THE BATTLE OF ARRAS (_Contd._)--ROEUX AND THE
CHEMICAL WORKS.
On the night of 15-16th April the Division relieved the 9th Division on
the battle front east of Fampoux, with its right resting on the river
Scarpe.
The reserve brigade was quartered in Arras, this being the first
occasion on which any of the Division had occupied billets in that town.
During the next six weeks the Jocks were continually moving into Arras
for short periods of rest, and they became much attached to it.
By a curious coincidence all three Scottish Divisions, the 51st, the
9th, and the 15th, were engaged in operations close to Arras, as well as
many Scottish battalions from other Divisions, such as the 3rd and 34th.
Arras, therefore, became a great social centre. Though considerably
damaged, it had many good billets and excellent cellars and caves for
use in emergency. The whole town was, however, in the early days of
April, in a most insanitary and disgusting condition. Accumulated heaps
of months-old refuse and garbage lay everywhere in the courtyards and
gardens. In course of time, however, the town was cleaned up by the
troops, who would otherwise have been refreshing themselves for their
next fight, and became most comfortable.
One felt then and often how unfortunate it was that the infantryman had
so frequently to be employed on tasks menial to a fighting man, such as
road sweeping, scavenging, or unloading coal trains, when he should have
been either resting himself or perfecting himself in the profession of
arms. Circumstances, however, compelled these burdens to be thrust on
the fighting units. In this connection one remembers a cavalryman, up
to his hocks in mud, sweeping the streets of Acheux one November
morning, who, on being asked to what unit he belonged, replied
feelingly, "We used to be blinkin' Hussars." But this is a digression.
The trench system taken over was one which will for ever remain fresh in
the memory of all who fought there. Its chief characteristics were
numerous defiles, which daily had to be traversed, and which were more
or less permanently bombarded. These defiles consisted first of the
bridges over the river Scarpe, which had to be crossed by all whose
business took them into the right sector, and which were within range of
machine-guns and rifles. There was also the straight embankment of the
Arras-Douai railway, down which the Germans looked from its highest
point. This embankment was continually bombarded. There was the road
from Athies to Fampoux, and Fampoux itself, and the road from Feuchy to
Fampoux, which were shelled almost every hour of the day.
Further, there was the Hyderabad Redoubt, which was a veritable cockshy.
This redoubt was an old German headquarters north-west of Fampoux,
perched on the crest of an upland. It was shelled so heavily that
approach was seldom comfortable; while, having once entered, to make a
graceful exit was equally rare.
Lastly, there were the few valleys which afforded shelter for the guns,
which were treated to special and intense bombardments of their own
several times a day, an abundance of gas being used against them.
The main characteristic of this period was a continual and savage
bombardment of the British infantry by the German artillery. To the
infantryman this is a most trying and aggravating form of warfare, as
though his own guns may be supporting him by giving the German infantry
similar treatment, he has no adequate means of ventilating his own
feelings towards the enemy, and can but passively endure the
bombardment.
The troops in the front line on the right had their backs to the river
Scarpe, flowing south-east, only a few hundred yards in rear of them.
This river is in itself only some thirty feet in breadth, but flows in
the main through swampy marshlands. In advance of the foremost trenches
lay the village of Roeux, masked on its western edge by a hanging wood
which sloped down towards the river. North-west of Roeux was a small but
conspicuous copse standing on high ground, called for some obscure
reason Mount Pleasant. Due north of Roeux lay the now famous chemical
works--a large factory surrounded by numerous buildings that had been
used as workmen's dwellings, offices, &c.
Diagonally across the left of the position ran the Arras-Douai railway,
passing through a deep cutting on the summit of a high rise about a
thousand yards in rear of the chemical works. This rise was known as
Greenland Hill. It was the most prominent feature in the landscape, and
overlooked all the neighbouring country-side. It possessed the
peculiarity of having its summit, which was actually south of the
railway, shown as being north of the railway on the official maps.
On it were a large quarry and two woods, named Hausa and Delbar, which
commanded extensive views, observation posts in the tree-tops covering a
vast expanse of the surrounding country. The whole feature formed an
extensive and lofty plateau, which stretched almost to the Scarpe, the
ground falling down to the water's edge in a steep slope. This slope,
being covered with trees, afforded the enemy a good covered approach
along the banks of the river.
The position as it stood was one which could not be allowed to remain. A
successful attack from the Germans would force our troops into the
Scarpe. Moreover, there was little room in the confined area between the
front line and the river in which to manœuvre troops to resist attack.
On the other hand, if a force moving over Greenland Hill and north of it
could strike at Plouvain, the Germans between Plouvain and the chemical
works would find it almost impossible to extricate themselves.
Orders were therefore issued for an attack to be prepared with this
intention.
In the circumstances, one of the earliest considerations was the gaining
of ground by minor enterprises, so as to extend the area in which troops
could be assembled for the attack.
[Illustration: MAP V.--THE CHEMICAL WORKS, ROEUX.]
On 18th April the front line was extended southwards by the occupation
of a portion of sunken road running parallel with the Scarpe about 300
yards east of it.
At 3 P.M. on the 21st the 9th Royal Scots carried out an operation with
a view to extending our hold on this road farther southwards. This
attack was at first successful, but subsequently a local counter-attack
on the right restored the situation for the enemy. The net result was,
however, that one additional post was established 150 yards in advance
of the sunken road.
Meanwhile, on the left, where the trenches were well clear of the river,
work was carried on in digging new assembly trenches.
As a preparatory measure attempts were made to harass the enemy with
discharges of gas. The difficulty of bringing up the necessary apparatus
was great owing to the poor communications, and the plan met with little
success. On one occasion a sergeant in charge of a train of mules loaded
with gas, which came under heavy shell-fire on the railway embankment,
noticed that his men were showing some signs of nervousness as the shell
splinters came amongst the cylinders. He therefore encouraged them by
shouting out in a stentorian voice, "Great God A-michty, ye canna a' be
killed." Apparently his words of encouragement comforted the party, as
it continued on its way without any further misgivings.
The plan of action for the operation was that the 17th Division should
attack south of the Scarpe, and that the 37th Division should continue
the attack to the left of the 51st. Objectives were selected as
follows:--
The first objective, known as the Black line, was a line running west of
the Roeux-Gavrelle Road, excluding the buildings of the chemical works
and the village of Roeux.
The second objective, the Blue line, included the western half of the
village of Roeux, the chemical works, and the Roeux-Gavrelle Road.
The third objective, the Brown line, took the line of the road running
due north from the eastern end of Roeux, and included all the remaining
trenches of the German front system.
The fourth objective, the Red line, included Hausa, and Delbar Woods and
Plouvain Station.
The final objective, the Pink line, included Plouvain.
The 154th Brigade was detailed to attack on the right, the 153rd Brigade
on the left.
