CONCLUSION.
The Divisional artillery came out of action in the neighbourhood of
Famars on 2nd November, but returned to the line on 6th November under
orders of the C.R.A. 56th Division. They remained attached to the
advancing Divisions until the declaration of the armistice at 11 A.M. on
11th November, within forty-eight hours of the second anniversary of the
battle of Beaumont Hamel.
With the armistice ends the real history of the Highland Division, and
it is well to leave the story of the gradual fading away of the Division
during the period of demobilisation untold. Suffice it to say that the
last commander who finally hauled down the Divisional flag was
Brigadier-General L. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., the C.R.A., who had
joined the Division on July 1916, and had served longer with it than any
other of its Brigadiers.
The last of the battalions that had served with the Division left in
Belgium or France was the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who
remained at Charleroi under the command of Major Andrew Lockie. Attached
to this battalion were a number of non-demobilisable Jocks from many
different battalions, and it in consequence came to be known as the 8th
Argyll and some other Highlanders.
No history of the Highland Division would be complete without a word
spoken about both the incomparable Jock and his adversary the Boche.
That the Boche was such a magnificent fighter reflects more to the
credit of the Highland Division probably than any other factor. The
picture of the Boche as a fat, crop-eared, spectacled, middle-aged
gentleman, holding up his hands and crying "Kamerad," was a libellous
portrait of him that appeared almost daily in the illustrated press,
and sickened the men who had to fight him.
The German was, in fact, a magnificent worker in trenches, a rifle-shot
full of initiative, a machine-gunner whose courage did not fail him up
to the last days of the war, an accurate gunner, a skilful and at times
very aggressive airman, an infantryman capable of great skill and
initiative in his attacks, of prolonged resistance in the defence, and
of occasional bursts of great enterprise in raiding.
That the Jocks should have defeated him in every department of the game
from 13th November 1916 until 29th October 1918 would not have been so
praiseworthy a feat were the military qualities of the Germans less.
As regards the Jock, the men of the Highland Division, while Scotland
had men to give, were difficult to equal. Of splendid physique, and with
their fine characteristic open countenances, they compared favourably in
appearance with the Guards Division.
At Arras in 1916, as one walked round the vast hollow square of Highland
soldiers within which the Divisional band of 100 pipers used to play,
one felt that one would never be privileged to see the manhood of a
nation better expressed, or a nation that could provide a better
exhibition of manhood.
Here were men from all those various callings which by their nature tend
to give men physical strength--miners, fishermen, farm-servants,
gillies, stalkers, all in their prime of life. Later, particularly in
1918, when the Highlands had nothing further to give but her boys, the
physique and general appearance of the Division naturally deteriorated.
However, though called upon to shoulder a man's burden before their
physical development was complete, these same boys, in Champagne and in
the last phases of the war, showed that they had at least inherited the
spirit of their fathers and elder brothers.
The past records of the Highland regiments had afforded ample proof that
the Highlander was well endowed by nature for any form of warfare that
he had taken part in prior to the Great War. From the time that they
were raised there has hardly been a battle of first importance in which
some act of gallantry on the part of one or other of the kilted
regiments has not become proverbial. But experience had already proved
that this war was not one in which the _arme blanche_, _élan_, and
physical courage, unassisted by considerable tactical skill and the
power of prolonged endurance of nerve-shattering things, could hope for
success.
Modern conditions of war have, however, only added lustre to the
reputation of the Highlander as a fighting man. The Jock soon learned to
temper his natural courage and dash with skill and intelligence. He
regarded the war not as a sport, but as a business. He took his training
seriously, and in consequence was easily trained. In battle his great
virtue was that he did not "see red" or lose his head, but coolly and
intelligently put into practice what he had learnt in his training. The
men had thus the necessary aptitude to be moulded by their commanders
into a highly-perfected fighting machine.
According to their own statements, the Germans feared the Highland
Division more than any other Division on the Western Front. This was not
because it was the most savage, for the Jock was a clean fighter, if
anything over-kind, but because, after the evil days of High Wood, the
Division never knew failure.
One of the great factors on which the reputation of the 51st Division
rested was its intense _esprit de division_, which continuously
increased as success followed success. No matter in what arm of the
service he might be, the Jock was proud of the 51st. As a result, the
various arms were all animated by the common ideal of enhancing the
reputation of their Division.
