THE CAPTURE OF GREENLAND HILL.
On 4th August 1918 Divisional headquarters opened at Villers Chatel, and
the last of the trains conveying troops of the Division from Champagne
began its journey. By this time the brigades had almost completed
concentrating in the familiar country north-west of Arras--the 152nd
Brigade at Caucourt, the 153rd Brigade at Chateau de la Haie, the 154th
Brigade at Berles, and the Divisional artillery at Acq and Aubigny.
About this time Brigadier-General E. Segrave, D.S.O., H.L.I., who had
been brigade-major to General Harper when commanding a brigade in the
6th Division, was appointed to the command of the 152nd Infantry
Brigade. General Segrave had already gained a considerable reputation as
a gallant battalion commander. His was one of the many happy
appointments in the higher ranks of the Division.
The Division, now in G.H.Q. reserve, continued in this area until 14th
August, when it returned to the command of the XVIIth Corps, and began
to take over the line. Between 14th and 18th August the 154th Brigade
relieved a brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Division in the trenches east
of Bailleul, of which many had been dug by the Jocks in May and June of
the same year; the 153rd Brigade relieved a brigade of the 57th Division
between that village of ill repute, Fampoux, and the right of the 154th
Brigade, and the 152nd Brigade relieved a second brigade of the 57th
Division in the Fampoux sector. At the same time the 170th Brigade, 57th
Division, south of the Scarpe came under orders of the 51st Division, so
that General Carter-Campbell was commanding a front of some 7600 yards
extending from Tilloy les Moufflaines (exclusive) on the south to
Bailleul (exclusive) on the north.
The Division had thus had less than ten clear days in which to rest,
refit, and recuperate since its return from the second battle of the
Marne, before it was again facing the enemy on what came to be an active
front.
It was hoped that after its experiences and heavy losses in Champagne a
longer period of rest would be vouchsafed to the troops. The days of
rest in this period were, however, becoming fewer and fewer, and the
whole of the British line was becoming agitated preparatory to uprooting
itself and beginning its three months advance towards Germany. This
uprooting, as far as the Highland Division was concerned, began
gradually. It developed from the repeated testing of the enemy's lines,
resulting in the occupation of portions of them, and finally culminating
in the overrunning of the whole of the German front system, and in the
capture of the main tactical features behind it--Greenland Hill and
Hausa and Delbar Woods.
The results of this advance were far-reaching, for as long as Greenland
Hill and the two woods on its southern slopes remained in enemy hands,
they stood as a menace to any attack delivered south of the Scarpe; and
the plan was to deliver the British counter-stroke in a few days' time,
which was to extend from the south of the Scarpe down to the right of
the British line.
Greenland Hill can be described as the point on which the great forward
move to the Canal du Nord hinged.
It was fitting that the Highland Division should begin its final advance
from the Arras country. Bailleul it had known in May 1916 from
intelligence summaries as a place behind the long ridge in front of it,
in which German reserve battalions rested, and through which they passed
during their reliefs. Almost a year later, in April 1917, the big ridge
was captured, and the Division saw Bailleul for the first time, and its
patrols entered it. On relief it saw the 2nd Division occupy it
unopposed. Again a year later it had occupied Bailleul itself and
reconstructed its defences. Fampoux it knew in April 1917 as a village
that shells were just beginning to destroy; it watched the hamlet change
into a heap of brick dust, and learnt to avoid it like the plague.
Farther to the right lay Roeux and the chemical works--"the comical
works" that "made one windy even when it wasn't shelling," in which all
units of the Division had experienced the bitterest infantry fighting
and the most infernal shelling. In rear lay Greenland Hill, which in
1917 men of the 7th Gordon Highlanders had reached, but which the
Division had never captured--the treacherous hill marked on the map on
the wrong side of the railway. To the south of it lay those two woods,
Hausa and Delbar, which throughout the fighting of April and May 1917
had looked down on the forward trenches, and from which the Germans saw
every movement and signalled it to the gunners.
