CHAPTER XV.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE (_Contd._)--THE BATTLE OF THE LYS.

On 1st April the Division moved by train to an area near Bethune, where

it remained for a few days resting and refitting. The only event of

interest that occurred in this area was the accidental bombing by

daylight of the vicinity of Divisional headquarters by a British

reconnaissance aeroplane, fortunately without casualties.

On 7th April the Division was transferred to the XIth Corps, and was

moved to an area in rear of the Portuguese Divisions, which at the time

were holding the line about Neuve Chapelle and Festubert.

Divisional headquarters was established at Robecq, a village which it

had occupied on its first arrival in France. The 152nd Brigade were

billeted at Ham en Artois, the 153rd Brigade at Busnes--or Business, as

the Jocks called it,--the 154th Brigade at Gonnehem, and the Divisional

artillery at Amettes.

The units were in the throes of reorganisation under most difficult

circumstances. Some three thousand men had joined as reinforcements, but

few new officers had arrived; moreover, the authorities at the base had

made confusion worse confounded by posting Gordons to Black Watch

battalions, and Seaforths to Argylls, and thereby had considerably tried

the temper of the men and increased the difficulties of their

commanders.

While the Division was resting in this area, there was much speculation

as to whether the enemy's effort had not spent itself in the south, and

whether he was likely to make a similar attempt in this part of the

front, with a view to threatening the Channel ports.

Ultimately the same white directing posts were reported on the enemy's

front as had appeared opposite to the Division just prior to the German

attack on 21st March, and it was then generally felt that a new

offensive in this part of the front could be anticipated with certainty.

At this time arrangements were being made for the relief of the two

Portuguese Divisions in the line, with a view to the frontage held by

them being taken over by the 50th and another Division. This relief was

planned to take place on 10th April.

Meanwhile, certain changes had taken place in the Division. General

Pelham Burn, whose health for the last year had been very indifferent,

was compelled to give up command of the 152nd Brigade. It is difficult

to estimate the loss which not only his brigade but the whole Division

sustained at his departure.

Throughout his period of command he had displayed a knowledge of minor

tactics and trench craft which had been invaluable both to his own

battalions and to the infantry as a whole.

To the satisfaction of all, General Burn was succeeded by the G.S.O. I,

Lieut.-Colonel J. K. Dick-Cunynghame, C.M.G., D.S.O. There was probably

no officer into whose hands the traditions of the 152nd Brigade could

have been better entrusted. Moreover, this appointment not only secured

to Colonel Dick-Cunynghame his promotion, but also secured for the

Division a continuance of his services--unfortunately, however, for but

a few days.

Colonel Dick-Cunynghame was succeeded as G.S.O. 1 by Colonel A. Symons,

C.M.G., 13th Hussars, who had recently been employed at the War Office,

and later on the staff of the IVth Corps.

The country in which the Division was billeted and in which it was to

become engaged was typical of Flanders--low-lying, studded with hamlets,

farms, and orchards, and intersected by dykes, ditches, and fences. In

some places it was marshy, and nowhere could trenches be dug to a depth

of more than three feet without water being reached.

At 4.5 A.M. on 9th April an intense bombardment broke out on the front

of the Portuguese Divisions in the line about Richebourg l'Avoue, Neuve

Chapelle, Fauquissart. At 10 A.M. information was received that the

Portuguese had broken.

At 6.30 A.M. the 152nd Brigade, in accordance with instructions issued

by the corps, had ordered its battalions to move to positions of

reserve--the 5th Seaforth Highlanders to Huit Maisons, the 6th Seaforth

Highlanders to Lacouture, the 6th Gordon Highlanders being in reserve at

Zelobas and La Croix Marmuse.

At 11.30 A.M. the 152nd Brigade had established its headquarters near La

Croix Marmuse, where its battalions were waiting for guides from the

units which they were to relieve in Huit Maisons and Lacouture--the

Corps Cyclists and King Edward's Horse.

The 152nd Brigade was at this time directly under the orders of the XIth

Corps.

As soon as definite information from the front was received, and it

became evident that the German attack was making considerable progress,

the 154th Brigade was ordered into the 55th Division area east of the

Aire-La Bassée Canal, the Divisional artillery to Gonnehem, and the

153rd Brigade to the Le Cornet Malo-Pacaut area. The 51st Division

Machine Gun Battalion was also ordered to send one company to join each

of the three brigades.

At this time the information concerning the progress of the battle was

extremely vague. It was, however, appreciated that the Portuguese had

been overwhelmed, and could no longer be considered a fighting force,

and that the only troops opposing the Germans in front of the Division

were King Edward's Horse and the Corps Cyclists. The 50th Division were

known to be on a line east of the river Lawe from Bout de Ville

northwards.

At 12.45 P.M. the 5th and 6th Seaforth Highlanders began their advance,

guided by troops of King Edward's Horse. It was the intention of the

officer commanding 6th Seaforth Highlanders to place two companies in

Lacouture. The leading company had, however, only reached the

foot-bridge east of the Vert Lannot (subsequently called Boundary

Bridge) when it came under hostile rifle and machine-gun fire. In spite

of the brisk fire which was engaging them, an attempt was made to

continue the advance, but without success. Two companies were therefore

placed in position along the western bank of the river Lawe, from 200

yards south of Boundary Bridge up to the southern bridge at Vieille

Chapelle: one was disposed on the western outskirts of that village; one

in reserve at Les Lobes. An attempt to blow up Boundary Bridge

unfortunately ended only in its partial destruction.

On the front of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, King Edward's Horse were

offering a stubborn resistance against great pressure on a line from a

point some 300 yards north of Lacouture to just south of Bout de Ville.

The situation was, however, desperate. Both flanks had been turned, the

enemy having occupied both Lacouture and Bout de Ville. The cavalry

nevertheless held on in their isolated position, and maintained

themselves with the greatest gallantry.