This feeling dominated the whole Division from its commanders down to
the cook in the Divisional soup kitchen, and the old warrior, some sixty
years of age, who drove the Foden disinfector.
Proud of their Division and proud of their record, the _morale_ of the
Jocks was always maintained at a high pitch throughout the war, with
perhaps the exception of the period after the two heavy German attacks
with the consequent enormous losses in March and April 1918.
During this period the Division was so decimated and so exhausted that a
fear existed that it might never regain its old fighting efficiency.
However, a quiet tour of trench life on the familiar Vimy Ridge soon
dispelled this fear, and the Division was able to give as good an
account of itself as ever when fighting alongside the French in
Champagne in the following July and August.
In billets the Jock was as good a soldier as he was in the field; crime,
apart from the most minor offences, was almost non-existent. The periods
of rest, which were seldom long, were ungrudgingly devoted to restoring
uniform and equipment to an almost pre-war standard of smartness and to
training for further encounters.
The inhabitants of France and Belgium had a deep affection for _les
Écossais_ and the 51st. This, no doubt, was in a measure due to the
Highland dress, but more particularly to the natural courtesy and kindly
disposition of the Jocks.
It will always remain a mystery how the Jock understood the patois of
the natives, and how the natives understood the mixture of broad Scots
and bad French which the Jock employed. The fact remained that their
disabilities in respect of language apparently placed little restriction
on their intimacy with one another.
For many years to come the inhabitants of the erstwhile British lines in
France and Belgium will regard the 51st (Highland) Division not only
with admiration for their fighting qualities, but also with deep
affection for that gallant gentleman, the Jock.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] On 11th May 1915 the 1/1 Highland Division was renamed the 51st
(Highland) Division, the Infantry Brigades being numbered, 152nd
(Seaforth and Camerons), 153rd (Gordon Battalions), 154th (Lancashire
Battalions).
[2] Shortly after this move Lieut.-Colonel A. J. G. Moir, who had
mobilised as G.S.O. 1 to the Division, returned to the Division as A.A.
and Q.M.G.
[3] The 6th Scottish Rifles had replaced the 2/5 Lancashire Regiment, a
second-line battalion, which was withdrawn from the Division to complete
its training.
[4] With the later and more delayed fuzes it was necessary to have
thirty feet of head cover to be secure against bursts of 5·9-in. or
8-in. shells.
[5] Knife-rests are portable wire entanglements. The framework is shaped
like a knife-rest, numerous strands of barbed wire being stretched from
end to end of it. It is carried up to the trenches folded up so as to
make it easily portable. At night they are taken into No Man's Land,
opened out, and placed in position and pegged to the ground.
[6] Obtaining identifications was a matter of extreme importance, as it
enabled G.H.Q. to estimate the number of German Divisions holding the
line, and the number in reserve available to be moved from one portion
of the front to another.
[7] This passage is quoted from Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper's 'Notes
on Infantry Tactics and Training.' Appendix, p. 126.
[8] To protect the troops in the shell-holes from the shrapnel barrage
the Germans had about this time equipped them with body armour, proof
against shrapnel bullets and against rifle bullets from a range of 400
yards and over. This armour, which could be worn either on the back or
the front, according to whether a man was standing or lying down, proved
too heavy and was soon discarded.
[9] On the arrival of the first smoke shells the enemy, thinking they
were some new form of frightfulness, put on gas masks.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
* * * * * *
Transcribers' note:
Hyphenation has been standardised.
Stop has been added after cent in per cent. Treated as abbreviation per
centum.
Where map legend indicates coloured demarcation lines an approximately
appropriate colour has been superimposed in the HTML version.
All instances of Bois de Coutron changed to Bois de Courton.
All instances of Bois des Eclisses changed to Bois d'Éclisse.
All instances of Minnenwerfer changed to Minenwerfer.
page 56: vigiliance ——> vigilance
page 94: bayonetted ——> bayoneted
page 212: 6.5 ——> 6.05
page 234: Hauteville ——> Hautvillers
page 286: 293th ——> 293rd
page 318: appreciaton ——> appreciation
page 348: Charmuzy ——> Chaumuzy.