WITH THE FRENCH IN CHAMPAGNE.
When the Division was resting in the Norrent-Fontes area two new
brigadiers were appointed to it, in place of Generals Dick-Cunynghame
and Beckwith. The command of the 153rd Brigade was assumed by
Lieut.-Colonel W. Green, D.S.O., Black Watch. Colonel Green at the time
of his appointment was commanding the 9th Royal Scots, and thus was well
known to the Division. He had been in command of this battalion when it
had been transferred from the 51st to the 61st Division, and had proved
himself a most capable battalion commander. It was, in fact, felt at the
time of his departure that the Division was losing in Colonel Green one
of the best infantry leaders that had served with it. It was therefore
with the greatest satisfaction to all that news was received that he was
rejoining his Division as commander of the 153rd Brigade.
On 16th April Brigadier-General E. I. de S. Thorpe, D.S.O., Bedfordshire
Regiment, was appointed to the command of the 152nd Infantry Brigade. On
28th April he was, however, transferred to the command of another
brigade, Colonel B. Laing, D.S.O., M.C., Seaforth Highlanders, being
appointed in place of him.
Colonel Laing had not previously served with the Division, but he had
been in close contact with it in the Arras fighting in 1917, in which he
commanded his battalion in the 4th Division with considerable
distinction.
On 3rd May the Division began moving to familiar areas north of Arras,
the 153rd Brigade group moving to the Mont St Eloi-Neuville St Vaast
area, the 152nd and 154th Brigades to Ecoivres-Bray areas, Divisional
headquarters opening at Marœuil.
On the 6th and 7th May the 152nd and 153rd Brigades went into the line,
relieving the 10th and 12th Brigades of the 4th Canadian Division in the
sector stretching from Bailleul on the right to Willerval on the left,
the front line trenches being situated at the foot of the eastern slopes
of the Vimy Ridge.
The sector was well known to the older veterans of the Division, as it
covered in its reserve area the greater part of the front held from
March to July in 1916, and practically the whole of the front held in
February and April 1917.
On the right of the Division were the 15th (Scottish) Division and on
the left the 52nd (Lowland) Division, so that on this occasion the line
from the river Scarpe on the south almost up to Lens on the north was
held by Scottish troops.
The area occupied by the Division had been the scene of a great German
attack on 28th March 1918. The 56th (London) Division had, however,
offered a magnificent resistance, and apart from the loss of the
foremost trenches held by their outposts had held their ground in spite
of repeated attacks delivered by the Germans in great strength.
The actual line taken over by the 51st Division as the front line had
before the attack been the reserve line, or, rather, the front line of
the reserve system. The whole scheme of defence had therefore to be
recast so as to transform this reserve system into an outpost system and
to create a new reserve system in rear. There was not the same amount of
new work required as had been the case in the sector astride the
Bapaume-Cambrai road, since numerous trenches and dug-outs existed which
could be incorporated into the new scheme. As, however, the Division was
now primarily composed of boys, who were unable to carry out a daily
task equal to that of the old trained soldiers, the work contemplated
was more than sufficient to keep the Division fully occupied for many
months.
In the new scheme of defence the system of holding a position by a
series of trench lines was abandoned. The experience of the last two
months had proved that the Germans were conducting their attacks in the
main according to a stereotyped plan. This plan was to attack frontally
with a great weight of artillery and trench-mortars on a narrow front,
and thus blast open by an intense bombardment an area of penetration
through which the attacking troops could pass and operate outwards
against the flanks thus created. In this manner they had been able to
roll up one trench line after another in a series of flank attacks.
To meet this form of advance a trench system was planned which consisted
of a number of localities, sited checkerwise, each locality being
capable of all-round defence. Thus if the enemy penetrated any portion
of the defences, whichever way he turned he would be met by entrenched
troops facing the direction of his advance.
The introduction of this system necessitated the laying out of a
complete new system of defence, which, though existing trenches were
largely utilised, entailed a vast amount of new work in the sector.
In carrying out this work much difficulty was at first encountered owing
to the inexperience of the troops, and the fact that the bulk of them
were not fully developed men. The Jocks, however, played up
magnificently, almost surpassing their efforts in the early part of the
year; and in a few weeks the defences, though not actually completed,
contained the framework of a series of well-wired localities, in which
the troops could have offered a stubborn resistance.
It was, in fact, evident from the manner in which the work was carried
out that, in spite of the immense number of casualties sustained in the
last two months, the traditions established in the Division for hard
work were being well maintained by the new drafts.
On one occasion while this work was in progress, a party was working at
night in front of Bailleul when a machine-gun opened, and a boy slid
from the berm into the trench and lay on the duck-board groaning
heavily. The platoon sergeant jumped down beside him and said, "What are
ye groaning for, laddie?" "I've a bullet in the fleshy part of my leg,"
was the reply. "Fleshy part of the leg!" said the war-weary sergeant,
with visions of a peaceful spell at home, "what the h----l are you
complaining about?"
Throughout this period there were occasions on which the enemy's
artillery was extremely active. High-velocity guns paid considerable
attention to the back areas, particularly to Ecurie, Ecoivres, and
Marœuil. On one occasion a shell from one of them landed in the
machine-gun battalion camp at Ecurie, killing two men and wounding Major
Clarke and Captain Biddulph, the second in command and adjutant
respectively, and wounding seven other ranks.
The battery positions of the heavy artillery and the Concrete Road, a
famous overland route made of concrete running from Roclincourt to the
Arras-Lens Railway, received a daily ration of heavy shells.
The enemy also occasionally carried out intense bombardments with gas
shells. On one particular occasion, the night 16-17th May, he fired
three half-hour violent bursts of mustard-gas shell at intervals of
three hours, causing casualties to 3 officers and 139 other ranks of the
7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
On 25th May over 800 shells were fired into the area near Thelus by 4·2,
5·9, and 8-inch howitzers without a single casualty being caused.
Shellings of this nature continued until 9th June, gas shells frequently
being mixed with high explosive; but the dug-out system had been so
rapidly improved under the directing energy of Colonel Fleming, the
C.R.E., that only slight casualties were caused.
After 9th June, the hostile artillery slackened off considerably.
High-velocity guns ceased to trouble the back areas, and the front
trenches, except for occasional intense bursts, received little
attention. On the 23rd the casualties in the entire Division for
twenty-four hours had dropped to one man killed and two wounded.
On 10th June a new form of gas attack was delivered on the Divisional
front, known as a "gas beam" attack. Forty truck-loads of cylinders were
run up to the most advanced point on the light railway, which lay in
front of Bailleul and just behind the support line.
Those cylinders were arranged so that they could all be opened
simultaneously by an electrical device. This was a marked improvement on
the old system, in which each cylinder required four men to carry it up
to the front line, and then had to be left in position until a wind of
the right velocity was blowing in the required direction, in danger of
being burst by shell-fire and flooding our own trenches with gas. In the
case of the "gas beam" the train was not moved up to the position of
discharge until the wind was suitable, so that the gas could be released
immediately on arrival, and was thus stored in the trench area for the
shortest possible time.
Prior to the discharge the front and support lines in the area liable to
be affected by the gas were evacuated by their garrisons. The train
carrying the cylinders was then moved into position without incident. A
machine-gun bullet penetrated one of the cylinders, but the escape of
gas was quickly stopped by the presence of mind of one of the gas
personnel, who plugged the holes made in the cylinder with clay.
The discharge then took place, and as far as could be seen the "gas
beam" rolled slowly over to the German lines, the wind at the time
having dropped to about four miles an hour.
