THE OPERATIONS TOWARDS VALENCIENNES.
On 5th October the Division began its move southwards, with orders to
relieve the 3rd Canadian Division in the line north-west of Cambrai, and
by the evening of 8th October was concentrated in the Queant-Inchy area.
However, a rapidly-changing situation on the 8th necessitated an
alteration in the plans. On that date an attack was delivered by the
Third and Fourth British Armies, which was continued by the French on
their right. Farther south on the same date French troops attacked east
of the Meuse and in Champagne. This attack progressed for some three or
four miles into the enemy's lines, with the result that his resistance
temporarily gave way. During the night the Canadian Corps captured
Ramillies and crossed the Scheldt Canal at Pont d'Aire, and entered
Cambrai from the north. The following day the advance was continued.
Cambrai was in our hands, and our troops established themselves on a
line three miles east of the town.
Orders were therefore issued for the 51st Division to move to the
Bourlon area, and to be placed under the command of the Canadian Corps.
Accordingly on 10th October the 152nd Brigade moved to Bourlon village,
153rd Brigade to the area north-east of Bourlon, and 154th Brigade north
of Fontaine Notre Dame, the village in which they had experienced such
savage fighting in November 1917.
On 11th October orders were issued for the 51st Division to relieve the
2nd Canadian Division, which was attacking the village of Iwuy on the
same day, the instructions being that the 51st was to take over from the
2nd Canadians on whatever line they had established themselves at the
conclusion of the operations.
Prior to these moves an important change had taken place in the
composition of the Division: the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
who had been employed as pioneer battalion to the 5th Division ever
since they had left the 51st in the Labyrinth in 1916, rejoined the
Division as an infantry battalion. They were allotted to the 153rd
Brigade in place of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, who, on account of the
difficulty of finding further reinforcements, were transferred to the
152nd Brigade and amalgamated with the 6th Gordon Highlanders. This
composite battalion was known as the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders.
In view of the coming relief, the 152nd and 154th Brigades moved forward
during the morning into the 2nd Canadian Division area, the 153rd
Brigade moved towards Tilloy and Essars, and the Divisional staff
headquarters opened a report centre at the headquarters of the 2nd
Canadian Division at Escadœuvres.
At 4 P.M. the 51st Division again came under the XXIInd Corps, and
received orders that it would attack through the 2nd Canadian Division
on the following day in conjunction with an attack to be delivered by
the Corps on either flank.
The operations on which the Division was now to embark constituted a
complete change from any in which it had previously taken part. Trench
warfare, in which the enemy's defences can be largely definitely
located, now belonged to the past. The scene of the fighting was for the
future to be laid amidst large uplands, checkered with undestroyed
villages, many of them still occupied by their civilian inhabitants, and
with occasional woods and spinneys with living trees in full leaf.
Continuous trenches no longer stretched across the battle front.
The country was, however, well adapted for the rearguard action which
the enemy was fighting. On the western edge of the uplands he could
adequately cover the eastern slopes of those facing him with
comparatively few machine-guns, skilfully hidden in spinneys and sunken
roads, in positions which dominated the open country over which the
attacking troops must advance.
Moreover, two serious obstacles in the shape of rivers completely
crossed the Divisional front--namely, the river Selle and the river
Ecaillon. These rivers, with soft treacherous beds and steep muddy
sides, were not fordable. Further, their course ran through narrow
steeply-sloped valleys, so that the high ground on the eastern banks
afforded magnificent observation to machine-gunners and artillery
observers of the western slopes of the valleys and of the crossings of
the river.
To the north of the Divisional front ran the Canal de l'Escaut in a
north-easterly direction until it passed Denain, where, in a short
reach, it suddenly turned south-east and traversed almost half the
Divisional front before it again bent north-eastwards and resumed its
course.
Traversing the Divisional front obliquely from south-west to north-east
ran the great Cambrai-Valenciennes road.
The country was for the most part not so enclosed as it was further
south, where innumerable orchards, spinneys, and woods blinded the
enemy's troops, and so compelled him either to fall back to more open
country, or to employ strong rear-guards to cover the ground and hold
it. In this case each attack required delicate handling to prevent large
numbers of men falling victims in an endeavour to close with a few
marksmen on well-sited machine-gun nests.
To protect the infantry from this fate creeping barrages were arranged
wherever possible, and even when this form of attack was not considered
advisable or was impracticable, sections of field-guns and howitzers
were invariably detailed, as far as the crossings of the river allowed,
to accompany the infantry in close support. In fact, it will be seen
that in this battle the co-operation between the artillery and infantry
had reached an abnormally high standard, due to the gallantry,
initiative, and efficiency of the junior officers and men.
In appreciating the true value of the success of the Highland Division
in this, its last engagement, it must not be forgotten that since 21st
March it had lost in major operations, apart from sickness and trench
warfare, over a thousand officers and many thousands of men. Thus it was
embarking on a form of warfare of which the bulk of its commanders had
had no experience, and with its infantry composed for the most part of
immature youths or men who had only recently joined the ranks of the
infantry. Taking these facts into consideration, the repeated incidents
of unusual daring and gallantry displayed in these operations will give
clear proof of the great vitality of the Division. This was largely due
to the manner in which its reinforcements, earnestly applying themselves
to the upholding of its traditions, supported the commanders and more
experienced comrades.
In the early hours of 12th October 1918, orders were received that the
Division was to form up on a line roughly 1000 yards north-east of the
village of Iwuy, and to attack with the object of capturing a line
running from Avesnes le Sec inclusive along the Lieu St Amand road as
far as Maison Blanche Farm, thence to the railway at Houdain, the
breadth of line to be attacked being about 5000 yards.
The 49th Division was co-operating in this attack on the right, and a
brigade of the 2nd Canadian Division was to operate on the left flank
and clear the country between the railway and the Canal de l'Escaut.
Two brigades were detailed by the G.O.C. for the attack, the 152nd
Brigade on the right and 154th Brigade on the left. The 152nd Brigade
attacked on a two-battalion front, the leading battalions being the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders and the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, each on a
two-company front. The 154th Brigade, however, employed only one
battalion on the front line, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, who formed up
on a three-company front.
By 4.45 A.M. the attacking brigades had completed the relief of the 4th
and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades. The remainder of the morning was
spent by the battalions in moving into position and completing their
arrangements for the attack.
At 8 A.M. General Carter-Campbell took over command of the sector.
At 10 A.M. reports were received at Divisional headquarters that the
enemy were withdrawing on the front of the 49th Division on the right,
and that their brigades were moving forward without waiting for the
artillery barrage. No reports could, however, be obtained on the
Divisional front that the enemy had withdrawn there; it was in
consequence decided that the attack should be carried out as originally
planned.
Accordingly at 12 noon the infantry advanced, preceded by a creeping
barrage fired by six brigades of field artillery. It, however, quickly
transpired that the attack had coincided with an enemy withdrawal, and
the prescribed objective was reached with little opposition. On the
extreme right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders had some fighting in clearing
Avesnes le Sec; while on the left, on crossing the spur facing Lieu St
Amand, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders came under heavy fire from that
village, but managed in spite of it to establish themselves on the
forward slope.
By 1.30 P.M. the objective was gained on the whole Divisional front.
It had been previously arranged that if success attended these
operations the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, accompanied by a
mobile 18-pounder section under the command of Lieutenant J. Gillespie
of "A" Battery, 256th Brigade, should pass through the 4th Seaforth
Highlanders and if possible occupy Lieu St Amand and the station at Pavé
de Valenciennes, situated close to the junction of the railway and the
Valenciennes-Cambrai road near Lieu St Amand.
Accordingly, as soon as the protective barrage that was covering the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders had ceased, two companies of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders continued the advance. Though at first under
fairly heavy hostile artillery barrage, they moved rapidly forward until
on a line about 150 yards from the southernmost houses of the village.