The 154th Brigade had a particularly difficult operation to perform, as
the frontage available for the assembly of their troops was considerably
narrower than the frontage to be attacked. The attacking lines had
therefore to expand laterally as the advance progressed, so as to cover
the whole of the frontage allotted to them.
The number of guns available for the barrage appeared inadequate for an
operation of this nature. It was anticipated that, as the enemy was
practically without dug-outs to which he could be driven by the
approaching barrage, he would have no other alternative but to remain in
his shell-holes and fight.
To ensure success, it was therefore considered necessary to provide a
barrage sufficiently dense to sweep the whole area to be attacked with
shrapnel bullets. However, additional guns could not be spared readily,
while attendant circumstances made it imperative that the attack should
be carried out without delay.
The attack was launched at 4.45 A.M. on 23rd April, and developed into
perhaps the most savage infantry battle that the Division took part in.
Attacks continued throughout the day, followed by a succession of
determined counter-attacks on the part of the enemy. Both sides
sustained serious losses, and many positions changed hands several times
in the twenty-four hours.
The main attack was delivered by the 153rd Brigade, the 7th Black Watch
being on the right, the 7th Gordon Highlanders on the left. In rear of
these two battalions, the 6th Gordon Highlanders, temporarily attached
to the 153rd Brigade, were on the right, and the 6th Black Watch on the
left. The plan was for the two leading battalions to seize the Black,
Blue, and Brown lines, while the 6th Gordon Highlanders passed through
to the Red line. The 6th Black Watch were to consolidate a line running
due north from the left flank of the 6th Gordon Highlanders in the Red
line.
As soon as the infantry moved forward, a heavy machine-gun fire was
opened on them, followed in a few minutes by the German artillery
barraging the ground in rear of our assembly trenches. The left of the
attack at first proceeded satisfactorily. The 7th Gordon Highlanders
repeated their success at Beaumont Hamel. Their left company captured
the Black line, according to programme, and killed a number of Germans
in it; the second wave passed through them and reached the Blue line,
though in very reduced numbers. Only five of this company answered the
roll at the end of the operations. The right company of the 7th Gordon
Highlanders occupied the Black line, and the left platoon of the second
wave entered the Blue line. The remainder of this battalion were held up
between the Black and Blue lines, where, incidentally, they captured
seventy-six prisoners.
The 7th Black Watch were held by machine-gun fire in front of the Black
line, and could not get forward.
On the right the position of the 154th Brigade remained obscure. It is
certain that at one time they were well in Roeux Wood and towards Roeux
village, as the bodies of Highlanders were found in those places when
the Division subsequently occupied Roeux. This brigade also captured the
Black line, in spite of considerable opposition, and killed a number of
Germans there.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders carried the chemical works, and they held
them on the evening of the 23rd; they were also in the Black line just
south of the railway.
It appears, however, that the chemical works were not captured behind
the barrage, which had failed to subdue the resistance, as had been
anticipated, but were taken by the action of a tank. This tank was a
"male," armed with two 6-pounder guns, and was commanded by a sergeant.
It arrived on the scene at a time when the attack was held up in front
of the Black line, and units had become badly confused. It moved forward
to the Black line, and annihilated the enemy in it with point-blank fire
from its 6-pounders. It then worked along a communication trench towards
the chemical works, strongly held by the enemy, and destroyed its entire
garrison.
The tank then advanced through the chemical works, turned up the main
road, and round the north-east corner of the village. It next continued
along the eastern outskirts of the chemical works, dealing with all the
parties of the enemy it encountered.
A machine-gun which still survived amongst the ruins of the chemical
works, and which was causing casualties to the advancing troops, was
pointed out to the tank. It accordingly engaged the machine-gun, and
destroyed it and its crew.
By the aid of this tank a line of shell-holes was occupied by a mixed
body of troops, but chiefly 6th Gordon Highlanders, 200 yards east of
the chemical works. The tank waited with these men for an hour, and then
having little petrol and no ammunition left, withdrew out of action.
The gallant handling of this tank by the sergeant in command of it, and
his tactical skill, had enabled the chemical works to be taken, in spite
of the barrage having been lost.
Taking advantage of the disorganisation of the enemy caused by the tank,
Lieutenant Still, the only surviving officer of the right company of the
7th Gordon Highlanders, went forward with the remainder of the two
companies to the Blue line. He captured fifty wounded Germans in a
dressing station on the way forward, two trench-mortars between the
Black line and the Roeux-Gavrelle Road, and a machine-gun east of the
road.
He then proceeded with his party 800 yards east of the Blue line, and
almost reached the Brown line. Here he held up with his Lewis guns
several attempts to advance made by the enemy. At 9 A.M., having few men
left, he withdrew to the vicinity of the Gavrelle Road.
For his gallantry, initiative, and skilful handling of his party during
these operations, Lieutenant Still was awarded the Military Cross.
The position then was that at one time our troops were east of the
Roeux-Gavrelle Road almost as far south as the junction with the
Fampoux-Plouvain Road, that the enemy was in and about the station
buildings, that we held the chemical works, that he held the whole of
Roeux village and about one-third of Roeux Wood.
During the day the 6th Seaforth Highlanders had been placed at the
disposal of the 153rd Brigade, and had moved up into the Black line
north of the railway.
Later, Lieut.-Colonel S. Macdonald, commanding the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders, received orders that he was to cross the railway, get into
touch with the 4th Seaforth Highlanders east of the chemical works, and
consolidate a line from their left to the railway.
Colonel Macdonald then instructed his battalion to cross the railway in
two parties, one north of the station and the other south of it. The
party detailed to advance north of the station found that the enemy was
holding the station buildings, and two officers who went forward to try
and locate the 4th Seaforth Highlanders east of the chemical works were
captured. They walked right into a strong party of the enemy immediately
south of the level crossing. This party of Germans then became engaged
with the leading company of the detachment of the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders, and sharp skirmishing took place.
The companies which crossed south of the station came under heavy
machine-gun fire while crossing the railway, and it soon became evident
that the enemy must have retaken the chemical works, and that he was
holding them in strength.
The 6th Seaforth Highlanders therefore constructed a trench on the north
side of the railway and parallel to it, to form a flank defence to the
troops dug in on the eastern side of the Roeux-Gavrelle Road.
It subsequently transpired that, while the position of our troops was as
described on page 166, the enemy continually counter-attacked during the
day. He concentrated a considerable amount of artillery on the chemical
works and on the Black line, and ultimately had by this means so reduced
the defenders that they were compelled to fall back. During the
withdrawal most of the remaining officers had been hit, and the troops
had become disorganised owing to their losses. The result was that the
withdrawal of the various posts could not be well co-ordinated, thus
some remained in position while others fell back. In this manner a
complete section of the 152nd Brigade Machine-Gun Company, left isolated
in the chemical works, was surrounded by the enemy and captured.