In the morning the Flying Corps observers reported that a broad belt of
discoloured grass showed that the beam had travelled some 4000-5000
yards into the enemy's country towards Douai. What effect it had on the
Germans is not known. No kind of alarms seem to have been given from the
German front-line trenches. The German batteries in the area affected by
the gas were, however, silent for several days.
When the troops returned to the front and support lines after the
discharge, they found numbers of rats, moles, and beetles dead at the
bottom of the trenches, while the brass shell-cases hung up as gas-gongs
were coated with a deposit of verdigris about the depth of a half-crown
piece, evident signs that the gas was a fairly powerful mixture.
During this period General Carter-Campbell had a heavy task to perform.
Not only had a new system of defence to be planned and put into effect,
but the Division itself required time and opportunity to recuperate.
As the official despatch says: "All battalions were urgently in need
of rest, and contained large numbers of young, partially trained, and
wholly inexperienced recruits, and subordinate commanders had had
little or no opportunity of becoming acquainted with their men."
To meet this contingency intensive training was carried out by the
brigade and the battalions resting, in so far as the demands made upon
them for working parties would allow. Divisional classes were formed,
and every effort was made by commanders to turn their battalions into
trained units in the shortest possible time.
The inexperience on the part of the men, and the successful way in which
it was eliminated, is well illustrated by their efforts on patrol. Six
to eight patrols were out in No Man's Land covering the Divisional front
every night, but these were at first almost ineffective; not only did
they hesitate to engage enemy patrols and were inclined to avoid them,
but they allowed themselves to be outwitted by them. By 26th May the
Division had lost one officer and three men missing without a single
prisoner having been captured.
On 26th May an enemy patrol reached our lines, bombed a post, and
wounded two men. This date was, however, the turning-point; the next
night a similar attempt was made, but was defeated. The following night
a sergeant of the 100th Grenadiers was captured, on 9th June a second
N.C.O. was captured, and on the 12th a private. Finally, on 14th June, a
patrol of one officer and four other ranks of the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders waylaid an enemy patrol of seven men and captured it
complete.
By the end of the tour in this sector, the men had become really good on
patrol, completely dominated No Man's Land, and would immediately attack
and disperse any patrol they encountered.
In other directions the training of young officers and men was no less
successful, and, in spite of many obstacles, by the time the Division
left the area in July it was able to remain in action in a great battle
for eleven consecutive days and to add further to its laurels.
When it is considered that it had sustained 7480 casualties in the four
weeks ending 15th April 1918, it will be appreciated how much those
responsible for its efficiency are to be congratulated, particularly
since between 24th April and 11th July the Division was only completely
out of the line for ten consecutive days.
By 11th July 1918 the Division had been relieved in the Bailleul and
Willerval sector by the 4th Canadians, and had begun its move to the
Dieval-Monchy-Breton-Chelers area.
Shortly before this relief Lieut.-Colonel L. M. Dyson, who had commanded
the 255th Brigade, R.F.A., for some years, very reluctantly gave up
command of his brigade, ill-health and two severe wounds compelling him
to do so.
He may be said to represent the best type of modern gunner
lieut.-colonel. Always willing, cheerful, and untiring, he was the best
possible companion to the infantry brigade with which he worked. At the
same time, he kept well abreast of modern developments in artillery. It
is difficult to estimate the debt the Division owed to colonels like
Dyson, Dawson, and Rorie.
This latest move was due to a request from Marshal Foch that four
British Divisions might be transferred, two of them to areas south of
the Somme, and two to positions astride that river, so as to ensure the
connection between the French and British armies about Amiens, and to
enable him to move four French Divisions farther east to his right
flank.
On 13th July Sir Douglas Haig received a further request from Marshal
Foch that these four British Divisions might be placed unreservedly at
his disposal. This request was agreed to, and accordingly the 15th,
34th, 51st, and 62nd British Divisions were formed into the XXIInd Corps
under the command of Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, and were ordered to
move down to the French front.
The entire Division moved to the new scene of operations by train, the
intended destination being the Chalons-sur-Marne area. It was estimated
that the journey _viâ_ the southern outskirts of Paris would take thirty
hours. The trains, of which thirty-four were employed, steamed off at
intervals of one hour, the first leaving Bryas at 5 P.M. on 14th July,
the last train, carrying the Divisional artillery, leaving Pernes at 3
A.M. on 16th July.
Before the first troops had reached their destination the Germans, on
the morning of the 14th July, launched an offensive on a front of eighty
kilometres east and south-west of Rheims, which carried them across the
Marne, but which was finally held by the French, American, and Italian
forces on this front. This attack was in the first instance checked east
and north of Rheims, but as it was making progress westwards along the
valley of the Marne towards Epernay and towards the Montagne de Rheims,
the destination of the Division was altered, and on the evening of the
15th the first of the Divisional units were detraining in the
Nogent-sur-Seine area.
As each unit arrived on the 16th it was moved by motor lorry towards the
south bank of the Marne in the Epernay area, the manner in which this
move was organised by the French being admirable and few delays
occurring.
During the night of the 16-17th Divisional headquarters opened at
Moussy, three miles south-west of Epernay. On the following day the
enemy continued his advance north and south of the Marne, and had also
further encroached on the Montagne de Rheims, his farthest point of
penetration in the Epernay area being Boursault, a village four and a
half miles north-west of Moussy on the other side of the forest of
Epernay.
During the night of the 17th the 152nd, 153rd, and 154th Brigades
established their headquarters at Le Mesnil, Pierry, and Chouilly
respectively, the infantry battalions, now almost complete, being
grouped in villages and woods about their brigade headquarters.
Regimental transport, field companies, and field ambulances, which were
marching from their detraining stations, had not yet arrived in their
brigade group area, the first being still many miles behind, while the
Divisional artillery was still detraining during the day.
On 18th July Marshal Foch opened his counter-offensive on the western
flank of the Rheims-Soissons salient, which, with a series of
counter-attacks delivered south of the Marne, arrested the enemy's
advance. While these operations were in progress, the Divisional
artillery were on the march from their detraining station,
Nogent-sur-Seine, and the bulk of the regimental transport, field
ambulances, and field companies were arriving in their brigade group
areas.
During the night 18-19th July the original plan of employing the
Division south of the Marne was changed, and orders were received at 1
A.M. for it to move to the Forêt de la Montagne de Rheims. This move was
carried out on the morning of the 19th, the troops crossing the Maine at
Epernay and moving to the south-western fringe of the Forêt de la
Montague.
By 9 A.M. Divisional headquarters had been established at Hautvillers,
152nd Brigade headquarters at Champillon, 153rd Brigade headquarters at
Romery, and 154th Brigade in woods one mile north of Bellevue.
The Divisional artillery had also concentrated on the Moussy-Pierry
area.
All these moves were carried out in a hilly country in days of intense
heat, broken on the 18th by a violent thunderstorm, and proved extremely
trying both to men and horses--to the former particularly after nine
weeks of continual trench warfare. The Divisional artillery had covered
eighty miles in three days by forced marches, and after the storm on the
18th had found the roads impassable in many places owing to trees which
had been blown down in the storm and which had to be cleared before the
batteries could pass on.
During the 19th heavy fighting went on throughout the day, in which the
balance was in favour of the French, though German patrols had
penetrated as far as Nanteuil le Fosse. As soon as night fell the
Division continued its march and passed through the 14th and 120th
French Divisions to positions in the valley of the Ardre and the Bois de
Courton, with orders to advance the following morning in conjunction
with the 62nd Division and drive the enemy back.
The area in which the Division was to operate was on the western edge of
the Montagne de Rheims, the great massif which the enemy had endeavoured
to seize in order to turn the Rheims defences from the south and to
dominate the Marne valley.