Here, faced by the enemy, who appeared to have established a firm line
all along the front, they came under a heavy burst of machine-gun fire
which first checked their pace, and, finally, as the German
machine-gunners began to get on to their targets, brought the general
advance to a standstill.
The 18-pounder section at once came into action in the open, and
silenced many of the machine-guns; but the guns hidden amongst the
houses could not be located, and so could not be effectively bombarded.
While searching for these guns, a German 8-inch howitzer battery got on
to the 18-pounder section, and shelled it so effectively that it was
forced to withdraw temporarily.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, however, did not give up
their attempts to reach the village, and each platoon endeavoured to
work its way forward. One of them, from a point 200 yards from the
south-west corner of the village, crawled forward between the furrows of
a newly-ploughed field until within twenty-five yards of two
machine-guns which were firing from behind a bank.
Unfortunately, just at the moment when the sections were about to rise
and rush this post, a burst of enfilade machine-gun fire from the
railway caught them. Swept by the bullets from this gun, they were
unable to rise from the furrows, and movement forwards, rearwards, or to
the flank became impossible. In this position they remained until an
hour or so later. About 4 P.M. the men were able to dribble back to
cover singly.
During this movement on the left, the information having been received
at Divisional headquarters that all objectives had been gained, orders
had therefore been issued for the attacking brigades to move forward to
gain a line running from the river Selle just north of Haspres round
Lieu St Amand to the railway. The 152nd Brigade on the right, however,
found the resistance as strong as it had been in front of the 7th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders, and no substantial alterations in the line
took place.
It was therefore decided to subject Lieu St Amand to a heavy bombardment
from 5 P.M. to 5.30 P.M., and then to advance strong patrols against the
village, and if possible occupy it.
At that time many batteries were moving forward, and though the
18-pounder section attached to the infantry again did gallant work in
the open, the officer commanding the company of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders concerned decided that the attack was unlikely to
be successful, and so cancelled the orders for the advance. One platoon,
however, which did not receive its instructions in time, had already
moved forward, and reached a line about 100 yards from the outskirts of
the village. At this point they were swept by machine-gun fire from the
houses; but, nevertheless, with a fine determination to reach their
objective, the men rushed the village and disappeared amongst the
buildings. Those of them who had successfully crossed the open in face
of the hostile fire and reached the village were at once subjected to
close-range fire from all sides. The survivors, however, hung on behind
what cover they could obtain from walls and buildings, and managed to
extricate themselves one by one when darkness came.
The performances of the two platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, which each had tried to carry Lieu St Amand individually,
were characterised by great gallantry and skill on the part of the men.
They had not only advanced against considerable machine-gun opposition,
but they had also, having found themselves cut off from immediate
assistance and at close grips with an enemy considerably superior to
them in numbers and fire power, successfully extricated themselves from
serious predicaments.
The mobile section accompanying the Argylls had supported the infantry
in these attacks magnificently. They had drawn considerable shell-fire
when in action in the open, and had had one of their ammunition limbers
set on fire, Lieutenant Gillespie himself extinguishing the flames.
By 6 P.M., a farther advance that evening appearing impracticable,
orders were issued for a line to be consolidated roughly on the original
objective given for the first attack.
At 9 P.M. orders were received from the Corps that pressure was to be
exercised against the enemy's rear-guards on the morrow by carrying out
an attack with the object of gaining a line running from the railway
east of the river Selle 1000 yards north of Haspres, east of Fleury and
Noyelles, and thence running westwards to the railway north of Lieu St
Amand.
October 13th turned out to be a day of heavy and costly fighting. It was
evident from the outset that the enemy was making a determined stand
south of Valenciennes, so as to secure the flanks of his withdrawals
that were taking place in other parts of the front. Indeed, orders
captured during the forthcoming operations showed that the troops had
been instructed to hold the line of the river Selle at all costs. In
consequence, he was holding his position with machine-guns in
considerable strength.
Moreover, the protection afforded him by the river Selle and the Canal
de l'Escaut enabled him to mass to the north-east a weight of artillery
which he would not otherwise have dared to maintain in action in such
close support to the infantry of his rearguard.
To increase his powers of resistance further, he also employed on this
portion of the front a number of aeroplanes, which flew low over our
attacking waves, and constantly bombed and machine-gunned the troops and
batteries.
The enemy's determination to stand not having yet been disclosed at this
time, it was decided to attempt to gain this objective by exploitation,
and not to employ a creeping barrage. The 255th Brigade, R.F.A., was,
however, detailed to follow the infantry in close support as a mobile
brigade.
At 9 A.M. on the 18th the same four battalions as had been engaged on
the 12th moved forward to the attack, two sections of machine-guns being
sent forward with each leading battalion, as well as three light
trench-mortars which accompanied them.
Prior to the attack, places which appeared suitable for enemy
concentrations and nests of machine-guns had been heavily bombarded by
the artillery.
Only on the right was any substantial progress made. On that flank the
5th Seaforth Highlanders, suffering heavy casualties from frontal and
enfilade machine-gun fire, forced their way forward to a line 1000 yards
north-east of Avesnes le Sec, where they were finally checked.
On their left the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders came under such a blast of
machine-gun fire that they made practically no advance, and sustained
over 300 casualties; the effect of this fire was so destructive that the
four sections of machine-guns, in their efforts to beat it down, had
three officers killed and six guns knocked out, while the teams of the
light trench-mortars lost so heavily that the survivors were too few in
number to work the guns, and so joined in the fighting as infantry.
Meanwhile the enemy had also opened an intense artillery barrage all
along the line.
In order to help forward the infantry on this point of the field, 2nd
Lieutenant P. H. Unwin from "A" Battery, 256th Brigade, R.F.A., brought
his section into action at 800 yards' distance from the enemy, and
immediately opened fire with great effect, driving back parties of
infantry that were counter-attacking, and inflicting serious losses on
them. 2nd Lieutenant Unwin remained in action in his exposed position
throughout the day, and gave great moral assistance to the infantry.
On the left brigade front it was arranged that the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders on the left flank should move forward and capture
Lieu St Amand before the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on the left centre
moved forward to attack.
Two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore
went forward with the artillery bombarding the village; but as soon as
the guns lifted off the southernmost houses, a white Very light was
fired by the enemy, followed by an intense burst of machine-gun fire
which swept the attacking waves.
As no covered approaches existed except on the right, all forward
movement was at once paralysed, apart from that of one platoon on the
extreme right flank. Here a certain amount of cover existed, and the men
worked their way forward to within fifty yards of some enemy
machine-guns, and maintained themselves there, unable to make further
progress, as the country had again become open.
Attempts to rush forward were beaten down by hostile fire; and though
one Lewis-gun team worked its way into position, and by excellent
shooting knocked out a machine-gun team and inflicted casualties on
parties seen in the village, no further progress was made.
The advance made by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had not
carried the line sufficiently forward to enable the 4th Seaforth
Highlanders to gain Maison Blanche in the centre, and by 11 A.M. most of
the attacking waves were back on the jumping-off line, though seriously
depleted in numbers.
On the right, however, parties of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, with
both their flanks in the air, were digging-in along the railway north of
Avesnes le Sec, and held on in this position until 2 P.M. A party of an
officer and twenty men protecting their right beat off several attempts
to work round their flanks, covered the withdrawal of the troops on the
railway, and remained in position until dusk, when they regained our
lines.
The platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which had
also been brought to a standstill, with both its flanks in the air,
close against Lieu St Amand, similarly regained our lines at dusk, this
being the third platoon of this battalion which had made a great
endeavour to carry Lieu St Amand single-handed.
Neither of the Divisions on the flanks was able to make progress during
this day, and it was clearly evident that the enemy had selected the
line of the Haspres-Lieu St Amand road as his line of resistance for his
rear-guards.
