MEASURES OF THE FRENCH IN ARAGON. MANRESA BURNT. FIGUERAS SURPRISED
BY THE CATALANS. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF TARRAGONA BY THE ENEMY, AND
RECAPTURE OF FIGUERAS. CAMPOVERDE SUPERSEDED BY GENERAL LACY.
♦1811.♦
Both in Portugal and in Andalusia the French had at length encountered
a resistance which, with their utmost efforts, they were unable to
overcome: but their career of success continued longer in the eastern
provinces, where their operations were conducted with more unity
of purpose, and where Great Britain afforded only a precarious and
inefficient aid to the best and bravest of the Spaniards.
♦PLANS OF THE FRENCH IN CATALONIA.♦
No sooner had Tortosa fallen, than Marshal Macdonald began to prepare
at Lerida for laying siege to Tarragona. The arrival at Barcelona of
a convoy of ammunition and grain from Toulon relieved him from all
anxiety on that point, and left him at leisure to direct his whole
attention to this great object, which in a military view would complete
the conquest of Catalonia, ... any other Buonaparte was incapable
of taking. Tortosa was to be the pivot of the intended operations
against Tarragona first, and after its fall, which was not doubted,
against Valencia; and to facilitate these operations, Col de Balaguer
was put in a state of defence, and Fort Rapita which commanded the
mouth of the Ebro. These measures had been taken when General Suchet
received orders from Paris to undertake the siege, and was at the
same time informed that Lower Catalonia was to be under his command.
Early in the preceding year this general had ♦MARCH 19.♦ been told
that he must raise in his government of Aragon means both for the pay
and subsistence of his troops, France being no longer able to support
such an expense; and that while he was to communicate as before with
the _E’tat-major_ of the army ♦THE PYRENEAN PROVINCES ADMINISTERED IN
BUONAPARTE’S NAME.♦ concerning military affairs, he was to receive
instructions upon all matters relating to the administration, police,
and finances of the country, from the Emperor alone. It was evident,
therefore, that Buonaparte was as little disposed to keep faith with
his brother, King Joseph, as he had been with his ally Charles IV., and
Ferdinand his invited guest, but that it was his intention to extend
the frontier of France from the Pyrenees to the Ebro; and in fact from
that time all orders of the government in that part of the Peninsula
were issued in his name. The faithful Spaniards cared not in which name
it was administered, acknowledging neither, and detesting both: if
they had any feeling upon the subject, it was a sense of satisfaction
that their unworthy countrymen in the Intruder’s service should be
deprived of the shallow pretext with which they sought to excuse their
treason to their country. At first this change appeared to increase
the difficulties of Suchet’s situation, who, while he looked only to
a temporary occupation of the province, would without scruple have
supplied himself by force, regardless in what condition he might leave
it to those who should succeed him, or what sufferings he might bring
upon the inhabitants. But regarding himself now as fixed in a permanent
command, it behoved him to adopt measures which, ... if any thing could
have that effect upon the Aragonese, might gradually reconcile them
to subjection, by giving them the benefit of a military government,
regularly as well as vigorously administered.
♦STATE OF ARAGON.♦
The province was in a miserable state: though the population had
increased from the end of the Succession war till the beginning of
Charles IV.’s reign, it had diminished since that time, owing to causes
which have not been explained. There were 150 deserted villages in it,
and nearly 400 in which a few houses were all that remained, ... this,
not in consequence of the existing war, but of the preceding decay. Yet
before the invasion, Aragon exported corn, wine, and oil to Catalonia
on one side, and to Navarre on the other: to that export the war had
put an end; fields, and vineyards, and oliveyards, had been laid waste;
and an enormous consumption of sheep by the armies had almost destroyed
the only kind of cattle which in that country could be depended on
for food. It had been drained of money also both by the national and
intrusive governments: before the siege of Zaragoza, three millions of
francs had been remitted to Seville; and the spoils of the suppressed
convents to the amount of a million _reales_ and 3000 marks of silver
had been afterwards sent to Joseph’s treasury at Madrid. Very many
families, and among them all the wealthiest, had emigrated, taking with
them all the specie they could collect, ... the miserable remains of
their fortunes. Trade had suffered in the same degree as agriculture;
there were no manufacturers left; and from a province in this
condition, which in its best times paid only four million francs to
its native government, eight millions were to be raised for the annual
pay of the troops alone. Suchet began by levying an extraordinary
contribution per month, which ♦SYSTEM OF THE FRENCH GENERAL.♦ more than
doubled in amount the tax in ordinary times; the mode of collecting was
prepared for him by a regulation of Philip V., who, as a punishment
upon the three provinces of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, for their
adherence to his opponent the Archduke Charles, had subjected them to
a property tax, taking from them the privilege which they had formerly
possessed of taxing themselves. It might have been thought impossible
to wring this additional impost from a ruined people; but the hoards of
prudence, of selfishness, and of misery are opened at such times, and
what has been withheld from the pressing necessities of a just cause,
is yielded to a domineering enemy; and Suchet, while he insisted to
the utmost upon the law of the strongest, and regarded no other law,
had clear views of the policy by which obedience to that law is to be
facilitated or conciliated. No compunction withheld him from any crime
which he deemed it expedient to commit; but he would do good as well as
evil, and perhaps more willingly, when it accorded with his purpose;
and worldly wisdom producing the effect of better motives might under
other circumstances have made him a beneficent ruler. He abolished
monopolies, by retaining which nothing was to be gained; he sent for
his wife from France, to conciliate the Aragonese ladies by her means,
and their husbands by theirs; he employed the influence of those
priests who followed the example of their traitorous archbishop; and
he purchased with offices in the revenue department and in the police
the ablest of the Spaniards whose souls were for sale. Among them was
Mariano Dominguez, who having held the office of military Intendant
under Palafox during the siege of Zaragoza, lived to be praised by
General Suchet for the eminent services which he rendered to the
French. He was made corregidor of that city; and it is said that under
his administration not a single murder occurred there during eighteen
months, though before the war the annual average exceeded three
hundred. In no situation does a man seem so cut off from repentance,
as when he can reconcile himself to his own dereliction of duty by the
good that he may do in an office which he has accepted as the price of
his integrity.