The sector allotted to the XXIInd British Corps covered a front of 8000
yards astride the Ardre river, a stream running northwards to the Vesle,
and consisting of an open valley bottom with steep wooded slopes on
either side. Both valleys and slopes were studded with villages and
hamlets, which were for the most part intact, and afforded excellent
cover.
The northern boundary of the 51st Division was the river Ardre, which at
the point where the attack began was little more than a ditch.
The most formidable obstacle in the path of the Division was the dense
wood, the Bois de Courton, which stretched for 3500 yards from the
jumping-off line in the direction of the attack. This wood was composed
of a thick tangle of trees traversed by rides and country tracks, both
laterally and from front to rear. On the slopes of the valley at the
edge of this wood lay the hamlets of Espilly, Les Haies, and Nappes,
which linked up the defenders in the wood with various _points d'appui_
in the valley.
The valley itself was also admirably suited for concealed defences,
consisting as it did of small woods, mills, banks, and sunken roads
hidden by standing corn.
During the 19th the course of the fighting had been such that in the
instructions received by the Division it was stated that the enemy
appeared to be retiring on a wide front covered by rear-guards.
The orders issued for the attack therefore provided for a deep advance
into enemy territory, the final objective selected, the Brown line,
being at its greatest distance nine and a half kilometres from the
jumping-off line. The first objective, the Blue line, corresponded
roughly with the old French front line, and was from four to six
kilometres from the jumping-off line. As far as the Division was
concerned, this line ran roughly north and south along the western edge
of the Bois d'Éclisse.
The troops formed up for the attack on a two-brigade front on a line
stretching four kilometres as the crow flies, from the Ardre just west
of Pourcy to a point in the Bois de Courton one kilometre south-east of
Paradis; the 154th Brigade on the right, the 153rd on the left, and the
152nd in reserve. The attack was to be continued on the right by the
62nd Division, and on the left by the 7th French Division.
Each attacking brigade advanced on a one-battalion front, the leading
battalions employing their companies in line and keeping one in reserve.
The objective allotted to the leading battalions was an intermediate
objective known as the Green line, which ran from Chaumuzy to the
north-western edge of the Bois de Courton. The plan was that after the
capture of the Green line, a second battalion on each brigade front
should pass on to the capture of the Blue line, and the third battalion
to the capture of the Brown.
[Illustration: MAP XII. THE COUNTER-ATTACK IN CHAMPAGNE: THE ADVANCE ON
27TH AND 28TH JULY 1918.]
The artillery covering the attack was placed in the hands of the C.R.A.,
and consisted, in addition to the Divisional artillery, of two groups
of French 155 mm. guns, and seven groups of 75's. It was arranged that
the French artillery should cover the advance of the infantry up to the
Green line, and that the Divisional artillery should then move forward
and cover the remainder of the advance.
The artillery, and indeed all arms, were considerably hampered by the
scanty supply of French maps. Those that were issued were difficult to
read for British troops, and appeared very inaccurate when compared with
those produced by the topographical section of the general staff.
Indeed, it was not until the French maps were issued that it was
appreciated what a valuable asset the accuracy of the British maps was,
and it was found that whereas a barrage could be accurately fired from a
British map, the French maps could not always be depended on to give
satisfactory results.
At the time of the attack three enemy Divisions were in line opposite
the 51st--the 103rd Hessian Division in the centre, the 123rd (Saxon)
Division on the German right, and the 22nd (Sachsen Meinigen) Division
on the German left, the two latter both overlapping the front attacked
by the 51st. All three were classified by Intelligence as of average
quality; but the 123rd had been badly cut up in the fighting of the
previous days, and on the 20th units of the 50th Division had already
begun to relieve it astride the Ardre.
The move to the jumping-off line through units of the 14th and 120th
French Divisions was laborious and of long duration. The troops were
considerably delayed by the congestion on the roads and tracks, and did
not reach their positions until 4 A.M. The shortage of French guides
considerably added to their difficulties. Moreover, touch was not
obtained between the leading troops of the two attacking brigades until
after the attack had begun.
So far, to the Jocks the move to Champagne had been a great adventure;
the entrainment of the complete Division, the passing through the
outskirts of Paris, the journey on the French lorries, as well as the
arrival in a country of new and beautiful scenery, had all been of deep
interest to them. Most of them for the first time saw the French army in
the field, and no doubt realised, as most men do on the first occasion
that they have dealings with an active French Division, what magnificent
men they are, and what a false impression of them is obtained from the
odd and rather bedraggled French soldiers that were occasionally seen on
leave in the zone of the British armies.
Great adventure, indeed, it was. Not only had the Highland Division the
privilege of taking part in the early phases of Marshal Foch's great
counter-stroke which turned the German invasion of France into a hasty
retirement, but it was to maintain itself for eleven days in the heat of
sanguinary fighting without relief, and to advance its line over four
and a quarter miles through a country heavy with dense woods and
magnificently adapted by nature for stubborn defence, and in which an
enemy only recently victorious was offering an heroic resistance.
At 8 A.M. the artillery barrage opened and the advance began, the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders leading on the right, and the 6th Black Watch on
the left. Nor had the battle long been in progress before it became
evident that the enemy, so far from retiring on this portion of the
front, was holding on to his position with great determination.
Immediately in front of the 154th Brigade lay a large and partially
wooded hill of which the slopes on the enemy's side were dominated by
Marfaux on the north bank of the Ardre and by the Bois de l'Aulnay. On
its eastern side this hill sloped steeply to the river Ardre.
In front of the 153rd Brigade lay the dense Bois de Courton, divided by
a main ride running in the direction of the attack.
Both brigades captured the enemy outpost line with a total of 150
prisoners without meeting serious resistance.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders then carried the hill in front of them, and
were making their way down the slopes on the enemy's side when they came
in view of Marfaux, the Bois de l'Aulnay and Espilly, and heavy
machine-gun fire was opened on them, with the result that the advance
was checked. The right company had by this time occupied Bullin Farm,
and passed some 200 yards beyond it; the centre company had, however,
mistaken Marfaux for its true objective, Chaumuzy, and had edged its way
over towards that village, becoming intermingled with the right company.
The left company had reached the sunken road running from Espilly to
Bullin Farm. In this advance heavy fighting against machine-gun nests
had taken place, and the barrage was in consequence irretrievably lost,
so that for the present the attack could only be continued if the
infantry could subdue Marfaux and the Bois de l'Aulnay on the right and
Espilly in the centre with their own weapons. The battalion was,
however, much disorganised, as the centre company had lost its
direction, and the left company, in touch on neither of its flanks, was
being badly enfiladed from Espilly.
The Seaforths, however, made repeated attempts to close with the enemy;
but these were all held off by the great volume of the fire produced by
the vast number of machine-guns that were encountered. Even men trying
to make their way by creeping through the standing crops attracted so
much fire that this method of advance had to be abandoned.
In this position two companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders advanced to
support the 4th Seaforth Highlanders along the valley of the Ardre, and
two along a track leading to Espilly. The latter automatically filled
the gap between the two brigades, and became heavily involved in the
fighting as they approached the road known as Bullin road, running
almost north and south across the position about 700 yards east of
Espilly. Here, finding the enemy in strength lining the road, they
immediately deployed and assaulted the position, and though they
suffered serious losses, they made their way forward with the greatest
gallantry. The enemy in face of these attacks finally broke, abandoned
the line of the road, and fell back into some woods in rear of it.