No further attack was carried out until 19th October. As a result of
operations in other parts of this line, everything pointed to an early
withdrawal on the front south of Douai, which might possibly extend as
far southwards as the front of the 51st Division. Extensive patrolling
was therefore carried out during this period, but the enemy was always
found in strength and alert, and numerous patrol encounters took place.
The artillery, who were well provided with good observation posts,
carried out numerous bombardments against enemy movement, and selected
strong places with satisfactory results. They, however, received in
return a very considerable ration of shells from the German gunners, who
were still in force, and harassed the forward areas and battery
positions continuously, particularly with gas.
On the 17th October the enemy withdrawal south of Douai began, and on
the 18th it had extended as far as the front occupied by the Canadians
on the left flank of the 51st. The enemy was, however, still firmly in
position along the Haspres-Lieu St Amand road.
These days of respite from active operations were employed by the R.E.
in solving many problems. Water for the forward troops was located in
damaged wells in Avesnes le Sec and Iwuy, which had to be repaired and
tested.
A track for horse transport had to be made south of the village of Iwuy
on account of the continuous bombardment of that village by the German
artillery.
The enemy had also, with characteristic thoroughness, destroyed all the
bridges on the railway from Cambrai to Denain, and had thus effectually
interfered with lateral communications on this area. The 8th Royal Scots
were therefore employed working continuously in conjunction with a
field company of the 4th Division in removing the debris of the broken
arches from the roads so as to reopen them for troops and transport.
An attack was now planned for the 20th October, the objectives given
being the same as had been arranged for the attack on the 12th.
However, on the early morning of 19th October, favoured by a thick mist,
the enemy withdrew on the Divisional front. At this time the 153rd
Brigade had taken over the line on the left, while the 154th Brigade
had, after three days' rest, relieved the 152nd Brigade on the right.
Until the mist lessened the enemy could not be actively followed, but
patrols from both brigades came into contact with him shortly after
dawn.
On the left of the Division the Canadians also reported that the enemy
was withdrawing on their front, and that they were moving forward to
seize the crossing on the left bank of the Canal de l'Escaut at
Bouchain, north-west of Lieu St Amand.
The withdrawal on the front of the 51st Division was, however, slow, and
by noon patrols had reported that the enemy was still in position both
on the right front and in Lieu St Amand.
However, at 2.10 P.M., the enemy began to bombard the latter, and twenty
minutes later patrols of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were
in its streets.
Orders were then issued for the brigades to gain the line
Fleury-Noyelles-Douchy, or, in other words, to seize the bridgeheads
across the river Selle. The advance began on the greater part of the
Divisional front at 3 P.M., covered by detachments of the Corps cyclists
and infantry patrols. It was at once discovered that while the
resistance on the left was almost negligible, the enemy was holding on
to Haspres, and was making some effort to delay the advance on the
right.
On the left progress became rapid. The two leading battalions, the 6th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 7th Black Watch, at first
moved forward in extended order; but later, as only stray groups of the
enemy were encountered at this stage, a screen of scouts was sent
forward, the companies following in artillery formation, and later by
platoons in column of route. Simultaneously the artillery brigades
advanced to positions in and about Avesnes le Sec and Lieu St Amand with
mobile 18-pounder sections closely following the infantry battalions.
By 6 P.M. the woods east of Maison Blanche were cleared, and the troops
were well east of Lieu St Amand. Before midnight Neuville sur l'Escaut,
in which 1500 civilians were found, and Douchy, also full of civilians,
were rushed. In the latter village a few riflemen had been left behind
by the enemy to check the advance, but these fled as the leading troops
approached.
On the right brigade front the 4th Gordon Highlanders advanced towards
Fleury with two companies, the remaining two companies forming a
defensive flank to protect the right, as Haspres was still held by the
enemy.
As they approached Fleury they came under considerable artillery and
machine-gun fire; but they pushed forward in spite of it, and reached
the west banks of the river Selle. Here they found all bridges
destroyed, so that the stream, some 20 feet wide, 5 feet deep, and with
muddy banks and a soft bed, presented a serious obstacle. The advance
therefore came to a standstill, while the troops collected material with
which to improvise bridges.
On the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders had made rapid progress. They had, in fact, outrun their
neighbouring battalions, and their three leading companies were in
consequence compelled to form deep flanks as they advanced, while the
fourth company moved in close support to them on their right flank.
By 7 P.M. they had reached Noyelles, which they found clear of the
enemy, but, like Douchy and Neuville, occupied by numbers of civilians.
They had dispersed a small party of Germans on the east bank of the
river Selle, and though the bridge had been blown up, three companies
had established themselves on the east bank of the river by 9.45 P.M. in
touch with the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The 4th Seaforth
Highlanders also advanced in rear of the 1/7 Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders towards Noyelles, while sections of the 400th and 404th
Field Companies, R.E., were hastening forward with bridging material so
as to prepare passages across the river for artillery at the earliest
possible moment.
The situation of the troops at midnight 19-20th October was thus as
described above, while on the right, though Saubroir had fallen, the
enemy in Haspres were still gallantly holding out. On the left the 4th
Canadian Division had reached Denain.
During the night the 404th Field Company, R.E., who had reconnoitred and
selected a site for a bridge just north of Noyelles as soon as the
infantry patrols had passed that village, moved forward with the pontoon
and trestle waggons. Though they came under both rifle and machine-gun
fire as they neared the village, the waggons reached the site
successfully, and a bridge of two Weldon trestles was completed by 3.45
A.M. The construction of a bridge within eight hours of the infantry
having reached the east bank of the river, within a few hundred yards of
enemy riflemen and machine-gunners, was an exceptionally fine
performance.
The advance continued throughout the night, but it was found that the
enemy was making a stand roughly on the line of the road from Haspres
through La Croix St Marie to Denain.
On the right the 4th Gordon Highlanders, by improvising rough bridges
from beams, branches, and straw, crossed the river Selle south of
Fleury, and at 6.45 A.M. on 20th October occupied the village. The enemy
machine-gun teams had bolted from the eastern outskirts of the village
as the troops approached.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders then crossed the river at Noyelles over the
bridge just completed by the R.E., and formed up on a two-company front
east and south of the village on the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders;
and with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their left, the
Argylls and Seaforths then attempted to advance at 5 A.M.
Heavy machine-gun fire was, however, at once opened on the 4th Seaforth
Highlanders, with such effect that they were unable to make material
progress, and were compelled to dig in only slightly in advance of their
forming-up line. In this position they tried to locate the enemy
machine-guns so that they might deal with them and continue the advance.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders also found that their patrols
could not get forward on to the high ground north of Noyelles, and so
discontinued their advance until arrangements could be made for
artillery support.
Similarly on the left the two leading battalions were well across the
river Selle at dawn, but were in their turn checked by machine-gun fire
from the wood north-west of La Croix St Marie, and were also preparing
to attack with artillery.
Considerable fighting occurred during the early part of the day. In the
night two attacks carried out by the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and one by
the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders ultimately, about 8 A.M.,
forced the enemy beyond the Haspres-La Croix St Marie road, machine-guns
being captured at Maison Rouge. Beyond this point, however, the troops
could make no headway against the volume of fire drawn by any attempt to
move forward in the open.
On the left brigade front the artillery came into action at 9.30 A.M.,
when a concentrated fifteen minutes shoot was carried out against the
woods and houses west of La Croix St Marie. The infantry line attacked,
but failed to dislodge the enemy.
The shoot was then repeated for a second fifteen minutes, and the 6th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 7th Black Watch again went
forward, cleared the woods and houses, and quickly reached the La Croix
St Marie-Denain road, touch being obtained in Denain with the 4th
Canadians on the left.
The mobile section of "A" Battery, 256th Brigade, R.F.A., under the
command of Lieutenant S. Simkins, attached to the 6th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, had materially assisted in this advance.