At this time Le Marais post was held by troops of the 50th Division. Two

companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders were therefore ordered to hold

the west bank of the river Lawe, while the remaining two companies

crossed the river. They reached Huit Maisons, two platoons of the

leading company reinforcing the cavalry garrison there, while two

platoons lay in support of them. The remaining company was diverted so

as to form a flank facing north-east along the road to Fosse. At this

period the shelling was intense, being particularly violent on Fosse

village and on both banks of the Lawe.

Some desperate fighting ensued, almost immediately after the troops were

in position. King Edward's Horse had already been heavily engaged, and

had defeated repeated attempts to envelop their left flank. The arrival

of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders was most timely, and considerably

relieved the pressure, the garrison being able to retain its hold on

Huit Maisons for another three hours. In fact, it was not until Le

Marais post had fallen, and the enemy appeared to be surrounding Huit

Maisons, that the garrison fell back in face of heavy enfilade

machine-gun fire and bombing. These troops withdrew to Fosse post,

which, with the assistance of the battalion headquarters of the 5th

Seaforth Highlanders, they occupied on three sides.

While this action was in progress "A" Company of the 8th Gordon

Highlanders, under the command of Captain J. E. Christie, was sent to

Vieille Chapelle to reinforce the garrison there of King Edward's Horse

under Lieutenant Stein. This company placed one platoon just west of

the bridge across the Lawe, the remainder taking up defensive positions

in Vieille Chapelle, in spite of a terrific bombardment to which the

village was being subjected.

The remaining three companies of the 6th Gordon Highlanders deployed on

a line west of the Lawe due north of La Tombe Willot.

Meanwhile on the left the 153rd Brigade had also been ordered forward.

The roads were, however, so congested with Portuguese troops and

refugees moving westwards that it was not until as late as 5.45 P.M.

that the battalions could move off from Pacaut. At that hour the 7th

Gordon Highlanders, with four machine-guns, moved forward to take up a

line east of the river Lawe north of the village of Fosse. These

battalions, however, during their advance, learnt from troops of the

50th Division whom they met that there was considerable uncertainty as

to the situation. Moreover, a change in dispositions became necessary,

as the Divisional front was suddenly extended so as to include the whole

of Lestrem. As a result, practically none of the 153rd Infantry Brigade

were able to cross the river, except for one platoon of the 7th Gordon

Highlanders, which formed a bridgehead protecting the bridge just south

of the Lestrem Loop.

The 7th Gordon Highlanders and the 6th Black Watch ultimately took up a

position on the west bank of the Lawe from just north of Fosse to

Lestrem inclusive, the 7th Gordon Highlanders being on the right.

On the right of the Division the 154th Brigade, until the morning of the

10th, was under orders of the 55th Division, the 4th Seaforth

Highlanders remaining with the 166th Brigade until 13th April.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had moved off at 11.40 A.M. on

the 9th, and after various vicissitudes and alterations of plans, due to

rapidly changing circumstances, were finally disposed with the 7th

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders along the west bank of the Lawe from

Pont Tournant inclusive to Boundary Bridge. The 4th Gordon Highlanders

remained in reserve about Les Caudrons.

At 7 P.M. the Divisional artillery came into action between the villages

of Paradis and La Croix Marmuse.

Thus at nightfall the Division was in position in the same order of

battle as in the operations about Bapaume: 154th Brigade on the right,

152nd Brigade in the centre, and 153rd Brigade on the left. On the

flanks touch was maintained on the right with the 55th Division, who

were still in their original front line, but had been compelled to form

a defensive flank to connect up with the river Lawe; on the left with

the 50th Division, who were being heavily engaged about Estaires.

The 51st Division was entirely west of the Lawe, except for the 6th

Gordon Highlanders at Vieille Chapelle, the 5th Seaforth Highlanders at

Fosse, and the one platoon of the 7th Gordon Highlanders south of the

Lestrem Loop.

By dawn on 10th April the whole Division, less the 4th Seaforth

Highlanders, had reverted to the command of General Carter-Campbell. No

changes had been made in dispositions during the night except that half

the reserve company of the Divisional machine-gun battalion had been

sent forward to reinforce the 153rd Brigade front, while two companies

of the 39th Machine Gun Battalion, due to arrive at Calonne during the

day, were placed at the disposal of the Division.

Throughout the day the 152nd Brigade experienced the most sanguinary

fighting. The enemy during the night had, in a brilliant enterprise,

managed to dribble across Boundary Bridge and push machine-guns and

riflemen into the farms just west of it. These he covered by other

machine-guns on the eastern bank of the Lawe. From the farms and

out-buildings he inflicted numerous casualties to the 6th Seaforth

Highlanders by close-range machine-gun fire. When daylight came, he

attempted to reinforce them by pushing parties across the bridge, over

which only one man could advance at a time. The Seaforths put a stop to

this manœuvre by rifle and Lewis-gun fire, and many Germans shot on the

bridge were drowned in the river. A counter-attack was launched against

the farms by two platoons of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, supported by

covering fire from the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, but it

broke down under the intense volume of machine-gun fire directed against

it.

At 3 P.M. a more deliberately prepared counter-attack was delivered by

one company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders sent forward for the purpose.

Three of its platoons attacked and successfully occupied the northern of

the two farms. The troops were, however, held up in the open in front of

the second farm. In this position they were in their turn attacked by

some fifty of the enemy. The Gordons held their ground until dusk, when

fifteen men out of an original total of ninety-seven rejoined the

remaining platoon of their company.

Meanwhile the 6th Gordon Highlanders and King Edward's Horse in Vieille

Chapelle, resisting with the utmost vigour, were repeatedly attacked,

but gave no ground. A Lewis-gun team on the roof of a cottage remained

in action and inflicted many casualties on the enemy, in spite of the

building being several times hit by shells.