♦GOOD EFFECT OF PAYING THE TROOPS REGULARLY.♦
The money which Suchet raised for his military and civil establishments
was presently expended in the province, to the immediate benefit of the
people upon whom it had been levied. The troops were paid every five
days, the civil officers regularly received their salaries, and what
they received was necessarily spent in the country. Suchet took care
also to purchase there whatever it could supply for the clothing and
equipment of the troops, paying for it at once from the contributions;
and the active circulation ♦MÉMOIRES DU MARÉSHAL SUCHET, 1. 302.♦
which was thus occasioned, if he may be believed, made the inhabitants
themselves sensible that they were gainers by such taxation. He
repaired the dykes, the sluices, and the great basin at Mount Torrero
which had been destroyed during the siege; the canal was thus again
restored: preparations were made for conducting water into the city
and erecting fountains there: the hospitals and the bull circus were
repaired; bull fights, the national sport and the national reproach,
were exhibited; and by these means ... and by his refusal to send the
treasure of Our Lady of the Pillar to Madrid, notwithstanding repeated
orders to that effect, ... he endeavoured to gratify the Zaragozans,
while he erected works about the city to secure it against any sudden
attempt. Buonaparte’s orders were not so safely to be disregarded
as those of the Intruder; when, ♦BRITISH GOODS BURNT AT ZARAGOZA.♦
therefore, Suchet was instructed to confiscate and burn all the English
goods which could be found in Aragon, the general remonstrated against
so impolitic a measure, and proposed instead to levy a duty upon such
goods of fifty per cent.; but Buonaparte hated England too vehemently
to be capable of receiving any advice which opposed the indulgence
of that insane passion, and Suchet found it necessary to search the
warehouses, and make a bonfire of what he found there, in the _Plaza
Mayor_ at Zaragoza, taking care however that the search should be
as perfunctory as he could venture to make it, and leaving colonial
♦MÉMOIRES, 1. 306.♦ produce untouched because it happened not to be
specified in his orders.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR BESIEGING TARRAGONA.♦
But the Spaniards were a people whom no length of time could reconcile
to an usurpation by which they felt themselves insulted as much as they
were wronged and outraged. Though his political sagacity was equal to
his military skill, and though he was placed in a part of the peninsula
where the Spaniards never received the slightest assistance from their
British allies, even in Aragon he felt the insecurity of his position,
and deemed it an advantage of no trifling moment when he could discover
a manufactory of arms among the mountains. The Spanish frontier is that
upon which France was least provided with military establishments; but
the want of stores, which in other quarters could be drawn abundantly
from the arsenals of Douay, Metz, and Strasbourg, was supplied here
by the treacherous seizure of Pamplona before hostilities commenced,
and by the subsequent capture of Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, and Col
de Balaguer. In this respect the war had abundantly furnished its
own means; nor was he deficient in numbers for the siege which he
was about to undertake, the army now under his command consisting of
more than 40,000 men, notwithstanding its daily waste, and the great
losses it had suffered. The Italian division from 13,000 to 14,000
had been reduced to five or six; but with the population of France,
Italy, and the Netherlands, at his disposal, and of those states which,
under the name of confederates, were actually subjected to the French
government, Buonaparte thought that no war could thin his armies faster
than the conscription could recruit them; and under his officers he
well knew that men of any nation would soon be made efficient soldiers.
Suchet found it better to make the regiments of different nations
act together than to keep them in separate divisions; they were more
likely thus to be influenced by a common feeling, and less liable to be
affected by the proclamations in Italian, German, Dutch, and Polish,
as well as Spanish and French, which General Doyle addressed to them,
inviting them to abandon the unjust service in which they were engaged.
Suchet provided also for their wants with a solicitude which made
him deservedly popular among his men. He saw that the commissariat
department was better administered by military than by civil agents;
and having placed it therefore wholly in their hands, he adopted the
farther improvement of giving to each regiment the charge of its own
cattle, convoys of which from Pau and Oleron were constantly on the
road, protected by a chain of fortified posts from Canfranc and Jaca
to Zaragoza. It was found that by this means the cattle were better
guarded and more easily fed; that the movements of the army were not
impeded by them; and that when the soldiers reached their bivouac
they were no longer under the necessity of marauding for their food.
This general was as little subject as Massena to any visitations of
compassion; but he knew that a system of marauding must in the end
prove as fatal to the army which subsisted by it, as to the inhabitants
who were the immediate sufferers.
But the people whom he protected from irregular exactions were under
an iron yoke; they were to be kept down only by present force and the
severest intimidation; and Suchet prepared willingly for the siege
of Tarragona, because he saw that the only serious losses which the
Spaniards sustained was when they defended fortified places with a
large military force. Their armies, when routed in the field, collected
again as easily as they were dispersed; but from Lerida, Mequinenza,
and Tortosa, no fewer than 800 officers and 18,000 soldiers had been
sent prisoners into France. He desired therefore to attack a fortress
which would be regularly defended, as much as he dreaded to encounter
♦MÉMOIRES. 2. 17.♦ a civil defence. While he was preparing for the
enterprise, the news of Massena’s retreat raised the hopes of the
Spaniards, and made their desultory parties everywhere more active:
in proportion as they were elated, were the invaders exasperated.
A ♦MANRESA BURNT BY MACDONALD.♦ considerable force under Marshal
Macdonald moved upon Manresa. Sarsfield and Eroles were on the alert to
harass its movements: and they attacked its rear at Hostal de Calvet,
about an hour’s distance from that city: many of the Manresans were
in the field. The disposition of the inhabitants was well known, and
perhaps Manresa was marked for vengeance, because it was the first
place in Catalonia which had declared against the French; and one of
those journals also was printed there which contributed so greatly to
keep up the national spirit. Upon whatever pretext, ... for pretexts
are never wanting to those who hold that everything ought to succumb
before ♦MARCH 30.♦ military force, ... orders were given to burn the
city: it was set on fire in the night, and between seven and eight
hundred houses were consumed. The very hospitals were not spared,
though an agreement had been made between the Spanish and French
generals, that they should be considered sacred, and though that
agreement was produced by one of the physicians to General Salme, and
its observance claimed on the score of honour and good faith as well as
of humanity. It availed nothing; the wounded were taken out of their
beds; the attendants plundered; the building sacked and set on fire.
It was by the light of the flames that Sarsfield and Eroles attacked
the enemy at Hostal de Calvet; their orders were that no quarter should
that night be given; and in consequence, of many who surrendered (for
in this partial action the Catalans had greatly the advantage), one man
alone was spared. The commander-in-chief Campoverde accused Macdonald
of having in this instance broken his faith, as well as violated the
received usages of war; and he ♦APRIL.♦ issued orders that his troops,
regular or irregular, should give quarter to no Frenchman, of what
rank soever, who might be taken in the vicinity of any place which had
been burned or sacked, or in which the inhabitants had been murdered.
Subscriptions were raised for the relief of the Manresans; and, as in
every case where intimidation was intended, the effect of this atrocity
was to render the invaders more odious, and give to that desire of
vengeance with which the Spaniards were inflamed the dreadful character
of a religious obligation.