Lieutenant Simkins, having been pointed out houses in which machine-guns
were located, engaged them over open sights. Civilians who were taking
shelter in the cellar of one of these houses afterwards told Lieutenant
Simkins that the shooting was very accurate, and that the enemy
machine-gunner in that house had left badly wounded.
In spite of the proximity of the enemy and the fighting going on in that
neighbourhood, the 404th Field Company, R.E., erected a bridge at
Fleury. Owing to the hostile fire they could not get their waggons
forward until 11.30 A.M., but by 6.10 P.M. a bridge consisting of a
pontoon and a trestle was completed and brought into use.
The 400th Field Company, R.E., had been ordered to bridge the river at
Douchy, but they experienced similar difficulty in getting their waggons
forward. They, however, found and repaired a partially-destroyed German
bridge, and constructed a new bridge of two Weldon trestles south of the
village. In each case the bridges were completed in time for the advance
of the artillery.
At 12 noon the 153rd Brigade continued its advance and made rapid
progress. The enemy on the extreme left, fearing that he might be driven
against the now bridgeless Canal de l'Escaut, withdrew rapidly, the 7th
Black Watch reaching the canal bank along their whole front by 5 P.M.
They then detached two platoons to operate against the rear of the
Germans resisting the 4th Canadians at Wavrechain, north of the canal,
but they were held up through being unable to find a crossing.
The advance of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was slower, not
so much on account of the German resistance to them frontally, but on
account of the fire which came from the high ground on their right
flank. However, by 10 P.M. they had established themselves on the canal
bank from the rubber factory south of Prouvy westwards, capturing
Haulchin and releasing 1500 French civilians. This advance was
materially assisted by the Corps Cyclists, who patrolled the country
well in front of the infantry, and enabled the latter to advance with
few delays.
After dark, at 8 P.M., the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders resumed
their advance, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the Divisional right at
10 P.M. This advance proceeded successfully, and by midnight the leading
troops had reached the eastern edges of the Grand Bois and the Bois de
l'Entrée, the line running thence north-westwards to the railway leading
to Denain.
Throughout the night 20-21st October, which fortunately was light and
clear, the advance continued. The 153rd Brigade had already reached the
canal bank throughout their front, and had formed a defensive flank on
their right along the railway line facing Thiant. The 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders on the right of the 153rd Brigade also made
great progress. In the grey of the morning their first company entered
Thiant. Here they encountered a burst of machine-gun fire, but by 9 A.M.
they had beaten down all resistance, and had worked through the village
as far as to the banks of the Ecaillon. They, however, found the enemy
in strength on the eastern banks, and so took up positions in houses and
hedgerows on the edge of the stream. At 10 A.M. 21st October they gained
touch with the Canadians, who had entered Prouvy.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 11th Brigade, 4th Division, who
were now up in line with them on the high ground overlooking Monchaux
and the river Ecaillon, were now unable to make further progress towards
the banks of the river, as they found the western sides of the river
valley were very exposed and covered by the fire of the enemy holding
strong natural positions in sunken roads.
During the day the field artillery moved into positions west of Thiant.
From this point onwards, as the villages in front of the line were
occupied by French civilians, the Divisional commander decided only to
use 18-pounder shrapnel against them. Similarly, for the same reason,
gas was not employed against the villages. This was a great deprivation,
as a large supply of the long awaited mustard gas had just arrived.
Naturally the Germans used gas in similar circumstances freely.
Meanwhile the bridges thrown across the Selle were only sufficient for
field-guns and horsed transport. Arrangements had therefore to be made
by the C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel Napier-Clavering, to provide bridges which
would enable the Corps heavy artillery and lorry traffic to keep pace
with the advance, so that all weapons would be available to engage the
enemy should he decide to stand on the east banks of the Ecaillon.
Reconnaissances were therefore carried out by the 400th and 404th Field
Companies, R.E., at Douchy and Noyelles for sites for the construction
of heavy bridges over the river Selle. In both places the enemy had
destroyed the original brick bridges, totally removing the central pier
and one abutment in each case. The Douchy gap measured 72 feet and that
at Noyelles 88 feet. No long girders were available to bridge these gaps
without piers, and the difficulty of securing foundations for the piers
on the mass of brick debris in the river-bed had therefore to be
overcome.
For the Douchy bridge standard girder spans of 16 feet by 18 feet were
available, so that work was begun by the 400th Field Company, R.E., on
the 20th. By 10.30 A.M. on the 23rd the bridge was completed for all
traffic except heavy tanks, thus enabling the heavy artillery to cross
the river in time to take part in the attack to be delivered on the
24th.
For the bridge at Noyelles only salved German materials were available,
which had to be collected and brought to the site of the bridge by horse
transport. Work was begun on the 21st, and the bridge was completed for
heavy traffic on the 28th.
The result of the preceding operations had materially altered the
dispositions of the Division. The 153rd Brigade had been pinched out of
the front line, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders of the 154th Brigade occupying the whole of what
was now the Divisional front, with the 4th Gordon Highlanders in support
of them at Fleury. The 153rd Brigade was therefore concentrated at
Haulchin and Douchy, while the 152nd Brigade moved forward to Douchy and
Noyelles.
The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd October were passed in making preparations for
forcing the passage of the river Ecaillon. At 11 A.M. on the 21st the
enemy began to shell Thiant, and for the next three days the artillery
and machine-gun fire against our positions on the west bank of the river
continued briskly. Orders were issued to accept any opportunity offered
of crossing the river, but in only one case was an attempt to carry out
this order successful, and then only temporarily. The 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders had made three such attempts at Thiant, and at
the third a small party succeeded in crossing the river. They rushed a
machine-gun post, but the alarm had been given, and a strong machine-gun
and trench-mortar bombardment was opened by the enemy. In the face of
this fire no support could be pushed across the river to help the
Argylls, and they were therefore compelled to return, bringing the
captured machine-gun with them.
On 22nd October the 4th Seaforth Highlanders successfully advanced, and
occupied the sunken road running parallel with the Ecaillon west of
Monchaux. Their patrols had previously reached the west bank of the
river, but had drawn such a storm of fire from the east bank that they
were unable to maintain themselves there.
While the troops were thus situated, it was decided to carry out an
attack to force the passage of the Ecaillon on the 24th. On the evening
of the 23rd, the 153rd Brigade, to whom this attack was to be entrusted,
accordingly relieved the 154th Brigade in the line.
The objective allotted to the Division for this attack was the village
of Maing and the high ground south-east of it, the 4th Division being
ordered to attack simultaneously on the right with a similar objective.
The frontage of the attack allotted to the Division was 3000 yards in
breadth, and for the operation seven brigades of field artillery and one
of heavy artillery were placed at the disposal of the Divisional
commander.
Three intermediate objectives were selected, the first being the river
Ecaillon including the eastern outskirts of Thiant, and for the 4th
Division, Monchaux; the second objective was the western outskirts of
Maing, while the railway running north and south between Maing and
Famars was given as a line of exploitation for the operations if the
attack was successful.
The artillery, as soon as it had got into its own position east of the
Selle, had fired Chinese barrages over the enemy's front system on the
22nd and 23rd. These were most successful, the enemy becoming completely
demoralised, vacating his rifle-pits and running from one place to
another, undoubtedly suffering many casualties, as the number of
stretcher parties seen at work after each barrage had lifted proved.
It was therefore hoped that when the real attack came the German
infantry would be considerably shaken, although patrols up to this point
had always found them in position and alert on the east bank.
Two companies of machine-guns were also detailed to fire a barrage,
while a section of machine-guns and light trench-mortars accompanied
each infantry battalion.
Further, two sections of machine-guns were placed in the 4th Canadian
Division area amongst the houses on the north bank of the canal to
enfilade the positions to be attacked.