Throughout the whole day, while the enemy's grip was continuously

tightening on them, this company and the cavalry defeated every attempt

made by the enemy to drive them in. On the night of the 10th

communication between battalion headquarters and Vieille Chapelle was no

longer possible. Captain Christie therefore decided to destroy the

bridges. An R.E. officer and one sapper were available to carry out the

work; but the explosives, for a reason which has never been explained,

had been dumped half a mile west of the village.

A party of the 6th Gordon Highlanders, however, made their way under

heavy fire to the dump, and successfully carried the charges back to the

village. The main bridge was blown up the same night, but the fire

directed against the other bridges was so accurate that they had to be

left intact.

On the left attempts were also made to blow up the bridges in the

Lestrem Loop; but these were only partially successful, and none of the

bridges were totally destroyed. At 8 A.M. the enemy, being admirably led

by his officers, managed to rush the crossings at the Lock de la Rault

and at Pont Riqueul, a subaltern officer being mentioned by name in the

German official communiqué for the gallantry and initiative displayed by

him in this enterprise. The defenders of the bridges were then driven

back, and became absorbed in the line, held as a chord line to the

Lestrem Loop, along the Lestrem-Fosse road.

About 10.30 A.M. the enemy also crossed the Lestrem Bridge and entered

the village. He was, however, counter-attacked by the 6th D.C.L.I. of

the 50th Division and driven back across the river, the bridge remaining

in the hands of neither side.

Throughout the afternoon the enemy made repeated attempts to break

through the chord line; but the 6th Black Watch, with ten Lewis guns,

and the 7th Gordon Highlanders, with eight machine-guns, broke up every

attack, and inflicted great losses on the attackers.

During these operations, 2nd Lieutenant R. Scott, 256th Brigade, B.F.A.

(since killed in action), observed a party of the enemy digging-in close

to the river bank. He at once sent a runner back to his battery to ask

for a single gun to be sent forward. He then selected a position for it,

and made all arrangements for opening fire on its arrival. The gun came

into action at 5.30 P.M., and fired ninety-four highly-effective rounds

at close range, causing many casualties, and remaining in action for

three hours.

This and many other cases in which a bold use was made of the artillery

considerably strengthened the infantry's powers of resistance.

During the night of the 10th orders were received for the Division to

extend its front to a point 400 yards north of Lestrem, two companies of

the 7th Black Watch being sent forward to take over the additional

frontages from the 50th Division. Meanwhile the 61st Division was moving

forward in rear of the 50th and 51st, to ensure that no gap should exist

between their flanks. Two battalions of the 61st Division, the 2/6

Warwicks and the 1/5 D.C.L.I., were to come under orders of the 51st

Division on their arrival.

For some time before nightfall the enemy had been observed collecting,

obviously for a renewal of the attack; the artillery had in consequence

been harassing all the approaches to the river Lawe from the east.

Shortly after dark a heavy attack was launched from the village of Fosse

northwards. At Fosse post the enemy managed, after a short struggle, to

drive in the north flank, the remainder of the garrison being compelled

to fight their way back to the Fosse Bridge. They, however, resisted the

enemy's attempt to advance with such vigour that they were able to

withdraw in good order, cross the bridge, and successfully destroy it

after they had crossed.

In the chord line Lestrem post was also rushed soon after the opening of

the attack. The enemy, having thus gained a lodgment in the chord line,

developed a strong series of attacks northwards and southwards. In each

case he met with some success; to the north the chord line was cleared

as far as the northern outskirts of Lestrem, but here he was brought to

a standstill by the 7th Black Watch. To the south he reached the village

of Fosse, where a defensive flank formed by the 7th Gordon Highlanders

held its ground, and stopped his further advance until midnight.

The defenders of this flank, after a gallant resistance in the dark for

over three hours, were finally driven back on to a party of about 150 of

King Edward's Horse and the 5th Seaforth Highlanders. Here the enemy was

again checked, the troops maintaining themselves against several attacks

until the pressure became too much for them, and they were driven back

on to the Zelobes-Croix Marmuse road.

At this stage the Division still formed a continuous line of resistance.

The 154th Brigade, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, and the company of the

6th Gordon Highlanders at Vieille Chapelle, remained as they had been at

check. The remainder of the 6th Gordon Highlanders had been disposed in

and about Zelobes, three companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders in

and about Croix Marmuse, one company of the 8th Royal Scots and the 7th

Gordon Highlanders between Croix Marmuse and L'Epinette, the 6th and 7th

Black Watch between L'Epinette and the Divisional northern boundary. In

rear of this line 500 reinforcements of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders

were at Les Croquaux; the 4th Gordon Highlanders at La Tombe Willot; one

company of the 8th Royal Scots at Paradis and one at Pacaut; the 39th

Machine Gun Battalion with a half company at Paradis, one and a half

companies at Pacaut, and two companies at Calonne sur Lys; the 6th

Warwicks at Pacaut; and two companies 5th D.C.L.I. at La Pierre au

Beurre.

It must, however, be appreciated that though there was a continuous line

of resistance opposed to the enemy, the units forming it were in many

cases in a state of great disorganisation. They had gone into action

considerably deficient of officers, and the continuous fighting in the

dark had resulted in not only platoons and companies, but also in men of

different battalions, becoming intermingled. Control was therefore

becoming increasingly difficult to exercise.

In this position, and before anything in the nature of reorganisation

could be completed, a further attack broke out at dawn on the 11th

throughout the greater part of the Divisional front.

The enemy pursued his attack along the front with sufficient vigour to

find out any weak spots in the defences, with the result that he had

soon penetrated to the road between L'Epinette and Croix Marmuse. From

this point, as was his usual custom, he made every effort to extend his

gains to the north and to the south. After considerable fighting, in

which the enemy supported these flank attacks with heavy frontal

attacks, our troops were forced back on to the Zelobes-Paradis road. The

ground was, however, only given up after desperate fighting, in which

the enemy was compelled to pay heavily for his successes. The Jocks

were, in fact, in spite of their disorganisation, offering a gallant and

stubborn resistance in circumstances in which control was almost

entirely dependent on the initiative and leadership of N.C.O.'s.