Lieut.-Colonel Bickmore, D.S.O., commanding the 4th Gordon Highlanders,
finding that all the officers in one company had become casualties,
immediately took command of it, and, supported by the second company,
personally led his troops against the enemy in the wood. Shortly after
crossing the road the companies came under a burst of close-range
machine-gun fire and rifle grenades, and the attack was shattered,
Colonel Bickmore being mortally wounded at the head of his men.
The remnants of the two companies then withdrew and lined the road they
had captured.
By 12 noon the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were advancing in
rear of the 4th Seaforth and 4th Gordon Highlanders. This battalion
captured a machine-gun still in action in the right rear of the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders, which had been causing them considerable trouble,
and subsequently combined with the Seaforths in their attempts to free
themselves from the machine-guns on their right front and centre.
In spite of many gallant attempts which were made during the continuous
fighting throughout this day, the volume of enemy fire never abated, and
no substantial advance could be made. An N.C.O. and a few men did,
however, manage to enter the outskirts of Marfaux.
Though these battalions, in spite of the fact that they had become much
intermixed and disorganised, never relaxed their efforts to get on and
maintained a continuous pressure against the enemy, their gallantry was
not rewarded by success.
The line thus remained as it stood for the remainder of the day, with
the exception that the company in the sunken road was subjected to so
much fire that it could not maintain itself in its isolated position,
and withdrew first to behind the crest, subsequently to move forward and
dig itself in in view of the enemy.
Meanwhile, on the left, the 153rd Brigade had experienced heavy fighting
throughout the day in particularly trying and difficult circumstances.
After they had captured the outpost line this leading battalion, the 6th
Black Watch, disappeared into the wood. At this point an unusual
incident occurred, which greatly added to the confusion which must
inevitably occur during an action fought in dense woods.
Shortly after the advance began the Germans opened a heavy barrage about
the jumping-off line. In consequence, the 7th Black Watch and 7th Gordon
Highlanders pressed forward close on the heels of the 6th Black Watch so
as to get clear of the barraged area as quickly as possible.
There was, however, a gap in this barrage between the main drive and the
south-western edge of the Bois de Courton, which resulted in the bulk of
the 7th Black Watch and 7th Gordon Highlanders being attracted into that
area.
Meanwhile the 6th Black Watch were with great difficulty forcing their
way through the wood. The enemy was, however, in considerable strength,
particularly as regards machine-guns, and everywhere offered a stubborn
resistance. The going in the wood was desperate, tangled undergrowth and
the numerous trees making the physical effort of advancing very
considerable. In addition, the country was so blind that it afforded the
enemy every facility for ambushing the most advanced troops.
In these circumstances the keeping of direction became a matter of the
greatest difficulty. Not only were the troops unable to see more than
fifty yards or so in front of them, but also they were constantly led
out of their true direction to deal with some hidden point of resistance
which suddenly engaged them. In fact, the wood fighting became a
question of isolated bodies of troops making their own way through the
wood as best they could, platoons and even sections of the enemy
completely detached and losing touch with their neighbours on both
flanks.
On the right the 6th Black Watch fought their way successfully through
the wood until they came under heavy fire from the vicinity of Espilly.
This village proved itself to be the centre of a strongly-defended
locality which, in spite of repeated attempts, could not be stormed by
the infantry. By the time the leading troops came under fire from the
Espilly defences, so much time had been spent in fighting in the wood
that the barrage had passed on, so that the infantry were here also
dependent on their own weapons alone to cover their forward movement.
On the left, as, owing to the density of the wood, it was impossible to
see the position of neighbouring troops, the 6th Black Watch, the 7th
Black Watch, and the 7th Gordon Highlanders all became involved in the
fighting and became split up into numerous detached parties.
On the extreme left elements of all these battalions, led by Lieutenant
M'Corquodale, 6th Black Watch, and accompanied by some French
Senegalese troops, reached the north-western edge of the Bois de
Courton, and even passed on to the southern edge of the Bois d'Éclisse.
They were, however, met with so heavy a fire in this advanced position,
and were entirely unsupported on either flank, and so fell back to the
edge of the Bois de Courton.
The remainder of these battalions were for the most part held up by the
western and south-western defences of the Espilly locality, though some
of them fought their way well beyond the La Neuville-Les Haies road.
Subsequently the Senegalese troops on the left, finding that they were
unsupported by the remainder of their battalion, and learning that
Paradis was still in the hands of the enemy, fell back to the line held
by the remainder of their unit. The foremost troops of the 153rd Brigade
were thus left holding a narrow front well in advance of all
neighbouring troops; and as the enemy were threatening to cut them off
from the rear, they were compelled to withdraw gradually to a line some
200 yards north of the La Neuville-Les Haies road.
The success of the 153rd Brigade was largely due to the gallantry and
leadership of the commanding officer of the 7th Black Watch,
Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Miller, M.C.
Colonel Miller, seeing that his attacking waves had lost direction owing
to the gap in the enemy barrage, pushed forward with his intelligence
officer, and passed through part of the heaviest of the barrage. He was
thus able to direct a company from his rear wave to fill the gap. In
passing through the barrage Colonel Miller lost his intelligence officer
and both orderlies, and was himself blown over by shells on more than
one occasion.
2nd Lieutenant J. B. Cable, 7th Black Watch, also showed fine qualities
of leadership. After his company commander had become a casualty, he
took over command of his company, and with his two leading platoons
succeeded in capturing an enemy lieutenant and twenty-five prisoners. He
then pushed forward and captured another twenty prisoners. Subsequently,
finding that he was being fired on from his unprotected right flank and
rear, he successfully withdrew his company. Later, hearing that troops
on his right flank were advancing, he again led his platoons forward and
captured several machine-gun nests.
As it was now evident that the three battalions of the 153rd Brigade
were seriously intermingled, orders were issued to consolidate the line
held, to obtain touch on the flanks, and to reorganise.
During the afternoon the French made a second attempt to capture Paradis
and so cover our left; they were, however, unable to gain their
objective.
At 6 P.M. the enemy, who had been reinforced, began to exert pressure.
He had already delivered a small counter-attack against the right of the
154th Brigade at 4.30 P.M., which had been shattered by rifle and
Lewis-gun fire, and he was now seriously threatening both flanks of the
153rd Brigade. As the battalions were considerably reduced in strength,
and could ill spare the men required to protect their exposed flanks,
they were withdrawn to the line of the road running from La Neuville to
Les Haies.
The 6th Seaforth Highlanders were then placed at the disposal of the
153rd Brigade, and moved forward to fill the gap between the left of the
brigade and the French, and also to take over the front line so that the
three battalions of 153rd Brigade could reorganise.
At 6.30 P.M. an intense bombardment against the right of the Division
broke out. As the enemy had launched a great premeditated attack on this
front a few days previously, he naturally had a large number of guns
available for this bombardment, and the shell-fire was therefore more
than usually severe. This was followed by an attack delivered by two
parties advancing from different directions and converging on the high
ground on the right, about one hundred men altogether being employed.
The parties advanced to within a few yards of the position held by the
7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, when they were caught in enfilade
fire.
The Germans winced for a moment under this burst of fire, whereupon an
N.C.O. led his section forward and charged them, with the result that
they immediately broke and fled in disorder down the hill.
During the day the artillery had begun to move forward, beginning about
9 A.M. By 11 A.M. the 256th Brigade were in action by Pourcy, and 255th
Brigade in front of Nanteuil.