As it was necessary for the infantry to cross the Ecaillon on a broad
front to enable them to take full advantage of the barrage, a number of
bridges of 15 and 20 feet span were made. These were fitted with petrol
tins and cork floats, which would prevent them from sinking should any
of them prove too short to span the river.
Demonstrations in the use of these bridges were given to officers and
men at the river Selle at Noyelles, but no adequate inspection of the
places where they were to be employed in the crossing of the Ecaillon
could be made, owing to the vigilance of the enemy's patrols.
The two Black Watch battalions were detailed for this attack by the
153rd Brigade, and were disposed with the 6th battalion on the right on
a two-company front, and the 7th battalion on the left on a one-company
front.
At 4 A.M. on 24th October, supported by a great weight of artillery,
this attack was launched. Each company carried with it eight bridges,
each supported by two to four men. Several of these, however, were
destroyed by shell-fire before they had arrived at the water's edge.
The Ecaillon was found to be swollen by recent rains, and south of
Thiant to be about 20 feet wide, from 4 to 6 feet deep, with bed and
sides of soft mud, and banks, often steep, from 3 to 6 feet high. A
single line of wire entanglement, except at Thiant, ran along the east
bank of the river, and also along the greater part of the western bank.
The right company of the 6th Black Watch, whose advance had to be
carried out down a glacis dominated by the village of Monchaux,
encountered strong opposition. In the first instance, only one platoon,
No. 11, commanded by Lieutenant Walker, managed to cross the river. This
platoon, on the left of its company frontage, found its bridge too short
to span the river; it was therefore discarded, and Lieutenant Walker,
with his sergeant and runner, under the fire of machine-guns, plunged
into the water and swam across to the other side. They were then
followed by the remainder of the platoon, whom they helped to drag
ashore as they struggled across the river, swimming and wading, in their
heavy kits.
The next platoon on their right found themselves in a zone of
machine-gun bullets, and in ten minutes only a corporal and six men were
surviving. Nevertheless, the corporal crossed the stream alone, but had
to return, and then crawled back with his six men to the assembly
position.
The platoon in rear then renewed the attempt, but after suffering many
casualties on a glacis destitute of cover, had also to withdraw.
The second platoon on the left--that is, the one in rear of No.
11--placed their bridge in position across the wreckage of an old German
bridge and scrambled across.
Meanwhile the commander of No. 11 platoon and the company commander,
realising that the machine-guns holding up the advance of the platoons
on the right were located in Monchaux, turned their men right-handed,
entered the village, and set upon the machine-gunners with their rifles
and destroyed them. The two platoons that had already failed to cross
then ran down to the river banks, and assisted by some men on the east
bank, who threw out a stout ladder towards them, managed to cross the
river. Three Lewis guns were then put out at once north-east of Monchaux
to pin the enemy into that village while No. 11 platoon was dealing with
the enemy in it. Monchaux was finally cleared, 68 prisoners and 9
machine-guns being captured there. Touch was also established in the
village with men of the Hampshire Regiment, 4th Division.
The left-hand company of the 6th Black Watch, not being involved in the
close-range machine-gun fire from Monchaux, and meeting no direct fire,
quickly threw their bridges across the river, and were at once in
possession of their first objective.
The company of the 6th Black Watch on the left crossed after many
adventurous incidents by six bridges, placed across the river between
the northern and southern outskirts of Thiant. Three of these had been
quietly placed in position across the river before zero hour, and were
crossed without difficulty when the barrage opened. The fixing of the
remaining bridges, however, presented several difficulties. In one case,
when the bridges were too short, one was used as a ladder down to the
water, and a second was attached to it and to débris on the other side.
Another party crossed by a hand-rail and girder remaining on a
destroyed bridge. Another bridge, which was found to be too short, was
floated across the river and lashed by a wire to a tree, each man having
to leap from the bridge on to the beach on the opposite bank.
Crossings were made by a section at a time. In each case the foremost
man as he reached the bank rushed into the nearest house to deal with
the enemy there. Throughout, the crossing was effected under fairly
lively machine-gun and trench-mortar fire.
The second objective was attacked by two companies on the right and one
on the left of the same battalions. The advance was met by heavy
shelling and considerable machine-gun fire. The progress was slow, and
it was not before 8 A.M. that the objective was reached. The 7th Black
Watch had for some time been held up by machine-guns in the Chateau des
Pres, but they brought their Lewis guns into action, successfully
countered the guns, and rushed the chateau. Farther on, in the outskirts
of the village, they captured a German trench-mortar, which they turned
on the enemy with good effect.
Heavy fighting ensued in the attack on Maing. The troops operating south
of the village, one of the companies of the 6th Black Watch which had
forced the passage of the Ecaillon, found it impossible to advance owing
to the severity of the fire from the south-east corner of the village
and from the sunken roads in front of them.
On the left, where two companies entered the village of Maing, close
fighting went on for many hours in the streets and amongst the houses.
Mobile 18-pounders, two reserve sections of machine-guns and the German
trench-mortars already referred to, were all employed in the effort to
secure the village. It was not, however, until 3 P.M. that the bulk of
Maing was captured, the line then running round the eastern outskirts of
the village to the cemetery, and thence along the sunken road running
south-eastwards. The chateau at the eastern corner still remained in the
enemy's hands.
Meanwhile the Divisional engineers had made every effort to bridge the
Ecaillon for the passage of artillery. A section of the 404th Field
Company had moved to the river-banks early in the morning to build
foot-bridges for infantry; the remainder of the company also came up
with bridging material, but owing to the heavy hostile barrage fire
which greeted the attack, they were unable for some time to get their
waggons forward. By 9 A.M., however, the reconnaissances of the bridge
sites had been completed, and between 9 and 10 A.M., in spite of heavy
shell-fire, the waggons moved forward. The first bridge just north of
Thiant was completed by 10.30 A.M., and the second at the southern edge
of the village by 11.45 A.M. The 400th Field Company completed a third
bridge just south of the village. The first was completed in sufficient
time to allow the mobile sections of the field artillery to be in action
in close support of the infantry by 11 A.M.
A reconnaissance for a site for a heavy bridge at Thiant capable of
carrying lorry traffic was made during the morning of the attack, and
the abutments and foundations of the pier of a bridge destroyed by the
Germans were found to be sound.
In spite of a considerable amount of shell-fire, work was carried on in
preparing this site. The material for the bridge could not, however, be
dumped at the site until the debris of the railway bridge over the
Denain-Thiant road which had been blown up had been cleared away. The
8th Royal Scots had begun working continuously on the removal of this
debris on 23rd October. In the course of the morning of the 24th they
had cleared a path for horse-drawn vehicles, which greatly assisted the
artillery moving forward, and by 3 P.M. of 25th October a passage was
ready for lorry traffic. Shortly after this hour the lorries carrying
the material for the heavy bridge reached Thiant, and by 7.50 A.M. on
26th October the bridge was ready for all traffic, including heavy
tanks.
On the conclusion of this day's fighting the following message was
received by the G.O.C. from the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir A.
J. Godley:--
"Will you please accept for yourself and convey to all
concerned very heartiest congratulations and thanks for the
excellent and successful attack made by the Division to-day.
The gallantry and steadiness of the 153rd Infantry Brigade
were most marked, the artillery barrage was all that could
be desired, and the work on this and previous days in
bridging the river under heavy shell-fire and difficult
circumstances was beyond all praise."
October 25th was a day of heavy fighting, in which the enemy sustained
serious losses. The Canadians were facing Valenciennes from the west
bank of the canal, and the Highland Division and the 4th Division were
ordered to continue the pressure on the east bank of the canal. The
objective given for this attack was the high ground east of the railway
east of Maing, and it was also hoped that it might be possible to gain
Famars and Mont Houy by exploitation.
Of these objectives Mont Houy was an outstanding hillock north of Famars
88.1 metres in height, from which practically all the ground from the
Ecaillon to the foot of the hillock could be observed. It thus commanded
the approaches to Valenciennes from the south.