When it was definitely known that the advance had been held up, orders
were issued for the Division to resume the attack in conjunction with
the 17th and 37th Divisions at 6 P.M. Orders for this attack were issued
to the brigades; but the troops were so closely engaged with the enemy
resisting his counter-attacks that their action was restricted to an
attempt to keep touch with the advance of the Divisions on the flanks by
means of strong patrols.
The hostile counter-attacks, already frequently referred to, began at 9
A.M. The enemy several times attempted to advance over Greenland Hill in
extended lines. In each case on this portion of the front his attacks
were broken up by artillery and machine-gun fire, and were checked some
500-800 yards east of the Roeux-Gavrelle Road.
At 3 P.M. the enemy, about a battalion in strength, advanced in extended
order from Hausa and Delbar Woods towards the railway east of the
chemical works. This advance was again stopped by artillery fire, and
many of the Germans turned and fled. Later, another force was seen
forming up in rear of the Roeux-Plouvain Road, but was again dispersed
by the artillery. At dusk the Germans made a further attempt to assemble
for attack in the same place, but were similarly dispersed by the
artillery.
Seldom have gunners had such targets as were given them during these
attacks. Time and time again the German infantry resolutely attempted to
advance over the forward glacis of Greenland Hill in full view of the
abundant observation posts on the battle front. Not until it was dark
could he make his way through the barrage which the artillery and
machine and Lewis gunners were able to fire, and regain the chemical
works.
During the day reports of enemy counter-attacks reached Divisional
headquarters so constantly that a battalion of the 103rd Infantry
Brigade was ordered forward as a reserve to the 154th Brigade; similarly
a second battalion was placed at the disposal of the 153rd Brigade.
After dark orders were issued for the 103rd Brigade, with the 26th and
27th Battalions Northumberland Fusiliers and the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders, to take over the battle front of the 153rd Brigade.
As soon as it had become clear that the enemy was again in possession of
the chemical works, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were ordered to make a
further attempt to retake them. This attack was launched during the
night, but failed to achieve its object.
Dawn therefore broke to find the Black line south of the railway, some
of the buildings just north of the station and a trench line east of the
Gavrelle-Roeux Road north of the station, in our hands. This line was
maintained throughout the night, in spite of many attempts made by the
enemy to penetrate it.
On 24th April no important actions occurred, both sides being too
exhausted to continue the engagement. The enemy's artillery, however,
remained very active on the Black line.
On the night 24-25th April the Division was relieved by the 34th
Division, with the exception of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders. It was
arranged by the Brigadier commanding the 103rd Brigade that the 26th
Northumberland Fusiliers, who were holding the line on the 154th Brigade
front, should be relieved on that front, and move across to relieve the
6th Seaforth Highlanders. Dawn had, however, broken before the relief of
the 6th Seaforth Highlanders had been begun. In consequence, the
battalion had to spend another very uncomfortable twenty-four hours in
the line.
On the 25th Divisional headquarters moved back to Chelers, the 152nd
Brigade to Acq, the 153rd and 154th Brigades to the Tincques-Ligny-St
Flochel area. The following day the 152nd Brigade moved to the Ternas
area.
So ended a most sanguinary encounter. From most difficultly-situated
assembly trenches, an attack had been launched against a position of
considerable strength. It had been supported by a weak barrage.
Moreover, as the enemy's defences were ill-defined and composed in many
places of unlocated shell-holes, the barrage could not have that
precision which obtains in a trench to trench attack. From the outset,
in most part of the attack, the barrage was lost, and such advances as
were carried out were made by unsupported infantry, with the exception
of the brilliant action of the tank. The men had advanced against a
stout opposition and had suffered heavy casualties, had then been
systematically bombarded in shallow trenches and shell-holes, and had
been repeatedly counter-attacked.
They, however, maintained a portion of their gains against all comers,
and had appreciably deepened the area held east of the Scarpe.
The artillery had played a large part in the destruction of many hostile
counter-attacks, and had afforded our troops great protection against
the action of the enemy's infantry. The losses which the gunners had
inflicted on the enemy were such that by nightfall he was not in a
position to attempt any action on a large scale, and could do no more
than reoccupy the chemical works.
In one respect, however, the artillery were at a disadvantage. The enemy
had withdrawn his guns so far to the rear that he could do little more
with most of his pieces than shell our trenches and foremost battery
positions at their extreme range. In consequence, it was difficult to
counter his batteries. Efforts were made to push forward heavy howitzers
for this purpose, but his observation was so good that he was able to
knock many of these out. In one case, a four-gun 92 howitzer battery had
five guns put out of action in twenty-four hours, a fresh gun which had
been sent forward as a replacement meeting the same fate as its
predecessors.
Moreover, his guns were so placed that he could concentrate on to the
chemical works the artillery, not only of the corps operating against
it, but also of the corps on either flank.
The artillery commanders, both field and heavy, did their utmost to
check the shelling of the infantry, but they were able to produce little
effect.
The Division had been continually in the line since February, had fought
for three days in the battle of 9-12th April, and had had only
forty-eight hours' rest before again taking over a battle front. In
these circumstances the battle of Roeux and the "Comical" works, as the
Jocks called it, gave abundant evidence of the magnificent fighting
qualities of the troops.
During this battle the Divisional rear headquarters on the St
Nicolas-Bailleul road--in which the "A" and "Q" offices and a rear
signal office had been established--received a direct hit from a 9-inch
high-velocity gun. The signal office was destroyed, several men and
horses of the signal company were killed and wounded, and ten motor
bicycles were so damaged as to require replacing.
During the month of April 1917 the casualties sustained by the Division
were severe. They were as follows:--
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Officers 66 140 8
Other ranks 828 2972 482
--a total of 214 officers and 4382 other ranks.
Of individual units the following suffered most severely during the
month:--
6th Seaforth Highlanders 16 officers and 508 other ranks
6th Gordon Highlanders 25 " " 491 " "
7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders 22 " " 499 " "
4th Gordon Highlanders 24 " " 575 " "
while the 5th Gordon Highlanders lost 9 officers killed and the 7th
Black Watch 8.
Amongst the wounded were Major Rowbotham, M.C., 9th Royal Scots;
Lieut.-Colonel S. R. M'Clintock, 4th Gordon Highlanders; Lieut.-Colonel
J. Dawson, D.S.O., 6th Gordon Highlanders. The latter was severely
wounded by a machine-gun bullet while gallantly directing the advance of
his leading company. Colonel Dawson's wound kept him out of the field
for the remainder of the war, the Division thus losing one of its most
brilliant commanding officers.
After the completion of the relief of the Division, the following
message was sent to General Harper by Lieut.-General Sir Charles
Fergusson, commanding the XVIIth Corps:--
"I wish to express to the Division through you my congratulations
on the splendid work which they have done in the recent fighting,
especially on Monday, 23rd April.
"Had it not been for the fine fighting spirit of the Division, the
result might easily have been disadvantageous to us. I am proud and
delighted with the Division, as they may be themselves with the grand
fight they put up, and I know when they are rested and reorganised they
will be keen to add to their reputation."