In these operations, which began eighteen days after the last troops
came out of action in Champagne, the eastern outskirts of Fampoux were
cleared. Greenland Hill, Roeux, the chemical works, Hausa and Delbar
Woods, fell into our hands, and a firm line was established east of
Plouvain.
At this time the enemy was reported to be carrying out a withdrawal
opposite the line held by the Third and Fifth Armies. It appeared
improbable that this withdrawal would extend as far north as the front
of the 51st Division, but there were reasons for thinking that the enemy
might have thinned out the troops in the forward zone with a view to
avoiding casualties.
A vigorous policy was therefore adopted by General Carter-Campbell so as
to obtain more information concerning the enemy's dispositions, and to
take full advantage of any opportunity offered of gaining ground in
order to deepen the British outpost zone in front of the main line of
resistance.
On 17th August patrols found the enemy alert and holding the front line.
On the 18th, however, they reported that he appeared to be holding his
line lightly, while a prisoner captured by the Division on the right
stated that the enemy was withdrawing the bulk of their front system
garrison to the line Monchy-Pelves-Biache, leaving only weak outposts in
position. It was therefore decided to advance and occupy the front line.
Accordingly the right brigade (170th) was ordered to test the enemy
front line opposite to it and occupy it, the 152nd Brigade was ordered
to clear the east end of Fampoux, and the 153rd Brigade was given
similar orders to the 170th Brigade.
In these operations the 170th Brigade made a successful advance. They
found the enemy's front line unoccupied, and carried on for some 700
yards into a farther trench, in which they captured six prisoners.
On other parts of the front the enemy was found to be in strength;
indeed, north of Fampoux he attempted a small raid with two parties,
which, however, bore no result except that the German officer in charge
of the raiders lost his life.
From the information obtained in these encounters, it was decided that
the 170th Brigade should continue their advance, while north of the
Scarpe a series of operations were planned in order to gain the enemy's
outpost zone from the Scarpe as far north as the Arras-Gavrelle road.
It was hoped by this means to gain a good jumping-off line for an
advance which the Division had now been ordered to carry out on the left
of the Canadian Corps on 26th August.
In planning these operations the governing factor was the amount of
artillery available, which, as regards field artillery, in no case
exceeded four brigades. This precluded any attack from being carried out
on a frontage wider than 1500 yards.
The first of these operations took place on the night 19-20th August. On
the right the 170th Brigade advanced some 500 yards and occupied a
trench from which they had driven a small party of Germans. However, at
9 A.M. on the 20th they were counter-attacked after a hurricane
trench-mortar bombardment, and driven back into the trench from which
they had started the operations. In this position they were bombarded
all day, particularly by heavy trench-mortars. By 4.30 P.M. this
bombardment had become intense, and was at that hour followed by a
counter-attack. This attack was, however, shattered by artillery and
rifle fire, and made no progress. The bombardment then reopened, and by
9 P.M., as the foremost troops of the 170th Brigade had been so badly
harried all day, they were withdrawn by orders of the XVIIth Corps to
their original front line.
North of the Scarpe a company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders attacked
a sunken road running due north from Fampoux, at 4.30 A.M. on the 20th.
They reached their objective, but were subjected to so much rifle-fire
and bombing that they were driven back. However, at 8.30 A.M. they
advanced again to the attack, and made good their objective. The 7th
Gordon Highlanders of the 153rd Brigade on their left had also made an
attempt to occupy the enemy's front line, but had been unsuccessful. At
5.30 P.M. the 5th Seaforth Highlanders were counter-attacked in the
sunken road. They had, however, consolidated their new position well,
and drove back the enemy with some loss.
