe, he was too able a politician to let pass the

opportunity of employing as large a force in the Peninsula as could be

supported there upon his predatory system of warfare; and accordingly

more than 50,000 troops were marched into Spain between the middle of

July and the end of September.

♦PLANS OF SOULT AND MARMONT.♦

When Marmont and Soult, finding it impossible to take Lord Wellington

at advantage, separated on the Guadiana, their plan was, that the

former should keep the English in check, while Dorsenne, who had

succeeded Bessieres in the north, should enter Galicia, fortify Lugo,

seize Coruña by a _coup de main_, and in this manner once more obtain

military possession of the province.

♦DORSENNE ENTERS GALICIA.♦

Abadia had just taken the command of the Galician army; it was in

wretched equipment, and without magazines of any kind; but the men

had confidence in their general, and when Spanish soldiers have this

feeling to invigorate them, they will support privations under which

the troops of almost any other nation would sink. His advanced guard

was at S. Martin de los Torres, and occupied the bridge of Cebrones;

one division was at Bañeza, another at the bridge of Orbigo, and

the reserve at Astorga. Dorsenne collected his troops in a line of

operations on the Ezla, the right leaning upon Leon, and the left at

Castro ♦AUGUST 25.♦ Gonzalo: then he crossed the Ezla, one division

marching upon the bridge of Orbigo, two upon Bañeza, and the reserve

upon Cebrones. Abadia well knowing the state of his own army, and the

strength of the country behind him, had formed his plans in case of

such an attack. The division at Bañeza withstood a charge of lancers,

and fell back in good order to Castro Contrigo, from whence its retreat

was unmolested to Puebla de Sanabria, the place appointed.

♦RETREAT OF ABADIA.♦

The other divisions fell back from four in the evening, when the enemy

first presented themselves, till night had closed, when they were

all collected in Castrillo. The next day the French entered upon the

mountains behind Astorga in pursuit. The points of Manzanal and Molina

Seca were well defended, and though the Spaniards retired at both

points before superior numbers, they brought off with them the eagle

of the sixth regiment of infantry, which Abadia, in the name of the

army, dedicated to Santiago, and deposited in the chapel of that saint,

in his cathedral at Compostella. Seeing the force of the enemy, and

divining their purpose, he fell back to Ponferrada, covering, with

his little cavalry, a considerable body of men who were crippled for

want of shoes, and in the most dismal state of nakedness and want. The

ferry in Valdeorras, that gorge through which the river Sil entering

Galicia carries with it all the waters of the Bierzo, was the point

of re-union. The artillery at Villafranca was ordered back into the

interior, three regiments took a position upon the heights of Valcarcel

to cover the roads from that town, and another detachment was stationed

at Toreno for the double purpose of assisting the reserve and watching

Asturias. Abadia himself took a position at the Puente de Domingo

Florez. In the Vale of Orras he hoped to find provisions, meaning, as

soon as he should have collected enough for three days, and received

shoes for his men, to act upon the offensive, in co-operation with the

Portugueze general Silveira.

♦LORD WELLINGTON OBSERVES CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦

The French hoped, that while Dorsenne was dispersing the Galician army,

and getting possession of that important province, Lord Wellington

would make some incautious movement upon Salamanca, and expose himself

to Marmont’s superior numbers, and far superior cavalry, in the

open country. Lord Wellington knew better in what manner to relieve

Galicia. Immediately upon his failure at Badajoz, his attention had

been directed to Ciudad Rodrigo, and orders were given for bringing

a battering train and siege stores up the Douro to Villa de Ponte,

whereby much of the difficulty experienced in Alentejo for want of

means of transport was avoided. General Hill had been left with 14,000

men to guard that frontier; the rest of the army was collected on

the Agueda; and Lord Wellington fixing his head-quarters at Fuente

Guinaldo, kept his troops there in a healthy country, and rendered it

impossible for the enemy to throw supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo, unless

they advanced with an army strong enough to give him battle. Marmont,

♦DORSENNE RECALLED FROM GALICIA.♦ in consequence, recalled Dorsenne to

join him, that they might raise the blockade, and supply the fort with

provisions for a long time. Dorsenne, indeed, could not have advanced

without danger of having his retreat cut off; even in his own account,

wherein he asserted that the Galician army was entirely dispersed,

and could not possibly resume the offensive, he pretended to have

occasioned them no greater loss than that of 300 killed and wounded,

and 200 prisoners: but in reality no dispersion had taken place: if

he had pursued his original plan of descending upon Lugo and Coruña,

Abadia would have been in his rear, and the French knew by experience

what it was to encounter the peasantry of Galicia, armed against them,

and thirsting for vengeance. Dorsenne therefore retired more rapidly

than he had advanced, leaving behind him some of his wounded, and

provisions enough to supply Abadia’s army with three days’ consumption,

... a booty of no little consequence in the deplorable state of the

Spanish commissariat. The Spaniards in their turn advanced, and fixed

their head-quarters in Molina Seca, where ♦AUGUST 31.♦ they had won the

eagle four days before; and the French derived no other advantage from

their expedition, than the possession of Astorga, which they once more

occupied, and repaired its ruined fortifications.

♦MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH TO THROW SUPPLIES INTO CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦

The relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was an object not less important to the

French in this part of the country than that of Badajoz had been on the

side of Extremadura, and equal exertions were made to effect it. Lord

Wellington had formed the blockade to make these exertions necessary,

not with any serious intention of attacking the town, an operation for

which he was not yet prepared. Two important objects were fulfilled

by making the enemy collect their force upon this point. It relieved

Galicia, and it drew from Navarre General Souham’s division, which had

been destined to hunt down Mina. Lord Wellington was perfectly informed

of Marmont’s plans; the only thing doubtful was the strength of the

enemy, and upon that head reports were as usual so various, that he

determined to see them, being certain of his retreat, whatever their

superiority might be, and ready to profit by any opportunity which

might be offered. As soon, therefore, as the French commenced their

movements with the convoy of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar, and

from Salamanca, he collected his army in positions from which he could

either retire or ♦SEPT. 22.♦ advance without difficulty, and from

whence he could see all that was going on, and ascertain the force of

the hostile army.

The third division occupied a range of heights on the left of the

Agueda, between Fuente Guinaldo and Pastores, having its advanced guard

on the heights of Pastores, within three miles of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The fourth division was at Fuente Guinaldo, which position had been

strengthened with some works. The light division was on the right of

the Agueda, its right resting upon the mountains which divide Castille

and Extremadura. The left, under General Graham, who, having joined

Lord Wellington’s army, had succeeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in

command, was posted on the Lower Azava; D. Carlos d’España and D.

Julian Sanchez observed the Lower Agueda, and Sir Stapleton Cotton,

with the cavalry, was on the Upper Azava in the centre. The fifth

division was in the rear of the right, to observe the Pass of Perales,

for General Foy had collected a body of troops in Upper Extremadura. On

the 23rd, the enemy appeared in the plain near the city, and retired

again: the next morning they advanced in considerable force, and before

evening collected on the plain their whole cavalry, to the amount

of 6000, and four divisions of infantry; the rest of their army was

encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround

the plain; and on the following day an immense convoy, extending along

many miles of road, entered the town under this formidable escort.

♦THE ALLIES FALL BACK.♦

On the 25th, fourteen squadrons of their cavalry drove in our posts

on the right of the Azava. General Anson’s brigade charged them,

pursued them across the river, and resumed the posts. But their chief

attention was directed toward the heights on the left of the Agueda;

and they moved a column in the morning, consisting of between thirty

and forty squadrons of cavalry, fourteen battalions of infantry, and

twelve guns, from Ciudad Rodrigo, against that point. The cavalry and

artillery arrived first, and one small body sustained the attack. A

regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking two pieces of cannon;

the Portugueze artillerymen stood to their guns till they were cut

down; and the guns were immediately retaken by the second battalion

of the fifth regiment under Major Ridge. When the enemy’s infantry

were coming up, Lord Wellington saw they would arrive before troops

could be brought to support this division, and therefore he determined

to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 77th, which had

repulsed a charge of cavalry, and the second battalion of the 5th,

were formed into one square, and the 21st Portugueze regiment into

another, supported by General Alten’s small body of cavalry, and by the

Portugueze artillery. The enemy’s horse immediately rushed forward,

and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portugueze

regiment. The 5th and 77th were then charged on three faces of the

square; Lord Wellington declared, that he had never seen a more

determined attack than was made by this formidable body of horse, and

repulsed by these two weak battalions. They halted, and received the

enemy with such perfect steadiness, that the French did not venture to

renew the charge.

In the evening, Lord Wellington had formed his troops into an

_echellon_, of which the centre was in the position at Guinaldo, the

right upon the pass of Perales, and the left at Navedeaver. In the

course of that night and of the ensuing day, Marmont brought his whole

army in front of the position. Fuente Guinaldo stands on an extensive

plain, and from the convent there the whole force of the enemy, and all

their movements, could be distinctly seen. Their force was not less

than 60,000 men, a tenth part being cavalry, and they had 125 pieces of

artillery. There was no motive for risking a battle, for the happiest

result would only have been a profitless and dearly-purchased victory,

as at Albuhera. Lord Wellington therefore retired about three leagues.

No movement was ever executed with more ability in the face of a

superior enemy; ... yet even this, performed with consummate skill and

perfect courage, without hurry, without confusion, and almost without

loss, presented but too many of those sights which make the misery of

a soldier’s life. The sick and hungry inhabitants of the villages were

crawling from their huts, too well aware of the fate which awaited

them if they trusted to the mercy of Buonaparte’s soldiers; women were

supplicating our troops to put their children in the provision cars;

and the sick and wounded were receiving medical assistance, while they

were carried over a rugged and almost impassable road.