The Commander-in-Chief also wired to General Harper as follows: "The
fierce fighting of yesterday (23rd April) has carried us another step
forward. I congratulate you on the results of it, and on the severe
punishment you have inflicted on the enemy."
The Division remained at rest until 10th May in a delightful area. The
villages had seldom been occupied by troops, and so did not contain
numerous unsightly heaps of empty tins, derelict horse-standings,
salvage dumps, &c., which in most rest areas prevented the men from
shaking off the more sordid atmosphere of war, even when resting behind
the line.
On this occasion the Division lay in a country of pleasant clean
villages, nestling amongst orchards in blossom and woods in new leaf.
Moreover, the weather was perfect, one cloudless day following another.
The policy adopted during this period was to give the men the maximum of
rest and recreation, as it was evident that the Division would shortly
be called upon to take further part in active operations.
After the men had cleaned themselves up and all deficiencies in
equipment had been made good, training was practically confined to
musketry. It was found that in the case of the older men musketry had
become a forgotten art, while in the case of the new drafts it was an
art which had never been adequately acquired. Long periods of trench
warfare, and the undue importance which has been attached to the
subsidiary weapons--the bayonet and the bomb--at the training centres
had relegated the rifle to a secondary place. A concerted effort was
therefore made to revive the prestige of the rifle by giving all ranks
an intensive training in its proper uses.
As was the case in most areas at this stage of the war, facilities for
musketry were either non-existent, or consisted only of indifferent
thirty-yard miniature ranges. However, by working at high pressure,
whenever the country suited the purpose, serviceable ranges were soon
improvised in every area, and were continuously used from dawn till
dusk. Some of them were not quite as safe as those that one had been
accustomed to at home; but the Division was lucky, and no one working in
the fields was actually shot. On occasions peasants were certainly seen
ploughing at the double behind the stop-butts, but they fortunately
always managed to avoid the bullets.
By the time orders to move back to the line had been received, every man
had been put through a course, and had fired a considerable number of
rounds.
The scores made during a brigade competition held during this period
show how the musketry of the army had suffered since the early days of
the war. The ten best shots were picked from each company, and were
given two minutes in which to fire 15 rounds each at a bull's-eye target
at 200 yards. The average score made was 16·5 out of a possible 60, and
this by picked shots.
On 10th May the Division began to move to the line again, the 152nd
Brigade by tactical trains to Arras, and the remaining two brigades by
march route.
On the night of 12-13th May, with rather mixed feelings, the 152nd
Brigade relieved the whole of the 4th Division in the Roeux
chemical-works sector.
It was a difficult relief, as one brigade was taking over the line from
two brigades, both of which had been reduced to the strength of about a
weak battalion each. The relief was further complicated by the fact that
the brigade-major of the outgoing brigade who was to hand over the
greater portion of the front was killed on the morning of the relief.
The 4th Division had, however, improved the situation since the Highland
Division had left the area on 25th April. They had occupied Roeux as far
as the centre of the village; they held the eastern edge of Roeux
Cemetery. They were established along a line some 300-500 yards east of
the chemical works, and were on the railway about 600 yards east of
Roeux station.
The whole battle area was found to be in a ghastly condition. The
fighting had been too intense for any attempts to be made to bury the
dead. In consequence, the whole area was littered with corpses. Germans
in large numbers, men of the 4th, 9th, 34th, and 51st Divisions lay
everywhere. Between Fampoux and Roeux Station, the British dead lay in
swathes, where they had been cut up in an attempt to exploit the success
of 9th April against German machine-gun rear-guards. Salvage of every
kind lay broadcast over the country-side, while the ground itself,
particularly round the chemical works, had been churned by shell-fire
into an immense dust-heap.
An air of depression hung over the whole place that it was almost
impossible to dispel. As a Jock once put it, "To be in the Comical works
made a body windy whether it was shellin' or not."
This was the eve of a great battle, so it may be well to describe the
dispositions of the brigade in detail. Instructions had been issued that
no further advance was contemplated during the coming tour of duty. The
troops, therefore, went into the line with orders to make good what
ground they could by patrolling, and to consolidate all gains.
The 5th Seaforth Highlanders took over the right sector and the 8th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders the left, the railway line being the
northern boundary in the front line. As, however, the railway ran
obliquely across the front, troops of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders in the rear lines were also in position north of it. The 6th
Seaforth Highlanders were in support, occupying two lines of trenches
from 300-600 yards east of the Scarpe. The 6th Gordon Highlanders were
in reserve occupying old German trenches astride the Athies-Fampoux road
just west of Fampoux. Brigade headquarters were in an old German 8-inch
howitzer position in a sunken road immediately south of the railway at
Fampoux.
Orders were given that on no account were troops to occupy the ruined
buildings of the chemical works, as these were certain to draw heavy
shell-fire.
During this period rumours were frequently circulated that the enemy was
about to withdraw to the Queant-Drocourt line, a strong defensive system
similar to the Hindenburg line some miles in rear of his existing
positions. Orders were therefore issued for patrolling to be actively
carried out, so that early information of any such withdrawal would be
obtained, and further, that the ground which was made by patrols was to
be consolidated.
The first twenty-four hours spent in the sector were sufficient to make
it quite evident that the hostile artillery had not decreased since the
Division had been relieved towards the end of April. The left battalion
trench system, then Roeux village, then the area between battalion and
brigade headquarters, and finally the reserve battalion, were all
heavily bombarded on the 13th. Brigade headquarters, being in deep
dug-outs, were well protected against bombardment. The battalion
headquarters were, however, not so well situated. Those of the right and
support battalions were in elephant shelters cut into a bank just east
of the river Scarpe. As these shelters were in an area that drew a
considerable amount of shell-fire, and as they were not even proof
against a 4·2 howitzer, they were most unsatisfactory domiciles. The
left battalion had its headquarters in an old German bomb store in a
quarry north of the railway. This bomb store was reasonably shell-proof,
but the quarry was a well-marked feature to which the German gunners
paid continual attention.
During the day of the 13th the enemy shelled the eastern portion of
Roeux; it was therefore assumed that he had evacuated it. Accordingly at
10 P.M. the whole line south of the railway was advanced to a road
running due northwards from the eastern outskirts of Roeux. Positions
were then taken up in shell-holes clear of this road. The whole of the
village of Roeux also was occupied, six wounded prisoners being
captured, one German being killed, and several wounded men of the 4th
Division being brought in. As this considerable advance was made without
any fighting, the day became known to the Jocks as "The Meatless Day."
Vickers guns were sent forward during the night to take up positions in
the most forward line of posts or in advance of it. The results of this
method of disposing the Vickers guns, as will be seen, proved
far-reaching.