On 21st August command of the Division passed to General Oldfield,
General Carter-Campbell having gone home on leave. The General had gone
home on the understanding that a fresh Division would undertake the
coming attack in this sector. After his departure the Army Commander
asked if the 51st would carry out the attack, as it was of the utmost
importance to keep a fresh Division in reserve. General Oldfield in
these circumstances agreed to undertake the offensive. Accordingly on
21st August an operation was carried out by the 6th Gordon Highlanders
(152nd Brigade) with a view to occupying the country lying between the
Fampoux-Fresnes and Fampoux-Gavrelle roads for some 500 yards from their
junction. This operation, after a considerable amount of infantry
fighting in which two companies were engaged, was successfully carried
out, an officer, seven men, and three machine-guns being captured.
On the same day patrols from the 153rd Brigade reported that Pippin
Trench and a trench running roughly parallel to the Fampoux-Gavrelle
road on the west side of it was protected by a belt of wire in good
condition.
It was therefore decided that an operation should be carried out to
capture Pippin Trench and a support trench behind it east of the
Fampoux-Gavrelle road called Zion Alley for a distance of 700 yards from
the area recently occupied by the 6th Gordons.
These operations were ordered to be carried out on 24th August, so as to
give the artillery time to cut the wire in front of Pippin Trench, and
to enable two companies of the 7th Black Watch to practise the attack
over a lifesize replica of the German trenches marked out with
tracing-tapes behind the line.
On the 23rd August patrols reported that the artillery had cut five
clear gaps through the wire in front of Pippin, and that the whole belt
of wire was considerably damaged.
Orders were therefore issued for an attack to be carried out at 4.30
A.M. on 24th August. This operation was also successful. On the right
the 7th Black Watch reached both their objectives according to the
programme, but on the left a prolonged resistance, chiefly by rifle-fire
and bombing, continued until 11 A.M. Even then a pocket of twenty
Germans remained holding out in Hyderabad Redoubt, at the northern end
of the support trench, until they were dislodged the following morning.
Hyderabad Redoubt had an evil reputation in 1917, and still retained it
at this time. It was a group of headquarter dug-outs, situated so that
their entrances were connected by a trench roughly in the shape of a
triangle. It was perched on the summit of a crest which overlooked Arras
and the neighbouring country on one side, and Plouvain and Biache St
Vaast on the other. Its numerous dug-outs made it capable of prolonged
resistance, while when it was captured it became a target for every gun
in the neighbourhood.
On other points of the front Divisional patrols reported that the enemy
showed no signs of vacating his positions without offering resistance,
and it appeared that he had no intention of withdrawing north of the
Scarpe, even though he was not holding his forward trench lines in great
strength.
On 26th August a third operation took place. The trenches captured on
the 25th continued northwards. The first line, known as Newton Trench,
widened out to a distance of some 500 yards west of the Fampoux-Gavrelle
road, the Support line, known as Hoary, Haggard, and Naval trenches,
being just west of the road. The plan was to capture these two trenches
to within 600 yards of Gavrelle, the depth of penetration ordered being
600 yards on the right to 900 yards on the left, the frontage attacked
being some 1100 yards in breadth. The advance was undertaken by the 6th
Black Watch operating on a two-company front, the 154th Brigade being
ordered to form a defensive flank facing north as the attack progressed.
This attack should have been carried out at 5 A.M., covered by an
artillery and machine-gun barrage, but before that hour an S.O.S. signal
was fired on the new front occupied by the 7th Black Watch, as in the
half-light parties of enemy infantry were seen moving in the open. As a
result of this signal, our barrage and the enemy's came down almost
simultaneously; but no infantry action followed, the parties of the
enemy seen being probably troops relieving his front-line posts.
In consequence of this artillery fire the attack was delayed until 6
A.M. At 8 A.M. all objectives had been gained and twenty-three prisoners
captured.
These operations had now established the Division on a line running
practically due north and south from the eastern outskirts of Fampoux to
a point 600 yards south-west of Gavrelle. Four battalions--the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, 6th Gordon Highlanders, and 6th and 7th Black
Watch--had been engaged, but had suffered comparatively small losses.
Thus the first of the objectives which the Division had set itself to
attain--namely, to establish a firm and regular line from which it could
initiate its attack in support of the left flank of the Canadian
Corps--had been successfully realised by 25th August, one day before the
major operations were due to begin.
