to Monreal; each division being thus three hours’ distance from him.
The next day he moved to Sanguesa, and rested there the whole day. On
the morrow he was apprized that Caffarelli was approaching Lumbier and
Reille Caceda, both points within two hours of him: upon this he sent
his cavalry along the river Aragon to call off their attention in that
direction, while with the infantry he took his route for the mountains
of Biqueza. The two hostile divisions followed him, one on the right,
and the other on the left, hoping again to place him between two fires:
he had the start of them only half an hour, and having gained the
mountain, put his men in order to defend the post; but in the evening
the enemy moved off, meaning to take him at more advantage, and he
reached the village of Veguezal. This was on the 16th of June; the next
day he was informed that Caffarelli and Reille, with the French from
the district of the Cinco Villas, would attack him on the 18th on the
three sides of the Puerto, Navascues, and Tiermas: he eluded them all
by marching to Iruzozgui. Caffarelli followed him as far as Artieda,
which was an hour and a half’s distance. Mina was not informed of this:
they met on the way to Aoiz; the Spaniards had the good fortune to gain
a strong position upon some heights, where they were able to repulse
the enemy, notwithstanding his forces were double in number, with the
loss of more than 300 killed. This gained them a day’s respite from
their pursuers: on the 20th they learnt that Reille had again joined
Caffarelli, and Mina once more resolved to divide his force, and thus
multiply the chances of escape. Cruchaga, with the second battalion,
took his course toward Roncesvalles, and he with the first and third
marched for Zubiri. On his way he learnt that the French in Aoiz had
been 6000 foot and 700 horse, who were now thus disposed of; 4000 were
marching to Zubiri, 2000 with 400 horse to the town of Urroz, and
Reille with 300 horse was gone to Pamplona; 200 who had escorted the
wounded were also on their way to Zubiri with a supply of ammunition.
Fearful as this intelligence was, his men ate their rations with
composure, and then amidst incessant rain turned to Larrainzar; ...
from thence he sent his third battalion to Bustan, and he himself, with
the remaining one marched for the village of Illarse. His own danger
was not diminished by this separation, for it seemed of more importance
to the enemy to secure his single person than to destroy the troop;
they followed close upon the scent: from Illarse they pursued him to
Villanueva in Araguil, where he arrived at night, and from whence he
set out at two in the morning: as little was he able to rest at Echarri
Aranaz; from thence, through the Puerto de Tizatraga, he made for the
Puerto de Lezaun; still they were close upon him; he got on to Los
Arcos, and the enemy halted at Estella, twelve miles distant.
The French had formed their plan for hunting him down with perfect
knowledge of the country, meaning to hem him in on all sides among the
mountains; and they had assembled not only all their troops in Navarre
for this service, but had drawn soldiers from Alava also, and from part
of Castille, and were aided by reinforcements from France. Not less
than 12,000 men were now employed against him. Mina, however, knew
the ground as well as his pursuers, and never losing hope, and never
without resources, he once more divided his men into small moveable
columns, which he dispersed among the mountains in contrary directions,
but with such instructions, that whenever a favourable opportunity
arrived, the reunion might be effected as rapidly as before. The
French were thus compelled either to extend their line so far that
their strength would not be sufficient to cover it, or else to keep it
together without any object upon which they could bring it to bear. As
he expected, they found themselves at fault, and before they knew how
to act, or where to seek him, he had reunited his three battalions and
all his cavalry in Estella, where Cruchaga, with the other battalion,
hastened to join him, after having attacked the enemy in Roncesvalles,
killed and wounded twenty-five of them, and driven the rest into their
fort.
Mina’s reputation was greatly raised by the ability with which he
extricated himself from so many dangers, and the loss which he so
frequently inflicted upon the enemy; but these persevering efforts of
the French had the desired effect of rendering it impossible for him
to undertake any enterprise which might tend to the relief ♦SUCHET, T.
2. 20. TARRAGONA.♦ of Figueras, or, by disturbing Suchet in Aragon,
operate in aid of Tarragona. That city, one of the most remarkable
in Spain for its monuments of antiquity, and for the historical
circumstances connected with it, stands about the distance of a
musket-shot from the sea shore, on a steep and rocky ♦ESPAÑA SAGRADA,
T. 24. P. 69.♦ eminence, where (in the words of Florez) it commands
and enjoys a free air, a clear sky, and its own fertile plain. Its
foundation being in an age beyond the reach of history, has been
variously ascribed to Tubal, Hercules, Teucer, Remus, a king of Egypt,
and a colony of Phocæans, by fablers who sought in their inventions
to gratify that allowable and useful pride which citizens learn to
take in the place of their birth and abode ... or to accredit their
own theories, or to support some baseless etymology of its name. This
alone is certain, that it was a considerable place before ♦YCART.
GRANDEZAS DE TARRAGONA, 65.♦ the Romans and Carthaginians contended
for the dominion of Spain; and the remains of its more ♦LABORDE VOYAGE
PITTORESQUE. INTROD. P. 31.♦ ancient walls, which excited the wonder
of antiquaries in the sixteenth century, excite in the present age
their sagacity, their conjectures, and their doubts; for, though
resembling those which are called Cyclopean in magnitude and solidity,
they differ from them in construction. The Scipios so greatly enlarged
and embellished it, as almost to be considered its refounders; and
on the division of the Peninsula under the Romans, it gave name to
that province which had before been called Citerior Spain. Augustus,
according to fond Spaniards, issued from Tarragona his ever memorable
decree that all the world should be taxed: here it was that the palm
was said to have grown upon his altar during his life; and the year
after his death the inhabitants sent deputies to Rome, soliciting
permission to erect a temple to him as a god: ... a fragment of that
altar, a single stone of that temple, and a few medals, are now the
only remains of their vile and impious adulation. When Galba was
declared ♦SUETONIUS.♦ emperor, the crown of gold for his inauguration
was taken from the temple of Jupiter in this city. The Egyptian Isis
was worshipped here, and the African goddess Cœlestis: and when
the Romish church had corrupted Christianity with the polytheism
and idolatry of Pagan Rome, changing the names, but retaining the
superstition, the craft, and the sin, it was then inferred that
Santiago _must_ have sanctified Tarragona by his presence, it being
certain that he was at Zaragoza when our Lady descended there with the
pillar from heaven. When the barbarians in the reign of ♦OROSIUS, L.
7. § 15.♦ Gallienus first entered Spain, Tarragona was reduced by them
almost to a heap of ruins; and it was the last place in that country
which the Romans retained. Many of the Gothic kings coined money there.
It underwent a second destruction from the Moors, in revenge for the
resolution with which the inhabitants resisted them. Louis the Pious
recovered it from them at the beginning of the 9th century, but the
Christians could not hold it long; nor is it known by whom it was
finally taken from the Mahommedans, nor when, except that it was some
time in the 11th century, ... an uncertainty, which shows how slowly it
had risen ♦ORDERICUS VITALIS, 892, QUOTED BY FLOREZ, T. 25. P. 116.♦
from its ruins. Indeed, when Oldegar was made archbishop there, in the
year 1116, large oak and beech-trees were growing in the cathedral.