During this period the enemy was extremely active with low-flying
aeroplanes over the forward area, and it was clear that he was making
every effort to locate our defences. At 9.40 A.M. on the 14th there were
nine such aeroplanes flying low over our trenches at the same moment. On
occasions coloured lights were fired by them, a heavy shelling of the
chemical works or some portion of the trench area ensuing. At other
times his artillery was directed by observers who were seen to climb
into "crows' nests" in the trees of Hausa and Delbar Woods. Machine-guns
and shrapnel were frequently employed to discourage this form of
activity.
Throughout the 14th the enemy artillery remained active. The opinion had
therefore generally been formed that, so far from it being his
intention to withdraw, he was preparing for a deliberate attack on our
positions. There were, however, still optimists who thought that his
excessive shell-fire was accounted for by the fact that the German
gunners were emptying their dumps prior to withdrawing. On the night of
the 14-15th the sector was decidedly quieter than it had been for some
days. The optimists put this down to the fact that the German artillery
was busy withdrawing. However, this theory was rudely dispelled, for at
dawn on 15th May the bombardment of the brigade area began again with
tremendous vehemence, 8's, 5·9's, 4·2's, and 77's all being freely
employed. Messages were received from all parts of the brigade front
reporting heavy shelling. The 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
reported by runner that they were being violently bombarded with 5·9's,
and that all the telephone wires had been cut. The support battalion and
the troops at Roeux similarly reported intense shelling. In fact, the
only troops who were not involved in this bombardment were those which
occupied the foremost line of shell-holes, to which they had advanced
unopposed on the night of the 13th. They remained in their position
quite secure without a round falling amongst them, and it was evident
that they had not as yet been located in their new position.
Officers and men who were in the trench area during this bombardment all
reported that the shells, from the sound of their flight through the
air, appeared to be fired at the extreme range of the guns. This
statement was confirmed by the fact that the corps heavy artillery,
though they were continuously in action during the day attempting to
counter the enemy's batteries, could not diminish the volume of hostile
fire.
It was assumed that this bombardment was preparatory to an attack. The
Divisional artillery was therefore employed in shelling the enemy's
foremost trench line, which patrols had discovered running just west of
Hausa and Delbar Woods, in bombarding the woods and the area between
them and Plouvain. It was thus hoped to interfere as much as possible
with any attempt the enemy might make to assemble.
At noon the village of Fampoux was heavily bombarded with gas shells.
At this period it was estimated by the artillery that twelve German
heavy batteries were firing on the front of the 152nd Brigade.
At 3 P.M. orders were received that two companies of the 152nd Brigade
were to relieve two battalions of the 51st Brigade, 17th Division,
holding the line immediately north of the railway. In the existing
circumstances the situation astride the railway was not satisfactory, as
touch had not been found by our foremost troops with the foremost troops
north of it. The railway, therefore, constituted a weakness in our
defensive system. By the carrying out of the relief ordered the
situation would be much improved, as the guarding of the railway, a
natural approach leading into the heart of our position, would then be
in the hands of one commander.
Two companies of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders were therefore detailed
for this duty, and were placed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel R.
Campbell, D.S.O., commanding the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
At 7.55 P.M. the shelling was still so severe that all working parties
were told to stand by and not to proceed to the trenches. At 9.15 P.M.,
however, the shelling had ceased. The troops had been heavily and
continuously bombarded for fourteen hours by howitzers of all calibres.
Moreover, they were entirely without the protection of shell-proof
dug-outs. Competent artillery observers estimated that during this
bombardment shells were bursting in the brigade area at the rate of one
5·9, two 4·2's, and two 77 mm. shells per minute in every seventy yards
of the front. In addition, a number of 8-inch howitzers were freely
employed. However, all buildings having been carefully avoided and the
front line having been advanced to a position undiscovered by the enemy,
the casualties inflicted by the bombardment were not excessive. The
three battalions in the forward area were estimated to have lost a total
of about 450 men at the time when the bombardment slackened off.
On the other hand, it had undoubtedly been a trying ordeal for the men
to endure. General Burn, therefore, decided to relieve the two
front-line battalions. Thus the 6th Seaforth Highlanders were ordered
not only to relieve the 51st Brigade north of the railway, but also to
relieve the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders as well. On the right
the 6th Gordon Highlanders were ordered to relieve the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders.
The relief of the 51st Brigade meant the taking over of an additional
1000 yards of front.
This relief as planned was destined never to be completed. The 6th
Gordon Highlanders had no sooner received their orders to move than the
battalion bivouacks were heavily bombarded with gas shells. This
necessitated the men moving off to the bridges over the Scarpe wearing
box-respirators. As the ground to be traversed was by nature much
broken, and in addition considerably torn up by shell-fire, this
movement in the darkness could only be slowly executed. Much delay in
the carrying out of this relief was caused at the outset.
At 3.15 P.M., before dawn had broken, an intense bombardment again
opened on the whole brigade front. At this hour the relief was in
progress, but far from complete; the shell-fire was, however, too
intense for it to be continued. The situation at the moment was as
follows: Two platoons of the right company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders
had entered Roeux, and had relieved one of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders'
posts; the remaining two platoons manned a communication trench joining
the original front line and the new line consolidated north of the
eastern outskirts of Roeux. A second company 6th Gordon Highlanders were
moving forward in the area south of the chemical works. This company
manned trenches in this vicinity. The third company, which had suffered
most severely from the gas-shell bombardment, had only just crossed the
Scarpe. It therefore occupied a trench east of the river. The fourth
company subsequently occupied trenches in the same vicinity.
Two companies of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders had practically completed
the relief of the 51st Brigade, except in a section of the foremost
trench about two hundred yards in length immediately north of the
railway. The troops on either side of the railway were, therefore, still
not in touch with one another, and the railway remained a weak point in
the first-line defences. These two companies had both been skilfully
disposed in depth by their commanders.
The first bombardment was a prelude to an attack delivered by two
successive brigades of a fresh German Division which had recently been
transferred from the Russian front. The enemy's plan appears to have
been to advance along the bank of the Scarpe and along the railway line,
and then to turn inwards and so gain possession of all the country
enclosed, as it were, within the jaws of the pincers.
At the moment of attack, no reliefs having been completed, the whole of
the 152nd Infantry Brigade was east of the river Scarpe. Moreover, the
troops were for the most part occupying positions which were unknown to
their commanders, as no information was received in the first stages of
the battle as to how far the relief had progressed.
When the attack was launched, the events which occurred on the right are
clear. The attack along the river bank made some progress. Some of the
enemy certainly reached the western outskirts of Roeux Wood, where they
were engaged by a Vickers gun firing to its rear and by bombs thrown by
the machine-gunners.
The 5th Seaforth Highlanders in the eastern outskirts of Roeux were
attacked frontally, but defeated this attack by rifle and Lewis-gun
fire. In the midst of this action they observed the enemy working round
their flanks between the village and the river; the right section
therefore faced its outer flank and stopped this movement by its fire,
while the other neighbouring posts, after having disposed of the frontal
attack, also faced half-right and strengthened the defence of this
flank. In this manner a large number of Germans were accounted for. The
resistance of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders in this corner was so
effective that the enemy suddenly evacuated the whole area between Roeux
and the river, and this portion of the line remained intact for the rest
of the day.