While these actions were being fought great developments had taken place
in the south. By the 25th August the Third and Fourth Armies had formed
a salient of the German positions opposite Arras according to a
prearranged plan, and had thus prepared the enemy's strong positions on
Orange Hill and about Monchy le Preux for assault.
The intention was that the First Army, which prolonged the line on the
left of the Third Army, should extend the attack northwards, and by
driving eastwards from Arras, with their left covered by the Scarpe and
Sensee rivers, turn the enemy's position on the Somme battlefield and
cut his railway communications, which ran southwards across the front.
As has already been pointed out, the Scarpe in itself could not
sufficiently cover this advance as long as Greenland Hill lay in the
hands of the enemy. It therefore fell to the lot of the 51st Division to
capture this hill and make good the commanding ground on the north bank
of the Scarpe, so as to free the Canadian Corps from molestation from
that quarter.
It was arranged that the 51st should not attack in force, but should
push forward along the Scarpe as the Canadian Divisions advanced and
protect their flanks.
The front line held by the Canadians (who had by this time relieved the
170th Brigade, 57th Division, south of the Scarpe), running as it did
roughly from Feuchy (inclusive) to Thilloy les Moufflaines (inclusive),
lay considerably in rear of the line now held by the Highland Division.
It was therefore arranged that the latter should not move until the
Canadians had captured Orange Hill and the commanding village of Monchy
le Preux. Both these positions were of great natural strength,
particularly the latter, and afforded observation over a wide area of
our lines, particularly to the north.
The plan of attack was that the Canadian advance should begin at 3 A.M.
on 26th, and that as soon as it was reported that they had passed Monchy
le Preux, the 152nd and the 153rd Brigades were to advance and occupy a
line of trenches parallel with the Roeux-Gavrelle road at an average
distance of 500 yards west of it. The depth of this advance would vary
from some 500-700 yards.
At 8 A.M. 26th August, it was learnt that the Canadians had captured
Monchy le Preux and were still going well. Orders were therefore issued
for the advance of the 152nd and 153rd Brigades to begin at 10.30 A.M.
The operation was begun as arranged, the troops meeting with practically
no opposition. By 11.30 A.M. the line was occupied by the 6th Gordon
Highlanders on the right, and by the 6th and 7th Black Watch on the
left, each on a two-company front.
As soon as this line was established, the 6th Gordon Highlanders pushed
parties southwards to occupy a continuation of the captured trench line,
which joined the Scarpe about 400 yards east of Roeux. By noon the
Germans still gave no signs of making a stand, and parties of them could
be seen on the road retiring towards Fresnes. By 4 P.M. the 6th Gordon
Highlanders had passed through Mount Pleasant Wood, and had occupied
Roeux Station and the chemical works.
Meanwhile in the centre the 153rd Brigade had reached a trench some 400
yards east of the Gavrelle road running parallel to it, and had found it
vacated.
The 154th Brigade on the left hand also occupied the enemy's front line,
and by 5.30 P.M. were patrolling towards Gavrelle. It was anticipated,
however, that the resistance might soon begin to stiffen, as
reinforcements had been seen advancing towards Fresnes soon after noon,
and more were reported to be detraining at Biache. The heavy artillery
had accordingly taken the necessary action.
It had been the intention to establish a line on Greenland Hill and east
of Hausa and Delbar Woods. As, however, the day was now well spent, this
plan was modified, and an objective line was given running north and
south from the railway on the western slopes of Greenland Hill.
This objective the 153rd Brigade attacked at 7 P.M. under a barrage,
having formed up on the Roeux-Gavrelle road. Again only slight
opposition was encountered, except on the right, where the 7th Gordon
Highlanders were held off from their objective by German machine-gunners
posted on the lips of a deep railway cutting.