Macdonald was at this time meditating an attempt upon Montserrat,
the possession of which place would be of great advantage in the
operations against Tarragona. But the Catalans were not idle. Looking
to something of more permanent importance than could be achieved in
desultory warfare, Rovira, who from the commencement of the struggle
had so distinguished himself as to be honoured with the particular
invectives of the French, had long projected schemes for recovering
from the enemy some of the fortresses whereof they had possessed
themselves, and these schemes he proposed to the successive generals
in the principality, all of whom, till Campoverde took the command,
regarded them as impracticable. Rovira, however, was not deterred by
ridicule from prosecuting plans which appeared to him well founded; and
Campoverde at length listened ♦SCHEME FOR THE RECOVERY OF BARCELONA
FRUSTRATED.♦ to his representations. He had established a communication
in Barcelona, which, like other attempts of the like nature, was
discovered; and five persons, two of whom were women, were condemned
to death for it, but only one, Miguel Alzina by name, fell into the
enemy’s hand, and he was executed upon the glacis of Monjuic. The
sentence charged him with having conspired to betray that fortress
and the place of Barcelona to the Spaniards: this he had done, and in
suffering for it, felt that he was dying a martyr to his country’s
cause: but he was charged also with having intended to poison the
garrison; and that any such purpose should have been sanctioned by the
commander-in-chief, under whose sanction the scheme was formed, or that
it should have been communicated to him, or even formed at all, is not
to be believed. Of the persons who were acquitted of any share in the
conspiracy, two were nevertheless ordered to be sent into France, and
there detained till the general pacification of Catalonia; and one, who
was niece of Alzina, to be confined in a nunnery, under the special
observation of the vicar-general and of the prioress, who were to be
responsible for her.
Rovira had concerted a plan also for surprising Figueras: it was
conceived in the spirit of more adventurous ages, and therefore, some
of those persons who felt no such spirit in themselves called it,
in mockery, the Rovirada; to better minds, however, it appeared so
feasible for men like those who had undertaken it, that Martinez, the
commandant of the division of Ampurdan, was instructed by Campoverde to
join him in the attempt.
♦FIGUERAS.♦
Figueras is a little town situated in the midst of the fertile plain
of Ampurdan, eighteen miles from the French frontier. Some centuries
ago it was burned, and its castle razed, by the Count of Ampurias, in
his war with Jayme I. of Aragon; but in the last century, Ferdinand
VI. erected there one of the finest fortifications in Europe, which
he called, after his canonized namesake and predecessor, the Castle
of St. Fernando. It is an irregular pentagon, the site of which
has been so well chosen upon the solid and bare rock, that it is
scarcely possible to open trenches against it on any side; and it
commands the plain, serving as an entrenched camp for 16,000 men. As a
fortress it is a masterpiece of art; no cost was spared upon it, and
the whole was finished in that character of magnificence which the
public works of Spain continued to exhibit in the worst ages of the
Spanish monarchy. But an English traveller made this prophetic remark
♦TOWNSEND’S TRAVELS, 1. P. 81. 3RD EDITION.♦ when he visited Figueras
in the year 1786: “Every such fortress requires an army to defend
it, and when the moment of trial comes, the whole may depend on the
weakness or treachery of a commander, and instead of being a defence
to the country, may afford a lodgement to the enemy.” Nowhere has that
apprehension been more fully verified than in the place where it was
excited. Figueras was surrendered to France in the revolutionary war,
by corruption or by treason, more likely than by cowardice; for the
governor had behaved bravely at Toulon. After the peace he returned to
Spain, was delivered over to trial, and condemned to lose his head: but
the punishment was commuted for perpetual exile. When the place was
restored, after the treaty of Basle, some ink spots still remained upon
the wall, where an officer, in honourable indignation, had dashed his
pen, either determining not to sign the capitulation, or in despair for
having borne a part in that act of infamy. And now Figueras served as
a stronghold for the invaders, having been one of the four fortresses
which Godoy delivered into their hands as the keys of Spain, before
Buonaparte avowed his profligate design of usurping the kingdom.
♦ATTEMPT UPON FIGUERAS.♦
Rovira, who was a doctor in theology as well as a colonel, and
regarded the contest to which he had devoted himself as a holy war,
fixed upon Passion week as the fittest time for the attempt: there
could be no season so proper for it, he thought, as that on which
the church was celebrating ♦APRIL 6.♦ the sufferings and death of
Christ[24]! Accordingly, on Palm Sunday he assembled his division
in the village of Esquirol, and when they were drawn up, addressing
them, says the Spanish relator, like another Gideon, he desired that
every man who was willing to accompany him in an expedition of great
peril, but of the highest importance and greatest honour, should step
out of the line; 500 men immediately volunteered, all of the second
Catalan legion. The same appeal was made to another detachment at S.
Privat, and ninety-two of the battalion of Almogavares, and 462 of the
Expatriates, as those Catalans were called who came from parts of the
country which the French possessed, offered themselves. The two parties
formed a junction that night at Ridaura, and marched the next day, by
roads which were almost impracticable, to Oix, a village close upon
the French border. From thence they proceeded on the 8th by Sadernes,
Gitarriu, and Cofi, to Llorena, taking this direction in order that the
enemy and the men themselves might be induced to believe it was their
intention to make an incursion into France. The alarm spread along the
border as they wished; the somaten was rung; the French peasantry, and
about 300 troops of the line, collected at S. Laurent de Sardas, and
remained under arms for thirty hours. At noon on the 9th, the Catalans
left Llorena, and proceeded in a direction toward Figueras as far as
the wood of Villarit, where they concealed themselves in a glen till
night came: it had rained heavily all day, and a strong north wind was
blowing, nevertheless orders were given that no man should kindle a
fire on pain of death.
♦ROVIRA TAKES IT BY SURPRISE.♦
One scanty meal a day was all that could be allowed to these hardy and
patient men; but a good allowance of generous wine had been provided
for them when it should be most needed: this was distributed now after
they had been formed into six companies, and when night set in they
advanced to Palau-Surroca, a short hour’s distance from the fortress.
The officers of each division were men who were well acquainted with
the works; and each was now informed what point he was to attempt,
at what time, and in what manner. At half-past two the first party
leaped into the ditch; three soldiers, who had served in the garrison
more than a year, for the purpose of performing this service when
the hour should come, opened the gate which leads into the ditch to
receive them. The first sentinel whom they met was killed by one thrust
before he could give the alarm; the different parties went each in
its allotted direction; and so well had every part of this enterprise
been planned, and so perfectly was it executed in all its parts, that
before men, officers, or governor, could get out of their quarters,
... almost before they were awakened, ... Figueras was in the hands
of the Spaniards, and its garrison, amounting to about 1000 men, were
prisoners. The gate by which they had entered was immediately walled up
to guard against any counter-surprise; and as Rovira, being a native
of the country, and conspicuous in it since the commencement of the
war, was better known than Martinez, orders were sent out in his name,
and signed by his hand, calling upon the men of the adjoining country
to come and strengthen the garrison. His signature left no doubt of
an event which they could else hardly have been persuaded to believe,
so much was it beyond their hopes, and in a few hours men enough were
assembled there to man the works.