This personage, eminent during his life, as a politic prelate and saint
militant, and as a worker of miracles after his death, refortified the
city, and may be said to have refounded it.
The ruined and almost desolate city, with all belonging or which ought
to belong thereunto, was given to this prelate and his successors in
the see, under the Romish church, by the Count of Barcelona, Ramon
♦FLOREZ, T. 25. APP. NO. V.♦ Berenguer 3; the deed of gift transferring
to the archbishop full power of every kind, stipulating only for an
alliance offensive and defensive with the Tarragonans. Oldegar, finding
that after ten years his means were not sufficient to complete the
cathedral, or to defend the city, transferred the grant to ♦ORDERICUS
VITALIS, L. 13. § 5. FLOREZ, T. 10. APP. ULT.♦ be held as a feud under
the see to a Norman knight, Rodbert Burdet by name, who had married
in that land, and had acquired there considerable possessions and a
great name; but ♦DIAGO. CONDES DE BARCELONA, P. 183.♦ this family, a
branch whereof continues to flourish in England, seems to have taken
no root in Spain. The tithes both of the sea and land were reserved
for the see: ... those of the nuts[26] alone from the Selva de Avellana
are said to have yielded in some years a thousand escudos. Funds for
completing the cathedral, the largest and massiest in Catalonia, were
raised by a contribution which the Pope imposed upon the suffragan
bishops, and by soliciting alms in aid of the work throughout the
province: but the city never recovered even a semblance of its former
prosperity. ♦FLOREZ, T. 24. 69.♦ Its circumference is now little more
than two miles, and the river Francoli, which, when it bore its ancient
name of Tulcis, ran close to Tarragona, is now a mile distant from
it. War had not been the cause of this improsperity; for after its
restoration, the Moors never attempted it; it suffered little in the
revolt of the Catalans; and nothing in the Succession War, the English
being received there by the inhabitants, and retiring from it after the
peace of Utrecht. But at the time when it might otherwise have partaken
the improvement which was then general in Spain, the neighbouring
town of Reus made an extraordinary advance in industry and opulence,
trebling its population in the course of fifteen years; and making Salo
its port, it had the effect rather of taking from Tarragona what trade
it might have had, than of contributing to it.
When this unexpected war commenced, Tarragona was deemed so little
important as a fortress, that its garrison consisted only of fifty
men; it was now the only strong place which the Catalans possessed
upon the coast; every exertion had been made to strengthen its works,
and they who relied upon fortresses regarded it as the last bulwark of
Catalonia. The city was crowded with fugitives from the open country
and from towns in the enemy’s possession; there was a strong garrison;
and Tarragona had this advantage above every other place in the
province which had yet been besieged, that supplies and reinforcements
could at all times be thrown in by sea. Captain Codrington was in the
roads with the Blake, Invincible, and Centaur, ready to aid in any way
wherein the zeal and intrepidity of British seamen could be rendered
available. Under these circumstances, the spirit of the principality
being what it was, and Valencia with unexhausted resources close at
hand, a resolution like that of the Zaragozans and Geronans, or an
influencing mind like that of Palafox or of Mariano Alvares, would have
baffled all the efforts of the enemy; and unity of counsels, with a
competent leader in the field, might have rendered the siege fatal to
the besiegers. There were men and means in abundance; the inhabitants
as well as the garrison were prepared to act or to suffer; neither
will nor resolution were wanting; but there was no commanding mind, no
harmony of purpose; some hearts were accessible to fear, and some to
corruption. This Count Suchet knew, and could calculate as certainly
upon confusion and perplexity in their counsels as upon steadiness and
method in his own.
♦MAY 2.
SIEGE OF TARRAGONA.♦
He established his head-quarters at Reus: the inhabitants of that
busy town had been properly rewarded for the inclination which
they had shown toward the French; and their hatred toward them now
was in proportion to their sufferings and their repentance. Suchet
endeavoured to win them over by maintaining strict discipline, and by
courting the chief authorities, civil and religious. Expecting also an
obstinate resistance, he prepared extensive hospitals with all things
necessary to receive his wounded, and made arrangements for removing
them without delay from the trenches; measures whereby he deserved
and obtained the affections of the soldiery in a greater degree than
any other of the French generals in Spain. He pushed the siege with
characteristic vigour, and had soon the satisfaction to learn that
Campoverde, having ♦CAMPOVERDE ENTERS THE CITY AFTER A DEFEAT.♦ been
defeated before Figueras in attempting to relieve that fortress, had
hastened back to Tarragona by sea with the remainder of his troops,
who were more likely to dispirit the garrison by the distrust which
they had conceived of themselves and of their commander, than to bring
any increase of real strength. Sarsfield remained with one division
in the field, and threatened the enemy’s line from Mora to Reus. This
brave and enterprising officer annoyed them on that side; and that part
of the besieging army which was encamped on the high and dry level
ground at a distance from the Francoli and the Gaya, suffered for want
of water, having continually to repair and protect the aqueduct. The
most important of the outworks were Fort Francoli, on the left bank
of the river to the west of the city, and Fort Olivo: the latter was
a new fort, about 400 toises to the north, on ground so high that it
could not with safety have been left unoccupied; and this it was deemed
necessary to reduce before any attack could be made upon the body of
the place. On the part of the enemy’s engineers everything was done
which could be expected from a thorough practical knowledge of their
destructive art; and so vigorously were their advances resisted by the
Spaniards, that the wounded who were carried to the French hospitals
are stated by Suchet himself to have been from fifty to threescore
daily during the siege of this outwork. The Spaniards estimated them
as nearer 300. In one of the sorties General Salme was killed; his
body was buried under a part of the aqueduct; his heart embalmed, and
deposited under that well-known monument which is called the Tomb of
the ♦FORT OLIVO BETRAYED.♦ Scipios. Olivo held out till the night of
the 29th; nor would it then have been taken had there not been found
a wretch wicked enough to sell the blood of his comrades and the
interests of his country. The garrison, consisting of 2000, was to be
changed that night, the regiment of Illiberia returning into the town,
and that of Almeira taking its place: the French presented themselves
at the same time with the new garrison, while a false attack was made
in another quarter, and entered with them; others found their way
through a dry aqueduct, which the Spaniards had neglected either to
destroy or properly to secure, and Fort Olivo was thus taken, some 800
Spaniards being made prisoners, and more than as many slain. For the
information which led to this carnage a price had been bargained, and
the money[27] was paid.