For this attack the Divisional front was divided into two sectors, the
152nd Infantry Brigade relieving the 6th Black Watch on the right, the
153rd Brigade relieving the 7th Black Watch on the left. The 152nd
Brigade employed two battalions, the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders on the right
and the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on the left in the front line of the
attack, and the 153rd Brigade one, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders.
So that the attack might be launched behind a regular barrage, all
troops were withdrawn behind a line running through the centre of Maing
village.
At 7 A.M. the advance began and at once made rapid progress. Two
companies of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders reached the railway embankment
without difficulty; the two remaining companies passed through them and
established themselves by 11 A.M. on the high ground at Caumont Farm and
Grand Mont--not, however, without some brisk fighting with machine-gun
posts. The 6th Seaforth Highlanders met with some stiff resistance on
the railway, where they rushed a machine-gun post and captured an
officer and twelve men. They met further opposition on Rouge Mont, but
were equally successful in dealing with it. From this point, however,
they came in contact with a strong enemy line west of Famars, which
checked all their further efforts to advance.
On the left the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their right
flank reached their objective by 8.30 A.M., but on the left they met
determined resistance opposite La Fontenelle and at the houses alongside
the canal opposite Trith-St Leger. It was not until they had
successfully employed their light trench-mortars that on this part of
the field they reached their objective at noon.
In this action, a section of 4.5 howitzers (under the command of
Lieutenant D. L. MacMasters, M.C.) was employed as a mobile section for
the first time, and did excellent work.
It engaged machine-guns in La Fontenelle and Poirier Farm with direct
observation, and made such accurate shooting that the enemy ran in a
panic in all directions.
On the attainment of these objectives, the fighting did not abate. All
along the front our troops were in close contact with the enemy holding
his line in strength. Our line then ran from the northern Divisional
boundary along the railway down to the point where it crosses the
Maing-Famars road, and then bulged forward in a loop to enclose Rouge
Mont, Grand Mont, and Caumont.
Enemy machine-guns at fairly close range throughout the day kept up
continual bursts of fire, which made any movement a matter of great
difficulty, while low-flying aeroplanes constantly machine-gunned the
troops in their new positions. The shelling was also very heavy,
particularly along the railway, where, owing to the large proportion of
gas used, masks had to be worn almost continuously.
At 4 P.M. the enemy opened a hurricane bombardment of our lines, and
shortly afterwards launched a counter-attack. The S.O.S. was fired, and
the artillery protective barrage came down. Observing officers reported
that this was most effective, and that the enemy, who was
counter-attacking in large numbers from the village of Famars, was well
caught in the barrage and suffered seriously.
He was, however, in spite of his losses in the barrage, able to push
back the line of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders in the loop, and compel them
gradually to give way until they were able to take up a firm stand along
the railway.
The conformation of our line now enabled him to press the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders on both flanks. They opposed his advance resolutely,
inflicting further serious losses on him with rifle and Lewis-gun fire,
until their ammunition, of which a quantity had been expended in
combating low-flying aeroplanes, began to run short. They then fell back
fighting by stages to the railway.
On the left, where the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had taken
up their position west of the railway, the attack was stopped before it
reached our lines. In this action two sections of machine-guns
distributed along the railway caught the enemy in their fire just as the
artillery had done, and also took a heavy toll of them. The mobile
section of 18-pounders attached to the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders also
seized many opportunities of cutting up enemy parties crossing over the
high ground west of Famars.
Considering the amount of fire in which it became involved, this
counter-attack was a gallant performance on the part of a retiring
enemy, and proved that the _morale_ of his troops was, at any rate in
some units, still high.
At 6 P.M. the enemy delivered a second counter-attack, this time with
its weight against the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The
Argylls, who had knocked out the first attack against their lines with
rifle-fire, on this occasion adopted another method. As the enemy
approached, they sprang from their shell-holes and charged down the hill
against the approaching enemy with such vigour that those attackers who
survived the onslaught fled from the field. The net result was that the
Argylls carried their line forward for 500 yards, and established
themselves in a line of trenches which, running east of the railway on
the left, crossed it 100-200 yards south-west of La Fontenelle Wood. In
this brilliant action they captured seventy-four unwounded prisoners, a
trench-mortar, and several machine-guns. After this treatment the enemy
had no further stomach for counter-attacks, but he vented his spleen by
maintaining a heavy bombardment of our whole line with his artillery and
machine-guns, which he maintained throughout the night.
October 26th was another day of savage fighting, the enemy resisting
stubbornly, and being aggressive with his artillery and in
counter-attacks.
Orders were issued for the advance to be resumed in conjunction with
the 4th Division, the objectives of the 51st being Famars and Mont Houy.
For this attack the 152nd Brigade employed the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders on
the right and the 4th Gordon Highlanders (attached) on the left, while
the 153rd Brigade employed the 6th Black Watch. The artillery fired a
creeping barrage, and a company of machine-guns was again placed across
the canal at Trith-St Leger in positions in enfilade, in which it had
many opportunities of engaging good targets with machine-gun fire.
The attack was launched at 10 A.M., and on the right both battalions
made good progress. Caumont and Betterave Farm were soon in the hands of
the leading companies of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, and these joined
with the 4th Gordon Highlanders on the left in surrounding Rouge Mont
Copse and accounting for its entire garrison. The rear two companies
then passed through them, and also reached the objective allotted to
them, a line south of Famars facing the Rhonelle river.
The two leading companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders were no less
successful. They forced their way by short rushes to the high ground
south of Famars, having rounded up a number of machine-guns _en route_.
The two following companies then passed through them and entered Famars
village. Here, after a series of struggles with machine-gun posts and
some street fighting, the village was cleared and posts established east
of it by 11.30 A.M.
On the left the 6th Black Watch carried out their advance successfully,
though subjected to considerable artillery and machine-gun fire. By
11.30 A.M. the two leading companies had made their way close up to Mont
Houy. The two rear companies then passed through them, the one to attack
the hill, and the other to continue the advance beyond La Poirier
Station. These troops were assisted by one of the machine-guns on the
north side of the river, which, seeing some infantry held up by an enemy
machine-gun, fired a burst into the gun, scattered the survivors of the
detachment, and enabled the infantry to capture it.
On Mont Houy there was prolonged rather close fighting, but the company,
now much depleted by losses from machine-gun and shell-fire, gradually
overcame the Germans, and eventually forced its way to the summit of
the hill and held on there. The left company got to within about 200
yards of La Poirier Station, when machine-gun fire from houses on the
canal bank which caught them in the left flank brought their advance to
a standstill.
Throughout the afternoon fighting continued in the neighbourhood of Mont
Houy, where the situation was very obscure. Finally, after the
protective barrage had stopped, the enemy dribbled round the flanks of
the position, and by 5 P.M. the remnants of the 6th Black Watch were
almost surrounded, and compelled to extricate themselves, falling back
to a line between Famars and La Fontenelle.
When the situation had become clear, orders were issued that at dusk the
6/7 Gordon Highlanders, with artillery support, should advance to secure
a bridgehead over the Rhonelle river at Aulnoy, while the 6th Black
Watch, with one company of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
were ordered to push forward beyond Mont Houy.
At the same time the enemy decided to counter-attack with a view to
regaining Famars. It thus happened that while the troops were moving
forward to give effect to these orders, the enemy put down a tremendous
gas-shell and high-explosive bombardment, which stretched in depth from
our foremost trenches to Maing. This bombardment led up to a
counter-attack, which succeeded in forcing the 4th and 6/7 Gordon
Highlanders out of Famars. They were, however, immediately reorganised
at the south end of the village and led forward again. They forced their
way back through the village, drove out the enemy, and restored the
line.