Owing to the progress made by the enemy, it became evident soon after

dawn that the positions in which the field batteries were in action

would soon become untenable. Orders were therefore given for both

brigades to withdraw to positions previously reconnoitred, 255th Brigade

to near the eastern edge of Pacaut Wood, and the 256th Brigade to near

Le Cornet Malo. To effect this retirement gun-fire was opened

immediately on the advancing enemy, while batteries withdrew singly from

both brigades to their new positions, and at once came into action. This

covering fire, being mostly over open sights, was highly effective; and

though isolated portions of the enemy closed to within 600 yards of some

of the batteries and opened fire on them with machine-guns, their main

line was checked about 500-600 yards west of the Zelobes-L'Epinette

road. Two companies of the 8th Royal Scots established themselves just

short of this line, and assisted materially not only in covering the

withdrawal of the guns, but also in salving the ammunition of both

brigades, very few unexpended rounds being left on the ground.

At about 6.45 A.M. the headquarters of 152nd and 153rd Brigades moved

back to the cottages facing one another half-way between Le Cornet Malo

and Riez-du-Vinage. At this time Lieut.-Colonel L. M. Dyson, D.S.O.,

commanding the 256th Brigade, R.P.A., was ordered to take over command

of the 153rd Infantry Brigade from Brigadier-General A. T. Beckwith,

C.M.G. D.S.O. The latter had been gassed during the operations in

March, and was suffering considerably from the effects. He, however,

gallantly continued to carry out his duties until his condition became

so serious that he had to be admitted to hospital.

Meanwhile at Vieille Chapelle a company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders

and King Edward's Horse were offering a resistance which should become

historical. The garrison had denied the enemy passage over the river for

two days and two nights, but only by dint of continuous heavy fighting.

They were now completely isolated, the enemy's troops and guns being

pushed across the river in large numbers both north and south of them. A

German battery of field-guns was in action 600 yards from them to the

west. At 7.45 A.M. a pigeon message was received from Captain J. B.

Christie, stating that his situation was "almost unbearable." Christie,

however, decided with his men that, in view of their orders, surrender

was out of the question, and they resolved to make a desperate effort to

extricate themselves.

Their best chance seemed to be to make a sortie towards their right,

where the enemy did not appear to be in so great strength as he was

elsewhere. Machine-guns were posted to cover the withdrawal while the

remnants of the garrison emerged on the opposite side of the village.

Here they were met by a storm of close-range machine-gun and rifle

bullets. Captain Christie was at once hit by a bullet in the right knee,

but he managed to rejoin the survivors of his party by crawling to the

farmhouse, in which the survivors had been compelled to shelter. Six men

in succession advanced to knock out a machine-gun which was pinning

them to the farm, each in his turn being shot dead. Captain Christie,

unable to walk owing to his wound, next crawled forward himself to

attempt to put the gun out of action. He was, however, immediately hit

again, his right arm being shattered by a bullet. The enemy then entered

Vieille Chapelle and captured the remnants of the garrison, a handful of

wounded men.

As Lieut.-Colonel Lionel James, commanding the King Edward's Horse,

wrote in his report: "It is impossible to speak temperately of Captain

J. R. Christie, 6th Gordon Highlanders, and his officers, and of

Lieutenants Stein, Pinckney, and Laurenson of King Edward's Horse."

At 5.15 P.M. on 9th April Lieutenant Pinckney, King Edward's Horse, left

Vieille Chapelle with a message to Colonel James, stating that the

situation was desperate. This gallant officer made his way back again

into Vieille Chapelle, with instructions that the bridgehead was to be

held to the end. Thirty-six hours later, at 8 A.M. on 11th April, the

bridgehead was still held.

Captain Christie fortunately recovered from his wounds in the hands of

the Germans, and for his gallant leadership and devotion to duty was

awarded the D.S.O.

During the action at Vieille Chapelle the enemy was struggling to extend

his hold on the Lestrem-Fosse-Locon road southwards. In this attempt

heavy casualties were inflicted on him. On one occasion a large body of

Germans marching in close order along the road was shattered by the

artillery, while again and again machine-guns and Lewis guns took full

advantage of splendid targets offered to them as the enemy's troops

advanced to the attack.

Gradually, however, in spite of his losses, he forced a way between

Zelobes and Vieille Chapelle. Here he isolated and cut off two platoons

of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders guarding the western end of the Vieille

Chapelle bridge, who continued to resist while completely surrounded in

an attempt to force an exit from Vieille Chapelle for the 6th Gordon

Highlanders and King Edward's Horse inside the village.

Having effected a lodgment between Vieille Chapelle and Zelobes, the

enemy finally, after having suffered numerous casualties at the hands of

the 6th Gordon Highlanders, forced his way into Zelobes, throwing the

garrison back on Les Lobes.

As a result of these operations, the defending troops had become still

more disorganised; but though units were considerably intermingled, and

the number of officers and N.C.O.'s still surviving had further

diminished, the men remained disposed in such a manner that the Division

continued to maintain an uninterrupted line of resistance.

At noon (11th April) the line was held as follows: from the Canal de la

Lawe on the Divisional right boundary to north of Le Vert Lannot lay

three companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, supported

by the fourth company with a company of the 4th Gordon Highlanders. The

line was then continued towards the north-east corner of La Tombe Willot

by two companies of the 4th Gordons and 200 reinforcements of the 4th

Seaforth Highlanders. The line then curved round to the north of La

Tombe Willot, and was held for a distance of 600 yards by elements of

the 5th and 6th Seaforth Highlanders, and of the 6th Gordon Highlanders,

disposed in depth. The remainder of the reinforcements of the 4th

Seaforth Highlanders held the line along the Le Cornet Malo-Croix

Marmuse road. Two companies of the 8th Royal Scots then linked up the

4th Seaforth reinforcements to the 2/6 Warwicks, who were holding the

line from the church at Paradis to a point 300 yards south of Le

Bouzateux farm, held by elements of the 6th and 7th Black Watch and 7th

Gordon Highlanders. On their left came the 5th D.C.L.I., holding the

line as far northwards as the railway crossing west of Merville, while

further elements of the 6th and 7th Black Watch and some of the 8th

Royal Scots manned the railway on the left flank of the D.C.L.I. facing

southwards.