♦GENERAL CONTRERAS.♦
At this time General Senen de Contreras arrived at Tarragona in a
frigate from Cadiz. He had distinguished himself when a young man, by
abridging the voluminous Military Reflections of the Marquis de Santa
Cruz, and was thought to have studied his profession so well that he
was sent by Charles III. on a travelling mission, to examine into
the military institutions of other countries. On this service he was
employed four years, visiting England, France, Prussia, Austria, and
Russia, and in the campaign of 1788 he served against the Turks. In the
war against revolutionary France he acted as aide-de-camp to General
Urretia in the Pyrenees; and in the present contest had afforded a
timely support to the Portugueze in Alemtejo and Algarve, ... had been
in the retreat of the central army, gaining some partial successes in
those disastrous days, ... and afterwards, in some critical situations
and some important stations, supported the reputation which he had
obtained. He landed now at Tarragona in an inauspicious hour, and had
immediately a command entrusted to him at the gate opposite Fort Olivo,
where he passed the first unhappy night after his arrival in receiving
the fugitives. On the following morning Campoverde assembled his chief
officers and the deputies of the superior Junta: it was agreed that an
effort for raising the siege should be made in the field; and while
the general in chief should be thus ♦CONTRERAS APPOINTED TO COMMAND IN
THE CITY.♦ employed, Contreras was appointed to command in the city.
The danger of the place, and the numerous defects of its incomplete
works, were obvious to all military men; and to no one more clearly
than to the general who now unwillingly took upon himself the charge
of defending it. He represented ♦JUNE.♦ that he was neither acquainted
with the troops and officers whom he was to command, nor with the
civil authorities with whom he should have to act, nor with the people
on whose energetic aid he must rely, nor with the place itself (of
which not even a plan could be produced), having, in fact, none of
that information which might be considered indispensable for such a
command. With this responsibility, however, Contreras was left; and
Campoverde ♦CAMPOVERDE GOES OUT TO ACT IN THE FIELD.♦ departed by sea
with his staff, and so many officers (every man seeming to act at his
own pleasure), that of the regiments in the garrison only two were left
with their own colonels or proper commanders. He issued a proclamation
before his departure, promising to return in the course of six or
eight days with an army, and make an effort, which was to be seconded
by the garrison, for raising the siege. The new commander had no
expectation that this promise would be performed; but the garrison and
the inhabitants looked with confidence to its fulfilment, ... for the
Spaniards are a hopeful people, and, all circumstances considered, they
had on no former occasion had such reasonable ground for hope. They
had lost about 3000 men during the siege, which they supposed to be a
less loss than the French had sustained, and they could more easily be
reinforced. If, indeed, the same means of defence had been resorted to
here as in Zaragoza and Gerona, Tarragona, defective as its works were,
must have been impregnable; it was secure against famine; it was in no
danger of pestilence; and its numbers might always have been kept up.
The enemy had broken the aqueduct, expecting to distress the besieged
by reducing them to use the brackish water of their wells; but in this
he was deceived, for no distress was occasioned by it. The very sight
of the English squadron, and the constant communication with it, and
its aid on all opportunities, contributed greatly to the confidence
which was felt.
Contreras did not partake that confidence; his measures, however, were
such as might support it. He established a military police; he formed
the inhabitants into companies; and he employed the women in such
services as they were capable of performing. On their part, indeed, a
spirit was manifested such as the time required; no danger deterred
them from administering refreshments to the soldiers at their stations,
nor from bearing away the wounded: it was sometimes necessary to
restrain their ardour, but on no occasion did it need excitement. The
military chest was almost exhausted; the commander replenished it by
levying a contribution upon those merchants who had retired to Villa
Nueva with their effects. He gave ear to no overtures from the enemy
of whatever kind. When Suchet proposed a suspension of hostilities,
that the dead might be interred who lay in heaps around Fort Olivo, in
sight from the ramparts of the city, even that proposal was rejected;
and in that hot season of the year, and on that rocky soil where graves
could not be dug, the French, for their own sakes, were compelled as
long as the siege continued to consume the slain by fire.
♦FORT FRANCOLI ABANDONED.♦
They gave the fort which they had won the name of Salme, from the
general who had fallen before it. And now their attacks were directed
against Fort Francoli, which they reduced at length to such a state
that the commandant found it necessary to abandon it as untenable,
destroying such stores as he could not remove. Hitherto there had
been no want of firmness in the besieged; but vigour, confidence,
and unanimity were wanting among their leaders. Three members of the
supreme Junta were in the city, in order that the civil power might
through them afford all the aid which the military might require: this
they did most unreservedly; but the proposals which they made met with
no correspondent consideration, and the soldiers complained of the
inaction in which they were kept. When Campoverde first entered the
place, it was supposed that he had invested Sarsfield with powers to
act for him both as governor-general of the province and ♦SARSFIELD.♦
commander in the field; but Sarsfield was soon called after him to
Tarragona, and remained there after he had departed. This general
was one of the best officers in the Spanish service for an inferior
command, ... an intelligent, enterprising, intrepid, and honourable
man; but he was punctilious and irritable, and thought less of his
country and his duty than of his own personal importance, ... differing
in this most widely from Eroles, of whose high reputation and higher
virtues he was so jealous, that he regarded him with a dislike little
short of personal enmity. This same unhappy temper made it impossible
for him to act cordially with Contreras. In the field he might have
been far more serviceable than in the fortress, for in the field it
was that the best service might have been effected, and the French
acknowledged and feared his activity as a partisan; but though he kept
up that character in the sallies which he directed, his impractical
disposition marred all his better qualities. What he did ♦CATALUÑA
ATRIBULADA, 13.♦ was without consulting the governor; he neither
thought it necessary to concert operations with him, nor even to inform
him of the results.
♦TROOPS SENT TO REINFORCE THE GARRISON, AND LANDED ELSEWHERE.♦
Meantime the siege was pressed with the utmost skill and exertions;
and on the part of the Spaniards there was as much want of concert
and ability without the walls as within. Troops were twice sent from
Carthagena to reinforce the place, and both times without arms, so
that when they arrived they were useless, there being already 2000
men there more than there were weapons for; and therefore by desire
of Contreras they were carried on to Villa Nueva, there to be armed,
if Campoverde could arm them, or to take their own course! And on the
part of Campoverde himself there was such uncertainty, such seeming
apathy, that the British officers, who were exerting themselves with
indefatigable zeal, apprehended the worst consequences from the
incapacity which they now perceived in him. O’Donell, now Conde de
Bisbal, was not yet sufficiently recovered from his wound to take the
field: his services were never more needed than at this time, when
there was no lack of means or men, only of hearts and heads to direct
them. He consulted, however, with his brother, who had a command in
the Valencian army, and in concert with him and Captain Codrington
it was agreed that 4000 of the best Valencian troops should be sent
in British ships to reinforce the garrison, while the rest of that
army should move to the banks of the Ebro, and there, in concert
with the Aragonese, threaten Suchet’s depôts, the movement which of
all others he apprehended most. These troops, under General Miranda,
were accordingly embarked at Peñiscola, with written orders to land
at Tarragona; the intention being that they should join in a sally,
which Captain Codrington thought could not fail of success. Miranda,
however, refused to land, protesting that both his written and verbal
instructions forbade him to shut himself up in the fortress with his
division. This was neither the place nor the time for disputing; and
as little good service can be expected from one in whom good will is
evidently wanting, the division landed at Villa Nueva, according to
Campoverde’s desire, that they might join him at Igualada, and act upon
the besiegers’ flank.
Suchet, meantime, was not without uneasiness: he had already lost 2500
men, including 280 officers; and hitherto the chief advantage which he
had gained had been obtained less by force of arms than by corruption.