Lord Wellington formed his army, after this retreat of twelve miles,

with his right at Aldea Velha, and his left at Bismula: the fourth and

light divisions with General Alten’s cavalry in front of Alfayates, the

third and seventh in second line behind it. Alfayates, though now one

of the most wretched of the dilapidated towns in Portugal, was once a

Romish station, and has since been considered as a military post of

great importance. It is about a league from the border, standing so as

to command an extensive view over a beautiful, and in happier times a

fertile, country. Here Lord Wellington stood by the castle (one of the

monuments of King Diniz), observing the enemy with a glass. Marmont

had intended to turn the left of the position at Guinaldo by moving a

column into the valley of the Upper Azava, and thence ascending the

heights in the rear of the position by Castillejo; from this column he

detached a division of infantry and fourteen squadrons of cavalry to

follow the retreat of the allies by Albergaria, and another body of

equal strength followed by Forcalhos. The former drove in our piquets

at Aldea da Ponte, and pushed on to the very entrance of Alfayates.

Lord Wellington, with General Stuart and Lord Robert Manners, stood

watching them almost too long; for the latter, who retired the last

of the three, was closely pursued by ten of the enemy’s dragoons,

and might probably have been taken, if his horse, being English, and

accustomed to such feats, had not cleared a high wall, and so borne him

off.

General Pakenham, supported by General Cole, and by Sir Stapleton

Cotton’s cavalry, drove the enemy back through Aldea da Ponte upon

Albergaria; the French being reinforced by the column which had

marched upon Forcalhos advanced again about sunset, and again gained

the village, from which they were again driven. But night had now

come on; General Pakenham could not know what was passing on his

flanks, nor was he certain of the numbers which might be brought

against him; and knowing that the army was to fall back farther, he

evacuated Aldea da Ponte during the night. The French then occupied

it; and Lord Wellington, falling back one league, formed his army on

the heights behind Soito, having the Sierra das Mesas on their right,

and their left at Rendo on the Coa. Here ended his retreat. Marmont

had accomplished the object of throwing supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo,

and could effect nothing more. Lord Wellington was not to be found at

fault. He had fallen back in the face of a far outnumbering enemy,

without suffering that enemy to obtain even the slightest advantage

over him. The total loss of the allies on the 25th amounted to

twenty-eight killed, 108 wounded, twenty-eight missing. On the 27th,

fourteen killed, seventy-seven wounded, nine missing. The hereditary

prince of Orange was in the field, being then for the first time in

action.

♦THE FRENCH RETIRE.♦

While the British took their position behind Soito, the French

retired to Ciudad Rodrigo, and then separated, Dorsenne’s army toward

Salamanca and Valladolid, Marmont’s towards the pass of Baños and

Plasencia. Marmont boasted in his dispatches of having forced Lord

Wellington to abandon an intrenched camp, and driven him back with

great loss ♦MARMONT BOASTS OF HIS SUCCESS.♦ and confusion; “The Spanish

insurgents,” he added, “have felt the greatest indignation at seeing

themselves thus abandoned in the north as well as in the south; and

this contrast between the conduct of the English, and the promises

which they have incessantly broken, nourishes a natural hatred, which

will break out sooner or later.” “We should have followed the enemy,”

said Marshal Marmont, “to the lines of Lisbon, where we should have

been able to form a junction with the army of the south, ... which is

completely entire, and has in its front only the division of General

Hill, ... had the moment been come which is fixed for the catastrophe

of the English.” Soult, of whose unbroken strength Marmont thus

boasted, was at this time devising measures for destroying the army

which Castaños had recruited, or rather remade, since it had been so

miserably wasted after Romana’s death. General Girard therefore, with a

division of about 4000 foot and 1000 cavalry, was sent into that part

of Extremadura which was still free, thus to confine Castaños within

narrower limits, and deprive his army of those rations which it still,

though with difficulty, obtained, and which were its sole means of

subsistence; for in the miserable state of the Spanish commissariat and

Spanish Government, their armies subsisted upon what they could find,

and had little or nothing else to depend upon.

♦GIRARD IN EXTREMADURA.♦

Girard took his position at Caceres, extending as far as Brozas. Of the

spirit in which his detachment acted, one instance will suffice. He

sent a party against the house of D. Jose Maria Cribell in Salvatierra,

an officer in the service of his country; they carried off his wife

in the fifth month of her pregnancy; plundered the house, even to the

clothes of her two children, one five years old, the other three,

and left these children naked to the mercy of their neighbours. The

presence of such a force greatly distressed the country, and produced

the intended inconvenience to Castaños; that general, therefore,

concerted with Lord Wellington a movement for relieving this part

of Extremadura by striking a blow against the enemy. The execution

was entrusted to general Hill, with whom a Spanish detachment was to

co-operate under Camp-Marshal D. Pedro Augustin Giron.

General Hill, with such a portion of his force as was thought

sufficient for the service, moved from his cantonments in the

neighbourhood of Portalegre on the ♦GENERAL HILL MOVES AGAINST HIM.♦

22nd of October, and advanced towards the Spanish frontier. On reaching

Alburquerque he learned that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda,

had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco; and that Aliseda was occupied by

the Conde de Penne Villemur with the rear of the Spaniards. At that

place, the allies and the Spaniards formed their junction the next

day. The French occupied Arroyo del Puerco with 300 horse, their main

body being at Caceres. Penne Villemur, on the 25th, drove back their

horse to Malpartida, which place they held as an advanced post. At

two on the following morning the allies began their march upon this

place, in the midst of a severe storm; they arrived at daybreak; but

the enemy had retired in the night. Penne Villemur, with the Spanish

cavalry, and a party of the second hussars, followed them, skirmishing

as far as Caceres, supported by the Spanish infantry under D. Pablo

Morillo. Girard, as soon as he knew that the allies were advancing,

retired from that city, and General Hill received intelligence of his

retreat at Malpartida, but what direction he had taken was uncertain.

In consequence of this uncertainty, and of the extreme badness of the

weather, the British and Portugueze halted for the night at Malpartida,

the Spaniards occupying Caceres.

♦OCT. 27.♦

The next morning General Hill, having ascertained that the enemy had

marched on Torremocha, put his troops in motion, and advancing along

the Merida road, by Aldea del Cano, and the Casa de D. Antonio; for as

this was a shorter line than that which Girard had taken, he hoped to

intercept him and bring him to action. On the march he learned that

the French had only left Torremocha that morning, and that their main

body had again halted at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear-guard at

Albala. This proved that Girard was ignorant of the movements of the

allies, and General Hill therefore made a forced march that evening

to Alcuescar, a place within four miles of Arroyo Molinos, where he

was joined by the Spaniards from Caceres. Everything confirmed the

British general in his opinion that the enemy were not only ignorant

of his near approach, but also off their guard; and he determined upon

attempting to surprise them, or at least bringing them to action,

before they should march in the morning. The troops, therefore, lay

under a hill, to be out of sight of the enemy; they had marched the

whole day in a heavy rain, the rain still continued, and no fires were

allowed to be made.

♦ARROYO MOLINOS.♦

Arroyo Molinos is a little town situated at the foot of one extremity

of the Sierra de Montanches; this mountain, which is everywhere steep,

and appears almost inaccessible, forms a cove or crescent behind it,

the two points of which are about two miles asunder. The Truxillo road

winds under the eastern point; the road to Merida runs at right angles

with that to Alcuescar, and that to Medellin between the Truxillo

and Merida roads. The ground between Alcuescar and Arroyo Molinos is

a plain, thinly scattered with cork-trees and evergreen oaks; and

General Hill’s object was to place a body of troops so as to cut off

the retreat of the enemy by any of these roads. At two in the morning,

the allies moved from their comfortless bivouac: it was dark, the rain

was unabated, and the wind high, but in their backs: but this weather,

severe as it was, was in their favour, for it confirmed the French

in their incautious security. When Girard had first advanced into

Extremadura, he felt some uneasiness at the neighbourhood of General

Hill, and demanded succour, saying, that unless he was reinforced

he should not be able to resist in case the English should attack

him. But the little enterprise which the British and Portugueze army

had hitherto displayed, seems to have lulled him into a contemptuous

confidence; and there was no distinguished guerrilla leader to disturb

the enemy in this part of the country, since D. Ventura Ximenes fell in

a rencontre near Toledo.

♦THE FRENCH SURPRISED AND ROUTED THERE.♦

The allies moved in one column right in front upon Arroyo Molinos,

till they were within half a mile of it: the column then closed in

a bottom under cover of a low ridge, and divided into three, the

enemy not having the slightest intimation of their approach. The left

column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, marched direct upon the town;

the right, under Major-General Howard, broke off to the right so as

to turn the enemy’s flank, and having marched about the distance of

a cannon-shot toward that flank, moved then in a circular direction

upon the farther point of the mountain crescent. Penne Villemur, with

the Spanish horse, advanced between these two columns, ready to act

in front, or to move round either of them, as occasion might require;

he had found a good road, but the English horse, owing to an error,

which, in so dark and tempestuous a night, might easily have been more

general, had gone astray, and were not yet come up. The French had had

a piquet about a mile from the town, which would have given the alarm,

if it had not retired just before the head of our column came to the

spot; for Girard had ordered the troops to be in motion at an early

hour. One brigade of his infantry had marched for Medellin an hour

before daylight: and when the allies were close at hand, Girard was

filing out upon the Merida road; the rear of his column, some of his

cavalry and his baggage, being still in the town. A thick mist had come

on, the storm was at its height, and the French general marched with

as little precaution as if he had been in a friendly country. When he

heard that an enemy was approaching in the mist, he laughed, and said,

“the English were too fond of comfort to get out of their beds in such

a morning; ... it could only be an advanced party of the Spaniards;”

... but while he was ordering his men to chastise these insurgents, the

Highland bagpipes played “_Hey, Johnny Coup, are ye waukin yet?_” and

the 71st and 92d charged into the town with three cheers. Their orders

were not to load, nor to halt for prisoners; but to force through every

obstacle between them and the enemy, without turning to the right or

left.