The reserves were now reduced to one company of the 39th Machine Gun

Battalion and the 404th Field Company, R.E., about Pacaut Wood, the

remaining three companies of the 39th Machine Gun Battalion being

already in position between Le Cornet Malo and Calonne.

It will thus be seen that though the line, as has been stated, was

continuous, it can only be described as patchwork; and it had become

evident that no orders as regards a properly co-ordinated advance or

retirement, which either the Divisional or brigade commanders might

issue, were likely to be put into operation successfully. All that could

be expected was that each unit would conform to the movement of the

troops on its flanks, the success of this conformation being dependent

on the leadership of the local commanders, who in many cases were junior

officers if not junior N.C.O.'s.

The enemy continued his efforts during the afternoon, with the result

that the line was forced back so as to run through Le Vert Lannot and La

Tombe Willot. On the left, however, the fighting was not so severe,

though the enemy succeeded in occupying the whole of Paradis.

Meanwhile a large number of men of all regiments who had become detached

from their units had during the morning been collected at the

headquarters of the 153rd Brigade. They were, however, entirely without

officers, and almost entirely without N.C.O.'s. Volunteers were

therefore called for from the 256th and 12th Australian Brigades of

field artillery to officer these infantrymen. Of those that came forward

Captain Rickard, M.C., and Lieutenant Seton, M.C., of the 12th

Australians, and 2nd Lieutenants Inkson and Gordon of the 256th Brigade

were selected to reorganise the men and to lead them forward into

action. These four gunner officers, acting as platoon commanders, did

admirable work under very difficult conditions. Having led their

commands forward, they remained in action with them until the 13th inst.

Throughout this period they kept their troops well under control,

particularly during the series of withdrawals in the face of vastly

superior forces in the rearguard action which took place on the 12th

inst. They, indeed, all proved themselves highly capable infantry

leaders.

In the first instance the men were formed into a reserve, and took up a

position in rear of the line Pacaut-Bouzateux Farm, as further

battalions of the 61st Division were now arriving with orders to take

over all ground north of an east and west line through L'Epinette. At

4.30 P.M. the first of these battalions, the 5th Gordon Highlanders,

late of the Highland Division, took up its position along the stream

L'Ancienne Lys, with its left flank in contact with the 50th Division.

The situation now appeared to be improving: an additional reserve had

been improvised; the reinforcing Division had substantially joined up

with the 50th Division on the north; Givenchy on the south still held

out owing to the magnificent resistance of the 55th Division, and the

154th Brigade was maintaining itself on the right flank in the same

gallant and efficient manner as it had done three weeks earlier at

Hermies and Beaumetz. Moreover, another Division, the 3rd, was moving up

to support the 154th Brigade and 55th Division.

In these circumstances General Carter-Campbell decided to make a firmer

line by withdrawing his foremost troops north of Bouzateux Farm on to

the Paradis-Merville road, so as to join up satisfactorily with the line

held by the 5th Gordon Highlanders.

In the course of these operations the fighting had necessitated further

withdrawals by the artillery brigades, the 255th Brigade taking up

positions in Riez-du-Vinage, the 256th Brigade in Carvin, and the

Australians west of the river Clarence in Calonne.

During the night of the 11th-12th a further adjustment in the infantry

took place, the 76th Brigade of the 3rd Division having arrived and

relieved the 154th Brigade up to and including La Tombe Willot, leaving

only a very small portion of the front line held by the 4th Seaforth

reinforcements, under the command of General Buchanan.

The order of battle in the front line was now as follows: the 4th

Seaforth reinforcements extended from La Tombe Willot half-way to

Pacaut, the 2/6 Warwicks and 8th Royal Scots continued the line thence

up to but excluding Bouzateux Farm. Elements of the 153rd Brigade next

held the line along the Pacaut-Merville road just west of Bouzateux

Farm. On the left lay the 5th D.C.L.I., who were in touch with the 5th

Gordon Highlanders on the Ancienne Lys.

At dawn on the 12th a sudden and disastrous collapse occurred. The enemy

launched an attack on the centre of the position, which came in the

nature of a surprise. Patrols of the 2/6 Warwicks were covering the

front, but they did not return with information that the enemy was

advancing, doubtless having been cut off.

[Illustration: MAP XI.--THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE. (THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER

LAWE.) DISPOSITIONS OF 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION, DAWN, 12TH APRIL 1918.]

At 5.15 A.M. it was reported from an artillery O.P. at Pacaut that the

enemy could be seen advancing. At the same time numbers of men were

found falling back about the headquarters of the 2/6 Warwicks on the

west of Pacaut and at the headquarters of the 8th Royal Scots in the

village, the officer commanding and the adjutant of the latter battalion

already having been cut off.

Five minutes after this report had been received from the O.P. in

Pacaut, close-range rifle and machine-gun fire were brought to bear on

Riez-du-Vinage from the east, south, and south-west.

The enemy during this advance had all but surrounded the headquarters of

the 152nd and 153rd Brigades on the eastern outskirts of the village.

Colonel Dyson, Captain Wrathall, the brigade-major, and the remainder of

the staff of the 153rd Brigade managed to extricate themselves and

escape just as the leading German troops were entering the front of the

cottage that had been used as brigade headquarters.

On the opposite side of the road the 152nd Brigade were not so

fortunate, and just as they were preparing to leave the cottage they

were occupying, the Germans closed in on it from all sides.