But the feeble irresolution of the Spanish leaders and their ruinous
delays gave him time, by which he profited like one who knew its value;
and on the evening of the 21st he assaulted the lower town; three
breaches had been made, and with all its defences, it was in the course
of an hour in his hands, at the cost of about 500 men. It is said that
the same means for insuring success had been provided here as at Fort
Olivo[28]. With the exception of a small number, all the Spaniards
were put ♦THE LOWER TOWN TAKEN.♦ to the sword in the town, at the port,
in the houses, and in pursuit ... to the gates of the upper town; only
160 prisoners were taken, most of whom were wounded; no more than these
were spared, while the number of bodies which the French collected and
burnt amounted to 1350. Suchet then held forth a threat which he had
now shown, that the troops whom he commanded were capable of carrying
into effect: “I ♦SUCHET’S THREAT.♦ fear much,” said he, “that if the
garrison wait for the assault in their last hold, I shall be forced to
set a terrible example, and intimidate Catalonia and Spain for ever by
the destruction of a whole city!”
Sarsfield, who was slightly wounded in this action, embarked
immediately to join Campoverde and act in the field; this he did
without informing Contreras of his intention, and at a moment when
his presence was more needful than it had been at any former time.
An officer was appointed to succeed him as soon as his departure was
known; but before that officer could repair to his post, the enemy had
forced it, and were ♦THE MOLE AT TARRAGONA.♦ masters of the mole. Ten
years had not quite elapsed since that port had been a scene of proud
rejoicing, the King and Queen of Spain having visited it to inspect
the works at the mole, which having been commenced in the year 1790,
were then on the point of completion. The quarries being near at hand,
an enormous stone had been prepared for this occasion, on which an
image of Neptune, ten feet high, was placed, with one hand reining the
dolphin on which he stood, with the other holding his trident. The
huge mass was raised by the exertions of three hundred men, and let
down into its place in the sea. Neptune descending with it as into
his own empire, amid the sound of music, and the festive discharge
of artillery, and the exulting acclamations of myriads of beholders.
The beach which on that day had been lined with happy multitudes was
soon to become the scene of the most atrocious tragedy in this whole
dreadful war.
♦CAMPOVERDE’S INACTIVITY.♦
The Junta of Tarragona were now so indignant at the conduct of
Campoverde, whose futile movements at this crisis were as injurious as
his inactivity, that they enclosed to him his own proclamation, issued
at the time of his departure, wherein he had promised to relieve them
in the course of a few days. Three weeks had now elapsed; he had been
reinforced with 4000 Valencian troops on whom he had not counted when
that promise was made; and there was a general outcry against his
unfitness for the command. Eroles alone acted with the spirit which the
exigence required, and succeeded in capturing a convoy of 500 laden
mules between Mora and Falset, and cutting off part of their escort.
Wherever his services were most needed there he was always to be found,
... seeking as little to aggrandize as to spare himself, his single
object being the deliverance of his country. The magazines at Reus were
not so well provided but that the loss of these supplies would have
been felt by the besiegers, if the city had been defended after the
manner of Gerona. But the Geronans were commanded by a man of the old
heroic stamp, and they had no base examples to discourage them: whereas
the garrison and the people of Tarragona saw nothing in the conduct of
their leaders and their countrymen but what was disheartening. While
the gun-boats and launches of the British squadron were employed every
night, and all night long, in annoying the enemy’s working parties,
there were two Spanish frigates which remained quiet spectators. While
the English were removing women, children, and wounded, in their
transports to Villa ♦ILL BEHAVIOUR OF THE SPANISH FRIGATES.♦ Nueva,
those frigates would not receive on board their wounded countrymen
who were sent off to them; and these poor creatures were left to lie
without assistance of any kind in the boats which brought them off till
relief was sent them from the British ships. This heartless disregard
of all duty called forth strong remonstrances from General Doyle,
as well as from Captain Codrington; and it was not till above 2000
people had been removed in our transports that the positive orders of
Contreras, and the threat of General Doyle, that the captain of one of
their frigates should be put under arrest if he refused to receive the
wounded, compelled them to act as if they had some sense of honour and
humanity. Had the Spaniards in the fortress and in the field displayed
as much spirit and alacrity as was manifested by the British ships in
their aid, Contreras has declared that Tarragona could not have been
taken.
♦COL. SKERRET ARRIVES WITH BRITISH TROOPS.♦
Suchet meantime pushed his attacks vigorously against the only
remaining defences of the city, aware that he had no time to lose, and
that if preparations were made for defending the streets and houses,
a war of that kind might detain him till efficient succours should
arrive by sea. Sir Edward Pellew, who had just taken the command of
the Mediterranean fleet, was hastening with all speed to assist the
besieged; and when the enemy’s batteries for forming a breach were
almost completed, a detachment of 2000 British troops under Colonel
Skerret arrived from Cadiz in the bay. He landed with his engineers,
and they perceived how ill the front which the French threatened was
able to withstand such batteries as would presently be opened against
it. There was but one point now at which a disembarkation could be
effected, and that point was flanked by the enemy. The disembarkation
would nevertheless have been made, and these troops would have saved
Tarragona, or fallen in its defence, if Contreras had not recommended
that they should co-operate with Campoverde from without: their
presence, he thought, might goad that general on to action, and give
reasonable hope of some decisive success in the field, from which alone
he looked for deliverance. Besides, he said, the garrison was numerous
enough; and as soon as the enemy should have opened their trenches,
and begun to batter in breach, he had determined to abandon the place,
thinking it of more importance to preserve 7000 fine troops, than to
defend the ruins of Tarragona. Skerret, therefore, met Eroles, who
came from Campoverde; and they agreed with Doyle and Codrington, that
the best plan would be for a sally to be made from the town with 4000
men, and Skerret at the same time to land and join in it. But when they
came to consult with Campoverde himself and with Sarsfield, doubts and
difficulties were started; other schemes were proposed, discussed, and
rejected, and at length a written project of Campoverde’s was assented
to. He had just before required 3000 of the best troops from the
garrison: Contreras said, he would not commit such an error as to send
them: he sent, however, one of the regiments which had been specified.
Meantime, precious hours were let pass unprofitably by the Spaniards,
and the French the while were unremittingly active in their operations.