A few of their men were cut down by the French cavalry, but they soon

drove the enemy every where before them at the point of the bayonet.

The enemy’s infantry, which had got out of the town, formed into two

squares, with their cavalry on their left, between the Merida and

Medellin roads, by the time our two regiments had forced their way to

the end of the town. Their right square being within half musket-shot,

the 71st promptly lined the garden walls, while the 92d filed out and

formed in line on the right, perpendicularly to the enemy’s right

flank, which was much annoyed by the well-directed fire of the 71st.

Meantime, one wing of the 50th occupied the town and secured the

prisoners, some of whom were surprised over their coffee; and the other

wing, with a three-pounder, which was all the artillery the allies

had brought, skirted the outside of the town, and fired with great

effect upon the squares. General Howard’s column was moving round their

left. Penne Villemur meantime engaged the enemy’s cavalry, till Sir

W. Erskine came up and joined him; they then presently dispersed the

French horse, and charged their infantry repeatedly, “passing through

their lines,” said a serjeant, “just like herrings through a net.”

The French were now in full retreat, when, to their utter dismay,

General Howard’s column appeared, and cut off the road. There was no

resource, but to surrender or disperse; all order was at an end ... the

cavalry fled in all directions, the infantry threw down their arms, and

clambered up the mountain, ... where, inaccessible as the way appeared,

they were pursued by General Howard, till the British became so

exhausted, and so few in number, that he was obliged to halt and secure

his prisoners. Morillo, with the Spanish infantry, one English and one

Portugueze battalion, having ascended by the Puerto de las Quebradas,

in a more favourable direction, continued the pursuit farther, and met

with more resistance; but they drove the enemy from every position

which they attempted to take, and pursued them many leagues, till

within sight of the village of St. Anna, when, being completely

exhausted with their exertions, they returned, having counted in the

woods and mountains upwards of 600 dead.

In this brilliant affair, General Brun, the Prince de Aremberg,

two lieutenant colonels, thirty other officers, and 1400 men, were

made prisoners. The British and Portugueze loss amounted only to

seventy-one, that of the Spaniards was very trifling. The whole of the

enemy’s artillery, baggage, and commissariat was taken, the magazines

of corn which they had collected at Caceres and Merida, and the

contribution of money which he had levied upon the former town. A panic

was struck into the enemy, to such a degree, that Badajoz was shut for

two days and nights, all the fords of the Guadiana were watched, and

every detachment ordered to rendezvous at Seville.

This expedition was less important in itself, than as it was the first

indication of a spirit of hopeful enterprise in the British army; it

seemed as if that army had now become conscious of its superiority, and

would henceforth seek opportunities of putting it to the proof. For

the Spaniards it was a well-timed success, when all their own efforts

tended only to evince more mournfully the inefficiency of their troops

and the incompetence of their generals.

♦MARQUES DEL PALACIO APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN VALENCIA.♦

The Marques del Palacio had been appointed captain-general of the

kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia, and Murcia. He announced his coming in a

proclamation from Alicante, of a very different character from those

which had so greatly contributed to support the cause of Spain. “From

the moment,” said he, “that I set foot in this country, and knew the

fall of Tarragona, my spirit, far from being cast down, seemed as if

it had taken fresh courage to run to danger as well as to victory. Do

not hold me arrogant and vain, for my hopes are not rested upon the

arm of flesh. From afar I see the walls of Valencia of burnished and

impenetrable brass; and the more secure, inasmuch as the enemy cannot

perceive them. I see also a cloud of protection over the whole kingdom,

whereof that which for forty years protected the people of God was but

a type and a figure. The brazen walls are the Valencian breasts, which

have loyalty for their stamp and shield of arms; and the cloud which

protects us is the Queen of Angels, ... she who is the general of the

best appointed army, our adorable and generous Madre de desamparados,

_Mother of the helpless_, with her omnipotent Son. Heaven itself has

given the greatest proof of this truth, and of its predilection for the

city and kingdom of Valencia. Is there any other capital in all Spain

which has not been entered by some army of this Corsican robber, this

impious tyrant? Is there any other province which has twice repelled

the enemy from its centre, without walls and without armies? Heaven

and this invincible Deborah, or Judith, have saved us, and will save

us, if our conduct is not unworthy of her protection. Wonder not at

this language from a soldier! I am a Christian; I am an old Spaniard;

and I am persuaded that they are not earthly victories, but bolts from

heaven which reach the wicked, such as the Corsican and his generals,

whose principles are bad, and whose conduct is worse. I resign,

therefore, my staff to this Sovereign Queen: she has been the general

who has delivered the kingdom thus long: she it is who will deliver

all that is placed under this staff, no longer mine but hers, and the

Lord’s, who is the God of battles.”

It would be wronging the Marques to break off here, for in other parts

of his address he spoke in the proper language of a Spaniard and a

general. “This is a holy war,” said he, “in which we must fight like

the Maccabees. Let him who feels for the public cause join us, and take

arms, and offer himself as a sacrifice, and put forth his hand, and

advance, and attack, and triumph. Confide in the Government, and it

will confide in you. If there is conduct in the chiefs, there will be

conduct in the people; moderation in the expenditure, and there will

be plenty in the army; order in private families, and it will display

itself in public actions; activity in individuals, and the army will

be invincible. Let there be obedience, union, fidelity, justice, and

truth, and God will fight with us.”

Unfortunately, there were many in Valencia upon whom the first part of

this address was likely to have more effect than the second. A friar,

preaching in the Plaza Catalina, said to his auditors, “If the Cortes

think of abolishing our holy order, and that of our sisters the nuns,

obey them not, ye armed Valencians, but oppose such mandates like

lions. We are the servants of God, whom you must obey rather than man.

The English themselves, though they have an excellent constitution,

must eventually fall for want of the blessing of the Catholic faith.

Ask not for cannon and gunpowder, but rather fly to your altars; and

instead of any vain attempt to resist the victorious French by force

of arms, implore the aid of Heaven, which alone can avert the heavy

calamities that threaten you.” Zaragoza is as Catholic a city as

Valencia, but it was not by such sermons as this that the heroism of

the Zaragozans was excited and sustained!

♦BLAKE TAKES THE COMMAND.♦

Zaragoza had defended itself without any other reliance than what

the inhabitants placed in themselves. Valencia prepared for its

defence under very different circumstances. The Regent, General

Blake, embarking with all the force he could collect, had landed at

Almeira to take the command in those provinces, which, since the fall

of Tarragona, were so seriously menaced. From thence he proceeded to

Valencia, with full powers, civil as well as military, and the whole

strength of the executive authority, to carry into effect whatever

measures he might think needful. The collected force under his command

was more than equal in number to that of the invaders; one division

of 6000 men, taking its name from the field of Albuhera, had attained

discipline upon which the officers could rely, and reputation which

every effort would be made to support. Some of the generals also

stood high in public opinion; Lardizabal had distinguished himself in

Lapeña’s expedition; and Zayas was thought by the English, as well as

by his own countrymen, one of the best officers in the Spanish service.

But Blake himself inspired no confidence wherever he went; he had the

reputation of being an unfortunate general; and what credit he acquired

in the battle of Albuhera had been lost by his subsequent movements

in the Condado de Niebla. The Valencians, therefore, were unwilling

to receive him, and would fain have persuaded the Marques del Palacio

to retain the command, to which, in these times of insubordination, a

popular election would have been considered as conferring a legitimate

right; but the Marques had been bred in a better school, and though

he had some reason to complain of the manner in which he was thus

suddenly superseded, demeaned himself toward his successor with a

frankness and cordiality deserving a better return than they obtained.

In the course of more than thirty years’ service, it had been his good

fortune never to incur the slightest disaster in any command which

he had held; twice during the present war, having been appointed to

armies which he found incomplete and ill-equipped, he had placed them

upon a respectable footing; and being then removed from the command,

they had presently under his successors been dispersed or destroyed;

he was popular, therefore, because no miscarriage could be laid to his

charge. Embarking from Cadiz for Alicante on the day that Tarragona

was taken, he brought with him no supplies either in men, arms, or

money, nor was any thing sent after him; it seemed as if the eastern

provinces were left to their own resources; and Alicante and Orihuela,

from whence he might have drawn supplies, were separated from his

government. The Murcian army consisted nominally at this time of 20,000

foot and 5000 horse; he asked for 3000 of these men and 600 cavalry,

and they were refused. The effect of this was, that feeling he had no

external support to look for, he formed his plans for defence upon the

nature of the country, and that moral resistance, in which the strength

of the Spanish cause consisted: but Blake coming with the entire

confidence of the executive Government, of which he was a member, had

the Murcian forces at his command, and seemed to think his military

means so fully sufficient, that he disregarded all other resources.