Thus did history repeat itself, as on more than one occasion in the past
machine-gunners posted on this same embankment, and probably firing from
the same emplacements, had denied farther advance to the Highland
Division. This embankment was a commanding place admirably suited for
purposes of defence, which lent itself perfectly to the German genius
for improvising strong points of resistance.
South of the railway the 6th Gordon Highlanders entered Roeux, and
established a line east of the chemical works. This was the second
occasion on which Roeux had fallen into the hands of the 152nd Brigade,
and as was the case on the first occasion, it was entered practically
without opposition, resulting in another "meatless day," as the Jocks
described their first unopposed occupation of this village.
On the 154th Brigade front patrols were out north and south of Gavrelle,
but the village had not yet been entered. On the right of the Highland
Division the 2nd Canadian Division were about 1000 yards west of Pelves,
and on the left the 8th Division had occupied the enemy's front line.
During the night patrols of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
passed through Gavrelle.
On the following day, 27th August, considerable advances were made,
though an attempt to capture Greenland Hill failed.
At 10.30 A.M. the 153rd Brigade launched an attack under an artillery
and machine-gun barrage, with the 7th Gordon Highlanders on the right
and the 6th Black Watch on the left. The 7th Gordon Highlanders had set
foot on Greenland Hill in 1917 under the gallant leadership of
Lieutenant Still, but had been unable to maintain themselves there
unsupported in their isolated position. On this occasion, too, the hill
remained at the end of the day in German hands. Both the 7th Gordon
Highlanders and the 6th Black Watch were at first reported to have
gained their objectives, but it soon transpired that this was not the
case, the German signal for "enemy attacking" having been mistaken for
the British signal "objective gained."
The 7th Gordon Highlanders had succeeded in establishing a footing
towards the summit of the western slopes of the hill; but the enemy
dribbled strong reinforcements through the railway cutting, and into the
trenches and sunken roads leading from it.
This cutting, already referred to as used extensively in the operations
in April and May 1917, afforded a covered approach from Biache, from
which troops could spread northwards, westwards, and southwards into the
trenches and sunken roads on either side of the cutting. During
operations, when the smoke and dust allowed, individuals could be seen
moving forward or falling back along the cutting throughout the day;
but, as a rule, the numbers doing so were so regulated that there were
seldom sufficient to justify a large expenditure of artillery
ammunition.
In this instance, after much fluctuating fighting, the enemy became so
threatening on the flanks of the 7th Gordon Highlanders that they were
compelled to withdraw from the position they had gained.
The 6th Black Watch, whose troops were not directly interfered with by
the German reinforcements arriving through the cutting, reached a line
just short of the summit of Greenland Hill before their advance was
checked by machine-gun fire. In this position they maintained themselves
for the remainder of the day.
On the flanks of the 153rd Brigade substantial advances were made by the
152nd and 154th Brigades.
Hearing that Greenland Hill had been captured, the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders, extended on a wide front from the Scarpe to the railway,
attacked from a line east of Roeux and the chemical works, with a line
of trenches immediately west of Plouvain as their objective.
They pushed their advance for some 800-1000 yards, but then encountered
strong resistance. Hausa and Delbar Woods, with their magnificent
observation, were found to be well organised with machine-guns, which
swept the glacis in front of them, as also was the large chalk-pit on
the edge of the Roeux-Plouvain road just in front of the woods.
The advance was checked at this point, while on the left the enemy,
again making use of the railway cutting, compelled the flank platoons to
withdraw back into line with the 7th Gordon Highlanders north of the
cutting.
The deepest advance made during the day was that of the 154th Brigade on
the left. This Brigade, after many encounters between small patrols and
small parties of the enemy, brushed aside all resistance and established
a line in touch with the 6th Black Watch 500 yards east of Gavrelle, and
linked up with the 8th Division on the outer flank.
In the afternoon three of our posts north of Gavrelle were rushed by the
enemy, who attacked them under cover of the maze of trenches in which
they were situated. Two of these were restored by the 7th Argyll and
Sutherlanders, but the third was considered so particularly liable to
this form of attack that no effort was made to retake it.