♦TARRAGONA TAKEN BY ASSAULT.♦
On the 28th a breach had been made between two bastions capable of
only two, or, at the most, three men abreast. That afternoon there was
a strong cannonade: it ceased, and a dispatch came off from Contreras
to the squadron, saying that the British guns had silenced the enemy’s
batteries, that very little harm had been done to the place, and that
the breach was nothing; yet he said, knowing the city was not tenable,
he had determined upon leaving it with the garrison next day. While
the British officer was reading this dispatch, the enemy were seen
from the ships storming the breach, and in half an hour the place was
carried. The Spaniards, disheartened by all the previous events of the
siege, ... betrayed by some, and by others deceived and disappointed,
... abandoned themselves now: they were seized with a sudden panic;
... and there is nothing to alleviate, nothing to mingle with and
modify the horror wherewith the ensuing tragedy will be regarded as
long as the history of these times shall be held in remembrance. The
scene was shameful as well as shocking. Instead of maintaining the
breach, as the people of Gerona had done when suffering under disease
and famine; instead of attempting to cut their way through the enemy,
which at one time had less wisely and less generously been intended,
the soldiers fled. Without the satisfaction of selling their lives
dearly, or the sense of duty to console them in death, they suffered
themselves to be butchered without resistance. Some of the officers
tried every means to rally their men, but such efforts were in vain;
that moral discipline had been neglected by which Zaragoza and Gerona
have rendered themselves for ever worthy of admiration. The governor of
the place, Gonzalez, with a handful of brave men, defended himself till
the last, and fell. Contreras was wounded, and taken prisoner. The last
effort was made before the cathedral, whither a multitude of Spaniards
had betaken themselves; some in the vain hope that the sanctity of
the place might protect them, some that they might die before their
altars, and some to avail themselves of the vantage ground afforded by
the ascent, which is by a flight of threescore steps. The conquerors
made their way up under a destructive fire; and their fury, according
to Suchet, knew no bounds, till upon entering the cathedral they beheld
nine hundred wounded lying on the ♦MÉMOIRES, 2. 105.♦ pavement. Their
bayonets, he says, respected them; and he commends what he calls this
trait of humanity. Little was shown elsewhere; but the carnage was
chiefly among the inhabitants. Many thousands who had got over the
ramparts or through the embrasures, or through the gate of St. Antonio,
fled along the beach. The French field artillery and the batteries
opened a fire upon this mixed and flying multitude on one part; and on
another the cavalry charged among them, sabring the women and children,
and trampling them down.
♦MASSACRE AT TARRAGONA.♦
These execrable conquerors kept up a heavy fire upon the landing-place,
where women and children stood grouped together, crowding to the
British boats; and they endeavoured to sink the boats that were
employed in this service of humanity. Suchet stated in his official
account that four thousand men were killed in the city, and a thousand
sabred or drowned in endeavouring to make their escape, ... “a horrible
massacre had been made,” he said, “with little loss on the side of the
conquerors; the terrible example which he had foreseen had taken place,
and would be long remembered in Spain!” From the Spaniards and from our
own officers we learned what was the nature of this example, which,
because it was threatened, must be believed to have been predetermined!
More than 6000 unresisting persons were butchered; old and young,
man and woman, mother and babe; and when the enemy had satiated
their thirst for blood they turned to the perpetration of crimes
more damnable than murder. In the streets and in the churches they
violated women who had escaped their first fury, only to suffer now
worse horrors before they died. Nuns and wives, and widows in the hour
when they were widowed, girls and children, were seized on by these
monsters, ... and, retaining their cruelty when rage and lust were
palled, they threw many of these victims, and of the wounded Spaniards,
into the burning houses.
There were officers in this accursed army whose hearts revolted at
the wicked service in which they were engaged, and who at all times
redeemed themselves as far as they could by acts of individual
humanity. What little mercy was shown at Tarragona ... little indeed it
was, ... was owing to such men. But General Suchet was of the school
of terrorists[29]; his intention was to intimidate Catalonia and the
whole of Spain by this terrible example; and on the following morning
he ordered the Alcaldes and Corregidores from the surrounding country
to be brought together and led through the streets of Tarragona, that
they might see the bodies ♦CONTRERAS, P. 72.♦ which were lying there,
and report to their countrymen what they might expect if they dared
attempt resistance to the French! If, indeed, at ♦CAMPOVERDE RESOLVES
TO ABANDON CATALONIA.♦ any time it were possible to intimidate such a
people as the Catalans, who in all ages have shown the same invincible
resolution, it would have been now, when the last bulwark of the
province had fallen. By some strange imprudence the greater part of
their ammunition had been deposited there, and very little remained in
those parts of the country which were yet free. There still remained in
the field the remains of an army which they had clothed and armed at
their own cost, as well as raised among themselves; and which, often
as it had been defeated, had nevertheless shown a braver countenance
to the enemy, and inflicted upon him greater loss than any other in
the Spanish ♦JULY 1.♦ service. The general, however, held a council of
war at Cervera; the usual course when a commander wishes to shift from
himself the ignominy of the measures which he is prepared to take. It
was proposed to abandon the province, as if farther resistance were
hopeless. Eroles was not present; and though Sarsfield, who was the
first to give his opinion, declared that any one who should vote for
such an abandonment would be a traitor to his country, and that he and
his division would stand or fall with the principality, he received
only a faint and false support from Campoverde, and was consequently
outvoted; and an aid-de-camp of the general was sent to inform Captain
Codrington that they were on their march to Arens, there to embark,
leaving their horses on the beach. Codrington replied, that having
brought the Valencians thither for a special service, he felt himself
bound in duty to take their division on board, and return them to
the general and kingdom by which they had been spared; but that
he would not embark the army of Catalonia, and thus make himself a
party concerned in the abandonment of a province which he was sent
to protect. Upon receiving this answer, Campoverde determined upon
marching into Aragon, ... not upon any brave attempt, but for the
chance of making his way into some safer country; a determination which
so dismayed the Valencians, that nearly 2000 of them dispersed, as well
knowing how much better they could shift for themselves individually
than they were likely to fare in such an undertaking. The commander
now began to perceive that as the English would not take away his army
by sea, neither would the troops follow him by land; and there was a
general call that Eroles should take upon himself the command. ♦EROLES
REFUSES TO LEAVE IT.♦ But Eroles, who acted always from a worthier
motive than ambition, replied to the Junta of generals who would have
conferred it upon him in obedience to the voice of the people, that as
long as any of those who were his superior officers remained in the
principality, he must decline it; but that whenever, in pursuance of
the resolution which had been taken, they should pass the boundaries,
he would then, however unwillingly, take upon him that duty, rather
than see his country thrown into the worse anarchy which must otherwise
ensue.
♦GENERAL LACY ARRIVES TO TAKE THE COMMAND.♦
That anarchy began already to be felt. The superior Junta at Solsona
were left to learn as they could the resolution that had been taken of
withdrawing the army which they had raised and provided; and deserters
were already collecting in bands and acting as guerrillas, or as
banditti, as opportunity invited. But the Junta, when they laid their
situation (dissembling nothing) before the British admiral, assured
him that they would persevere in the contest, because they knew that
the Catalans were more than ever unanimous in their abhorrence of
the invaders. Tarragona had been betrayed, not conquered: the enemy
might congratulate themselves upon their good fortune, not upon
victories well contested and fairly won; ... this was the language of
the people. At this crisis, General Luis Lacy arrived upon the coast
to take the command: the Duque del Infantado had been talked of for
it, and the Catalans wished for him; but the Duke was more in his
place at Cadiz; and a fitter commander than Lacy could not at that
time have been sent to a charge which might seem so hopeless. Eroles,
after a fruitless endeavour to meet him, sent him full information
of the state of affairs, and promised to support him in the command
whereto he was regularly appointed with all the personal exertions
of which he was capable, and all the ♦JULY 9.♦ influence that he
possessed in this his native province. The French were just then
endeavouring to cut off the Valencian division, and their movements
made the communication difficult between the army and the coast. The
remainder of that division, however (reduced to 2400, though not a man
had fallen, for they had never faced the enemy), made their way to
Arens de Mar, and were there embarked, Eroles detaining the enemy by a
feint at Mataro. Lacy then assumed the command of an army which he said
was non-existent: “Bad as I expected to find things,” said he, “they
are infinitely worse; and my only consolation must be, that there is
absolutely nothing left for me to lose.”