There were about 700 of the enemy in the town, who supposed at first
that the stir which they perceived in the castle was merely some
quarrel between the French and the Italians of whom the garrison was
composed. One of them went to ascertain this; he was asked _Quien
vive?_ as he approached, and upon his replying “France,” was fired at
and shot. Upon this the French commandant sent a trumpeter, who was
ordered to return and tell his master, on the part of General Martinez
and Colonel Rovira, that no Frenchman must again present himself
before the fortress, or he would be answered at the cannon’s mouth.
Martinez immediately sent off a dispatch in brief but characteristic
language: “Glory to the God of armies, and honour to the brave
Catalans, St. Fernando de Figueras is taken; Rovira had the happiness
of directing the enterprise, and I of having been the commander.” The
Doctor-Colonel, in a private letter which found its way to the press,
alluded to the ridicule which had been cast upon his project: “The
_Rovirada_ is made,” said he, “and the great fortress is ours!”
♦ROVIRA REWARDED WITH CHURCH PREFERMENT.♦
Rovira needed no other reward than the place in history which the
success of this _Rovirada_ secured for him; but it was not the less
becoming that the government should express their sense of his
services. Some little time after, the dignity of Maestre-Escuela, which
is equivalent to that of prebend in the English church, fell vacant
in the cathedral of Vich. A decree had past in the preceding year
for leaving unfilled such ecclesiastical offices as could, without
indecency, be dispensed with, and applying their revenues to the
public use as long as the necessities of the country should require.
The Regency applied to the Cortes to dispense with this law for the
present occasion only, that they might confer the vacant dignity upon
Rovira, as the most appropriate testimony of national gratitude; that
when the bloody struggle in which they were engaged against the tyrant
of Europe should have terminated happily, as was to be expected, they
said, he might have a decorous retirement suitable to his profession,
and an establishment for that time in which, indispensably, he ought
to renounce the military honours and dignities with which he was now
decorated, but which, in any other than the actual circumstances, were
incompatible with his ministerial character. Arguelles declared, that
the Doctor Brigadier (for to this rank he had then been promoted) was
worthy in the highest degree of national gratitude; but he wished
that any mode of remuneration should be devised rather than one which
involved the suspension of a law, ... too perilous an example not to be
carefully avoided. But Creus observed, that Rovira, who was a priest
as much in heart as in profession, would value this prebend more than
any military rank which could be conferred upon him; and more even
than the archdeanery of Toledo, because it was in his own country.
And he argued, that no injury could accrue to the state, as the income
might be reserved for the treasury while the existing circumstances
continued. Garcia Herreros was of opinion that the reward ought to
be of the nature of the service; the soldier should have a military
recompense, the priest a clerical one; he proposed, therefore, that as
the order of St. Fernando had just been instituted, Dr. Rovira should
be the first person who should be invested with it; and that when the
war was ended one of the best prebends should then be given him. The
proposal of the Regency, however, was adopted, and Rovira was made
Maestre-Escuela of the cathedral of Vich, for having recovered Figueras.
Had the Catalans been equally successful at Barcelona, all their
losses would have been more than compensated; the success which they
had gained excited the greatest exultation, not only in Catalonia, but
throughout the whole of Spain. Te Deum was sung at Tarragona, and the
town was illuminated three successive nights. In Madrid the Spaniards
could scarcely dissemble their joy. In the Cortes the news was welcomed
as the happiest which had been received since the battle of Baylen; and
the Regency called upon the people for fresh contributions and fresh
efforts to improve this unexpected success, the first of its kind which
had been obtained during the war. The army which had achieved it, they
said, was in want of every thing; and the two Regents who were in Cadiz
(Blake being absent) set the example themselves by contributing each
a month’s salary. It was, indeed, a success which, if the Spaniards
had been able, or their allies alert enough to have improved it,
might have been a far more momentous advantage than the victories
of Barrossa and Albuhera. The first report appeared incredible to
the French generals; when it was confirmed, ♦SUCHET REFUSES TO SEND
THE TROOPS WHICH MACDONALD REQUIRED FROM HIM.♦ Macdonald called
upon Suchet to send him by forced marches that part of the army of
Catalonia which he had placed under his command; unless this were done,
he said, Upper Catalonia was lost: for neither Rosas, Gerona, nor
Hostalrich, were provisioned, and the consequences of this cruel event
were incalculable; and Maurice Mathieu, who commanded in Barcelona,
instructed the governor of Lerida to be ready with provisions for these
troops upon their way, not doubting but that Suchet would see the
necessity of the measure in which he was called upon to concur. But
when that general had recovered from the first grief and astonishment
which the news excited, he considered that part of these troops being
employed in an expedition among the mountains, and the others along
the Ebro to protect its navigation, from twenty to five and twenty
days must elapse before they could receive orders from Zaragoza,
assemble at Lerida, and march from thence by Barcelona to Figueras;
during which interval the Spaniards would have done all they could do
for storing and garrisoning the place. All the French could do was to
blockade it with the troops which were nearest at hand: those from a
distance would arrive too late, and there would then be the difficulty
of supporting them in a part of the country stripped of its resources.
If the Spaniards should fail in endeavouring to throw sufficient
supplies into the fortress which they had surprised, the unexpected
success with which they were now so greatly elated would in the end
be little to their advantage: it would even facilitate his operations
against Tarragona, for Campoverde would doubtless move his army towards
the Ampurdan, instead of endeavouring to interrupt the investment of
that city; to hasten that investment, therefore, and press the siege
would be the best service which he could render to the French in
Upper Catalonia: this opinion he thought Buonaparte would form, whom
the intelligence would reach at Paris five or six days before he had
received it at Zaragoza: upon that opinion, therefore, he resolved to
act, on his own responsibility; and he had soon the satisfaction of
knowing that his conduct in so doing was approved and[25] applauded.
His judgment was not less accurate as to what was, ♦MÉMOIRES, 1.
13–18.♦ in this instance, to be expected from the Spaniards, who were
still destined to suffer for the weakness of their government, the
want of union in their leaders, and the want of system which was felt
in every ♦EROLES INTRODUCES TROOPS INTO FIGUERAS.♦ department. Eroles,
indeed, acted on this emergency as he always did, with promptitude,
and vigour, and ability. Collecting all the force he could, he
hastened from Martorell to reinforce the garrison of Figueras, and on
his way took the forts which the French had erected in Castelfollit
and Olot, and made above 500 prisoners there. Though a considerable
♦APRIL 16.♦ force had already been collected to blockade the place,
he entered it on the sixth day after its capture, with 1500 infantry,
150 horse, and about 50 artillerymen, losing on the way some forty
killed and sixty wounded; but the French battalion, which endeavoured
to prevent his entrance, suffered ♦THE FRENCH BLOCKADE IT.♦ more
than a threefold loss. General Baraguay d’Hilliers had by that time
brought together about 8000 troops for the blockade, nearly half of
which had been called off from blockading the Seu d’Urgel, and had
made a circuitous march within the French border. All posts of minor
importance they immediately abandoned, retaining only Rosas, Gerona,
and Hostalrich, in that part of Catalonia, and even weakening the
garrison of Gerona so much, that that place might have been recovered
by a second _Rovirada_, had there been another Rovira to conduct one.