Brigadier-General J. Dick-Cunynghame, Captains Berney-Fiklin and W.

Drummond, the brigade-major and staff-captain, Lieutenants Cummings and

Simpson, the signal and intelligence officers, and the whole of the

headquarters personnel, with Colonel Fleming commanding the 255th

Brigade, R.F.A., who was acting as artillery liaison officer to the

brigade, fell into the hands of the enemy. They had delayed their

attempt to escape from their headquarters by less than a minute after

the 153rd Brigade, who had made good their escape, only to find the

Germans entering their cottage.

Meanwhile the Divisional artillery was adding possibly the greatest

chapters to its history. Gunners have few opportunities of engaging the

enemy at close quarters, and their work is for the most part of a nature

that precludes them from performing outstanding acts of valour that

attract the public eye. This occasion, on which the enemy broke through

the infantry and with little warning appeared in close proximity to

portions of our gun line, was an exception of which they took full

advantage.

In spite of the complete surprise, "A" and "B" Batteries of the 255th

Brigade in the vicinity of Riez-du-Vinage managed to limber up and

withdraw south-west across the canal, although they suffered severe

casualties amongst their horses from machine-gun fire. "C" and "D"

Batteries of the same brigade could not get their guns away in spite of

many gallant attempts, as the teams were all knocked out by machine-gun

fire; but they remained in action, keeping up a rapid rate of fire to

cover the withdrawal of "A" and "B," and did not leave their guns until

the enemy were almost amongst them. The headquarters of 255th Brigade

just managed to escape with the loss of all its horses.

Farther north the 256th Brigade were in equal danger of falling into the

enemy's hands. The officers of the 153rd Brigade headquarter staff, who

themselves had only recently escaped from the enemy by a hair's-breadth,

collected stragglers and formed a line to protect the withdrawal of the

batteries. The gunners remained in action engaging targets at close

range with direct observation though under rifle and machine-gun fire at

some 500 yards' range. They finally withdrew in succession, the last

battery, "D" 256, only clearing its position when the enemy was 300

yards from it on the left front. Sergeant V. Illidge was partly

responsible for the successful withdrawal of this battery. He cut out

several killed and wounded horses from the different teams, assisted in

their hooking-in, and remained in the position until the last gun had

left.

Lieutenant M'Farlane of the same battery, who was acting as liaison

officer with the 6th Black Watch, was last seen emptying his revolver

into the enemy at close quarters.

The 12th Australian Army Brigade, R.F.A., also found themselves in an

awkward situation, heavy close-range rifle and machine-gun fire suddenly

being opened on them from their left.

The limbers were brought up at the gallop just as the enemy opened on

the position with his artillery, and in spite of the machine-gun and

shell fire, the guns were got safely away through Robecq. The gunners

with a few infantry stragglers provided their own covering parties, and

with their battery Lewis guns checked the enemy's advance until the

positions were successfully evacuated.

"A" and "B" Batteries, 255th Brigade, crossed the canal by the bridge

due south of Riez-du-Vinage, closely followed by the enemy. Majors

Davidson and Jack, the two battery commanders, however, each dropped the

last of their guns within 300 yards of the bridge to cover the

withdrawal of their remaining guns. Of these one gun covered a

foot-bridge and the other a drawbridge.

The Germans were so close on the heels of the artillery that they were

able to rush the drawbridge and establish themselves in a house on the

west side of it. Major Jack, however, brought such effective shell-fire

on to this house that the enemy fled from it and recrossed the canal,

whereupon Major Fairlie, Lieutenant Mackay, and Driver Boyd took up

rifles, occupied the bridgehead, and by their fire forced the enemy to

retire down the road.

In the meantime Major Davidson with his gun was firing on enemy

machine-guns which had been brought up close to the Canal, and by the

accuracy of his fire effectually covered the withdrawal of two heavy

batteries which were coming up out of action under heavy fire.

A description of this action, in which Major Davidson and Major Jack

were mentioned by name, was included in the Commander-in-Chief's

despatches dealing with the battle, Major Davidson being subsequently

awarded a bar to the D.S.O. and Major Jack the D.S.O.

It would be difficult to overestimate the valuable part played by these

two guns and the gallant conduct of all concerned in restoring a

situation at so critical a stage. Undoubtedly had it not been for the

prompt action of Davidson and Jack, the enemy would have succeeded in

establishing himself on the southern bank of the La Bassée Canal.

The enemy, opening fanwise from his area of penetration, had been

rapidly pressing his attack north, west, and southwards. Numerous

attempts were made to improvise lines of defence, but in the absence of

officers these all broke down until the infantry had withdrawn across

the Clarence river, where they linked up with the 5th D.C.L.I. in front

of Calonne. The line was then continued northwards along the Turbeaute

and Ancienne Lys rivers.

Southwards, as has already been described, the enemy reached the

northern bank of the La Bassée Canal.

The 154th Brigade farther eastwards had, however, formed a defensive

flank, which prevented the enemy from extending his gains in this

quarter. The 4th Seaforth reinforcements throughout these operations had

held their ground about La Tombe Willot, the remnants of the 152nd

Brigade were disposed facing north about La Vertbois Farm, extending

from La Tombe Willot almost to Pacaut Wood. Here they joined part of the

8th Royal Scots and 404th Field Company in Pacaut Wood facing north.

Meanwhile patrols of the 1st Gordon Highlanders, 3rd Division, were

entering Pacaut Wood from the south.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had been relieved and

were just withdrawing from the line, took up the lines of the La Bassée

Canal from Pacaut Wood to Robecq.

After the infantry had all been withdrawn behind some natural obstacle

such as the canal or the streams on the left, in spite of the

disorganisation that had resulted from the enemy's successful surprise

and the depth of his advance, the line began to harden again.

The 154th Brigade were adequately safeguarding the canal, and were in

touch with the 55th Division.