♦MONTSERRATE TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
The fortified points which the Catalans still retained were Berga,
Montserrate (for this had been made a military post), Figueras,
Cardona, and the Seu d’Urgel. Berga was dismantled by Lacy, because he
was unable to defend it, and it might have been a useful hold for the
French. Orders arrived from Paris to demolish Tarragona, preserving
only a redoubt there, to reduce Montserrate, and then prepare to march
against the kingdom of Valencia. Suchet was at the same time created
a marshal of the empire for his services; the massacre at Tarragona
was considered as no reproach to him, or the army by which it had been
perpetrated. By General Rogniat’s advice, the works which surrounded
the upper town were preserved, because they might be defended by a
thousand men: the other works were destroyed, and the greater part of
the artillery removed to Tortosa. Montserrate was then attacked; ...
its former peaceful inhabitants had removed to Majorca, and taken with
them in time the treasures of their sanctuary. Great enterprise and
activity were displayed in the attack; and the garrison, confiding too
much in the natural strength of the mountain, suffered themselves to be
surprised from its heights. This was a severe loss to the Catalans; for
it was now their chief depôt, and they had counted upon its security.
The ♦FALL OF FIGUERAS.♦ last calamity in this series of misfortunes
was the fall of Figueras. When it had been blockaded between four and
five months, and all the horses were eaten, the garrison sallied, and
attempted to force their way through the besiegers. An aid-de-camp of
the governor had deserted and given information of their purpose; the
enemy therefore were prepared to receive them; nevertheless they made
their way to the _abattis_, formed of trunks of trees, which they found
impenetrable; ♦AUGUST 19.♦ and after three attempts in the course of
one day, these gallant men were compelled to capitulate, three sacks of
flour being all the provisions which were left. During two preceding
days they had employed themselves in destroying whatever could be of
use to the enemy. Honourable terms were obtained, and Martinez was
made to say in his dispatch to his own Government that the garrison
were treated by the French with the generosity which characterises
that nation. That phrase would be rightly understood by ♦BASE USAGE
OF THE PRISONERS TAKEN THERE.♦ the Spaniards. It had been stipulated
that they should march out with their baggage, and deliver their arms
on the glacis. But no sooner had they given up their arms than they
were plundered; and they were marched into France in such a state
of destitution, that they were indebted for needful covering to the
humanity of the towns through which they passed. Eight hundred peasants
were among these prisoners. Buonaparte sent them to the hulks at Brest
and Rochefort, and there they were compelled to work with the convicts,
being distinguished from them only by a dress of different colour, not
by any difference in[30] treatment.
When Figueras had been recovered from the enemy, it was asserted in the
Government gazette, that in consequence of that event the French had
abandoned Hostalrich and Gerona, and that the English had taken Rosas;
so readily did the Spaniards listen even to the idlest rumours of
success! The French in like manner believing, or professing to believe,
what they wished, gave out upon their recapture of this fortress
that the war in Catalonia was ended: so M. Macdonald affirmed in his
dispatches; and the vain boast was repeated in the Barcelonan journal,
though in that city undeniable proofs of its falsehoods were daily and
hourly received. One of the most remarkable men whom these troubles
had drawn from obscurity into active life was Jose ♦MANSO.♦ Manso, who
at the commencement of the struggle followed the humble occupation
of a miller upon a small patrimony of his own, near Barcelona; some
French officers, by their outrageous conduct towards him, roused in
him a spirit which under happier circumstances might never have been
awakened, and he began his honourable warfare against the invaders
with only three comrades. By a series of exploits skilfully planned
and bravely executed, he had gained for himself a high reputation,
which was in no slight degree enhanced by his moral worth; for it might
truly be said of him that he was without fear and without reproach.
When Manso entered upon this new course of life he was about two or
three and twenty years of age, and was so uneducated that he could
neither write nor read; but every portion of time that could now be
spared from his military duties was devoted to self-improvement, and
his progress in this kept full pace with his fortune. At this time
he held the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Catalan army; and when
Suchet, soon after the fall of Tarragona, was on his way to the capital
of the province, he, at the head of a detachment, harassed his march,
and succeeded in cutting off some fifty of the enemy and taking six,
between Ordal and Molins de Rey; but twelve of his soldiers were taken
in these skirmishes, and the French commander ordered some of them to
be shot, some to be hanged, and some to be burnt, though they claimed
the protection to which they were entitled by the laws of war, and
though they threw themselves at his feet and entreated mercy. His
orders were executed; some thirty peasants of St. Vincente, Molins de
Rey, and Palleja, who were working in the fields, were murdered in like
manner; and every woman who fell into the hands of these inhuman troops
became their victim. Manso issued a proclamation denouncing these
crimes before God and man; and declaring that the right of reprisals
which till then he had from humanity forborne to exercise should
instantly be enforced; he hung his six prisoners in the immediate
vicinity of Barcelona; and gave notice, that every Frenchman who from
that hour fell into his hands should be put to death, till the enemy
should have learnt to treat as prisoners of war brave men who were
fighting for their country, which had been perfidiously invaded, their
religion, which was insolently outraged, and their king, who had been
treacherously decoyed into captivity.
♦CONDUCT OF THE JUNTA OF CATALONIA.♦
The French asserted also in their journals, that the Junta of Catalonia
had fled to Majorca, giving up the principality in despair. The
Spanish frigates had indeed run for that island, contrary to orders,
carrying with them the archives, and the money, stores, ammunition,
and medicines intended for the inland fortresses, and at that time
especially needed by them. But the Junta were at their post when
Catalonia was left to stand or fall by its own strength, and when
without their presence there could have been none to call forth or
direct it. In many parts of Spain the provincial Juntas disregarded
sometimes, and sometimes counteracted, the orders of the Government;
but here the duties of Government devolved upon the Junta. From Solsona
they now issued some of those proclamations which contributed so
greatly to support the national cause, calling upon their countrymen in
the language of hope and heroism and indignation, and exhorting them to
rely upon their good cause and their own right arms, and the justice
of the Almighty. The Barcelonan journal said that Lacy had fled with
the Junta. If they who made this assertion believed it themselves, they
♦LACY’S PROCLAMATION.♦ were speedily undeceived. That general declared
in a proclamation, that if his well-founded hope of soon seeing better
days should be disappointed, he would die with the last soldier rather
than abandon his post: eight days he allowed the dispersed troops for
rejoining their colours at the places fixed upon; those who should not
then have rejoined were to be pursued as deserters by the civil and
military authorities. “Catalans,” said he, “the country is in danger,
and now more than ever stands in need of your exertions. The Junta and
your general are bound to explain to you your situation, because true
courage consists not in being ignorant of danger, but in overcoming
it. The fall of Tarragona has made that situation critical in the
extreme, not desperate. There yet remain to us inextinguishable hatred
of oppression and ardent love of independence; ... there yet remain
to us strong-holds and mountains; ... there remain to us the arms of
our numerous and valiant youth for recovering what is lost, and for
making the enemy know that the attempt to conquer us is vain. With
fewer resources did Pelayo from the mountains of Covadonga begin the
deliverance of Spain: and there are not wanting to us chiefs who are
determined to follow his glorious example. Great efforts are necessary:
let our efforts then be united, and for those who have not spirit to
follow this resolution, let them abandon us and join the enemy, that
we may know whom to treat as enemies, and whom as friends. The priest,
the religioner, the father of a family, every one has wrongs to avenge,
every one has much to lose, and our country calls upon all. In all
parts the alarm-bell is heard, and wherever there are enemies, there
should be Catalans to fight them. War and vengeance must be our only
business; and, like our forefathers, let us leave to the women the care
of our houses and families!”