As the enemy was found to be resisting much more strongly than had been
anticipated, and as counter-attacks appeared likely, the guns, except
the forward sections, moved back to behind Nanteuil. The forward guns
were left in close support of the infantry, in some cases 1200 yards
from the enemy, and continued harassing him all night. These forward
guns, as well as trench-mortars and machine-guns, had all been employed
in attempting to subdue the hostile machine-gun nests in close support
of the infantry. The first had proved themselves particularly useful;
but as regards the trench-mortars and machine-guns, the mere physical
labour of carrying the guns forward through the dense undergrowth made
it impossible to get them into action with the foremost troops until
late in the day. Even then, in the confusion that existed, one section
of the 153rd Brigade Trench-Mortar Battery found itself unexpectedly in
ground occupied by the enemy, and was dispersed by their fire.
During the day 8 officers and 360 other ranks were taken prisoners, 2
officers and 50 other ranks being taken from a single wired-in post in
the Bois de Courton. In addition, about thirty machine-guns and eight
trench-mortars were captured, and a battery of 75's and many
mitrailleuses that had been taken from the French were recovered.
In spite of the fact that a withdrawal had been anticipated, the
resistance had been stubborn. This was due to the fact that during the
day the enemy had withdrawn across the Marne at the southern end of the
salient, and was covering this movement by a desperate defence of the
flanks from Rheims to the Marne, on which the withdrawal was hinging.
During the night, while the relief by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders was
taking place on the left brigade front, the enemy maintained his
pressure, with the result that the line was again forced back about 1000
yards south of the Neuville-Les Haies road.
It was arranged that the 152nd Infantry Brigade should take over the
153rd Brigade front and carry out a second attack. The general plan
was that the brigade should advance on a one-battalion front, the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders leading, the 6th Gordon Highlanders next, and the
6th Seaforth Highlanders in the rear. Three objectives were selected
for the attack, the first being the north-west, edge of the Bois de
Courton, the second the southern slopes of the Bois d'Éclisse, and the
third the northern slopes.
The 153rd Brigade were to form such defensive flanks as became necessary
during the progress of the attack, the 7th Gordon Highlanders on the
right, and the 7th Black Watch on the left. On the right of the Highland
Division the 62nd Division were to attack with a view to encircling the
Marfaux locality from the north while the 9th French Division were
attacking on the left, the village of Paradis being the particular
stumbling-block in their path which they hoped to remove.
The artillery barrage fell, as had been planned, south of the Les
Haies-La Neuville road; but as the enemy had closely followed our troops
during their last withdrawal, he had been able to establish many
machine-gun posts close to the jumping-off line. The result was that the
barrage fell behind the enemy's foremost troops, and the machine-guns of
his outposts were untouched.
In consequence, the 6th Gordon Highlanders met with the stoutest
opposition from the outset of the attack, a storm of bullets greeting
them as soon as their advance began. Nevertheless, the troops on the
right, with fine determination, brushed back all resistance until they
had reached a point which was estimated to be about 200 yards from the
north-west edge of the Bois de Courton. Here the enemy were found to be
holding a carefully-prepared line of resistance supported by numerous
and well-sited machine-guns and trench-mortars.
In spite of many gallant attempts made by the battalion to carry this
line, it held firm, the Germans defending themselves skilfully and
courageously with rifles and hand-grenades. For an hour the 6th Gordon
Highlanders tried to come to close grips with them, and drive them from
their position, but without results.
Meanwhile the enemy displayed on his part the greatest initiative,
making repeated attempts to filter through gaps in our front line and on
the right flank, and ultimately became so threatening on the right rear
of the 6th Gordon Highlanders that they were compelled to fall back on
that flank to a position some 200 yards in advance of their jumping-off
line.
On the left the advance was held up after the wood had been cleared for
some 500 yards. Paradis had successfully withstood the repeated attempts
of the French to storm it, so that the left flank of the Division's
attack was again in the air. In consequence, the leading troops in this
part of the battlefield also fell back on to the same line as the right
flank had done, the 7th Black Watch forming a defensive flank to connect
the left of the 6th Gordon Highlanders with the right of the French.
A company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders was also sent forward to fill
gaps which had occurred in the centre of the 6th Gordon Highlanders'
line.
As had been the case on the previous day, the difficulties of the
operation were greatly increased by the blindness of the country, it
being almost impossible to locate exactly the positions and flanks of
advanced parties in the wood.
However, by noon a continuous line had been formed joining the left of
the 154th Brigade to the right of the French.
The troops were closely engaged throughout the day, and it became
necessary to move forward companies from all three battalions of the
152nd Brigade to strengthen the line in places where it was becoming
weakened. On the left the successful resistance of the Germans in
Paradis had made it necessary to occupy a line which curved round the
eastern side of that village some 300 yards from it, while on the right
flank the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, after some fighting with enemy
machine-guns, established themselves on a line facing north some 700
yards south of Espilly.
On the 154th Brigade front no particular incidents occurred. Strong
patrols attempted to advance and make ground towards the enemy, but they
found him everywhere in strength, and were unable to get forward. For a
time the high ground on the extreme right was harassed by machine-guns.
However, a Stokes mortar from the 154th Trench-Mortar Battery was
brought into action against them, and after firing forty rounds silenced
them. A patrol subsequently found twelve dead Germans in one machine-gun
nest that had thus been dealt with.
So ended another day of severe fighting. The 152nd Brigade had taken
over the whole of the front on the left, the 5th and 6th Seaforth
Highlanders having been employed, either in strengthening the line held
by the 6th Gordon Highlanders, or in protecting their flanks, while the
153rd Brigade, which had been reorganised during the previous night, lay
in close support to it.
In the day's operations eighty-one prisoners with a number of
machine-guns and trench-mortars were captured. The forward guns of the
Divisional artillery had been constantly in action, moving continually
in close support to the attacking troops and making every effort to help
the infantry forward. Their activities were, however, equally hampered
by the blindness of the country.
On the following day no serious infantry action took place until 4 P.M.
During the morning the 4th Gordon Highlanders, who had extended their
left so as to take over the front as far as the main drive in the Bois
de Courton, attempted to make ground towards Espilly by means of strong
patrols.
They, however, found the enemy as alert and as strong as ever, and could
make no appreciable progress.
Early in the day it was arranged that the 7th Black Watch should operate
during the afternoon with a view to establishing themselves in a
position on the south-west edge of the Bois de Courton, north of
Paradis, from which they could cover with their fire an attack to be
delivered by the French against that village.
To make this operation possible, it was necessary to advance the left of
the line, so as to allow the 7th Black Watch to get into this position;
the 6th Black Watch were therefore detailed to carry out an operation
with this intention.
Accordingly at 4 P.M. the 6th Black Watch passed through the 6th Gordon
Highlanders in the front line and attempted to dribble forward by
individual rushes and establish a line behind which the 7th could reach
their position on the flank of the French attack.
The enemy machine-gun nests in the wood, however, appeared to have been
reinforced, for the volume of fire developed by them was such that the
advancing parties were knocked out or driven back again and again. In
spite of many determined efforts made by the 6th Black Watch, by five
o'clock they had not been able to make any progress.
At this hour the French attack on Paradis was launched, but it was
immediately met with such an intense volume of machine-gun fire from the
village that the troops, after having made their way forward with heavy
losses for 100 yards, were compelled to dig themselves in.
Night thus fell with the position materially unchanged on the front of
the 51st Division; the 62nd Division had, however, successfully attacked
the enemy's lines on their right on the Bois du Petit Champ and cleared
the wood.
It had now been decided that an attack should be delivered by the 152nd
Brigade on the following day on the front of the 154th Brigade, the
objective given being a line from the Bois de l'Aulnay inclusive to
Espilly. Accordingly the hours of darkness were taken up with a complete
re-arrangement of the troops, battalions of the 152nd Brigade having to
be relieved by the 153rd Brigade and transferred to the front of the
154th Brigade. These moves were successfully accomplished without
incident, except for the fact that one company of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders was relieved too late to take part in the initial attack.