The Marques would have defended the strong ground through which the

enemy must pass before they could attack Murviedro. Between that town

and Valencia is a labyrinth of water-courses, gardens, plantations,

and deep narrow roads, through which no force could penetrate against

the resistance of a determined people; ... and if that resistance had

been overcome, he would have cut the dikes and inundated the country.

These plans he communicated to Blake, who never bestowed a thought upon

them, contemplating no measures which were not in the ordinary course

of tactics, and thinking, that if the punctilios of his profession were

correctly observed, nothing farther could be required on the score of

honour or of duty.

♦MURVIEDRO.♦

Murviedro is an open town twelve miles east of Valencia, but its

fortress, called the Castle of San Fernando de Sagunto, was, both for

its natural strength and artificial defences, a most formidable post.

D. Luis Maria Andriani commanded there with a garrison of 3500 men, who

had volunteered for its defence. The name which that fortress bore,

and the knowledge of the resistance which upon that spot had been

made against Hannibal, as it might well have given confidence to its

defenders, induced Suchet to expect greater difficulty in its conquest

than any which he had yet overcome. The Roman theatre here, which

was one of the most perfect remains of the ancients, and the other

antiquities of this sacred spot, were held in such proper estimation by

the Spanish Government, that in 1785, under the ministry of the Conde

d’Aranda, an officer was appointed to preserve them. When it was deemed

necessary to fortify the place, the engineers condemned the theatre;

the conservator appealed to the Cortes, and the Cortes unanimously

agreeing that it would be a reproach to the nation if this precious

monument should be destroyed, addressed the Regents, requiring them

to give orders for its careful preservation: but such considerations

could no longer be allowed, when the paramount interests of the nation

were at stake, and instructions were given to make any demolition which

might be required for the security of the place. Andriani entered upon

his command there in the middle of September, and a few days afterwards

the French from Tortosa and from Aragon began their march toward

Valencia. Suchet had with ♦SUCHET TAKES POSSESSION OF THE TOWN.♦ him

all the disposable troops from Aragon and Catalonia, ... withdrawing

many of the less important garrisons and smaller detachments, in

full confidence that there was neither energy enough in the general

Government of Spain, nor union enough among the provincial authorities,

to take advantage of the opportunity which was thus afforded them. He

arrived before Murviedro on the 21st, and took possession of the town.

Blake, who had advanced thither to see that the garrison was complete,

and the place provided for defence, offered no resistance when the

enemy approached, but retired within an intrenched camp, on the right

of the Guadalaviar; it rested with its right upon the sea, and covered

the city of Valencia; he had the Murcian army behind him in reserve.

The divisions of Obispo and Villacampa, under Carlos O’Donnel, had been

recalled from the frontiers of Castille and Aragon: these remained in

the field and formed his left; 4000 men occupied Segorbe and Liria, and

Bassecourt, with about 2000, was in Requeña and Utril: besides these

forces the commander-in-chief had 1600 cavalry, part of them veteran

troops.

Against such means of resistance Suchet would never have ventured

to advance if he had not despised the Valencians. With an abundant

population, brave and patriotic enough to offer themselves to any

danger and submit to any sacrifices, ... and with resources greater

than those of any other province from its redundant fertility, Valencia

had scarcely made an effort in favour of its neighbours. When, at the

earnest requisition of the British naval commander on that coast, a

body of its troops had been detached into Catalonia, they were embarked

without muskets, because there was an established regulation, that

before they left the province their arms must be deposited in the

arsenal. After arms had been provided for them, it was judged necessary

to march them into Aragon; but they refused to enter that kingdom,

because they had not been sent with that intention, and in consequence

they returned to Valencia without having faced the enemy. Whenever,

indeed, the Valencian army had faced them, some glaring misconduct had

appeared, and some lamentable disaster been the necessary result. The

spirit of provincialism ceased to paralyse them when the enemy was

within their own territory, but Suchet still calculated upon want of

discipline in the men, and want of skill in the leaders; some reliance,

too, he placed upon those means of seduction by which France had

triumphed as often as by her arms.

♦THE FRENCH REPULSED IN AN ASSAULT.♦

The day after he reached Murviedro, he assaulted the fort at two in the

morning; in three places the escalade was attempted, but the French

were repulsed at all points with the loss of their ladders, and of more

than 400 killed and wounded. Suchet was induced to make this dangerous

attempt by his engineers, who discovered two old breaches which had not

♦MEM. 2. 161.♦ been effectually repaired, and who were sensible of the

great difficulties they should have to encounter in a regular siege.

His men, too, he says, since their exploits at Tarragona, regarded it

as pastime to march to an assault; but the way there had been prepared

for them by corruption. They kept possession of the town, broke through

the party walls of the houses, that they might communicate without

exposing themselves ♦OCTOBER.♦ to the garrison’s fire, barricadoed the

streets, and planted guns in those houses which looked toward the fort.

This was not effected without loss, and they had not yet brought up

their battering train; it was to come from Tortosa, and the little fort

of Oropesa in their rear commanded the road. Suchet gave directions

for reducing this, and acted in the meantime against the troops in the

field. Obispo was attacked on the 30th at Seneja, and driven back upon

Segorbe; there he rallied, but reinforcements came to the enemy, which

again gave them the superiority; they entered Segorbe in pursuit of

his broken troops, put all who resisted to the sword, and drove him

towards Liria. The next object of Suchet was to drive Carlos O’Donnel’s

division beyond the Guadalaviar. On the night of October 1st he marched

against it; the advanced guard was attacked and routed at Betero; the

main body at Benaguacil. Little loss was sustained by the Spaniards

in these actions, but they did not contribute to raise the character

of the Valencian troops in the eyes of their enemies; and Suchet, who

knew that the struggle would be with Blake, endeavoured to provoke that

general into the field, by reproaching him for having remained idle in

Valencia while two divisions of his army were defeated.

♦OROPESA TAKEN BY THE ENEMY.♦

He had made himself, however, already so far master of the field, as

to continue his operations against Murviedro without interruption.

Oropesa surrendered on the 11th, after a cannonade of a few hours;

Captain Eyre, in the Magnificent, had just arrived to assist it, but

he came only in time to bring off the garrison of a tower about a mile

distant. Artillery and tools could now be safely brought from Tortosa;

and a week afterwards a practicable breach was effected. Twice in the

course of a day and ♦OCT. 11.♦ night the French attempted to storm it,

and were repulsed with great slaughter. The fort, though, according

to the inveterate habit of procrastination which has for centuries

been the reproach of Spanish policy, its works were incomplete, yet

was capable of ♦A SECOND ASSAULT REPELLED.♦ making a very formidable

resistance; for it was so constructed as to form four parts, each of

which might be defended after the others were taken. Blake calculated

upon the impetuosity of the enemy, the steadiness of the garrison, and

the patriotism of the governor; the two former did not deceive him: and

he had laid down for himself a wise plan of operations; which was to

abstain from battle, in hope that the French would weaken themselves in

the siege, and might be compelled to retreat by movements upon their

flank and on the side of Aragon.

♦GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN AID OF MURVIEDRO.♦

It was part of this plan to surprise the French in Cuenca, and thus

cut off Suchet’s communication with Madrid: this expedition was

committed to General Mahy, with whom the Conde de Montijo was to

co-operate. The attempt proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with

his division to join the commander-in-chief. In Aragon the Spaniards

were led by men of a different stamp, and their movements would have

led to very different results, if the spirit of provincialism, and

that insubordination which long habits of military independence can

scarcely fail to produce, had not frustrated fair beginnings, and

bright prospects of success. A decree of the Cortes had attached the

guerrilla parties to the armies of their respective districts, and

given rank to their leaders, leaving them to pursue their own system

of warfare at their own discretion, but subjecting them thus to a

military superior whenever they should be called upon. By virtue of

this decree, Duran and the Empecinado, who commanded, the one in Soria,

the other in Guadalaxara, each with the rank of brigadier, had been

ordered by Blake to unite and enter Aragon, which Suchet had drained of

troops for his expedition against Valencia. It was not easy to bring

these irregular companies under any restraint of discipline: the Junta

of Guadalaxara were not willing to part with the Empecinado’s band;

the men themselves were not willing to leave what they considered as

their own district; disputes broke out ♦DISPERSION OF THE EMPECINADO’S

TROOPS.♦ among them when their leader was not present; they turned

their arms upon each other at Villaconejos: after an affray in which

some were killed and many wounded, the rest dispersed, were overtaken

by the French, and suffered great loss; and ♦M. DEL PALACIO, TRASLADO A

LA NACION ESPANOLO, P. 19.♦ Cuenca was in consequence again entered by

the enemy, who committed their usual enormities there. The Empecinado,

however, was soon heard of again: he formed a junction with Duran, and

their collected force was computed at about ♦HIS SUBSEQUENT SUCCESSES

IN CONJUNCTION WITH DURAN.♦ 4000 men. With the greater part of this

force they appeared before the city of Calatayud, where the enemy had

a garrison of between 800 ♦SEPT. 26.♦ and 900 men. Not expecting so

bold a measure on the part of the guerrillas, the French upon sight

of them sent out a detachment, who took post upon an eminence before

the city, where there was a ruined castle. Of that detachment about

fifty were killed, and as many made prisoners, not a man escaping. The

garrison then, and all the persons connected with them, took shelter

in the convent of the Mercenarios. This edifice had been fortified,

and was one of those posts which gave them military possession of the

country. The Spaniards had no artillery, and having in vain attempted

to burn it, began to mine. This was a branch of warfare in which they

had little skill and less experience: ... on the third day the mine

was ready; it was exploded, and produced no effect; two others were

immediately commenced. Meantime a reinforcement of 200 foot and fifty

horse, the precursors of a larger force from Zaragoza, came to relieve

the besieged; ... the Empecinado hastened to meet them, routed them,

and chased them as far as Almunia, taking the colonel who commanded,

and more than 200 of their muskets and knapsacks, which they threw away

to disencumber ♦OCT. 3.♦ themselves in flight. On the sixth day of the

siege, the match was laid to the second mine, which produced little

more effect than the first: the third, however, was more successful;

it brought down part of the wall of the church, and the French then

capitulated, on condition that the officers should be sent to France

on their parole. Five hundred men were made prisoners, and about

150 killed and wounded were found in the convent. There were found

here provisions and money which had been collected by the intrusive

government: the grain was sold at a fair price to the inhabitants of

the district for seed: this Duran and the Empecinado thought necessary,

that they might lessen as much as possible the evils arising from

the state of waste to which that part of the country was abandoned.