♦RETREAT OF THE CAVALRY FROM CATALONIA TO MURCIA.♦
Yet while Lacy held this language, and used at the same time every
exertion for collecting the dispersed troops, he was obliged to dismiss
a body of cavalry, from utter inability to support them, or even to
feed the horses. Brigadier D. Gervasio Gasca commanded this division,
which contained twelve superior and 112 subaltern officers, 922 men,
and about 500 horses, the remains of the regiment of Alcantara, the
Numancian dragoons, Spanish hussars, _cazadores_ of Valencia, and
hussars of Granada. They had to make their way through Aragon, into
a free province, and incorporate themselves with the first army they
could find. The details of their march show the skill with which the
enemy had chosen his positions, so as to give him military command of
the country; for near as Valencia was, Gasca was six weeks on the way,
and travelled between 700 and 800 miles before he could effect his
junction with a Spanish army. He began this perilous retreat on the
25th of July, with his horses in miserable condition for want of food,
and without money; getting provisions and information as he could find
them; and having no means of procuring either, except such as chance or
charity might bestow. At Graus, a small party of the enemy were found,
whom they kept in check with a part of their force, while the rest
forded the Esera by Barazona. Making long marches, so as to outrun the
intelligence of the enemy, they succeeded in passing the rivers Cinca
and Gallego without opposition; but when they were in the district of
Las Cinco Villas de Aragon, knowing that the French from Barbastro
and Huesca were about to collect and cut them off, they made yet
longer marches, taking a more devious direction, and moving by night.
Notwithstanding these precautions, they were attacked at midnight near
the village of Luesia, by what force they knew not, but the fire came
from the village, and from a height which commanded the ground over
which they were passing. Gasca could not prevent his men from making a
precipitate retreat; he had only time to name a place of rendezvous;
and while the enemy, who consisted of 1000 foot, and from two to three
hundred horse, under the Polish general Chlopiski, hastened to cut
them off from the pass of the Gallego, Gasca avoided them by entering
Navarre, where he rested three days at Eybar, expecting help from
Espoz y Mina to effect the perilous passage of the Ebro. Three parties
of that distinguished leader’s cavalry came to assist and guide him:
their knowledge of the country was of essential service; they made
a rapid and unexpected march to one of the fords of the river; its
waters were swoln, and they were obliged in some places to swim: the
passage, however, was effected, and immediately Gasca marched from four
in the afternoon of one day till eight on the following morning, that
he might get out of reach of the garrisons of Tafalla, Caparroso, and
Tudela. The danger was now less imminent, though still sufficiently
great; they made shorter marches, varying their direction, according
to the intelligence they procured of the enemy; and thus, after six
weeks of such hardships as few people, except the Spaniards, could have
sustained, they joined the army in Murcia by the circuitous way of
Guadalaxara and Cuenca, having lost upon the road four officers, 153
men, and 213 horses: the greater part of these men had been dispersed
in the night route at Luesia; the horses had mostly died upon the march.
♦STATE OF THE ENEMY IN CATALONIA.♦
But the Catalans, in circumstances under which almost any other people
would have despaired, never lost hope; their saying was, that now, when
the fortified places were lost, the war was only begun. And indeed,
deplorable as the state of things was for the natives, it was far
more so for the invaders: they were masters of almost every fortress,
but their dominion did not extend beyond the walls. They levied
contributions upon the villages near, and this was all; ... they could
only move in large detachments, and wherever they moved they were
harassed by the armed peasantry and the Somatenes. The daily and hourly
cost of life at which they kept their ground was such, that the enemy,
who avowed their determination of extirpating half the inhabitants
in order to intimidate the rest, must have exhausted the resources,
if not the patience, of France, before such a determination could be
executed. In the preceding year Suchet had dispersed a proclamation,
declaring that Great Britain and her Spanish allies had made peace
with France, and acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as king of Spain. The
French now circulated a report that negotiations were going on, and
with such probability of success, that Talleyrand had been sent to
London, and the Emperor himself had gone to the coast for the purpose
of expediting the business. But these artifices availed them nothing,
for Doyle contradicted their falsehood in addresses which were carried
everywhere, and eagerly received, ... and British ships were still upon
the coast, to act wherever opportunity might offer.
♦LAS MEDAS RECOVERED BY THE SPANIARDS.♦
Every success at this time was of great importance in its moral
effect. Men are usually alive to hope in proportion as their natures
are generous; and the same cause, which throughout the war rendered
it impossible to depress the Spaniards, made them easily elated.
Of the patriotic journals which were published in every part of
Spain, scarcely a number appeared that did not contain details of
some skirmish, some guerrilla attack, some successful enterprise, or
hair-breadth escape, ... more animating than success in the recital.
These things, more even than signal victories, tended to excite a
military spirit, when no other advantage accrued from them. But of
the advantages which the Catalans at this time obtained, one was of
considerable importance. An expedition of Spaniards and English,
who in all were but a handful ♦SEPT. 1.♦ of men, recovered the isles
of Las Medas, which had been betrayed to the enemy the preceding
year. Colonel Green, the British commissioner, and Baron de Eroles,
commanded in this well-planned and well-executed attempt; and the
crew of the Undaunted frigate, Captain Thomas, displayed that zeal
and those resources in dragging guns up the rocks, by which British
seamen have often made themselves dreaded upon their enemies’ shores.
They found in the fort four guns and provisions for three months.