During the night 27-28th the 154th Brigade was relieved by the 8th
Division, the Divisional front being thus considerably shortened.
Activity on the following day was confined largely to patrol actions on
the front of the 152nd Brigade.
The position held by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders was so dominated by
Hausa and Delbar Woods and the chalk-pit, from which the enemy was
continually harassing them with machine-gun fire, that attempts were
made to work forward by patrols and make good the woods and quarry.
These, however, all broke down in face of the volume of machine-gun
fire, from which the openness of the country afforded no escape.
On the front of the 153rd Brigade the enemy made two attempts to rush
posts, but in each case was successfully driven back.
During the evening of the 28th preparations were made for an attack on
Greenland Hill to be carried out on the following morning.
Just south of Delbar Wood the Scarpe bends in a north-easterly
direction, while the country between Plouvain and Biache is covered by
wide pools and marshes. In consequence, the German positions about Hausa
and Delbar Woods were enclosed on their southern and eastern sides by
water.
In view of this, it was decided by General Oldfield to obviate the
necessity of a direct attack on the woods, which was certain to be
expensive in casualties, by manœuvring the enemy out of them. The plan
was to strike from the north of the Divisional front towards Plouvain,
and thus threaten the only communication by which the garrisons of the
Hausa and Delbar Woods positions could extricate themselves.
The 154th Brigade were therefore ordered to advance against Greenland
Hill on the whole Divisional front north of the railway and for 230
yards south of it.
Two objectives were selected: the first, a line which gave the attacking
troops a position on the summit of the hill, and the second, a line
about the Plouvain-Gavrelle road which gave them a firmer hold on it.
The 4th Gordon Highlanders (right) and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
(left) were detailed for the operation, each battalion detailing two
companies for the capture of each objective.
To enable a more accurate barrage to be fired by the artillery, the
troops were all withdrawn to a trench which had been the old British
front line before the Germans had attacked in this sector earlier in the
year. The barrage was arranged so as to come down on what had then been
the German front line.
The attack was a complete success in every detail. The enemy posts on
Greenland Hill put up a poor fight, in all about twenty prisoners being
taken. At 10 A.M. the final objective was reached. Moreover, exactly as
had been planned, the enemy south of the attack, seeing Highlanders on
Greenland Hill, and advancing along the railway towards Plouvain, and
knowing that they could only extricate themselves along the banks of the
Scarpe, evacuated their positions, fearing lest that exit might also be
closed to them.
The 152nd Brigade followed close on their heels, and captured 1 officer
and 15 other ranks who had left their withdrawal too late. At 1 P.M. our
artillery ceased shelling Hausa and Delbar Woods, and at 2.20 P.M. the
6th Seaforth Highlanders had reached their eastern edges.
Thus, like many other places that had for some time been a bitter thorn
in the flesh, such as the Brown line at Arras in April, Flesquières in
November 1917, and Espilly and the Bois de Courton of more recent
memory, the formidable Hausa and Delbar Woods ultimately fell
undefended.
After occupying the woods, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders continued their
advance and occupied a line of trenches about 1500 yards west of
Plouvain, capturing another eight prisoners.
During the evening Greenland Hill was consolidated, machine-guns and
artillery moving forward into close support of the infantry.
Thus ended a completely successful day, in which Greenland Hill, 1
officer, 52 other ranks, 10 machine-guns and 2 light trench-mortars were
captured.
Early on the morning of the following day patrols were pushed forward
with orders to get into touch with the enemy and establish posts in
contact with him. The Germans were soon located holding a strongly-wired
trench line in front of Biache and Fresnes, and were found to be active
and alert. Some posts were accordingly established during the day in
front of the new line.
In view of its great tactical importance, every effort was made to
ensure the holding of Greenland Hill should a counter-attack be made to
regain it.
South of the Scarpe the great advance was proceeding rapidly towards
Cambrai, and as its left flank increased in depth, so did the importance
of holding Greenland Hill increase.