Soon afterwards more than 3000 French arrived, hoping to recover the

plunder; but the Guerrilla chiefs gave them no opportunity of effecting

this, and the next day the enemy returned into Navarre, whither they

were recalled to resist Espoz y Mina.

♦A PRICE SET UPON THE HEADS OF MINA AND HIS OFFICERS.♦

General Reille, with two divisions, had used his utmost endeavours

to destroy this most enterprising of the Guerrilla chiefs; and Mina,

compelled once more to break up his little army into small bodies, had

for three and fifty days eluded the enemy, by continual marches and

countermarches among the mountains, suffering hunger, nakedness, and

every kind of fatigue and privation, with that unconquerable spirit

of endurance which is the characteristic virtue of the Spaniards. To

effectuate his long-desired object, the French general, in the spirit

of ♦AUG. 21.♦ the wicked government which he served, set a price upon

the heads of these gallant men, offering 6000 dollars for that of Mina,

4000 for Cruchaga’s, and 2000 each for those of Gorriz, Ulzurrun, and

Cholin. This detestable expedient failed also. A traitor, by name D.

Joaquin Geronimo Navarro, then offered to treat with the Guerrilla

chief, and win him over to the intruder’s cause; or, if he failed in

this, to seize him at a conference. Mina obtained intelligence of this

second part of the plot, and when he was invited to confer with Navarro

upon matters which, it was said, nearly concerned his own interest,

and that of his men, and the welfare of the kingdom, he replied, that

Navarro must come and treat with him in person. The traitor accordingly

appointed a meeting at the village of ♦SEPT. 14.♦ Leoz, whither he

came, accompanied by D. Francisco Aguirre Echechuri, D. Jose Pelon,

and Sebastian Irujo de Irocin. Mina, with his adjutant Castillo, met

them, partook of a supper which they had prepared, listened to their

proposals; then, being beforehand in the intended surprisal, seized

them, called in his assistants, and delivered them over to a council of

war, by whose sentence they were put to death.

Lord Wellington’s movement upon Ciudad Rodrigo at this time compelled

Marmont to withdraw his troops from Navarre. Immediately Mina reunited

his men, and occupied Sanguesa. “Vengeance,” he cried, “for the victims

who have been sacrificed because they performed their duty to their

country! While some of these are at rest in the grave, others in

dungeons, or led away into captivity in France, I will take vengeance

for their wrongs. Arms and ammunition, arms and ammunition, ... I ask

arms and ammunition of the nation and of all Europe, for public and

for private vengeance. My division will carry on the war as long as a

single individual belonging to it shall exist.” From Sanguesa he looked

about him where to annoy the enemy with most effect: while Duran and

the Empecinado were employed on the right bank of the Ebro, he thought

he might act upon the left, by cutting off the French garrisons. The

first which he assailed consisted of forty foot and seventy horse, at

Egoa de los Caballeros, who kept close within their fort, in fear of

such a visit. While he was mining the fort, the enemy during the night

broke through the wall on the opposite side, and fled. The sudden

cessation of their fire gave cause for suspecting what they had done:

they were pursued, and twenty of the cavalry were all who effected

their escape to Zaragoza. ♦MINA’S SUCCESS AT AYERBE. OCT. 16.♦ He then

marched against Ayerbe, and began to mine a convent which the French

had fortified there. While he was thus employed, 1100 French, with

forty horse, came from Zaragoza to relieve the besieged, and cut off

the Navarrese, who were only 900. Mina drew off his men as soon as he

heard of their approach, and posted the infantry upon a height above

the road; sending out parties to harass the enemy, and then fall back

upon the main body. The French advanced, mocking the brigands, as

they called them, and telling them to go to Valencia for bayonets,

and they encouraged each other to attack with the bayonet, saying

the brigands were without that weapon: but they were repulsed in

their attempt to win the height, leaving nineteen dead and forty-nine

wounded upon the field. They then proceeded to Ayerbe, received a

supply of ammunition there, and being joined by twenty horse from the

garrison, took the road to Huesca. Mina, though inferior in numbers,

was superior in cavalry, having 200 horse, and of this superiority he

made full use. With 160 horse he followed close upon the rear of the

enemy, and impeded their march in the plain till his infantry came

up. Part under Cruchaga got upon their left flank, another column

under Barena menaced them in the rear, a flank company supported this

movement, and on the right and in front Mina brought his cavalry.

Unlike the French generals, who, whenever they boasted of victory,

showed the baseness of their own nature by depreciating and vilifying

their opponents, Mina bestowed the highest praise upon the courage and

discipline of the enemy in this action. They formed themselves into a

square, closing their files with the utmost coolness as fast as the

men fell. Three times the Spaniards broke them, pouring in their fire

within pistol-shot. They formed a fourth time; Cruchaga then, after

pouring in a volley, attacked them with the bayonet; at the same moment

they were assailed in the same manner by the rest of the infantry;

they were again broken, and the cavalry began to cut them down. The

commander, seventeen officers, and 640 men laid down their arms and

were made prisoners. The French cavalry also surrendered; but thinking

that they saw a favourable opportunity for escaping, they wounded

some of the unsuspecting Spaniards, and rode off. This conduct met

with its merited punishment; they were so closely pursued, that five

only reached Huesca, and two of those were cut down at the gates; the

remaining three were all who escaped of the whole detachment. Among the

Spaniards Lizarraga fell, who commanded the cavalry that day. Mina,

whose horse had been shot under him, immediately advanced to Huesca;

the garrison had fled, leaving behind them some of their effects, and

five Spanish officers, who thus received their liberty from the hero of

Navarre.

♦CRUCHAGA CARRIES OFF THE ENEMY’S STORES FROM TAFALLA.♦

Mina was now embarrassed with his prisoners: he marched them to the

coast, in hopes there to find means of embarking them for Coruña, and

fortunately the Iris, Captain Christian, was in sight, and took 400

of them on board. While he was thus employed, Cruchaga learnt that

the French had collected considerable stores of grain in Tafalla,

relying in perfect security upon the fortifications, where they had

mounted four pieces of cannon, and upon the situation of that city

on the road to Zaragoza, within reach of succour from Pamplona and

Caparrosa. From Sanguesa he watched the motions of the French. By a

rapid march he reached S. Martin de Ujue, two short hours distant from

the city, and he took such effectual means for keeping his movements

secret, that no intelligence could be given to the enemy. At daybreak,

he approached Tafalla with that silence which he said was peculiar to

his troops: they surprised the guard, the French retired within their

fort, Cruchaga entered with music before him, as in triumph, and loaded

the grain upon beasts which he had brought with him for the purpose.

It had not been his intention to attempt any thing against the enemy’s

works: but his men heard that a priest, a number of peasants, and

about thirty women, were confined in a fortified convent, because

they had relations in the service of their country, or were suspected

of favouring their country’s cause; and they attacked the convent. The

French abandoned it, and fled to their other works, leaving good spoil

behind them to the conquerors. They, however, rejoiced more in having

delivered their countrymen from these oppressors, than in the important

stores which they obtained by the day’s expedition; and before they

left Tafalla, they drew up in the centre of the city, and the band

played, to comfort, Cruchaga said, the hearts of the Spaniards!

♦MINA’S OBJECT IN SOLICITING FOR MILITARY RANK.♦

Mina had obtained military rank for himself and his officers, and was

now colonel and commandant-general of the division of Navarre, under

which appellation his troops were considered as attached to the seventh

army under Mendizabal. Pre-eminent as were the services of this chief

and his followers, they did not obtain this rank without repeated

solicitations, and the direct interference of the Cortes; for the

Regency at first would only concede them the title of _urbanos_[31],

or local militia. The fitness of this designation was well exposed by

Sr. Terreros: “They,” said he, “who go among the mountains hunting

the wild beasts of France, and bathing their weapons in French blood,

are local militia! and they who live at home and drag their sabres at

their heels in coffeehouses, are regulars and veterans!” ... Mina’s

object in soliciting rank in the regular army was, that his men when

they fell into the hands of the enemy might not be put to death as

insurgents; but, like the Empecinado, and Manso, and Ballasteros, he

found that men who were equally destitute of honour and humanity

could only be made to observe the ordinary usages of war by the law

of retaliation. Repeatedly and earnestly had he applied to the French

generals, conjuring them to respect the laws of war; nor did he cease

to remonstrate till farther forbearance would have been a crime.