The firing line of the left was taken over by two companies of the 8th
Royal Scots (Pioneers) who had been placed at the disposal of the 153rd
Brigade, and by two companies of the 7th Black Watch.
The 152nd Brigade assembled for the attack with the 5th and 6th Seaforth
Highlanders on the right and centre respectively, and with the 6th
Gordon Highlanders on the left. On the left of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders parties of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 4th
Gordon Highlanders were ordered to push through the Bois de Courton to
the west of Espilly, and sweep up the enemy in the western defences of
the Espilly locality.
The barrage provided by the Divisional and French artillery was arranged
to come down at zero 200 yards ahead of the forming-up line, and to
advance 100 metres every five minutes. A barrage was also to be fired by
the Divisional machine-gun battalion.
At 6.10 A.M. the barrage opened, but unfortunately on the left a
considerable proportion of the shells fired by the French artillery fell
short amongst the infantry with serious results. All the officers in one
company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders became casualties before the
advance was fairly launched. The 6th Seaforth Highlanders also suffered
a number of casualties, while on the front of the 154th Brigade the 7th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders suffered sufficiently to become
seriously disorganised.
Partly on account of this error in the firing of the barrage, and partly
on account of the great natural strength of Espilly, the attack
progressed in ratio to the distance of the troops engaged from that
village.
On the right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders had a brisk fight for half an
hour, captured six machine-guns which attempted to bar their way, and
were well up with the barrage when it passed on to the Bois de l'Aulnay.
The 6th Seaforth Highlanders were also close to the barrage at the
pause, but their left company were suffering severely from machine-gun
fire both from front and flank, and the reserve company had to be pushed
forward to help them.
Opposite Espilly the 6th Gordon Highlanders were working their way
slowly towards the village under a heavy shelling, and being badly
enfiladed by machine-gun fire. Farther to the left, the 4th Gordon
Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were heavily
shelled, and were faced from the start by strong machine-gun posts which
the barrage had failed to subdue, and so were unable to make ground.
On the other hand, the two companies of the 8th Royal Scots, pioneers
though they were, were operating magnificently as infantry. By 7 A.M.
they were well up with the barrage, and had captured two machine-guns;
they finally fought their way unsupported on either flank for 500 yards
into the Bois de Courton.
When the barrage moved forward after the pause, the enemy in the Bois de
l'Aulnay put up a poor fight, and by 8.30 A.M. the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders and a company of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders had reached
the northern edge of the wood. The 5th Seaforth Highlanders also formed
a defensive flank on the eastern edge of the wood, as the enemy were
still holding the ground on the opposite bank of the Ardre.
On the left a few men of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders reached the spur
south-west of the Bois de l'Aulnay, but the bulk of them, with the 6th
Gordon Highlanders, were checked in the sunken road running from the
wood to Espilly. From here men of both battalions strove to cross the
open and assault Espilly in face of a terrific fire. The open country
was, however, so swept by rifles and machine-guns that every attempt
broke down.
Farther to the left, though the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
and 4th Gordon Highlanders made similar efforts to get forward, the
enemy pinned them to the ground by the intensity of his fire, and
prevented them from making any headway.
Meanwhile, on the extreme left of the attack, the two platoons of the
8th Royal Scots, still unsupported on either flank, found themselves in
a precarious position 500 yards in advance of the remainder of the line.
They accordingly withdrew slowly with a bag of twenty-eight prisoners to
their jumping-off line.
At 11 A.M. a fresh attack by two companies of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders was carried out on the left of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders.
These companies, in an advance which demanded great physical efforts
from the men, carried the line forward through dense undergrowth for 400
yards, clearing up two enemy machine-gun posts. In this position a line
was established with great difficulty.
From noon to dusk repeated efforts were made to reach Espilly, but the
troops engaged were so scourged by machine-gun fire that every attempt
broke down.
During the day contact was obtained with the foremost troops of the 62nd
Division, which had also advanced their line.
At the end of the operation, the Bois de l'Aulnay was held. From its
southern end the line followed the course of the sunken road towards
Espilly to the point where it enters the Bois de Courton east of that
village. Here it joined up with the new position won by the 7th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders in the wood, which for the most part was
facing west, and thence to the original line as held in the morning.
In this operation the Divisional artillery suffered heavily. During the
previous night several of the batteries had been subjected to a heavy
gas bombardment, but in spite of it they continued to carry out a strong
harassing-fire programme.
In this operation "A" and "C" Batteries, 256th Brigade, then went
forward to positions west of Nanteuil to support the infantry advance.
Here they were subjected to intense bombardments, and suffered some
casualties to personnel and horses, particularly from mustard gas.
Little occurred during the evening and night except that the 7th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders, having located some enemy machine-gun nests
by patrols, forced them back, and advanced their line by an additional
100 yards.
Meanwhile, immediately north of the Marne, the enemy was being hard
pressed where his salient was becoming dangerously narrowed by the
Franco-American advance northwards from Chateau Thierry.
The 24th passed without any major operation taking place.
It had been intended to carry out an attack on the Bois de Courton on
the 24th, with a view to gaining the line of the Haies-Neuville road;
but it was decided in the afternoon of the 23rd to postpone this
operation until Espilly had fallen.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore attempted to gain
ground by means of strong patrols south and south-east of Espilly, with
a view to forming the locality into a salient which would lend itself to
attack. In this they were partially successful, and though the enemy's
resistance was as strong as ever, they were able to establish posts, of
which the most northerly was about 350 yards south-east of Espilly.
On the right the 152nd Brigade spent the day reorganising. The character
of the fighting they had been engaged in is well illustrated by the fact
that battalions were so reduced in numbers that the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders were reorganised as two companies and the 6th as one. Each
of these battalions, in exchange for some reinforcements that had
arrived the night before, sent back to rest a hundred of its most
exhausted men.
During the night the 153rd Brigade was relieved by the French 35th
Regiment of the 14th Division, and encamped in woods near St Imoges.
Throughout the whole of these operations the enemy's defence had been
supported by a considerable artillery. He had concentrated on this front
a great number of batteries with which he had been supporting his
attacks, and when the Division checked his advance these guns were
still available to assist him in his defence.
He could therefore put down heavy barrages on back areas and across the
approaches to the front, so that troops in process of relief and in
moving to assembly positions were frequently caught in violent bursts of
shell-fire. In addition, during the actual attacks, a heavy volume of
fire was often directed against the area of the jumping-off line and on
tactical features that had been captured.
This shell-fire and the countless machine-guns that barred the advance
across the whole front had thus made the fighting of the last few days a
severe ordeal, which must have reminded the veterans of High Wood and
the chemical works, and which must have tried the young reinforcements
highly. They, however, stood the test like men. To take the case of the
153rd Brigade as an illustration. This brigade had lost 30 per cent of
its strength in casualties up to the time of its relief on the 24th, but
was able after twenty-four hours' rest to conduct itself gallantly
during a further four days of active operations in which it lost an
additional 500 officers and men.
After the relief of the 153rd Brigade by the French, the southern
boundary of the Divisional sector was found to run along the main drive
in the Bois de Courton and thence to Chantereine Farm on the south-west
corner of the Bois d'Éclisse, the 152nd Brigade remaining in position
on the right, the 154th on the left.