The enemy's effort on his left wing had therefore collapsed. On his
right he was, however, more successful. He advanced on either side of
the railway, firing Very lights across it so that the attacking forces
hidden from each other's view by the embankment could keep in touch with
each other. He occupied the foremost trench north of the railway, while
south of the railway he continued his advance along the embankment. The
area immediately south of the embankment should have been adequately
covered by the machine-guns. These were, however, knocked out during the
bombardment, and so could not play their part.
To the north of the railway the enemy at once attempted to widen the
area of his penetration by a series of heavy bombing attacks against the
6th Seaforth Highlanders, delivered from both flanks.
The first of these attacks was successfully repulsed by Lieutenant Dow
and his company, who, however, were compelled to use all their bombs in
doing so. They therefore repulsed the second attack by advancing to meet
the enemy with rifle and bayonet, these tactics completely discomfiting
him. At 10 A.M. the enemy made a third and more determined attack.
Lieutenant Dow was forced out of his front-line trench into a
communication trench. Here he immediately organised a counter-attack,
and led it in person against the enemy. The attack, however, failed, and
Lieutenant Dow was mortally wounded. The gallantry and leadership of
this officer had successfully limited the enemy's gains to a small
footing in a section of the front-line trench.
Farther to the north the second company of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders,
under the command of Lieutenant King, had been skilfully disposed by
this officer. This company was able to bring flanking fire to bear to
support Lieutenant Dow against the enemy's attack, and in addition to
defeat more than one frontal attack delivered against itself. Lieutenant
King retained all the ground occupied by his company through the action.
The two wings therefore held firm. The enemy had, however, penetrated
the front in large numbers along the railway embankment, and immediately
south and north of it. Having effected a lodgment in our trenches in
this manner, he then delivered a series of flank attacks. By this means
he successfully occupied the whole of the chemical works and the
trenches immediately west of them, and in addition the buildings north
and south of the railway adjacent to the chemical works.
In this position he was pinned. He first attempted to develop an attack
southwards from his south-east corner of the chemical works. This
attempt was defeated by a company of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, who, seeing the enemy in their rear, left their trenches,
charged them, and routed them. This company, which suffered severe
casualties, was led by Captain A. Mactaggart. No officer could have
shown a finer example to his men. His right hand was shattered by a
fragment of a shell early in the attack. Subsequently, owing to a second
shell wound, he lost an eye. Nevertheless, he continued to lead and
encourage his men until he was mortally wounded, and could continue no
farther. Mactaggart's complete disregard for the pain of his wounds and
for his own personal danger, and his devotion to duty, may perhaps have
been equalled, but can never have been surpassed. Even as he lay
mortally wounded with a gaping wound in the abdomen, he continued urging
on his men until he lost consciousness.
A second attack of the same nature was stopped by the rifle and
Lewis-gun fire of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders and a Vickers gun.
Covering fire was then arranged, under which a bombing party advanced,
forced the enemy to retire across the open, and captured 1 officer and
20 other ranks.
In the course of these operations the troops, led by the junior officers
and N.C.O.'s, had so disposed themselves that the enemy could not
develop his advance in any direction except by delivering a frontal
attack. Before the enemy had time to bring up fresh troops with which to
deliver further attacks, Lieut.-Colonel R. Campbell, D.S.O., commanding
8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, personally organised a
counter-attack which restored to us the whole of our line south of the
railway.
Colonel Campbell, realising that the Germans had made a deep penetration
into our lines, fell in the personnel of his battalion headquarters, and
assisted by Captain Pollard, his bombing officer; Lieutenant Worlock,
his Lewis-gun officer; Captain A. MacDonald, the adjutant; and Captain
Fairlie, his artillery liaison officer, delivered an immediate
counter-attack against the Germans north of the railway. This attack was
delivered as follows: Captain Pollard, a skilful bomber, drove the enemy
from his shell-holes with rifle grenades, while the remainder of the
party shot them down as they ran. Colonel Campbell himself killed six
Germans with his rifle.
By 6.45 A.M. he had killed or captured all Germans on the north side of
the railway. However, about this hour he heard heavy rifle-fire taking
place on the south side. He therefore led his party on to the
embankment, from which he saw a party of Germans just west of the
chemical works being engaged by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders both from
their front and from their left flank with rifle-fire.
Colonel Campbell immediately sent his adjutant to tell the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders to deliver a frontal attack while he enfiladed the Germans
from the embankment. This operation was carried out with complete
success. Captain Pollard was, however, killed by a bullet which passed
through his heart. Colonel Campbell narrowly escaped a similar fate, a
bullet flattening itself against the railway line on which his chest was
resting as he fired.
Colonel Campbell then joined the 6th Seaforth Highlanders with his
party, advanced through the chemical works with them, and dug himself in
just east of them.
Meanwhile Captain Donald Clarke, M.C., of the 6th Gordon Highlanders,
had also organised a counter-attack, and with men of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders and 5th and 6th Seaforth Highlanders carried out a sweep
forward covering the whole of the brigade front south of the chemical
works. The advance of this force made great progress except in Roeux
village, where it was checked for a time by a heavy enemy barrage. On
the rest of the front over which they advanced they reached the foremost
British lines. Here Captain Clarke reorganised his troops and disposed
them in depth. He found the front line still occupied by its original
garrison. These troops had not been shelled either during the actual
attack or in the preliminary bombardment, the enemy doubtless not having
discovered their position. In the grey of the dawn, they had seen by the
assistance of Very lights large numbers of the enemy advancing in small
columns to the attack. Vickers and Lewis guns and riflemen opened on
them, and fired round after round into them, thus bringing the advance
to a complete standstill, and killing large numbers of the enemy. As it
became lighter, the enemy repeated his attempts to advance, on this
occasion adopting an extended formation. Again these men, who had not
been shaken by any previous bombardment, steadily engaged the splendid
targets offered them, and annihilated the attacking force. The Vickers
guns in particular played tremendous havoc with the enemy, and the
policy of pushing them well forward, though often condemned, proved in
this case to have been amply justified. No further attacks were
delivered against the front of these two companies.
Meanwhile all telephone wires were cut, and information was extremely
difficult to obtain. The enemy's barrage had now lifted on to the area
between the river Scarpe and brigade headquarters, and numbers of
runners were killed in trying to pass through it.
Prisoners and wounded men on their way to the dressing stations had,
however, reported that the Germans had captured the chemical works.
Arrangements had therefore been made to counter-attack behind a barrage
with a view to recapturing the works. The 5th Gordon Highlanders, having
been placed at General Burn's disposal, were detailed to carry out this
attack.