In the course of two days twelve peasants were shot by the French

in Estella, sixteen in Pamplona, and thirty-eight of his soldiers,

and four officers, were put to death: Mina then issued a decree for

reprisals, exclaiming, ♦HIS DECREE FOR REPRISALS.♦ that the measure

was full. He began his manifesto by contrasting his own conduct with

that of these ferocious invaders; then declared war to the death and

without quarter, without distinction of officers or soldiers, and

especially including by name Napoleon Buonaparte. Wherever the French

might be taken, with or without arms, in action or out of it, they

were to be hung, and their bodies exposed along the highways, in their

regimentals, and with a ticket upon each specifying his name. Every

house in which a Frenchman should have been hidden should be burnt,

and its inhabitants put to death. If from any village information were

given to the enemy that there were volunteers there, such volunteers

not amounting to eight in number, five hundred ducats should be levied

upon that village, for the information; and if any volunteer in

consequence should have fallen into the hands of the French, four of

that village should be chosen by lot and put to death. Mina’s anxiety

not to bring the inhabitants into danger is apparent in this decree;

he seems to have thought that if as many as eight volunteers were in

one village, the imminent hazard of concealing them might exempt the

people from punishment for informing against them. He declared Pamplona

in a state of siege, and the villages and buildings within a mile

round the walls; within this line no person was to pass on pain of

death; the parties who should be stationed to observe it were ordered

to fire upon any one who trespassed beyond the bounds assigned, and if

they apprehended him, wounded or unwounded, to hang him instantly upon

the nearest tree. All persons who wished to leave that city should be

received with the humanity of the Navarrese character; they were to

present themselves to him in person; ... if a whole family came out, it

was sufficient that the head should appear. Deserters of all ranks were

invited by a promise that they might, at their own choice, either serve

with him or go to England, or return to their own country; in either

of which latter cases, he undertook to convey them to one of the ports

on the coast; and he decreed the punishment of death against all who

should kill or betray a deserter, or refuse him shelter and assistance.

All persons were forbidden to go beyond the limits of their respective

villages without a passport from the Alcalde or Regidor, signed by

the parochial priest, or by some other inhabitant in places where no

priest resided: whoever should be apprehended without one was to be

shot: the innkeepers were charged to demand the passport from all their

guests, and seize every person who could not produce one, and deliver

him over to the first Guerrilla party. If any village should pay, or

influence the payment of the forty _pesatas_ per week, which the enemy

had imposed upon the parents and relations of the volunteers, (the name

by which Mina always designated his followers,) the property of the

magistrates, priests, and influential persons of that village should be

confiscated at discretion. And in requital for this imposition of the

Intrusive Government, he imposed a weekly mulct of twice that sum upon

the parents, brothers, and kinsmen, of those persons who were in the

employ of the French at Pamplona. This decree was to be circulated in

all the cities, towns, valleys, and _cendeas_ (parochial, or district

meetings) of Navarre; it was to be proclaimed every fifteen days, and

to be read by the officiating priest in every church on the first and

third Sundays of every month: wherever this duty was omitted, the

magistrates, priests, _escribanos_, or town-clerks, and two of the

influential inhabitants, were declared subject to military ♦DEC. 14.♦

punishment. He dated this decree from the field of honour in Navarre,

and the Government ratified it by inserting it in the Regency’s Gazette.

♦DURAN AND THE EMPECINADO SEPARATE.♦

The movements of the Guerrilla leaders on the Ebro, as well as in

Navarre and Upper Aragon, made Suchet feel that he had placed himself

in a situation in which every day that deferred his success increased

his danger; nor was he without uneasiness on the side of Catalonia,

where the Catalans carried on their warfare with such vigour, that the

French could aim at nothing more than preserving and provisioning their

fortified posts. His communication with Tortosa was interrupted by the

armed peasantry; scarcity began to be felt in his camp, and he was

obliged to detach 4000 men to protect a convoy going from Zaragoza. It

was Blake’s hope that Duran, the Empecinado, and Mina, might threaten

that city, and perhaps succeed in delivering it from its oppressors.

The plan was well concerted, and if it had been executed, Suchet

would hardly have ventured to maintain his ground in the kingdom of

Valencia. The attempt, however, was not made; for some difference arose

between Duran and the Empecinado, and instead of forming a junction

with Mina, they separated from each other. By this time Murviedro was

closely pressed, a battery of eight four-and-twenty pounders had been

constructed, and the governor made signals of distress. The ♦BLAKE

DETERMINES TO GIVE BATTLE.♦ Spaniards were eager for battle; and

Blake, foregoing his first and better resolution, consented to gratify

them, in the hope that one victory, when victory certainly appeared

attainable, and would be of such immense importance, might repay him

for the many disasters which he had sustained. He advanced, therefore,

on the 24th about noon, and took post for that night on the height of

El Puig, his right resting on the sea, and his left upon Liria.

♦BATTLE OF MURVIEDRO.♦

The country between Valencia and Murviedro is like a closely-planted

orchard, bounded by the sea on the right, and on the left terminating

at some distance from the foot of the mountains which separate Valencia

from La Mancha, Cuenca, and Aragon. Three great carriage roads cross

this land of gardens; and by these three roads the attack was to be

made; for though, from the nature of the ground, the left wing could

not be united with the centre and the right, it was thought that this

would be a less inconvenience than to leave open either of the three

roads. It was of especial consequence to occupy the left road, that

of Betera; for should Suchet, as might be expected, endeavour to

anticipate the attack, he might otherwise send his main body in this

direction, where the mountains would cover them, and the open country

give free scope for his cavalry and for those manœuvres, in which Blake

knew but too well the superiority of the enemy.

On the next morning the army was put in motion. Zayas commanded the

right, Lardizabal the centre, Carlos O’Donnell the left, consisting

of the Valencian division under Miranda, and the Aragonese under

Villacampa: Mahy, with the Murcian division, was to support this wing;

Blake, with another body of reserve, remained upon El Puig. The left

wing was to begin the attack, relying upon the support which they

would receive from the centre and the other wing, who were to accompany

the movement and cover them on the right: this, it was thought, would

be a resource in case of a want of firmness on their part, which would

not have been the case had a different disposition been preferred. If

there was an error in Blake’s disposition, it was in thus trusting

the principal attack to that part of his army upon which he had least

reliance.

Suchet, who desired nothing so much as an action, prepared to meet his

antagonist, leaving six battalions to continue the siege. At eight

in the morning his sharp-shooters were briskly driven back; and from

that moment, he says, he knew that he had to contend with troops very

unlike those of Valencia. Some strong columns outflanked him on the

left, and his right, which was a league distant from the main body, was

outflanked also by O’Donnell. Both armies began their movements at the

same time: about half way between them on the left of the Spaniards,

where the fate of the battle was to be decided, was a ridge of ground,

which offered some advantage, and which both parties endeavoured to

gain. The sharp-shooters of O’Donnell’s division running with eagerness

towards this point, drove back that part of the French cavalry which

covered the enemy’s advance: they got possession, and were supported

by two battalions and some field-pieces; but their ardour had been

inconsiderate, for they had separated too much from the columns, and

the French, who knew how to avail themselves of every opportunity which

was offered, speedily dislodged them by a well-supported charge.

This error was fatal; for the want of discipline was felt in leaving

the ground, as it had been in winning it: one battalion after another,

after a feeble resistance, was thrown into disorder, and abandoned the

field. It was now that Mahy with the reserve should have endeavoured

to support them and retrieve the day, but the order for him to attack

did not arrive in time, and he did not advance in time without it:

and seeing that the chief efforts of the enemy would now be directed

against him, and that his cavalry abandoned him on their approach, he

immediately commenced his retreat. While the fate of the left wing was

thus decided, Suchet broke through the centre: not without a brave

struggle on the part of the Spaniards. D. Juan Caro, the brother of

Romana, who commanded a body of cavalry on the left of the centre,

made a desperate charge against the enemy’s horse, though they were

supported by artillery, and defended by a mud wall. The Spaniards

leaped the wall, Colonel Ric of the grenadiers leading the way, and

cut down the French at their guns. The enemy’s reserve came up, and

the second line of the Spaniards, which should have supported them,

having been unhappily detached to reinforce the vanguard, the guns were

retaken, and Caro himself was made prisoner.

The centre of the Spanish army was now defeated: Lardizabal, however,

supported the character which he had gained at Santi Petri, and

collecting some cavalry, checked the enemy and covered the retreat of

his troops. But it was on the right that the Spaniards displayed most

resolution; and had all the army behaved like Zayas and the division

of Albuhera, Blake’s highest hopes might have been accomplished.

They, though unsupported on their left, cleared the road before them,

and when the day was lost in the other part of the field, repeatedly

repulsed the superior forces which were brought against them. By the

account of Suchet himself, the action was maintained here with great

slaughter: they covered their left with a battalion in mass, and

stood their ground till their cartridges were consumed, ... Zayas then

sent for more, but Blake ordered him to retreat. This movement was

admirably executed, all the wounded were removed, and so little were

the men dispirited, that twice they demanded to be allowed to charge

with the bayonet. They occupied the houses in the village of Puchole,

and fired from the roofs and windows; but here, by an error, for which

the commandant of the imperialists of Toledo was suspended, the remains

of the Walloon battalion were surrounded and made prisoners. When the

fugitives had reached Tuna, the reserve was ordered to retreat, and

Zayas brought them off in the face of the enemy.

This was the best action which had yet been fought by the Spaniards,

but it was most unfortunate in its results, and the issue proved but

too plainly that it ought not to have been hazarded. By the French

account 4639 prisoners were taken, four stand of colours, and sixteen

pieces of cannon; the killed and wounded were estimated at 2000 men; on

their own part they acknowledged only 128 men killed and 596 wounded.