But there was little concert among the Catalan leaders; it was deemed
fortunate that Eroles had not been obliged to require the co-operation
of another body, which from its position he might have looked to for
aid, because there was ill blood between that body and the corps
which he commanded. His arrival was well-timed, for the garrison was
disorderly as well as weak, ... more enterprising than wary, ... not
to be restrained from making rash sallies against the blockading
force; and they had also 1500 prisoners to guard, whom, for their own
security, they were compelled to confine so closely, that they were
in reasonable apprehension lest disease and infection should be the
consequences. But supplies were as needful as reinforcements; wine
and oil were especially wanted. The Spaniards, with more alertness
than they often exerted, sent off a convoy of stores with one of their
frigates from Tarragona: it came into the bay of Rosas three days
after Eroles had entered the fortress, but it had to wait off shore,
vainly expecting that a sufficient force for escorting it might be
collected. The British squadron off that coast was too weak to afford
any effectual assistance. Captain Buller, taking immediate advantage
of the enemy’s departure from those places, had landed at Palamos, St.
Feliu, Cadeques, and Selva, embarked their guns and destroyed their
batteries; a useful service for the time, but one which could not
affect the operations on the land, and the commander-in-chief in the
Mediterranean, who was applied to for some ships of the line, could
spare none from his own anxious station, where all his vigilance was
required for watching those ports in France from whence the enemy might
look for reinforcements or supplies. In Valencia, where there were most
means, there was least energy; and in Tarragona, where alacrity was not
wanting, it was necessary to wait for the new levies before they could
venture to send from thence any considerable body of old soldiers with
which Campoverde might undertake the relief of the blockaded fortress,
lest Suchet, if his preparations for besieging that city were anything
more than a feint, should find it in a state of insecurity and weakness.
That general had never been more in earnest. He ♦MÉMOIRES, 2. 20.♦
perceived that he could no longer look for co-operation from the side
of Catalonia in his intended siege; from thence, however, he expected
little interruption, but he apprehended serious annoyance from Mina;
for if that enterprising chief could connect himself with the Catalans
of the upper valleys, it would be possible for him, he thought, to draw
after him so large a part of the Aragonese, that he might cut off the
communication with France, and thus endanger the subsistence ♦ATTEMPTS
TO DESTROY MINA.♦ of the besieging army. None of the Guerrilla leaders
were placed in so dangerous a position as Espoz y Mina. Every fortress
in Navarre was occupied by the French, and they were in possession of
all the country which surrounded it. There was no point from which he
could receive succour; none upon which he could retire: the mountains
were his only fastnesses; and he had no resources but what were to be
found in his own genius, and in the courage of his comrades, and in
the love of his countrymen. But this man was the Scanderbeg of his
age. Reille, the French governor of Navarre, had received special
instructions to hunt him down; and toward the close of the preceding
year, the enemy had succeeded in surprising his troop. He and the
commanders of the second and third battalions, Cruchaga and Gorriz,
immediately began to collect their scattered force, and perceiving
that their dispersion would not have been so injurious but for want of
order, they abstained awhile from offensive operations, for the purpose
of disciplining the men. Reille hoped again to surprise them while they
were thus employed, and detached Colonel Gaudin from Pamplona with 1500
foot and 200 horse, who was to form a junction with an equal number,
drawn from Tudela, Caparroso, and Tafalla by Colonel Brescat, surround
Mina, and occupy all the points by which he might endeavour to escape.
Mina was informed of their movements: before the two detachments could
join, he drew Gaudin into an ambuscade, in which forty of his cavalry
were killed, and about 100 infantry made prisoners, he then attacked
them in their position at Monreal, drove them from it, and was about
to renew the attack upon a second position which they had taken, when
intelligence that Reille with a force from Pamplona was hastening to
Gaudin’s succour, induced him to retire. The Guerrilla chief let his
men rest one day, and on the second attacked Brescat, who, with 1300
men and 170 horse, occupied Aybar, part of the line within which it
was intended to surround this heroic Navarrese. The enemy were driven
successively from every position where they attempted to make a stand,
till having fallen back two leagues, they reached the river Aragon:
the infantry crossed it by the bridge at Caseca, the cavalry swam the
stream, and thus interposed a barrier between themselves and their
pursuers, which Mina was not able to force, being without artillery. In
this action the French left 162 men and sixty-three horses upon the
field: their commander and about 220 men were wounded.
♦JAN. 12.♦
Reille next sent his brother, at the head of 5000 foot and 200
horse, against this harassing enemy. For the last month Mina had
been manufacturing arms, ammunition, and clothing for his men, at
Lumbier, and there two thousand of the French found him. Aware of their
intention, and having concerted measures with his officers, he did not
disturb the soldiers in the rest which they were enjoying, till the
moment arrived. Then, telling them what the force was which was ordered
against them, they exclaimed, with one voice, that it would not be for
their honour to abandon the post without resistance, even though all
France should attack it. Two companies, under D. Juan de Villanueva,
defended the fords of the river, and repulsed the enemy in their first
attempt at crossing, forcing them to retire with such precipitation,
that some of Mina’s men, who passed over at night to see what they had
left behind, collected more than a hundred muskets from the field. The
French took a position which Mina was not strong enough to force, and
for a day and a half both parties kept up a fire upon each other; by
that time a reinforcement came to the enemy from Pamplona. The river
was well defended against them, and before they won the passage they
lost above 300 killed, and twice the number wounded: among those who
died of their wounds was Leon Asurmendi, a renegade Spaniard, known
by the name of _Conveniencias_, and infamous for the crimes which he
had committed in aid of the intrusive government. Having succeeded in
crossing the river, the French chose rather to perpetrate their usual
cruelties upon the inhabitants of Lumbier than follow Mina, who retired
without loss, and in the best order. They obtained information from
some traitors of the place where the Spaniards had their hospital; but
Cruchaga and Gorriz were too vigilant to let it be surprised, and when
the enemy approached they were so warmly received that they were driven
back the four hours’ march to Lumbier, leaving on the way sixty killed,
many wounded, and twelve prisoners.
Mina was at this time raising a fourth battalion; the French sent a
detachment to cut it off before it should be completely formed. Four
hundred and fifty men, destined for this service, proceeded against the
village of Echarri-Aranaz, where the commandant of the battalion, D.
Ramon de Ulzurrun y Eraso, had only about one hundred to oppose them.
He left the village, and disposed his handful of men so judiciously,
for the double purpose of concealing their numbers and annoying the
enemy, that the French dared not enter the place, and during the night
the officers did the piquet duty themselves, being afraid to trust
their soldiers. “Reams of paper,” Mina said, “would not suffice for the
details of all the skirmishes in which he and his party were engaged,
... for every day, and sometimes twice or thrice in the day, they were
occurring.”