Meanwhile, on the left, owing to the darkness and the fact that the
bombardment had cut all communications, the advance of the 6th Black
Watch and 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was rendered very
difficult. However, in spite of this, it was attempted; but the
machine-gun fire was so severe that it offered no prospect of success,
and was in consequence abandoned.
Patrols of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders then advanced, but they found
Aulnoy strongly held, and it was therefore decided that for the present
no further advance should be contemplated.
During the day 2 officers and 172 other ranks were captured, and many
machine-guns. On the right the 4th Division were now established on the
line Betterave Farm-Artres.
At the conclusion of the day's fighting the following message was
received by the G.O.C. from the Corps Commander:--
"The Corps Commander wishes to compliment the Division on
their continued success of yesterday and to-day, and would
be glad if you would convey his special congratulations to
the 1/6 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their fine
repulse of yesterday's counter-attack."
October 27th, though no attack on a large scale was planned, turned out
a day of fighting almost as strenuous as that of the last three days,
the enemy becoming active and aggressive.
It had been decided that the 154th Brigade should take over the front
during the night 26-27th October; but the situation had fluctuated and
remained so obscure that this relief was not carried out. Certain
reliefs, however, did take place.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders took over from the 6th Black Watch, the
front-line reliefs having to be carried out by the incomers and outgoers
dribbling in and out singly, owing to the lightness of the morning. The
operation was, however, successfully completed by 9 A.M. On the right
one company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders went into the
line north of Famars, the remaining three companies holding the line of
the railway, while the 6/7 and 4th Gordon Highlanders remained in
position under the command of the B.G.C. 154th Brigade.
Famars was now to change hands for a fourth and fifth time. During the
morning the enemy continued to shell it heavily, and after an intense
bombardment attacked at 10.30 A.M. The 4th Gordon Highlanders were
gradually pressed back, and the enemy established posts in the village.
A counter-attack was therefore immediately organised. At 12.30 P.M.
parties were put out round the flanks, and when these had worked their
way forward, the counter-attack companies advanced through the village.
The enemy fought stubbornly amongst the houses; but after he had
suffered many casualties at the hands of the 4th Gordon Highlanders in
heavy street fighting, his resistance collapsed, and the line was again
restored east of Famars.
No further infantry action followed, though the enemy continued to shell
our front positions viciously, employing large quantities of gas.
In the afternoon, as much movement had been observed in Mont Houy by the
artillery observers, a series of five Chinese barrages were fired across
it. A mobile section of 4.5 howitzers also did good work, and materially
assisted the infantry. 2nd Lieutenant W. Baines, who was in command,
established an observation post in Famars, and from it silenced a
forward section of German field-guns that were harassing our infantry,
and also engaged much enemy movement.
From this point the importance of the capture of Mont Houy increased, as
an attack on a wider front south of Valenciennes was now being planned
which necessitated the move of the artillery supporting this attack into
the valley south of Maing, which was in full view of the summit of Mont
Houy. It was of great importance, therefore, to deny to the enemy the
use of the hill for purposes of observation.
In view of this attack further readjustments had taken place. The 5th
and 6th Seaforth Highlanders had taken over the line on the right and
the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left. The latter were ordered to
carry out an attack against Mont Houy on the morning of 28th October,
the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders being detailed to link up the
new line reached with the right brigade front, and to support the attack
and exploit it should it be successful.
The final objective was a line from the cross-roads west of Aulnoy to a
point 400 yards north of La Poirier Station.
All four companies of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were launched in this
attack at 5.15 A.M., covered by a barrage fired by the artillery, by a
machine-gun company on the east bank of the canal, and by machine-guns
firing from the railway.
The Seaforths advanced with three companies leading, supported by two
sections of machine-guns, and followed by the fourth company 150 yards
in rear of the centre.
The right company worked along Mont Houy Wood, two platoons going to the
right and two to the left. The Germans were in the wood in strength, but
after some hard fighting fifty prisoners were captured and a line
established through the wood.
The centre company advanced with great gallantry in the face of heavy
shell and machine-gun fire, which was inflicting considerable casualties
on them. They captured some forty prisoners defending a quarry at the
north-west corner of the wood, and finally reached their objective--a
trench north-west of Chemin Vert--after all its ranks had fallen with
the exception of twelve men. The effort to reach their objective shown
by these twelve survivors after having been shelled and machine-gunned
during an advance of 1500 yards shows what a spirit of determination
animated the men even after a fortnight's continuous fighting.
The support company at once sent two platoons to reinforce the twelve
men, and two platoons to the cemetery east of Aulnoy. The former
successfully reached their objective, and captured those Germans that
were not killed in the assault. The latter reached the cross-roads, but,
owing to the number of houses in the vicinity in which machine-guns were
mounted, they were pinned to the ground and surrounded. Their comrades
on their left were too closely engaged to render them any help, and it
is assumed that they were all either killed or captured.
The company on the left, divided into two waves, reached a line about
400 yards north of La Poirier Station before being held up by
machine-gun fire from La Targette. In this advance the first wave
captured four machine-guns and the second wave ten, and cleared numerous
factories along the canal bank occupied by parties of the enemy.
At 8 A.M., then, the whole of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were on or
close to their objectives, had captured many machine-guns and prisoners,
and killed a number of the enemy. They had, however, experienced heavy
fighting, and were weakened by serious losses, and had one half-company
surrounded and isolated. Parties of the enemy were also still left in
Mont Houy Wood.
The situation, however, remained obscure, and as the runners from the
most advanced troops had to traverse areas swept by machine-gun bullets,
few of them survived to deliver their messages. It was therefore not
known in what serious straits the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were.
Gradually the enemy dribbled his men in between the posts and began
threatening them on their flanks and forcing them back. Machine-guns
also were active against them from parts of Mont Houy that had not been
entirely cleared.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders were now too weak to maintain themselves in
this situation against the increasing numbers of the enemy, and they
were thus gradually forced back, still fighting, to a line running a
little north of La Poirier Station, and west and south of Mont Houy
Wood, to the junction with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
north-west of Famars.
During these operations a company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders that had been waiting in readiness to move forward for
exploitation had advanced on its own initiative to the support of the
4th Seaforth Highlanders left, while a second company, having been sent
forward to strengthen the centre, found the troops establishing the line
just described at about 12 noon and joined them.
In view of the situation, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who
were on the march to rest billets at Lieu St Amand, were turned back to
Maing and placed at the disposal of the 154th Brigade.
Fighting went on all day, but there was no substantial alteration in the
line. The action had so far resulted in the infantry establishing
themselves so close to Mont Houy that it could no longer be used as an
observation post, so that the objectives had in some degree been
obtained.
At 4 P.M. the artillery fire again became intense along the whole
forward area. This was followed by what the enemy intended for a
counter-attack. The German infantry had, however, apparently experienced
all the fighting that they could endure for one day, and few of them
left their trenches. Those that did were easily dispersed with
machine-gun and Lewis-gun fire.
During this day's fighting 117 unwounded prisoners were taken.
[Illustration: MAP XIII. THE FINAL ADVANCE: DISPOSITIONS OF 51ST
(HIGHLAND) DIVISION, 5 P.M., 28TH OCTOBER 1918.]
On the 28th orders had been issued for the relief of the left brigade by
the 4th Canadian Division, and of the right brigade by the 49th
Division. This arrangement had been made to allow the Canadians, whose
general line faced Valenciennes from the west, also to attack the town
from the south. Only the relief of the 49th Division was, however,
carried out, as the situation about Mont Houy was still considered too
obscure for adequate arrangements to be made. The relief of the left
sector was therefore postponed for twenty-four hours. The troops about
Mont Houy were, however, greatly reduced in fighting strength, and were
exhausted; the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore relieved
the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the two companies of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders who had joined with them in consolidating the
line. One company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders remained
in the front line north of Famars.