The three field companies and the 8th Royal Scots were at once employed
in giving effect to a scheme of defence that had been prepared.
This scheme embodied, in the first place, the defence of Greenland Hill
against a frontal attack, a main line of resistance being constructed
east of Hausa and Delbar Woods and Windmill Copse on the railway
embankment. A defensive flank was also sited facing south along the
river Scarpe, and a second defensive flank facing northwards designed to
meet an attack developing through Gavrelle. Five companies of
machine-guns were placed in the line and three held in reserve.
In these operations the Division, under the command of General Oldfield,
the C.R.A., had fulfilled all the tasks allotted to it absolutely, with
a total loss of 1145, including 4 officers and 182 other ranks killed
and missing.
During the attacks against Greenland Hill the Division was placed under
orders of Lieut.-General Sir A. W. Currie, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., commanding
the Canadian Corps. On the return of the Division to the XXIInd Corps,
on 30th August, General Oldfield received the following congratulatory
message from General Currie:--
"Now that the gallant 51st Division is passing from my
command, may I be permitted to say that I shall always
remember with the greatest pride that for six stirring days
you formed part of the Canadian Corps. I remember very well
when the Division first came to France in May 1915, and that
we took part together in the fighting at Festubert and
Givenchy. Again we were associated in the memorable battle
of Arras in April 1917, and now again we have kicked off
side by side in an advance the results of which I have every
reason to believe will be far-reaching. That your Division
was able after the continuous fighting in which it has been
engaged this year to take and keep the strong position of
Greenland Hill, testifies in the strongest possible manner
to the fact that the fighting qualities of the 51st are
second to none in all the Allied armies.
"On behalf of the Canadian Divisions I thank you most
sincerely for the splendid help and support you have given
to the main advance south of the river. I wish you all the
best of luck always, and have every confidence that the
splendid reputation that the Division now enjoys will ever
be maintained."
Until 14th September, when the Division was relieved by the 49th
Division, no events occurred which materially changed the tactical
situation. The period was not, however, a quiet one. The enemy was at
times extremely active with his guns, on occasions using quantities of
mustard gas, the targets against which he chiefly vented his spleen
being the railway cutting, Greenland Hill, and Fampoux.
Enemy aircraft were also unusually active in this area, particularly in
bombing the troops in the line. On one occasion in particular, 4th
September, aircraft were crossing over lines frequently throughout the
night--singly, by twos, and in flights up to six in number--which
heavily bombed the vicinity of Roeux, Fampoux, and the valley north of
Fampoux.
Patrolling was maintained with the greatest energy, as it was
anticipated that the success of the operations in the south in which
Cambrai was becoming threatened might at any time lead the enemy to
further withdrawals.
In consequence, encounters in No Man's Land were of frequent occurrence,
in which considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy--not, however,
without losses also being sustained by the Jocks. On one occasion a
daylight patrol of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, consisting of one
officer and two other ranks, had a lively fight with an enemy post 200
yards from Biache power station. They killed two of the enemy and
wounded several others, and then returned to our lines, all three having
first been wounded.
On relief on 14th September the Division remained at rest and training
until 24th September, when it again returned to the same sector, and
remained in the line until 4th October, when it was again relieved by
the 44th Division. This relief was not, however, carried out with the
object of allowing the Division a period of rest, but for the purpose of
its being moved to another portion of the front to take part again in
active operations.
Probably, in common with many other Divisions, the men of the 51st had
come to consider that they were doing more than their fair share of
battle fighting. They had, indeed, been engaged in nine major operations
in the period of seventeen months from April 1917 to August 1918.
The men thus felt entitled to covet the long periods of rest such as
fell to the lot of some of the more fortunate Corps and Divisions, which
occasionally were given five or six weeks' rest in which to regain their
form after an operation.
They, however, comforted themselves by the thought that they were so
continuously employed in the forefront of the battle because the Higher
Command had learnt to rely on them to carry to a successful issue any
task that was set them.