The more the enemy suffered from this band, the more efforts they made
for its destruction, and towards the close of January, Mina was again
surrounded. But this lion was not to be taken in the toils. His first
measure was to determine upon a point of reunion, and with that spirit
which made him so truly formidable to the usurpers of his country,
he fixed upon the mountains immediately above Pamplona. Here, having
overcome every difficulty that a vigilant and powerful enemy could
interpose, Mina collected his gallant companions: still the pursuers
were on all sides; there was not a point which he could occupy without
being attacked, neither could he remain in that position; and 2000
men, with a proportionate cavalry, sallied from Pamplona to dislodge
him. Mina had not waited for this: knowing that there was no escape but
by becoming the assailant, he sent Gorriz to El Carrascal, upon the
left of the city, to call the attention of the enemy in that direction,
and fall upon any convoy or escort which might be upon the road. This
movement succeeded perfectly: the troops which were advancing had
proceeded little more than a mile when they were hastily recalled by
the alarm which Gorriz had raised in another quarter, and the governor,
thinking that Mina was on that side, and that the other roads were
secure, ordered a convoy of sixty carts with ammunition and stores to
set out for Vitoria; 200 men escorted it, and 1000 men followed at
about an hour’s interval: ... in Navarre distance is commonly expressed
by time ... the best measure in so mountainous a country.
When Mina received intelligence that this convoy was setting out, his
men were fasting, and they were three hours’ march from the position
which it was proper to occupy for intercepting it. Leaving Cruchaga
with the main body, he set off with the horse and two companies of
foot; but the convoy had passed the place where he meant to attack it
before he could come up. The horsemen, however, fell upon its escort,
and they, abandoning the carts, took possession of an adjoining height,
where they defended themselves, relying upon the greater force in their
rear, and likewise upon assistance from the fortress of Irurzun, which
was only at half an hour’s distance. Mina had no time to complete
their destruction; it was of more importance for him to secure the
ammunition, more precious in his circumstances than the richest booty,
and for this there was little leisure; ... on two sides the enemy were
approaching in force, and the escort was ready to assail him on the
third. Night came on, and on all sides there was firing; his men became
mingled with the enemy, and sometimes engaged one another. But when
Mina had succeeded in collecting his men, and would have contented
himself with drawing them off in safety, and destroying the stores, a
general cry arose that they would rather perish than leave behind them
what they should make so useful. The men, therefore, loaded themselves
with cartridges, of which, after each man had stored himself, they
carried off more than 60,000. Other effects, however tempting, they
regarded not: but, spoiling what they could, and setting fire to the
powder carts, they drew off in safety with their precious plunder.
The joy of Mina and his comrades for this success was clouded by one
of those fatal accidents for which even a soldier is not prepared:
Gorriz that day, in leading on his troops, was thrown from his horse,
and lived only long enough to go through the last ceremonies of the
Romish superstition: however worthless these were to the sufferer,
the thought that his salvation was thus secured was the consolation
of his comrades, and probably of no little importance in keeping up
their hopes and their belief in the protection of Heaven. Mina spoke
of his loss with the deepest sorrow, a sorrow which was felt by all
his fellows in arms, whom he had more than once led on to victory, and
sometimes saved from destruction.
Mina was now in that perilous stage of his progress, when every new
exploit, adding to his celebrity without adding to his strength, served
to increase his danger, by exasperating afresh the enemy, and exciting
them to make greater efforts to destroy him. In Aragon, as well as
in Navarre, the French troops were put in motion to hunt him down,
by night and day, like a wild beast. Harispe occupied the bridges of
Sanguessa, Galipienzo, and other passes into Aragon; Panatier with
another division watched La Ribera de los Arcos, Estella, and its
vicinity; and three moveable columns kept up the chase. The first
impulse of the Navarrese hero, when he found himself thus beset, was
to attack the enemy; but for this he was too weak. Turning back, he
marched above Pamplona by El Carrascal, and there he discovered that
two of their columns were close at hand; upon this he countermarched
towards Lumbier. Harispe was informed of his movements, and at
Irurozqui Mina found ♦FEB. 11.♦ the French in his front: his men had
made long and rapid marches for the three preceding days, nevertheless
they prepared for battle with their wonted resolution. Before the
firing began Harispe sent a cavalry officer with a flag, which
Cruchaga, who went out to meet him as an enemy, discovered just in time
as he levelled a pistol at him. The Frenchman said, he had matters of
great importance to treat of, and Mina therefore came to hear them.
His errand related to the treatment of prisoners; it was believed in
the French army that Mina’s soldiers gave no quarter, and he came to
request that this practice might no longer be continued. Mina on his
part disclaimed the system which was imputed to him, and required a
like declaration on the part of the enemy; to which the French officer
replied, that his general was distinguished for humanity, and that
all the officers of that division had received orders to treat such
of Mina’s men as might fall into their hands as prisoners of war,
since they now knew that they did not deserve to be styled brigands,
but defenders of their country. Mina observed in his dispatches, that
this officer behaved with perfect courtesy, and with more honour
than was usual for a Frenchman; and he clearly perceived that this
acknowledgment of the rights of war proceeded not from the humanity of
the general, but from the discontent of the miserable men under his
command, whom Buonaparte and his agents in Spain sent to butcher or to
be butchered.
An affair ensued, in which Harispe lost half his cavalry in vainly
attempting to break the Spaniards. Five times he attacked their
position, and was as often repulsed; but Mina perceiving that a
movement was made to cut off his retreat, withdrew in time, in good
order, and keeping up a brisk fire. This continued till evening closed;
night set in with fogs, and the French and Spaniards got confused
and intermingled, firing upon their comrades: at length the latter
retired into a difficult pass, where the enemy did not venture to
follow them. Mina now determined, with the advice of Cruchaga and his
other officers, to break up his force into companies, sending each to
a different point; a measure which would distract the attention of the
enemy, who would thus lose sight of him, withdraw perhaps part of their
troops, and divide the others, and thus give him opportunity to collect
his companions again, and strike a blow when it was not expected. He
himself retained only twenty horsemen, with whom he meant to make
a circuit to preserve order among his scattered bands, and prevent
excesses of any kind. After awhile he came to a village near the
French border, where some of his companions had stationed themselves,
and where he hoped to give a little rest to his comrades; but an
overpowering force was brought against him, and he, again dispersing
his infantry, went with his little band of horsemen into France. Here
he found that his name was known, and his virtues honoured by the
mountaineers, while every heart cursed the tyrant who inflicted curses
upon Europe, and brought disgrace as well as misery upon France, by the
crimes which he compelled her to perpetrate. They offered all they had
to the Spaniards, but Mina would suffer nothing to be taken without
paying its fair price.