One battalion of the 61st Division was already moving forward to occupy

the line of the Clarence river from the canal at Robecq to Carvin. This

section of the line had at one time been seriously threatened, as the

enemy had reached the outskirts of Robecq, thus somewhat precipitating

the departure of Divisional headquarters to Busnes. He had, however,

withdrawn, and Robecq was occupied by elements of the 189th Brigade,

61st Division, the 400th Field Company, R.E., and elements of the 404th

Field Company, R.E., who were disposed on an extended front covering the

eastern approaches to the village.

North of Carvin the 61st Division had one battalion already in position

on a line running from that village to Baquerolles Farm, and a second

battalion continuing the line towards Calonne.

North of Calonne remnants of the 5th D.C.L.I. and elements of the 153rd

Brigade had withdrawn beyond the Lys canal, and were engaged during the

remainder of the day in the fighting about Merville.

By 1 P.M. the three brigades of artillery were all established in new

positions: the 256th Brigade on the Robecq-St Venant road, the 255th

Brigade at L'Ecleme, and the 12th Australian Brigade at La Pierrière.

While in these positions the artillery drew its ammunition from an army

ammunition dump, in spite of the fact that one end of it had been set on

fire and was blazing furiously.

It will thus be seen that General Carter-Campbell had been able to

restore his battle line with the help of these additional battalions

from the 61st Division in such a manner that the enemy was not likely to

make further serious progress, at any rate until he could move a

considerable number of his guns forward. Thus valuable time was secured

in which troops could be reorganised, and which enabled other battalions

of the 61st Division to arrive on the scene.

The line from La Tombe Willot to Pacaut was not seriously threatened

during the morning, but throughout the afternoon the pressure against it

steadily increased.

The 4th Seaforth reinforcements north of the Vertbois Farm were well in

advance of the remainder of this line; the 4th Gordon Highlanders, who

had been concentrated on the south side of the canal, were therefore

ordered to join up the left flank of the Seaforth reinforcements with

the canal by forming a line through Pacaut Wood.

While the 4th Gordon Highlanders were moving forward to carry out these

orders, information was received that the 3rd Division, to shorten their

frontage, were falling back on to the line Locon-La Bassée Canal, and

that all troops were to conform to this movement.

This withdrawal was therefore begun; but the 4th Seaforth

reinforcements, under the command of Major Jobson, either never received

these orders or received them too late, and were left in the air by the

troops on their flanks. The enemy, discovering their position, pressed

round them on either flank, and Major Jobson realised that their only

hope of escape was to cut their way out. In this attempt Major Jobson

was wounded, and with the remainder of his party, being completely

surrounded, was captured.

Those Seaforth reinforcements, who had not even joined their battalion,

but had been employed as a separate unit, with four officers to weld it

into shape, had stubbornly fought for many hours, and had maintained

themselves on their ground in spite of strong attempts made by the

enemy to drive them in. They remained fighting gamely to the end in an

isolated position, cut off from all hopes of relief. Many of them were

only boys who had just arrived in France for the first time, and the

steadiness with which they conducted themselves in their first and last

fight was worthy of the highest praise.

The remainder of the line gradually withdrew, but in good order, and it

was not until 8.40 P.M. that the 4th Gordon Highlanders, who had moved

forward to the vicinity of Le Cornet Malo and had fallen back fighting

through Pacaut Wood, crossed with elements of the 152nd Infantry Brigade

to the south side of the canal.

Meanwhile the defence of the La Bassée Canal was handed over to the Ist

Corps, the 51st Division being ordered to cover the junction between the

XIth and Ist Corps. A composite brigade was therefore formed under the

command of Lieut.-Colonel A. Fleming, D.S.O., the C.R.E., known as

Fleming's Force, which took up a line from the bridge over the canal

south of Robecq, east of Robecq, to the hamlet of Les Amusoires.

Fleming's Force, as it took over this line, was composed of the

following:--

Echelons B (transport men, quartermasters' staffs, bands,

&c.) and further reinforcements of the 154th Brigade.

One hundred officers and men, details of the 152nd Brigade.

Two hundred officers and men, details of the 153rd Brigade.

Nos. 1 and 2, special companies, R.E., 300 strong (gas

projector companies).

Two companies, 11th Canadian Railway Construction Battalion,

250 strong.

One company, 51st Division M.G. Company.

One company, 39th Division M.G. Company.

Some further elements of the 152nd Brigade were collected in reserve at

Hollanderie.

The 154th Brigade was ordered to withdraw to Busnes as soon as it was

relieved by the 3rd Division.

By 3 A.M. on the 13th Colonel Fleming had organised his force into two

sectors, the right being commanded by Major Campbell of the 6th Black

Watch, and the left by Major Stein, 4th Gordon Highlanders.

The night of the 13th passed quietly, and was employed by Colonel

Fleming in advancing his line by 700 yards and in reorganising his

force. The railway companies and some elements of the Berkshire

Regiment, who had become attached to the Division, were withdrawn. Their

place in the line was taken by the 7th Gordon Highlanders, who had by

this time been collected and reorganised. The remnants of the 152nd and

153rd Brigades were also collected and formed into a composite battalion

under Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Scott, D.S.O., commanding the 5th Seaforth

Highlanders.

On 14th April orders were issued for the 154th Brigade to relieve

Fleming's Force during the coming evening. Shortly before this relief

took place the 4th Division, which had recently arrived in the area,

attacked northwards from the canal bank and established themselves on a

line from the canal through Riez-du-Vinage to Carvin. Thus when at 2

A.M. the relief of Fleming's Force was completed, the actual firing line

was for the most part well to the east of the line actually held by the

154th Brigade.

The situation then remained unchanged until the night of 23-24th April,

when the 154th Brigade was withdrawn.

Throughout this engagement the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had been

attached to the 55th Division, and had taken part in the obstinate and

successful defence of the defensive flank which that Division had formed

from Givenchy to Le Touret.