As soon as this order was issued, Lieutenant J. B. Simpson (5th Seaforth
Highlanders), the brigade bombing officer, was ordered to go forward,
get in touch with Colonel Campbell, and find out what the situation was.
After successfully passing through the German barrage about the river,
he found Colonel Campbell with his party dug-in east of the chemical
works. Colonel Campbell, however, on hearing that an attack behind a
barrage was to be delivered, withdrew his men from the works and
informed brigade headquarters of the situation. On Lieutenant Simpson
reporting that Colonel Campbell had cleared the chemical works, it was
decided to attack north of the railway only with a view to restoring a
firm line, particularly astride the embankment east of the chemical
works.
The counter-attack of the 5th Gordon Highlanders was to be delivered in
conjunction with an attack by the neighbouring Division on the left
flank. It was successfully launched, covered by an intense and accurate
18-pounder and Stokes mortar barrage. It was, however, held up by a
heavy enemy barrage along the line of the Roeux-Gavrelle road. This
barrage, fortunately, suddenly ceased, and the 5th Gordon Highlanders
carried on their advance unsupported by the artillery, the 18-pounder
barrage long since having passed on. It appears that they reached their
final objective, the old British front line, but were immediately
heavily counter-attacked from the left flank, and were forced to
withdraw to the original British second line. It subsequently transpired
that the reason why the 5th Gordon Highlanders arrived in their
objectives with an open flank was due to the fact that the attack to be
carried out by troops of the neighbouring Division on the left was
cancelled, and that no intimation to this effect was received by General
Burn or by his attacking troops.
On the completion of this attack the enemy effort seems to have been
spent, and the whole of our original line was left in our hands, except
for the foremost trenches immediately astride the railway.
The enemy had suffered unusually heavy losses from rifle, Lewis gun, and
machine-gun fire. His columns and waves had been completely broken many
times. Eighty-three prisoners remained in our hands, including men from
six different battalions and two pioneer companies. The observers of the
Corps R.F.C. squadrons reported that they had never before seen German
dead and wounded lying as thick as they were in front of our trenches
and between the British front line and the chemical works.
The manner in which this attack was resisted and beaten off was due, in
the first place, to the fighting spirit, leadership, and initiative
displayed by officers and men. It proved that the Divisional commander's
efforts to train the Division to fight, not merely with gallantry but
also with tactical intelligence, had been successful.
Further, the thorough training in musketry carried out during the last
period of rest could not have been more opportune, as the men had
undoubtedly gone into the line with a determination to make full use of
their rifles if the opportunity occurred.
The Vickers gunners also played a great part in this battle. Not only
did they fire on targets such as machine-gunners dream about from their
foremost positions, but they also were so disposed as to be able to fire
an intense barrage 500 yards in advance of the British front line. This
barrage was fired from half an hour before dark until darkness set in on
the evening before the attack, and at intermediate periods throughout
the night. It was also fired from the beginning of the attack until
there was sufficient light to see whether it was required or otherwise.
The teams of the two Vickers guns farthest forward stood-to all night,
occasionally firing Very lights to illumine their front. It was in the
glare of one of these lights that the Germans were first observed
advancing in artillery formation. The two Vickers guns at once engaged
them, and at the same time fired an S.O.S. signal, which was immediately
followed by the opening of the whole machine-gun barrage. Before the
enemy had time to extend, he was exterminated. Subsequently a succession
of waves advanced at the double, only to meet a similar fate. These two
guns remained in action all day, dealing with parties of the enemy
trying to regain their own lines by running from shell-hole to
shell-hole.
Another machine-gun about a hundred yards east of the south end of the
chemical works faced its rear, and killed a large number of Germans
bolting from the chemical works in the face of Colonel Campbell's
counter-attack; while a further gun fought facing its rear in Roeux
Woods, and was even there compelled to protect its flanks by bombing.
This gun team finally put to flight or killed all the enemy who engaged
it. Indeed, infantry could not have been better supported by their
machine-gunners.
The Divisional artillery also gave the infantry the support which the
latter had now become accustomed to expect. They had been a little slow
in opening the barrage on account of all lines having been cut and the
difficulty of seeing the S.O.S. signals in the dust and smoke caused by
the German bombardment. The barrage fired in support of the 5th Gordon
Highlanders' counter-attack, in spite of the fact that it had been
hastily improvised, was fired with great precision.
The German artillery could not, however, be checked by the British heavy
artillery. Many of his guns were firing from new positions in the open,
which had not been previously located. They were also firing from
positions as far in rear of their lines as the range of the guns would
allow. They were therefore beyond the reach of the bulk of the British
counter-battery guns.
The British field-guns in the most advanced positions received
considerable attention from the enemy's artillery, and were in
particular deluged with gas shells. A number of field-guns were also
knocked out by direct hits.
Two anecdotes connected with this battle are worth recording. During the
early stages of the German attack a runner arrived at the headquarters
of the 6th Gordon Highlanders. Colonel Fraser asked him where he came
from.
"Aberdeen," said the runner.
"No, no! Where do you come from now?"
"Yonder," replied the runner, pointing towards the front line.
"Well," said the Colonel, "what's happening there now?"
"Well, a Boche officer comes up to us and he says, 'Surrender!'"
"Well?"
"We told him, 'To hell with surrender.'"
"Where's the officer now?" said the Colonel.
"Yonder."
"What's he doing yonder?"
"Doing?" said the runner; "doing? He's dead."
Some of the tunnelling company, with their infantry assistants, also
joined in the fray, and took part in Captain Clarke's counter-attack. On
their return from the trenches they met the staff-captain, who hailed
them, and said, "Are you the tunnelling company?"
"Tunnelling be damned," a voice replied; "we've been ower the bags."
The casualties to the 152nd Infantry Brigade, with the 5th Gordon
Highlanders, amounted to about 900, including 53 officers. In this case
most of the wounds were serious. The men had had such slight protection
in which to withstand the bombardment that the shell-splinters
unfortunately did considerable execution. The medical officers reported
that they had never seen so large a percentage of seriously-wounded
cases. The spectacle of a steadily-increasing number of men arriving at
the dressing stations with shattered limbs was most pitiable, and the
medical personnel could hardly keep pace with the number of cases
brought in.
The stretcher-bearers went backwards and forwards through the most
hellish barrage both on the day before and during the attack in their
usual exemplary manner. Many of them were, however, killed, often with
the wounded man they were carrying.
On 19th May the following message was issued to the troops by the
Divisional Commander:--
"The Divisional Commander wishes to express his sincere appreciation of
the resource and bravery shown by all which led to the great defeat of
the enemy on the 16th May. He has much pleasure in communicating the
following message from the Corps Commander:--
"'Heartiest congratulations to you all on fine work on 16th and 17th
May 1917, and especially on General Burn and 152nd Infantry Brigade,
whose tenacity and pluck saved an awkward situation. The Division may
well be proud of their latest achievement.'"