It was not long before the French discovered with astonishment, that
Mina had entered France; they dispatched forces against him, which he
eluded, and, wandering about the borders of Roncesvalles, Viscarret,
and Olbayceta, surprised one of their parties, killing two officers
and seven men. A handful of men only were engaged, ... but it was a
well-timed success, and an auspicious scene, and Mina said, that the
Spanish spirit of old times shone in his comrades that hour. A greater
force, to which the fugitives had given the alarm, followed him during
the whole night, but without success; and he continued among the
mountains within the French border, waiting impatiently for better
prospects. “From thence,” says he, “I stretched my eyes over this
kingdom close at hand, covered with innumerable enemies, and I groaned
for her miserable condition; the imprisonment of so many of its good
inhabitants, the persecution and the banishment of the relations of my
companions rent my soul, seeing myself without the means for redressing
their wrongs.”
But the opportunity which he expected, and which he provided by his
retreat, soon occurred; the greater part of the troops which had
been sent against him returned toward Zaragoza, and so well had
Mina instructed his officers, and so well did they execute their
instructions, that when he re-entered Navarre, his whole band were
re-assembled within four-and-twenty hours. “It would not have been
strange,” he said, “if some of the men, closely pursued as they had
been, and dispersed in scattered parties, as the only means of safety,
had returned home; but only a very few, who were sick, had done this,
and of them not a man without his officer’s permission.” During this
long pursuit, the enemy, less accustomed to fatigues and privations
than the hardy mountaineers of Spain, suffered a tenfold greater loss
than they inflicted; above 1000 of their men were invalided, and as
many more wounded in the incessant skirmishes which took place.
♦MARCH 18.♦
A seasonable supply of flints, cartridges, and other necessaries, was
sent at this time to Mina by the Junta of Aragon. He was soon seen
at the gates of Estella; from that city he decoyed a hundred of the
garrison, by showing only a few of his men, whom they sallied to cut
off; then he rose upon them, killed half their number, and took the
rest prisoners under the very walls of the fortress, not one escaping.
A letter from Reille to Marshal Bessieres was intercepted shortly
afterwards, in which he said, “that by this imprudence of the governor
of Estella, they had lost more men in one foolish affair, than they had
taken from the enemy during a pursuit of two months. The brigands,” he
added, “had so many partisans, that their sick and wounded were in all
parts of the country, and yet it was impossible to detect them: the
public spirit was very bad, and the business could never be completed
in Navarre, till a place of deportation was appointed for all the
relations and connexions of the brigands, and strong escorts along the
road to convoy them thither.”
♦MARCH 23.♦
Renewing their efforts for the destruction of an enemy who became every
day more popular among his oppressed countrymen, the French attacked
Mina a few days after his exploit before Estella, near Arcos. His
inferiority in numbers was compensated by his perfect knowledge of
every foot of the ground, the experience of his officers in their own
mode of warfare, and his confidence in all his followers. After an
action which continued nearly the whole day, he drew off in good order,
and scarcely with any loss, having killed and wounded nearly 400 of
the enemy. They obtained ♦MARCH 26.♦ a reinforcement, and renewed the
attack on the third day at Nacar, where he occupied a strong position,
and where he succeeded in repulsing them, with the loss of forty
killed, about 200 wounded, and seventeen prisoners. He now entered
Aragon, and while one part of his force, under Cruchaga, approached
Zaragoza, Mina, with three companies and a few horse, surprised a party
of the enemy consisting of 152 gendarmes and twenty-eight cavalry:
the horses, the commander, another officer, and seventy-seven of the
soldiers, were made prisoners, all the rest fell, not a man escaping.
Successes of this kind made Mina dangerous in more ways than one to
the invaders. Germans, Italians, and even French deserted to him. In
the course of five days fifteen hussars came over with their arms and
horses, and fourteen foot soldiers, besides some poor _juramentados_,
who were happy in an opportunity of joining their countrymen.
The Junta of Valencia sent him a timely supply of arms; he issued
his proclamations through Navarre, and a man was soon found for
every musket. Another convoy from Valencia was on its way, and had
to cross the Ebro in front of Calahorra. Mina set forth to secure
its passage, leaving one battalion at Puente la Reyna to observe the
enemy in Pamplona, and another at Carcar to cover Lodosa, which the
enemy occupied, and from whence he apprehended most danger. When he
reached the river he stationed part of his little force upon the left
bank to guard against any attack from Lodosa, on that side also, and
with two companies forded, meaning to attack a body who occupied a
village on the other side, about a league from the ford. They fled at
his approach, leaving some of their effects behind them: 150 horse
also, who were in Calahorra, fled to Lodosa; and the passage being
thus freed, Mina received his convoy, and returned the same night to
Estella, ... for the French after their late loss had evacuated that
city, and he made it at this time his head-quarters.
Well had it been for Spain if all the supplies which the Juntas of
Aragon and Valencia raised had been as well employed as the little
portion allotted to Espoz y Mina. The French were now so well aware
of the superiority of his followers over their troops in personal
conflict, that they never moved against him without artillery. In his
mode of warfare it was impossible for him to be provided with equal
arms; but one of his men, by name Josè Suescun y Garcia, contrived to
fix three barrels upon one stock and fire them by one lock; ♦MAY 17.♦
they carried two ounce balls, and were found to succeed well the first
trial, which was in an action fought by Cruchaga near Tafalla, with an
inferior force against 1500 foot and 180 horse. Between 300 and 400 of
the enemy were killed and wounded, and twelve were made prisoners, whom
Mina, upon the proposal of the French, joyfully exchanged for an equal
number of his own men.
At this time the Intruder went to Paris, for the ostensible purpose of
being present at the baptism of Buonaparte’s son. Mina was on the watch
to incommode him, as he said, upon his journey; but this wretched man
was too well aware of the danger not to take every possible precaution,
and occupied every place along the road with a strong force before
he ventured to advance. Mina had still his eye upon this road; and
shortly afterwards, when 6000 of the enemy from Pamplona and Tudela
were about to make a combined movement for the purpose of dislodging
him from Estella, he abandoned ♦MAY 22.♦ that place to them, as if in
fear of their numbers, and with the whole of his force entered the
province of Alava. He himself, with three of his four battalions and
the cavalry, reached Orbizu, the first village in that province, on the
morning of the next day; the fourth proceeded by a different route.
Here he received information that Massena was expected at Vitoria, on
his way to France, with an escort of 2000 men, after his defeat at
Fuentes d’Onoro. The hope of meeting with one who had been called the
Child and Favourite and Angel of Victory delighted Mina, and he set
off immediately in hopes of intercepting him; but Cruchaga, overcome
by an illness against which he had borne up for many days, was most
reluctantly compelled to remain behind.
At five in the evening of the 24th they reached the Puerto de Azazeta,
and halted there till it was dark, lest they should be seen by the
enemy or some of his scouts, in passing some plains which were at no
great distance from Vitoria. Mina would not enter any village on his
way, for the French, under pain of rigorous punishment, had enjoined
all persons to give intelligence of his movements; and he was careful
not to compromise the people. On the 25th, at four in the morning, he
reached Arlaban, the mountain which forms the boundary between Alava
and Guipuzcoa, and here he chose his ground, placing one battalion in
the woods on the left of the road, two on the right, and the cavalry
upon the plain; the fourth he meant to station in a grove when it
should arrive, from whence it might surprise the enemy’s rear-guard.