Suchet was struck by a ball on the shoulder, General Harispe had two

horses killed under him, and two others of the French generals were

wounded: the manner in which they exposed themselves, and the number of

officers of rank whose names appeared among the wounded, prove that the

victory was not achieved without difficulty, nor without greater loss

than the official account admitted.

♦MURVIEDRO SURRENDERED.♦

The garrison of Murviedro, when they saw the battle commence, threw

their caps into the air with shouts of joy, calling to their countrymen

to come on to victory. In the evening, Suchet, leaving his army a

league from Valencia, returned to the camp: a breach had been made

during the day, which was not yet practicable, but by the fire of

some hours longer would have been rendered so; the French general had

no inclination to assault the walls again; ... it was of consequence,

he said, to profit by the victory which had been gained under the eyes

of the garrison; ... and the governor’s want of constancy, or perhaps

of integrity, enabled him to do this most effectually; for Andriani

had no sooner satisfied himself that General Caro was really taken

prisoner, than, as if the victory of the French had destroyed all

hopes, he capitulated with more than 2500 men. “Thus,” said the French,

“we became masters of a place which had so long resisted Hannibal.”

Had Andriani been as true to the cause of his country as the soldiers

under him, the second siege might possibly have become as famous as the

first. A successful assault could only have put the enemy in possession

of a fourth part of the fort, when there would have been three more

breaches to make, and three more ♦MÉMOIRES, 2. 191.♦ attacks. It was

the governor’s duty to have resisted to the last extremity; but to that

extremity he was not reduced. By Suchet’s own statement, the place was

in no danger, and notwithstanding all the efforts of his engineers and

all their skill, nothing could be less certain than the success of a

new assault.

Blake, in the orders which he issued on the following day, said that

he was dissatisfied with certain corps, and with some individuals,

and that as soon as their cowardice was juridically proved, he would

punish them with all the rigour of national justice. But in general he

declared, that the conduct both of officers and men, and especially

that of the division under Zayas, had been satisfactory. “For himself,”

he said, “he was sufficiently accustomed to the vicissitudes of war,

not to be surprised at the ill success of the action, and he was not

the less confident of being able to repel the invasion of the enemy.”

But Blake did not feel the confidence which he affected. He confessed

afterwards, that after the fall of Tarragona, the loss of Valencia

was to be apprehended; but that the brilliant manner in which the

defence of Murviedro was begun, the forces which its defence gave

time for assembling, and the spirit of the officers and troops, had

given well-founded and flattering hopes, which continued till this

battle extinguished them. From that moment, he said, nothing but what

was gloomy presented itself; only some political revolution, or other

extraordinary event, which should deprive Suchet of his expected

reinforcements, could save Valencia; and his plan was to defend the

lines which had been formed for its protection as long as possible,

without entirely compromising the safety of his army.

♦VALENCIA.♦

Valencia stands in an open plain, upon the right bank of the

Guadalaviar, about two miles from the sea. Its old ramparts were at

this time in good preservation; but works of antiquity are of little

use against the implements of modern war. They were thick walls of

brick-work, flanked with round towers at equal distances, and without

moats. The river flows at the foot of the walls the whole extent of

the eastern side, separating the city from its suburbs; the suburbs,

being of later date than the town, are more open and commodiously

built, and contain a larger population; including them, the number

of inhabitants is estimated at 82,000. The adjoining country is in

the highest state of cultivation; and the city, from its history, its

remains of antiquity, and the customs of the people, is one of the most

interesting and curious in the whole Peninsula. In no part of Spain,

nor perhaps of Christendom, were there so many religious puppet-shows

exhibited; nowhere were the people more sunk in all the superstitions

of Romish idolatry, and, if the reproaches of even the Spaniards

themselves may be credited, there was as little purity of morals as of

faith. It is a proverbial saying, that in Valencia the meat is grass,

the grass water, the men women, and the women[32] nothing. But if the

Valencians were, as a censurer has said of them, light equally in

mind and body, the cause has been wrongly imputed to their genial and

delicious climate; the state of ignorance to which a double despotism

had reduced the nation, and the demoralizing practices of the Romish

church, sufficiently account for their degradation.

The Guadalaviar at Valencia is about a hundred yards wide; it is

usually kept low, because its waters are drawn off by canals, which

render the adjoining country like a rich garden; but in the rainy

season the stream is so strong, that it has frequently swept away its

bridges. There are five of these, fine structures, and so near each

other, that all may be seen at once. Two had been broken down, and

the other three were covered by _têtes-de-pont_. There had been ample

time to provide for defence, and much labour and much cost had been

bestowed upon the works which were deemed necessary. A small ditch

filled with water was made round the wall, with a covered way; works

also were constructed to defend the gates; but the Valencians chiefly

relied upon their intrenched camp, which contained within its extensive

line the city, and the three suburbs upon the right bank. These works

were fortified with bastions, and mounted with 100 pieces of cannon;

they extended from the sea to Olivette; but as the point in which they

terminated was weak, because it could be attacked in the rear by the

left bank, other interior works were commenced, for the purpose of

insulating this from the rest of the line. The engineers relied also

upon their command of the river, meaning to cover the approaches by

inundations, and to fill the fosses of their camp, which might easily

be done, the ground being a low plain intersected by numerous canals.

♦SUCHET SUMMONS VALENCIA.♦

Suchet summoned the city the day after his victory, saying, that he

had taken 8000 prisoners, many generals, and the greater part of

Blake’s artillery, and calling upon the governor to save Valencia from

the calamities and outrages which a vain resistance must inevitably

draw upon it, and of which all the fortresses besieged and taken by

the French presented terrible examples. He promised an amnesty for

the past, offered the people his special protection, and assured them

that the French would endeavour, by generous proceedings, to make them

forget the evils of war, and the horrible anarchy in which they had

so long been plunged. Blake published this summons, and did not think

proper to reply to it; at the same time he appealed to the people as

witnesses of the valour with which the troops had fought, and the good

order in which they had effected their retreat, for the purpose of

occupying their former position.

♦HE ESTABLISHES HIMSELF IN THE SUBURB, AND IN THE PORT.♦

The enemy soon closed upon the city, and established themselves in the

suburb called Serrano, on the left bank of the river, not, however,

without considerable opposition. They won their way foot by foot,

and carried the last house by sapping and mining. Had the spirit of

which the people here gave proof been properly fostered and directed,

Valencia would have been safe. Having gained the suburb, they formed a

contravallation of three strong redoubts, having seven feet water in

their ditches, with two fortified convents and some houses, to confine

the besieged within their têtes-de-pont. The fire of the Spaniards

was well directed to annoy them during these operations; but the loss

inflicted upon the enemy by no means counterbalanced the advantage

which they had gained, in possessing themselves of the fortified

convents in the suburb. Next they occupied the Grao, which is the port

of Valencia.

Suchet’s left was now at the Grao, his right at Liria, and his centre

in the suburbs. Using every possible exertion to ensure success, he

brought up in the course of December 100 four-and-twenty pounders,

thirty mortars and howitzers; and when this formidable train was

ready, and his reinforcements had arrived, he put the army in motion

for decisive operations. On the night between the 25th and 26th of

December, two bridges were rapidly constructed by the engineers, a

league from Manisses, above all the sources of the different waters, in

order that the troops might not be engaged in a labyrinth of canals.

Blake had posted his infantry from the sea to Manisses, and his cavalry

on more elevated ground above that village, to cover his left. He had

fortified the villages of Mislata, Quarte, and Manisses, on the banks

of the river, and connected them by lines with artillery. His great

object was to keep possession of Quarte and S. Onofre; as long as that

was done, and the cavalry retained its position, it would be in his

power either to risk a general action, drawing from Valencia all the

troops for that purpose; or to evacuate the city, and leaving only a

small garrison for the purpose of capitulating, draw off and save the

great body of the army. And even if the enemy should succeed in turning

the left wing, and thus cut off his retreat by the great road, it was

scarcely possible, he thought, that the two Cullera roads should be

intercepted on both sides of the lake of Albufera.

The general’s hopes were, as usual, frustrated by the misconduct of

those in whom he trusted, and by the ♦DEC. 26.♦ rapidity of Suchet’s

movements. At daybreak the two bridges were completed, three divisions

of infantry and the whole of the horse passed, and drove back the

Spanish cavalry; and the French getting possession of the sluices,

turned the waters of the canals into the river, and thus deprived

Valencia of one means of defence on which she had relied. Another

division crossed the river between Quarte and Mislata to occupy the

Spaniards in front. Here Zayas again displayed that resolution, and

that military skill, which made him more, perhaps, than any other man

at this time the hope of the Spanish armies; but the troops on the

left, where Mahy commanded, gave way, as they had done in the former

action; they abandoned the intrenchments at S. Onofre, ... the vital

points of the line, ... without even waiting for an attack, and retired

from Manisses almost upon the first fire. Mahy, with about 5000 men,

reached Alcira, abandoning the artillery; the rest of the division was

unaccounted for; the loss in killed could have been little or none,

and the French made no boast of the numbers which they had taken; they

who were missing then must mostly have dispersed in their flight, the

unavoidable consequence when men have lost all confidence in their

leaders.