On the morning of the 9th April the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had been in

billets at the Ferme du Roi near Bethune, in close proximity to the 55th

Divisional front. In consequence, when the sudden break through the

Portuguese lines occurred, they were placed under the orders of the

166th Infantry Brigade under the command of General Kentish.

Their first move was to the banks of the Canal de Lawe. Later, during

the same day, it was discovered that a gap existed in the line held by

the 166th Infantry Brigade, north of Le Touret. The battalion was

therefore moved forward under cover of darkness and disposed so as to

fill this gap, their headquarters being established at Les Faucons.

During the day (10th April) the enemy did not attack in force, but he

made several local attempts to penetrate the line held by the 4th

Seaforth Highlanders. On each occasion he was repulsed, and the position

was maintained intact throughout.

On 11th April, about 11 A.M., the German attacked in force. The 4th

Seaforth Highlanders resisted all his attempts to drive back their line.

Later in the day, the battalion on their left was driven in. The

Seaforths, however, formed a defensive flank, and in spite of numerous

attempts made by the enemy to roll up their line, maintained themselves

in their position and inflicted heavy losses on him. Subsequently the

Northumberland Fusiliers, on the left of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders,

delivered a counter-attack, which successfully restored the situation.

The Seaforths assisted this attack by giving covering fire from the

right flank, and inflicted serious losses on the enemy as he fell back

in front of the Northumberland Fusiliers.

On the night of the 11th the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were relieved by

the 1st Division, and took up a reserve position in rear of the stream

south-west of Les Faucons. Here in the course of the fighting on 12th

April they were attacked about 5 P.M., the enemy everywhere being

completely repulsed. On the 13th they were relieved and moved back to

billets at Oblingham.

The 4th Seaforth Highlanders had conducted themselves magnificently.

They had been in action for five days, had been repeatedly attacked, but

had not yielded a yard of ground to the enemy. General Kentish, in a

telegram to the officer commanding, expressed his great appreciation of

the splendid resistance offered by the battalion when fighting under his

command. General Jeudwine, commanding the 55th Division, also wired:

"Please accept from all ranks 55th Division our hearty thanks for

the willing co-operation of the 4th Seaforths. Their help and plucky

fighting have been an invaluable aid to maintaining our line through a

long period of strain."

The battle of the Lys was perhaps the most trying ordeal through which

the Highland Division passed in the whole course of its service in

France and Flanders.

It had just emerged from the operations round Bapaume, in which numbers

of officers and irreplaceable N.C.O.'s had become casualties. It had

received large numbers of reinforcements, mostly boys of eighteen and a

half and nineteen years of age, with no previous experience of war.

With its units incomplete in their organisation and under-officered, the

Division moved forward to stem the tide after the Portuguese had been

driven from their trenches. Information as regards the progress of the

enemy's advance was scanty, so that he was encountered in unexpected

places, with the result that in the initial stages of the attack a solid

front was not opposed to the German advance until the enemy had reached

the line of the river Lawe.

To increase the difficulties attending these operations, not only were

the roads in the early stages of the fight so congested with the

retiring Portuguese that forward movement, particularly for vehicles,

became at times absolutely impracticable, but also the whole area was

covered with civilians evacuating their homes, constantly under

shell-fire, and at times under machine-gun fire. Indeed, the advance of

the Germans had been so rapid, and the penetration made by them so deep,

that in many cases fighting took place in farms and cottages still

occupied by old men, women, and children. The sufferings of these poor

people were deplorable; many were killed and wounded, as were also their

beasts; others became involved in gas-shelling, and with no knowledge of

anti-gas defence, were overcome by the poisonous fumes. Of the

survivors, some fled from their houses as they stood, while others

packed their household effects, surmounted by the inevitable

box-mattress, on their waggons, and driving their beasts before them,

congested every road and track in the area. Others, again, particularly

the more elderly, overcome by the suddenness of the arrival of the

German infantry, were stupefied, and could not be persuaded to take any

action beyond sitting in their houses in a helpless state of collapse.

Later the capture of a complete brigade headquarters, in the course of a

prolonged rearguard action, was itself sufficient to break down the

organisation. The loss sustained by the Division in this unfortunate

incident was a grave one. No better successor to General Pelham Burn

could have been selected than General Dick-Cunynghame. That he should

have fallen into the hands of the enemy within a few days of having

taken over command was a piece of cruel ill-fortune, felt as acutely by

the brigade itself as by its commander. Moreover, in Captains

Berney-Fiklin and Drummond, two most reliable staff officers had been

lost to the Division; the latter was the embodiment of efficiency as a

staff captain, and had held every rank in the British army from private

soldier to captain.

In this battle the part played by the 55th Division on the right of the

51st was a memorable one. The Division, after all the troops on its left

had given, formed a defensive flank and brought the German advance to a

complete standstill, in spite of many violent attacks. The 51st was only

able finally to hold up the German advance by the fact that its right

was always thus secured.

On completion of the relief the 154th Brigade moved back to join the

Division, which was resting in the Norrent-Fontes area.

On 16th April, General Sir H. S. Home, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., commanding

the First Army, sent the following message to General Carter-Campbell:

"I must write you a line to tell you how highly I appreciate the

splendid fight that you and the 51st (Highland) Division have put up,

not only against very superior numbers, but under particularly trying

circumstances. You have done wonders. I am proud to be a Scotsman

at any time, but more than ever now. Tell all ranks I know how well

the Division has done, and what splendid fighting qualities and

determination they have displayed. It is this determination to 'stick

it out' that makes all the difference, and will win this war."

General Harper wired his congratulations to the Division on its recent

splendid fighting, and also General Lukin, commanding the 64th

(Highland) Division.

The results of the battle of the Lys were far-reaching. The decision of

the German Higher Command to exploit to the full the Portuguese debacle

resulted in the using up of nearly the whole German reserve, and

undoubtedly led towards their final collapse.

The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918 · 第 15 / 19 章