Both officers perceived how important it was to retain possession of
a place which at little expense might be rendered a second Gibraltar,
... for little was necessary to render it impregnable: here was a post
where they could receive supplies, and here a depôt might be securely
established. Eroles, therefore, dispatched orders for 500 men to come
and garrison it. The French were equally aware of the advantage which
the possession of this point would give their enemies. They brought
down a considerable force to Estardit, a village on the opposite shore,
and opened batteries against the island, which was within reach of
shells. The succours which Eroles had gone to expedite did not appear;
the force upon the island consisted only of 146 men, exhausted with the
fatigues they had undergone; and Colonel Green reluctantly yielding
to the representations of the officer ♦SEPT. 4.♦ of the Undaunted,
abandoned the works which he had begun, and with them the hopes which
he had formed, and blew up the fort. The opportunity, however, was
happily retrieved. Lacy, who felt the want of such a point to look to,
embarked with 200 men from Arens de Mar in the Undaunted; and taking
♦SEPT. 13.♦ with him labourers, tools, and stores in some transports,
re-occupied the islands, giving them the names of the Isles of
Restoration, because, he said, this might be considered as the first
step to the recovery of the principality. Water was discovered there, a
sufficient garrison established, and the fortifications commenced and
carried on in sight of the enemy on the opposite shore, and in defiance
of their batteries. Bomb-proofs for men and stores were soon made in a
situation favourable for such works. The chief battery was named Lacy
by the governor; but that general said he would not permit himself to
receive this honour, it should be called Montardit, in honour of the
last Catalan whom the French, having taken in arms, had put to death,
in violation of the laws of war.
General Lacy, being unable to undertake any considerable attempt
against the enemy, determined, in the right spirit of a soldier, to
make activity and enterprise supply the want of numbers, and cut up the
invaders in ♦SUCCESSFUL ENTERPRISE OF LACY AND EROLES.♦ detail. They
had formed a chain of fortified posts from Barcelona to Lerida. These
he resolved to attack, and began by a rapid march upon Igualada, where
the enemy had fortified a Capuchine convent. Four hundred men with two
guns were to have joined him from Cardona; but he was disappointed of
this aid, for no means of moving the guns, nor for making the road
practicable for them, could be procured in time; all that could be done
was to surprise the town, and cut off as many of the French as possible
before they could take refuge in their fort. At three in ♦OCT. 4.♦
the morning the sentinels were put to the sword, the enemy surprised
in their quarters, twenty-five prisoners were taken, and about 150
killed; the rest escaped into the convent, as they got out of their
beds; and Lacy, seeing at daybreak that succours were coming to them
from Monserrate and Casa-Masana, retired to Col de Gusem, satisfied
with his success, and thence to Manresa. This made them suppose that
he had desisted from offensive operations; and a convoy which, in fear
of his movements, had been for some days detained at Cervera, ventured
to move toward Igualada. Eroles with half the Catalan force got before
it, and the commander-in-chief with the other half cut off its retreat.
A column with artillery sallied from Igualada to its assistance, but
came only to share in the defeat; ♦OCT. 7.♦ 200 were wounded and made
prisoners, the killed were in proportion, and the whole convoy was
taken.
The general finding now that his presence was necessary in the Junta,
to forward the formation and organization of the army, left Eroles,
his second in command, to complete the plan, which had already so far
succeeded that the French, dreading a second attack, and weakened by
this last loss, retired precipitately from Igualada, Monserrate, and
Casa-Masana, to Barcelona. Eroles no sooner knew that Igualada had been
evacuated ♦OCT. 10.♦ than he marched against Cervera. The French, when
they saw him approaching, withdrew from the city into the university,
which they had fortified; and a body of 500 foot and thirty horse,
which had just arrived from Lerida to their support, turned back to
provide for its own safety. D. Luis de Creeft and D. Jose Casas were
sent to pursue them, while Eroles with one ten-pounder prepared to
attack buildings which had been designed by their founders for far
other purposes than those of war. This single gun threw down part of
the house in which it was planted; but Eroles turned the accident
to advantage; for while he affected to be replacing it, in order to
deceive the enemy, the gun was moved to another situation, from whence
it opened its fire, anew, and its carriage was rattled along so as to
make them believe that more artillery was about to be brought to bear.
Their commandant soon hung out the white flag, and 630 men were made
prisoners of war, at an expense to the Catalans of only ten in killed
and wounded.
♦CORREGIDOR OF CERVERA TAKEN AND PUNISHED.♦
This conquest set free a considerable territory, which, ever since the
loss of Tarragona, had been at the enemy’s mercy. Creeft, meantime,
with a force inferior to that he was pursuing, followed the column
which was retreating to Lerida, and which on its way was joined by
the garrison of Tarrega, another post abandoned by the French in
their alarm. In this pursuit the corregidor of Cervera was taken
attempting to escape with the enemy; a man who had joined the French,
and, with the malevolence of a traitor, persecuted his own countrymen.
He had invented a cage in which to imprison those who did not pay
their contributions, or were in any way obnoxious to him: it was so
constructed as to confine the whole body, leaving the head exposed to
be buffeted and spit upon; and sometimes this devilish villain anointed
the face of his victim with honey to attract the flies and wasps.
“Tomorrow,” said Eroles in his dispatches, “the señor corregidor will
go out to parade the streets in this same cage, where the persons who
have suffered this grievous torment may behold him: _Discite justitiam
moniti, et non temnere Divos!_” The capture of this man was worth as
much, in the feelings of the people, as all the preceding success.
♦EROLES ENTERS FRANCE AND LEVIES CONTRIBUTIONS.♦
Eroles, with the rest of his division, now hastened to Bellpuig, where
Creeft had blockaded about 400 French in the old palace of the Dukes
of Sesa, a castle of the fifteenth century, which they had fortified,
and which commanded the town. The besiegers had only one ten-pounder,
and the walls were more than seven feet thick. They had no time to
lose, for Latour, with the troops who had escaped from Igualada, and
the garrisons of the other evacuated posts, was preparing, in concert
with the enemies from Lerida and Balaguer, to march against them.
Unused as they were to such operations, and, as Eroles said, without
any other engineers than ingenuity and strong desire, they made three
mines which reduced ♦OCT. 14.♦ the castle almost to a heap of ruins:
184 prisoners were taken, the rest of the garrison perished. This
success completed Lacy’s plan, and set free the whole of the country
between Lerida and Barcelona. Eroles then, by a movement as judicious
as it was unexpected, while the French commanders were concerting plans
against him, marched by the Seu de Urgel to Puigcerda, where he routed
all the force that the enemy could bring against him: then having
occupied the pass of the Valle de Luerol, he entered France, and levied
contributions in Languedoc. It was the earnest wish of Baron de Eroles
that his troops in this expedition should be as much distinguished by
their good order, moderation, and humanity, as the French in Spain
were for their crimes. In every place, except one, this object was
effected; but in the little town of Marens, the only place where
resistance was made by the inhabitants and an armed force, a soldier,
in violation of his orders, set fire to one of the houses: the wind was
high, the flames spread, notwithstanding the efforts which were made
to stop them, and the whole place was burnt. Villamil, governor of Seu
de Urgel, who commanded this division of Eroles’ army, expressed his
regret for what had happened; “_But_, perhaps,” he said, “the furious
hand which committed the evil had been impelled by divine justice, that
France might behold an image of Manresa.” Every where else the orders
of the commander were rigidly observed; and the French, admiring the
humanity of an enemy who had been so grievously wronged, in many places
where they paid the required contribution, acknowledged the justice
of this retaliation. Some thousand sheep and corn, and specie to the
amount of 50,000 dollars, were the fruits of this first inroad of the
Spaniards into France.