The investment of Valencia was completed before the close of the day;

and Suchet, again turning against the Spaniards those advantages of

which they had so little availed themselves, secured himself everywhere

by the canals and fosses with which the ground was intersected. Still

the lines remained which the Valencians had for three years been

employed in constructing; but after the labour, and the cost which

had been expended upon them, when the hour of need came they were

found, or thought to be, untenable. Blake, with the troops who were

without the city, might still have effected a retreat; but he wished

to save as much of the army as possible, and to prepare the people

for a catastrophe which they had never looked on to, and to which he

perceived they would not be induced to submit, till they felt the

uttermost necessity. Such, indeed, was their disposition, that men like

Santiago Sass, and D. Pedro Maria Ric, and such women as the Countess

Burita, would have protected them better than Blake with his army and

all his lines and defences.

♦THE ARMY ENDEAVOURS TO ESCAPE.♦

A council of war was held, and it was agreed unanimously that the

army should endeavour to effect its escape on the night of the 28th.

They went through the gate of S. Jose; but before they had gone far,

the advanced posts discovered them; about 300 men made their way to

the mountains under favour of the darkness, about as many more were

killed or drowned in the canals, and the rest withdrew within their

intrenchments, having no confidence in the works, nor in their general;

and their general having none in them, nor in himself, nor any hope

from without or from ♦XATIVA SURRENDERED.♦ within. An event more

discouraging than the surrender of Murviedro occurred the day after

this attempt, for the town of St. Philippe, half way on the road to

Alicante, was given up without opposition to Suchet’s advanced guard.

This place had distinguished itself in the War of the Succession for

its inflexible fidelity to the Austrian party. The inhabitants defended

themselves, as Marshal Berwick relates, with unheard-of firmness,

maintaining street by street and house by house, for eight days after

his troops were within the walls; in revenge for which he razed the

town; all the surviving inhabitants were removed to Castile, and

forbidden on pain of death ever to return; and Philip, when a new town

was erected on the ruins, abolished its old name of Xativa, and imposed

upon it that of St. Philippe.... Even the new race of inhabitants felt

this name as a reproach; and but a few months before this cowardly

surrender, the Cortes, at their petition, had passed an edict restoring

the old appellation. It was just restored in time to be disgraced.

The French found a great quantity of provisions and a million of

cartridges, ... hoarded there for this shameful end!

While the enemy succeeded thus, almost without opposition in every

thing they attempted, Blake resolved to make a second trial at

escape; but the people ♦BLAKE ABANDONS THE LINES AND RETIRES INTO THE

CITY.♦ compelled him to give up this project, and remain in patient

expectation of a fate which he no longer made an effort to avert. This

he calls an inconsiderate popular movement; but the people, who saw

their works as yet untouched, above 16,000 regular troops to defend

them, including the best officers and artillerymen in the service,

with artillery and military stores in abundance, and the population of

the city ready and eager to bear their part in the defence, might have

encouraged a general to hope, and ought to have inspired him with a

more ♦1812.♦ heroic despair. Suchet opened his trenches on the first

night of the new year; on the fourth they were advanced within fifty

toises of the ditch. Blake then called another council, the result of

which was, that the lines were abandoned, and the troops retired into

the city, taking with them their field artillery, but leaving eighty

pieces behind.

The French general says, that the astonishing desertion from the

Spanish army induced Blake to abandon these vast and important

works. Blake himself assigned no such cause, but the desertion must

undoubtedly have been very great, ... a commander who feels no hope can

excite none. The suburb of Quarte was immediately seized by the enemy,

and Suchet bombarded the city during the whole of the fifth. The next

morning he sent in a summons, “thinking,” he says, “that an army which

had just abandoned works of such strength, mounted with eighty-one

pieces of cannon, would call loudly for capitulation, now that they

saw the effects of ♦THE CITY A SECOND TIME SUMMONED. JANUARY.♦ a

bombardment upon a city which at that time contained no fewer than

200,000 souls.” The summons was in these words: ... “General, the laws

of war assign a period to the sufferings of the people; this period

has arrived. The imperial army is now within ten toises of the body of

your fortress; in some hours several breaches may be effected; and then

a general assault must precipitate the French columns into Valencia.

If you wait for this terrible moment, it will no longer be in my

power to control the fury of the soldiers, and you alone will have to

answer to God and man for the evils which must overwhelm Valencia. The

desire to spare the total ruin of a great city determines me to offer

you an honourable capitulation: I engage to preserve to the officers

their equipages, and to respect the property of the inhabitants. It

is unnecessary for me to add, that the religion we profess shall be

revered. I expect your reply in two hours, and salute you with very

high consideration.”

Blake replied, “Yesterday, perhaps before noon, I might have consented

to change the position of the army, and evacuate the city, for the

sake of saving its inhabitants from the horrors of a bombardment;

but the first twenty-four hours which your excellency has employed

in setting it on fire have taught me how much I may depend upon the

constancy of the people, and their resignation to every sacrifice

which may be necessary, in order that the army may maintain the honour

of the Spanish name. Your excellency may consequently continue your

operations; and as to the responsibility before God and man, for all

the misfortunes which the defence of the place occasions, and all

those which war brings with it, it cannot attach to me.” This ♦SUCHET

EXPECTS A DESPERATE RESISTANCE.♦ reply led Suchet to apprehend he

should have to encounter a Zaragozan resistance. “The general,” said

he in his dispatches, “is no longer the master; he is obliged to obey

the decisions of a fanatical Junta, composed of seven persons, five of

whom are Franciscan monks, and the other two butchers of Valencia; the

same who, about three years ago, directed the massacre of 400 French

families that were ordered out of the country. I therefore continue my

operations with vigour against the place, which at this present moment

counts a population of 200,000 souls. Five of the principal chiefs

of the insurgents are now within its walls, with all their property,

and whatever fanatics or madmen are yet left in Spain. The engineers

will open their works under the walls. The artillery raises formidable

batteries; and notwithstanding the rains, it will in a few days be

able to make a breach in the last enclosure. The army is waiting with

impatience for the attack, and if we should have to make a war of

houses, as at Zaragoza, it will be rendered of short continuance, by

the ability and rapidity of our miners.”

Had the Valencians resorted to this mode of defence, Suchet’s miners

would have found themselves engaged in an extraordinary subterranean

war, among the Roman sewers; but after relying so long upon the army,

and a military defence, it was too late to organize the people for that

better system, which, if it had been determined upon from the first,

might have proved successful, and which, even in its most disastrous

termination, would have added as much to the strength of Spain as to

the honour of Valencia. But Blake had nothing of the heroic character

which had been displayed so eminently in Zaragoza and Gerona. He was a

soldier, skilful enough in his profession, to have held a respectable,

perhaps a high rank, if he had commanded well-disciplined troops; and

now at the last he performed all that ♦HE BOMBARDS THE CITY.♦ the code

of military duty requires. Three days and nights Suchet bombarded

the city, which was so utterly unprovided for such an attack, that

the people had not even cellars in which to take shelter: the enemy

continued their approaches, till they had effected a lodgement in the

last houses of the suburbs, and placed mines under two of the principal

gates. Blake then offered to give up the city, on condition that he

might march out with the army. Such terms were of course rejected; a

council of war was therefore held, and terms of capitulation proposed,

to which Suchet agreed the more readily, because, according to the

system of Buonaparte, he meant to be bound by them no farther than

suited his interest, or his inclination. The troops were to be made

prisoners of war, the inhabitants and their property protected, and no

inquiry made into the conduct of those who had taken an active part

in the war. In one point the Spanish general exceeded his powers;

forgetting that he was no longer in a situation to act as one of the

Regents, and that even his free and voluntary act would have required

the consent and approbation of the other members of the executive, he

agreed that the French prisoners in Majorca, Alicant, and Carthagena,

should be exchanged.

This capitulation delivered into the hands of the enemy 16,131

effective troops of the line, besides about 2000 in the hospitals,

1800 cavalry and artillery horses, twenty-two generals, Zayas and

Lardizabal among ♦JAN. 9. BLAKE SURRENDERS THE CITY TO THE ARMY.♦

them, 893 officers, and 374 pieces of cannon. The most irreparable

loss was that of fifty good artillery officers, formed in the school

of Segovia, nearly 400 sappers and miners, and 1400 old artillerymen.

The battle of Ocaña drew after it more disastrous consequences, but

the loss in itself had been far less severe. Thus terminated General

Blake’s unfortunate career; his failure at Niebla was the only one of

his many misfortunes which was disreputable, but all experience was

lost upon him: often and severely as he had felt the want of discipline

in his troops, his obstinacy was not to be overcome, and he never would

consent that the Spanish army should be brought into an efficient state

of discipline by the English, though he had seen that a similar measure

had delivered Portugal, and must have known that it would as certainly

deliver Spain. But though the loss of a general, thus incorrigible in

error, and whose continual ill fortune was such as almost to deprive

the army under him of all hope, could not be regretted for the sake of

Spain, Blake himself, amid all his errors and misfortunes, maintained

the character of a brave man, and it was not possible to read his last

dispatch without some degree of respect as well as compassion. “I

hope,” said he, “your highness will be pleased to ratify the exchange

which has been agreed upon, and to transmit orders in consequence

to Majorca. As to what concerns myself, the exchange of officers of

my rank is so distant, that I consider the lot of my whole life as

determined; and therefore, in the moment of my expatriation, which is

equivalent to death, I earnestly entreat your highness, that if my

services have been acceptable to my country, and I have never yet done

anything to forfeit the claim, it will be pleased to take under its

protection my numerous family.”

Suchet observed the capitulation like a Frenchman of the new system.

He had promised that no man should be molested for the part which he

had taken; but no sooner was he master of the city, than he sent 1500

monks and friars prisoners into France, and executed in the public

square some of those who were most distinguished for their zeal in the

national cause.