No attack was made on the 25th or 26th, but strong patrols maintained
continuous pressure against the enemy. As a result of successful
enterprises by these patrols the line was in certain parts of the front
sensibly advanced. On the right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders pushed out
eight posts sixty yards clear of the Bois de l'Aulnay; they also reached
the Moulin de Voipreux, and found it unoccupied. The 4th Seaforth
Highlanders advanced their line by some 100 yards in the wood, though
not without having some stiff fighting for their gains.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were continuously engaged in
the wood in trying to make headway, but the resistance they at all times
encountered was such as to deny them any substantial progress.
After further fighting on the 26th, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders made
good another fifty yards of ground. Both on this and the previous day
there were occasions on which our troops suffered considerably from the
enemy's artillery, which at times became intensely active both on his
forward and back areas.
The 26th was, however, the last day on which the enemy stood his ground
in Espilly and the Bois de Courton. On the north banks of the Marne he
had now been crushed into a small forward salient between
Belval-sous-Chatillon on the east and the Forêt de Riz on the west; and
while arrangements were being made to renew the attack on the Divisional
front, he was perfecting his plans to evacuate his position before it
was too late for him to disengage.
It had been intended to attack on the 26th, but it had been decided to
give the troops, all of whom had now been engaged for several days, the
benefit of twenty-four hours' rest--a rest which was unfortunately
denied to most of them by deluges of rain which fell incessantly through
the night.
The plan was to attack on a three-brigade front, 152nd being on the
right, 187th Brigade (from the 62nd Division) in the centre, and the
153rd Brigade on the left, the 154th Brigade being withdrawn to the
woods between Nanteuil and St Imoges. It would at first sight appear
abnormal that a brigade from the 62nd Division should attack between two
brigades of the 51st; but by this time the liaison with the 62nd
Division, commanded by General Braithwaite, had become so complete that
these dispositions caused no lack of cohesion in the attack.
A careful barrage programme was arranged, which allowed ample time for
the 153rd Brigade to fight their way through the difficulties of the
wood.
Two objectives were selected, the first being roughly the line Moulin de
Voipreux-Neuville within the Divisional boundaries, the second being a
line some 500-700 yards beyond this, including the village of Nappes.
At zero hour, 6 A.M. on 27th July, the artilleries of the 51st and 62nd
Divisions, with the attached French batteries and twenty-four guns of
the Divisional machine-gun batteries, opened the barrage.
The attack was met on the left by a light artillery barrage, and on the
right by a fairly heavy shelling of the banks of the river and the Bois
de l'Aulnay, but no infantry action beyond some long-range machine-gun
fire was encountered. The whole front, including the redoubtable
Espilly, had been evacuated.
At 10 A.M. the final objective was reached on the right just in time for
the troops to see the last of the enemy transport hurriedly leaving
Chaumuzy.
By 10.40 A.M. it was apparent that a general retirement was taking place
on the whole front, and mounted patrols were sent forward to get into
touch with the German rearguard.
The attacking brigades were therefore ordered forward to the line from
Chaumuzy to the north-west corner of the Bois de Courton, and by 1 P.M.
the whole Division--infantry, artillery, and machine-gunners disposed in
depth, and well covered by strong infantry patrols as well as the
cavalry--were on the move, while the sappers were at work repairing the
communications.
The last fight in the much-hated Bois de Courton and in Espilly had been
fought, and those centres of resistance which had for so many hours
appeared almost impregnable had at last fallen into our hands almost
without a shot being fired.
It was with a sense of relief to all that it was found that the whole
Division was advancing practically unmolested through an area on which a
few hours previously the advance of even a section had been welcomed by
a shower of machine-gun bullets. This sense of relief lost nothing from
the fact that in the last two battles in which the Division had been
engaged the whole Division had similarly been on the move, but in the
wrong direction!
At 2 P.M. Chaumuzy was entered, and the artillery came into action near
the north-east corner of the Bois de l'Aulnay, engaging the enemy who
were reported by the mounted patrols to be falling back on the line of
the road from Bligny to Chambrecy. At this time the German artillery
from positions in rear of this road were becoming increasingly active on
the Divisional front.
By 3 P.M. the battalions ordered to the line beyond Chaumuzy were all
in position, and patrols were sent forward to the old French trench
line skirting the western edge of the Bois d'Éclisse and curving round
the Montagne de Bligny.
Later in the afternoon the mounted patrols definitely located the enemy
on a line from Montagne de Bligny to the south of Chambrecy.
Orders were therefore issued at 4 P.M. that as soon as patrols had
reported the wood clear brigades should advance and occupy the old
French trench line as the main defensive line--that is to say, that the
Division was to take up a position facing west. The Bligny-Chambrecy
road was to become the Divisional right boundary, and Chantereine Farm
the left. The 187th Infantry Brigade was to drop out of the Divisional
line and come under orders of the 62nd Division.
At midnight, 27-28th, patrols reported the Bois d'Éclisse clear, and
the forward move began in a downpour of rain.
Meanwhile the enemy were retreating in the Rheims-Soissons salient,
their line after passing the front of the French Division on our left
running almost due west, the Marne being some five to eight miles south
of it.
Throughout the night the troops were moving to their new positions,
suffering no casualties except from occasional bursts of shell-fire.
By 11 A.M., 28th, the 62nd Division, which had attacked at dawn, had
gained a footing on the Montagne de Bligny, while the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders, in touch with them, had successfully occupied the old
French trenches as far as La Garenne. In close support to them in the
wood lay the 5th Seaforth Highlanders; while on their left, also in the
French trenches, the 7th Gordon Highlanders connected the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders' left with the right of the French. The latter were still
advancing northwards, with patrols of the 153rd Brigade keeping in touch
with them.
It was reported at 9.45 A.M. that the French had taken Chambrecy, and at
1 P.M. the 152nd Brigade was ordered to advance to the line
Chambrecy-Michel Renaut Farm. It was, however, later discovered that the
Germans were still occupying Chambrecy, and the movement could not be
carried out.
It was then decided that the French should attack Ville en Tardenois at
3 P.M., and that the 51st should co-operate. The 153rd Brigade was
therefore ordered to advance to the high ground north of Chambrecy, with
the French on its left and the 62nd Division on its right.
The artillery brigades moved forward to support this attack from
positions about Chaumuzy. To reach this area they had to advance under
direct observation for half a mile over open ground. The gunners,
however, made their best pace, and as the shelling was erratic their
losses were small.
"B" 255th Battery, commanded by Major F. C. Jack, D.S.O., M.C., were
ordered to move to a position north of Chaumuzy. On arrival near the
village, Major Jack found it and its approaches being subjected to a
heavy bombardment by 5·9 howitzers. He therefore instructed his guns and
limbers to gallop through the village at intervals of a minute, he
himself galloping through with his orderly first. By this means his
whole battery passed successfully through the village. It was a very
gallant performance, and was much appreciated by the infantry.
The attack was launched by the French at 3 P.M., and failed under heavy
machine-gun, rifle, and shell fire. The 7th Gordon Highlanders and 6th
Black Watch, however, advanced at 4.20 P.M., and attacked across the
valley towards Chambrecy and east of the village. Violent machine and
shell fire was opened on the battalions soon after they left the
trenches in the Bois d'Éclisse; but in spite of their losses elements
of the 7th Gordon Highlanders carried on, crossed the Bligny-Michel
Renaut Farm road, and tried to make their way into the farm.
Similarly advanced parties of the 6th Black Watch passed through
Chambrecy to the north-east and north-west of it.
By 6 P.M. the two battalions were held up on a line roughly from a point
500 yards south-west of Michel Renaut Farm to the north-east outskirts
of Chambrecy. From here, unsupported on either flank and pounded by the
German artillery and machine-gunners, they were compelled to withdraw,
the 7th Gordon Highlanders to the old French trenches, while the 6th
Black Watch finally established a line from the Bois d'Éclisse to 200
yards south of Chambrecy.