There was a little village near, about six miles only from Vitoria;
and, that no information might be given by any of the inhabitants, he
marched them all off, old and young, into the mountains, and placed a
guard over them, ordering them to remain quiet for eight hours as they
valued their lives.
Soon after these preparations were made, a messenger reached him with
news that Massena had arrived at Vitoria, and would halt there; but
that a great convoy was on the point of setting out, with a general in
one coach, a colonel and lieutenant-colonel and two women in another,
1100 prisoners, and an escort of 2000 foot and 200 horse. The hope
of delivering the prisoners repaid him for the disappointment of his
design against Massena. Not trusting too implicitly to the messenger,
for fear of deceit, he ordered him to be bound to a point of the
rock, and placed a guard over him, who was to put him to death if he
attempted to escape, but he promised him a munificent reward if his
information should be verified. They were not long in suspense. About
eight o’clock the enemy’s van appeared, ... 100 foot and twenty horse,
who were allowed to pass unmolested; a second party of thirty foot and
twelve horse passed in like manner, that Mina might not, by giving
the alarm too early, lose his object. The main body came next with
the prisoners, a number of carts laden with plunder, and one of the
coaches. A fire was opened upon them from the left by one battalion,
and the two others rushed out upon them from the right. The prisoners
threw themselves upon the ground that they might not fall by the
hands of their friends; then joyfully ran to join their deliverers.
Mina went to the coach, for the purpose of saving its passengers; the
two officers, however, refusing to surrender, defended themselves
with their sabres; one was killed; Colonel Lafitte, the other, was
wounded and made prisoner with the women. The French, though thrown at
first into confusion and dreadfully cut up, formed with the celerity
of well-disciplined and experienced troops; 600 foot and 100 horse
brought up the rear with the other coach: upon the first fire the coach
was driven back to Vitoria, escorted by the horsemen; the infantry
remained and got possession of a height, from whence they annoyed the
Spaniards, who were now completing their victory. Two hundred men from
the garrison of Salinas came to their succour, but they were dislodged
and driven to the gates of Salinas. Mina’s fourth battalion did not
arrive till the business was done: the men had made a forced march
of fifteen hours and were fasting, nevertheless they joined in the
pursuit. By this time reinforcements came to the enemy from Vitoria,
and the French in Salinas being joined by part of the garrison of
Mondragon, and of all the neighbouring posts, again showed themselves.
Mina drove them back, and then thought it advisable to secure what
he had gained; the affair had continued five hours, and his men had
neither eaten nor drank since ten in the morning of the preceding day;
he therefore retired with his spoils to Zalduendo, six hours’ distance
from the field.
The French lost their whole convoy and above 1000 men, of whom
about 110 only were made prisoners. Among the slain was Valbuena,
who, having formerly been aide-de-camp to Castaños, had entered the
Intruder’s service, and distinguished himself by his cruelty to his
own countrymen. The booty was very great: Mina reserved one load of
specie for the public service, and his men took what they could find,
many loading themselves with gold, ... the plunder which their enemies
were conveying to France. The peasants’ artillery was tried on this day
for the second time with excellent effect; at the first discharge it
brought down above twenty of the French, and on the second dispersed
a column which had formed in the road. The loss of the Spaniards was
inconsiderable, but D. Pedro Bizarron, who that day commanded the
cavalry, was dangerously hurt, to the great mischief of Mina and all
his comrades. Many women were taken, they were treated with respect,
and set at liberty. Among the Spaniards who were delivered were
twenty-one officers; Garrido was one, the leader of a Guerrilla party
in Castille.
Mina’s first care was to place the rescued prisoners in safety, and
this could only be done by getting them into Valencia. For this purpose
he sent to Duran and the Empecinado to co-operate with him, and pass
along the bank of the Ebro in order to protect their passage; but
Duran was too far distant, and the Empecinado was at this time closely
pressed by the enemy; he had therefore nothing to rely on but himself.
Accordingly he made preparations for throwing a bridge over the river,
and named the place where it was to be done; the materials were sent
towards this place, and he moved in the same direction: then in the
middle of the night turning aside marched to a part of the river twelve
miles distant, tried the depth by forcing his own horse into the water,
and making each of his cavalry take up a man behind him, in this manner
landed the whole in safety, while the enemy were waiting to attack him
when he should be employed in making his bridge.
♦JUNE 6.♦
Next his band was heard of at Irun, when D. Josè Gorriz, who, according
to the Maccabean system, had succeeded his kinsman in the command of
the third battalion, forming a junction with the fourth under Ulzurrun,
marched against that place, defeated the garrisons of Oyarzun and
Beriatu, got possession of the stores of the Intrusive government at
Irun, and burnt the bridge which the French had constructed over the
Bidasoa, which there separates France from Spain; after which they
returned with their booty, though all the force of the adjoining posts
was collected to oppose them. Greater and more persevering efforts
were now made to destroy him. Caffarelli arrived to take the command
in Biscay, and his first object was to signalize himself by the
destruction of an enemy, for whose blood Buonaparte thirsted as he
had thirsted for that of Schill and of Hofer. Mina was in the village
of Mendigorria with three of his battalions and his cavalry, when
Caffarelli with one division came against him by Puente la Reyna,
another by the Valle de Echaurri; Reille advanced with a third by
Carrascal, and a fourth moved from Logroño upon Estella. The whole
force in ♦JUNE 14.♦ motion against him amounted to 8000 foot and 2000
horse. Mina put himself in ambush near Carrascal, meaning to attack
Reille; he engaged him, and forced him to retire upon Tafalla: but when
the Guerrilla chief had advanced in pursuit as far as the village of
Barasoain, he discovered that Caffarelli, marching back from Puente,
had contrived to cut off the battalion which he himself commanded,
and place it between two fires. Reille and Caffarelli then, whose
joint force amounted to 700 horse and 4000 foot, attacked him with
as great advantage of ground as of numbers, and Mina for the moment
expected to see six of the seven companies of his battalion cut off.
Their desperate courage brought them off with the loss of twenty-three
killed and eighty taken; a heavy loss, but far less than there had
been cause to dread, ... and for which in the action they had revenged
themselves. He himself was in the most imminent peril: a party of
hussars surrounded him, and one of them aimed a blow which he had no
other means of avoiding but by stretching himself out upon his horse;
the horse at the same moment sprung forward and threw him; he recovered
his feet and ran; the horse, ... whether by mere good fortune, or that,
in the wild life to which Mina was reduced, like an Arab he had taught
the beast to love him ... followed his master, who then lightly leaped
into his seat, and, though closely pursued, saved himself.