General Allenby, commanding the Third Army, wired: "Convey to 51st
Highland Division my congratulations on their great gallantry at Roeux
and the chemical works."
On the night 16-17th May the 153rd Brigade and the 5th Gordon
Highlanders were relieved in the line, the 6th Black Watch taking over
the left sub-sector, and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders the right. On the
extreme north of the Divisional boundary about fifty men of the 6th
Seaforth Highlanders could not be found in the darkness, and were in
consequence not relieved until the following night. The command of the
front was then divided between the 153rd and 154th Brigades; the 152nd
Brigade moved back to Arras to recuperate and refit. They were not
employed again in this sector, the other two brigades remaining
permanently in the line until the Division was relieved on 31st May.
From the day following the battle until the date of relief the 153rd and
154th Brigades were severely and constantly bombarded by guns of all
calibres up to 8-inch. The enemy was extremely active in the air, and
made considerable use of aeroplanes in co-operation with artillery. The
Divisional war diary for 24th May runs as follows: "Hostile shelling
intermittent but accurate. Enemy aeroplanes for the past week have had
an uninterrupted survey of our lines. Between 3 P.M. and 3.30 P.M. an
aeroplane registered the right brigade headquarters, scoring several
direct hits, and causing considerable casualties."
The following day the right brigade was shelled out of its headquarters,
and had to move back to an embankment west of Athies. The activities of
these aeroplanes were to a certain extent checked by employing Stokes
guns to engage them with air-bursts. It was the first time that the use
of Stokes guns as anti-aircraft guns was attempted; and though it was
almost impossible to obtain any degree of accuracy, the Stokes bombs
certainly had a deterring effect on the enemy's pilots.
In spite of the continual bombardments, with the assistance of the 8th
Royal Scots, the field companies, and some tunnellers, the troops in the
line made rapid progress in the consolidation of the position. The
trenches everywhere were deepened, wire entanglements erected, and the
construction of dug-outs begun.
It was during this period that a party of sappers had an interesting
adventure. The party, led by Major Bisset, M.C., and Captain Grant of
the 404 Field Company, R.E., went forward to destroy a bridge which was
shown on air photos to have been constructed across the river Scarpe.
This bridge crossed a stretch of the river which flowed due east and
west. At this time our line on the north bank was some thousand yards in
advance of the line on the south bank. Thus this bridge, though it was
well behind our lines on the British bank of the river, was well behind
the German lines on the German bank. Any attempt to blow it up was,
therefore, certain to be attended by considerable danger.
On arrival at the so-called bridge, it was reconnoitred and found to be
nothing more than a tree which had been knocked over by a shell, and
which, lying across the surface of the water, had formed a dam and
collected a mass of floating débris. It had thus the appearance of a
broad wooden bridge on the air photographs.
Major Bisset decided that as the tree was in a position in which it
could be utilised as a bridge, it was advisable to destroy it. A
sergeant accordingly waded into the river, and was standing with water
up to his neck fixing the charge to the tree, when a German sentry
walked out along the tree-trunk towards the centre of the river. When
his feet were a few inches from the sergeant's head, he stopped, unaware
that he was covered by the revolvers of the two officers. After a pause,
apparently suspecting nothing, he moved away. The tree was then
successfully blown up without incident. The adventures of this party
were, however, not yet over. On their return through the British lines
they were mistaken for a German patrol, and were engaged with
close-range rifle-fire. Fortunately no one was hit, but the whole party
was compelled to take refuge in shell-holes. The trench party then
proceeded to bomb them. The bombs produced such a torrent of
unmistakably Scottish oaths that it ceased at once--not, however, before
a Mills bomb had pitched between Major Bisset and Captain Grant as they
lay in the same shell-hole.
On the arrival of this bomb both officers feverishly searched for it in
the dark, in the hope that they might be able to throw it away before it
burst. When it was found, they discovered to their great relief that in
the excitement of the moment the man who had thrown the bomb had
forgotten to extract the safety-pin, and that therefore it was
fortunately innocuous.
The R.E. made considerable use of pontoons in this area, not so much for
bridging purposes as for navigation. They were used for conveying
ammunition up the river Scarpe to battery positions in the Scarpe
valley, and wounded were conveyed down the river in them on their return
journey.
It was interesting to watch them manipulate the rapids which had been
formed where the large brick railway bridge just south of Athies had
been blown into the river by the Germans. There was always a large crowd
of Jocks at these rapids, who gave loud and conflicting advice to the
sappers as they were navigating them. The jest in this part of the
world, of which the Jocks never tired, was to ask one of the mariners on
a passing pontoon to bring him back a parrot.
The pontoon ferry service from Fampoux _viâ_ Athies to Blangy was
maintained under great difficulties owing to the shell-fire, the
numerous obstacles in the water, and to other causes. All difficulties
were however overcome, and it was finally extended as far as the
railway bridge, east of Fampoux. In one night over two hundred
seriously-wounded men were evacuated from the foremost area in pontoons.
This system relieved the heavily over-taxed roads, and considerably
lessened the difficulties of communication.
After the German attack, the Division played a considerable part in the
clearing of the battlefield in this area. The dead lay so thick on the
country-side that drastic measures were necessary to deal with the
situation.
Accordingly a hundred men from a labour battalion were placed at the
disposal of Lieutenant Brown of the 8th Royal Scots, and formed into a
Divisional burial party.
This party was constantly working in heavily-shelled areas, as it had
become essential that the positions occupied by reserve and supporting
battalions should be cleared.
Altogether Lieutenant Brown and his men buried over 3000 dead between
9th April and 31st May, not, however, without having suffered some
casualties themselves.
When active operations were not in progress, the troops in rest were
well situated in Arras, and rather more comfortable than usual. A
certain number of shops existed, against the few remaining windows of
which the nose could be glued. There were almost sufficient estaminets
to cope with the demand for them. Numerous Divisional troupes were
performing in the vicinity, and a large number of bands were available.
There was therefore plenty of relaxation to be obtained close at hand.
In this sector the massed pipe band of the Division, consisting of over
a hundred pipers and ninety odd drummers, played on several occasions.
On one of these occasions a distinguished General came to hear the
massed bands, and at the conclusion of the performance horrified the
drum-major in charge of the parade by congratulating him on the "most
inspiring noise" produced by the pipers.
The "Balmorals" also gave many performances, often to distinguished
audiences, in a marquee behind Divisional headquarters at St Nicolas.
Frequent discussions arose as to whether the "Balmorals" gave a better
performance than their rivals from the 56th Division, the "Bow Bells."
There were, however, few persons who did not admit that our "Gertie" was
second to none.
In spite of Roeux and the chemical works, the Jocks carried away many
pleasant recollections of Arras.
On 31st May the 9th Division began to relieve the brigade in the line.
On 2nd June the relief was completed, and two days later the 51st began
its northward march to prepare for the third battle of Ypres.