During the night the 154th Brigade were ordered to take over the front;
the 4th Seaforth Highlanders accordingly relieved on the right, with
their right flank just south of the Montagne de Bligny, and the 4th
Gordon Highlanders relieved the line recently established by the 6th
Black Watch. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in support
on the Bois d'Éclisse.
The 154th Brigade was instructed to keep in touch with any forward
movement on the flanks, and to patrol actively with a view to preventing
the enemy from withdrawing unobserved. Chambrecy at this time and during
the following days remained in No Man's Land. It was visited constantly
by patrols, but the heavy enemy machine-gun fire drawn by their visits
forbade its occupation.
In these respects, apart from heavy enemy shelling, in which quantities
of gas shells were employed, the 29th July passed uneventfully.
In the evening the Divisional front was extended so as to include the
Montagne de Bligny. The 5th West Yorks, from whom this position was
taken over, had at 7 P.M. attacked the enemy position on the western
slopes of the hill. Though they had not been completely successful, they
had made ground on the crest, the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
taking over this new position.
On 30th July the situation remained stationary, though constant pressure
was maintained against the enemy by means of patrols, which at all times
found him alert. "Constant pressure," which played so large a part in
this and the following actions, is one of the most disagreeable features
of battle. To attack, supported by artillery, with units attacking on
either flank, produces its own attitude of mind which makes it
tolerable; to sit in trenches on a quiet front had come in those
strenuous years to be regarded as a holiday; to maintain "constant
pressure" required a considerable display of courage in cold blood. It
was a thing that might have to be maintained for many hours and perhaps
for many days, as had been the case during the last ten days. It meant
that any weakness on the part of the enemy had to be tested and
exploited. How could his weak points be discovered? Only by gallant men
working their way forward until they were shot at. His strength or
weakness was in direct ratio to the number of bullets this forward
movement provoked. The Division, when it had not been fighting actively,
had maintained constant pressure for ten days. It was a cold-blooded
operation which required resolute troops to perform it conscientiously
and effectively.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, situated on the bare and
exposed crest of the Montagne de Bligny, had employed the night 29-30th
in digging themselves in well. It was fortunate that they had done so,
for during the day they had to withstand a systematic and heavy
shelling; and at 8 P.M., after fifteen minutes intense bombardment, an
attack was launched against them. They, however, stood their ground, and
with rifles and Lewis guns shattered the fifty odd Germans who advanced
against them from the west.
This was the last incident of note that occurred. During the day of the
30th preparations had been made for the relief of the Division by the
14th French Division. The 255th Brigade, R.F.A., was relieved at noon,
and the 256th Brigade during the night. At dusk the relief of the 62nd
Division also began, and the most advanced troops of the Highland
Division were thus left with French battalions on either side of them.
Throughout the following day the 154th Brigade remained in position,
active patrolling continuing till dusk, when the Brigade was relieved by
the 14th Regiment, 14th French Division. Command of the sector passed to
the G.O.C. 14th Division at 10 P.M.
When the Highland Division moved north again, it left behind it 38
officers and 417 other ranks who had fallen, the total casualties in
killed, wounded, and missing being 173 officers and 3690 men. The total
of 3863 represents probably the largest number of casualties that the
Division ever sustained during a single period in the line.
It represents the losses that occurred in two attacks on a two-brigade
front, three on a one-brigade front, and in constant minor attacks
carried out by one or two battalions, and in maintaining constant
pressure for the whole eleven days to prevent the enemy from disengaging
and extricating himself unobserved from the increasingly awkward
situation in which Marshal Foch's counter-stroke was placing him.
In these eleven days the youth in the Highland Division, many of whom
were blooded for the first time in this battle, engaged six German
Divisions, stemmed their advance, and hurled them back four and a half
miles--days which were described in the following terms by General
Berthelot, commanding the Fifth French Army.
"Order of the day No. 63 of the Fifth French Army
(translation):--
"Now that the XXIInd British Corps has orders to leave the
Fifth (French) Army, the Army Commander expresses to all the
thanks and admiration which the great deeds that it has just
accomplished deserve.
"The very day of its arrival, feeling in honour bound to
take part in the victorious counter-attack which had just
stopped the enemy's furious onslaught on the Marne and had
begun to hurl him back in disorder to the north, the XXIInd
Corps, by forced marches and with minimum opportunity for
reconnaissance, threw itself with ardour into the battle.
"By constant efforts, by harrying and driving back the enemy
for ten successive days, it has made itself master of the
valley of the Ardre, which it has so freely watered with its
blood.
"Thanks to the heroic courage and to the proverbial tenacity
of the British, the combined efforts of the brave Army Corps
have not been in vain.
"Twenty-one officers and 1300 other ranks taken prisoners;
140 machine-guns and 40 guns captured from the enemy, four
of whose Divisions have been successively broken and
repulsed; the upper valley of the Ardre with its commanding
heights to the north and south reconquered; such is the
record of the British share in the operations of the Fifth
Army.
"Highlanders under the orders of General Carter-Campbell,
commanding the 51st Division; Yorkshire lads under the
orders of General Braithwaite, commanding the 62nd Division;
Australian and New Zealand mounted troops; all officers and
men of the XXIInd Army Corps so ably commanded by Sir A.
Godley, you have added a glorious page to your history.
"Marfaux, Chaumuzy, Montagne de Bligny--all those famous
names will be written in letters of gold in the annals of
your regiments.
"Your French comrades will always remember with emotion your
splendid gallantry and your perfect fellowship in the fight.
BERTHELOT,
le General Commandant
la V^{me} Armée."
_30th July 1918._
The Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
addressed the following messages to the Divisional Commander:--
"_21st July._--The Corps Commander wishes to convey to all
ranks of your Division his appreciation of the great work
that has been done by them during the past two days'
fighting.
"The French Army Commander told him to-day that he was
entirely satisfied with the result and the good bag of
prisoners obtained in face of most obstinate resistance by
picked troops of the enemy, who are under special orders to
hold the front in order to allow for the safe retreat of the
German troops beaten and driven back by the French across
the Marne and on the Soissons front.
"Tactically, strategically, and politically the gallant
fighting of your Division may have far-reaching results."
* * * * *
"_28th July._--Will you please convey to all ranks of your
Division my hearty congratulations on the most successful
result of their hard week's fighting.
"The valour and tenacity with which the troops have
continuously engaged the enemy, and their endurance in face
of exceptional difficulties of country and latterly of bad
weather, have resulted in heavy losses to the Germans, and
in their full retreat closely pursued by our victorious
troops."
At the conclusion of these operations a special honour was conferred
upon the 6th Black Watch--namely, that of being mentioned in the orders
of the French army, "Cité à l'ordre d'Armée," and of being decorated
with the Legion of Honour.
The following is a translation of the Army Order:--
"The general officer commanding the Fifth (French) Army
hereby specially mentions in orders the 6th Battalion Royal
Highlanders. This battalion d'élite, under the brilliant
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rowland Tarleton, has
given splendid proof of its dash and fury in the course of
several hard-fought battles between the 20th and 30th July
1918. After seven days of furious fighting, in spite of
exhaustion and heavy losses caused by intense enemy
machine-gun fire, it successfully stormed a wood splendidly
fortified and stubbornly defended by the enemy.
GUILLAUMAT,
General Officer Commanding
Fifth (French) Army."
The Jocks entraining on their departure from the French zone were a
memorable sight. They had exploited the resources of the country with
great industry, and every man appeared to have a tin of bully beef in
one hand and a bottle of champagne in the other.