On 29th October the line of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
who had already successfully dealt with several counter-attacks, was
twice tested by the enemy. The night 28-29th had passed quietly, the 6th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders putting the enemy's inactivity to good
use by establishing a post on the southern edge of Mont Houy.
At 6.30 A.M. the enemy attacked on the left, but chiefly on account of
the fire which took him in enfilade from the recently established post
the attack broke down in front of our lines.
At 4 P.M., after another heavy artillery bombardment, the enemy again
attacked, about 250 of his infantry debouching from Mont Houy Wood. The
Argylls and machine-gunners, however, stood their ground, and had
smothered the attack with their fire before it reached our lines, the
new post again giving effective aid.
Meanwhile the G.O.C. 49th Division had taken over command of the
Divisional front at 10 A.M.
At 9 P.M., 29th October, the 6th and 7th Argylls, the last of the
infantry of the Highland Division to hold the battle front in France,
were relieved by the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The Divisional
artillery, however, remained in the line, and continued the battle for
Valenciennes.
In these operations the Division advanced its line ten miles, captured
661 unwounded prisoners, 164 machine-guns, 4 trench-mortars, 3
minnenwerfers, and 6 anti-tank rifles.
Though the enemy's military power was fast crumpling, the armistice
occurring twelve days after the relief of the Division, the resistance
encountered, particularly as regards artillery, was at times very
formidable. On four occasions attacks were delivered on a two-brigade
front, and twice on a one-brigade front, a heavy burden of fighting to
be borne in nineteen days by nine battalions of infantry. The casualties
were not light, amounting as they did to 112 officers and 2723 other
ranks, some battalions suffering particularly heavily, such as the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders (14 officers and 409 other ranks), the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders (13 officers and 283 other ranks), the 6/7 Gordon
Highlanders (16 officers and 425 other ranks), the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders (8 officers and 294 other ranks), while the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders and the 4th Gordon Highlanders lost 13 and 14
officers respectively. Fortunately the numbers of killed and missing--21
officers and 292 men killed, and 6 officers and 184 men missing--were
not so proportionately high as had been the case in some of the previous
operations.
In few battles did the various arms of the service co-operate more
successfully in face of such great difficulties.
The support given by the artillery to the infantry and machine-gunners
contributed largely to the success of the advance, inflicted
considerable casualties on the enemy, and materially reduced our losses
by its effectiveness. This support was largely made possible by the work
of the R.E., who, in spite of all the attempts made by the German
gunners to hinder their work, completed their bridges in the minimum of
time, and so allowed the gunners to keep in close support of the
infantry.
As regards the infantry, these battles were a succession of gallant acts
and heroism. The 7th Argylls at Lieu St Amand, and again at Thiant, the
charge of the 6th Argylls, the forcing of the Ecaillon by the Black
Watch battalions, take one back to a war of romance, such as the long
days of stationary warfare and stereotyped trench-to-trench attacks had
led one to forget. There must, however, always exist a natural feeling
of sorrow for the loss of those officers and men who, in many cases
after months of continuous fighting, gave their lives within a few days
of the close of the war, particularly perhaps for those men of the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders who pressed on to the farthest point reached by the
infantry of the Highland Division in the Great War, and fell at Aulnoy
cemetery.
The work of the R.A.M.C. in battle, since it is usually performed during
the times when the thoughts of all are naturally turned to the foremost
infantry, does not always take its fair place in the public eye. On this
occasion it was carried out in face of great difficulties, due to the
abnormal conditions. Nevertheless, it reached the same standards which
the R.A.M.C. had set for itself in the varying circumstances that had
arisen during the retirements in March and April and in the advance in
Champagne.
In the first place, the demolition of cross-roads by mines and the
blocking of routes by the blowing up of railway arches and bridges
rendered the evacuation of casualties a difficult matter. Ford
ambulances were, however, employed immediately any route was
sufficiently cleared to give them passage. They proved invaluable, as
owing to their lightness they could cross fields, pick their way through
shell-holes in the roads, climb banks, or be man-handled through soft
cut-up ground.
They could therefore in most cases be run up to regimental aid-posts,
and in consequence a large amount of their work was done under heavy
shell-fire. In the village of Iwuy one Ford was hit twice by shell-fire,
one orderly being killed and the M.O. wounded. On both occasions the
driver, Private Highmore, D.C.M., M.M., M.T., R.A.S.C., attached 1/2
Highland Field Ambulance, managed temporarily to repair his car under
shell-fire and safely evacuate the cases entrusted to him.
During this advance a problem entirely new to the Division arose. The
civil population was present in large numbers in the area of active
operations, either in process of being evacuated from their homes or of
returning from the back areas to villages recently released from the
enemy. About one-half of these people were ill, largely owing to
exhaustion, exposure, and long-continued underfeeding while in enemy
hands. A large proportion of them were tubercular; for instance, in the
village of Haulchin, with a population of 1500, over 90 cases of
tubercular disease, many of them in an advanced stage, were treated, and
this was by no means the total.
Medical attendance of the sick was organised through the field
ambulances and M.O.'s of units; in Neuville sur l'Escaut alone over 200
cases were visited in three hours.
Soup kitchens and centres of distribution of bones were installed and
handed over to the French authorities in eleven different villages, and
it is estimated that over 5000 civilians were supplied with nourishing
food, in addition to the rations and medical comforts issued.
On 30th October 3760 rations were issued to the inhabitants of Douchy,
Haulchin, Noyelles, Neuville, and Famars.
Thirty-five cases of civilians suffering either from gunshot wounds or
gas were also evacuated, most of them from Famars.
The French authorities and the people themselves expressed the greatest
appreciation of the work carried out on their behalf by the Division,
and especially by the R.A.M.C.
In all the reoccupied areas the sanitation was in a deplorable
condition. In view of the enemy's boasted efficiency in this respect,
this was probably intentional on his part. The conditions were made
worse by the amount of refuse which had to be cleared out of the houses.
Owing to the mildness of the weather, these conditions produced a plague
of flies. Moreover, incineration, the usual safeguard against them, was
seriously handicapped by the fact that it could only be carried out with
the greatest caution owing to the number of loose bombs, hand-grenades,
and booby traps in general that had been left behind by the enemy. For
instance, in Iwuy a bomb had been placed inside a mattress that had been
intentionally fouled, with the result that when it was burnt the bomb
exploded, wounding two men.
At Douchy a refuse-pit full of dry refuse, inviting incineration, was
found on examination to have the bottom layer lined with hand-grenades.
Throughout the operations two parties, each of an officer and ten men of
the 172nd Tunnelling Company, wore employed in making a systematic
search for mines and traps, and a large number of them were found and
removed.
The work carried out by the 51st Divisional Ammunition Column in these
operations was enormous. They organised and controlled six different
ammunition dumps. Throughout they assisted the batteries in the supply
of ammunition to the gun line, and at the same time salved and brought
forward all ammunition left behind in old gun positions and rear dumps.
They also collected the empty cartridge-cases from the vacated gun
positions, and thousands of these were salved, boxed, and returned to
railhead.
During the operations the D.A.C. handled 229,162 rounds of 18-pounder
and 73,000 rounds of 4·5 howitzer ammunition.
The work of the signal company was also heavier than it had been in any
other offensive operation. They not only had to compete with an advance
of ten miles, but also with the following number of changes in the
location of the various headquarters:--
Divisional headquarters with Divisional artillery
headquarters 2
152nd Brigade headquarters 6
153rd Brigade headquarters 9
154th Brigade headquarters 5
The fact that Signals were able to maintain an efficient service
throughout these operations was largely due to the energy and skill of
the officer commanding the 51st Divisional Signal Company, Major J.
Muirhead, D.S.O., M.C.
In short, probably no previous operation had demanded a greater or more
prolonged effort on the part of all arms and branches of the service
than this, the last fight of the Highland Division.